Consistency and the unexpected
Noordewier, M.K.
Publication date: 2009
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Noordewier, M. K. (2009). Consistency and the unexpected. Ridderprint.
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Noordewier, M.K.
Publication date: 2009
Citation for published version (APA):
Noordewier, M. K. (2009). Consistency and the unexpected Ridderkerk: Ridderprint
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
1
In 2012, the Levelt Committee, formed to investigate the publications by mr. D.A. Stapel, has decided to label this publication as fraudulent as it does not meet the accepted requirements for scholarly quality which are also adhered to by Tilburg University. The publication is shown to enable social and scholarly meta-research.
M.K. Noordewier (2009), Consistency and the unexpected (dissertation)
Conclusion from the Levelt Committee:
Chapter 2, see article:
Noordewier, M.K., & Stapel, D.A. (2010). Affects of the unexpected: When inconsistency
feels good (or bad). Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 642-654.
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According to Mr. Stapel: fraudulent
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Fake data collection (school data), data supplied by Mr. Stapel
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Results extremely unlikely, e.g., too high effects, too clean data (no missings)
Chapter 3, see article:
Noordewier, M.K., & Stapel, D.A. (2011). Stereotype disconfirmation affect: When sweet
hooligans make you happy and honest salesmen make you sad. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, 33,
1-6.
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According to Mr. Stapel: fraudulent
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Fake data collection (school data), data supplied by Mr. Stapel
2
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According to Mr. Stapel: fraudulent
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Fake data collection (school data), data supplied by Mr. Stapel
Personality, taste, price, performance, appearance... People have a lot of expectancies about all kinds of future circumstances or events. But what happens when reality turns out to be different from what people thought it would be? How would people feel, for instance, when they heard a rumor that their new neighbor is rude and offensive, but upon meeting her discover she is in fact very polite, pleasant and nice? Or, how would people respond when the weatherman forecasted rain, but the moment they pull the curtains, they feel the sun shining on their face? This dissertation is on how people respond to the unexpected. It answers the question how people feel about things that they did not anticipate and how they subsequently judge these unexpected outcomes.
The background of the research described in the present dissertation lies in consistency theories. Based on this perspective, the answer to the question about feelings of the unexpected seems simple: We all have a strong need to understand, structure, and predict reality and as a result of this need for consistency it is unpleasant when reality does not match our expectancies. On the other hand, however, people like positive outcomes: They like friendly people, success, sunny weather, and pleasant tastes. Interestingly, there are numerous examples where reality is both unexpected and positive and the question is whether people feel good about this outcome because it is positive or whether they feel bad about this outcome because it is inconsistent. A first tentative answer to this question can be found in a classic and striking book on the consequences of people’s need for consistency in response to an outcome that is definitely more positive than expected…
When prophecy fails
Marion Keech who had received a message from an alien creature called Sananda, saying that at midnight on the 21st of December 1955 the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean would rise and as a consequence, the land on the Atlantic coast would flood, France would sink, Russia would be one big ocean and a huge wave would rage over the Rocky Mountains. All this, as the prophecy proclaimed, would happen because earthly creatures needed to be purified and a new order was about to rise. Stanley Schachter, a researcher working together with Festinger, infiltrated in the group to observe what would happen on the night of the prophecy would fail. The followers of Marion Keech believed that they were chosen to be rescued from this disaster. On the night of December 20th, a space ship would come to pick them up and bring them to a safer place. The followers of Marion Keech were normal and healthy citizens who had a place in society. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the savior, people had quit their jobs, sold their houses or were alienated from their relatives. On the night of the predicted flooding, they all gathered in the house of Marion Keech awaiting their rescue. However, midnight came and went without any sign of Sananda or a space ship, nor did the sea show any signs of flooding. How did the group respond? Were they happy with the positive outcome that the earth would not be washed away? Were they relieved that the horrible prophecy turned out to be false, and thousands of lives were saved? No. Instead of responding with happiness and relief, they were shocked and they felt terrible. They sat there, in the living room of Marion Keech, frozen in disbelief, upset and dazed, some of them were crying.
beliefs (and some of them kept receiving messages from other planets once in a while).
Why were these people initially not happy with the fact that the prophecy failed? Reality was without a doubt more positive than what was predicted (although some followers might have been excited about flying in a space ship). The story illustrates the strength of people’s need for consistency. People have beliefs, prophecies, anticipations and expectancies to predict a future state of affairs (Roese & Sherman, 2007). When reality turns out to be different, this means that the world is an unpredictable, unstructured and inconsistent place, and this is an unpleasant experience. Even when this unexpected reality is a world that is saved from destruction, people are initially shocked and confused.
The need for consistency is thus important in answering the question how people respond to the unexpected. Is this need for consistency so strong that unexpected outcomes are always unpleasant – even when they are positive? Would people always respond with negative affect to unexpected positive outcomes, like unexpected success, smiling faces, and kind others? Before I outline the specific predictions of the research in the present dissertation in more detail, it is important to discuss some relevant theoretical background.
