THE INSTITUTION OF THE ‘TRIO PRESIDENCY’ – HUNGARY IN THE LIME-LIGHT

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FINAL THESIS

THE INSTITUTION OF THE ‘TRIO PRESIDENCY’ – HUNGARY IN THE LIME-LIGHT

Written by: Anett Galovicz, (student number: 1951386)

UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN/Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Faculty of Arts, Department of IRIO Master, International Relations and International Organization (2009/2010)

Thesis supervisor: dr. Nienke de Deugd

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, ABBREVIATIONS ...2

ABSTRACT ...3

INTRODUCTION...3

CHAPTER I. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND THE EU ...8

I.1. INTERGOVERNMENTALIST THEORIES ...8

I.1.1. CLASSICAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM...9

I.1.2. LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM...10

I.2. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM IN THE OPERATION OF THE EU...12

CHAPTER II. THE EU PRESIDENCY. ...17

II.1. THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY ...17

II.2 THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENCY...19

II.2.1. MAIN FUNCTIONS WITH SPECIAL REGARDS TO THE CFSP...22

II.2.2. CHANGES DUE TO THE TREATY OF LISBON...23

II.3. AN OVERVIEW OF PRESIDENCIES- ‘A SUCCESS OR A FAIL’ ...26

II.3.1. THE BEGINNING OF THE TEAM PRESIDENCY- THE CASE OF GERMANY ...27

II.3.2. FRENCH-CZECH-SWEDISH TRIO AND LESSONS FOR HUNGARY ...28

CHAPTER III. HUNGARY’S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE PRESIDENCY...37

III.1. THE FRAMEWORK- THE CURRENT SPANISH-BELGIAN-HUNGARIAN TRIO ...38

III.1.1. PRIORITIES FOR 18 MONTHS- COMMON INTERESTS ...39

III.2. NATIONAL PRIORITIES IN SIGHT...41

III.3. THE PREPARATION PROCESS AND THE HUNGARIAN PROGRAMME ...47

III.3.1. PREPARING FOR THE PRESIDENCY...47

III.3.2. PRESIDENTIAL PRIORITIES, THE HUNGARIAN PROGRAMME...49

CHAPTER IV. HUNGARY AS PRESIDENT. ...60

IV.1. DOMESTIC SUPPORT...62

IV.1.1. THE NEW GOVERNMENT...62

IV.1.2. PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND ...63

IV.1.3. COMMUNICATION...65

IV.2. INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS- BRUSSELS MEDIA ...67

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION ...70

APPENDIX ...76

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my thanks to my supervisor, dr. Nienke de Deugd who was responsible for helping me complete the writing of this thesis as well as the challenging research that lies behind it. She was always there to give advice, thus, I would like to thank her especially the help provided in connection with the formation of research questions and the construction of logical structure of my thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CGA Council of General Affairs

COREPER Permanent Representatives Committee

EaP Eastern Partnership

ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs (Council formation)

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

EDRS European Danube Region Strategy

EEC European Economic Community

EEEEEP Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership

ENP European Neighborhood Policy

EP European Parliament

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

EU European Union

GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council

HR High Representative

ICPDR International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River

JHA Justice and Home Affairs

LI Liberal Intergovernmentalism

LS Lisbon Strategy

PJCC Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters

PLS Post-Lisbon Strategy

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

SAA Stabilization and Association Agreements

TEC Treaty establishing the European Communities

TEU Treaty on European Union

ToL Treaty of Lisbon

UM Union for the Mediterranean

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ABSTRACT

The Council of the European Union (the Council or the Council of Ministers), established by the treaties of the 1950s, is the main decision-making authority of the European Union (EU).

Consisting of all the currently 27 member states, it is obviously the most dominant institution where intergovernmental principle prevails. Holding the position of the Council Presidency is highly desirable for each state, since through this function they can raise not only the international reputation and image of their country, but also have an opportunity to draw wider attention to their national interests and priorities. Finding the balance between European and national interests is one of the most challenging tasks of Presidencies in office. Since the 2004 accession, Hungary’s dream has not been realized hitherto, but now the time has come and the country can achieve full membership through its 2011’ Presidency which constitutes a part of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio of 2010-2011. The question is whether Hungary will be able to carry out a successful Presidency living up to European expectations while also realizing its national priorities.

INTRODUCTION

AREA OF RESEARCH, ACADEMIC MOTIVATION AND AIM OF THE THESIS

The Council of the European Union is regarded the most significant decision-making institution concerning the present structural arrangement of the European Union. It has an undoubtedly emblematic role in shaping European policies, with special regards to the external affairs of the community. The main arrangement responsible for the functioning of the Council is the rotating Presidency, which is called the ‘Trio’ Presidency since its introduction in 2006

¹

. Recently, its short history of operation has also coincided with several momentous changes within the EU such as the creation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Stockholm Programme or the Union for the Mediterranean (UM), as major examples.

