The North-South Divide: The Deliberative Performance of South
African Television
Master’s Thesis
Prepared by Nomakhwezi Nkwanyana Student number: 1157161
Thesis Supervisor: Mr. Michael Hameleers The University of Amsterdam
Word Count: 6918 29th June 2018
Abstract
This experimental design investigated the relationship between news media, political debates, and question and answer (Q&A) television programming on political education and
deliberation. Using South Africa as a case study, this is the first empirical research examining the relationship of political television in a new democracy within the Global South, and to provide a comparative assessment of levels of success between all three television formats to deliver deliberative democracy ideals. Current research suggests that political television, especially news media, has strong effects on the audience’s knowledge gains, political participation and deliberation. However, results within this study have found that these effects are incongruent within a South African context. More specifically, that (1) news media did not elicit higher levels of political conversation or levels of deliberation; and (2) that politically knowledgeable participants were not more prone to engage in political
conversation or deliberation. The results did, however, imply that political debates and Q&A are the strongest formats for advancing issue knowledge and deliberation within a South African audience when compared to Western audiences. These results provide reasoning that media-democracy within South Africa does not adequately foster high political education, and only moderately enacts deliberation within its audience. Moreover, the appropriateness of western epistemologies as the standardised judgement of media’s performance in
non-western democracies is challenged. Thus this study has two chief recommendations for future research: (1) this study is replicated in other new democracies within the Global South; and (2) more comparative assessments between differing political television and its audience effects are carried out to better ascertain the strengths of various television programming.
Keywords: South Africa, television, news media, question and answers, political debates, deliberation, education.
Introduction
There is wide consensus within academia that a politically knowledgeable electorate is healthy for democracy (see Dahl, 1979; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Mills, 1898). In addition, presenting citizens with opposing viewpoints and promoting open discussion aids democracy; as citizens are better informed prior to elections (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2002). Television has, to some extent, attempted to provide an engagement in the ideals of a deliberative democracy through content which allows opponents to listen, debate, and question societal issues and legislation. However, the mass of literature examining the effectiveness of television to foster deliberation within an electorate has been focused in western mature democracies (Aarts & Semetko, 2003; Anderson, Dardenne & Killenberg, 1994; Benoit & Hansen, 2004; Dahlgren, 2005; Kim, Wyatt & Katz, 1999; Koch, 1994; Pan et al., 2006; Slade, 2002; Zhu et al., 1994). There remains little empirical understanding if political television within new democracies outside of the West promote the ideals of deliberation within their audience.
The context of South Africa provides an interesting and fitting case for empirical research for three reasons. The first is that the country’s constitution seeks active citizen participation alongside its representative government through the legally mandated
participatory democracy (Brooks, 2017). Thus there are normative expectations for citizens to engage in political discussion and deliberate policies. Second, South African media
professionals widely perceive their role in the new democracy as information disseminators and cultivators of democratic engagement (Chuma et al., 2017) which is principally aligned with mechanisms and ideology of the mediated public sphere (Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013). Thirdly, there has been heated debates between political bodies, media professionals and scholars surrounding the applicability of western-derived media dogmas
within South Africa, and the country’s ability to accomplish their measurements of success (Wasserman, 2010).
Alongside empirical investigations outside of the West, there have been no experimental observations between different types of television programming and their effects on the audience. Therefore, this study is academically pertinent for two reasons: (1) it provides preliminary research as to whether television cultivates political education and deliberation with viewers within new democracies in the Global South; and (2) it examines whether audience effects are greater in certain types of television programming. Results from the study reveal that political debates produce the strongest levels of issue knowledge and deliberation within a South African audience. Moreover, political knowledge and issue salience are not significant predictors for the likelihood of television cultivating political conversation and deliberation.
It is hoped that this research better informs African scholars, government bodies, NGOs, and media specialists of the of the shortcomings of western epistemologies and their relevance to media-democracy in a foreign context. Moreover, this study calls for adaptation of media ideals within new democracies to better suit their demands, and mirror the
complexities of non-homogenous populations within the Global South.
Theoretical Framework
South African Politics, Citizenship and Media at a Crossroad
Following the first democratic election in 1994, South Africa exhibited a major social and economic change from an authoritarian rule to democracy. This transition enshrined a vision for a new political and media landscape within the country. The adoption of a new constitution in 1996, guaranteed all citizens the right to freedom of expression and permitted unprecedented amounts of press freedom (Botma, 2011; Wasserman & Beer, 2007). Under
freedom of expression, public participation was idealised and mandated whereby citizens would be active constituents in the policy-making process (Piper & von Lieres, 2016). With the new capacity of press freedom, the media were expected to educate and foster public deliberation which in turn would encourage political engagement (Chuma et al., 2017). The media was then seen as essential to South African political life.
Despite legislative measures, the envisaged democratic participation did not materialise (Piper & von Lieres, 2016). South Africans have consistently shown little political interest and engagement in conventional forms of electoral participation when compared to their African and global counterparts (Mattes, 2008). Currently, four-fifths of South Africans have identified themselves as having little interest in following political affairs (Glenn & Mattes, 2011). Two-thirds assert that they have little to no trust in politicians and political institutions (Afrobarometer, 2016) which is demonstrated by the high rates of protests within the country. As a result, South Africa has been colloquially dubbed as “the protest capital of the world” (Friedman, 2018; Runciman, 2017). Citizens’ lack of trust and engagement with formal politics has been predominantly blamed on rampant corruption amongst political elites and the lack of transformation in wealth distribution within the country (Afrobarometer, 2016; Corruption Watch, 2016; Mattes, 2002; Piper & von Lieres, 2016). However, there has been habitual reflection on the media’s role in the large-scale political apathy.
