Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation: An in-depth case study on the shortcomings and lessons that were identified in the aftermath of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis

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Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation

An in-depth case study on the shortcomings and lessons that were identified in the

aftermath of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis

Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management Esmee Leeman

Student Number: s2374870 Date of Admission: 16 March 2020 Thesis supervisor: Dr. S.L. Kuipers Second reader: Dr. L.D. Cabane Leiden University – Campus the Hague Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

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Finishing this master thesis would not have been possible without the help of the following

people:

I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to all respondents at the LVNL, OT

Schiphol Airport, KNMI, NLR and DCC-IenW for participating in this research and sharing

your knowledge. I very much enjoyed all of our conversations!

Many thanks go to DR. S.L. Kuipers for the much-appreciated advice and guidance during

the whole thesis process.

Last but not least, a special thanks to all my family and friends who have always

expressed their interest and endlessly encouraged me throughout my studies.

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List of abbreviations:

LVNL Air Traffic Control the Netherlands

NLR Royal Netherlands Aerospace Centre

KNMI The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute

DCC-IenM Departmental Coordination Centre Crisis Management for the Ministry of Infrastructure

and Environment (Now Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, IenW)

VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

FIR Flight Information Region

VAFC Volcanic Ash Forecast Chart

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Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation

1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2009 scientists started to detect seismic activity at the Eyjafjallajökull volcano located at the Eastern Volcanic Zone in southern Iceland (Loughlin 2010). On 20 March 2010 the Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted for the first time after the detected seismic activity of 2009. However, this was a relatively small eruption rated as the second to lowest impact on the Volcanic Explosivity Index

(Godmundsson et al. 2012: 1). On 14 April 2010 the Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted again however this time the impact was much bigger. The eruption caused melting of large amounts of the ice cap and ‘the interaction of magma with water created a plume of volcanic ash and gas over 10km high, which was spread out and was carried by winds south-eastwards towards the European continent’ (Loughlin 2010).

On 15 April 2010, the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) located in London issued a forecast map indicating that the ash cloud would track over Europe in the coming hours. According to the guidelines developed by the international Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) ‘the recommended procedure in the case of volcanic ash is exactly the same as with low-level wind shear, regardless of ash concentration – AVOID AVOID AVOID’ (ICAO 2007: 19 & Alemanno 2010: 102). These guidelines from ICAO are based on the perceived hazard volcanic ash poses to aircrafts. Ash can fuse on the surfaces within the engines which can cause the engines to flame-out and potentially even lead to an air crash (Alexander 2013: 10). Based on this information national authorities quickly decided to adopt the prescribed ‘zero risk’ regulatory response. In practice this resulted in airspace closures all across Europe. As a result, ‘by 17 April 2010 airports were closed as far south as Rome and as far east as Moscow’ (Alexander 2013: 12).

With almost every flight in Europe cancelled the volcanic ash cloud caused major disruption in national, European and even worldwide air traffic. However, a few days into these airspace closures nobody exactly knew how severely the atmosphere was contaminated, at what height the volcanic ash cloud was located, how long this volcanic ash cloud would linger in the European atmosphere and at what point it would be safe to fly again (Alexander 2013: 10-13). Three days into the flight ban it became clear that the crisis in aviation could not be solved on a national level but only on a European level. It is therefore that European commission started to get involved into the crisis. The European commission who was officially not part of the set of organizations taking decisions on the matter of the volcanic ash cloud did propose a co-ordinated European approach to tackle the crisis. This approach resulted in new measures to be implemented on 20 April that would partially re-open European airspace

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based on three zones of contamination (Alemanno 2010: 102). By 22 April 2010 the European air space was gradually being opened up again. By then 108.000 flights had been cancelled over the past 7 days which has affected around 10,5 million passengers (Budd et al. 2011: 33). As such the Eyjafjallajökull volcanic ash cloud of 2010 was a real transboundary crisis with major consequences.

