University of Amsterdam
The Responses of the Catholic Church to Contemporary Civil Wars: An Analysis of Papal Sources
Jeremy Clement
Supervisor Dr. Mike Medeiros Master Thesis Political Science International Relations Specialization
Chapter 1: Introduction 2
1.1. The research problem and research question 2
1.2. A brief summary of the research design 3
Chapter 2: Context 4
2.1. Pre-Christian thinkers 4
2.2. Biblical Sources 6
2.3. Pacifism in the Early Church 8
2.4. Post-pacifism in the Early Church 8
2.5. Scholastic Theologians 11
2.6. Modernity and contemporary times 12
Chapter 3: Literature Review 15
3.1. Religion as a cause of conflict 15
3.2. Religion as a cause of peace 17
3.3. Religion as one factor among many 24
3.4. Religion in international relations theory 26
Chapter 4: The Theoretical Framework 29
Chapter 5: Methods and Methodology 30
5.1. Theoretical assumptions 30
5.2. Introduction to content analysis 31
5.3. The theoretical background of qualitative content analysis 34
5.4. Inductive category formation 37
5.5. Source selection and analysis 38
Chapter 6: Results 41
6.1. Categories 41
6.2. Trends 44
Chapter 7: Conclusion 47
Appendix 1: Documents Utilized for the Content Analysis 49
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. The research problem and research question
The Catholic Church’s stance on the phenomenon of war has evolved since the beginning of the common era through a process of tradition, reform, debate, division, and experience with the realities of warfare. Politics, theology, and philosophy have all contributed to the evolution of thought within the church from sources as diverse as ancient greek philosophers to biblical texts to modern theologians. While scholars of various disciplines have had centuries, even millenia, to study the many periods of Catholic thought on the topic of war, contemporary Catholic
thought has had less time for exposure to the rigors of scholarly study due to the rapid changes in the Church in response to contemporary issues, such as terrorism, world wars, and weapons of mass destruction.
In order to fully understand the nature of contemporary warfare it is important to understand the various actors which have a role in its proliferation, prevention, and resolution. The Church is an actor which has played each of these roles, from the proliferation of war during the crusades, its prevention through facilitating talks regarding the peaceful transition of power in Zimbabwe, and its resolution through peace talks in Venezuela (Abu-Nimer). There is plenty of scholarship detailing the Church’s historical role and contemporary role which will be detailed in the following literature review and context sections. The research regarding its contemporary role supports a vision of a Church with a strong preference for peace in most, if not all,
circumstances. The purpose of this study is to investigate this by taking a deep and rigorous look at contemporary cases of the Church’s involvement in responding to the reality of war in order to provide an analysis that is grounded in empirical examples of the Church’s responses. This will allow for a few different advances in the study of this phenomenon:
First, the analysis will provide empirical evidence regarding how the Church responds to war which will either tentatively support, reject, or enhance the complexity of the peaceful Church thesis. The results of the analysis will contribute to enhancing the strength of theory regarding the role and thought of the contemporary church through an inductive process using a small-n qualitative framework which allows for deep investigation into the individual cases.
Second, the analysis will provide for a description of how exactly the Church is responding to contemporary war, rather than a simple description such as claiming that it has a preference for peace. In keeping with this point, the analysis will provide a framework of categories for the various responses of the Church.
Lastly, the analysis will hopefully lend support to the use of qualitative content analysis as a valid and insightful method for engaging with issues of concern for researchers in the fields of political science, international relations, and religious studies.
The fundamental objective of this study is to determine how the contemporary Catholic Church responds to war. This study will attempt to investigate this in light of the scholarly literature and the development of Catholic thought on war. In order to narrow the focus, the case studies will be civil wars only; namely, the Syrian Civil War and the War in Donbass (including the conflict in Crimea). Civil war is the focus of this studies broader research project and the narrowing of the case studies to civil wars will allow for a new perspective in the study of the Catholic Church’s thought and practices on war. Since most of the scholarship focuses on the Catholic Church’s thought and practices regarding war in general, looking at cases which are specifically civil wars will allow for comparing whether or not the same trends evidenced in the literature apply to civil wars.
1.2. A brief summary of the research design
This study’s research design is primarily qualitative, descriptive, and inductive. There are exceptions to this, for example in the results section when the findings are used to support or question prior theoretical findings in a deductive fashion, but the primary model is built around these three criteria.
The analysis will look at textual data (i.e. statements from popes) using qualitative content analysis. The qualitative approach will allow for closer reading, deeper insights, and thicker descriptions of the texts than a more quantitative method would allow. The small-n case selection will also allow for a more narrow and deep focus which will hopefully bring some insights that may have been missed if a larger number of cases were superficially analyzed.
An inductive approach is used for the qualitative content analysis. This means that the categories and codes are built directly from the text itself, rather than from prior theoretical insights. The research question guides what type of content is included in these categories, but the categories themselves are dependent on the interaction between the text and the reader. Before delving into the study itself, it is important to cover some basic history and concepts in the development of Catholic thought on war and violence.
Chapter 2: Context
The history of the Catholic Church’s thought on war and its mirad influences are vast. This section will attempt to compress this several millennia long process into a few pages and provide a structure for understanding how the Church arrived where it is today. This context is important for both conducting the analysis and understanding the results. The context places the results within a deeper historical narrative and will help identify historical trends that the results either continue or break. This section also serves as an orienting reference for the reader which can help in understanding the various terms and historical events referenced throughout the study.
2.1. Pre-Christian thinkers
The Catholic Church traces its teachings on war to the influence of several pre-christian thinkers. Unlike the Protestant Churches, which due to the doctrine of solo scriptura must exclusively rely on biblical sources for their teachings on war, the Catholic Church has formed its teachings from a wider variety of sources due to rationalist thinking regarding natural law and the influence of secular sources (Gaffney 46). Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.) and Cicero (c. 106-43 B.C.) are two major pre-christian thinkers with influence on the development of the Church’s thinking on war (47).
Similar to classical international relations theorists, Aristotle noticed a disconnect
particularly in the ways in which justice was administered (47). He noted a trend where acts which would be considered criminal if committed intra-state would be allowed, or at least tolerated, on the inter-state level (47). One can notice the similarities here between Aristotle's observations and those of the earlier Thucydides and later Hobbes (47). Regarding war, Aristotle used a simple line of reasoning to develop what may be the first reference to the concept of just war (47). By way of criticizing Spartan war doctrines and practices, he reasoned that the securing of leisure and peace were two of the only legitimate reasons for war (47-48). The concept of securing peace as a legitimate objective of war will recur in later christian thought. Since the Spartans sometimes went to war for the purpose of acquiring slaves, he conceptualized the concept of just and unjust wars. He writes, “wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a slave” (Aritotle 1255a). At this point, for clarity's sake, it should be noted that Aristotle did support the idea of slavery, but only the slavery of “natural slaves” (Gaffney 48). Non-greeks were included in the natural slave criteria, therefore the previous argument regarding just and unjust wars relates to the enslavement of undeserving Greeks (Hunt 197). This natural slave argument will find its way into Christian thought as a justification for Christian imperialism in a later millenia (Gaffney 48). It should also be noted that Aristotle’s discourse on just and unjust war is an ethical argument (48), which might make it more accessible to Christian moral thought than a legalistic argument.