Currently, there is an aggressive standoff between media professionals and South Africa’s governing party - the ANC - concerning the media’s ability to fulfil its function to engage the electorate and consolidate the young democracy (Wasserman, 2010). The media has continually identified itself as indispensable and the bastion of democracy. This notion that the media is fundamental to democracy is the product of expansive research on the media-democracy paradigm, which underpins political communication scholarship within the
Global North. At the core of the media-democracy paradigm is the belief that the media (in particular journalism) performs a deliberative function to engage citizenship by providing political information and a forum for political discussion (Strömbäck, 2005).
What is Deliberative Democracy?
At its roots, democracy is the process of making decisions. Theorists often assert that the democratic process is of intrinsic good as it treats people equally, providing them the respect they deserve (Bohman, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1996). On an aggregate level, the democratic process ensures that each vote holds the same weight. In a deliberative democracy, this parity is amplified as all viewpoints are given equal chance of consideration within the electorate (Habermas, 1996).
Political decisions that are the product of reasoned discussions with the incorporation of citizen in the public exchange of arguments is understood to be a deliberative democracy. Citizens are normatively required to consider opposing frames of thought to generate an outcome which secures the common political good. Cohen (1989) explicitly described deliberative democracy as possessing the following attributes: (1) The deliberative process should take the form of an argumentative system which is regulated and informed amongst all parties with the ability to test the assertions put forth. (2) There must remain utmost inclusivity of all electorate members and discussion must be held within a public arena. (3) Deliberations are free from any external or internal coercion. All members have a uniform capacity to listen, discuss, and critique ideas. And (4) deliberation should meet a rationally driven consensus. The stance of a position must be taken solely on the credibility of the arguments brought forth into the arena. Critical reasoning is the product of all participants being actively involved in the decision-making process.
The foci of a deliberative democracy is the belief that reasoned thought and
arguments and consideration of various viewpoints is essential, which is similar to the democratic objectives stipulated within the South African constitution (Barnett, 1999). This begs the questions: What is the forum for the exchange of ideas? And, how does it
functionally work in modern society? Within the media-democracy paradigm, the media is essential in fostering the forms of deliberative democracy (Manin, 2010). There are numerous ways in which the media can promote deliberation within its audience, such as: broadcasting different social and policy perspectives, delivering factual information, and encouraging the audience to share their stances on political doings. The next section, dissects how the South African media environment notionally stimulates the deliberative model.
Television and the Public Sphere
Political scholars have long been interested with the “public sphere”, its role in democracy and the construction of citizenship. Conceptualised and popularised by Habermas (1989), the public sphere is the space which arbitrates between society and the state. It conveys the discussion of socio-political matters by private individuals; is an arena where critical and a well-reasoned consensus is met; and is the formation of public opinion (Calhoun, 2011). Thus, within the public sphere citizens have the ability to actively contribute to the policy-making process, influence political elites, and hold the democratic state accountable to them. “The public sphere is...what one might call the factory of politics – its site of production...the space in which politics is first made possible at all and
communicable” (Kluge, 1981). Within the deliberative democracy, the public sphere is further required to include, educate and nature open and reasoned discussion between all citizens (Briggs, 2009; Simons, 2003).
Due to the emergence of the printing press during Habermas’ conceptualisation, the “mass media” and the “public sphere” have fundamentally been intertwined and fervently debated within political communication scholarship. Some theorists have argued that the
media fulfils the symbolic and functional role of the public sphere as the advent of mass media provided individuals with information about relevant political news which aided in the construction of public opinions (Cook, 2011; Dahlgren, 2005; Silverstone, 1994; Simons, 2003). Mill (1974) reasoned that the media fosters in self-governance by exposing citizens to dissimilar viewpoints, increasing citizens’ ability to exercise judgement, and holding the (political) elite accountable to the electorate through the watchdog function. Many have viewed the media as essential for guaranteeing all voters have adequate and equal knowledge to best equip them to make the wisest voting choice (Manin, 2010; Page, 1996). Within western mature democracies, it is widely accepted that the media is the dominant public sphere (Habermas, 1996; Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2009). Numerous scholars agree that post-Apartheid South Africa exhibited a mediated public sphere comparable to the West, where social issues, idea formation, deliberation, participation, and citizenry is constructed (Wasserman & Garman, 2014; Jacobs, 2002). As Jacobs (2002) highlighted, South African media is a power centre for political discourse and is expected to foster public engagement in line with the deliberative function.
