The effect of Social media towards Euroscepticism: A new era of media and formation of public opinion
The case of Cyprus
Table of contents
Abstract ... 3
Literature Review ... 6
Theory and Hypotheses of the Present Study ... 12
Background of the study: Cyprus as a place to study social media trust and Euroscepticism ... 12
Hypotheses of the study ... 13
People who use and trust social media will tend to have more negative opinion towards the EU ... 13
An especially strong effect is expected for those using social media as a news channel and not for gossip ... 15
Methods ... 16
Study design ... 16
Statistical analyses ... 17
Results ... 17
Descriptive analysis ... 17
Statistical analysis concerning the hypothesis that people who use and trust social media will tend to have more negative opinion towards the EU ... 18
Statistical analysis regarding the hypothesis that an especially strong effect is expected for those using social media as a news channel and not for gossip ... 24
Discussion ... 30
Conclusions ... 33
Abstract
Background: Recent data indicate that there is a rise of Euroscepticism levels across the European Union. This effect is stronger for the countries affected by the debt crisis, such as Cyprus. At the same time, social networks have lead to a significant change in information provision, leading to a massive use of non-conventional media for the communication of political messages. In general, social networks are strongly related with the outcome of elections and political campaigns and should therefore be considered as worth investigating for political scientists.
Aim: The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between social media use and Euroscepticism in Cyprus.
Methods: A secondary data-driven analysis was carried out on data collected by the Eurobarometer 2017 on the responders from Cyprus. The trust in social media and the frequency of use were used as independent variables in order to investigate a potentially negative correlation between social media use and Euroscepticism. Using social media as a news resource was also treated as an independent variable, in order to investigate if those using the social media had higher scores of Euroscepticism. For both hypotheses, all the variables that reflected parameters associated with Euroscepticism were used as potentially dependent variables.
Results: Most of the relationships that were investigated did not lead to statistically significant associations between the variables examined. More specifically, the hypothesis that those using and trusting social media would have higher scores of Euroscepticism was not confirmed, since in some cases the analyses reflected higher Euroscepticism scores for those using and trusting the social media, while in some others lower. For example, those trusting the social media believed that more decisions should be taken on a EU level (p=0.025, OR 1.78), while they also believed that there might be a better future outside the EU (p=0.001, OR 2.22).
Conclusions: Since most of the analysis lead to non-statistically significant relationships, both hypotheses were rejected. Yet, the fact that for some aspects those using the social media as a primary news resource had more positive attitudes towards the European Union while for some others negative can lead us to the conclusion that Euroscepticism is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, rather than a single attitude regarding an overall agreement with the concept of the European Union.
Key-words: Cyprus, Eurobarometer, European Integration, European Union, Euroscepticism, social media
Introduction
From a historical perspective, the EU era can be regarded as a period of economic development and peace for most European countries, which succeded the World War II era. Due to the economic benefits of the Union, several countries became members during the previous decades leading to a unified market, also allowing free travel to the citizents of each country (Dinan & Wolinetz, 2004).
Yet, according to Taylor (2008) the EU ideal is in doubt during the last decades. As he notes, several reasons such as the continious enlargement of the Union have lead into massive skepticism concerning its usefulness. Yet, this attitude is not in line with the agenda of the major political parties in most of the countries, who support each countries participation in the Union. However, Brexit could be regarded as one of the first consequences of Euroscepticism, since the skepticism concerning the usefulness of the European Union was followed by specific actions leading to the exit of Great Britain (Hobolt, 2016). Therefore, it could be supported that we are living in an era in which Euroscepticism starts to have specific consequences for the European Union and is not just an attitude of minor political parties who have no power to practically support their countries exit from the Union.
A major challenge for social sciences is to carry out research regarding phenomena that are of high importance for the society in order to draw reasonable conclusions and to come to practical implications (Babbie, 2013). Public surveys are of high importance in social research since they can provide valuable information concerning the attitudes of people for social and political phenomena, in order to help policy makers adjust their policies accordingly (Robson, 2002).
In that context, the aim of the present study was to expand our knowledge concerning Euroscepticism in Cyprus by investigating parameters regarding social media use on Euroscepticism levels.
Literature Review
European integration is the major goal of the EU. and refers to economic, juridical, political, social and security constitution between the countries that belong to the union (Sankari, 2016). Euroscepticism is a term used to express the opposition towards higher European integration (Usherwood & Startin, 2013). Nonetheless, Euroscepticism and resistance to higher European integration should not be considered as synonyms. Euroscepticism refers to beliefs and attitudes, whereas resistance to European integration refers to specific behaviors (e.g. voting a specific political party). For that reason, Euroscepticism is considered as a precondition of resistance to the European integration, resulting therefore in relevant subsequent actions (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009).
Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have accelerated the European integration process back in the ‘80s and the ‘90s (Pollack, 2001). The ideal of integration was adopted in most countries belonging to the union and was positively correlated with their time length of participation in the union (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). Yet, according to Taylor (2008), even though European Integration was positively anticipated by citizens of many European countries, they were never really enthusiastic regarding to overall concept of integration. As he supports, positive attitudes were more an agreement and a passive consent to a policy enforced by the local governments and the European Union, rather than an enthusiastic support of the integration process, making it vulnerable to a future transposition of beliefs and attitudes concerning the integration itself.
A massive skepticism concerning European integration was developed at the beginning of the 21st century (Harteveld et al., 2013). It is supported that Euroscepticism became more prevalent after the 1991 Maastricht agreement, as an opposing force to the rising trend of European Integration (Verny, 2011). Analyses from several countries of the EU indicate that the mistrust towards the EU has been increased after the beginning of the debt crisis in 2007 (Harteveld et al., 2013). This mistrust has been expressed towards specific institutions that are responsible for the economic policy of the union (e.g. the European Central Bank) (Ehrmann et al., 2013), as well as towards the wider concept of European integration (Fligstein et al., 2012). It is currently supported that there are high rates of Euroscepticism across the union, which resulted
in voting Euroscepticism parties in the 2014 European elections, leading to an unprecedented success for those parties (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016).
A vital point in studying Euroscepticism is to detect the time point related to the decline in positive attitudes towards the European Union. As supported by Taylor (2008), 2005 is a very important year for Euroscepticism, since from then and after the positive attitudes for the Integration process showed a significant decline. More importantly, as he mentions, 2005 is the year in which less than half of the European Union citizens expressed a positive attitude for the Union. This was the first time that the positive appreciation of the European Union became a minority, instead of a majority.