Cicero left a much more descriptive and prescriptive legacy of thoughts on war and also left a great influence on the Church. Notably, an early Christian textbook on morality
by St. Ambrose (c. 340-387 C.E.) is essentially a Christian reworking of Cicero’s homonymous De Officiis (48). Cicero had a juridical view of warfare, and viewed war as “a court of last appeal in international civil litigation” (50). Therefore, he viewed war as a last resort, a view that will become a theme in later christian thought. Below are some examples of his various prescriptions regarding just warfare.
Cicero suggests two legitimate criteria for engaging in just warfare. The first is
“redressing an injury or driving out an invader,” (49) and the second is that “no war is held to be lawful unless it is officially announced, unless it is declared, and unless a formal claim for satisfaction has been made” (49). He describes an unlawful war as one “begun from a mad
impulse and without legitimate cause” (49). This definition of an unlawful war defines both the mens rea and actus reus criteria for an unlawful war.
Besides providing the prior jus ad bellum criteria for determining whether the reasons for going to war are just, Cicero provides an early discourse on jus post bellum concerns. He
recommends behaving honorably and with kindness towards defeated enemies, especially if these enemies were honorable themselves (49-50). Furthermore, he “[did] not approve of the indiscriminate cruelty so often practiced in destroying, plundering, murdering, when a war was won or a city captured” (Harrer 29).
Somewhat echoing Aristotle's natural slave discourse, whether intentionally or not, Cicero was also in favor of expansionism as he saw Roman conquest as beneficial to weaker peoples (Gaffney 49). However, he did not claim to support aggressive violence to expand the empire (49). Cicero’s expansionist views are also echoed in Christian colonization discourse and justification.
2.2. Biblical Sources
Any analysis of Christian thought on war will have to take into account scripture with its wealth of instructions and meditations on warfare. The theme of war is present throughout the Bible. It can be seen, whether in a literal or allegorical sense, from the sedition of the serpent in Genesis to the violent eschatological struggles in the Apocalypse of John (The Catholic
University of America 634). The following will describe how war is portrayed in the Bible. First, an Old versus New Testament perspective, and then a discussion on how the Church’s
theologians have attempted to reconcile the seemingly conflicting messages of each testament. In the Old Testament, the warfare practices of ancient Israel are not dissimilar to those of Israel’s pagan contemporaries in the holy land (635). Holy wars were fought for their Gods, Yahweh in Israel’s case (634-35). Israel’s God was depicted as actively assisting Israel in these wars (634-35). Under ancient Israel’s monarchy, beginning with King Saul, these holy wars began to lose their influence and instead wars were often fought for the various kings with or without divine backing (635).
During the era of the holy wars in pre-monarchy Biblical times there were roughly two phases and types of warfare. In the Book of Joshua we see wars undertaken for the purpose of conquest (635). An example of this is the conquest of Jericho. God declares to Joshua that he is to sack Jericho and Joshua in turn “devoted to destruction by the edge of the sword all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and donkeys” (NRSV, Josh. 6.21). The next phase includes defensive wars in the book of Judges against Israel’s various regional enemies (The Catholic University of America 635).
Browsing the books of the Old Testament will reveal plenty of material relating to divine prescriptions on warfare such as those above. As stated before, these wars can be roughly
divided into holy wars of conquest and defense, and more secularly focused wars under the monarchy (634-35). However, in the New Testament, the situation is more complicated and more focused on spiritual and allegorical warfare rather than physical interpersonal violence. The New Testament does not contain much instruction regarding what constitutes a just war on a worldly level (Reichberg et al. 76).
There are three main types of discernible warfare in the New Testament: Christ versus Satan, individual humans versus Satan, and eschatological war (The Catholic University of America 635). The three synoptic gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke describe the first type of war through Christ’s antagonistic relationship with Satan and their battle over the worldly domain (635). St. Paul describes the second type allegorically by equating the individual’s spiritual journey to a type of warfare (635). Lastly, the Apocalypse of John provides imagery of the ultimate battle of good versus evil at the end of time (635).
A synthesis of the messages in the Old and New Testaments provides early Christian thinkers with the basis for a theory of just war (Reichberg et al. 76). Although the New Testament seems to share a pacifist message besides its discussion of spiritual and allegorical warfare, it still grants civil authorities the power to use violence (76). For example, an often quoted passage of the New Testament reads, “but if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain” (Rom. 13.4). This message in the New
Testament, combined with the instructions for warfare in the Old Testament, provide a basis for a Christian belief in the possibility of just war (Reichberg et al. 76).
2.3. Pacifism in the Early Church
The previous distinction between the peaceful nature of Christ and the violence
sometimes required in worldly matters was not drawn until the fourth century (81). Before this, Christianity manifested itself as a pacifist endeavour (81). This phenomenon was, however, more a result of the historical circumstances than a fundamental theological belief in nonviolence (81). In order to avoid participating in pagan rituals, Christians would refuse to serve in the Roman military (81). Many Christians were killed for this refusal (The Catholic University of America 636). This led to Christian pacifism as a “lived reality” (Reichberg et al. 81).
Despite the lived reality thesis, there were Christians who argued pacifism from a theological standpoint rather than a practical one. Tertullian (c. 160-220 C.E.) argued that engaging in war was prohibited for Christians even if they avoided taking part in pagan rituals (82). He reasoned that despite the numerous examples of divinely inspired violence in the Old Testament, the coming of Christ and his seizure of Peter’s sword in the gospel of Luke removed any divine permission to use violence (82). Violence, therefore, became a sinful act and
Christians had to make a choice between their loyalty to Caesar and their loyalty to God (82). Another Christian pacifist, Justin Martyr (c. 100-165 C.E.) pushed the pacifist thesis as well. Quoting a passage from the book of Isaiah, he recalls a prophecy which claims that nations and peoples will cease going to war after God “judge[s] the gentiles and reproach[es] many people” (qtd. in Reichberg et al. 82). He interprets the first coming of Christ as the fulfillment of this prophecy and therefore claims that nonviolence should be the way of the Christian faithful (82).
The lived reality of pacifism and the pacifist thesis lasted only a few centuries after the death of Christ at which time it would fall out of fashion in the mainstream thought of the Church (81-82). Instead, as Christianity became the dominant force after the fall of the Roman Empire, the realities of protecting an empire and its people sidelined pacifist Christians (82).
The shift away from pacifism and towards a more practical Christianity, which includes the just war tradition, can be traced to two important leaders of the Early Church, St. Ambrose (c. 340-397 C.E.) and St. Augustine (c. 354-430 C.E.) (82-83). From these figures come important foundations for the just war tradition.
