A Never-ending Story? Military Interventions in
the Sierra Leone Civil war
Maud Hartstra 10267190 Supervisor: dr. A. A. Steele
Second reader: dr. J. M. J. Doomernik June 2017
Abstract
Military interventions in civil wars are a recurring and debatable phenomenon. This research provided insight in the relation between military interventions and the duration of a civil war. The Sierra Leone civil war formed the context in which three cases, three government-biased military interventions, were studied. The military capacity and the strategy of the protagonists determine whether a civil war the civil war continues and thus prolongs. The military interventions influenced mainly the military capacity and strategy of the government. The RUF chose to continue fighting until it was made impossible to regain military strength. Certain structural factors present in Sierra Leone, and characteristics of the protagonists formed the conditions in which the hypothesis can be affirmed. Government-biased military interventions prolong a civil war when the state is weak and the rebels continue to have access to natural resources.
Abbreviations
GoSL: Government of Sierra Leone
RUF: Revolutionary United Front APC: All Peoples Congres SLA: Sierra Leone Army
CDF: Civil Defense Forces
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EO: Executive Outcomes
NPFL: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC: National Provisional Ruling Council SLPP: Sierra Leone People’s Party
UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNOMSIL : UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
Table of Contents
Abstract ... 2
Abbreviations ... 3
1. Introduction ... 5
2. Theoretical Framework ... 7
2.1 Interventions in civil wars………...7
2.2 Literature Review ... 8
3. Research Design ... 15
3.1 Methodological Approach ... 15
3.2 Case Selection………16
3.3 Sources and Data Selection………...17
3.4 Operationalization of the Variables………...18
3.4.1 Duration of civil war ... 18
3.4.2 Government-biased military intervention ... 19
3.4.3 Alternative key variables: Natural resources ... 20
4. The Sierra Leone Civil War ... 21
4.1 A weak state……….……….……….21
4.2 Main actors ... 21
4.3 Overview………22
5. Case studies and analysis ... 25
5.1 Military intervention Executive Outcomes ... 25
5.3 Military intervention ECOMOG ... 32
5.3 Military intervention United Kingdom ... 41
5.4 Cases compared ... 45
6. Conclusion & Discussion ... 47
6.1 Main findings ... 47
6.2 Implications and future research ... 48
Bibliography ... 50
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have become the dominant and most deadly form of armed conflict in the world (Walter, 2015). Foreign actors repeatedly intervene in these civil wars. Through diplomatic, economic or military means these actors seek to influence the civil war process and in general aim to reduce a conflict’s duration and intensity (Rosenau, 1969). Military interventions are in that sense a controversial concept as it is characterized by fighting violence with violence. Consequently, the effects of military interventions on the civil war process have been subject in public and policy debate.
While it is expected that third parties military intervene to stop the fighting, multiple empirical studies have found the contrary: military interventions increase the duration of civil wars (Fearon, 2001; Regan, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2001; Balch-Lindsey & Enterline, 2000). While these results are disturbing, they do not unravel whether actors simply choose to intervene in the longer running conflicts, or whether interventions extend the duration of civil wars. This case study aims to reveal this by addressing the following problem statement: How do military interventions influence the duration of civil wars?
This research question will be answered by analyzing and comparing the behavior and military capacity of the warring parties affected by the intervention. As civil wars impose a destructive toll on societies, it is essential to understand what induces and enables protagonists to make certain choices that lead to the continued fighting. Military interventions may change the available choices and consequently influence the duration of civil war. As an illustration, a basic element of the current US strategy in Syria is to arm the rebels aiming to pressure the government to take a seat at the negotiation table (Humud & Nikitin, 2016). When policymakers understand how actors change their strategy as a reaction to the military intervention, they can make better-informed decisions to adapt their intervention strategy or maybe even refrain from intervening. The current literature concerning the influence of military intervention on duration of civil war does this from a premise that military asymmetry is inherent in internal conflict; usually, the rebels are perceived as the weaker party which receives the military assistance. For instance, Elwadawi and Sambanis (2000) found that the direct effect of external intervention in favor of the rebels is rebel’s military capacity. Therefore, it is expected to lead to a longer duration of conflict, as it will take more time for the government to defeat the rebel group. However, little research has been done about the effect of military intervention on the side of the government in a so-called ‘weak state’. This research attempts to contribution to the existing literature by focusing on that specific category, exemplified by the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991 – 2002). The weakness of the Sierra Leonean state was among others reflected in the inability of the state to project official authority, the manipulation of political institutions for personal gain, and the exploitation of diamond resources that increased inequality in socio-economic conditions (Conteh-Morgan, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014).
This state weakness provided the framework of one of the longest-running civil wars since 1945, resulting in more than 20,000 deaths (CIA World Fact Book, 2017). The Sierra Leone civil war was among others known for extensive involvement of foreign actors; in particular, military interventions in support of the government.
By doing an in-depth case study of three of the government-biased military interventions that took place in the Sierra Leone civil war, this research examines the relation between interventions and the strategies and military capacities of the warring parties, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United front. The essential aim of this study is to improve our understanding of the influence of military interventions on the duration of civil wars.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In chapter two, the theoretical framework that forms the basis of this research will be outlined. Further, the hypothesis and causal mechanisms will be explained. The third chapter contains the methodology that provides the framework for testing the hypothesis. In chapter four, an introduction of the Sierra Leone civil war and relevant information concerning the two main actors, the government and the RUF, will be given. The fifth chapter consists of the in-depth study and analysis of the three cases and provides the foundation on which conclusions are drawn. In chapter six, an answer to the research question will be formulated. Furthermore, the limitations of this study and suggestions for further research will be provided.
2. Theoretical Framework
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that forms the basis of this research. The first section defines the general concepts, followed by a section that will discuss the existing literature and narrow down the debate regarding military interventions and the duration of civil wars. The theory that leads to my hypothesis and the causal mechanisms that I expect to be present are explained in the second section.