To attribute this decline it is necessary to provide a model which can explain the massive decline in positive attitudes for the Union. Contrarily to models attributing this “abnormal” decline, from an alternative point of view, highly positive attitudes towards the Union during the 90’s can be treated as the abnormal condition, which was brought back to normality during the next decade. According to this Eurosceptic perspective itself, there are several reasons for which the high rates of positive attitudes towards the Union were recorded during the 90’s. The main reasons for this favoritism are the following (Taylor, 2008):
The influence of highly appreciated political personalities supporting the Integration, such as Kohl and Mitterrand
The establishment of a common economic market for the Union’s countries, accelerating their economical development
The end of the Cold War, leading to an optimism for the future in most European countries, especially in Germany
The further enhancement of the Schengen agreement
The adoption of a common policy for international affairs, leading to an improvement in the international relationships for the members
In order to get a deeper understanding of Euroscepticism it is necessary to highlight the Eurosceptistics parties inside the union. According to Hooghe & Marks (2007), there are two major groups of Euroscepticists inside the EU. The first group is the right
wing party. Right wingers are more resistant to European integration since they consider that this process poses serious threats to the cultural identity of their countries and therefore there is no reason to accelerate the European integration process. The second party is the left wingers, which support that European integration will result to work rights’ violation for the lower social classes. The more radical those parties are, the stronger their resistance to European integration (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2007). Taggart (1998) also supports that Euroscepticism is found on parties which are placed on the periphery of the party system. As he supports, the major parties support the ideal of European integration, whereas those right and left wing parties, who are not that popular, find a way through Euroscepticism to reach an audience that is under expressed by the agenda of the major political parties. Hence, political parties use Euroscepticism as a way to reach a specific audience of potential voters that is neglected from the mainstream parties.
Apart from the aforementioned differentiation which examines Euroscepticism as a belief of extreme political parties, other models have tried to associate Euroscepticism with several factors that differentiate a nation from the wider European identity. England is such an example, since there are many factors that differentiate local people from other Europeans. Among the factors that have shaped a sense of English national identity are its insular, geopolitical situation, the early development of a centralized English state, and the concomitant growth of a unified English legal system (Smith, 2006). Indeed, Brexit indicates that Euroscepticism is a public belief, which is an attempt to protect the national identity, irrespective of radical right and left wing beliefs (Vasilopoulou, 2016). As supported by Taylor (2008), it was also the first country in which a decline was recorded in positive attitudes towards the European Union during the 70’s. It is also interesting to investigate how Euroscepticism is developed in Eastern Europe. In those countries Euroscepticism is based on their communist legacy, since citizens of those countries are opposed to integration in general, not necessarily to European integration. In the post-communist states there are both strong nationalistic ideas, as well as negative attitudes towards a unified economic zone (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Vachudova & Hooghe, 2009). Therefore, evidence from different countries indicates the strong effect of historical parameters on the levels of Euroscepticism.
Yet, Euroscepticism does not arise only from historical events of the previous decades or centuries, but also by striking societal and economical events of the present. As supported by a recent analysis in Cyprus, the fiscal economic policy implemented during the previous years by the EU. lead to higher levels of Euroscepticism (Katsourides, 2016).
Apart from the effect of political and economical events which affect a country influencing the levels of Euroscepticism, other proposed models have tried to explain why some people are more Eurosceptic compared to the others. As supported by Webels (2007), Euroscepticism is a form of skepticism towards the usefulness of the European identity. Those with higher levels skepticism towards the European identity share the belief that the integration process should be stopped, while those with lower levels of Euroscepticism share the belief that the European Union should be reformed. Hence, even though in both cases Euroscepticism consists a form of skepticism towards the European identity, the degree of skepticism is associated with the perception concerning the further steps of European integration.
According to a deterministic model supported by Hooghe & Marks (2005), the citizens of the member-states evaluate the economic consequences of the European integration in two different directions, forming the following categories of evaluations: a) subjective as well as objective, b) sociotropic evaluations concerning one’s group (in this case, country). As they support, subjective as well as objective evaluations concern the rational calculation of the citizens who are expecting that the European integration will develop (as an individual and as a group) their economic Citizens who feel confident about their economic future are more likely to support the European integration whereas citizens fearful for their future economic development are likely to be more skeptical. With regard to the sociotropic evaluations, the authors argue that it seems reasonable to expect that citizens who are net recipients of EU spending to support European integration and on the other hand those who are in donor countries to oppose it. Through their data analyses conclude that the citizens take the consequences of market integration into account (for themselves and their countries), a factor that influences their support towards the EU.
Another part of the literature has not focused on how Euroscepticism in a single region of Europe affects the levels of Euroscepticism across the Union. The example of
Brexit indicates that when Euroscepticism levels are increased in a single country, they are subsequently increased in other European countries as well (FitzGibbon et al., 2016). A parallel development of distrust concerning supra-national institutions is considered to be an important parameter leading to distrust towards the EU across its citizens (Usherwood & Startin, 2013).
Further emphasis should be given on Brexit as it consists a unique example of how Euroscepticism can lead a country to leave the union. It is supported that before Brexit Euroscepticism became a mainstream political attitude in Great Britain, whereas the ideal of European integration became a non-mainstream attitude (Startin, 2015). Therefore, this public belief which was apparent across the British society made the citizens of the country to vote against their stay at the union, leading to Brexit.
It is also essential to investigate the role of media as a form of expression of distrust for the EU. As supported by Katsourides (2016) the print media had a significant effect on the recent increased levels of Euroscepticism in Cyprus. Analyses from other countries’ newspapers, such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom indicate that print media are a major form of expression of distrust towards the EU. This distrust is based, as indicated by the content analysis of the newspapers, on the belief that a national government is more appropriate to encounter the problems faced by each country compared to a supranational union (Alarcon, 2010).