Countries of Presidency are coming and going, but the essence of the Trio institution, namely the intention of ensuring continuity and cooperation by a common agenda remains

1http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-trio-concept-gains-weight-amid-czech-presidency-doubts/article-177347 (August 6, 2010)

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untouched, though, the functions have been recently modified

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. Acquiring the office is highly important and desirable from the prospects of single nation states since it is accompanied by special respect and influential role. The exact scope of my research exceeds the general examination of the rotating terms; it focuses on the Trios which determines the time period of scrutiny for 2006 onwards. Furthermore, the stress is based on a single Presidency that will soon acquire the office: Hungary, which will hold the position between 1

^st

January and 30

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June of 2011. Thus, the actuality establishes the relevance of my topic and on the one hand, also my motivation and interest in writing a thesis engaged in the Trio system and Hungary. The uniqueness of this turn is also ‘supported’ by the institutional development of the EU, the changes of the Presidency’s settlements generated by the Treaty of Lisbon. On the other hand, the system of ‘Team Presidency’ cannot be deemed an over-scrutinized field of EU affairs, albeit it is interesting to discover what different member states are able to carry out concerning both their national priorities and the more immense, common political issues which affect the whole Union. Through this institution even the smallest Member States can influence the progress of the integration and can achieve profound reputation for their country. Generally, the knowledge of EU citizens is undoubtedly insufficient in connection with the Presidency and with the greater functions of the EU on the whole. That justifies my inclination to perceive, it is definitely a challenging and worth topic to deal with and to provide a deeper insight into. Finally, my nationality provides the last key point and main answer for the motivation question. Being a Hungarian citizen with permanent residence in the country, it is definitely a priority issue for me to draw up the challenges and opportunities that the Presidency will bring for Hungary. It is of utmost importance to be able to carry out a successful office term and fulfill the high expectations both from inside and outside the country. Consequently, the aim of my thesis is to scrutinize the system of Trio Presidency and the opportunities it can give to a Member State.

More precisely, I would like to focus on Hungary’s 2011 activity and the chances hidden in this position. Elaborating it more exactly, my questions of research are shaped in the following way:

Primary Research Question: To what extent will Hungary be able to attain its goals along with the international expectations by fulfilling the EU Presidency of 2011? The main

question is to be supported by certain sub-questions that are the following, respectively to the

2 Due to the Treaty of Lisbon

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four major chapters: (1) What is the role of the intergovernmental mechanisms in the EU and

how can they contribute to a country’s ability to fulfill its goals?; (2) To what extent is the EU

Presidency influential and how could the previous Presidencies implement national priorities besides carrying out a successful Presidency?; (3) To what extent are national interests reflected in Hungary’s Programme and are there any ‘overlapping’ issues with the Trio

Programme?; (4) How can the success of the Hungarian Presidency be supported or

‘guaranteed’?

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The questions of research mentioned before clearly reflect the structure of the thesis,

which consists of four main chapters and a final conclusion. Each chapter signifies a step

towards the major question thus; they systematically build up the scrutiny and provide

opportunity to reach a complex picture. First of all, the theoretical background offers the basis of

the research while its institutional relations are also elaborated. That covers gaining a deep

insight into the intergovernmental approaches and their correlation with the institutional

functioning of the EU itself. After immersing in the theoretical basis, the second chapter

introduces the precise focus of the thesis, the institution of the Presidency and the major factors

that are cardinal in this study. Not just the system of the current Presidency, but its origins,

functions, exact role as well as previous, recent Presidencies- with success stories and failures-

are also presented here. The ability of tackling challenges arising and balancing between

domestic preferences and international interests all indicate the aspect how a good presidency

can be characterized. Examining this matter is definitely salient from Hungarian perspective, and

it also leads us to the next, third chapter, that is engaged in the discussion of the forthcoming

Hungarian Presidency. That part brings Hungary into the picture and by drawing the conclusions

from the previously mentioned chapter, its objective is to sketch the Hungarian domestic

interests and the possibility of their implementation. Naturally, first the Presidency shall be into

the framework of the Trio and their common programme; only after is it logical to scrutinize

Hungarian interests and their potential realization. Success can be ‘measured’ or predicted by

looking at the preparation process, as well, that is a notably long period and can determine future

possibilities of the six months. The fourth chapter is designed to focus on the guarantees of

success by giving an overview on the most crucial single factors such as communication, the role

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of the media and well-established, national consensus achieved by the new administration as well as the professional presidential staff. All of these are examined profoundly after which arriving at the last part of the study, the main research question seems likely to be answered and hopefully the reader will obtain a clear and complex insight into the topic. The final conclusion summarizes the essence of the scrutiny and recalls all sub-questions came up during the thesis, while providing additional remarks and possible ways of further engagement in this theme.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Examining the role of given Member States as ‘Presidents’ of the Council means to scrutinize the extent to which the intergovernmental principle influences the community. Thus, dealing with the intergovernmental forces of the EU, the theoretical background of my thesis may seem evident. However, elaborating this further, it is pivotal that my argumentation is mainly based on Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach which was most specifically reflected in his article ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach’

³

. From the prospect of this theory, it can be seen that states as rational actors are willing to maximize their gains as much as it is possible, and this is definitely true regarding the position of Presidency. States would like to combine the completion of their national priorities with common advantages. According to Moravcsik, it is indispensable to scrutinize the so-called ‘domestic preference formation’ in which the economic interests are outstanding. National priorities can be expressed through a set of intergovernmental mechanisms, at international level that depends on the domestic level, more precisely on the bargaining power of states. My research question also generates this kind of separation, as domestic and international aims have to be distinguished in order to answer to main question in connection with Hungary’s complex goals.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the course of my thesis, through five chapters and four sub-questions, I would like to offer a proper study about the under-scrutinized Trio Presidency and Hungary’s chance to assert

3 Andrew Moravcsik: Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.31, No.4, December 1993

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its own interests while providing satisfactory outcome for the whole community of Europe. I will dominantly draw on original, primary sources, including websites such as the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, the ‘EurActiv’

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or that of the Consilium

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, and studies released by the EU or related institutions. Nevertheless, my scope of attention should also touch upon the relevant regulations of the common law, the legislation in force that is spanned by the ‘EUR- Lex’