2.1 Interventions in civil wars
It is widely recognized that after World War II civil wars have increased in frequency and have become one of the most recurrent forms of conflicts (Walter, 2015). Kalyvas (2006) defines civil war as “armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities”(p.17). Further, the military conflict requires at least two competing sides, including a large rebel organization with military equipment and full-time recruits (Kalyvas, 2006).
With civil wars recurring more frequently, empirical and theoretical research on civil wars increased accordingly. In addition, there is increasing recognition that active involvement of foreign actors is central to the civil war process. These interventions may take various forms and can be executed by various actors. As studied by Regan (2002), a majority of civil wars experiences interventions from third parties. Out of 150 civil wars between 1944 and 1999, 97 experienced intervention by foreign states or international organizations. Research about the civil war process can roughly be divided in explaining the civil war onset, in outcome and duration. I will focus on the latter.
To analyze this phenomenon, it is essential to develop a comprehensible and operational definition of external third-party intervention following several criteria. Rosenau (1969) argues that the definition of a third-party intervention should include the following two criteria; (1) convention breaking and (2) targeting the authority structures of the government. The first criterion is important while it distinguishes intervention from influence. Influence from one country in another is conventional in international relations where intervention is a restricted and temporary phenomenon and therefore easier to operationalize. The second criterion focuses on how the intervener can change the authority structures of the state. Interventions can take place either to support the government, government-biased interventions, or to support the rebel organization, rebel-biased interventions, or be neutral, aiming to impartially resolve the conflict; called neutral interventions (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). The last type of interventions do not explicitly support one side but have the purpose to impartially resolve the conflict, to prevent further violence and/or assist the parties to negotiate a formal end to their conflict. By supporting the government, interveners tend to reinforce the existing authority structures; while by supporting the rebel-side the intervener can change these
structures (Regan, 2002). Third parties often decide to intervene to influence the outcome (Rosenau, 1969). Biased-intervention, an intervention in assistance of either the government or the rebels, entails that the intervener supports the actions of the preferred side and in turn legitimizes the stance that side is taking.
Different actors can carry out an intervention; these can be state or non-state actor, military companies, coalitions or multilateral organizations. An important characteristic of an external intervention is that the intervening actor is foreign to the conflict country. These actors can use military, economic and/or diplomatic means to affect the conditions of the conflict (Regan, 2000). While I am aware that economic interventions, like economic assistance, can influence the course of a civil war in multiple ways, I choose to focus solely on military interventions. Economic interventions are difficult to distinguish from another form of economic impact, therefore problematic to meet the first criterion of Rosenau’s definition, convention breaking, and consequently difficult to analyze (Regan, 1996). This argument also applies to diplomatic interventions. Military interventions are probably the most visible form of intervention and therefore can be measured more accurately, which makes the results more reliable. Military interventions can refer to the deployment of military troops, the provision of supplies, and military assistance in the form of weapons or logistics, military training, air support to safe havens, intelligence or other military aid.
2.2 Literature Review
In order to understand the effect of interventions on the duration of civil wars, it is important to understand the ideas in the existing literature on the duration of civil wars and the perspectives on the nexus between the outcome and duration of civil war. Afterwards, I will theorize general factors that influence this duration, followed by the influence of the interventions on these factors. From a theoretical perspective, civil wars have, in general various outcomes; (1) government victory (2) rebel victory or (3) negotiated settlement (Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999). These possible outcomes are mutually exclusive and compete to end the war. A civil war thus prolongs in the absence of one of these outcomes. While the definition of a government or rebel-victory, where one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and surrenders, is more straightforward, a negotiated settlement is more complex. In theory, a negotiated settlement can be defined as the presence of a formal peace agreement or truce that results in a significant reduction in killing that lasts for some period of time (Toft, 2010). A negotiated settlement can only be effective if both partied adhere to the signed agreement. In practice however, negotiation talks may not lead to a negotiated settlement and subsequently the ending of the civil war. Hazen (2013) argues that there are different reasons why negotiations are no guarantee of successful settlement. Negotiations eventually might fail and not lead to a peace settlement. Other interests could be in play rather than actually aiming to move towards peace. When this is indeed the case, one could doubt whether the peace-agreement will hold. However, even if the negotiation process does not translate into a solution of the conflict, talks are a
necessary prerequisite to any signed agreement.
Understanding the factors that prolong civil wars is essential to examine how external third-party intervention may influence the prolonging of civil wars. Several scholars argue that that the duration of warfare is driven by factors that (1) affect the ability of one side to achieve decisive military victory or/and (2) the willingness of each side to reach a negotiated settlement (Brandt et al., 2008; Zartmann, 1995). The former, a decisive military victory by either the government or rebels refers to a situation where the civil war comes to an end by a military defeat of one of the parties (Toft, 2010). The military capacity of the protagonists forms the first factor that influences the duration of a civil war; a military victory can only be achieved when one of the protagonists experiences a decisive military capacity. Fearon (2004) empirically studied why some civil wars last longer than others and found that civil wars are relatively short when conditions favor a decisive victory. When a one-sided victory does not occur one could claim that the military capacity of the government or the rebels during that period of time is not sufficient to defeat the opponent. In this sense, a civil war prolongs when both actors are able to acquire and maintain the ability to challenge each other militarily. A certain level of military capacity is thus necessary to continue fighting. Fearon (2004) argues that civil wars last longer when neither side can disarm the other. While the imbalance of military capabilities ought to predict a higher chance of a decisive victory and thus a shortening of the civil war, a situation that is characterized by a balance of military capacity leads to a prolonging of a civil war (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). This argument focuses on the effect of military capacity on the prolonging of a civil war when focusing on the absence of a military outcome (military victory by one of the parties).