Apart from skepticism towards organizations, such as the European Union, another part of the literature has focused on skepticism concerning the media. It is supported that skepticism concerning the traditional media is associated with the perception that their information is politically biased (Lee, 2010). Generally, the role of traditional media is of minor importance compared to the past, In the mid-1990’s the scene in the communication field changed significantly through the introduction of the Internet, which was the precursor of the new digital media. The use and the importance of digital media have grown steadily over time, especially in election campaigns, a fact that has attracted the interest of the political and academic world. The criticism about the effects of the digital media varies, since some have argued that the new media will have positive and potentially strong effects on political participation, in contrast with others that have seen them as predominantly entertainment-oriented and less influential about political participation and knowledge (Dimitrova, et al., 2011).
A significant event that became the cause for the social networking and digital media to gain popularity was the Obama’s election campaign, which used effectively these new tools to mobilize and organize supporters. Since then there is a considerable number of political actors and institutions in the United States and the EU with an online presence (Dimitrova, et al., 2011).
Further attention to the effect of social networks has been given during the 2016 US president election. As supported, this campaign was followed by fake news, communicated through social networks. Since it has been supported that these news had a profound influence on the outcome of the elections, a dialog has opened regarding trust on the information shared through social networks, as well as concerning the way to encounter fake news in the future (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Waldrop, 2017).
Information trust has also been investigated in online social networks as a form of media communication. Yet, due to their complex associations in information provision, since the source is not necessarily defined, trust has two different aspects. The first aspect of trust is associated with the other users, since people trusting the other users find their information more reliable. The other aspect of trust concerns a wider attitude, which is associated with the service provider (Sherchan et al., 2013). Thus, the levels of trust regarding social networks might be more complex compared to the levels of trust for the mainstream media.
Trust levels concerning the political content found and shared through social networks are of primary importance since they result in political actions. A relevant example supporting this statement is the Arab Spring, where people took action through calls found on social networks (Khondker, 2011). Therefore, in case that information found on social networks is considered as reliable, this trust might lead to specific political actions. In general, it is widely accepted that social networks result to increased civic and political participatory behaviors (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012).
Based on the aforementioned evidence, it can be supported that there is a wide distrust concerning the supranational concept of European integration, as well as concerning the use of the traditional media. On contrary, people tend to trust information found through social networks, which might have a strong influence on their political participation. Nevertheless, even though the example of the Arab Spring might be useful in order to investigate the effect of social media on radical political
actions, it might not offer generalizable conclusions concerning the effect of social media on political movements which might be non-radical. In addition, this example found on the literature might not offer generalizable conclusions concerning the effect of social media use on political participation in European countries, like Cyprus.
Theory and Hypotheses of the Present Study
Background of the study: Cyprus as a place to study social media trust and Euroscepticism
Cyprus consists a suitable country in order to investigate the relationship between the use and trust of social media and Eurospecticism for several reasons. One reason to support this argument is that the levels of both Euroscepticism and social media use have increased in Cyprus, which provides an opportunity for the investigation of the phenomenon under study (Verney, 2011).
Even though Euroscepticism is prevalent across the Union, it is considered to be even higher for countries that were not members of the European Coal and Steel Community, such as Cyprus. According to a research by the Euro barometer (2016), only 15% of Cyprus citizens had a positive opinion for the Union, a percentage which is the lowest among all European countries under study. The same study found that there as a decline in positive attitudes towards the Union by 30% between 2006 and 2016. This is the second bigger decline across all the members of the Union during these 10 years, since an even stronger decline has been reported only in Greece (41%). Therefore, Cyprus is considered as the most Eurosceptic country in the Union, providing a reasonable ground to study this phenomenon in detail.
In recent history, Cyprus has been considered as one of the most Eurosceptic countries in Europe for a variety of reasons. During the previous two decades, the communist party, which is Eurosceptic, was quite popular in Cyprus and won the 2008 elections. In addition, Cyprus was consistently opposed to reforms suggested by the European Union during the integration process (Verney, 2011). Therefore, the resistance of the political parties and the government of this country to the Integration process might reflect high levels of Euroscepticism both in the country’s politicians, as well as the in the local society.
Another important factor that highlights the necessity to study Euroscepticism in Cyprus is the economical situation in this country. As indicated by other countries, the economical policy enforced by the European Union leads to high levels of Euroscepticism. For example, in the United Kingdom, the initiatives of the European Union to intervene to the government spending lead to a massive increase of Euroscepticism (Taylor, 2008). Similarly, the recent debt crisis experienced in Cyprus lead to a rise in the Eurosceptic levels across the country, since the citizens of the Cyprus considered the international influence on the country’s economy to be highly responsible for the austerity measures taken to encounter the crisis (Agapiou-Josephides, 2011). Hence, the economic situation that the country faced the previous years might have lead to high Euroscepticism, providing a good place to study this phenomenon.
Apart from the rise in both Euroscepticism and social media use, relevant data indicate a connection between those two trends detected in Cyprus. As supported by Triga & Papa (2015), social networks, mainly facebook, consist a mean of political expression agains the austerity measures imposed by the European Union. Cypriots use the social media in order to express a collective nationalistic identity against the European Union and to express their mistrust towards the local goverment, which they consider to be cooperating with the European Union to impose the austerity measures. Hence, previous evidence indicates that there is a pathway from Euroscepticism to political expression through the social media.
Hypotheses of the study
People who use and trust social media will tend to have more negative opinion towards the EU
The first hypothesis of the study is that there will be a negative correlation between the opinion towards the EU and the trust in social media. This hypothesis is supported due to the mass use of social media as a way to express non-conventional political beliefs which do not have a place in the traditional media. For that reason, it is necessary to support that Euroscepticism is a non-conventional political belief and that the social media are a form of non-conventional beliefs expression.
Indeed, several cases of the last years support that the social media are used by political groups which cannot access the mainstream media in order to communicate
their political agenda. A first case supporting this statement was the Zapatistas’ movement in Mexico. Due to their disagreement in the way that the traditional media were covering their movement the Zapatistas created social networks through the internet so that they could express their beliefs regarding their movement, avoiding the use of conventional television channels, since they estimated that they were strongly opposed to their movement (Cleaver, 1998).
Yet, it is not necessary that the social media consist a form of alternative political expression. An example supporting that they are not necessarily used to express non-conventional political beliefs is the social media coverage of the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, Canada. A relevant analysis of 11.556 tweets, 222 youtube videos and 3.338 shared photos found that contrarily to the hypothesis of the study the vast majority of the content shared though social media did not focus on the opposition of this summit (Poel & Borra, 2012).
