The effect of redeeming sanctions on the relation between sanctions and
moral concerns
University of Groningen, Faculty of Management and Organization
ABSTRACT
Tax evasion, handing in material late in the library and driving fast on the highway are examples of undesirable behavior. Authorities formulate laws and rules to make clear what undesirable behavior is, and to discourage such behavior of citizens (Gilo & Guttel, 2009). Nevertheless, undesirable behavior still takes place and may even never disappear from of our lives. An often-proposed solution for reducing undesirable behavior is sanctioning undesirable behavior (Chen, Pillutla, & Yao, 2009). For instance, tax evasion can get you into jail and driving fast can get you a fine or you may lose your drivers‟ license.
However, there is literature demonstrating that sanctions may result in less cooperation, thus an increase of undesirable behavior (Gneezy, & Rustichini, 2000; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006a). While without a sanction, decisions may be mainly infused with ethical and moral considerations, adding a sanction may remove these moral considerations and may change it into a cost/benefit calculation. As a result, people then actually become more egocentric and less cooperative. The decision will be based on balancing incentives and disincentives and therefore will become more business oriented. This indicates that people become more aware of the costs and benefits of their decisions instead of ethical and moral oriented (Tenbrunsel, & Messick, 1999).
A nice illustration of this effect is the study of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). This study took place in an Israeli day-care in which there was the problem of parents that came too late picking up their children. Consequently, a fine was installed on picking up one‟s children more than ten minutes late. However, the result was an increase in parents picking up their children late rather than a decrease. One of the explanations that Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) gave for their results is the rationale of parents that they pay for the time they are late. In that reasoning, a sanction redeems the extra time that the caretakers of the day care have to work and therefore undermines moral concerns. Although this is a likely explanation for their findings, it has not directly been studied before if sanctions undermine moral norms and evoke a consideration between costs and benefits.
suggests, it has not been actually tested whether a sanction may undermine a moral norm. The current study aims to do so by means of studying the effect of sanction on self-conscious emotions guilt and shame. Furthermore, this research will also focus on the question when a sanction undermines moral norms and when they do not.
Self-conscious emotions
Shame, guilt and pride are self-conscious emotions that appear by self-reflection and self-evaluation. This self-evaluation may be implicit or explicit, consciously experienced or become known beyond one‟s awareness (Tangney, 2002). Shame and guilt, in particular, are often cited as “moral emotions‟‟ because of the presumed role they play in motivating people to avoid immoral and antisocial behavior (Tangney, 1995). Shame can be defined as the feeling when the failure to meet important standards, rules, and goals is seen as a reflection of some deep-rooted and enduring defect in the self-a flaw in character, a moral failing, an inferior ability in a highly valued domain, or just plain being the wrong kind of person. Shame involves a sense that the entire self is bad and that others are evaluating one negatively. We feel guilt when we focus on a specific behavior that violates one‟s standards, rules, and goals (SRG‟s), regretting the action or inaction and focusing on its consequences for the self or others. And we feel pride not just when any good thing happens, but specifically when our own positive attributes or actions meet or exceed our SRG‟s. In short, shame, guilt, and pride function as an emotional moral barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on one‟s social and moral acceptability.
respond appropriately when we do not (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). Before self-conscious emotions arise, it is important that it is clear to that specific person that a norm has been violated. People will experience these emotions only after a reflection and self-evaluation and when they become aware that they failed to stick to the norm and behaved immorally. If sanctions undermine moral concerns, they will cause people to feel less guilty after having shown the sanctioned behavior. If sanctions increase a moral norm, however, they will cause people to feel more guilty after having shown the sanctioned behavior. So, if one feels less guilty or ashamed after an act when a sanction was in place than when no sanction was in place, it means that the sanction has undermined moral concerns. Alternatively, if one feels more guilty or ashamed after an act when a sanction was in place than when no sanction was in place, it means that the sanction has increased moral concerns.