The second factor that influences the prolonging of a civil war is the strategy of the protagonist; the choice to continue fighting or sign a negotiated settlement. Decision-models offer an explanation from a rational-choice-theory for the factors that drive the duration of civil wars and state that the termination or prolonging of a conflict depends on the choices the protagonists make (Zartman, 1995; Witmann, 1979; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2010). Strategies are developed and choices are made to reach certain goals. Possible objectives of the rebels could be to overthrow the government and replace it with a new regime or it may seek to participate in the government and gain political legitimacy. Other objectives might be that the rebels fight a separatist war and aim to create a new sovereign nation state within the borders of that particular country (Mason & Fett, 1996). Walter (2015) argues that the main purpose of rebel groups is to organize violent action that leads to political change. The objective of the government is often to maintain their political position, to prevent a coup and/or to defeat the rebels. These are possible long-term goals that represent the most favorable outcome of the civil war for, respectively, the rebels and the government. Wittman states that parties opt for a military (continue fighting) or political (negotiating) approach depending on the expected benefit of the outcome of continue fighting versus a settlement through negotiations (Wittman, 1979).
This implies that actors calculate what option provides the best opportunity of achieving their favorable outcome. Military defeat is not considered as an option one of the parties can choose from while the adversary imposes this. Along similar lines, Mason and Fett (1996) designed a decision model and argue that an important consideration to either party to continue fighting is its estimate of the probability it will achieve (military) victory. The protagonists are unlikely to be willing to negotiate as long as they believe that they can achieve a better outcome by military means. Zartmann (1995) argues that the possibility of a negotiated settlement increases when both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and see an opportunity for achieving their objectives through participating at the negotiation table. Following Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) the choice between continue fighting and negotiate can be made during the entire war. For the purpose of clarification, in this research, strategy is described as the choice of the protagonists to continue fighting or negotiate. The first factor, military capacity, influences this second factor as the strategies of the protagonists are underlined by their capacities. For example, the military capacity may limit the choices available; the rebel side can only choose to continue fighting when they have the military means. Once the capacity to fight a war improves, the protagonists face more options for continuing the war, while when their capacity weakens, the options are more restricted (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).
In summary, the literature provided insight in two factors that determine the duration of a civil war; a civil war continues when military defeat of one of the parties fails to occur or when the parties refrain from signing and adhering to the negotiated settlement. This depends on the military capacity to achieve a military victory and on the strategy of the protagonist, which are influenced by their objectives and strengthened or restricted by their military capacity. This literature forms the starting point for explaining the effect of military interventions on the two factors (military capacity and strategy) that determine the duration of a civil war. It should be noted, however, that the decision models mentioned above do not consider the characteristics of the rebels and the government. These characteristics are different which cause them to react differently in similar situations. This will be takin into account in the next chapter in which I will explain the theory and present the hypothesis.
2.3 Theory
Foreign interventions play an important role in affecting the military capacities and the strategies of the warring parties (Licklider, 1995). Firstly, the effect of military interventions on the duration of civil wars is elaborated on by focusing on the military capabilities of the protagonists in a civil war.. Regan (1996, 2002) argues that external interventions affect the capabilities of parties as they change their expected payoffs of conflict. These payoffs are determined by a cost- benefit analysis of fighting, risk preferences and estimations on the likelihood of victory or no-defeat (Regan, 1996, 2002). Military interventions can increase the favored party’s probability of victory or reduce its probability of defeat by improving the capacities of the preferred side (Mason & Fett, 1996). In this way, a third party intervention can shift the balance of power the military intervention influences the military
capacity of the party that is supported by the intervener. It is expected that the chance of military victory for the party who receives assistance increase. However, the literature demonstrates that military interventions of external parties generally take place to prevent one side from falling to defeat on the battlefield (Mason & Fett, 1996). After all, conducting interventions involves costs and risks for the actor intervening. As rational actors, external powers may be more willing to take on these risks when the costs to them of doing nothing, the defeat of a government they favor, are greater than the expected costs of intervening. Brandt argues that an intervention is thus more likely to be undertaken to forestall the impending defeat of a favored party rather than to insure quick victory (Brandt et al, 2008). From this premise, the military intervention prevents an outcome (military victory for the opponent) and thus prolongs the civil war. The intervener provides military capacity to their favored actor enabling that actor to continue fighting.
Secondly, military interventions may influence the strategy of the protagonists and their decision to negotiate. When the military capacities of one of the protagonists increases as a consequence of military assistance, this will likely contribute to preference of continuing the war instead of negotiating (Hazen, 2013). In addition, military assistance may reinforce the long-term objectives, not only in a military way but also in a political way since this assistance can be perceived as a form of political support. It is expected that the willingness of the assisted side to negotiate will decreases when one party acquires a significant fighting capacity vis-à-vis its opponents. Due to a military intervention, the party that does not receive this assistance is more willing to negotiate in order to avoid defeat. While this theory provides insight in how biased military interventions may influence the military capacity and the strategy of the protagonists involved, it is essential to acknowledge that governments and rebels are inherently different type of actors which may influence their decision making process. These characteristics will be further discussed in the following section. Based on the above-mentioned theory concerning the effect of biased military interventions and the characteristics of the government and the rebel group the hypothesis is as follows:
Government-biased military interventions prolong a civil war
2.3.1 Causal mechanisms
In this section I will theorize the causal relations between the government-biased interventions and the prolonging of a civil war. For the purpose of clarity, the dependent variable in this study is the duration of a civil war, explained as the strategy and the military capacity of the protagonist. The independent variable is the government-biased military intervention. The mechanisms that underline the hypothesis focus on how the government-biased military intervention changes the military capacity and choices of the protagonists. The first part elaborates on the change of military capacity of the government and the rebels and consequently the chances of a military outcome. The second part explains the changes in strategy of both the government and the rebels and takes into account the
possibility of a negotiated settlement.