The aforementioned evidence indicates that there might be regional and cultural divergences which indicate that the social media are not necessarily dominated by those expressing alternative political beliefs. Nevertheless, in the case of Europe, the domination of Brexit supporters in social media during the 2016 referendum (Seaton, 2016) indicates that in Europe the social media are more probable to be used by parties promoting an alternative political agenda. Another example of an overexpression of Euroscepticstic political beliefs in social media can be found in the Italian General Elections of 2013. A relevant analysis found that the proportion of left-wingers in these users in the social media was higher compared to the proportion of left-wingers in the general population of the country (Vaccari et al., 2013). In addition, several studies from western European countries indicate that right wingers are systematically using the social media in order to express islamophobical concerns (Awan, 2014). Therefore, this evidence indicates that in the European Union the social media are dominated by political parties in which Euroscepticism is a vital part of their political agenda.
Barring the right or left wing differences, it has been found that social media are a form of expression of skepticism towards the European Union irrespective of the position on the political parties’ axis. An analysis of relevant internet comments during the 2009 European Elections in 12 European Union countries found that the majority of them was negative (Wilde et al., 2014), indicating that irrespective of the ideology
of the users, social media are used in order to express the public’s opposition towards European Integration. Therefore, it is expected that this study will also result in a negative correlation between the use and trust of social media and the opinion towards the EU.
Apart from the aforementioned evidence supporting this hypothesis, it could also be supported by the nature and structure of the social networks. Social networks provide an opportunity for users with interests that are not common in the general population to reach each other and to communicate, also helping them to build offline relationships (Elison, 2007). Hence, since Eurospecticism is not a mainstream political belief, those sharing the alternative viewpoint of Euroscepticism might easier communicate with each other compared to those not being Euroscepticistic, which might easily find people sharing their beliefs offline.
Finally, social media provide a more comfortable form of alternative ideas expression due to the safety of the computer and the share of the information that the person communicating a message wants to share (Eliashop, 1999; Elison, 2007). Alternative political ideas consist taboo, which are not easily discussed in public, irrespective of their right or left wing basis. For example, promoting the rights of homosexuals and suggesting a right-wing political agenda are both considered as taboos, which are underrepresented in the public dialog (Tebble, 2011). Therefore, if Euroscepticism consists a non-mainstream belief it might also be a taboo, communicated easier through the safety and anonymity of a personal computer rather than through the mainstream media.
An especially strong effect is expected for those using social media as a news channel and not for gossip
The group of social media users can not be considered as homogenous, since they differ as for their intentions when using the social media. This divergence might have a significant impact on the way they operate while using the social media. People use social media for various reasons such as social comparison and feedback seeking (Nesi & Prinstein, 2015), communicating, dating, relieving stress, seeking health-related information (Perrin, 2015) and job finding (Nikolaou, 2014). In addition, some people use the social media as a news channel (Perrin, 2015). Thus, social media users
do not consist a homogenous group, since they differ regarding the reason they use the social media.
In line with the aforementioned hypothesis, it can be supported that the impact of social media use on Euroscepticism levels is even stronger for those who use the social media primarily as a news channel (De Wilde et al., 2013). This hypothesis is based on the continuous familiarity with Eurosceptic rhetoric, since social media are a form in which non-conventional Eurosceptic beliefs dominate. Therefore, the continuous familiarity with these information might lead to social influence for social media users, reflected through higher Euroscepticism levels. More importantly, those users might focus more on the political messages communicated through these media, which might have a stronger influence for them. For that reason, they might me more easily affected by the content found on those media, leading to higher levels of Euroscepticism.
Methods
Study designThis study was based on a secondary-analysis of data, collected for Eurobarometer. Secondary data analysis is a great way to study a research question when carrying out an original research is for some reason impossible or when there are already available data for the question that needs to be answered (Cheng & Phillips, 2014). The Eurobarometer has also been used in the past to draw conclusions regarding Euroscepticism across the union. For example Lubbers & Scheepers (2005) carried out an analysis using data from the Eurobarometer to investigate Euroscepticism across different regions of the union. Eurobarometer surveys have also been used to explore the relationship between several societal and political events with Euroscepticism, such as the increased publicity of far-right parties (De Vries & Edwards, 2009), as well as the attitudes of Greek people towards the European Union during the debt crisis era (Clements et al., 2014). Therefore, using secondary data from the Eurobarometer survey was considered as a suitable way to explore the hypotheses of the specific study.
More specifically, to investigate whether people who use and trust social media will tend to have more negative opinion towards the EU, two independent questions from the Eurobarometer measuring the level of trust (tend to trust/ do not tend to trust/ do not know) and the level of use (everyday or almost everyday/ two or three times a
week/ once a week/ two or three times a month/ less often/ never/ no acess/ don’t know) were used as independent variables. Each variable that measured an attitude towards the European Union in the Eurobarometer database was treated as a potentially dependent variable.
As for the hypothesis that an especially strong effect is expected for those using social media as a news channel and not for gossip, the Eurobarometer question asking the responders if they used the social media as a primary news reousrce (yes/no) was used as independent variable. Each variable that measure an attitude towards the European Union in the Eurobarometer database was treated as a potentially dependent variable.
Statistical analyses
The statistical analysis of the present study was carried out by the use of the SPSS statistical package version 21.0 (SPSS, Chicago, IL). The analysis was carried out on the dataset of the Eurobarometer 2017 survey. Before the data analysis the frequency of social media use was recoded from eight to three values. The new values were were: “no use”, “ocassionally” and “regularly”. The descriptive analysis of the study was carried out by calculating absolute values and proportions. As for the relationships between the examined variables, they were analyzed using x2, since they were categorical. In addition, odds ratio (OR) was estimated for each of the relationships so that the magnitude of effect could be presented. The p-value was set at 0.05 for all the analyses.
Results
Descriptive analysis
The descriptive statistics regarding the independent variables of the study are presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, a significant proportion of the responders used social media everyday or almost everyday (N=189, 38.8%), while another big percentage did not use the social media (N=176, 36.1%). Only a minority of the responders used the social media as a primary news resource (N=42, 6.7%), while a minor proportion tended to trust the social media (N=109, 22.3%). More detailed information is shown at the following table.