Consistency theories
1968). That is, even though not all the examples described below directly apply to responses to the unexpected, they will highlight the strength of the need for consistency, which, as we will see in this dissertation, appears to be the basic and primary factor in responses to the unexpected.
Below I will start with describing one of the most influential theories of the past fifty years, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). This will be followed by a description of balance theory (Heider, 1958), self‐verification theory (Swann, 1983/1987) and a brief overview of other findings and perspectives that can be related to consistency strivings.
Cognitive dissonance theory
A year after the publication of When Prophecy Fails, Festinger published A theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957), which starts with the proposition that ‘if a person held two cognitions that were psychologically inconsistent, he or she would experience dissonance and would attempt to reduce dissonance much as one would attempt to reduce hunger, thirst, or any drive’ (see also Aronson, 1992). Thus, cognitions that are relevant to one another can be consonant or dissonant. Two cognitions are consonant if one follows from the other (“I want to be healthy and I eat a lot of fruit”), and they are dissonant if the opposite of one cognition follows from the other (“I want to be healthy and I smoke”). Dissonance is a state of tension that is psychologically uncomfortable (see also Elliot & Devine, 1994), which motivates people to reduce dissonance. The greater the magnitude of the dissonance, the greater the pressure to reduce dissonance. That is, the more discrepant two cognitions are, the greater the discomfort, and the more motivated people are to reduce it.
using numerous methods, all demonstrating that dissonance can have intriguing consequences and that people employ a variety of strategies to keep beliefs, values, outcomes, attitudes and behavior consistent with each other. Here are a few classics: Induced compliance. When people are induced to act in a way that is contrary to their attitudes, the dissonance between attitudes and behavior can motivate them to change their attitude in the direction of their behavior. In a classic study (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), participants were asked to tell a waiting participant that an extremely boring experiment was actually one of the most enjoyable experiences they had ever had in a research study (the study involved things like the endless turning of plugs and taking of several dozen spools of thread with one hand). Participants received either a large incentive ($20) or a small incentive ($1) to tell this lie. When given a large incentive, participants did not change their opinion about the experiment, whereas, when participants received a small incentive, participants changed their attitude in the direction of the lie. The explanation for this effect is that the large incentive works as a justification for the lie (‘I am a truthful person, but this is a good pay for a small lie’), whereas a small incentive does not work in this manner and the logical way to restore the inconsistency is then to construct beliefs that are consistent with their lie (‘I am a truthful person, this experiment was not so bad’).
Free choice. Third, the motivation to keep cognition and behavior consistent can result in (biased) feelings that a good choice has been made. For instance, when people make a (free) choice between two products that are equally desirable (e.g., a toaster or a coffeemaker), the moment they choose one option, they reject the other. The rejection of an attractive alternative creates dissonance (Brehm, 1956) and to reduce this, people typically concentrate on or downplay positive and negative aspects of the different alternatives in such a way that the chosen alternative is evaluated more positively, supporting the choice made (but see also Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). Due to similar reasoning, people who have placed a bet have greater confidence in the choice they made (e.g., that the horse they bet on is going to win) than people who are about to place a bet (Knox & Inkster, 1968).
Belief disconfirmation. Finally, and especially relevant in regard to the research in the present dissertation, belief disconfirmation can result in dissonance, which motivates people to find ways to reduce it. In a famous study, people were led to believe that they would fail or succeed on a task (guessing out which one of two people on a picture is more likely to be schizophrenic; Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962). After this expectancy was induced, participants received false feedback that they were very successful or not. The dissonance between expectancy and reality motivated participants to influence the results, such that, when given the opportunity, people who expected to fail changed correct answers to incorrect ones to achieve the failure they anticipated, whereas people who expected to succeed changed wrong answers to correct ones to achieve success. Thus, people who are confronted with an outcome that is inconsistent to their expectancy are motivated to change the outcome when possible.
they change their attitudes, shift their preferences, alter their beliefs or create the outcome they anticipated. With these strategies, people make reality consistent again and possible negative feelings are eliminated.
The when and why of dissonance. From the day that cognitive dissonance theory entered the field, the question why dissonance is unpleasant and under which exact conditions dissonance is experienced has been debated. As a result of this, several boundary conditions have been proposed and the theory went through quite a few revisions in the past fifty years (see for an overview, Cooper, 2007; Harmon‐ Jones & Mills, 1999). It has been proposed that in order to experience dissonance, the self needs to be involved (Aronson, 1968; 1992) and decision freedom needs to be high (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). Furthermore, the new look version of dissonance proposed that people need to feel personally responsible for producing foreseeable aversive consequences (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), which in turn has been challenged by findings by Harmon‐Jones and colleagues showing that aversive consequences (that people are personally responsible for) are not necessary for dissonance to occur (Harmon‐Jones, 2000; Harmon‐Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996). A recent view on dissonance proposes an action‐based model that addresses the motivation underlying dissonance effects (Harmon‐Jones, 1999), and this is especially relevant to our question how people feel when they are confronted with unexpected outcomes. Specifically, Harmon‐Jones (1999; 2000; see also Harmon‐Jones, Amodio, & Harmon‐Jones, in press) proposes that when a behavior, belief, attitude, or value is regarded as a meaningful truth, people are committed to it and they will experience dissonance when they encounter information that is inconsistent with it. This dissonance is there because the sense of being able to predict and control outcomes may be threatened and this might interfere with the requirement to act consistently and effectively. The action‐based model of dissonance thus broadens dissonance theory again, as it states that the mere discrepancy between cognitions can result in dissonance.