The two saints based their just war theory on two assumptions (83). The first is that peace is the “normative, baseline condition of humanity” (83). This assumption is based on the Biblical narrative of the Garden of Eden and contends that the absence of interpersonal violence was part of God’s plan (83). The second assumption states that “God’s original plan for humanity had been contravened by human sin” (83). This assumption is again supported by reference to the Bible through the stories of Adam and Eve’s expulsion from the Garden of Eden, Cain and Abel, and the Tower of Babel (83). The saints reasoned that the realities of a world which fell from the grace of God required and justified the use of violence until the state of grace is reattained through the return of Christ (83). It seems that this line of reasoning has stuck with Catholics throughout the centuries; in 1925, Frederic Siedenburg, a Catholic social worker and founder of the Jesuit School of Social Work at Loyola, reiterated this perspective. He writes, “pending the establishment of a perfect Utopia on earth, that is, the universal acceptance of God's justice as the rule for all international, as well as national, dealings, there will occur from time to time
instances of unjust invasions of genuine rights” (Siedenburg 374). However, even though St. Augustine and St. Ambrose covered the foundations of early just war theory, questions remain as to the exact nature of the violence which is permitted.
Augustine reasoned that the guilt of war did not rest on the shoulders of those who engaged in just war in order to preserve peace, but rather he claimed that “it is iniquity on the part of the adversary that forces a just war upon the wise man” (Reichberg et al. 83). Protecting innocents on the basis of “just retribution with the aim of securing a just peace” (Chu 424) was an especially important reason for engaging in just war for Augustine (424). Therefore, the very existence of the concept of just war was founded on the “more fundamental concept of ‘peace.’” (qtd. in Reichberg et al. 83).
Although Augustine began his thought on just war using language that implies a relatively non aggressive and peace-forward approach, he eventually drifted towards a more
extreme interpretation which scholar James Gaffney refers to as Augustine’s “punitive paradigm” (Gaffney 50). When forming his thought Augustine had to engage with critics, in particular Manicheans, who believed that the Old Testament was immoral due to the actions of the Old Testament God (51). Among these actions was the violent suppression of heretics (50). However, like most Chrisitans, Augustine believed in the revealed status of both the Old and New Testaments (51). Therefore, he attempted to find an interpretation of the Bible which could reconcile the seemingly contradictory messages of the Old Testament and the comparatively peaceful, compassionate, and pacifist New Testament (51). He completed this through two conclusions.
First, he approached the actions of God in the Old Testament through the lens of holy war (52). Augustine reasoned that since God is the source of morality and morality is not independent of the will of God, then it is nonsensical to judge God based on any independent criteria of morality (52). The implication of this is that wars which are fought for or on behalf of God cannot be immoral because the very fact that God has sanctioned the war means that it is morally right (52).
Second, Augustine interpreted the peaceful message of the New Testament, and in particular Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, as a guide for inward virtue. Augustine claims, “what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition. The sacred seat of virtue is in the heart” (qtd. in Gaffney 52). Augustine further believed that “well-ordered love” (53) was the basis of the Christian moral framework (53). He then reasoned that war can be loving as well, especially when it is used to save the souls of sinners by “correcting their sinfulness . . . forcibly if necessary” (53). From this Augustine is able to provide a justification for punishing heretics through what Gaffney describes as “a kind of moral surgery to destroy an infection that resists less invasive treatment” (53).
After justifying the Biblical narrative as it relates to war, Augustine defines just wars as “wars that avenge wrongs, when a people or state must be chastised for neglecting to punish wrongdoings of their own citizens, or to restore something that has been wrongfully taken away” (qtd. in Gaffney 54). Here we can see the original restorative nature of Augustine’s just war interpretation side by side with the punitive paradigm (54).
2.5. Scholastic Theologians
After St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1275 C.E.) is the next theologian to have a paradigmatic influence on Catholic just war theory. During the time
between the thought of Augustine and Ambrose until the thought of Aquinas many less influential thinkers and groups still contributed important insights to Catholic just war theory, including those from groups like Pax Dei (Peace of God) and Treuga Dei (Truce of God) which established some early jus in bello guidelines for just war theory (Reichberg et al. 84-85). However, Aquinas remains the most influential Catholic theologian since the Early Church and builds on the theory of his predecessors to create a more developed just war theory.
As James Gaffney notes, St. Aquinas was much more organized in his approach to his thought on war and approached it as a single subject, as opposed to St. Augustine who addressed war as an aside among other topics (Gaffney 55). It is for this reason that his criteria for a just war can be more easily divided into that of “right authority, just cause, and right intention” (56). For Aquinas right authority belongs to the ruler because the purpose of war is “self-defense by a political community” (56). Aquinas differs from Augustine in this regard as he makes some changes towards a more popular definition of a ruler (The Catholic University of American 636). When discussing just cause, Aquinas largely defers to Augustine’s rational concerning guilt and vengeance, but he also moderates it through comments referencing values such as the common good (Gaffney 56). He writes, “the end of law is the common good” (qtd. in Norris 113). When discussing right intention, Aquinas again defers to Augustine and references Augustine’s listing of good and evil virtues (Gaffney 56). However, Aquinas rejects Augustine’s interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount and his belief in purging the inward dispositions of others as an act of love (56).
From the thought of Aquinas we are left with two seemingly contradictory theories. The first contains remnants of Augustine's punitive paradigm and the second is a more moderate form which values the common good, collective defense, and operates on a more rationalist
framework as opposed to the emphasis on dispositions and virtues within the thought of Augustine (57). Gaffney refers to the latter as “Aquinas’s defensive paradigm” (55). Catholic thinkers would build upon this defensive paradigm in 16th century Spain.
First and foremost among these thinkers was the theologian Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1486-1546 C.E.). Francisco de Vitoria’s life coincided with the Spanish conquest of the
Americas, and Spanish abuses against the native people had an impact on his thought (Reichberg et al. 93). Vitoria was very effective at influencing international and public law because his thought was practical and somewhat disenchanted from Christian theology (Gaffney 64). Vitoria’s focus on the value of natural law as law that applied equally to everyone helped create a system where the laws of war could be applied broadly through secular means (Reichberg et al. 93). Evidence of this disenchantment can be seen through his rejection of Augustine’s punitive paradigm which punished the disposition of enemies and his substitution of “equal claims to self-determination . . . undiminished by racial and social differences” (Gaffney 64). This disenchantment from divine revelation and theology is continued in later years through the thought of Hugo Grotius (c. 1583-1645) who maintained that certain natural laws were true “etiamsi daremus non esse Deum (even were God not to exist)” (O’Neill 81). Since Grotius was not a Catholic theologian his work will not be discussed in detail here; however, his thought allowed for just war theory to gain broader appeal in non-Christian circles (O’Neill 81).
Regarding legitimate authority, Vitoria rejected the royal prerogatives of earlier thinkers and adopted a republican view of legitimate authority (Gaffney 61). Vitoria also adopts a near entirely defensive approach to just cause (64). He rejects various imperial and self-serving justifications for war, including those based on religion (61). Jus in bello factors are not ignored either, as Vitoria rejects violence committed against the undeserving and even rejects
unintentional violence against innocents that leads to an unproportional response (62). In
conclusion, Francisco de Vitoria left a legacy of thought which made just war theory much more applicable to the more secular and legalistic world of international law.