Redeemingness
material late. In the former case, the sanction is regarded as a mere fine as it redeems the consequences of handing in your book late as it may be perceived as a reimbursement for the administrative cost or for the extra borrow time with longer holding your books. In the latter case, the sanction is not regarded a financial compensation but instead regarded a punishment that discourages people to engage in specific behaviors. Redeemingness refers to how people see the sanction. If a sanction is seen as a means to pay for the undesirable behavior, the sanction no longer will function as a signal to indicate that the behavior is undesirable. This may be reason why there were more parents in the study of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) that picked up their children too late; they felt that they could pay for the extra time that their children were on the day care. Thus, only a redeeming sanction may undermine moral concerns and a non-redeeming sanction may not or even may increase moral concerns. Therefore, it is expected that, when a redeeming sanction is present, negative self-conscious emotions after non-compliance are lower than when a non-redeeming sanction is present.
measured after demonstrating undesirable behavior in either the presence of a redeeming or a non-redeeming sanction.
To study this, a field experiment was performed in a library in which there was a fine for returning books late. People who had returned their material late and people who had returned their material in time were reminded of the fine in three ways; not at all, as a redeeming fine or as a non-redeeming fine. Then their self-conscious emotions were measured. The following hypothesis are proposed:
Hypothesis 1:
When reminded of a redeeming sanction, people will find handing in material late less morally wrong than when they are reminded of a non-redeeming sanction then when they are not reminded of the sanction.
Hypothesis 2:
People who have handed in their material late feel more negative self-conscious emotions than people who have not. However, this is less strong the case when they are reminded of a redeeming sanction than when they are reminded of a non-redeeming sanction or when they are not reminded of the sanction.
Future behavioral intentions
people are concerned with their moral self, they have been shown to monitor how they feel about their moral behavior and engage in compensatory ethical behavior after having engaged in unethical behavior previously (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Thus, people who have just handed in material late may have stronger intentions to hand in their material in time next time than people who have just handed in their material on time. However, this process may be influenced by the presence of a sanction. When a financial sanction lowers negative self-conscious emotions (as is expected of a redeeming sanction) it may decrease people‟s intentions to compensate for their previous acts and thus result in more of what the sanction is for. Alternatively, when a financial sanction increases negative self-conscious emotions (as is expected of a non-redeeming sanction), it may increase people‟s intentions of compensating their previous acts. Therefore, it is expected that people who handed in material late will have stronger intentions of handing in their material on time next time than people who handed in their material on time. However, this is expected to be more strongly the case when they are confronted with a non-redeeming sanction than when they are confronted with a redeeming sanction.
Hypothesis 3: People who hand in their material late are more likely to hand in their material on time in the future compared to those who hand in their material in time. However, this effect will be stronger when people are reminded of a redeeming sanction than when they are reminded of a non-redeeming sanction or when they are not reminded of the sanction.
Design and participants
Participants were 263 visitors of the local public library (87 male, 176 female, Mage = 43 years, SDage = 16.10), who voluntarily filled out a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire of 10 minutes. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. A „no-sanction condition, the „redeeming-sanction condition‟ and a „non-redeeming-sanction condition‟. Previous borrow behavior (having handed in material late or not) was measured.
Procedure
Participants who had just borrowed material (books, dvd‟s and cd‟s) and were on their way out of the library were asked to fill out the questionnaire. As we strived to have an equal representation of the people who had handed in their material on time and people who had not, we gradually approached more people who had been to the pay automaton that was among other things, meant for paying fines and dvd or cd rental. People were asked to sit on a specific table in the library were they could take their time for the questionnaire. On the table there were candies that people could take and there were posters in the library that said people get a reading light after filling in the questionnaire.
handed in the questionnaire, people were thanked and given a reading light, as a thank-you present.
Independent measures
Fine manipulations In the „no-sanction condition‟ participants read: “This research is about handing in books late”. In the „redeeming-condition‟ they read: “This research is about handing in books late. As you probably know, there is a fine on handing in books late. This fine is meant for the financing of the extra borrow time. So, the library lets you pay for the extra time you borrow material”. In the “non-redeeming condition‟ they read: “This research is about handing in books late. As you probably know, there is a fine on handing in books late. This fine is meant to discourage you from borrowing books longer. So, the library lets you pay to prevent you from borrowing books longer”.
Previous Borrow Behavior Previous borrow behavior was measured by the question “Have you handed in material late today? There were two answering possibilities; yes or no.
Dependent measures
form a reliable scale (α = .35). Therefore, “proud” was removed, that increased the scale reliability (α = .75).
Moral norm. The personal norm of the participants was measured by thirteen items on a five point answering scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). The items started with “Handing in material late, is in my experience….” and finished with the thirteen statements like “all right”, “morally wrong” and “acceptable”. These thirteen statements together formed a reliable check of moral norm (α = .84).