Balance theory
Balance theory (Heider, 1958) proposes that people try to maintain balance among their beliefs, cognitions, and ‘sentiments’ (see also Newcomb, 1968). According to Heider (1958, p. 176), “a balanced state is a situation in which perceived units (entities experienced as belonging together) and the experienced sentiments (attitudes, in the more common usage) co‐exist without stress; there is thus no pressure toward change, either in the cognitive organization or in the sentiment”. Heider furthermore stated that people will exert psychological energy to achieve or restore balance in relationships. A typical example is that if your two friends detest each other, you have an imbalanced set of relationships and you are motivated to restore the balance (for example by getting them to like each other or by ending one of your friendships).
Balance theory received support from findings that when people have an attitude toward one person (“Fritz is nice”) and then learn what this person thinks of a yet unfamiliar other (“Theodore is rude”), people usually form an attitude toward this unfamiliar person that results in a balanced triad (“I do not like Theodore” e.g., Aronson & Cope, 1968; see also Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005). In general, people are thus motivated to keep beliefs about themselves, another person and third person or object in harmony, that is, in positive relation with each other. A typical application of balance theory can be found in advertizing contexts, where oftentimes famous spokespersons are used to recommend certain products. If most people like the famous person, they will also like the product because disliking this product results in a state of imbalance. Thus, in this sense, consumers do not need to be convinced; they should just be confronted with a product in the hands of someone they like. Selfverification theory
and organize this quest for consistency. That is, Swann states that people want to confirm their self‐views not as an end in itself, but as a means of bolstering their perception that the world is predictable and controllable. Thus, self‐verification processes are driven by a desire for prediction and control and in an effort to exert control over their current situation, people rely heavily on their (chronic) self views (Swann, 1990).
Stable self‐conceptions give people confidence that they are able to navigate through daily life. For this reason, events that confirm people’s self‐conceptions boost their feelings of security, whereas events that disconfirm them produce a discomforting feeling that they may not know themselves after all (see Swann, 1990). Given that people want to be able to predict, control, and structure the world, the notion or possibility that they may be a different kind of person than they always thought they were creates a tension that does not feel good.
A consequence of self‐verification processes is that people prefer self‐ verifying interaction partners to self‐enhancing partners (Swann, Hixon, Stein‐ Seroussi & Gilbert, 1990; Swann & Pelham, 1988; 1990). That is, when people are given a choice between partners that provide favorable or unfavorable feedback, they choose the partner providing feedback that is consistent to the way they see themselves (thus, people who have negative self‐views prefer negative feedback over positive feedback). In line with this is the finding that a large majority of people with low self‐esteem prefers negative feedback to positive feedback (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996). In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the relation between self‐esteem and need for consistency is investigated in more detail.
And there is more
Preference for familiarity and fluency. First, people appear to have a preference for familiar and predictable phenomena. This manifests itself in a positive evaluation of stimuli that have been seen before (mere exposure; Zajonc, 1968). Related to this is processing fluency, which can be characterized as the first stage at which the cognitive system registers a confirmed or disconfirmed expectancy (see e.g., Roese & Sherman, 2007). That is, the experience of high fluency is caused by the smooth flow of incoming information that closely matches either expected or past information (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 2001), whereas the experience of dysfluency is the result of the detection of a mismatch. This is proposed to be a functional equivalent of an alarm system (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002).
Consistency in behavior. People are motivated to behave in a consistent way. For example, when people answer a question (e.g., “are you going to buy a computer in the next six months”) affirmatively, this increases the chance that people will behave consistent with the answer (mere measurement effect; Levav & Fitzsimons, 2006). Related to this is the fact that when people comply with a small request (e.g., display a three‐inch‐square sign bearing the words ‘be a safe driver’ on their window), they are more likely to subsequently comply with a bigger request (have a large billboard with the slogan “Drive Carefully” in their lawn for a week) compared to people who did not comply with the small request (foot‐in‐the‐door effect: Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Based on reasoning like “I am apparently a person who does this sort of things”, people thus behave in ways that are consistent with their previous behavior (see also Cialdini, 1984).
& Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 1983; Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999). Similarly, when confronted with stereotype‐incongruent information, people often reinterpret it as consistent. Thus, “strong” implies physical strength when it describes a construction worker, but mental strength when it applies to a professor (see e.g., Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987). Related to the strategies used to maintain expectancies and stereotypes, on a more general level, people preferentially search for evidence that is likely to confirm rather than disconfirm their hypotheses (Wason & Johnson‐Laird, 1972; Snyder & Swann, 1978), presumably because a positive or confirmatory instance of phenomena is experienced as particularly trustworthy, diagnostic, and easy to process (see e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987, see also Swann, 1990). The search for confirmation also results in the maintenance of one’s ideas and a view of reality that is consistent with prior beliefs.
Personality differences. Finally, there are personality differences in the need for consistency. That is, everybody has a need for consistency, but some seem to have this need more than others. People for instance differ in the extent to which they find predictability and structure important and have a chronic desire for consistent knowledge (e.g., Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). These differences are, for instance, expressed in making ‘to do lists’, being organized, and in planning things (high need for structure) versus tolerance to chaos, going to different places for the sake of variety and seeing what the day will bring (low need for structure). People with a high need for structure, as compared to people with a low need for structure, are more likely to assign value to consistency (more about this in Chapter 2 and the General Discussion).
Commonality in consistency theorizing
affective response to inconsistencies could be summarized by the statement of Harmon‐Jones, who noted that ‘when knowledge about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s action, beliefs, or attitudes is in a dissonant relation, the sense of being able to control and predict outcomes may be threatened, and ultimately, the need to act effectively would be undermined’ (Harmon‐Jones, 1999, p. 95). Based on the perspective that need for consistency is basic and strong, the research in this dissertation answers the question about how people feel in response to the unexpected. Do expected outcomes, as a consequence of the need for consistency, always feel better than unexpected outcomes, and what will happen when outcomes are unexpected but positive?
Consistency and the unexpected
Expectancies are an important tool in people’s need to be able to understand, structure, and predict the (social) world (see Abelson, et al., 1968; Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Harmon‐Jones & Mills, 1999). That is, expectancies are beliefs about a future state of affairs that enable people to anticipate what is coming and prepare them for effective living (Biernat, 2005; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996; Roese & Sherman, 2007). Based on the need for consistency perspective, the answer to how people respond to the unexpected seems relatively easy: When the world is expectancy‐congruent, people experience positive affect and feelings of comprehension and control. Conversely, when expectancies are disconfirmed and the world turns out to be incongruent to predictions, negative affect is often experienced (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). Of course, there are individual differences and situational exceptions, but for most people and in most situations, incongruency, inconsistency, disconfirmation, and dissonance are uncomfortable mental states that elicit negative affect.
negative expectancy also unpleasant? Does unexpected success feel bad? Are people upset when a product appears to be less expensive than what an advertisement said? And what about a skinhead that kindly helps an old lady crossing the street? As noted before, there are numerous examples where reality is both inconsistent and positive and the question is whether people feel good about this outcome because it is positive or whether they feel bad about this outcome because it is inconsistent. The research in the present dissertation offers an answer to this question by showing that people can respond to the consistency of the outcome (negative affect after inconsistency, positive affect after consistency – regardless of the outcome) or to the valence of the outcome (positive affect after positive outcomes, negative affect after negative outcomes – regardless of consistency).
With a variety of studies, we will specify when people respond to the consistency of an outcome and when to its valence. Specifically, we will argue and show that affective responses to disconfirmation of expectancies depend on whether people are mentally able and willing to abandon their expectancies and accept reality as it is rather than as they expected it would be. That is, based on the wealth of research showing that consistency is very important to people, one could argue that the need for consistency is relatively basic and, therefore, people’s primary and automatic reactions are likely to be driven by the congruency of the outcome (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999). People use expectancies to anticipate, predict, and prepare for the future and when reality appears to be different than expected, people will first experience the incongruency between expectancy and reality, before they look at reality as it is. Thus, in order to see the positivity of an outcome, people have to abandon their expectancy and shift their focus to the valence of the outcome (“Although this is not what I expected, I like it”). This shift is likely to take time, mental space, and motivation.
some people and in some situations consistency is of course more important than for other people and in other situations. In the chapters that follow, it will be specified for which people, situations and circumstances consistency is more and less important for people. When consistency is important for people, it is likely that the (in)congruency of an outcome will drive affective responses (e.g., expected failure feels good; unexpected success does not), whereas when consistency is valued less, it is likely that the valence of the outcome (and not its relation to expectancies) will drive affective responses (e.g., success feels good; failure does not).