Taken from the literature, military interventions in support of the government are more
presumable once the government is facing a rebel group that poses a threat to the government’s survival or when the level of government’s military capacity is low (Sullivan & Karreth, 2015). Thus, government-biased military interventions take place when the government’s military capacity is less than the military capacity of the rebel group and subsequently face military defeat. Under this circumstance, a military victory in favor of the rebels would be the quickest plausible outcome (Mason & Fett, 1996). However, when a government-biased intervention occurs, the military capability of the government increases. This diminishes their chance of military defeat and makes an outright military victory in favor of the rebels less likely. As a consequence the civil war continues. In theory, when focusing solely on the possibility of a military outcome (either government – or rebel-victory) of a civil war, it may be assumed that more balanced military capacities prolong the civil war, as it takes longer for one party to defeat the other. A government-biased intervention might create a situation in which the government has more military strength compared to the rebels. In that case, we would expect the rebels to be more prone to military defeat. However, it is important to take into account the nature and abilities of a rebel group when the government becomes the stronger party in the conflict, as it is explains why a military victory fails to occur. Herbst (2000) found that the degree of threat posed by the armed forces of the state is a critical determinant of how rebels will structure their own forces (Herbst, 2000). Rebels can shift to hit-and-run tactics, a guerrilla warfare strategy to avoid further direct conflict with the government forces. Rebels can survive while they are weak as they can become or remain hidden in the outland and build military strength for a later period (Hultquist, 2013). Subsequently, the government faces difficulties defeating these weak rebels. As Fearon argues, changing the military technology directly increases average war duration by making an outright military victory less likely in any given period (Fearon, 2004). Thus even when the intervention on the government-side can turn the tide and improve its military capacity to such an extent that the government becomes a convincing military threat to the rebels, rebels can avoid defeat by adjusting their fighting tactics. Subsequently, a military victory of the government does not occur, causing a prolonging of the civil war.
In the above the influence of a government-biased intervention on two possible war outcomes (government or rebel victory) have been discussed. The following part focuses on how the government-biased intervention influences the prospects the third possible outcome: a negotiated settlement. Prior to explaining the effect of the intervention it is important to note that the willingness of both parties to negotiate is required for talks to occur. In general, governments have fewer incentives to initiate negotiations as the government abandons its legitimacy if it openly negotiates with the rebels; this may lead to political unease (Licklider, 1995). Only when the rebels prove its ability to challenge the state militarily and the government faces military defeat, the literature predicts
that the government might enter negotiations (Clayton, 2013). However, a government-biased intervention decreases the chances of military defeat. Hence, a government will be more convinced of a military victory and would, therefore, be less likely to enter the negotiation table. Further, when the government receives military assistance, the intervener absorbs the costs of additional conflict, which makes fighting less costly and in turn makes it more appealing to continue fighting. Aside from the fact that an intervention improves the military strength of the government, it also strengthens the existing authority structures: an intervention on behalf of the government seeks to reinforce the government’s power and its policies. It is plausible to assume that the intervening actor prefers the government’s policies and way of ruling above to what it foresees the opposition would establish, if it were to win (Regan & Lemke, 2004). A government-biased military intervention by a regional organization or other state implies that the intervening actor is supporting the stance the government takes, which in turn legitimizes the warfare of the government. From a military and political perspective, the necessity and in turn the willingness for the government to negotiate decreases and in turn increases the willingness to continue fighting. For a war to end in a negotiated settlement requires the commitment of both the government and the rebels. In reference to the statement above, it can be observed that a government will not be committed to negotiate and, therefore, a continuation of the war will likely be the outcome.
Based on the fundamental distinctions between a government and a rebel, rebels groups are in general more eager to negotiate due to the power asymmetry in civil wars. As talks is a form of recognizing the rebels as worthy interlocutors, this could be seen as a form of legitimacy, something that many rebel groups strife for (Byman, 2009). Engaging in a negotiating process provides both recognition and legitimacy. It raises rebels’ status as a political actor and in turn could move them closer to their political goals (Clayton, 2003). As discussed above, a rebel group may change its tactics in order to avoid military defeat when facing a more forceful government as a consequence of the intervention. With regard to the willingness of the rebel organization to negotiate, when the military capacity of the rebels declines when facing a government-biased military intervention, it is expected that the rebel movement would be even more willing to negotiate as the military pressure on the rebel group increases.
To clarify, a government-biased military intervention takes place when the capacity of the government is low compared to the military capacity of the rebels. This will lead to an increase of the military capacity of the government. Consequently, the likelihood of rebel victory diminishes and the chance of a government military victory will increase. However, the rebel organization may be able to avoid defeat due to changes in warfare strategy. As a result, a military victory fails to occur and the civil war continues. When taking into account the possibility of a negotiated settlement we assume that before the intervention takes places the rebel organization is willing to negotiate while the government is not. The government-biased military intervention strengthens the military and political
position of the government that reinforces the unwillingness of the government. As the rebel’s military capacity is declining, the willingness to negotiate increases.
In the above, two casual paths have been outlined that link government-biased military interventions to the strategy and capacity of protagonists and thus the prolonging of ta civil war. It is important to be aware that the case studies might reveal other mechanisms that can link the variables and may lead to another outcome. One of these mechanisms, focusing on the outcome of a civil war in a negotiated settlement, is based on the theory that warring parties aim to negotiate from a position of military strength. A government-biased military intervention will improve the military capacity of the government; this in turn will provide more bargaining leverage and improves their negotiating position. Consequently, the government can initiate a deal that will meet their long-term objectives. To avoid military defeat, the rebels will likely agree to that deal (Clayton, 2013). Consequently the civil war comes to an end. This alternative causal path contradicts the theory discussed in this chapter. This research will examine whether and to what extent these mechanisms are present in the three cases.
3. Research Design
In this chapter I will outline the research design that provides the framework for testing my hypothesis; a government-biased military intervention prolongs a civil war. Firstly, I will describe the methodology I used. Secondly, a justification for the case selection will be provided. Thirdly, insight in the available data and the sources will be given. Fourthly, I will operationalize the variables and discuss alternative variables that might offer an alternative explanation for the expect variation in the dependent variable.