In the aftermath of the volcanic ash cloud crisis in 2010 there has been a lot of critique on how the crisis was handled in terms of the controversy around the airspace closures. Shifting from a zero-tolerance approach in terms of ash contamination to a new safety threshold of much higher volcanic ash concentrations in just five days raised many questions (Alemanno 2010: 101). Furthermore, the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 was a unique crisis as it had never occurred within the Dutch context but also because there were no fatalities in this crisis. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that such a crisis may occur again in the future (Sammonds et al. 2010). Which is why it is all the more important to research this crisis more in depth.

The main objective of this research therefore focusses on exploring the crisis response in great detail in order to be able to figure out how the crisis response fell short and was has been learned from this from an organizational crisis-induced learning perspective. while a lot of research on this case has been carried out in regard to how Europe has handled this transboundary crisis much less is known at how on a local level this disruption in aviation was handled and learned from. Therefore, this research will pertain to the perspective of the Netherlands with a focus on learning at the national organizational level.

1.1 Research Question

Based on this information I have formulated the following research question:

How did Dutch stakeholders respond to the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 and how have the

identified shortcomings in the crisis response been translated to crisi- induced organizational learning?

1.2 Academic Relevance

Though there is a significant increase in studies on organizational learning the academic body of literature available on organizational learning from crises has remained scarce (Deverell 2009: 179). In addition to this, literature that is available on crisis-induced organizational learning ‘has so far been vague and elusive’ (Deverell 2009: 179). This research therefore aims to contribute to the current academic body of literature on crisis-induced organizational learning.

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on crisis-induced learning. The volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 was marked as a transboundary crisis, experienced throughout various European countries crossing geographical and functional boundaries. Due to the transboundary nature of this crisis the main body of academic literature available focusses on how European intergovernmental organizations have responded to and learned from this crisis.

However, a gap of knowledge prevails as much less literature is available on how Dutch stakeholders have responded and learned from this crisis. This research will account for exactly this gap of

knowledge by providing insights on the learning schemes in terms of shortcomings as well as the policy and procedural changes that account for lessons implemented. This will overall contribute to the current academic literature available on crisis -induced organizational learning

1.3 Societal Relevance

Since scientists have stated that a crisis like the volcanic ash cloud in 2010 could occur more often in the future, it is incredibly important to figure out what has been learned from such a crisis situation if

learning occurred at all. This research will provide insight as to how the most important Dutch

stakeholders have responded from this crisis and have (visibly) learned from this crisis. It is important to shed light on this as it provides clarity towards society on what went wrong and how stakeholders have accounted for this, so that either the risks are minimized or a similar crisis situation will not occur again. This in turn may lead to an increase of societies’ trust in the current operation of these stakeholders. (re)gaining trust is extremely important because there was significant societal distrust during this crisis when the European commission decided to change their zero-tolerance volcanic ash concentration approach to a safety threshold that was much higher. This policy change in combination with a lack of data regarding the position and exact level of ash contamination of the volcanic ash cloud has not contributed to increased trust amongst society.

1.4 Reading Guide

Thus far the focus and relevance of the study are explained in the introduction of this thesis. In chapter II, the theoretical framework will be addressed which will consist of literature focussed on crisis

response, crisis-induced learning and barriers to learning. This chapter provides a structured framework when analysing what has been learned from a crisis. Chapter III introduces the reader to the research methodology that was used and will also explain why certain choices in the research design were made. Chapter IV provides an in-depth case description of the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010. The case description will not be limited to a chronological description of the series of events of the unfolding

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crisis but it also provides additional information on the involved Dutch stakeholders and their role in the crisis. Furthermore, this chapter also includes a technical section with insights on the damaging effects of volcanic ash on aircrafts. Chapter V will encompass the analysis of this research. As such data stemming from interviews, reports and academic articles will be analysed in further detail. This chapter can be divided into two sections. The first section focusses on the shortcomings that were identified in the aftermath of the crisis. The second section focusses on the lessons implemented that based on the identified shortcomings. Chapter VI will be the concluding chapter of this paper. Based on all the information in regard to this topic a concluding remark will be presented.