Despite the general consensus that the mass media is the contemporary public sphere, many denunciate the perception that the media adequately fulfils the function. Recurrent critiques have been directed to the forces of capitalism and its implication on democratic participation within South Africa. Friedman (2011) argued that although the media often views itself as the fourth-estate, fostering citizenship, engagement, education and opinion formation, this is largely circumvented by commercial interests. Airtime is restricted to empowered business people, policy professionals, prominent lobby groups, and think tanks (Neocosmos, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Jacobs, 2002). The media’s political economy has disadvantaged the majority of South Africans who are not provided equal opportunity to voice their concerns in the public sphere; consequently, the deliberative and decision-making
process is undermined as a variety of voices are not heard (Rao & Wasserman, 2015; Curran, 1991).
Although the challenges relating to concentrated ownership and its detriment to deliberation has been researched, there has been no empirical investigation into the media’s content and its ability to enact deliberative ideals within the South African population. Hence, the impetus for this study. Television was chosen for analysis as it is one of the most widely used media outlets for political discourse within the country. Following radio, television is the most used medium for acquiring news and political information with more than 91 percent of South Africans active consumers, even withstanding the prevalent wealth inequalities within the country (Lloyd, 2018; SAARF, 2015; Ndlovu, 2015). By design, television is informative, entertaining and requires very little cognitive energy to understand its content (Bignell, 2002; Corner & Pels, 2003; Zoonen, 2003; Cook, 2011) which Glenn and Mattes (2011) attributed to South African citizens’ current preference for passive modes of political information consumption. Moreover, television is commonly a trusted source of information within the country (Malilia, 2013). Despite the rise of online media, television is still the most dominant resource in discussing and resolving socio-political issues today (Zoonen, 2003; Gauntlett, 2008; Cook, 2011). Due to a stark digital divide within the country which disproportionately impacts women, low income earners, and rural residents’ ability to harness social networking platforms for information and discussion (Bornman, 2016), the online public sphere studied in other countries is not as robust or inclusive in South Africa. Subsequently, television still best delivers credible information enabling citizens to formulate and debate ideas; and thus provides viewers with the elements to engage in critical thought and conversation (Dahlgren, 2005; Slade, 2002).
A wealth of literature has investigated the relationship between television programming and its influence on political education and deliberation (including civic
engagement and political talk) within mature western democracies (Benoit & Hansen, 2004; Pan et al., 2006; Zhu et al, 1994). However, there is relatively little understanding of how television programming influences audiences in new non-western democracies. Two questions guided this study:
RQ1: To what extent does television programming educate viewers on
opposing viewpoints?
RQ2: To what extent does television programming increase policy
deliberation?
Literature has predominantly focused on two types of television programming (namely, news media and political debates) and its impact on audience’s political education and deliberation. This research investigated these two types in addition to opening
exploration into the Q&A format; as some academics have argued that it best replicates the public sphere. The following section outlines the current understanding of audience effects in these different level of television programming.
News Media
Literature has largely pointed to strong increases in the audience’s political knowledge as a consequence of watching news media (see Dalton, 2002; Neuman et al., 1992; Norris, 2000). Many theorists have argued that news media is linked to the frequency of political conversations. Bryce (1973), Herbemas (1989), Tarde (1989) and Anderson, Dardenne & Killenberg (1994) rationally asserted that news media predetermines political talk within a deliberative democracy. Whilst Koch (1994) Kim, Wyatt & Katz’s (1999) empirically showed that news media use resulted in greater amounts of political talk.
Furthermore, Kim, Wyatt & Katz (1999) concluded that citizens who watched news media were more likely to engage in participatory and deliberative actions, such as discussing policy stances with others and voting in elections. Aarts & Semetko (2003) corroborated this
finding, and further argued that there is a strong relationship between news media use and greater issue knowledge. This knowledge motivated the first two hypotheses:
H1a: Participants exposed to news media will have a greater likelihood of
engaging in political talk than those who are exposed to political debates or Q&A television programming.
H1b: Participants exposed to news media will have a greater likelihood of
engaging in deliberation than citizens who are exposed to political debates or Q&A television programming.
Political talk is often viewed as a primary moderator on how news viewers understand policy issues. Viewers who discussed news material with friends, family or acquaintances would exhibit higher levels political knowledge than their non-discussing counterparts; thus interpersonal communication is an important factor in understanding increased knowledge gains within a news audience (Schudson, 1998; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006). This motivated the next hypothesis:
H2a: The effects of news media on political talk will be strongest for people
with high political knowledge.
Scholarship on political deliberation largely assumes that politically knowledgeable citizens are more likely to consider the variety of arguments presented to them to make the best electoral verdict (Dahl, 1979; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Mills, 1898). However, research on cognitive heuristics and motivated reasoning has provided mix evidence on whether politically knowledgeable individuals are more prone to examine information in a deliberative manner. For instance, Taber and Lodge (2006) found that politically
knowledgeable citizens were more susceptible to devoting cognitive energy in order to reconfirm their political stance. And, similar to individuals with low political knowledge, knowledgeable citizens utilise simple heuristics when making political decisions; however,
sophisticates rely on these heuristics less and their use results in better informed decisions than non-political sophisticates (see Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). In light of these findings, this study postulates a further hypothesis:
H2b: The effects of news media on political deliberation will be strongest for
people with high political knowledge. Political Debates
A mass amount of literature has been focused on understanding the influence of political actors debating and the audience’s increase in issue knowledge. Although research has primarily been focused in the U.S context, there is strong evidence to suggest that televised presidential debates actively educate viewers on policy issues and legislation. Likewise, to news media, debates are highly capable of increasing issue knowledge amongst their viewers (Benoit and Hansen, 2004; Benoit, Hansen and Verser, 2003; Zhu, Milavksy and Biswas, 1994). This programming has on a great level “integrated citizens into a collective political experience” by providing a forum and context for them to evaluate and share their feelings about the common good in lines with a deliberative democracy (Cho and Choy, 2011).