Overview of the dissertation
The studies in the chapters that follow provide a systematic and extensive test of when and why disconfirmed expectancies elicit negative or positive affect. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I start with presenting an illustration of the manner in which incongruency‐to‐outcome responses unfold. Subsequently, I test whether different well‐known social psychological constructs (need for structure, regulatory focus, terror management, and cognitive load) are related to the value people assign to consistency. These constructs are then used to test the notion that people who assign value to consistency respond to the consistency of the outcome, regardless of the valence of these outcomes, whereas people who assign less value to consistency respond to the valence of the outcome, regardless of the consistency of these outcomes to expectancies. The predictions are tested in nine studies, using a variety of expectancies and outcomes, ranging from taste, person‐perception and object perception to self‐relevant performance.
stereotype is disconfirmed (e.g., a skinhead is good‐tempered), whereas people who are not cognitively busy feel better when a person has positive traits (e.g., a skinhead is good‐tempered) as compared to a person who has negative traits (i.e., a skinhead is aggressive), regardless of whether this person confirms their stereotype or not. In Chapter 4, the generalizability of the findings is extended by investigating the affective responses to unexpected windfall money. In two experiments, we disentangle primary and controlled responses to unexpected money and test the prediction that people initially feel bad when a product is cheaper than expected, or when they received more money than they anticipated.
In Chapter 5, the need for consistency is tested in regard to the self. We investigate responses to feedback that is consistent or inconsistent with the level of people’s self‐esteem. The aim of this chapter is to integrate our own view on people’s need for consistency with previous research from the area of self‐consistency. Specifically, we test the role of self‐activation in affective responses to success and failure of people with high and low self‐esteem.
In the final Chapter 6, the results of all the studies are summarized and further discussed. I will describe some implications of these findings, followed by more practical applications of the results. Finally, I will discuss some routes for future research.
One of the primary goals of people is to attain meaning and give structure to the ever‐changing environment. As a host of classic and modern consistency theories in social psychology have argued and shown, people have a strong need to be able to understand, structure, and predict the (social) world (see Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, & Tannenbaum, 1968; Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Harmon‐Jones & Mills, 1999). Expectancies are an important tool to achieve this goal. Expectancies can be defined as beliefs about a future state of affairs that enable people to anticipate what is coming and prepare them for effective living (Biernat, 2005; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996; Roese & Sherman, 2007). Without the help of expectancies, the world would be experienced as chaotic. Expectancies help to structure the world (“Leon is a friendly person”) and make it predictable (“Leon is unlikely to hit me”).
It feels pleasant and positive when expectancies are accurate. When the world is expectancy‐congruent, people experience positive affect and feelings of comprehension and control. Conversely, when expectancies are disconfirmed and the world turns out to be incongruent to predictions, negative affect is often experienced (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). Of course, there are individual differences (some people like structure more than others) and situational exceptions (think of sports and arts – excitement, creativity), but for most people and in most situations, incongruency, inconsistency, disconfirmation, and dissonance are uncomfortable mental states that elicit negative affect. At least, that is what consistency theories have been positing for the past fifty years (Aronson, 1968; Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Harmon‐Jones, 1999; Heider, 1958).
A paradox
consistency‐is‐good, inconsistency‐is‐bad reasoning: How would one feel when the world turns out to be inconsistent with predictions, but positive? The incongruency may feel uncomfortable, but the outcome may feel good. The question is thus, what will happen when a negative expectancy (“Elliot is unfriendly”) is disconfirmed in a positive way (“Elliot engages is several friendly acts”)? When will the (in)congruency drive the affective response (positive affect after congruency, negative affect after incongruency) and when will the valence of the outcome drive the affective response (positive affect after a positive outcome, negative affect after a negative outcome)? We argue that there is a simple solution for this paradox: The affective response to disconfirmation of expectancies depends on whether people are primarily focused on the expectancycongruency of the outcome or on the valence of the outcome. The affective responses of people who are congruency‐focused will be positive when outcomes are expectancy‐congruent and negative when they are expectancy‐incongruent –independent of the valence of the outcome. The affective responses of people who are outcome‐focused will be positive when outcomes are positive and negative when they are negative –independent of the expectancy‐ congruency of the outcome.
To illustrate, imagine you feel like eating a snack. You come home and on the table there is a plate with pieces of cheese. You like cheese very much and with the expectancy of the salty taste of cheese you take a piece and put it in your mouth. After a few chews you notice that it is not cheese you are chewing on, but something else. You do not immediately recognize what it is and the unexpected and unfamiliar substance in your mouth is probably an unpleasant experience (congruency‐focus). However, after a few moments you start realizing that instead of the salty taste of cheese, you are chewing on something that is sweet. You realize that the taste is nice and that instead of cheese you are eating marzipan that is shaped and colored to look like cheese. Although it is not what you thought is would be, the moment you realize what it is, you probably like the experience of eating it (outcome‐focus).