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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The following chapter will encompass the theoretical framework of this thesis and presents and discusses a wide variety of theories that will help gain insight on the topic of research. This literature review builds on the main concepts and theories surrounding the topic of learning from crises. As such these various theories will serve as a guideline in the analysis of this thesis. The first section of this literature review starts off with an introduction on transboundary crisis. This section is then followed by a more in-depth review of how learning is defined in this research. The third section of this literature review introduces the five critical tasks of crisis leadership. These five critical tasks of crisis leadership play an important role in this research as they will help structure the shortcomings in this research. The fourth section of this literature focusses more specifically on how organizations learn from crisis. The final section of this literature review explains that organizations do not necessarily have to learn from crises as there might be barriers that prevent or impede learning.

2.1 Transboundary Crisis Management

Before diving into the transboundary aspect of the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 one must first have to define the concept crisis. Oftentimes crisis refers to an undesirable, unexpected situation and marks a phase of disorder in continuity of a system. ‘We speak of a crisis when policy makers experience “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions”’ (Boin, et al. 2005: 2). Along the line of this definition a crisis consists of three components: Threat, uncertainty and urgency. During a crisis core values or life-sustaining systems become threatened. Especially these crisis

situations induce a sense of urgency. One needs to respond immediately in order to make sure that this threat an organization of society is dealing with does not materialize. However, a crisis is also most of the time accompanied by a significant degree of uncertainty pertaining to the nature of the threat and the consequences it may have.

Today’s rapidly changing world characterised by globalization, increased interconnectedness and mobility has given rise to a different type of crisis namely that of transboundary crises. While

transboundary crises have always existed, they are becoming more apparent due to the globalizing developments we are experiencing. ‘We speak of a 'transboundary crisis' when the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems or critical infrastructures faces an urgent threat that must be addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty’ (Kuipers & Boin 2015: 193). In contrast to other types of crises, transboundary crises are most importantly characterised by their potential to cross geographical, political and functional boundaries (Boin & Rhinard 2008: 4). The volcanic ash crisis of 2010 can be perceived

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as such a transboundary crisis as it has affected multiple member states within the European Union on these different levels. As such the volcanic ash cloud crossed the geographical airspace borders of European countries which led to a major disruption within European air traffic. Furthermore, during the volcanic ash cloud crisis there were many different stakeholders involved on both a national level as well as on the European level ranging from national governments, the European Commission, aircraft manufacturers, air traffic control, and aviation safety advisory bodies. Each of these stakeholders have their own interests, information and ideas on how to respond to and deal with the unfolding crisis. Due to its transboundary nature this crisis was no longer a national affair alone and various stakeholders involved eventually had to some extent work together. Therefore, authority on both political and functional levels crossed political and functional boundaries (Boin & Rhinard 2008: 4).

Though the focus of this research lies on the national level and the Dutch stakeholders that are involved in the volcanic ash crisis of 2010 it is still important to recognize that this crisis was not necessarily a Dutch crisis affecting only Dutch stakeholders. The volcanic ash crisis also significantly affected other European countries as well. Furthermore, acknowledging the transboundary nature of this crisis is of great importance as it might have played a role in how Dutch stakeholders have learned from the crisis. As there have been so many European stakeholders involved Dutch stakeholders were not dealing with the crisis on their own. As such the involvement of European stakeholders may have influenced the Dutch crisis response to the crisis as well as how these Dutch stakeholders have learned from this crisis in terms of policy- or procedural changes. Therefore, when analysing what how these different stakeholders have learned from the volcanic ash crisis of 2010 it is important to keep in mind that these Dutch stakeholders’ decision has been very much interwoven with other parties

2.2 Crisis-induced organizational learning

Broekema, Kleef & Steen (2017) have stated that public organizations struggle with learning from crisis and that learning is either done poorly or does not occur at all. ‘Learning from a crisis is a complex and challenging affair. Crises often are highly unique and unpredictable situations in which complex circumstances of chaos and stress, politicization and a lack of reliable information make it difficult to distil clear crisis lessons’ (Broekema, Kleef & Steen 2017: 326). Despite these difficulties it is still extremely important that organizations do learn from previous crisis situations in order to be able to respond to future crises more adequately. In this section of the theoretical framework I will therefore elaborate on the concept of organizational crisis-induced organizational learning by discussing some of the main theories regarding this topic.