However, there is contention about how universal these results are, as Cho and
Choy’s (2011) comparative assessment illustrated that debates do not significantly change the audience’s perception of political candidates and their policies but rather reinforces existing predispositions of candidates, issue alignment, and voting intentions. This data confirmed Sigelman’s (1984) questioning of the true value of debates between political elites and its role in the deliberative process. Hence, issue salience is an important factor here; as the more salient an issue, the increased tendency for the individual to have already deliberated it, albeit imperfectly (Fiskin, 2007). Fiskin (2009) highlighted that citizens who had processed an issue prior to exposure to new information were less likely to change or deliberate their
views. Moreover, Barabas’s study (2000) and Gastin and Dillard’s analysis (1999), inferred that citizens who did not frequently think about a specific policy, evaluated new information in deliberately good ways. Whether issue salience influences the relationship between political debates and deliberation is somewhat unclear. In light of this mixed evidence, this study postulates a further research question to better understand the relationship:
RQ3: Do news media reinforce prior issue alignment and how does issue
salience impact this? Questions & Answers
There has long been critiques to the value of television (and by extension other media) in a democracy. Some scholars have asserted that citizens are passive consumers who just spectate content presented to them rather than influence politics (see Carey, 2008; Chouliaraki, 2006; Jones, 2010; Krugman, 1965; Swanson and Mancini, 1996). The Q&A format has provided a direct challenge to this assertion as it has increased the direct role of the studio audience plus encouraged them “to think of themselves as participants in a political debate and as citizens with a stake in the political process” (McNair et al., 2003). Hawkins (2013) further claimed that the Q&A format cultivates the ideals of the public sphere in comparison to other television formats, as audience members are given permission to personalise and vent their feelings surrounding societal problems to an elite panel. This in turn, means that political decisions are scrutinised by a diverse population with varied opinions, and political elites are held accountable to their policies.
However, despite the convincing arguments praising Q&A format and its embodiment of the public sphere, there has yet to be any empirical study on its influence on the audience. It is worth investigating if Q&A programming educates its audiences and engages them in the deliberation. The following question has been postulated accordingly:
RQ4: To what extent does Q&A programming educate viewers on opposing
viewpoints and increase policy deliberation?
In light of this typology, this study explores which format has the strongest effects on political education and deliberation through a comparative assessment.
Methodology
Design and Procedure
To test the hypotheses, an online cross-national experiment was conducted in a non-laboratory setting. Despite critiques regarding low external validity, experimental design is the most effective at investigating the causal links of an independent variable on the
dependent variable and was therefore chosen for this study (Brown & Melamed, 1990; Kinder & Palfrey, 1993). The experiment comprised of a between subject design with four levels of one independent variable: the media format. The one-factor design can thus be described as four (media type: control vs. news media vs. political debates vs. Q&A) and two dependent variables (education and deliberation), with moderating variables of political knowledge and issue salience. All participants were randomly assigned into either a treatment or control group. The sample consisted of South African residents and nationals living
overseas from the ages of 18 years and older. Participants were retrieved by means of convenience and snowballing sampling through the researcher’s family and friend network. The experiment was carried out through Qualtrics and was active for 15 days from the of 3rd - 17th June, 2018.
Sample
At the end of the sampling period, there was a completion rate of 56% with a total of 117 people who started the experiment and 65 participants completing it. South African residents comprised 61.5% of respondents (N=40) and the remainder were South African nationals living overseas (N=25). The mean average age of participants was 37 years old.
Overall, the sample was highly educated with 36.9% obtaining a university bachelor’s degree (N=24), and 30.8% obtaining a postgraduate degree (N=20). The gender split was somewhat even, as males compromised 46.2% of participants (N=20), and the remainder were female (N=35).
Stimulus Material: The Independent Variable
For common similarity, all stimulus material related to the “land expropriation without compensation” policy recently introduced in South Africa. Due to ample video material available for each type of programming tested in the study, the ongoing debate, and the polarising discussion concerning land redistribution, this policy was the best socio-political issue which would enable the study to measure levels of education and deliberation, whilst also moderating for issue salience and political knowledge. In table 1 below, a
description of each video condition is provided.
Table 1: Stimulus Material Description
Television Category
Description of content
News Media News report by South African Broadcasting Channel that discussed the recent land grabs which has been the result of the announcement of expropriation without compensation land policy. Video consists of a news reader introducing the topic, interviews with disenfranchised citizens, a social activist for the redistribution of land, the executive director of AgriSA who opposed the policy, the ANC chair, and the Human Right Commission who discussed how marginalised South Africans are experiencing human rights violation due to lack of access to land.
Time - 3 minutes 41 seconds
Q&A Question Time (British Broadcasting Channel programme) is a topical debate programme which hosted a special South African version. The live studio audience and panel were all South African (including politicians, academics, and media experts). The segment included an audience member asking the panel if it is necessary for South Africa to adopt a radical land redistribution policy, similar to that of Zimbabwe. This question was answered by the panel members and 3 members of the audience shared their views.