Table 1. The descriptive information regarding the independent variables of the study
Absolute
value Proportion Frequency of social media use
Everyday/ almost everyday 189 38.8
Two or three times a week 40 8.2
About once a week 11 2.3
Two or three times a month 7 1.4
Less often 12 2.5
Never 176 36.1
No acess to this medium 50 10.3
Don't know 2 0.4
Using the social media as primary news reousrce
Yes 42 6.7
No 581 93.3
Trust in social media
Tend to trust 109 22.3
Do not tend to trust 214 43.8
Don't know 166 33.9
Statistical analysis concerning the hypothesis that people who use and trust social media will tend to have more negative opinion towards the EU
For the analysis purposes of the first hypothesis, there was a selection of five variables in correlation with the use of the social media: a) Trust in European Institutions, b) Trust in European Union, c) Understanding how European Union works, d) A better future outside European Union and e) levels of Optimism/ Pessimism European Union’s future. The five variables are also examined with two categories: a) Users or not users of social media and b) Users who trust or not trust the social media.
Begining with the relationship between social media use and trust in th European Instutions, the relevant analysis is presented at the following table. As Hooghe & Marks (2005), refered into their study citizens which fearful for their future economic development are likely to be more skeptical. Therefore it is crucial to examine first the below relationship as it relies to the fact that the EU Institutions are the centeral source of decision making for all EU member countries. The trust or the mistrust towards them demonstrates the tendancy of resistance towards the integration and the
skepticism of the Cypriot citizens. As indicated by the table, there were statistically significant relationships between the two variables. It is worthly to refer to the fact that besides the frequency of use of social media there is a tendancy of mistrust towards the EU Institutions in all levels. The most significant figure in this case is noted at the frequent users with 61.25% (147 out of 240) of the sample not trusting the insitutions. On the other hand, quite large is also the percentage of mistrust of the non users, being up to 53.51% (122 out of 228) of the responses. The Trust towards the European Instututions and using the social media regularly were kept as reference categories. Yet, after this recoding, no statistically significant differences were noted (p=0.891).
Table 2. The relationship between trust in the European Institutions and social network use Frequency social media use
Total p
Never
Occasional
y Regulary Trust in the European
Institutions Tend to trust 77 8 84 169 0.009 Tend not to trust 122 10 147 279 Don’t know 29 1 9 39 Total 228 19 240 487
As for the relationship between trust in European institutions and trust in social networks, as indicated by the following table, there was a statistically significant relationship between the two variables (p=0.003). Because both of those variables had more than three values, both of them were encoded into new binary variables in order to detect an odds ratio for this relationship. The two new variables were recorded as follows: (tend to trust the social media/others & tend to trust in the European Union institutions/others). Those variables were not statistically significantly related to each other (p=0.164, OR 1.36). Also in this case is notable the fact the the 61.68% (132 of 214) of the responders who do not trust the social media, does not trust also the EU, is higher in comparison to the 55.96% (61 out of 109) of the responders who do trust the social media but not the EU.
Table 3. The relationship between trust in social network use and trust in European Institutions Trust in social networks
Total p Tend to trust
Tend not to
trust Don’t know Trust in the European Union Tend to trust 44 71 55 170 0.003 Tend not to trust 61 132 87 280 Don’t know 4 11 24 39 Total 109 214 166 489
Going forward to the analysis, it was important to examine also the level of education towards the concept of the EU in correlation to the users/non users of the social media. As for the relationship between the level of understanding about how the European Union works and the degree of social media use, this analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, statistically significant relationships were noted between the two variables (p=0.018). Using the social media on a regular basis and totally agree/tend to agree were kept as reference categories. This analysis lead to a p value of 0.001 and an OR of 0.54, indicating that those using the social media regularly tend to believe that they understand how the EU works more than those not using the social media or compared to those using them on an occasional basis.
Table 4. The relationship between the frequency of social media use and and the agreement with the understanding of how the European Union works
Frequency of social media use
Total p Never Occasional ly Regularl y EU Statements:
Understand how the EU works Totally agree 37 4 53 94 0.018 Tend to agree 95 9 121 225 Tend to disagree 61 5 53 119 Totally disagree 30 1 9 40 Don’t know 5 0 4 9 Total 228 19 240 487
For the agreement with the understanding on how the European Union works and the level of use of social media, this analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, statistically significant differences were noted between the two variables (p=0.016). A new encoding category emerged after keeping tending to trust as a reference category for trust in online social media and the total or partial agreement with the statement as the other category. This analysis indicated statistically significant relationships between the two variables, leading to a p value of 0.020 and an effect size of 1.90.
Table 5. The relationship between the trust in online social networks and the agreement with the understanding of how the European Union works
Trust in social networks
Total p Tend to trust
Tend not to
trust Don’t know EU Statements:
Understand how the European Union works
Totally agree 23 48 23 94 0.016 Tend to agree 60 94 73 227 Tend to disagree 19 57 43 119 Totally disagree 6 12 22 40 Don’t know 1 3 5 9 Total 109 214 166 489
Furthermore according to Wilde’s study it was found that the majority of the users of the social media expressed in 2009 elections their scepticiscim and their opposition towards EU intergration (Wilde et al., 2014). Therefore it was important to investigate the relationship between online social networks use and the agreement with the statement that there is a better future outside the European Union. This analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, statistically significant differences were noted between those variables (p=0.026). Using the social media regularly and agreeing/tend to agree with the statement were used as reference categories. This analysis lead to statistically significant relationships between the two variables (p=0.001, OR 2.22). Hence, those not using the social media or using them occasionally tended to believe that there might be a better future outside the EU.
Table 6. The relationship between trust in online social networks and the agreement with the statement that there is a better future outside the European Union
Frequency of social media use
Total p Never Occasional ly Regularl y EU Statements: Better
future outside the European Union Totally agree 40 5 34 79 0.026 Tend to agree 47 4 44 95 Tend to disagree 60 7 73 140 Totally disagree 73 3 62 138 Don’t know 8 0 27 35 Total 228 19 240 487
Concerning the agreement with this statement and the level of social networks trust, this analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, no significant relationships were noted between the two variables of the study (p=0.111).