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current academic literature there is no general consensus on the definition of learning as there are still many conflicting perceptions of what learning entails. scholars take different positions on some of the fundamental questions regarding learning. As such there is a division on for instance the locus of social learning, what drives learning and how learning is demonstrated. These conflicting perceptions of what learning entails results in a diversified theoretical body of literature concerning the definition of the concept. For example, according to Stern (1997) ‘Most approaches to learning view the phenomenon as generating acquisition of new knowledge, skills, ways of thinking or modes of social organization’ (Stern 1997: 69). The author defines learning to be an increase of skills and knowledge. This definition proposed by Stern (1997) however is rather broad and seems to leave out some other interesting aspects of what learning could entail. Therefore, the definition proposed by Broekema, Kleef & Steen (2017) seems to be more fitting for this exact research objective. The authors define learning ‘as the acquisition of new knowledge into more effective organizational action’ (Broekema, Kleef & Steen 2017: 327). In contrast to the definition of Stern (1997), Broekema, Kleef & Steen (2017) follow the approach of Fiol et al. (1985) in which they recognize learning to encompass both a cognitive and an action dimension. As such the authors move away from learning which focusses solely on acquiring new knowledge to transferring new insights into improved actions.

In addition to defining the concept of learning it is also important to clarify the locus of learning. The locus of learning has to do with the question who or what learns. Similar to the definition of the concept of learning there is no solid agreement amongst scholars on the locus of learning as there are different schools of thought with contrasting ideas on the locus of learning. The first school of thought identified by Stern (1997) states that learning only occurs in individuals. Other scholars however take a completely different stance on this by claiming that learning will only take place in large-scale social formations with no focus on individual learning. However, Stern (1997) states that ‘from a policy

perspective, the most interesting approaches to social learning are at the intermediate (or meso) levels of analysis’ (Stern 1997: 70). In other words, individuals are linked to smaller scale social structures in which they learn through communicative interaction. Birkland (2006) presents a similar definition on the locus of learning however he does add an interesting perspective. Birkland for instance states that the smaller scale social structures in which individuals are linked together allows these individuals to work together and seek solutions. As such these individuals overcome their cognitive, information-processing and decision-making limits (Birkland 2006: 12). In this research I will use the combination of definitions on the locus of learning presented by Stern and Birkland when analysing how stakeholders in aviation on both the European and local level had learned from the volcanic ash crises.

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2.3 Five critical tasks in crisis leadership

Thus far this literature review has elaborated on the definition of crisis-induced organizational learning. According to this definition organizational learning consists of an requires the acquisition of information which is then transformed into actions such as policy changes or innovations. However, in order to be able to implement any lessons the organizations at stake have to know what they would have to learn from. In times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders such as politicians or other involved organizations to either avert the threat or to minimize the crisis impact.

Public leaders and involved organizations have the special responsibility to safeguard society from the consequences of a crisis (Boin et al. 2005: 1). Thus, public leaders and organizations are

appointed to ‘manage’ the crisis during all three phases: the incubation stage, the onset and the aftermath (Boin et al. 2005: 10). Hence, managing a crisis requires a significant amount of crisis leadership.

According Boin et al. this crisis leadership involves five critical tasks: Sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning (Boin et al. 2005: 10). The five critical tasks highlight different aspects these crisis leaders or organizations need to account for during the crisis response in order to be able to manage the crisis. However, in reality these public leaders and organizations might experience difficulties fulfilling all these different tasks during the three stages of a crisis. As such flaws or weaknesses may arise in each of the five critical tasks of crisis leadership. These flaws weaknesses are here identified as shortcomings and in practice translate to flaws and weaknesses in current policies, procedures and or routines (Broekema 2016: 384).

In practice these shortcomings may influence or affect how a crisis is being managed. Even though these shortcomings may not be a prerequisite in the learning process it will be interesting to figure out whether or not the shortcomings that were identified after the volcanic ash cloud crisis can, in some way, be linked to the lessons implemented. As such the five critical tasks will provide a structure to categorize and link the identified shortcomings. However, in order to be able to link these

shortcomings to the lessons implemented the shortcomings need to categorized first. This is done by applying the critical tasks of crisis leadership. For this research only three of the five critical tasks were identified because the shortcomings that were identified fell within three of the five categories of crisis leadership do so it is necessary to categorize these shortcomings according to these critical tasks of crisis leadership.