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, the access to European Union law. Furthermore, the circumstances formulated by the international economic trends are also momentous, most importantly the current situation of international economic and financial affairs, and its influence over Presidency operation, including the Hungarian Presidency’s position. The basic idea lying behind the scrutiny implies a gradually narrowing, specifying line of reasoning that commences with a general scope introduced in ‘Chapter I’. This section bases the theoretical ground of the research by elaborating liberal intergovernmentalism and discussing the appearance of intergovernmental mechanisms in the EU, namely the Council of the EU and the European Council. This part is necessitated by the aim to be able to situate the precise locus of the Presidency and to understand its most important operational accounts that are forwarded through the course of ‘Chapter II’ that concretizes the topic further. Concerning the evaluation of recent Trios, it is essential to provide a definition of success in order to examine the successful terms and the potential keys of positive outcomes. I would like to highlight general factors that characterize successful Presidencies that can serve as models for the forthcoming Hungarian term. The question of national interest and their feasibility along with the international expectations are dominating the whole research. ‘Chapter III’

specializes the scrutiny by problematizing the relation of national priorities vs. international interests, brings Hungary into the scope of inquiry and elaborates the milestones of Hungarian preparation. Furthermore, it introduces the country’s priorities that will be reflected in the work programme of the Presidency. The potential successes of them, as well as, the major goals are also discussed. ‘Chapter IV’ symbolizes a final narrowing of the research area and investigates the major guarantees of Hungarian success and that the potential of positive results for the community are dependent on several actors of the domestic and international society, as well.

4http://www.euractiv.com/

5http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?lang=en

6http://eur-lex.eu/en/index.htm/

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After all, the gradually specifying scope of attention facilitates to construct the answer of the main research question.

However, regarding the limits of content, it seems likely that my scrutiny cannot cover all fields of economic and other co-determinant conditions that may have an effect on the operation of a given Presidency, but by focusing on the previous turns and their results, I suppose that my study can offer a proper analysis of this section of the European Union’s work.

CHAPTER I. - INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND THE EU

This chapter is necessary to be able to introduce later the focus of the thesis and understand the functioning of the Council Presidency from the perspective of which, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is the most justified. During the initial chapter of theoretical analysis I would like to endeavor to discuss the role of intergovernmental mechanisms in the EU and

their contribution to a country’s ability to fulfill its goals. Facing the intertwined facts of the

question it would be essential to delineate the theoretical background picturing the methodology of EU’s influence on the national level.

I.1. INTERGOVERNMENTALIST THEORIES

At the heart of my research lies the conception of accentuated role of EU’s intergovernmental institutions, characteristics and operational mechanisms. The Council of the European Union and the institution of the Presidency constitute the forum and legal framework for the harmonization of diverging future objectives of Member States.

The EU bears on the one hand supranational and on the other hand intergovernmental characteristics. While the supranational principle is reflected in the first pillar of the EU, intergovernmentalism prevails in the second and third pillars. This means that while the Community is supranational in mainly economic respects, it is intergovernmental as regards the domains of foreign or military policy.

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The second and third pillars, namely the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) along with Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal

7http://www.carleton.ca/ces/EULearning/Introduction/int_orgn.htm (July 5, 2010)

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Matters (PJCC, the earlier Justice and Home Affairs

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) involve the cooperation of the governments of member states. Decision-making in these fields are determined by the 27 Member States’ interest harmonization process.

Hence, it is indispensable to examine intergovernmentalist theories in order to gain a deeper insight into the operation of such EU bodies and institutions as the Council of the European Union, and its Presidency. According to a plausible definition, intergovernmentalism can be regarded as “a theory of decision-making in international organizations, where power is possessed by the member states and decisions are made by unanimity.

⁹

” Though, unanimity can be definitely difficult to reach in certain delicate fields of integration. However, the Council’s decision-making is determined mainly by qualified majority voting (QMV) which means that each member state has a ‘weighted’ vote based on its size that is reflected in the relevant treaties

¹⁰

. This type of decision-making process was further extended by the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, hence new policy areas were included in this kind of voting.

Intergovernmentalist theories that aim to explain the intergovernmental cooperation within the integration can be divided into two major groups: classical and liberal intergovernmentalism, which are presented in the following points.

I.1.1 CLASSICAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

Stanley Hoffmann as a founder and leading theorist of intergovernmentalism observed a massive standstill in the integration process during the second half of 1960s. He pointed out the accentuated role of states’ own national preferences which drive the harmonization of diverging interests, that rests in the framework of intergovernmental bargaining meanwhile he also distinguished the scope of low and high politics. In the area of low politics (e.g. in the economic sphere) he could imagine a neo-functionalist spillover, since the maintenance of state sovereignty in such areas can be expensive, thus by surrendering it partly, the uncertainty of the international system may decrease. However, he claimed that integration would not be realized in the field of high politics, in questions touching upon the substance of nation state.

8Paul P. Craig, Gráinne De Búrca: EU law: text, cases, and materials. Fourth edition, Oxford, 2008

9http://www.spiritus-temporis.com/intergovernmentalism/ (July 5, 2010)

10Michelle Cini: European Union Politics. p 162

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Among the critics of Hoffman, it seems essential to highlight that his opposition reckoned that his theory could be merely used for the bargaining processes. He argued that the “scope for integration will be determined when member-state governments in pursuit of their national interests agree to negotiate compacts that advance the EC and its common policies and institutions.”

¹¹

Furthermore, with the start of the European Political Coordination from the 1970s, they found the spread of integration applicable to the high politics, as well. However, it is also important to see that the integration in tighter terms has still not extended for the most sensitive fields of politics, hence in these types of questions Member States allow only limited role for the non-governmental institutions.

I.1.2. LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was an answer for the limitations of neo-functionalist theory developed by Ernst Haas from 1955 on. Until the mid-1970s it signified a mainstream theory of European integration. Its core prediction was that European economic integration would be self-sustaining that idea was based on the so-called ‘spillover’ concept. This implied endogenous growth and development being generated by one initial step towards integration.