Manipulation checks We checked the sanction manipulation by two separate statements: “I see the fine as a financial payment for the extra borrow time I use” and “I see the fine as a discouragement to hand in books late”. These could be answered on a five-point answering scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree).
RESULTS Manipulation Checks
was a main effect of condition on the extent participants saw the fine as a discouragement to hand in books late F (2,257) = 7.07, p=0.01). Participants in the non-redeeming sanction condition indicated more strongly that the fine was a way to discourage people to hand in their material late (M=4.20, SD=1.15), compared to the no-sanction condition (M=3.84, SD=0.13) and redeeming sanction (M=3.82, SD=0.13). The redeeming sanction condition differed significant with the no-sanction condition and the non-redeeming sanction condition (Tukey post-hoc, p < . 01).
Moral norm We hypothesized that participants in the redeeming condition regard handing in material late as less morally wrong compared to participants in the non-redeeming sanction or when the sanction is not mentioned (H2). A one way ANOVA for was performed to test whether the three conditions differed in the extent to which people felt that handing in books late was morally wrong. This was not the case. F (2,257) =.284, p = .75. The condition did not significantly differ from each other (Tukey post-hoc, p > . 05). Therefore, hypothesis 2 is not confirmed.
main effect for sanction (F=3.94, p=.02). A non-redeeming sanction had the effect that people felt more self-conscious emotions (M=1.94, SD=1.12), than a redeeming sanction (M=1.88, SD=.10) or no sanction (M=1.70, SD=.47). The conditions did not differ significanlyt from each other (Tukey post-hoc, p > . 05). This main effect was qualified by a marginal interaction (F 2, 257) = 2.70, p < .07. Means of this interaction are shown in Table 1. This table shows that people felt more negatively self-conscious when they had handed in material late than when they had handed in their material on time, but that this difference was stronger in the non-redeeming-sanction condition than in the redeeming sanction condition or no-sanction condition. This is in line with Hypothesis 1. To test whether the findings with regard to self-conscious emotions reflected an effect of negative emotions in general, we performed the same ANOVA with negative emotions as dependent variable. We only found a main effect on “Previous Borrow Behavior” F(1,257) =11.47, p < .01). When people handed in their material late, they felt more negative emotions (M=2.42, SD=.51) than people who handed in their material on time (M=2.2, SD=.47). No interaction was found. The condition did not did not significantly differ from each other (Tukey post-hoc, p > . 05).
on time (M=3.03, SD=.71) compared to people who hand in their material on time (M=2.57, SD =.81). This main effect was qualified by an interaction F(2, 257) = 4.34, p < .05. Means of this interaction are shown in Table 4. This table shows that participants who hand in their material late had stronger future intentions to hand in their material on time than people who hand in their material in time, this difference was stronger in the redeeming-sanction condition than in the non-redeeming sanction condition or no-sanction condition. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is confirmed.
DISCUSSION
how a sanction affect people‟s moral norm. Especially when the sanction was presented as non-redeeming one (namely as a discouragement), people experienced more self-conscious emotions after having showed a sanctioned behavior. When the sanction was presented as redeeming the act of handing in material late, increased self-conscious emotions and after handing in books late was less strong.
This research builds upon the results of Gneezy & Rustichini (2000). It shows that sanctions may indeed undermine moral norms, but only if they can be perceived as redeeming. Such a particular sanction can reframe the situation in financial terms. However, there are ways to decrease the risk of this happening. When a penalty is perceived as non-redeeming then it may actually foster moral norms. So, this research qualifies the research of Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) in the sense that it shows that financial sanctions not necessarily undermine moral norms. Instead, when they are presented as a non-redeeming discouragement, they are also able to strengthen them. As far as is known, this is the first study that did research to how the effects of sanctions are moderated.