2.3.1 Sense making

The first critical task in crisis leadership introduced by Boin et al. (2010) is sense making. As has become clear transboundary crises are very complex as they cross geographical, political and functional

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borders but also involve many stakeholders. As such transboundary crisis management requires

intensive inter-organizational cooperation. However, in order to be able to do so effectively Kuipers & Boin (2015) state that there is another critical task that decision makers will have to fulfil beforehand and that is sense making.

Sense making is extremely important as it enables decision makers to recognize vague and ambivalent signals in regard to an unfolding crisis and how this crisis might evolve over time (Kuipers & Boin 2015: 193). In practice this means that sense making is focussed on ‘collecting, analysing and sharing information on the causes, dynamics and effects of the crisis and its potential solution’ (Kuipers & Boin 2015: 194). If being done correctly decision-makers will gain a better insight and understanding of what is actually happening. However, the authors also state that this is not always the case as different decision makers have different perceptions of what is happening which may lead to misunderstandings and eventually misguided decisions. It is therefore that sense making may be one of the hardest

challenges crisis managers are facing.

2.3.2 Decision making

In crisis circumstances the involved stakeholders are being confronted by issues they do not face on a daily basis which need to be dealt with and as such decisions need to be made (Boin et al. 2005: 11). A crisis might trigger various needs and problems which calls for prioritization of for instance the

reallocation of resources. ‘This is much like politics as usual except that in crisis circumstances the disparities between demand and supply of public resources are much bigger, the situation remains unclear and volatile, and the time to think, consult, and gain acceptance for decisions is highly restricted’ (Boin et al. 2005: 11). This explains why decision-making during crises is extremely important but also very complex because organizations are usually not built to manage a crisis. Organizations are built to conduct a routine business, though crisis situations require flexibility, improvisation and sometimes even breaking the rules (Boin et al. 2005: 11). What makes decision making even more complex is that an effective crisis response is not only determined by decisions alone but also to some extent by the institutional context in which these decisions are being made as crisis decision making requires interagency and intergovernmental coordination (Boin et al. 2005: 11).

2.3.3 Crisis termination and accountability

The third critical task in crisis leadership focusses on crisis termination as well as the accountability process. In case of a crisis situation states or organisations cannot stay in this crisis mode forever and

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have to return to a state of normalcy sooner or later. This means that such organisations or states have to get involved in the process of crisis termination. Crisis termination requires downsizing of crisis

operations with a primary focus on shifting from emergency back to routine (Boin et al. 2005: 14). Furthermore, crisis termination also focusses on gaining acceptance for what has happened and to (re)stabilize the system of governance and its legitimacy. However, as has been stated by Boin et al. crisis termination by its crisis leaders cannot be brought about by a unilateral decree (Boin et al. 2005: 14). The community also plays an important role here in terms of acceptance. If crisis terminations for instance occurs to soon it may backfire the entire crisis termination process: ‘Allegations of

underestimation and cover-up are quick to emerge in an opinion climate that is still on edge’ (Boin et al. 2005: 14).

Accountability also makes up an important part of the crisis termination process especially when it comes down to (re)stabilizing legitimacy of the crisis leaders involved. Accountability is most

importantly an institutional practice whereby the main goal is to clarify who can be held responsible of what has happened. However, accountability debates can quickly transform into so called “blame games” whereby there little to no focus on reflecting on what has happened and who has carried which responsibility in this and all the more to pointing out and punishing potential culprits. The main

challenge in coping with crisis accountability is to avoid both blame games as well as blame avoidance. As Boin et al. state, crisis termination depends on how crisis leaders deal with the accountability process as a whole (Boin et al. 2005: 14).