outcome‐ or congruency‐focused. But what then determines one’s focus? Following earlier consistency theorists (see Abelson et al., 1968; Festinger, 1957; but see also, Cooper, 2007; Harmon‐Jones & Mills, 1999; Swann, 1990; Tavris & Aronson, 2007), we argue that the need for consistency is fundamental and, thus, the expectancy‐ congruency focus is likely to be a relatively basic and primary response. People like the world to be predictable and controllable because this makes it easier to maneuver through. It is comforting to know that trees do not spontaneously change into porcupines and tables do not sometimes turn into casseroles. In fact, this need for consistency is the basis for all kinds of psychological phenomena. It is for the sake of consistency that people search for evidence that confirms rather than disconfirms their hypotheses, expectancies, stereotypes, or prejudices (e.g., Klein & Kunda, 1992; Snyder & Swann, 1978), that people especially like things they have seen twice instead of once (e.g., Zajonc, 1968), and that people are inclined to preserve and hold on to their self‐views, even when these views are not especially flattering (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962; Swann, 1983). People do not strive for consistency as an end in itself, but as a means of bolstering their perception that the world is predictable and controllable (see Cooper, 2007).
is important for people, it is likely that expectancy‐congruency will be their main focus and the (in)congruency of an outcome will drive affective responses (e.g., expected unkindness feels good; unexpected kindness does not). Conversely, when consistency is valued less, people are likely to be less congruency‐focused and more willing and able to become outcome‐focused, such that the valence of the outcome (and not its relation to expectancies) will drive affective responses (e.g., kindness feels good; unkindness does not).
In the present chapter, we test this main hypothesis concerning the need for consistency and the affective responses to disconfirmation of expectancies in five experiments and an illustrative study. In these five experiments, we use a variety of stimuli. Specifically, unexpected food (illustration), person perception (Experiment 2.1), visual (Experiment 2.3), and self‐relevant performance (Experiment 2.4 and 2.5) stimuli. Furthermore, we manipulate the value people assign to consistency in different ways. We do this not only to demonstrate the robustness of our theorizing, but also to attest to the theory‐overarching qualities of the consistency concept: That is, theorizing is used from divergent branches of social psychology. Specifically, we use measures and manipulations of Need for Structure (Experiment 2.1a), regulatory focus (Experiment 2.1b), mortality salience (Experiment 2.1c), and cognitive busyness (Experiment 2.1d, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5) to test the general hypothesis that whether one likes or dislikes positive/negative outcomes that are congruent/incongruent to one’s expectancies is a matter of whether one is outcome‐ focused or congruency‐focused –with the latter focus being the primary and more spontaneous one. We will furthermore offer an illustration of the manner in which incongruency‐to‐outcome responses unfold using filmed facial expressions to unexpected food.
is still unclear, however, whether dissonance always elicits negative affect, even when the dissonant outcome is positive. With the present studies, we aim to further our understanding of this issue and provide support for the hypothesis that a congruency‐focus is a primary, and an outcome‐focus is a secondary response.
From incongruency to outcome: An illustration
Before we turn to a discussion of our experiments, we first want to illustrate the manner in which incongruency‐to‐outcome responses unfold, using observation of how people react to unexpected (but nice) food. Similar to the example we described above, participants were asked to eat a piece of Gouda cheese. In reality, it was either cheese or marzipan that looked like cheese. We filmed participants’ facial responses to test our hypothesis that people who generally like marzipan but eat a piece expecting it is cheese, first respond with a negative facial expression (confusion, disgust), which in time turns to a positive facial expression. Thus, in this study we filmed participants (N = 58) who either ate a block of cheese or a block of marzipan that looked like cheese (see for pictures of the marzipan and an example a videotaped observation, www.stapel.socialpsychology.nl/cheese.html).
Procedure. Participants entered the lab, where they were seated behind a computer in an individual cubicle. Participants read on the screen that they were about to participate in three ostensibly unrelated studies.
who like cheese and marzipan) and to check for possible food allergies. Embedded in several filler questions (to avoid suspicion), we asked participants to indicate their preference for cheese and marzipan (from 1 = not at all nice to 7 = extremely nice) and whether they were allergic to any foods, including dairy products and nuts. When participants indicated that they were not allergic to any of these, the program continued to the final and last task, the “tasting” study.
Participants were told that they had to taste a piece of cheese after which they would be asked to give their opinion about this cheese. We told participants that they should take as much time as they needed to get a good sense of the taste of the cheese. For half of the participants, these instructions matched the outcome: They ate Gouda cheese. For the other half of the participants, these instructions mismatched the outcome: They ate marzipan that looked like Gouda cheese. We filmed participants’ facial responses while eating (with the webcam that was still running from the first part of the study). After participants tasted the cheese or marzipan, they were thanked and debriefed and we asked them for permission to use the films for analysis.
Coding of the facial expression. We edited the films in such a way that they all started from the moment that participants put the block in their mouth and stopped 20 seconds later. Two independent coders coded for each of the 20 seconds the content of the response (“What do you see?” choosing out of no response, disgust, confusion and, joyfulness) and the intensity of the response (“How intense is it?” from 1 = hardly visible, to 5 = extremely visible). The interrater agreement on content was 79% and disagreement was solved trough discussion. The intensity scores of the coders were averaged. For an illustration, see Figure 1.