2.6. Modernity and contemporary times
Catholic thought on war was relatively unproductive during the time between Francisco de Vitoria and the end of the early modern period until contemporary times beginning in the 20th century when compared to earlier eras (Reichberg et al. 98). This can partly be attributed to the rise of classical international law (the rule of sovereign states) and the later rise of the League of
Nations as the sole authority with the legitimacy to deal with issues of war (98). By the end of the early modern period just war theory was largely accepted amongst Christians, including Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists (The Catholic University of America 637). There was also a minority of Christian pacifists, such as the Quakers (637). The atrocities of the Franco-Prussian Wars and World War I lead to a sizable wave of pacifism in the Christian community (Reichberg et al. 99). Much of the thought during Modernity is not relevant to this present study; however, there is one topic that deserves some attention.
In response to the increasing proceduralization of rules within the League of Nations regulating warfare and a relative absence of concerns surrounding just cause, some Catholic thinkers thought it necessary to update their thought on war in order to reconcile their beliefs with contemporary concerns (99). This led to the Bishop of Geneva, Lausanne, and Fribourg to establish the Fribourg Conventus of 1931, which was a meeting of eight Catholic thinkers called to address issues of the time (Reichberg 572). The Convectus concluded that the “‘natural sociability of states’ leads to increasingly structured juridical relations” (572) which justified the authority of the League of Nations and the international legal system as guarantors of the
common good and order (572). The Convectus also rejected both the punitive paradigm and the defensive paradigm (581). Instead, they opted for a policy of “‘legitimate defense’” (581) which meant that war could only be used to combat “a momentary (on-the-spot) reaction against armed attack” (581). This led to an extremely narrow definition of just war which placed hope for peace in the hands of the international system as an arena for settling disputes. The conclusions of the Convectus are reflected in the statements of Pope’s since 1931 who increasingly defer legitimacy to the international system, especially as the United Nations is formed after World War II (592). Whether or not the Pope’s have adopted the narrow definition of legitimate defense remains to be seen as contemporary issues such as terrorism complicate the field (591-92).
The contemporary era beginning in the 20th century is replete with thinkers, theologians, Pope’s, and other influences and sources that add to the Catholic repository of thought on war. Some of the issues which Catholics in this era have confronted and continue to confront include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, genocide, mutually assured distruction, and the
to these issues and the developments within the thinking of the Catholic Church is beyond the scope of this contextual briefing, but the following paragraphs will highlight some of the more important points and conclusions.
The contemporary era has seen a major emphasis on using violence only as a last resort and a presumption against war (103). Scholar Kristopher Norris traces this presumption against war to the insertion of “James Childress's prima facie principle against killing or injury . . . into accepted Catholic moral discourse” (Norris 119). Norris writes that this presumption against war stands in contrast to earlier Catholic thought which carried with it a “presumption for justice” (119). The presumption against war can be seen in the 1993 statement of the U.S. Bishops The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace. In this statement, the U.S. Bishops implore leaders to take advantage of nonviolent means of conflict resolution and claim that the use of violence should “move back the point at which a government or nation reaches the condition of ‘last resort’” (The Catholic University of America 643). However, this presumption for peace is not absolute. Norris explains this best, writing:
traditional moral commitment to the common good and obligation to secure human rights, grounded in the idea of natural law, all render the Church's presumption for peace merely a prima facie principle that will always be capable of being overcome by these (divinely derivative) obligations. Situations that meet the just war criteria may be few in the contemporary context of warfare, but these features ensure that occasions of massive human rights violations—such as attempted genocide—and some defensive wars will still justify and even require armed protection (Norris 131-32).
When Norris claims that the opportunities for a legitimate just war are rare today, he reflects the thought of many contemporary Catholics such as Pope John XXIII (1881-1963 C.E.) who claims “in an age such as ours . . . which prides itself on atomic energy, it is contrary to reason to hold that war is now a suitable way to restore rights which have been violated” (The Catholic University of America 642).
Another important conclusion is that the Catholic Church has shifted attention to the underlying causes of war (Norris 132). Pope Paul VI addresses this in his 1967 Populorum Progressio where he cites the need to combat economic and social issues in former colonies in order to maintain a just peace (Chu 425). Others address the need for preventing terrorism through engagement with its root causes (Norris 116). Norris claims that “the most recent three
popes have given pacifist-leaning proclamations and appear to have shifted the official teaching of the Church in a more pacifist direction; but one still firmly ensconced in the just war
tradition—not functional pacifism” (132). He also notes that although Catholics believe a true just war would be very rare today, there is no “underlying theological warrant for proclaiming nonviolence as a faithful and obligatory ecclesial practice” (132). Therefore, changing
circumstances can renew the Church’s support for the use of warfare (132).
Chapter 3: Literature Review
This section contains prior literature concerning theoretical matters which are relevant to the present study. This will be divided into four subsections. First will be a section dedicated to literature regarding theories which support the argument that religion is a cause of conflict. Then, alternatively, the argument that religion is a cause of peace. After this will be a discussion of moderating literature which postulates religion's role as ambivalent and as one factor among many in both conflict and peace. Next, a section dedicated to literature concerning religion’s place in international relations theory and the theoretical role of the Catholic Church.
3.1. Religion as a cause of conflict
One cannot address the role of religion in contemporary modern conflict without including Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis. Huntington predicted that cultural (including religious), rather than nationalist, ideological, or economic fault lines will be the primary cause of conflict in this age (Silvestri and Mayall 15). Huntington largely relegates conflicts between nationstates to a bygone age which ended after World War I and conflicts between ideological opponents to the 20th century tripolar conflict between communism, fascism, and democracy (Huntington 23). Note, however, that Huntington maintains that nationstates will not lose their status as powerful actors, but rather will lose their status as the primary fuel for the creation of conflict (Silvestri and Mayall 15). He attributes conflict between cultures and religions to, among other causes, globalization which “[intensifies] civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within
civilizations” (Huntington 25). This shrinking of the world, combined with the erosion of local identities, leaves room for religious movements to fill the gap due to the ability of religion to “[provide] a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries” (26) in a process that George Wiegel called the “unsecularization of the world” (qtd. in Huntington 26) and Gilles Kepel has called “la revanche de Dieu” (qtd. in Huntington 26). Huntington notes that these religious movements are often the kind that are termed fundamentalist and include
processes such as the “‘Hinduization’ of India” (26) and the “‘re-Islamization’ of the Middle East” (26). For Huntington, the deeply ingrained and often immutable nature of culture causes the discussion of loyalties to be shifted from “Which side are you on?”(26) to “What are you?” (26). This is even more difficult when it comes to religion, since it is possible for someone to be bi-racial, but more difficult for someone to be bi-religious (27). Therefore, religion serves as a volatile fault line in the contemporary era.