Development and cooperation were thought to be natural and self-supporting; straightly resulting from first measures. However, this theory proved to be unsatisfactory regarding its ability to explain integration, since it was negligent of member states’ preferences and considered progression automatic and incremental. Though, intergovernmental bargains are important and cannot be ignored, because they complete a solid base for the development process. Another critique that was heralded against the neo-functionalist theory was that it lacked a theoretical core which would have been needed to provide a “sound basis for precise empirical testing and improvement”

¹²

.

The most notable theory born out of the failures of neo-functionalism was the liberal intergovernmentalism which was most pervasively represented by Andrew Moravcsik, a former

11 Roy H. Ginsberg: Demystifying the European Union: the enduring logic of regional integration. ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC., 2007. p70

12 Andrew Moravcsik: Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.31, No.4, December 1993 p 476

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student of Hoffmann

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. However, the approach was first introduced by Robert Putnam, who has coined the term of ‘two-level games’. Domestic and international levels are the main considerations of Putnam’s scrutiny, which has later been completed by Moravcsik’s third level, namely, the supranational institutions. Yet, intergovernmental bargaining and two-level games could not explain day-to-day decision-making, neither the problem-solving nor the role of norms.

That justifies the necessity to examine Andrew Moravcsik’s LI-approach which supports my argumentation and conclusions. I aim to use his article

¹⁴

as it is the most solidly based regarding integration theories that can be competent with this topic.

It builds on the “earlier approach, ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence.

¹⁵

” Three essential elements characterize the theory: assumption of rational behavior of states, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. States’ governments are supposed to be rational whose acts are constrained on the one hand by domestic societal groups and on the other hand by the strategic environment of the international domain.

¹⁶

According to Morvacsik, liberal intergovernmentalism differs from supra-nationalism in the focus of stressing the importance of ‘domestic politics’ in influencing the changing preferences of states

¹⁷

. Thus, concerning the EU, the aims and influences of governments of member states are of utmost importance by characterizing the integrative process through their initiatives based on their negotiations and compromises

¹⁸

. The rational behavior of states provides a general framework of liberal intergovernmental analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are primarily determined by national preferences.

“The relative intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the

13 Sam-Sang Jo: European myths: resolving the crises in the European community/European Union. 2007, p16

16 Laura Cram: Policy-Making and the Integration Process - Implications for Integration Theory Paper prepared for the European Community Studies Association, Charleston, South Carolina May 1995

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opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments.”

¹⁹

A process of domestic preference formation signifies the potential advantages of policy coordination perceived by national governments (demand), while a process of interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political responses of the EC political system to pressures from those governments (supply)

²⁰

. The interaction of demand and supply, hence, of preference and strategic opportunities, forms the actual traits of states’ foreign policy behavior. Thus, LI is outstanding considering that it actually integrates within a single framework

²¹

two types of general international relations theory which are often seen as contradictory: a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation.

²²

Consequently, a parallel can be witnessed in relation with the operation of the Council Presidency, which is completely based on this unique framework. Domestic preferences are salient but it is perilous to completely subordinate the operation of Presidencies to these factors since that could jeopardize success. In a way, the institution of the Council represents the unity of single Member States with their own interests and the Presidency symbolizes the actor of furthering interstate compromises and determining European agenda while also paying attention to given domestic expectations. Deriving from the LI’s account, it can be also stated that within the integration, states most primarily base their actions in the hope of potential economic benefits. Besides the economic interests, according to Moravcsik, states are also driven towards cooperation by the potential growth of their governments’ domestic power, as they are responsible for implementation of certain international questions.

²³

21 See the Figure of the framework in the appendix

23 Szolcsányi Bálint: Változatok egy témára – Hoffmann, Moravcsik és a többszintű kormányzás az Európai integrációról, EU Working Papers 2/2007

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After having gained a general insight into the intergovernmental theoretical background, it is of great importance to see how these approaches are present in the current institutional operation of the European Union.

I.2. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM IN THE OPERATION OF THE EU I.2.1. THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Council of the European Union is the primary decision-making authority of the EU.

It is often called simply ‘Council’ or the ‘Council of Ministers’ which suggests in advance the intergovernmentalist nature of the institution. The Council can be also perceived as the interest assertion body of EU Member States, since it consists of the national delegates of members, more precisely and generally, the ministers of a given field who at the same time represent certain domestic preferences that are needed to be realized.

²⁴

Their points of view usually signify the interest of the whole nation that is discussed well in advance.

Although, in legal terms there is only one Council, there are several formations organized according to policy specialization: General Affairs and External Relations; Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN); Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy;

Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; Education, Youth, Culture.

²⁵

The Council is the institution where Member States carry out their particular national interests. Together with the Commission that operates for advancing integration interests, the Parliament representing the European electors, the Council completes the dynamic institutional balance of the Union.

Disposition over its functioning was first and foremost set out in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, more precisely in the ‘Part Five’ of the ‘Treaty establishing the European Economic Community’

(EEC)

²⁶

. The institutional arrangement of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) served as a pattern however, there was a shift towards the power of the Council, thus instead of supra-nationalism represented by the Commission, the intergovernmental approach swelled

24 Horváth Zoltán: Kézikönyv az Európai Unióról, hvgorac, Budapest, 2007. p 132

25 Michelle Cini: European Union Politics. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2007 p156

26http://www.ena.lu/ (July 21, 2010) The Treaties Establishing the European Communities

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out

²⁷

. Albeit, it is true that the Council cannot be regarded as a simple sum of its parts- the Member States, as it blurs intergovernmental and supranational traits and features. “National actors in the Council also act collectively, and many develop a shared sense of responsibility that the work of the Council should move forward and the legislative output of the Council should be a success.”