3.1 Methodological Approach
To answer my research question (How do military interventions influence the duration of civil wars?) I used a case study research design. A case study is defined by Gerring (2004) as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. This design enables me to describe and explain the connection between the government-biased military interventions and the duration of a civil war. The Sierra Leone civil war formed the context in which three cases, three government-biased military interventions, were studied. I analyzed the three military interventions. The aim is essentially to draw causal inferences about the causal relation between government-biased interventions and the duration of civil wars. Prior to explaining how government-biased military interventions influenced the duration of civil wars we must study the presence of a causal effect. The cause and the effect must be found to co-vary to claim the existence of a causal relationship. This means I must examine if any temporal variation in the prolonging of the Sierra Leone civil war is an outcome of the presence of a government-biased military external intervention. Therefore, it is necessary to study my variables at different periods in time.
As King, Koheane and Verba (1994) argue, a comprehensible explanation of causality needs to specify how the effects are exerted. To exert these effects I studied the causal mechanism described in my theory that underpins my hypothesis. I relied on process-tracing methodology to link the independent variable and dependent variable and analyze the decision making-process of the actors involved (Checkel, 2008). Process tracing involves searching for evidence that is consistent with the causal theory, outlined in chapter two. Via process tracing I got insight in the decision-making process of the two most important actors in the civil war; the Sierra Leone government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The connection between the government-biased military intervention and the duration of the civil war is made visible once I examined how the interventions influenced the decisions of the government and the rebels to continue fighting or establish a negotiated settlement (Gerring, 2004). In addition, formulating counterfactuals was essential in order to make any claims about the causality of the variables. Without explicitly incorporating counterfactuals, process tracing can lead to incorrect causal inferences about the robustness of the presumed causal relation between the intervention and the duration war (King, et al., 1994). Using counterfactuals was particularly
important in this research, as it was impossible to empirically test the consequences for the duration of the civil war if the interventions had not taken place. Per case I included what might have happened if the intervention had not taken place and if and how the duration of the civil war had been different without the intervention.
While process tracing can provide causal inference about why (and how) the duration of civil wars is influenced by interventions we have to be aware of its limitations. A too-specific focus on mechanisms and process tracing might lead to outweigh the structural factors present in Sierra Leone (or the Sierra Leone civil war) (Checkel, 2013). These structures are briefly outlined in chapter 4 and referred to in the analysis and discussion. Further, as causal mechanisms are operationalized in three specific cases and process tracing is a within-case method of analysis generalization can be problematic. As I did not study the effect of government-biased interventions in different contexts it is important to provide detailed description of Sierra Leone’s civil war and distinguish to what extent the causal mechanisms were linked to context-specific conditions.
3.2 Case Selection
The objective of this research is to explain if and how government-biased military interventions influenced the duration of the civil war. In order to achieve this objective it was important to select a civil war that has encountered government-biased military intervention. The Sierra Leone Civil war provided to be a suitable context to study the influence of external military intervention on the duration of civil war as the war was among others known for the extensive interference of foreign state and non-state actors. Specifically, the government received external military assistance from a variety of actors: nation states, regional organization, international organization and non-state actors such as private military companies (TRC, 2004). Further, the Sierra Leone civil war lasted 12 years (from 1991 until 2002); only 25% of the civil wars since 1945 have lasted at least 12 years (Fearon, 2004). This resulted in more than 20,000 deaths and 2.6 million displaced people (CIA Fact book). The Sierra Leone civil war proved to be extraordinarily devastating in comparison to a median number of battle deaths in recent civil wars of approximately 10,500 (Human Rights Watch 2003; Lacina 2006). Further, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) the Sierra Leone civil war a symmetric non-conventional war. These type of civil wars are recognized by the fact that the military capacity of the state and the rebels are matched at an equally low level of material sophistication and resources (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). In my research I attempted to contribute to this category of civil wars. Combined with the long duration of its war, Sierra Leone provided a suitable context for selecting my case studies.
As stated before, multiple actors assisted the government of Sierra Leone. I selected the intervention of Executive Outcomes (1), Operation Sandstorm, the intervention by ECOMOG, (2) and the intervention of the United Kingdom (3) for the following reasons; first of all, the three cases meet
the criteria of a military intervention outlined in my theory. The interventions are similar in the fact that they all at least deployed troops (Woods, 2010). Next to deploying troops, the interveners provided other forms of military assistance, which will be outlined in my analysis. According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), relevant data must be available to make confident claims about the accuracy and conceptual validity of the variable (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). The three interventions have been documented thoroughly compared to other interventions. Further, the sources are fairly unanimous concerning what the interventions consisted of. In the following section I will discuss where the data were derived from.
Secondly, studying the relation between each intervention and the duration of the civil war requires disaggregation of each intervention’s influence on the military strategy and capacity of the protagonists after the intervention occurs. It is only possible to draw conclusions about each intervention separately when they occurred in different time periods. This was the case in this research. The intervention of the Executive Outcomes took place from May 1995 until January 1997, the intervention of ECOMOG, operation Sandstorm between 1997 and April 2000 and the British intervention lasted from May 2000 till the end of the Sierra Leone civil war.
Thirdly, Seawright and Gerring argue that chosen cases must also vary on relevant dimensions (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). A private military company performed the first intervention I studied; the second intervention by a regional organization and third intervener was state. As the inventions were carried out by different type of actors it enabled me to discover whether the type of actor intervening matters for the potential influence of the intervention on the prolonging of the civil war.
3.3 Sources and Data selection
Valid and reliable data are critical for drawing valid causal inferences about the influence of interventions on the duration of civil wars. The data in this research derived from multiple sources, both primary and secondary. This enabled me to crosscheck the data that decreased the chance of bias and improved the reliability of the causal inferences.