Table 7. The relationship between trust in online social networks and the agreement with the statement that there is a better future outside the European Union
Trust in social networks
Total p Tend to trust
Tend not to
trust Don’t know EU Statements: Better
future outside the European Union Totally agree 16 40 23 79 0.111 Tend to agree 21 38 36 95 Tend to disagree 28 65 47 140 Totally disagree 31 52 55 138 Don’t know 13 17 5 35 Total 109 212 166 487
As it was refered in the theoretical part of the research, in a case that the users of the social media considered the information reliable this could lead also to specific political actions. Hence it was necessary also to review the range of optimism/pessimism among the responders towards the future within EU. Concerning the analysis regarding the attitudes towards the future of the European Union and the
level of online social networks’ use, the relevant analysis is presented at the table below. As indicated by the table, this relationship was not statistically significant (p=0.142). Although is important to highlight the fact that on all levels the responders were in majority fairly optimistic.
Table 8. The relationship between trust in social networks and the anticipation of the European Union future with optimism/pessimism
Frequency of social media use
Total p Never Occasional ly Regularl y EU Future: Optimistic/ pessimistic Very optimistic 21 4 11 36 0.142 Fairly optimistic 88 7 114 209 Fairly pessimistic 74 4 73 151 Very pessimistic 29 3 29 61 Don’t know 16 1 13 30 Total 228 19 240 487
As for the analysis concerning the optimism and pessimism towards the European Union future and the trust in social networks, this analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, there were marginally statistically significant relationships between the two variables (p=0.043). The optimism and trust towards the social networks were kept as reference categories. The p value of this analysis was 0.384, leading to an odds ratio of 0.83.
Table 9. The relationship between trust in social networks and the anticipation of the European Union future with optimism/pessimism
Trust in social networks
Total p Tend to trust
Tend not to
trust Don’t know EU Future: Optimistic/ pessimistic Very optimistic 9 10 17 36 0.043 Fairly optimistic 43 109 57 209 Fairly pessimistic 36 60 55 151 Very pessimistic 14 25 22 61 Don’t know 7 8 15 30 Total 109 212 166 487
Statistical analysis regarding the hypothesis that an especially strong effect is expected for those using social media as a news channel and not for gossip
Continue with the investigation of the second hypothesis of the research the main aim is to demonstrate the different perspective towards European Union gfor the social users who use the social media as a main channel of news in comparison with the users that use the social media also for other various purposes. For the better analysis of this hypothesis the below seven variables are chosen: a) The trust in EU institutions, b) The level of understanding how EU, c) The level of agreement whether the EU concept is Democratic, d) the statements whether within EU the country’s interests are respected, e) The level of agreement whether there is a better future outside the EU, f) The level of agreement with the statement that more decisions should be taken at a EU level and g) finaly whether the future of EU is optimistic/pessimistic
To start with, it is crucial to start the analysis of the second hypothesis by investigate the trend of trust towards the EU institutions in correlation of the two groups. The relevant analysis is depicted at the following table. As indicated by the Table, there was no difference between those using and those not using the social media as a primary news resource (p=0.664). Further information is found at the following table.
Table 10. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and trust in the European Institutions
Social media as a primary news resource Total p Yes No Trust in institutions: European Union Tend to trust 12 158 170 0.664 Tend not to trust 26 254 280 Don’t know 4 35 39 Total 42 447 489
Additionaly the analysis refers to the level of knowledge of how the Union works as both groups have different channels to get informed about various topics.
Therefore, regarding the level of understanding for how the Union works, there were insignificant differences between the two groups (p=0.937), which are shown at the table below. Both groups shows that in majority are confident that they understand the concept of the European Union and as a second trend which is also significant although with less responses than the previous but also high, tend to disagree.
Table 13. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and understanding how the European Union works
Social media as a primary news resource Total P Yes No EU Statements:
Understand how the EU works Totally agree 8 86 94 0.937 Tend to agree 20 207 227 Tend to disagree 11 108 119 Totally disagree 2 38 40 Don’t know 1 8 9 Total 42 447 489
Investigating furtherer Euroscepticism in relation with the effects of using the social media as a primary news the below analysis tries to demonstrate the view of the two groups when it comes to the democratic concept of the EU. Hence through this analysis it was important to see whether the users feel engaged into the EU process as this argument could lead in higher levels of Euroscepticism. Concerning the anticipation of the Union as democratic, the relevant analysis for the differences between the two study groups is found at the following table. As indicated by the table, the differences between the two groups were insignificant (p=0.171). Both groups describe the EU concept as fairly well democratic.
Table 11. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and perceiving the concept of the European Union as democratic
Social media as a primary news resource Total p Yes No EU Concept: Democratic
Describes very well 9 43 52 0.171
Describes fairly well 19 237 256 Describes fairly badly 11 120 131 Describes very badly 1 27 28 Don’t know 2 18 20 Total 42 445 487
Keeping in consideration the recent economic crisis that Cyrprus went through but also the primary expectations (solution of the Cypriot problem with Turkish Cypriot community) of the Cyprtiots uppon the entry of the country in EU, the below variable was added into the analysis in order to investigate the perception of the Cyrptiots towards the efficiency of the EU. For the appreciation of the concept of the Union as efficient, the differences between the two groups were insignificant (p=0.298), as indicated by the following table. Despite this fact, it is important to refer to the fact that the majority of the responders of the first group descripe the EU concept as fairly well efficient and on the other hand the majority of the second group describe the EU concept as fairly badly.
Table 12. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and perceiving the concept of the European Union as efficient
Social media as a primary news
resource
Total p
Yes No
EU Concept: Efficient Describes very well 4 25 29 0.298 Describes fairly well 19 151 170 Describes fairly badly 13 189 202 Describes very badly 3 57 60 Don’t know 3 23 26 Total 42 445 487
As for the statement that each country’s interests are respected, significant differences were noted for the two groups (p=0.003). In order to further investigate these differences and to extract and odds ratio from the data, the dependent variable was recorded to binary. More specifically, the first values consisted of those agreeing or tend to agree with the statement, while all the other responses were encoded as a second value. Therefore, the recode lead to a p value of 0.01 and to an odds ratio of 2.20. Therefore, it was 2.20 times more likely for those using the social media as an only news resource to agree that the country’s interests are respected through its participation at the Union.