2.4 A conceptual framework of crisis-induced learning

Thus far this theoretical framework has elaborated on the definitions of crisis-induced organizational learning as well as the three critical tasks in crisis leadership to structure the identified shortcoming. However, it is also of great importance to introduce a conceptual framework on how learning can be researched from a practical perspective. This conceptual framework can then be applied to the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010. In his article Deverell (2009) presents his conceptual framework when

researching how organizations learn from crises. The conceptual framework presented in the article is designed to answer the following questions: ‘What is learned (single- or double-loop lessons)?; What is the focus of learning (prevention or response)?; When does learning take place (intra- or intercrisis)?; Is learning blocked from implementation or does it come full circle (lessons distilled or implemented)?’ (Deverell 2009: 180).

The first question of this conceptual framework focusses on: what is learned? ‘the question of what is learned is addressed by coding lessons either as single-loop lessons (…) or as double-loop

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lessons’ (Deverell 2009: 181) Single-loop learning occurs when flaws and divergences within the organization are being detected and corrected without making any changes in the basic organizational structure or norms of the organization. Double-loop learning however presupposes a deeper form of learning wherein error detection is not connected just to the strategies of the organization but to the basic norms and organizational structure. Double-loop learning therefore calls for radical adjustment as it questions the functioning of the entire organization (Deverell 2009: 181). In contrast to single-loop learning, double-loop learning presupposes critical and deeper reflection. However, this is an unconventional response to crises. ‘Rather than engaging in reflective cognition and analytical

investigations in response to crises, managers tend to resort to mechanic adaptation and reflex reactions in response to failures and external threats’ (Deverell 2009: 185). In this research it is extremely

interesting to distinguish between single- and double-loop lessons at it operationalizes a rather abstract concept of what learning is. Furthermore,

The second question of the conceptual framework looks at the focus of learning. In crisis-induced learning a distinction is made between prevention and response as the two basic foci. In this context prevention seeks to find the exact cause in order to be able to avoid a similar crisis situation in the future by either minimizing the risk of a reoccurrence or by improving the preparedness. Response on the other hand more or less focusses on limiting the consequences of a similar crisis situation in the future and improving the crisis response by enhancing crisis management capacities (Deverell 2009: 182).

The third question to be covered in this analytical framework focusses on when lessons are learned. In this part of the framework Deverell (2009) makes yet another distinction; that of inter- and intracrisis learning. Intercrisis learning is here defined as learning that takes place after a crisis has occurred. In practice this means that changes are being made and specific measures are implemented in order to prepare for another crisis. Intracrisis learning however takes place when the crisis is still ongoing. This type of learning concerns the improvement of crisis response (Deverell 2009: 182).

The fourth and final question of this analytical framework looks at how lessons are implemented are these lessons only distilled or have they also been implemented? ‘If the lesson was only noticed but not carried out to the extent that it altered organizational behaviour, it is understood as a lesson distilled. Whereas if the case narrative show evidence stating that the lesson was carried out, it is understood as a lesson implemented’ (Deverell 2009: 183). This conceptual framework is a useful tool when analysing crisis induces learning processes which will also be applied to the volcanic ash crisis to get a better and more in depth understanding of how organizations have learned. However, important to note here is that when applying this conceptual framework on this case study research organizational learning may occur

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in different ways. As such there are ‘changes in beliefs, ideas, culture, policies, knowledge, procedures, routines, structures, protocols, legislation and behaviour’ (Broekema, Kleef & Steen 2017: 328). So instead of focussing solely on the aspect of for instance procedure changes learning can also occur in other forms which may therefore not be disregarded.

There is still an important distinction to be made between ‘real’ learning and ‘quasi learning’. If adopted policies are not based on newly acquired knowledge on the identified shortcomings one can speak of ‘quasi-learning’ as learning did not take place (Broekema 2016: 384). ‘Distinguishing ‘real’ learning from quasi-learning requires tracing back the line to the origins of new policies. ‘Real’ learning is demonstrated by evidence of new legislation or regulation, together with evidence that this was based on thorough (formal) investigation (Broekema 2016: 384). In addition to the previous theories presented this is important to keep in mind when conducting research on the topic of crisis-induced learning. It is important to be aware of the difference between ‘real’ learning and ‘quasi-learning’ as it may affect the outcome of the research results.