Secondary data were used to provide an historical overview of the Sierra Leone civil war. The studies of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) proved to be a valuable source for this overview. The commission was established after the Lomé Peace Accord to create an historical record of the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Sierra Leone civil war. Their reports consist of detailed fact-finding missions, which make their descriptions very precise (Website Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2017). As explained before, the method of process tracing was applied to examine how the government and the RUF decided to either continue fighting or take place at the negotiation table. Insight in the decision-making processes of actors who played an important role within the RUF and
the government was, therefore, essential. Due to multiple factors I was not able to conduct interviews with high-ranked officials or leading commanders who were actively involved in the decision-making processes of the RUF and the government in the Sierra Leone civil war myself. However, the reports of the TRC consist among others of interviews that were conducted only two years after the ending of the civil war. A variety of secondary resources find their basis in interviews conducted with high ranked officials or other essential figures (Hazen, 2013; Woods: 2010, Keen: 2005). While it is important to acknowledge the subjective character of interviews with these officials of the government and the RUF, this did not hinder the possibility to make statements about the decision-making process of these actors. However, using interviews for explaining what actually happened in the civil war may be problematic as these officials may be biased and in turn misrepresent or conceal the actions of certain groups. I aimed to attenuate this possible bias using the No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) reports. These reports reconstructed in detail the chain of events and covered most battles between the different actors. Another important international recognized body that provided helpful primary data is the Special Court of Sierra Leone. The United Nations set up this court in 2002 as the result of the request of the GoSL. The archive of the special court contains many original documents like press-statements, manifestos, letters and speeches from officials of the Sierra Leone Government and the RUF. Further, I interviewed Kars de Bruijn; he is a research fellow at the Clingendael University and conducted fieldwork in Sierra Leone among leading commanders and vanguards of the RUF.1
The description of the dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data program (Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Data Set) provided annual data about the estimated troop size of the government army and the RUF during the war (Cunningham et, al., 2013).2 In the following section I will further discuss how these data were used for measuring military capacity.
3.4 Operationalization of the Variables
3.4.1 Duration of civil war
As previously discussed, the duration of civil war is captured by the military capacity and the strategy of the protagonists. The unit of analysis in this study is thus armed groups. First of all, a civil war in which a possible outcome fails to appear is partly determined by the military capacity of the warring parties. This forms the first part of my dependent variable. Many scholars use and rely on this concept while it is difficult to measure this at any given moment as the military capacity, as a consequence of interaction between the protagonists, may change continuously during the course of the conflict. To measure whether the military capacity changed as a result of the intervention we need sources that can
1 De Bruijne conducted fieldwork in November-December 2012, January 2012, March 2015, September 2015.
2 The original data derives from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2001:
Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. I tried to track down the data however did not have access to this
provide these data per conflict year or at least in the years before and after the three interventions have taken place. As stated above, the description of the Non-state actor data set provided annual data concerning the troop size. Annual troop size is an appropriate indicator to measure military capacity as the size of troops provides a raw index of military strength as quantity has a quality already on its own; without troops combat is not possible. However, we have to be aware of the limitations and the fact that there are multiple manners to define and measure military capacity. First of all, the nature of rebels and governments hinders comparing the military capacity; rebels and governments often use different fighting methods. A group with a relatively small number of troops might be a serious threat to a weak government. Besides, the size of the troops does not reveal whether the troops are well trained. Access to military training can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of troops. In addition, access to military equipment is important for executing the actual warfare: heavier firepower may be more efficient than regular guns (Hazen, 2013). Ideally, I would take into account all the above factors that influence the military capacity. However, data for these indicators are not sufficient to do this in a systematic manner over time. The secondary literature as well as the TRC reports provides precise descriptions of the military capacity of both parties. To be as accurate as possible and overcome the limitations I will operationalize military capacity as the quantitative measurement of the troops size per year combined with the qualitative descriptions found in the literature. The second part of the dependent variable is the strategy of the rebels and the government. The indicator for this variable is the choice betwfeen continue fighting or take a seat at the negotiation table. Other ways to measure the strategy is by referring to the warfare strategy of the protagonists, the rebels and the government. For example, the protagonists may choose to change their fighting tactics or revise their short-term goals. Changing the warfare strategy will be coded in my analysis as the choice of ‘continue fighting’. I will clarify the changing strategy as a consequence of the intervention in order to properly describe the causal mechanisms that are in play. It is important to be aware that negotiation talks do not necessarily lead to an ending of the civil war. However, negotiating is the first crucial phase towards political solution for stopping the war. Even if the negotiation process does not lead to an outcome of the conflict, talks are a prerequisite to any signed agreement.
3.4.2 Government-biased military intervention
My independent variable is the government-biased military intervention. A government-biased military intervention can include a variety of military means to assist the government. A state or non-state actor, coalitions or multilateral organizations, can carry out the interventions. An important characteristic of an external intervention is that the intervening actor is foreign to the conflict country. There was an important regional dimension to the war as the war began when the RUF together with NPFL-fighters moved into Sierra Leone from Liberia. Furthermore, the RUF received considerable support for the RUF (Keen, 2005). It is, however, difficult to disentangle the military capacity of the
RUF and the NPFL and their cooperation, especially the early stage of the conflict. This support will be touched upon in the analysis but not perceived as a rebel-biased military intervention. The indicator for the government-biased external military intervention is the presence of military troops combined with other forms of military assistance that aim to improve the military capacity of the favored party.
Table 1: Operationalization of the variables
Hypothesis: A government-biased military intervention prolongs a civil war
Variables Indicators
Independent: Government-biased military intervention
---
Dependent: Duration: Level of military capacity (1) Strategy (2)
Deployment of troops and other forms of military assistance ---
1:Troop size
2: Choice between continue fighting or negotiate
3.4.3 Alternative key variables: Natural resources
An alternative key variable may be the presence of natural resources. A number of studies found that natural resources and the duration of civil wars are correlated (Fearon, 2004; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Fearon found empirical evidence that civil wars last longer when rebels have access to commodities as it may finance their warfare. The Sierra Leone’s civil war was, among others, characterized by the exploitation of diamonds that complicated a resolution in the civil war (TRC, 2004). Furthermore, an outcome of a civil war might have failed to occur as both the government and the rebels were able to continue their warfare. It is thus possible that the presence of diamonds influenced the level of military capacity and the strategy of the protagonists that may have led to the prolonging of the civil war. Whether this alternative variable offers a better explanation than the presence of a government-biased military intervention will become apparent from the three case studies.