²⁸

Wallace

²⁹

has expressed the substance of the institution on one of the most plausible way: “The Council of the EU is both an institution with collective EU functions and the creature of member governments.

³⁰

”

The Presidency of the Council has originally played an important role in operating decision- making mechanism of the Council and in elaborating the compromises needed for decision- making, as well. Beyond that, it represented the EU towards third countries and organizations and was also in charge of taking measures in case of crises and catastrophes

³¹

. In the course of time, the Council has seen numerous changes, for instance in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that initiated its currently official title, the ‘Council of the European Union’.

Another example is the gradual decrease of its powers as certain legislative and budgetary ones

³²

have become shared with the European Parliament (EP). Concerning the limits of content, it would be impossible to pay attention to all specific operational element of the Council. Since the aim of this thesis is to focus on the Presidency of this institution, regarding the rules of operation, it seems enough to highlight that the decision-making process in the Council covers unanimity or qualified majority voting as relevant voting types.

I.2.2. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

For quite a long time, the European Council has not constituted the part of the Community’s institutional arrangement. It was established considerably late, only at the December 1974 Paris

28 Michelle Cini: European Union Politics. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2007. p 157

29 David Wallace

30 Michelle Cini: European Union Politics. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2007. p 157

31 Kormányzati, gazdasági és civil érdekérvényesítés az Európai Unióban. Szerk.: Bayer József, Kégler Ádám, MTAPTI, 2009

32http://www.ena.lu/ (July 21, 2010) Council of the European Union

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Summit on the initiative of Giscard d’Estaing, French President

³³

. The European Council was to generate new impetus for the European summits and was and is still responsible for deciding great, strategic questions and determining the general political directions for the EU

³⁴

. However, it is not competent to make legislation except the ‘principles’, general directions and common strategies. It rarely ever makes a decision on a specific proposal, nevertheless, the summits supply the EU with critical navigation and the usual output for a meeting is a communiqué exceeding 30 pages, which “summarizes positions on issues and sets priorities for future EU policy-making.”

³⁵

“The European Council was established as an authority responsible for both Community affairs and issues relating to European political cooperation in areas subject to the intergovernmental approach.

³⁶

” Since it is composed of the Heads of Government of the member states, the institution is definitely crucial from the point of this study. From its first formalized meeting of March 1975 in Dublin

³⁷

, it has had a vast number of summits, since the Council meets twice per six-month period and the course of meetings had started as early as the 1960s.

Since then the institution has seen certain modifications, from which the most essential ones are those created by the Treaty of Lisbon that will be further specified in a following section of the thesis.

SUB-CONCLUSION I.

In this chapter, intergovernmentalist theories revealed the importance of nation states and their domestic preferences regarding the operation of the EU. Intergovernmental bargaining, negotiations and compromises reached between the governments of Member States are crucial in the integration progress. The development and direction of the European integration are most dominantly influenced and led by the Heads of Governments of the 27 EU members which is mirrored in the operation of the Council, its Presidency and the European Council. In general,

33http://www.ena.lu/ (July 21, 2010) The European Council

35 Michelle Cini: European Union Politics. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, p 158

36http://www.ena.lu/ (July 21, 2010) The European Council

37http://aei.pitt.edu/1921/01/Dublin_march_1975_dossier.pdf (August 6, 2010)

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relying solely on one integration theory seems to be a faulty attitude, since none of the approaches could gain monopoly over the others, and all stress different aspects of integration.

Realism, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism are all equally important theories, albeit in this study the later is of definite significance which results from its scope and characteristics. Liberal intergovernmental theory’s main representative, Andrew Moravcsik summarized the substance of LI in the most adequate way. He stressed the “issue-specific functional national interests of member states and analyzed the interstate bargains they strike among themselves and the rational incentive to construct institutions to render enforcement and elaboration of those bargains credible”

³⁸

. The liberal theory’s account of his approach can be witnessed in his tendency to explain states’ behavior with reference to variation in the fundamental purposes (preferences) that states derive from their embeddedness in domestic and transnational civil society.

By developing further the model of two-level games, Moravcsik made an attempt to integrate the liberal theory of national preference formation and intergovernmental approach of intergovernmental strategic bargaining processes. In my opinion, it is crucial to highlight that different approaches can be connected to different type of international circumstances; theories such as the intergovernmtalism, multi-level governance and the liberal intergovernmentalism resulting from the ‘realist’ inspiration are usually dominant for the periods of economic regression when the search for national solutions are outstanding

³⁹

. That is also why this theory, the LI seems to be relevant for this study. Concerning the sub-question of this chapter: What is

the role of intergovernmental mechanisms in the EU and how can they contribute to a country’s ability to fulfill its goals?, the answer follows hereby. Intergovernmental mechanisms

are crucial in the operation of the EU, since they are presented at the most important decision- making institutions, the Council of the European Union, the current Presidency of it, and the European Council, as well. They embody the member states’ interests through the governments’

activities and are responsible for leading the EU in regards of political directions and common strategies needed. Furthermore, they contribute to the country’s realization of its goals. The Council of the European Union is the counter-pole of the Commission, since in the Council

38 Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.): Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: European Integration Theory, Oxford, 2009 p 76

39 Czékus Bálint: Nemzeti érdekérvényesítés az Európai Unióban. In: Külügyi Szemle, 2007/4.

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member states are able to carry out their own national interests. The same holds for the Presidency of the Council which embodies these privileges to a greater extent and will be later more profoundly discussed. Intergovernmental mechanisms are determinant in the operation of the EU and they are responsible for balancing the supra-nationalist elements. In the course of time, several modifications touched these institutions but their role seemed to be constant or even more crucial, if we take into consideration the widening and formalized functions of the European Council.