Table 14. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and the belief that each country’s interests are respected
Social media as a primary news resource Total P Yes No EU Statements: Country interests respected Totally agree 6 15 21 0.003 Tend to agree 12 98 110 Tend to disagree 18 182 200 Totally disagree 5 138 143 Don’t know 1 12 13 Total 42 445 487
Going forward, the research examines another significant topic which refers to the perspective of the two groups whether the future is more promising outside the Union. As for this a possible agreement with the statement no significant differences were noted between the two groups (p=0.517). Although is notable that the majority of the reposnders who use the social media as a primary resourse (12 out of 48) tend to agree with comparison the second group that the majority tend to disagree. Further information concerning this analysis is depicted at the following table.
Table 15. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and the belief in a better future outside the European Union
Social media as a primary news resource Total p Yes No EU Statements: Better future outside the EU
Totally agree 5 74 79 0.517 Tend to agree 12 83 95 Tend to disagree 11 129 140 Totally disagree 10 128 138 Don’t know 4 31 35
Total 42 445 487
Regarding the statement that more decisions need to be taken at a European Union level, the relevant analysis is presented at the following table. As indicated by the table, statistically significant differences were noted between the two groups (p=0.020). Therefore, the dependent variable was recorded as a binary, using two different values. The first value consisted of those totally agreeing or tending to agree with the statement, while all the other responses were recoded as the second value. Yet, after this transformation no statistically significant differences were noted between the two groups of the study (p=0.378, OR 1.39).
Table 16. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and trusting the European parliament
Social media as a primary news resource Total P Yes No EU Statements: More decisions at a EU level Totally agree 12 164 176 0.02 Tend to agree 20 146 166 Tend to disagree 9 54 63 Totally disagree 1 40 41 Don’t know 0 41 41 Total 42 445 487
Last but not least for the examination of this hypothesis the study investigates the level of optimism/pessimism towards the future of the Union. As for the appraisal for the future, no differences were noted between those using the social media as a primary news resource and the others (p=0.534). Both groups seem to be fairly optimistic for the the future of the Union. Further information is depicted at the following table.
Table 17. The relationship between using the social media as a primary news resource and optimism/pessimism towards the future of the Union
Social media as a primary news resource Total P Yes No EU future: optimistic/pessimistic Very optimistic 4 32 36 0.534 Fairly optimistic 22 187 209 Fairly pessimistic 10 141 151 Very pessimistic 3 58 61 Don’t know 3 27 30 Total 42 445 487
Discussion
This study investigated social media use and trust, and the use of social media as a primary news resource in relation to several aspects of Euroscepticism. For most of the analyses that were carried out there were no statistically significant relationships, which indicates than, in overall, these patterns of social media use are not strongly related to Euroscepticism. Therefore, both of the study’s hypotheses are not supported by the analysis, indicating that social media use is not significantly related with Euroscepticism.
Yet, a few of those significant relationships worth further attention. Concerning the use and trust of social media, it is quite weird that although some of the analyses indicated that those using and trusting the media had higher scores of Euroscepticism, some others indicated lower scores for those responders. For example, those not using the social media or using them occasionally tend to believe that there might be a better future outside the EU, while they also agree that the country’s interests are respected through its participation in the Union. This heterogeneity, which can be found mainly at the analyses of the first hypothesis, can lead us to the conclusion that the effect of social media use on Euroscepticism is multidimensional, since some parameters are influenced in a positive way, while some others in a negative.
With regard to the second hypothesis of the study, this can be considered as totally rejected, not only due to that lack of statistically significant relationships
indicating higher scores of Euroscepticism for those using the social media as a primary news resource, but also due to some statistically significant relationships that were flagged in favor of those using the social media, who had more positive attitudes towards the European Union. For example, those participants were more likely to agree that the country’s interests are respected through its participation at the Union. Yet, since the specific hypothesis is rejected and some of the analysis indicate a trend for the opposite direction of the hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned results can lead to interesting conclusions concerning Euroscepticism across the Union. Indeed, since social media use is both positively and negatively related to different aspects of Euroscepticism, this can lead to the conclusion that Euroscepticism consists a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, rather an overall agreement or disagreement with the European Union concept. This argument is in line with a theory developed by Boomgaarden et al (2011), who also support the complex dimensions of Euroscepticism, which can not be treated as a one-dimension phenomenon. Therefore, is could be an oversimplification to treat Euroscepticism as a single phenomenon since both the results of this study and previous theoritical arguments indicate that each parameter of this phenomenon should be indepentently investigated.
Despite the few statistically significant relationships that were flagged, this study is of high importance since it depicts the relationship between social media use and Euroscepticism. Therefore, since according to the second hypothesis, those using the social media might share some Eurosceptic beliefs, parties that are opposed to Euroscepticism have to use the same media in order to present their arguments and to tackle the spread of the eurosceptic rhetoric across the social media. Hence, a practical implication of this study concerns the use of the social media as a channel to present the benefits of the European Union, since this audience might have more negative attitudes compared to the general population.
Before drawing any kind of conclusion from this study, a few limitations have to be reported. First, the data of this study were based on self-reports, which are prone to bias and might not accurately reflect a responder’s behaviors (Robson, 2002). Indeed, several types of bias, such as recall bias, might be prevalent in the present study.
Another limitation of this study is the measurement of matters that are politically and ideologically oriented. It remains unknown if the responders of this research gave answers that reflect their real attitudes for the topics under study, since asking participants for their political beliefs might lead to answers that are in line with the norm, rather than non-conventional and opposed to political correctiveness (Braudburn et al., 2004). Indeed, if Euroscepticism consists a taboo, then answering in the Eurobarometer research might lead to responder bias. Further, since the original research consists a survey carried out by the European Commission, a European Union institution, it could be possible that those answering to this EU driven research might be those with more positive attitudes towards European Integration. Therefore, the study results might also be prone to selection bias. This type of bias should be regarded as a serious obstacle for the generalizability of the results, since the responders in this survey might not be a representative sample of the overall population under study, meaning Cypriots in general.
An additional limitation for the generalizability of the results is that the research was carried out on a specific region of Europe, in a specific era. Thus, the methodology of this study resembles more to a case study of Cyprus, rather than to a study leading to generalizable conclusions concerning social media use and Euroscepticism. Nonetheless, this could be regarded as an intentional decision of the study design, whose aim was to shed some light on this specific literature gap, rather than an uncontrolled limitation of a study whose aim was to lead to generalizable conclusions about the relationship between social media use and Euroscepticism in general.