This conceptual framework presented by Deverell (2009) will serve as a guideline throughout the analysis. As Deverell explains this is a concrete conceptual framework that can be applied to a case and helps to understand more about organizational learning in that specific case. By applying this conceptual framework of Deverell to the lessons implemented, the overall analysis will be more in depth. Basically, because the conceptual framework helps to gain a deeper understanding of crisis-induced organizational learning as poses four rather relevant questions in relation to what organizational learning entails.

2.5 Barriers to learning

Crises may provide an opportunity for the adoption of changes in policies, procedures, beliefs, ideas and routines. Current literature is still dominated by optimistic beliefs that organizational learning can be implemented (easily) and will lead to positive results for the organization (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 337). However, this is not always the case as there are also forces, such as political and structural forces, that hinder and suppress organizational learning (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 337). These forces that prevent or impede organizational learning are also known as barriers to learning. ‘We define barriers as those factors either preventing OL or, at least, impeding its practibility. From a more academic point of view, the analysis of impediments contributes to a deeper understand of the underlying dynamics of OL as it complements existing theory and research on factors fostering and supporting OL’ (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 337-338). Thus far this theoretical framework only focussed on lessons implemented but for research purposes it is also interesting to figure out whether or not Dutch stakeholders have experienced barriers in the learning process.

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In this research organizational learning has been defined as a twofold process, acquiring and processing information and translating this into action such as policy changes. However, when

organizational learning is impeded by barriers the second step in organizational learning, transforming this knowledge into action such as policy changes, does not occur. In order to be able to describe and explain the barriers of organizational learning an appropriate model has to be developed (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 339). Schilling & Kluge (2009) rely upon an existing model, developed by Crossan et al. (1999). This model is known as the 4I model. The 4I model postulates four processes by which the different levels of OL (individual, group and organization) are bidirectionally connected’ (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 340). These four processes are: 1. Intuiting (process whereby the individual develops new insights based on their own experience); 2. Interpreting (Process whereby the individual communicates his/her insights to others, either through word or actions); 3. Integrating (shared understanding between individuals and groups is attained allowing for collective action within the organization); 4. and

Institutionalizing (Implementing the shared understanding in current policies, system and procedures) (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 340).

Schilling and Kluge (2009) state that according to the 4I model organizational learning occurs at these four stages. However, at each of these four stages a variety of barriers might prevail. For this research. This model will however not be applied to this full extent in this research. The main research objective focusses on identifying shortcomings which are then translated into policy or procedural changes also known as lessons implemented. Therefore, it would be interesting to figure out what barriers might occur at the institutionalizing stage of organizational learning. ‘Institutionalizing means the implementation of a shared understanding in systems, structures, procedures, rules and strategies that now become independent of their individual or group origins and guide normal organizational action’ (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 352).

Schilling & Kluge (2009) identify four groups of barriers impeding or preventing the

institutionalizing phase of organizational learning. Schilling & Kluge (2009) identify a broad variety of barriers to institutionalizing. As such the authors have identified four blocks to categorize these barriers. The first block identified is that of a lack of trust in innovation itself (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 352). In some occasions organizations might conclude that certain learning results are irrelevant. This may apply to a dynamic organizational environment where rapid technological changes might render the policy obsolete by the time they are implemented. At the same time such an environment ‘may also foster the belief that institutionalizing innovations is generally unnecessary, as these will soon be outdated even if this is not necessarily the case’ (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 352). However, at some point during the learning process organizations might be seduced to implemented innovations that were suggested by the

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external environment instead of the employees of the organization. This will however complicate the implementation of innovations as the innovations stem from another organizational culture.

misunderstanding might arise from this which may lead to resistance amongst the organization employees.