4. The Sierra Leone Civil War
In this chapter the political, economic and social circumstances in Sierra Leone prior and during the civil war will be explained. These structures might shape the causal mechanisms present in the cases I will study. Finally, a brief description of the Sierra Leone civil war will be provided in which the actors involved are being discussed as well as a timeline of the civil war.
4.1 A weak state
The country of Sierra Leone has been the stage of European colonial rivalries since the 15th century. Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue that the governing structure present in colonial times contributed to the weakness of the Sierra Leone state. As a consequence of indirect rule, Sierra Leone lacked a monopoly of violence, a modern bureaucracy, a modern financial system. From 1961, when Sierra Leone attained independence, the country experienced inefficient governments, economic decline and aggravating poverty. By the 1990s, Sierra Leone's political structures were afflicted by corruption, repression, misuse of political power for individual enrichment and in turn political instability (Conteh-Morgan, 2006). According to the World Bank, Sierra Leone had plummeted to one of the ten poorest countries in the world by the 1990s (World Bank staff, 1997). During these years, youth-unemployment and corruption increased and state institutions weakened. In addition, misuse of diamond resources, the most important mineral resource in Sierra Leone, created inequality in socio-economic conditions (TRC: 2004). The outbreak of the civil war can be seen as the outcome of a long process of the aggravation of the abovementioned socio-economic and political problems. These structural factors, which provided the framework for the onset of the civil war, persisted throughout the war. The manner in which these structural factors influenced the causal mechanisms will be further outlined in my analysis.
4.2 Main actors
There were two main parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In the course of the conflict, each of these parties experienced changes in character and formed alliances with other groups. Among these groups was the Civil Defense Force (CDF) formed from local civil defense volunteers. It is important to note that, even though this group countered incursions of the RUF, this does not imply the group collaborated with the government (Richards, 2003). The Kamajors, for example, a type of paramilitary units, were, at a sudden point in the civil war, perceived by the government army as unconstitutional militia and humiliating to the army and, therefore, perceived as a threat to the army (Keen, 2005). The West Side Boys were another armed group who were prominent near the end of the war and known for fighting the UN Peacekeepers in 2000. While it is important to take into account the role of these actors, this research focuses on how the external interventions influence the military capacity and the strategy of
the government and the RUF. The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh and was an outgrowth of a radical student upheaval (Peters, 2006). The RUF relied primarily on the motivation and aspirations of Sankoh and consisted of factions held together by their loyalty to their leader (Shearer, 1997). In RUF’s manifesto, written in the beginning of the civil war is stated “we are fighting against corruption, because the past and present government seized political, economic and social justice in this country” (RUF, 1995). The initial goal of the RUF was to strive for increased voice and power in national politics. However, the political program of the RUF was not very specific (Hazen, 2013). Throughout the 1990s, three different internationally recognized regimes governed Sierra Leone, the All People Congress (APC), led by Momoh, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Strasser and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), led by Kabbah. The long-term objective of the different governments Sierra Leone experienced was to defeat the rebel group and to stay in government. How and if the RUF and government changes their goals during the course of the conflict will be further outlined in the chapter 5.
4.3 Overview
The Sierra Leone civil war broke out when, in 1991, the RUF began capturing towns on the border with Liberia and attempted to overthrow President Momoh, the leader of the All Peoples Congress party (APC) (Woods, 2010). The first incursions concentrated on capturing land, towns and equipment and were led by special forces of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). In the early stages of the conflict, the RUF received military support from fighters from neighboring countries in the region, for example fighters from Burkina Faso (TRC, 2004). As there are no indications that Burkina Faso was involved in the civil war at state level it is important to notice that RUF experienced these forms of military support as strengthening their military capacity and position. As a response, the government’s army, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSMLF) requested military assistance from the republic of Guinea and Nigeria. Nigeria sent a small force in late 1991 to guard the RSLMF and Guinea supplied arms and ammunition to the RSLMF up to 1993 (TRC, 2004). In spite of the military support of Nigeria and Guinea to the RSLMF their position did not improve and by the end of 1993 the RUF had taken much of the Southern and Eastern parts of the country (NPWJ report, 2004). In 1992 President Momoh got overthrown by junior officers of the government army. This group established a military junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) (Nuamah & Zartman, 2004). Valentine Strasser, the official who led the coup promised to end the war and restore peace. Strasser changed the name of the RSLMF in Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (Woods, 2010). In 1994 the president of the NPRC Strasser hired the military services of the British Private Military Company the Gurkhas Security Group. However, in their short period, the government and the Gurkhas achieved no military strength nor did they weaken the position of the RUF. In 1995, the NPRC hired the services of the South African private military company Executive
Outcomes (EO) to conduct military operations in Sierra Leone against the RUF forces. The influence of this military intervention forms the first case I will analyze (chapter 5).
A second coup followed in 1996, when Valentine Strasser, was ousted by his defense minister, Capt. Maada Bio. Bio was able to start the first peace talks between the GoSL and the RUF (Nuarmah & Zartman, 2004; Woods, 2010). A few months later, multi-party elections were held and won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). The negotiations continued and led to the signing of the Abdijan Peace Agreement on the 30th of November 1996 by both the Kabbah government and the RUF. However, this peace would be short-lived, as the articles present in the agreement failed to be implemented by both the signatories. Consequently, fighting continued. In May 1997 six months after the government signed the peace accord, a group of soldiers led by Koroma performed a coup and overthrew the Kabbah-Government. This military Junta was named the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ARFP). Former president Kabbah and his government fled to Guinea while Major Koroma invited the RUF leader Sankoh to join the AFRC. The RUF accepted this and even though Sankoh was detained by Nigeria, vice-chairmanship was offered to him. Government officials of African countries, African regional organizations and the international community thoroughly condemned the joint coup. Consequently, the organization of African Unity (OA) appealed to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to assist the people of Sierra Leone and restore initial order (Woods, 2010). ECOMOG was a military army of thirteen West African states established by the economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). On 23 October 1997 ECOWAS developed the Conakry peace Plan. This peace plan consisted of a three-phase strategy to remove the AFRC/RUF junta. However, the junta declared itself a legitimate government with a mandate to govern till the 22th of April 1998. This was unacceptable to ECOWAS and, therefore, they moved to economic sanctions. These sanctions had little effect on the AFRC leadership and in February 1998 ECOMOG forces launched a full-scale offensive in favor of the banned government to remove the military junta from power and restore the Kabbah-government (Woods, 2010). The military intervention of the ECOMOG forces, operation Sandstorm, is the second case.