While Huntington lays a reasonable foundation for pointing the finger at religion as a driver of conflict, Johan Galtung gives specific ways in which religion can promote violence. It should be noted that Galtung’s work taken as a whole does not support the thesis that religion is a primary driver of conflict because his work seeks to illustrate the peaceful aspects of religion; however, he indirectly creates a list of religious factors that promote violence which he uses to extrapolate his more peaceful thesis (Silvestri and Mayall 15). Here are a few of the mechanisms which Galtung describes.
The religious concept of a chosen people is problematic for Galtung. He writes that a people who believe that God has chosen them may be imbued with “a high level of
self-righteousness which, in turn, may lead to concepts of Holy War or at least Just War” (Galtung). He notes that religious individuals who believe in this somewhat egotistical chosenness may engage in “aggressive missionarism” (Galtung). Writing on aggressive
missionarism he claims that it is the “difference between being an adherent of a faith considered right and worthy of being spread to others, and that of living under a divine command to spread the faith, if necessary by backing up the message through the skillful use of the carrot and the stick. The occidental religions Christianity and Islam clearly fall into this category; Judaism, less so . . .” (Galtung).
In developing a framework for his conceptualization of chosenness, Galtung creates three categories of chosen people: those who express their status through withdrawal from world affairs and isolationism, such as the Chinese; those whose status makes them “universally aggressive” (Galtung) in the sense that their ethics and beliefs are often universalized to apply to the world as a whole in sometimes aggressive manifestations, such as Christians, Muslims, Marxists, and Liberals; and, finally, those whose chosen status often leads them to believe that they have been chosen for peace, such as various traditions of Buddhism (Galtung). Galtung notes that the last category is, unfortunately, the smallest (Galtung). Elaborating further, he writes that the relationship between a people and their God may, in some circumstances, create a perception of in-groups and out-groups (Silvestri and Mayall 19). Historically, the creation of in-groups and out-groups is a recipe for violence.
One last insight from Galtung is his description of how religions may contribute to structural violence. He cites the caste system of Hinduism as an example of vertical structural violence, which is contrasted with Buddhism which avoids the structural violence of a caste system through belief in a mutable soul (Galtung). Christianity serves as an example as well in its use as a framework for justifying slavery (Galtung). Also, in terms of its use as a framework for justifying colonialism (Galtung). Galtung writes that “liberation from colonialism could . . . be granted proportionate to the extent to which adherence to Christianity was reported”
(Galtung) meaning that the structural violence in colonies was directly related to the extent they accepted the beliefs of their Christian colonizers (Galtung).
These ideas from Huntington and Galtung taken together provide a theoretical lens for viewing religion as integral to the development of conflicts.
3.2. Religion as a cause of peace
The antithesis to the prior subsection is the thesis that religion is a primary cause of peace. The discussion of the relevant literature for this thesis will be divided into three parts. First an example of how religion is being used today to pursue peace; then, a discussion
regarding how religious beliefs and values contribute to peace; finally, a subsection dedicated to how religious leaders can be influential in the formation of peace.
Faith based diplomacy highlights ways the peaceful potentiality of religion can be institutionalized. The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs is a journal where the origins of the practice can be traced to in the United States (Silvestri and Mayall 28). Faith based diplomacy may utilize strategies employed by secular thinkers and actors, but faith is the
backbone of the approach (Cox and Philpott 32). The approach concerns itself with two issues regardless of the religious tradition being utilized, these are, “the proper orientation of politics to the transcendent . . . [and] . . . the active role of the divine in human affairs.” (31-32). Faith based diplomacy rooted in Judaism provides an example of how this proper orientation can be
visualized. For Jewish practitioners, God’s vision of how human beings should live amongst one another can be described using the concept of shalom (32). An article from The Brandywine Review of Faith and Diplomacy describes shalom as, “a harmony that amounts to far more than a negative peace in which people refrain from harming one another, but implies a condition of active love for each person consistent with his God-given dignity” (32). It is easy to see how this model for human relationships can be transformed into a roadmap for achieving peace. The authors also point to other tenants of faith based diplomacy, such as reconciliation, mercy, compromise, “solidarity with the poor, and the overturning of unjust structures” (33-34). These concepts point to more emotional and human issues in the peace process that may be left out when peacemaking is left to secular actors relying on game theory or classical international relations theoretical models of war and peace.
As faith based diplomacy relies heavily on various religious values to achieve its goals, it is important to elaborate on how scholars view these religious values as they relate to peace.
Scott Appleby writes that religious beliefs are important for peace because their ethical nature has a tendency to unite people who were once divided (Silvestri and Mayall 16). He also points to the influences of nonviolent practitioners such as Gandhi and Dr. King who
revolutionized the nonviolence movement and gave a religious flavor to nonviolence, Muslim thinkers who attempt to reconcile Sharia with the demands of a just society, Christian thinkers who apply just war and pacifism to contemporary issues, and scholars of the various Asian
traditions who attempt to apply their beliefs to the cause of human rights (Appleby 5). Similar to the idea that the ethical nature of religious beliefs can be uniting, another scholar writes that religious concern with ethical issues is positive because it leads to dialogue and brainstorming regarding ways to improve our societies (Silvestri and Mayall 28).
Specific examples exist in the literature of the myriad ways various religious traditions incorporate peace into their belief and value systems. Within Christianity, many of these
examples relate to the figure of Christ. The Passion of Christ models the virtue of reconciliation through the Christian God’s sacrifice on behalf of a sinful humanity (29). In this vain, the Epistle to the Ephesians reads, “and be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ has forgiven you” (Eph. 4.32). Here the reconciliation of God with humanity is used as a model for how human beings should relate to one another in the worldly domain. The greatest example of Christ in his traditional role as the ‘Prince of Peace’ are his biblical words during the Sermon on the Mount. Among the most direct peace promoting verses are, “blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy,” (Matt. 5.7) “blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God,” (Matt. 5.9) and “. . . love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you . . .”(Matt. 5.44).
Similar to the virtue of reconciliation is forgiveness. Dr. Marc Gopin writes in
“Forgiveness as an Element of Conflict Resolution in Religious Cultures” that forgiveness is so important to Christianity that “believing in forgiveness is a sine qua non of believing in the living reality of God” (Gopin 87). Forgiveness is important in Christianity in both a religious and worldly sense. Accepting forgiveness from Christ is essential to becoming a part of the Christian faith and it is also important for maintaining, in many Christian’s view, a right relationship with God (89). The theological concept of forgiveness becomes action in the worldly sense when individuals practice forgiveness in an attempt to imitate God. Furthermore, this concept of forgiveness is common to all of the Abrahamic faiths (89). It is seen in Judaism through the iterative forgiveness that God grants to the people of Israel as they navigate a cyclical process of falling in and out of favor with him and his covenant (89). In Judaism, forgiveness is seen within the framework of a larger process of individual change that includes repentance and a
forgiveness” (90) when an individual has clearly reformed themselves (90). In Islam, forgiveness is commended multiple times in the Qur’an and it is suggested that individuals who practice forgiveness, even when not required, will receive a divine reward (90).