Time - 6 minutes 45 seconds
Political debates Discussion between two politicians from different political parties debating the expropriation without compensation land policy. The debate occurred within the South African Parliament and was televised live. The two politicians disagreed with each other, one favouring the policy and the other against it.
Time - 3 minutes 48 seconds
Control Condition A mixture of the news report by the South African Broadcasting Channel and the political debates in parliament conditions. There was no inclusion of citizens within this condition.
Following exposure to the stimulus material all participants were required to answer a manipulation check asking if there was any audience interaction in the video they viewed, with the option to answer “yes” or “no” response. A chi-square test of independence showed that participants who were exposed to news media, political debates, Q&A and control conditions did not significantly differ in their indication of whether the video clip they viewed had interaction with an audience χ2 (3, N=65)=7.67, p =.053. Therefore, it is not
guaranteed that participants who were exposed to video material with audience interaction noticed it as such. However, observing the percentage distribution in the stimulus, the majority of participants in their respective conditions correctly identified if there was the presence of audience interaction. Moreover, the only condition to contain audience interaction was the Q&A which 75% of viewers accurately recognised. Hence, the manipulation check was regarded as effective.
Table 2: Manipulation Check
Experiment Condition Manipulation Check: “Was there any interaction with the audience in the video clip you just viewed?”
Yes No Total Political debates 5 29.4% 12 70.6% 17 100% News Report 6 40% 9 60% 15 100% Q&A 12 75% 4 25% 16 100% Control Condition 7 41.2% 10 58.8% 17 100%
Measures: Dependent and Moderating Variables
The study measured two dependent variables, education and policy deliberation. The success of different television programming in educating participants was measured via four post-test Likert scale questions: (1) the clip showed me differing views; (2) I was educated on differing viewpoints; (3) the clip motivated me to learn more about different views; and (4) the clip taught me a new perspective on land reformation I did not know or hear about before.
A principal components analysis concluded that the first factor explained 51% of variance and had an eigenvalue of 2.055 (M=3.37 SD=1.34 α=0.68). A new variable was created called “Education Score” with the total mean sum from the four post-test questions with “0” indicating nothing learnt to “7” indicating a great amount was learnt.
Policy deliberation was operationalised into two different measurements. The first
was a post-test open-ended question asking participants to list the thoughts that came to mind after viewing the stimulus material. Participants who provided relevant commentary
pertaining to video content or their beliefs were given a score of “1” meaning that they deliberated and those who did not were scored “0”.
The second measurement for policy deliberation were eight post-test questions on a Likert scale ranging from “0” for completely unwilling to “7” for completely willing. Question all pertained to the participants willingness to: (1) talk about land reformation with family and friends; (2) have a discussion with someone with opposing opinions; (3) share information on social media; (4) discuss the topic with people who share similar views; (5) sign a petition; (6) search for more information on land reformation to reconsider their current views; (7) find out more information about how it is regulated in South Africa; and (8) listen to others who have different opinions on the issue. A principal components analysis concluded that 2 factors explained 70.9% of variance. The first factor had an eigenvalue of 4.42 and the second had an eigenvalue of1.26. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.86. To improve reliability of the scale to more accurately measure deliberation, the two questions relating to willingness to share on social media and sign a petition was removed. Hence, the final scale was six item post-test questions (M=4.29 SD=1.68 α=0.88). A new variable was created called “Deliberation Score” with the mean sum from the six questions with “0” indicating absolutely no deliberation occurred to “7” indicating a lot of deliberation occurred.
Issue support was measured twice within the experiment in both the pre and
post-tests. This was recorded on a Likert scale, ranging from “I do not support land reform without compensation at all” to “I absolutely support land reformation without compensation” and an option to select that they “don’t know” (pre-test M=2.54, SD=2.28; post-test M=2.86,
SD=2.29).
Political knowledge was measured by means of four factual knowledge questions
within the pre-test: (1) the number of democratically elected presidents; (2) number of political capital cities within the country; (3) the speaker of the National Assembly in Parliament; and (4) the current leader of the main opposition party. Each question was multiple choice with three answer categories. All answers were recorded into “1” for correct and “0” for incorrect answers, which were all totalled so each participant had a score from 0 to 4 (M=2.72, SD=0.86). Participants were coded into two groups, low and high political knowledge. Those who scored 3 or more, were coded into high political knowledge (N=40) and those scoring lower were coded into low political knowledge (N=25).
Issue salience was measured by one post-test Likert scale question asking “how much
do you think about land reformation within South Africa?” (M=4.77, SD =1.77). The author acknowledges that there are a number of ways to measure issue salience, each with their own drawbacks. Within this measurement, issue salience had been solely measured as issue attentiveness. The chief deficiency of this method is that awareness of an issue does not simply equate issue importance, this can be overcome by adding more in-depth item
questions (RePass, 1971). However, for the purpose of this study, it was seen as inappropriate to ask participants more question about issue salience, as the papers that recommend doing so are primarily concerned with relating salience to voter preference. As mentioned earlier, in terms of deliberation, citizens who had processed an issue prior to exposure to new
concerned with measuring prior exposure to the issue; hence a simple one-item post-test question was considered appropriate for analysis.