CHAPTER II.- THE EU PRESIDENCY

This chapter is engaged in the scrutiny of the Council’s presidential system, considering both its operational accounts and the office of certain Presidencies. “The office of the Council Presidency offers its holder a privileged opportunity to shape the EU policy agenda in accordance with national interests.

⁴⁰

” Thus, the question that I aim to answer is the following: To what extent is

the EU Presidency influential and how could the previous Presidencies implement national priorities besides carrying out a successful Presidency? The relevance of this section can be

explained by the need to gain knowledge on the special functioning of the Trio Presidency that is indispensable for the future scrutiny of the Hungarian Presidency and its chances.

II.1. THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY

As an initial step it would be necessary to be familiar with the institution of the Council Presidency. The institution of the rotating Presidency was introduced by the Treaties of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EURATOM in 1957

⁴¹

. In the Article 146 the EEC Treaty set the rules of Presidency by clearly stating that the period of the office lasts 6 months in a system of rotation according to the alphabetical order of Member States

⁴²

. This regulation was in effect through several years and was modified only in the 1990s.

40 Jonas Tallberg: The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency. In: Journal of European Public Policy 10:1 February 2003 p13

41http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/ (August 6, 2010)

42http://eur-lex.europa.eu/hu/treaties/dat/11957E/word/11957E.doc (July 12, 2010)

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In 1992, the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), concluded in Maastricht, gave more detailed description bolstered by new innovations. It has complemented the previous 146

^th

article by stating that the six months long Presidencies’ order is determined in such a way that for the first six year period, the line of member states is: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom, while for the next period: Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and finally Portugal

⁴³

. All these systems were considerably just, since no state could steadily exercise influence over the operation of the Council. The Treaty of Amsterdam urged the development of Presidency by certain modifications that amended the TEU, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) and related acts

⁴⁴

. The earlier 146

^th

Article was converted into the 203

^rd

Article of the Treaty which provided that the “office of President shall be held in turn by each Member State in the Council for a term of six months in the order decided by the Council acting unanimously.

⁴⁵

” The so-called ‘Troika’ was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam which consisted of the cooperation of the Presidency in office, the previous and the forthcoming Presidency. The system of Troika was even more just, as it had to involve a greater and a smaller Member State.

2004 was the next cornerstone in the history of Presidency, since new institutional arrangements were necessitated by the unprecedented number of acceding states. In 2006, the current system of Trio Presidency was initiated

⁴⁶

, which not only takes into consideration the geographic locations, sizes and economic power of states, but also concentrates on the balance of

‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States. The first country that could hold such a Presidency was Germany in 2007

⁴⁷

. Greater emphasis was put on the cooperation and assistance-giving within the presidential group, and the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio will aim to take full advantage of this possibility. Since 2007 the line of Trio Presidencies has shaped in the following way:

2007 1

^st

half- Germany, 2

^nd

half- Portugal, 2008 1

^st

half- Slovenia, 2

^nd

half- France, 2009 1

^st

half-

43http://eur-lex.europa.eu/hu/treaties/dat/11992M/word/11992M.doc (July 12, 2010)

44http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf (July 13, 2010)

45http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11997E203:EN:HTML (July 13, 2010)

46 Stratégiai Kutatások 2007-2008, Ágh Attila, Vértes András: A magyar EU-elnökségre való felkészülés gazdasági, társadalmi és politikai feltételrendszere

47 Kormányzati, gazdasági és civil érdekérvényesítés az Európai Unióban. Szerk.: Bayer József, Kégler Ádam, MTAPTI, 2009

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Czech Republic, 2

^nd

half-Sweden, 2010 1

^st

half- Spain, 2

^nd

half- Belgium.

⁴⁸

After having a look at the institutional roots, it is crucial to get engaged in the operational questions, the exact role of the Council Presidency.

II.2. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENCY

Regarding the past of the presidential institution, it can be seen that it used to have more administrative and protocol-type of duties, however, in the course of time as the number of Member States has grown and the integration has developed further, the presidential tasks widened and became more complex since the 1970s. At the same time, the responsibility of a given Member State holding the Presidency also increased. Consequently, we can assess that the 1960s and 1970s indicated a functional ‘take off’ of the institution, as well as the further enhancement of its intergovernmental attributes. “The shift in the balance of power between the Council and the Commission, sparked by events such as the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, the launch of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 or the creation of the European Council in 1974, contributed to both a quantitative increase in the powers of the Presidency and to reinforce its institutional design.

⁴⁹

” The monopoly of the Commission regarding the external representation of the EC also ended, and the roles of the Presidency saw a great increase.

Between the first and current Presidency of the Council more than fifty years have gone, in which period several alterations have been taken. As it has been mentioned, the Presidency has been transformed both in terms of qualitative and quantitative regards, meanwhile, the exponential increase of its functions was accompanied by institutional changes, as well. The presidential mandate no longer means a “role of administrative manager and spokesperson of state interests in the heart of the Community, but rather has become a complex role of drive, coordination, negotiation, mediation and representation both in the supranational and intergovernmental areas of the Union.

⁵⁰

”

Concerning the major roles of the Presidency, it is possible to define the aspects of being

48Kormányzati, gazdasági és civil érdekérvényesítés az Európai Unióban. Szerk.: Bayer József, Kégler Ádam, MTAPTI, 2009

49 Ana Mar Fernandez: Change and Stability of the EU Institutional System: the Communitarization of the Council Presidency.