The redeemingness of the sanction did not only affect guilt and shame, but also future behavioral intentions. People who handed in their material late had more future willingness to hand in their material on time than people who had not handed in their material on time, but this was especially the case when there was a non-redeeming sanction and not so much when there was a redeeming sanction. The fact that participants who had handed in their material late had stronger intention to hand in their material on time in the future than people who had handed in their material on time, corresponds with earlier research by Sachdeva et al. (2009) and Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). According to this research, people are trying to find a balance in moral behavior and immoral behavior. Their study shows that people who engage in immoral behavior cleanse themselves with good work. When people operate above or below a certain level of moral self-worth, they instinctively push back in the opposite direction to reach an internally regulated set point of goodness. The current research shows that this inclination to compensate one‟s immoral behavior with subsequent moral behavior, was also the case for people who had handed in material late, but that this inclination was decreased when there was a redeeming sanction. This is another indication that the redeeming sanction removed the moral aspects of the decision to hand in material late or not.
something like “We want to discourage you from bringing your material late, therefore we added a fine for each day you are late”. It might even be stronger if it is added that it is not a financial compensation. Another example can be used in a day care, “We do not want you to pick up children late, and therefore we added a fine for each quarter you pick up your child late”. Such a statement is more likely to influence moral norms than simply installing a sanction that may be interpreted as administration costs or paying for extra daycare time. Also, this research suggests that it may be effective to explicitly mention the non-redeemingess of the sanction. Organizations may explicitly say that sanctions are not meant as a financial compensation but as a discouragement to decrease the undesirable behavior. Or organizations should make their fines not so low, that a fine can be interpreted as a financial compensation. Perhaps higher fines make it more apparent that it is a fine for undesirable behavior (Mulder, Verboon & de Cremer, 2009). This study showed that strict sanctions evoke stronger moral judgments with regard to undesirable behavior and stronger social disapproval towards rule-breakers than mild sanctions.
and what it was for. This idea is difficult to change with a few sentences in a questionnaire. Future research could take this into account to do research in an organization starting with a fine, so people do not have an idea about the fine in advance.
Secondly, in advance we expected a different nature of this interaction. We expected that people with a redeeming sanction would have less self-conscious emotions compared to people who were not confronted with a sanction. Instead, we found that, compared to people who were not confronted with a sanction, people with a non-redeeming sanction had more self-conscious emotions. It could be the case that participants, in the condition in which the sanction was not mentioned, already saw the fine as a financial compensation for handing in material late. This could explain why we found that that people in the no-sanction condition and the redeeming sanction condition felt almost the same extent of shame and guilt and the effect we found was mainly due to the non-redeeming sanction increasing felt most shame and guilt. Indeed, this is in line with the results of the manipulation check that measured the extent to which participants saw the fine as a discouragement to hand in books late. This also showed no difference between the redeeming condition and the no-sanction condition. So, we need to be careful to draw conclusions about the exact shape of this interaction effect. The results may tempt us to conclude that the non-redeeming sanction, increases a moral norm but not that the redeeming sanction decreases a moral norm. However, the latter may still be the case in situations in which, before the sanction is installed, there is an existing moral norm with regard to behavior.
social desirable answers when they are asked about their opinions about specific behavior, like “In my opinion handing in material late is not good”. This may have invited participants to give social desirable answers. It may be that self-conscious emotions (guilt and shame) after crossing a standard are a better indication of whether people see it as a moral decision. This reasoning is supported by Tangey et al. (2007). Further research should consider this.
An implication of the current research that may be tested in further research is the effect of sanctions on moral norms and behavioral intentions in either a non-profit organization or a profit organization. Profit organizations are about making money and profit. It could be the case that, a fine in such an organization is more likely to be seen as a way to pay for the undesirable behavior than in a non-profit organization. So, a sanction is more likely to be regarded as redeeming in profit rather than non-profit organization. This would mean that one should be more careful with installing sanctions in profit organizations than in non-profit organizations. Future research could investigate this. To conclude
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Table 1
Negative self-conscious emotions as a function of sanction and previous borrow behavior
No Sanction Redeeming
Sanction
Non-Redeeming Sanction
Handing in material late 1.95 b (.93) 2.09b (1.12) 2.63 c (1.30) Handing in time 1.46 a (.78) 1.66 a (.74) 1.59 a (.79)
Note: Within rows and columns, cells that do not share a letter in the superscript differ significantly, pairwise comparisons, p < .05.
Table 2:
Future intentions to hand in material in time as a function of sanction and previous borrow behavior
No Sanction Redeeming
Sanction
Non-Redeeming Sanction
Handing in material late 3.07 bc (.77) 2.79 b (.66) 3.31 c (.59) Handing in time 2.44 a (.73) 2.69 ab (.71) 2.58 a (.92)