Political talk was measured on a four item Likert-scale post-test question. Questions
asked pertained to the participants’ willingness to: (1) talk about land reformation with family and friends; (2) have a discussion with someone with opposing opinions; (3) discuss the topic with people who share similar views; and (4) listen to others who have different opinions on the issue. A principal components analysis found that the first factor explained 72.6% of variance with an eigenvalue of 2.903. (M=4.43, SD=1.77, α=0.87). A new variable was created called “Political Talk” with the total average sum from the four post-test questions, with “0” indicating absolutely no desire or willingness to discuss policy issue to “7” indicating a great willingness to discuss policy issue with an array of different people. Method of Analysis
This study carried out a one-way ANOVA, two-way ANOVA, linear regression, chi-square test of independence, and paired samples t-test to answer the research questions and hypotheses. The corresponding use of these test are detailed below1.
Results
Television Programming on Political Education
For RQ1, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted to compare the main effects of the
television programming (news media, political debates, Q&A programming, and control group) on political education. The main effect for television programming produced an F ratio of F(3,61) = 2.37, p=.079, indicating a nonsignificant difference between news media (M=2.63, SD=1.51), political debates (M=3.81, SD=1.33), Q&A (M=3.55, SD=1.25), and the control condition (M=3.40, SD=1.07) on education levels.
1 Three independent t-tests were carried out to compare if the education scores, deliberation scores and the post-test policy support for South African residents and South African national overseas differed significantly. For the three tests, the results were non-significant. Hence, it was deemed unnecessary to separate the two groups for further analysis as stimulus
Television Programming on Political Deliberation
To establish the extent that television programming increase policy deliberation (RQ2)
and if the effects were stronger in news media (H1b), a one-way analysis of variances was
carried out and revealed higher scores for deliberation than education. The main effect for television programming produced an F ratio of F(3,61)=0.67, p=.573, signalling a
nonsignificant difference between news media (M=4.03, SD=1.83), political debates
(M=4.34, SD=1.81), Q&A (M=4.00, SD=1.59), and the control condition (M=4.73, SD=1.52) on deliberation scores. Moreover, the chi-square test of independence showed that exposure to different television programming and the likelihood of participants to deliberate more within the open-ended question did not significantly differ, χ2 (3, N=65) =2.39, p=.495.
Therefore, H1b was rejected.
Television Programming, Political Knowledge and Political Talk
The study was also aimed to investigate whether the effects of news media on deliberation would be strongest for people with high political knowledge (H2b), hence a
two-way analysis of variance was carried out to assess if political knowledge had a moderation effect. A dummy variable was created for news media and high political knowledge. The results revealed that news media participants with high political knowledge had a positive but non-significant effect on the relationship between news media and political deliberation; highlighted by the interaction effect F(1,61)=0.05, p=.820. In addition, the difference in mean deliberation scores between high political (M= 4.16) and low political knowledge (M= 3.93) was incredibly slight; therefore, H2b was rejected.
For H1a, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare political talk in
news media with regards to other television programming (i.e. political debates, Q&A, and control). There was a nonsignificant difference in scores between news media (M=4.28,
SD=1.85) and other programming (M=4.48, SD=1.78) conditions; t(63)=0.36, p=.717 for
enacting political talk amongst its viewers; therefore H1a was rejected.
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to test if high political knowledge moderated the relationship between news media and political talk (H2a). The results from the test and scatter
plot revealed that high political knowledge had a positive but non-significant effect on the relationship between news media and political talk; as the interaction effect was non-significant at F(1,61)=0.01, p=.935. The H2a prediction that the effects of news media on
political talk will be strongest for people with high political knowledge was therefore rejected.
Issue Salience on the Relationship between Television Programming and Policy Support Finally, a paired-samples t-test was administered to assess the change of mean score in policy support after exposure to political debates (RQ3). There was a nonsignificant
difference in the scores for pre-policy support (M=3.08, SD=2.5) and post-policy support (M=2.62, SD=2.33) conditions; t(12)=1.15, p =.273.
Table 3: Multiple Regression Results
Results from the multiple linear regression indicated that there was a collective significant effect between prior policy support, exposure to political debates, and the moderation of issue salience on post-issue support. A significant regression equation was
Model 1 Model 2 Variable B SE B β B SE B β Pre-Policy Support 0.93 0.04 0.94*** 0.94 0.05 0.94*** Political debates -0.51 0.27 -0.09 -4.94 0.28 -0.91 Political debates* Issue Salience 0.04 0.13 0.02 Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87
Note 1: Political debates was a dummy variable with 0 representing no exposure to that condition *** p <.001.
found F(3,50)=116.71, p <.001, with an R2 of 0.87. However, the moderation of issue
salience on political debates (t=-0.31, p =.756) was not significant predictors in the model. Prior policy support was the only significant predictor within the model (t=18.61, p <.001). Hence, within this sample, issue salience is not significant.
Discussion
This experiment examined three television formats to observe the differential impacts of news media, political debates and Q&A programming on political education and deliberation in a South African context. Moreover, the study assessed whether audience effects were stronger in certain television formats. Existing literature has largely pointed to strong effects between news programming and political debates on increased policy knowledge and deliberation within their audience. Results from this study challenged the relevance of these findings outside of western mature democracies, as South African participants displayed low knowledge gains and only moderately deliberated after viewing television content.