These virtues of reconciliation, forgiveness, mercy, peace, and love are just a few
examples of Christian beliefs which support peacebuilding. Now it is time to take a deeper look at how these virtues can be applied.
Many Christian denominations boast a rich tradition of applying these virtues in practice. In fact, Christianity carries an entire toolkit of non-violent mechanisms for dealing with conflicts that many Christian groups have used throughout history (Silvestri and Mayall 29). Mennonite Christian organizations in particular have demonstrated their commitment to nonviolent
peacebuilding (29). Dr. Emily Welty from Pace University conducted a study in 2014 on the role of a faith-based NGO, the Mennonite Central Committee, in the context of peacebuilding in Uganda and Kenya. She located four central values which guide the practices of the organization on the ground; namely, “peace, community, simplicity and humility” (Welty 67). These values guide the how of Mennonite peacebuilding for the organization, which results in work that is “grassroots [and] community level” and is conducted “humbly [and] frugally” (67). The
Mennonite Central Committee takes these values seriously, requiring members to live like locals when working in developing countries to emphasize frugality and place blame on their own organization for failures in the field as an act of humility (68-69). Mennonite peace theology deeply pervades the entirety of the organization to the point that the organization requires members to “unequivocally reject military service and violence” (67). Every Christian
denomination has their own methods for applying their theological values to peacebuilding, but the Mennonitte community is a leader in systematically turning their values into practice. Christianity, however, is not the only faith which incorporates the value of peace into its belief system.
The Islamic tradition contains peace oriented beliefs, practices, and values as well. In “Islamic Resources of Peacebuilding: Achievements and Challenges,” Mohammad Abu-Nimer and Ihsan Yilmaz describe some of these values which are apparent in Muslim communities (Abu-Nimer and Yilmaz 19). These are, “concepts such as ihsan (perfect goodness, healing,
reconciliation), samah (forgiveness), sabr (patience), adl (justice), taqwa (piety), aml al-khayr (good deed), and a collective sense of communal peacemaking and human solidarity (ummah)” (19). Abu-Nimer describes how values found within the Qur’an and Muslim tradition underlie various non-violent tools that Muslims have used for centuries (Silvestri and Mayall 30). Some of these tools are recognizable in the secular world of conflict resolution, such as mediation and arbitration, yet some are more religious in character, such as methods which are “based on the value of forgiveness and public repentance” (30). The Qur’anic concept of sulhah, which can be translated to reconciliation, is an example of one of these values based in forgiveness
(Abu-Nimer and Yilmaz 20). The use of mediation is exemplified through the Prophet Mohammad’s mediation of disagreements with the Qurayshi regarding the Ka’bah and the Treaty at Hudaybiyah is seen as an example of the Prophet’s support for peace even when it comes with the price of losing face for the Musim community (19). Abu-nimer also cites Islam’s own tradition of just war theorizing and its influence on non-violent resistance to colonialism in the 20th century (Silvestri and Mayall 30).
One of the most powerful peaceful aspects of Islam may be its tradition of social justice. Social justice in Islam takes the form of care for the most vulnerable members of society, which helps to fight structural violence (Silvestri and Mayall 30). Social justice is so ingrained in the tradition of Islam that even its most violent manisfestations, such as the religious ideology of Al-Qaeda, use the concept (30). Islamist militants and terrorist organizations have embraced the concept of social justice in a multitude of ways, including criticizing the west for its failures regarding the Kyoto Protocols, denouncing the actions of multinational corporations, and
criticizing the cultivation of cash crops while citizens starve (Burke 20). Given that these groups have not abandoned a belief in social justice, it is no surprise that social justice is an integral part of Islam for the Muslim community as a whole.
Although contemporary discourse regarding Islam tends to focus on the topics of terrorism, militancy, and interpretations which are popularly viewed as antithetical to western ideals, such as Wahabbism, there are scholars who focus on the legacy of Islamic pluralism as it relates to peaceful coexistence. In The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, Abdulaziz Sachedina discusses how leaders who view pluralism as threatening to Islam often lead
contemporary Muslim nationstates (Sachedina 132). For these leaders, pluralism relegates Islam to the position of a mere opinion, and threatens its hold on public values (132). There are Middle Eastern scholars who attempt to bring to light sources from the Muslim tradition that support pluralism, however these scholars are often left out of the traditional Sunni institutions of political thought (132). Within Shia Islam, especially in Iran, traditional scholarly thought has been primarily focused on defending political Islam from western influences, and traditional Shia scholars often portray pluralist thinkers as slaves to westernized conceptions of Islam (132). Sachedina, however, writes that fundamentalist Muslim leaders and scholars who rely on classical interpretations of Islam are often acting in an ironically revisionist fashion (133). Sachedina claims that when these leaders and scholars view classical interpretations and rulings “as sacred, and hence immutable” (133) they inadvertently “end up actually closing what Muslim scholars have aptly described as ‘the gates of independent reasoning’ (ijtihād)” (133). He writes that classical Muslim scholars from whom fundamentalists draw their political beliefs practiced ijtihād themselves and would not have seen their own rulings and interpretations as infallible (133). Therefore, he reasons, each generation needs their own scholars to interpret the Qur’an and other Islamic sources for themselves in light of the current context (134). For himself, Sachedina finds evidence of values which prioritize human dignity and equality in the Qur’an (134). He explains that even though his findings may differ significantly from past
interpretations, they are ultimately drawn directly from the Qur’an (134). Therefore, Sachedina’s work provides a rationale and framework for reconciling Islam with contemporary notions of democracy, pluralism, and peaceful coexistence.
Moving on from the discussion of religious values, these next paragraphs will elucidate how religious leaders and actors can and have contributed to peace.
The crux of the argument for including religious leaders and actors as current and potential agents of peace stems from what can be referred to as the “nested paradigm” (Appleby 18). Scott Appleby expands on this concept which is drawn from a line of scholars such as Marie Dugan and John Paul Lederach. Appleby defines the nested paradigm as:
conflict transformation, whereby local actors, people already embedded, or “nested,” in the conflicted community, collaborate in a wide range of activities and functions that precede and follow formal peace accords. Respected midlevel educational, business,
health, and religious leaders who control primary networks of groups and institutions serve as advocates and mediators (18).
Religious leaders are suited to this brand of peacemaking because they are often already embedded in communities at all levels of leadership (18).