Results
disgust, confusion and joyfulness (1 = present, 0 = absent). Subsequently, we multiplied these variables with the intensity score per second (which thus resulted in zero when the facial expression was absent and in the intensity score when the facial expression was present) and we averaged the disgust and confusion scores to create one negative category. Figure 1. Examples of facial expressions to unexpected marzipan (Left: negative response at second 4. Right: positive response at second 11).
any positive or negative facial expressions, whereas participants in the marzipan condition initially respond with a negative facial expression (congruency‐focus), which is then followed by a positive facial expression (outcome‐focus). Thus, these results nicely illustrate the logic of our general model: People do not like unexpected outcomes, even when they are pleasant. It takes time to appreciate the pleasantness of the unexpected. Figure 2. Mean intensity of positive and negative facial expressions as a function of food (expected cheese or unexpected marzipan).
Experiments 2.1a2.1d: Person Perception
In the first series of experiments, we set out to test our hypothesis using a general person perception paradigm. In all these studies, we induced a positive or negative expectancy about a target and then presented respondents with information that either confirmed or disconfirmed this expectancy. In each study, we use well‐known social psychological phenomena that have been shown to influence the need for consistency.
Experiment 2.1a: Personal Need for Structure
In this experiment, we test our main hypothesis using a chronic measure of one’s willingness and ability to abandon expectancies and focus on the outcome. People differ in the extent to which they find predictability and structure important and have a chronic desire for consistent knowledge (e.g., Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). In the present experiment, we tap these individual differences in the Personal Need for Structure (PNS, Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989) and hypothesize that people who have a high PNS are more likely to be congruency‐focused, such that expectancy‐congruent outcomes elicit positive affect and expectancy‐incongruent outcomes elicit negative affect. People who have a low PNS should be more focused on actual rather than expected reality, such that positive outcomes elicit positive affect and negative outcomes elicit negative affect, regardless of congruency.
Method
Participants were undergraduate students (N = 80, Mage = 19 years), who were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Expectancy: positive, negative) x 2 (Target: positive, negative) between‐subjects design, with Personal Need for Structure as a continuous moderator variable.
Procedure. Participants received a set of two seemingly unrelated studies. After an instruction, participants filled out the Personal Need for Structure scale (Thompson et al., 1989; α = .80). After this, the second study followed, which was framed as a person perception study. In the instructions, we induced the expectancy: We told participants in the positive expectancy condition that they were going to read about a kind man, named Paul. In the negative expectancy condition, we told participants that Paul was unkind. Subsequently, participants read a scenario that was congruent or incongruent to their expectancy, about kind or unkind Paul.2 After reading the scenario, participants were asked to rate their current feelings on a 9‐
2 We pretested the two scenarios (“What is your impression of Paul”, from 1 = not at all kind, to 9 =
extremely kind), which showed that the kind scenario of Paul was judged extremely kind (M = 8.2) and the
point rating scale (“Right now, how do you feel?” from 1 = not at all, to 9 = extremely), using a mood questionnaire developed by Förster and colleagues (Förster, Higgins, & Werth, 2004; happy, content, discouraged, disappointed, calm, relaxed, tense, worried; α = .94). Finally, participants were asked to judge Paul on a 9‐point rating scale (“What is your impression of Paul?”, from 1 = not at all kind, to 9 = extremely kind).
Results
We computed the mean of the items measuring Personal Need for Structure and standardized this measure so that M = 0 and SD = 1. We performed a regression analysis with Personal Need for Structure, expectancy, target and the interactions between these variables on affect. The analysis revealed the predicted three‐way interaction between expectancy, target and Personal Need for Structure on affect, B = 2.31, t(72) = 5.48, p < .001. Following Aiken and West (1991), we selected data points for estimating regression lines at one standard deviation above the mean (labeled high need for structure) and at one standard deviation below the mean (labeled low need for structure). Table 2.1a depicts means of affect as a function of expectancy, target and label for high need for structure (+1 SD) and low need for structure (‐1 SD).
High need for Structure Low Need for
Structure Outcome Positive Negative Positive Negative Expectancy Positive 7.42 6.35 8.09 6.37
Negative 5.72 8.37 8.65 6.21
Table 2.1a. Mean affective response as a function of expectancy, target and Personal Need for Structure (Experiment 2.1a). Note: higher values indicate a more positive affective response.
Further analyses indicated that, as expected, people with a high need for structure responded more positively to congruency than to incongruency, regardless of the outcome (Mpositive expectancy, positive target = 7.42, Mpositive expectancy, negative target = 6.35,
F(1,72) = 9.93, p < .01, η2 = .06. Mnegative expectancy, negative target = 8.37, Mnegative expectancy, positive target = 5.72, F(1,72) = 40.12, p < .001, η2 = .25). People with a low need for structure responded more positively to positive outcomes than to negative outcome, regardless of congruency (Mpositive expectancy, positive target = 8.09, Mpositive expectancy, negative target = 6.37, F(1,72) = 16.61, p < .001, η2 = .10. Mnegative expectancy, positive target = 8.65, Mnegative expectancy, negative target = 6.21, F(1,72) = 30.20, p < .001, η2 = .18).