In: European Integration, vol.30, No.5, 617-634, December 2008/

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the leader of the EU, a mediator, the external representative of the Union, administrative manager and furthermore, an agenda-setter

⁵¹

. Theorists have diverging points of view regarding which role is the most essential; hereby, I would like to highlight the most significant ones. First of all, it is commonly accepted that the Council Presidency possesses a so-called mediator role, which covers the tendency to achieve negotiations and compromises among the Member States with different domestic preferences

⁵²

. The country in office is supposed to be neutral and impartial during the six months of the Presidency that is the main expectation towards it. Thus, it should favour European interests. The concept of ‘neutral presidency’ means that member states should refrain from insisting heavily on national preferences. As Richard Whitman stated: “states which appear to engage in the ‘aberrant’ behavior of nakedly pursuing national foreign policy objectives ahead of those of the EU face heavy criticism and a difficult Presidency. Thus, paradoxically, the Presidency may not provide a good opportunity for advancing national foreign policy objectives.”

⁵³

According to another opinion the Presidency ought to be an “honest broker, a cobbler of agreement and an architect of coalition.’

⁵⁴

However, it is possible to achieve a healthy equilibrium that is most prominently exemplified by the period of the Swedish Presidency which will be further examined (point III.2.2.).

It is also a pivotal feature to enhance the agenda-shaping powers of the Presidency and hence, the influence of the office. It is doubtless that the most commonly known duty of the Presidency is the ‘leadership’ of the EU through the Council and chairing of meetings; however, the ability to bring issues on agenda are as cardinal as these roles. This power is though often under-scrutinized and underestimated, however, influencing EU policies contains not only setting new issues on the agenda but also focusing on questions already on the agenda (agenda structuring) or barring certain ones from it (agenda exclusion)

⁵⁵

. Though, it is often highlighted

51 Jonas Tallberg: The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency. In: Journal of European Public Policy 10:1 February 2003:1-19

52 Ole Elgström: European Union council presidencies: a comparative perspective.

54 Ole Elgström: European Union council presidencies: a comparative perspective. p 40

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that the Presidency cannot possess own agenda-shaping power, since the Commission enjoys a monopoly on policy initiation in the first pillar while in the second and third pillars it shares it with Member States. For others, the stress is on countries’ limited possibilities, as Presidencies inherit the agenda of their predecessors which certainly narrows the scope of their activity.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Member States have no choice to bring new issues into limelight. Hence, there still exist few opportunities for countries to advance their own priorities, which topic will be elaborated further in connection with the Hungarian chances.

The arguments listed previously fail to deal with the ‘negative’ factors, as the blocking powers or structuring of the agenda. These are all salient, because the influence of Presidency means also the ability to for instance de-emphasize or exclude certain projects from agenda.

Hence, it seems that the potentially most remarkable role or one of the most important roles of the EU Council Presidency is the privileged opportunity to shape EU policy agenda.

According to another article, three hypotheses can be seen concerning role conception.

The representatives of the first claim that “holding the Presidency means a great responsibility that does not, however, bring about any political power for the state concerned.

⁵⁶

” Personally, I would disagree with this line of reasoning; the counter-example is again Sweden. Not all the national interests have to be subordinated to the common interests of the EU. It is feasible to carefully harmonize and realize certain national priorities, as well. The second group argues that the Presidency is essentially an intergovernmental function and asserts that holding this office places a country in a privileged position that “allows them to guide the European agenda and to maximize their own interests.

⁵⁷

” I believe that the truth lies somewhere between these two arguments, so the third type of reasoning seems to be the most logical, which is represented by Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg who combined the communitarian and intergovernmental features. With this approach the main role of the Presidency can be summarized definitely: “The Presidency is a complex role in which responsibility and opportunity are present at the same time. As the prominent figure within the Council, and therefore as one of the main bridges between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the Union, the Presidency

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implies a balancing act between the individual interests of national governments and the general interests of the Community.

⁵⁸

”

II.2.1. MAIN FUNCTIONS WITH SPECIAL REGARDS TO THE CFSP

Concerning the main functions of the Presidency, it should be admitted that these duties have spectacularly changed over the course of time. As it has been already mentioned, the enlargements and the development of the integration induced widening, more complex circles of presidential functions. Now, the Presidency possesses mainly representative

⁵⁹

and managing tasks which are represented as follows. It is responsible for: convening meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER

⁶⁰

) and other committees and work teams, representing the Council in other institutions of the EU (Commission, EP) and the EU towards third countries and international organizations

⁶¹

, viz. in international relations or external affairs.

⁶²

However, even more functions used to describe its activities, as the competence of the Presidency spread over the right of convening the meetings of the Council of the European Union, the European Council, and those of their preparatory committees, and preparing the agendas, and acting as chairman of such meetings. Though, these tasks have been amended by the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. These changes of Council Presidency’s powers, as well as in the institution of European Council are further elaborated in the next point. I would also like to stress the external affairs of the EU which is reflected by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second pillar of the Community. It was established in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht and is one of the most ambivalent and problematic policies of the EU, since it was considerably hard to achieve. “The role of the Presidency in CFSP matters was bolstered in Article J.5. of the TEU that was to represent the EU in CFSP issues and to be responsible for

In: European Integration, vol.30, No.5, 617-634, December 2008

59 Emil Joseph Kirchner: Decision-making in the European Community: The Council Presidency and European Integration.

Manchester University Press, 1992.

60 The abbreviation comes from the French term ‘Comité des représentants permanents’

61 Alina Kaczorowska: European Union Law. 2008

62http://www.euractiv.hu/intezmenyek-jovo/linkdossziek/a-soros-elnokseg-intezmenye (June 30, 2010)

*revised by the Treaty of Lisbon

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implementing common measures”

⁶³

. Furthermore, according to the Article J.7.