Future studies should focus on the way that users behave while using the social media and their differences regarding Euroscepticism. For example, those sharing content might be more Eurosceptic compared to those reading content. Therefore, a reasonable proposal for future studies is to investigate patters of social media use in relation to Euroscepticism.
Another reasonable suggestion for future studies could be the comparative evaluation of the relationship between social media use and Euroscepticism in Cyprus compared to this relationship in other part of Europe. As indicated by the results of the present study, Euroscepticism and social media use are not highly related. Therefore, comparative analysis with the data from other countries could possibly lead to a
conclusion about a universal effect across the Europe or about an effect accounting only for people living in Cyprus.
A further suggestion for future studies should be the longitudinal evaluation of the change in social media use and Euroscepticism. For example, it might be possible that since the social media are a channel through which non-conventional political beliefs are expressed (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012), the relationship between the Euroscepticism and social media use might be stronger after striking political events that question the use of the European Union in general.
In overall, future research should be lead to directions guided by the political events that take place, since Euroscepticism consists a political matter. Therefore, the research needs might be continiusly in line with the need to further explore how political and economic events influence the levels of Euroscepticism.
Conclusions
This study investigated whether the levels of Euroscepticism are associated with the use and trust of the social media and with the use of social media as a news resource. The hypothesies of the study were that those using and trusting the social media, as well as those using them in order to receive political information, whould have higher scores of Euroscepticism. The analysis lead to not statistically significant relationships for the majority of the relationships that were investigated. It is quite interesting that those using and trusting the social media were more Eurosceptic based on their responses to some questions and less Eurosceptic, based on their responses to other questions. This finding can lead us to the conclusion that Euroscepticism is a multidimensional matter and that an attempt to treat Euroscepticism as a single phenomenon might be an oversimplification.
References
Agapiou-Josephides, K. (2011). Changing patterns of Euroscepticism in Cyprus: European discourse in a divided polity and society. South European Society and Politics, 16(01), 159-184.
Alarcón, A. V. M. (2010). Media representation of the European Union: Comparing newspaper coverage in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. International Journal of Communication, 4, 18.
Anderson, C. J., & Kaltenthaler, K. C. (1996). The dynamics of public opinion toward European integration, 1973-93. European Journal of International Relations, 2(2), 175-199.
Awan, I. (2014). Islamophobia and Twitter: A typology of online hate against Muslims on social media. Policy & Internet, 6(2), 133-150.
Boomgaarden, H. G., Schuck, A. R., Elenbaas, M., & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support. European Union Politics, 12(2), 241-266.
Bradburn, N. M., Sudman, S., & Wansink, B. (2004). Asking questions: the definitive guide to questionnaire design--for market research, political polls, and social and health questionnaires. John Wiley & Sons.
Cheng, H.G., & Phillips, M.R. (2014). Secondary analysis of existing data: opportunities and implementation. Shanghai Arch Psychiatry, 26: 371-375.
Cleaver Jr, H. M. (1998). The Zapatista effect: The Internet and the rise of an alternative political fabric. Journal of International Affairs, 621-640.
Clements, B., Nanou, K., & Verney, S. (2014). ‘We no longer love you, but we don’t want to leave you’: the Eurozone crisis and popular Euroscepticism in Greece. Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 247-265.
Crespy, A., & Verschueren, N. (2009). From Euroscepticism to resistance to European integration: an interdisciplinary perspective. Perspectives on European politics and society, 10(3), 377-393.
De Vries, C. E., & Edwards, E. E. (2009). Taking Europe to its extremes: Extremist parties and public Euroscepticism. Party Politics, 15(1), 5-28.
De Wilde, P., Michailidou, A., & Trenz, H. J. (2013). Contesting Europe: Exploring Euroscepticism in online media coverage. ECPR Press.
Dimitrova, D. V., Shehata, A., Strömbäck, J., & Nord, L. W. (2014). The effects of digital media on political knowledge and participation in election campaigns: Evidence from panel data. Communication Research, 41(1), 95-118.
Dinan, D., & Wolinetz, S. B. (2005). Europe recast: a history of European Union. International Journal, 60(4), 1192.
Ehrmann, M., Soudan, M., & Stracca, L. (2013). Explaining European Union citizens’ trust in the European Central Bank in normal and crisis times. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(3), 781-807.
Eliasoph, N. (1999). “Everyday racism” in a culture of political avoidance: Civil society, speech, and taboo. Social Problems, 46(4), 479-502.
Ellison, N. B. (2007). Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship. Journal of computer‐mediated Communication, 13(1), 210-230.
FitzGibbon, J., Leruth, B., & Startin, N. (Eds.). (2016). Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon: The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition. Taylor & Francis.
Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). European integration, nationalism and European identity. JCMS: journal of common market studies, 50(s1), 106-122.
Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 17(3), 319-336.
Harteveld, E., Meer, T. V. D., & Vries, C. E. D. (2013). In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union. European Union Politics, 14(4), 542-565.
Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1259-1277.
Hobolt, S. B., & De Vries, C. (2016). Turning against the Union? The impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Electoral Studies, 44, 504-514.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2007). Sources of euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 119-127.
Katsourides, Y. (2016). Negative images of Europe in an era of crisis: The media and public opinion in Cyprus. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24(1), 61-85.
Khondker, H. H. (2011). Role of the new media in the Arab Spring. Globalizations, 8(5), 675-679.
Lee, T. T. (2010). Why they don’t trust the media: An examination of factors predicting trust. American Behavioral Scientist, 54(1), 8-21.
Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2005). Political versus instrumental Euro-scepticism: Mapping scepticism in European countries and regions. European Union Politics, 6(2), 223-242.
Nesi, J., & Prinstein, M. J. (2015). Using social media for social comparison and feedback-seeking: gender and popularity moderate associations with depressive symptoms. Journal of abnormal child psychology, 43(8), 1427-1438.
Nikolaou, I. (2014). Social networking web sites in job search and employee recruitment. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 22(2), 179-189.
Perrin, A. (2015). Social Media Usage: 2005-2015. Washington, D.C.: Pew Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved March 31, 2018 from http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/
Poell, T., & Borra, E. (2012). Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr as platforms of alternative journalism: The social media account of the 2010 Toronto G20 protests. Journalism, 13(6), 695-713.
Pollack, M. A. (2001). International relations theory and European integration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(2), 221-244.
Robson, C. (2002). Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Sankari, S. (2016). The many constitutions of Europe. Routledge.