Other scholars indirectly build on this concept by highlighting the different ways that the position of religious leaders and actors can make them effective peacemakers. Among the many characteristics which situate them as particularly adept at solving conflicts are “authority, trust, professionalism and also cultural and practical/experiential closeness to the people involved” (Silvestri and Mayall 34-35). The religiously orientated problem solving styles of these actors allow them to connect with local communities, come up with unique and contextually
appropriate solutions, and earn moral legitimacy (34, 36). This moral legitimacy, when applied to religious leaders, supports the image of leaders who are driven by interest in the common good rather than personal gain (38). These leaders are further trusted because religious adherents “often see ‘religion-based’ actors as able and willing to consider not just obvious facts, but also underlying and profound dimensions of conflict resolution, such as morality, responsibility, reconciliation, and forgiveness” (38). It is not enough for a leader to only understand or practice these virtues, but also to have the public recognize this in order to maintain support. When peace oriented religious leaders receive this support they can serve as a foil to leaders which use religion as a framework for the legitimation of violence in order to preserve power (Chu 422). As a side note, leaders of faith based humanitarian aid organizations are better positioned to distribute aid due to grassroots networks and low overhead costs in comparison to secular NGOs and IOs which typically operate on a salary structure and shoulder the costs of large
bureaucracies (Silvestri and Mayall 35).
An important aspect of including religious actors in the peace process is their ability to act as mediators by translating between two value systems; this can be conceptualized as
“mediators as translators” (35). Abbas Aroua discusses this in his 2005 paper “Danish ‘Faces of Mohammed’ Cartoons Crisis: Mediating Between Two Worlds,” which highlights the role of interreligious mediators in addressing tensions between the secular free press and the Muslim prohibition on caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (Aroua 34). Aroua noticed that Muslim
actors in this dillemma often presented their grievances in religious terms, which could not be readily translated to secular actors without a value system mediator (34-35). The value system mediator must “not rely on what is said but rather look at what is meant, at what a person wants to say” (35). This tactic does not only apply to translating religious terms into secular terms, but also vice versa. Aroua demonstrates how to translate the human rights discourse of the west into an Islamic value system; he writes:
Consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example: if one takes its articles one by one and tries to validate them by Islamic principles, they will be accepted by everyone. When I talk about torture, I never mention the UN Convention Against Torture. Rather I say: ‘The Prophet said that the human being is more sacred than the Kaaba, than the House of God’ (35).
In whichever direction the translation of values moves, it is an important tool which religious leaders can cultivate for avoiding misunderstandings and facilitating dialogue.
The Catholic Church boasts some contemporary examples of the value of religious actors in peace building. Abu-Nimer writes how the Church’s participation in Venezuelan peace talks is positive because it opens the door for catholic laity to participate as well (Abu-Nimer). He also claims that the success of the Church in peace building obligates it to participate in conflict resolution, especially when the authority and legitimacy of the Church can be leveraged in order to make it stand out as a trusted neutral mediator (Abu-Nimer).
The cause of conflict and cause of peace theses are moderated by a third option. This third option is likely where most scholars of religion would place themselves today.
3.3. Religion as one factor among many
Much literature on this topic reveals a moderating view; one that still accepts religion as a factor in the development of conflicts, but recognizes it as one factor among many. Various scholars have found themselves confronted with the complexity of conflict and in turn have recognized that single factor conflicts are rare, if not non-existent. Conceptualizing a conflict as one dimensional does not lend credence to the idea that conflicts are a complex web of
intentions, reactions, and the interplay between them (Silvestri and Mayall 16). Galtung has rejected the term ‘religious conflicts’ because of its lack of respect for complexity (19).
A powerful thesis within this stream of thought is Scott Appleby’s “ambivalence of the sacred,” (20) which contends that religion is not inherently good or bad, but its place on the violence versus peace dichotomy is dependent on societal circumstances (20). He writes that critics of religion who cast religions as either fundamentally opposed to progress and human rights or, alternatively, apologists of religion who explain away acts of religious terrorism and abuse through recourse to the “this is not Islam, this is not Christianity, this is not Sikhism” (Appleby 10) argument are both guilty of reductionism devoid of an appreciation for complexity (10). The critics do not take into consideration the “moral constraints [religion] imposes on intolerant and violent behavior” (10) and the apologists do not accept the fact that religious actors who commit atrocities may be acting based on authentic beliefs (10). Appleby exemplifies his thesis through reference to religious militants. He writes that there are two types of religious militants; extremists and peacemakers (11). Both types “go to extremes” (11) and are “radical” (11), but the extremist is radical in their preference for violent purification of their communities and the peacemaker is radical in their commitment to nonviolence (11). Both types are on the fringes of the religious communities to which they belong (11). They are also both “engaged in warfare” (11) to a certain extent (11). It is just that the extremists' engagement is literal and the peacemaker’s engagement is through the metaphorical spiritual equivalent of warfare (11). By way of example, this is similar to the Islamic conceptualization of ‘greater jihad’ and ‘lesser jihad.’
Another perspective on this ambivalence can be deduced from the work of Stefan Wolff in his book Ethnic Conflict. Wolff describes a system of “underlying’ (structural, political, economic, social, cultural, perceptual) and ‘proximate’ causes of conflict (i.e. the role of leaders and their strategic choices, both domestically and in neighbouring countries)” (Silvestri and Mayall 17). Underlying causes are “necessary, but not sufficient conditions” (Wolff 68) and proximate causes “increase the likelihood of conflict in a situation in which all or some of the underlying ‘ingredients’ are present” (71). Some scholars believe that while Wolff’s argument primarily describes issues of ethnicity as an underlying cause, this same argument can be applied to religion (Silvestri and Mayall 17-18). In other words, whereas ethnic and religious issues can be present in certain communities, it is ultimately up to the specific circumstances of the conflict
to determine whether these issues erupt into war (17). In support of this perspective, Wolff writes, “the distinction between underlying and proximate causes also enable an explanation of why, despite similar basic conditions, not every situation of ethnic tensions leads to full-scale civil war” (Wolff 71).
While Appleby, Wolff, Silvestri, and Mayall provide evidence for the argument that religion is not a cause of conflict or peace one way or the other, there is evidence that religion affects conflicts in other ways. For example, Jonathan Fox conducted a quantitative study which looked at the relationship between religion and various aspects of conflict and found that
religious factors influence ethnic discrimination more than cultural factors (Fox 136). He also found that religious similarities between an intervening state and a minority group are highly predictive of whether or not a state will intervene on behalf of an ethnic minority in an ethnic war; similarly, he found that intervention is much more likely in an ethno-religious war than an ethnic war (132). Another study has shown that when talks amongst conflicting parties involve demands which are presented in religious terms there is less of a chance for a successful deal (Silvestri and Mayall 19). This harkens back to the need for value system translators from the previous section. The results of these studies point to a role for religion in conflict that is not necessarily causational, but rather influential. In this case, the causational relationship is between religion and the qualities of the conflict, not the conflict itself.
3.4. Religion in international relations theory
This section will highlight some broad insights regarding the role of religion in international relations theory in general. The purpose of this is to examine the ways in which religion has been neglected in international relations theory. This section will conclude by relating this information to the role of the Catholic Church in international relations.