⁶⁴

, the office had to consult and inform the EP in connection with the ‘main aspects and basic choices’ of the CFSP and to take into consideration its recommendations. This role of the Presidency is now combined with the competences of the permanent President of the European Council who is also responsible for external representation at his level without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative

⁶⁵

. In support of his/her new mission, the HR is now to be assisted by the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS)

⁶⁶

that consists of officials from the Council, Commission and diplomatic services of Member States and will seek to streamline the EU external services by combining all those being involved in foreign affairs.

⁶⁷

The CFSP is outstandingly remarkable regarding that it symbolizes intergovernmentalism, as most of its decisions are made in the Council where the ministers of Member States’ governments sit. That also justifies why this policy of the EU is crucial from the perspective of intergovernmental approach and presidential chances.

II.2.2. CHANGES DUE TO THE TREATY OF LISBON

Ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) has been one of the most difficult processes concerning the evolution of the European integration; however, in the end of 2009 it could finally enter into force. “On 1 December 2009 the European Community was replaced by the European Union which succeeds it and takes over all its rights and obligations. The Treaty on European Union keeps the same name and the Treaty establishing the European Community reappears as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”

⁶⁸

. The ToL introduced numerous modifications as regards the institutional arrangements, and the system of rotating Presidency, as well. Hereby, I would like to mention only those major concerns related directly

63 Clive Archer: The European Union. Routledge, 2008, p 111

64 Clive Archer: The European Union. Routledge, 2008, p 111

65 The post of High Representative was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam to assist policy preparation and implementation in this fieldhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=248&lang=EN (July 13, 2010)

66 (ToL, Article 13a paragraph 3)- Treaty of Lisbon

67 The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP. In: European Security Review, no.37, March 2008. p 2

68http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf (July 18, 2010)

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to the Council and the operation of its Presidency. According to the ‘European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council (2009/881/EU)’, ‘Article 1’

pronounced that “The Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall be held by pre-established groups of three Member States for a period of 18 months. The groups shall be made up on a basis of equal rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical balance within the Union.

⁶⁹

” Furthermore, in Article 2 disposed “each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all configurations of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration. The other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis of a common programme. Members of the team may decide alternative arrangements among themselves.”

⁷⁰

These regulations constitute the basis of current legislation in force, that of the Lisbon Treaty which first and foremost, institutionalized the European Council, the ‘head’ of the Union that became the real political leader of the integration. The Treaty created the post of the stable President of the European Council

⁷¹

(now: Herman van Rompuy) who is elected for a two and a half year period. His main tasks include to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council and to facilitate consensus

⁷²

. Concerning this position, it is indispensable to remark that the cooperation of the permanent President and the current Presidency gives the leading power of the EU.

⁷³

Another change is that under the Lisbon Treaty, the GAERC (General and External Affairs Council) has been divided into two separate bodies: the External Relations Council chaired by the new HR, or ‘foreign affairs chief’

⁷⁴

and the General Affairs Council which continues to be chaired by the rotating presidency-in-office

⁷⁵

. Furthermore, the Presidency is no longer responsible for convening the European Council and chairing its meetings, since the European Council’s President also took this position

⁷⁶

. By electing a

69http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:315:0050:0050:EN:PDF (August 6, 2010)

70http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:315:0050:0050:EN:PDF (August 6, 2010)

71Laurent Cohen-Tanugi: Beyond Lisbon: a European strategy for globalization. P.I.E. PETER LANG S.A., Brussels, 2008

73http://euvonal.hu/images/100122_kiadvany.pdf (June 30, 2010)

74Elizabeth E. Bomberg, John Peterson, Alexander C-G. Stubb: The European Union: how does it work? Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2008.

75 The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP. In: European Security Review, no.37, March 2008. p 2

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permanent President of the European Council, the most important factor of decision-making has dropped out of the hands of the Presidency, albeit it is still responsible for the operation of committees that demands great organization and preparation

⁷⁷

. In the ToL, the 27 Member States of the EU have disposed that they have changed the previous system of rotating Presidency into the new Trio Presidency which signifies 18 months of office length yet, it does not alter the Member States’ period of own Presidency, since they still hold the position for half a year.

However, the three, succeeding member states are expected to develop a common programme.

The aim of this change is to ensure the continuity of projects.

⁷⁸

. The Treaty amended the previous dispositions of the TEU, namely the Article 203 was repealed, in substance, by Article 16, paragraphs 2 and 9

⁷⁹

. The altering functions of the Council Presidency can be summarized clearly in a table, following hereby:

Table 1- Council functions

Functions before the Treaty of Lisbon Modifications due to the Lisbon Treaty (from 1^st December, 2009 onwards)

Convening the European Council and Council of the European Union meetings, and other meetings

The convening of the European Council was transferred to the competence of the European

Council’s permanent President Chairing the meetings of the European Council, the

Council of the EU, and those of other committees and work teams

The President of the European Council is responsible for chairing the European Council

meetings

Convening the COREPER No change

Sole representation of the EU in external affairs The President of the European Council and the new High Representative (The Foreign Minister of the

EU) complete the Council Presidency’s previous monopoly

Chairing the GAERC GAERC is divided into two Councils, the Presidency continues to chair the General Affairs Council, while that of the External Relations is the

responsibility of the HR

77 Kormányzati, gazdasági és civil érdekérvényeítés az Európai Unióban. Szerk.: Bayer József, Kégler Ádam, MTAPTI, 2009

78http://www.euractiv.hu/intezmenyek-jovo/linkdossziek/magyarorszag-eu-elnoksege-000086 (July 2, 2010)

79 Relating parts of the Lisbon Treaty in the appendix