In sum, the affective responses of people with a high need for structure were more positive after congruent than after incongruent outcomes, whereas the affective responses of people with a low need for structure were more positive after positive than after negative outcomes.
The judgment results of this and the following person perception studies will be discussed in the discussion at the end of this section.
Experiment 2.1b: Regulatory focus
logic. In Experiment 2.1b we thus manipulate regulatory focus and hypothesize that people with a prevention focus are more likely to be congruency‐focused, such that expectancy‐congruent outcomes elicit positive affect and expectancy‐incongruent outcomes elicit negative affect. People with a promotion focus, however, should be more likely to have an outcome‐focus, such that positive outcomes elicit positive affect and negative outcomes elicit negative affect, regardless of congruency.
Method
Participants were undergraduate students (N = 91, Mage = 19 years) who were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions of a 2 (Expectancy: positive, negative) x 2 (Target: positive, negative) x 2 (Regulatory focus: promotion, prevention) between‐subjects design.
Lockwood and colleagues (2002), on a 7‐point rating scale (“I am more concerned with reaching success than preventing failure”, from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree), which served as a manipulation check.
Results
An ANOVA with regulatory focus on the manipulation check item showed that the regulatory focus manipulation was successful (Mprevention = 5.04, Mpromotion = 5.78), F(1,83) = 13.47, p < .001.
We conducted a 2 (Expectancy) x 2 (Target) x 2 (Regulatory focus) ANOVA on the affect scores, which showed the expected three‐way interaction between expectancy, target and regulatory focus F(1,83) = 12.08, p < .01, η2 = .11. We also found a main effect of target, F(1,83) = 9.74, p < .01, η2 = .09, a two‐way interaction between expectancy and target, F(1,83) = 4.85, p < .05, η2 = .04, and a marginally significant two‐way interaction between target and regulatory focus F(1,83) = 2.74, p = .10, η2 = .02 (Other effects, Fs < 1.00). To interpret the three‐way interaction between expectancy, target and regulatory focus on affect, we first looked at the prevention‐focus conditions and then at the promotion‐focus conditions (see Table 2.1b).
Prevention Focus Promotion Focus
Outcome Positive Negative Positive Negative Expectancy Positive 7.43 6.00 7.03 6.33
Negative 6.30 7.14 7.25 6.04
Table 2.1b. Mean affective response as a function of expectancy, target and regulatory focus (Experiment 2.1b). Note: higher values indicate a more positive affective response.
In the prevention focus conditions, we found the predicted interaction effect between expectancy and target, F(1,83) = 14.64, p < .001, η2 = .14. When expectancy and target were congruent, the affective response was more positive than when expectancy and target were incongruent, regardless of the outcome (Mpositive expectancy, positive target = 7.43, Mpositive expectancy, negative target = 6.00, F(1,83) = 12.95, p < .01, η2 = .11.
Mnegative expectancy, positive target = 6.30, Mnegative expectancy, negative target = 7.14, F(1,83) = 4.31, p < .05, η2 = .04).
In the promotion focus conditions, we found the predicted main effect of target, F(1,83) = 9.96, p < .01, η2 = .10. The affective response was more positive when the target was positive, regardless of congruency. (Mpositive expectancy, positive target = 7.03, Mpositive expectancy, negative target = 6.33, F(1,83) = 3.23, p = .08, η2 = .03, and Mnegative expectancy, positive target = 7.25, Mnegative expectancy, negative target = 6.04, F (1,83) = 8.82, p < .01, η2 = .08).
Thus, these results show that, as expected, the affective responses of people with a prevention focus were more positive after congruent than after incongruent outcomes, whereas the affective responses of people with a promotion focus were more positive after positive than after negative outcomes.
Experiment 2.1c: Terror Management
that expectancy‐congruent outcomes elicit positive affect and expectancy‐ incongruent outcomes elicit negative affect. When mortality is not salient, however, people should be outcome‐focused, such that positive outcomes elicit positive and negative outcomes elicit negative affect, regardless of congruency.
Method
To increase the generalizability of our findings, we used a somewhat different method from the one used in Experiments 2.1a and 2.1b. First, we constructed a different affect measure, which was an adaptation of the dissonance as psychological discomfort measure of Elliot and Devine (1994; happy, energetic, uncomfortable, uneasy, calm, optimistic, annoyed, dejected, α = .91). Second, we used a different scenario, which described a woman named Maria as either an intelligent woman (positive target) or as an unintelligent woman (negative target). Participants were undergraduate students (N = 101, Mage = 19 years) who were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Expectancy: positive, negative) x 2 (Target: positive, negative) x 2 (Mortality salience: yes, no) between‐subjects design.