South African television was evidently not successful in educating viewers. Participants across all television formats expressed that the content they witnessed was neither novel nor informative. Although results did not reach significance, participants
exposed to political debates exhibited the highest scores of learning followed by Q&A, whilst news media viewers displayed the least. It is possible that the news media’s poor ability to inform citizens may be due to the uniformity of opinions presented, whereas political debates & Q&A programmes are by design more contentious and varied ideas are broadcasted. Consequently, the latter two are better able to assist in knowledge gains.
More optimistically, South African television demonstrated a higher proficiency at enacting deliberation as participants reported a moderate willingness to consider similar and opposing viewpoints, seek new information, and discuss the land reformation policy with others after inspecting television content. The amount of deliberation was fairly similar
across all television formats, therefore, no format was deemed better at enacting deliberation ideals. This similarity remained constant when political talk, political knowledge and issue salience were the focal variables.
Surprisingly, news media did not elicit greater frequency of political conversation compared to political debates and Q&A formats. This result is in stark opposition to the generalisability of previous studies claiming news media produces high rates of political conversation (namely, Bryce,1973; Herbemas, 1989; Tarde, 1989; Anderson, Dardenne & Killenberg, 1994; Koch, 1994; Kim, Wyatt and Katz, 1999; Aarts & Semetko, 2003).
Contradictory to the theoretical arguments of Bryce (1973), Herbemas, (1989) Tarde (1989), and the empirical findings of Anderson, Dardenne & Killenberg (1994) Koch (1994) Kim, Wyatt and Katz, (1999) and Aarts & Semetko (2003), political knowledge was not a strong indicator for the likelihood of people engaging in political conversations after watching news. Moreover, previous studies have noted that within news media, politically knowledgeable individuals were more likely to deliberate news content, and use it to inform their electoral choices (Dardenne & Killenberg, 1994; Koch, 1994). However, there was no evidence within this study to support those findings. It is suspected that motivated reasoning may be the underlying factor for contradictory results, as Taber and Lodge (2006) argued, knowledgeable citizens are likely to disengage or reject information which contradicts their political stances.
Finally, political debates did not reinforce prior political stances and the prevalence of the issue did not influence the relationship at all.
For political communication scholars, this study offers t three chief implications for the wider context: (1) that the South Africa’s television media does not adequately produce deliberative outcomes within its audience; (2) that western epistemologies are decidedly ill
suited for South African media; (3) news media is not the most successful political television format.
South African television media as a whole unsuccessfully foster education and
deliberation ideals, as citizens are not well educated on a diverse range of ideas regarding policy issues. Moreover, citizens may talk or reconsider their viewpoints; however, not so much as to realign their political stances. This raises questions as to whether other media formats (namely print, radio, and new media) educate citizens more, or if all media fail in this endeavour collectively. It would be advantageous for academia to investigate citizens’
perception on which media informs them best, or if they believe that South African media at large is not informative.
Secondly, this study tested debates surrounding the appropriateness of applying western-derived ideologies within the country. Results suggest that South African television fails to sustain the expectation of media-democracy within a deliberative objective. There are a number of reasons why this may have occurred; one chief reasoning is that
western-epistemologies are ill-adaptive within South Africa as the population is incredibly diverse, evident through the country’s eleven official languages, its variety of racial identities and ethnicities. South African media is tasked with serving content to such a diverse population, and the media’s agenda between different groups may vary. Accordingly, it may be
detrimental to utilise a small set of ideologies inspired by homogenous groups within the South African populous and media landscape.
Thirdly, literature from the West has predominantly given news-media heightened attention and its role in the media-democracy paradigm. However, this study suggests that when compared with other formats, news media is subpar at performing its mediated political role. Although there is expanding research into why individuals across the world are turning away from traditional news and turning to other news-like formats (such as infotainment), it
is still important to research other serious programming content such as Q&A and its influence on audience’s issue knowledge. Moreover, further comparative assessment of differing television formats is recommended to better assess rates of successful audience effects.
It should be noted, that this study is not without flaws. The field design mandates caution in making inferences about levels of political education within the South African population. Due to the difficulty of obtaining participants, the small sample size cannot be generalised to represent the whole South African population, and difference between television effects could not be convincingly extrapolated. This became particularly notable when the difference in programming education scores were substantial and close to significance. Moreover, it is suspected that the low education scores were the consequence of a ceiling effect due to the expropriation without compensation land policy being a highly topical discussion within South Africa and globally. Therefore, it was highly probable that participants were already aware of a range different viewpoints and that the content within each television programme was not a new insight. Lastly, the sample make-up posed a further shortcoming in
representation. The majority of the participants were well educated with 67.7% tertiary graduates; not reflecting the 10% of tertiary graduates within South African population. Moreover, the sample age was skewed to the older generations with the average age being 37; this age group may be more difficult to educate or to encourage deliberation.
Despite these limitations, the findings offer a greater depth of understanding of western epistemology and its appropriateness of testing outside of its own context. The study adds to the body of research questioning the value of applying western epistemologies within new democracies within the Global South. Moreover, this study provided examination of differing formats to better foster deliberation.