Eventually, on the 10th of March 1998, president Kabbah was reinstated. However, AFRC reestablished a partnership with parts of the RUF regrouped and remobilized forces after their removal from power, and civil war continued (Woods, 2010). As a consequence, the UN established a mandate in July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. In July 1999, the Lomé peace Agreement was signed between the RUF and the Kabbah-government. This peace agreement between the GoSL and the RUF included among others article V that on paper enabled the RUF to join a broad-based government. In addition, the agreement assured that both Sankoh as well as the GoSL would not be prosecuted for war crimes up to the signing of the agreement (Article IX) (UN Security Council,
1999). The Security Council authorized deployment of the peacekeeping operations to secure the Lomé peace agreement (UNAMSIL)(UN, 1999). However, the Lomé Peace Accord failed to restore peace in the country. A few months after the UN peace troops had arrived in Sierra Leone to monitor the peace agreement, they came under attack by the RUF in April of that same year; RUF rebels took about 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. Subsequently, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, requested the United Kingdom to intervene in Sierra Leone. The British government responded to this appeal in May 2001 (Fears for UN mission in Sierra Leone, 2000, 6 May). The British intervention is the third case I will study. In Jan 2002 the war was declared over.
5. Case studies and analysis
In this chapter I will study in-depth the government-biased military interventions of the Private Military Company Executive Outcomes (case 1), of the regional organization ECOMOG (case 2) and the intervention of the United Kingdom (case 3). Per case, the military capacity and the strategy of the Sierra Leone government and the rebels before the intervention took place will be described. Then, a detailed description of the main events that took place during the intervention will be linked to the military capacity and the strategy of the government and the rebels at that moment. Through linking the possible changes of the dependent variables directly to the theory I examine which aspects of the causal mechanisms outlined in my theory are present. For each intervention counterfactuals will be formulated and eventually determined whether the case falsifies or affirms the hypothesis.
5.1 Military intervention Executive Outcomes
The military intervention of the Private Military Company Executive Outcomes lasted from May 1995 till January 1997. Intervention took place to support the government in their combat against the RUF. In February 1996 elections took place won by Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). The military capacity and the strategy of the government during the intervention period are presented in table 2, followed by a detailed description of the causal mechanisms
Table 2: Military capacity and strategy RUF and GoSL intervention Executive Outcomes
Source: Cunningham et al (2013) 3. .
before intervention during intervention after intervention 1995 1996 1997
In the early years of the war, the military capacity of the RUF was limited; the RUF lacked serious military goods, depended almost exclusively on light weaponry and relied on capturing weapons of
3 I would have preferred to measure the troop size of the protagonists of 1994, however these data were not
available in the SIPRI data set.
Troop size Strategy Troop size Strategy Troop size
Strategy Outcome Counterfactual Outcome
Government 5.000
6.000
Negotiate 12,000-18,000
Negotiate 14.000 Fighting Continuation of the war Coup d’état or negotiations RUF 2.000 Fighting 2,000-4,000 Fighting 3.000 - 5.000 Fighting
the opponents to supply its troops with arms (UNSC, 2000). As stated in the RUF manifesto, in 1993 the RUF was close to military defeat “By 1993 we had been forced to beat a hasty retreat as successful infiltration almost destroyed our ranks” (RUF, 1995). By the end of 1993, the RUF had managed to revive by the increased assistance of Charles Taylor (Hazen, 2013). Further, the following quote emphasizes their swift from conventional to guerilla warfare: “ (…) The forest continues to be our main sources of survival and defense to date”. (RUF, 1995). From table 2 can be derived that the troop size of the RUF was in 1995 indeed considerably smaller than the troop size of the government. However, the RUF managed to revive. This can be attributed to the increased assistance of Charles Taylor and capability of the RUF to adjust their combat tactics and re-arm (Hazen, 2013). In the beginning of 1995, the RUF succeeded in gaining more territory and had occupied three important mining sites (Francis, 1999). The military situation was to the advantage of the RUF and it became clear that in the course of 1995 the RUF was able to attack and capture the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown (NPWJ report, 2004). Based on the characteristics of a rebel organization the theory predicts that the rebel forces would be willing to negotiate, as it would raise their status as a political actor. However, RUF’ s willingness to end the war with a negotiated settlement during the first period (1992-1994) is rather low. This presumption is based on the fact that RUF ignored the unilateral cease-fire declared by the NPRC in 1993 and rejected the peace-plan offered by the NPRC (Hazen, 2013). This strategy may also be motivated by the fact that the offer did not meet any of the goals of the RUF and demanded unconditional surrender of the RUF (Shearer, 1997). The fact that the RUF had been able to restore their military capacity reinforced the preference of continuing the war. In the RUF manifesto, dated from February 1995, Sankoh clarifies their negotiation position and their feelings about the NPRC.
“The RUF/SL was open to dialogue and has consistently demonstrated this fact by risking to meet with representatives of independent civic groups, peace movements, labor unions, teachers, students, professional bodies, religious leaders and chiefs and elders. In September 1995 (…). An independent delegation being put together was rudely interfered with by the rebel NPRC (..) Such is the character of military juntas that seek to control every aspect of national life (...)” (AFRC/RUF, 1995)
This manifesto clearly points out that the RUF remains critical towards negotiating with the NPRC. It describes the NPRC as a military junta that created conditions that logically led to resistance, referring to the illegitimate way NPRC took office. The rhetoric present in this manifesto reveals that the RUF is pessimistic about negotiating with the ‘rebel’ and ‘so-called government’. The premise that rebels are in general more eager to negotiate than governments does not hold in this case.