Scholars Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito conceptualize religion in international relations theory as one centered on the theme of exile (Petito and Hatzopoulos 1). The emergence of the modern international relations discipline was dependent on the exile of religion, as the modern international relations system was partly built to stop endless religious conflict, starting
with the Peace of Westphalia (1). The scholars draw from Thomas Hobbes and write, “God made space to the great Leviathan (the sovereign state), that mortal God to which the new modern man owes his peace and security, religion was privatized” (1). The Peace of Westphalia introduced the modern sovereign state and subsumed issues of religion under the authority of the sovereign (Chu 421). Consequently, the discipline of international relations came to see religion as “the ultimate threat to order, security, and civility, and, could not inhabit both the practices of international relations and, subsequently, the discipline of International Relations” (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2). Writing for the journal Politics and Religion, scholar Lan T. Chu supports this and claims that theorists from the classical schools of liberalism and realism both have a history of viewing religion first and foremost as a threat to a peaceful world order (Chu 421-422). Chu also suggests that the mutual exclusivity of religion and the modern state system has not been the only factor keeping theorizing about religion from mainstream international relations theory, but the difficulty of studying religion itself in a positivist manner has been a factor as well (425). The Catholic Church in particular has been neglected in scholarship due to this theoretical bias
against the involvement of religion in international relations; Chu claims that religion is often overlooked as a significant factor in international relations and much of the research on the topic is relegated to the analysis of current events, rather than theorizing (421). However, as
Hatzopoulos and Petito note, religion has “survived the long Westphalian exile . . . [and] religion is again back to world politics” (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2).
In the contemporary international system issues regarding religion are front and center in discussions of terrorism, coexistence, global governance, conflict resolution, and more. Scholars have again taken an interest in the consequences of the existence of religion for the international relations discipline. This includes important contemporary works we have already discussed such as Appleby’s The Ambivalence of the Sacred and Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, but also calls from scholars such as Johnathan Fox to make space for the study of religion within the traditional international relations schools of thought, such as acknowledging religious actors and institutions as alternative sources of power in realist schools of thought (Chu 422). This fits with the trend in contemporary international relations scholarship of recognizing the power of actors besides the state (436). In this vein, Chu writes, “political and social realities remind us of the
need to take seriously alternatives to the state. Although it is a discipline traditionally
preoccupied with states and hard power, recognizing the influence of ideas and non-state actors has become increasingly popular and necessary” (436).
This resurgence of religion, however, is not simply a return to the pre-Westphalian past because, as Hatzopoulos and Peito note, exile in the Abrahamic faith context is not a process that ends with a return to normalcy, but rather “exile can be a deeply transformative experience” (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2). Both the exile and the place they are exiled from undergo changes (2). It is clear that the ‘place’ in this context, the international system, has changed since the Peace of Westphalia, but the scholars also question whether or not religion has changed enough for the international system (2). The line of questioning is summarized here:
the exile opens up the way for what Saint Paul calls a metanoia, a drastic ‘change of mind.’ But has religion experienced with respect to international politics this metanoia? Is religion ready to stand on the side of a ‘global peaceful ethos’ and not of a ‘global war’ as the scenario of a ‘clash of civilizations’ predicts (2)?
The scholars suggest that the answer to these questions could very well be affirmative (2). Chu would agree that this line of questioning is a good place to begin introducing the phenomenon of religion into serious international relations theory. She suggests, “rather than theorizing religion out, perhaps we should try to understand how religion has managed to adapt to an increasing secular, modern world” (Chu 423).
Chu cites the Catholic Church as an example of an institution which can possibly fit the profile of having a place in international relations theory, especially as it relates to its role in peace building (419-20). Examples such as the Church’s role in opposing the Iraq War, its role in democratization across Europe and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and its role in
influencing discourse about the use of war support including the Church as an actor with real power in the international system (419-20, 23). She claims that the difficulty of placing the Church in a causal framework due to the many variables it operates in conjunction with and the habit rationalist theorists have of disregarding arguments that are based on the moral and theological power of the Church has resulted in the under theorization of this particular institution (420). Encompassing all of her arguments and examples of the theoretical value of religion, she concludes with the observation of a “counter Nietzschean phenomenon: that God
indeed is not dead — and the value and peaceful effect of religion’s moral, symbolic voice on international relations can and should be incorporated into a consistent theoretical framework” (420). The results of this present study will hopefully shed some light on what this theoretical framework would look like, and whether or not the Catholic Church has the peaceful effect that Chu discusses.
Chapter 4: The Theoretical Framework
As this study will not be testing any particular theory, but will rather explore the contemporary Church in search of trends and new insights, the theoretical framework can be conceptualized as expectations for the results of the analysis. Due to the wealth of evidence within the literature for a contemporary Church oriented towards peace and the evidence from the literature review regarding the Church’s support for international governance and dispute resolution mechanisms, it is expected that the Church will support peaceful solutions to the conflicts analyzed in this study. The Church will likely use language which supports mechanisms common to international governance organizations like the United Nations, such as mediation, negotiation, and ceasefires. The nature of the qualitative content analysis will allow for
understanding the responses of the Church in a way that goes beyond the basic and broad description of being peaceful.
The analysis is also expected to indicate a moral framework that is entrenched in values that go beyond the theological values of the Church. This is due to the increasingly broad appeal of Catholic thought after multiple generations of disenchantment from theology and an
increasing reliance on natural law and secular sources of morality and conflict resolution mechanisms.
Hopefully, the analysis will shed some light on how the contemporary Church views contemporary issues such as terrorism as well. The nature of the Syrian Civil War will make it hard to avoid discussing these issues due to the range of problems involved in the war, including chemical weapons, terrorism, and proxy warfare. The War in Donbass and Crimea will also make it difficult to avoid touching upon issues of contemporary warfare due to the complicated network of proxies involved and issues of covert territorial expansion.
Chapter 5: Methods and Methodology
5.1. Theoretical assumptions
The theoretical assumptions of this study guide the selection of qualitative content analysis as a valid research method. A brief overview of these assumptions is given here.
The lens through which the textual data analyzed in this study is viewed is indebted to interpretivist and constructivist traditions more so than the positivist tradition. The lens is constructivist in the view “that each individual mentally constructs the world of experience through cognitive processes” (Andrews) and in the view that “knowledge and truth as created not discovered by the mind” (Andrews). Because of these assumptions, it has been attempted as much as possible to bracket prior beliefs when analyzing the textual data in order to achieve some degree of objectivity in what is primarily an analysis of subjective material. From social constructivism comes the idea that through a dialectical relationship between all of our
subjective realities we can hope to come to some sort of common understanding of our
subjective realities which approaches objectivity (Andrews). This objectivity is not to say that fundamental reality is being grasped in the sense of directly measuring what would be akin to, for example, Kant’s noumenal world. Rather, the objectivity is achieved through coming to a common understanding of meaning (Andrews). In other words, “meaning is shared, thereby constituting a taken-for-granted reality” (Andrews). When individuals dialectically discuss meaning through communication they can come to an understanding of a “quasi-objective reality” (Mayring 8). It is for this reason that rules concerning interpretation are important in order to achieve this quasi-objective reality through a process that multiple researchers can repeat (8). The following subsections of this section will describe the chosen method of inquiry and explain some of these rules which seek to ensure that the interpretation of the textual data can be understood and debated on a community level rather than simply being esoteric