Since democratisation there have been continual critiques on the western-centric expectations placed on South African media. It is hoped that this research enables African scholars, governments, NGOs, and media specialists to evaluate the shortcomings of the western epistemologies when seeking insight to make meaningful choices surrounding media within African countries.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Experiment Questions and Answer Options:Dear respondent, I would like to invite you to participate in a research study supervised by Dr. M. Hameleers, to be conducted under the auspices of the Graduate School of
Communication, a part of the University of Amsterdam.
The study will take about 10 minutes. We guarantee that your anonymity will be safeguarded and that your personal information will not be passed on to third parties under any
circumstances unless you first give your express permission for this. You can refuse to participate in the research or cut short your participation without having to give a reason for doing so. You also have up to 24 hours after participating to withdraw your permission to allow your answers or data to be used in the research. Participating in the research will not entail your being subjected to any appreciable risk or discomfort, the researchers will not deliberately mislead you and you will not be exposed to any explicitly offensive
material. Furthermore, I would like to request you to answer the following questions
honestly; there is no right or wrong answer. All data is processed anonymously, meaning that the information will not be linked to your name or other identity-related elements. Should you have any comments about the course of the research and should you need any additional information, you are welcome to contact the researcher, Nomakhwezi Nkwanyana (at the email address: nomakhwezi.nkwanyana@student.uva.nl) at any time. I hope I have provided you with sufficient information. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your assistance with this research, which we greatly appreciate. Kind
regards, Nomakhwezi Nkwanyana
Please select whichever is applicable to you
o
I am a South African resident (1)o
I am a South African national living oversees (2)o
I am not a South African national nor do I reside within the country (3)Skip To: End of Survey If Please select whichever is applicable to you = I am not a South African national nor do I reside within the country
What is your age in years?
________________________________________________________________ What is your gender?
o
Male (1)o
Female (2)o
Non-binary (3)o
Prefer not to say (4)What is the last grade or class you completed?
o
Did not finish high school (1)o
High school diploma or equivalent, no further schooling (2)o
Technical or vocational school after high school (3)o
Some collage/university – did not complete (4)o
Associate’s or two-year college/university degree (5)o
Four-year college/university degree (6)o
Graduate or professional school after college/university, no degree (7)o
Graduate or professional degree (8)Now, we want to ask you a few questions about politics.
Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. In general, how interested are you in politics and public affairs?
No interest at all Very much interested Don't Know 1 ()
In general, how much do you trust South African politics and its intuitions to be transparent and represent the interests of citizens?
No trust at all Complete trust Politicians ()
Community and City Councils () Legal Courts () Political Parties () National Government ()
How many democratic presidents (from 1994 onwards) has South Africa had?
o
2 (1)o
1 (2)o
4 (3)o
5 (4)How many political capital cities does South Africa have?
o
3 (1)o
2 (2)o
1 (3)Who is the speaker of the National Assembly in Parliment?
o
Caroline Mealor (1)o
Baeleka Mbete (2)o
Helen Zille (3) Page BreakWho is the current leader of the main opposition party to the ANC?
o
Mmusi Maimane (1)o
Julius Melema (2)o
Lindiwe Mazibuko (3)Did you vote in the latest South African general election in 2014?
o
I did vote (1)o
I am eligible to vote but did not vote (2)o
I am not eligible to vote (3)Please rank your behaviour according to the scale and questions below
Never Always
When you are with your friends or family, how often do you discuss political matters () How often have you used news media to gather information about politics, social issues, or community problems? ()
How much trust do you have in South African media in general – such as newspapers, television, radio, and the Internet – when it comes to getting factual and accurate news?
No trust at all Complete trust
1 7
1 ()
To what extent do you support the policy of land reformation without compensation within South Africa? I do not support land reform without compensation at all I absolutely support land reformation without compensation Don't Know 1 ()
Was there any interaction with the audience in the video clip you just viewed?
o
Yes (1)o
No (2)Was there any interaction with the audience in the video clip you just viewed?
o
Yes (1)o
No (2)Was there any interaction with the audience in the video clip you just viewed?
o
Yes (1)o
No (2)List the thoughts that come to mind after viewing the video presented to you. NOTE: You may choose to skip this question if no thoughts come to head.
________________________________________________________________ To what extent do you feel you agree with the following statements:
The video clip showed differing views on land reformation in South Africa. () I was educated on different viewpoints on land reformation in South Africa. () The video clip motivated me to learn more about different views on land reformation. () The video clip taught me a new perspective on land reformation I did not know or hear about before. ()
Please indicate how willing you are to perform the following actions after viewing the video clip:
Completely Unwilling Completely Willing Talk about land reformation with family and
friends () Listen to others that have an opinion on land reformation () Discuss land reformation with people that share similar views to you on the issue? () Have a discussion on land reformation with someone that has a different view on the issue to you () Search for more opinions on the issue of land reformation to reconsider your current opinion () Find more information on how land reformation is regulated within South Africa () Share information on land reformation on social media? () Sign a petition on land reformation that supports your view on this issue ()
In recent times, how much do you think about land reformation within South Africa? I never think about land
reformation
I always think about land reformation 1 ()
To what extent do you support land reformation without compensation in South Africa? I do not support land
reformation without compensation at all I absolutely support land reformation without compensation 1 ()