The second block of barriers is identified as the lack of skill on part of employees to implement the innovation (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 354). The lack of knowledge and skills amongst employees is an important obstacle when implementing innovation. This in turn is backed by a lack of time, space and organizational resources. As such deficient transfer processes may hinder the implementation of

innovations. In addition to this a high employee turnover can also impact on the implementation of innovation as it causes discontinuity of the organizational memory (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 354). This makes it more difficult to maintain the skill and knowledge of the organization. Especially if the

innovation that needs to be implemented is implicit, not tangible. In this case you rely on the specific capacities of the individual working at the organization. This may all be lost whenever an employee leaves or when the systems to transfer this knowledge of innovation to its employees is insufficient.

Moving on to the third block of barriers which are categorized as the lack of management skills (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 354). The top management of an organization may hinder organizational learning by not implementing the necessary changes to the organization’s routine. Top management might assume that implementation of new innovations will occur without any additional changes to the current routine. This is also known as a laissez-faire management style. Exactly the inadequate

leadership skills may prevent organizational learning (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 354). On an action-personal level the manager might not have enough confidence in the skills and willingness of employees to implement this innovation. The low level of trust a manager might have against its employees may reduce the overall confidence in successful implementation of the innovations. This in turn can negatively influence the managers commitment to implement these innovations (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 354). In addition, if these managers have adopted a laissez-faire management style they are less involved in the implementation of the innovations which in turn may lead to a diffusion of

responsibilities. However, innovations can only be implemented successfully if responsibilities are clearly marked down.

The fourth and final block of barriers focus on ‘institutionalization barriers that increase the likelihood that the adoption of an innovation will be rejected by organizational units and their members’ (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 355). A high level of decentralization may contribute to the difficulties to implement new innovations. Instead of applying innovations departments within the organizations or employees themselves may go against this and show opportunistic behaviour instead. As such

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departments and employees might perceive these innovations as threats, going against their aspirations of what should happen instead. The possibilities of opportunistic to arise are rather high when the organization does not have any means available to control this opportunistic behaviour. The lower the risk of being penalized for this the more likely opportunistic behaviour might occur during the

organizational learning process (Schilling & Kluge 2009: 355).

These are the four main blocks of barriers to institutionalization. If in the analysis it becomes clear that a lesson has been distilled but has not been implemented these four blocks of barriers to institutionalization will be applied. This will provide insight into the barriers that have prevented organizational learning to take place.

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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter extends on the research methodology of this thesis and will explain how research is being conducted. I will therefore include an explanation on the research design that was picked for this research. Furthermore, I will also provide the reader with an insight on the case selection, case type as well as the methodology for data collection. Describing these processes in full detail is rather important as it allows this research to be replicable and verifiable. As it is also important to be transparent on the potential shortcomings of this research this research methodology chapter will also include a section of validity and reliability of the research.

3.1 Research Design

‘A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. A choice of research design reflects decisions about the priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process’ (Bryman 2012: 46). When deciding to choose a specific research design it is therefore of great

importance to know along what line research is being conducted as research focused on understanding causal connections in a case study is structured differently than research focussed on the generalizability (Bryman 2012: 46). The research design that was used in order to conduct this research is a qualitative theory guided single case study design.

Theory-guided case studies ‘aim to explain and/or interpret a single historical episode rather than to generalize beyond the data. Unlike inductive case studies, they are explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others’ (Levy 2008: 4). This applies to this research as only one historical episode will be studied, focussing specifically on crisis-induced organizational learning. Furthermore, the single most important advantage of a case study research design, as described by Yin (2017), is that it allows

researchers to explore and understand complex issues in full detail by applying it on an actual real-world case. The proposed research question focusses on the learning process in the aftermath of the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010. The volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 was a rather unique crisis as it was crisis in aviation as well as a policy crisis. identifying shortcomings (lessons distilled) and the way in which this has translated to organizational changes (lessons implemented) are central in this research.

Learning and all it entails plays a significant role in this research. Nevertheless, learning is a complex research subject in the sense it is challenging to distinguish the difference between ‘real’ learning and ‘quasi’ learning. Do identified shortcomings actually translate to policy changes needs to be questioned here. Only lessons that have been implemented within the organizations are evidence of

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‘real’ learning. However, this line between ‘real’ learning and ‘quasi’ learning may be very thin in some cases. Therefore, in order to be able to rule out the possibility of ‘quasi’ learning one needs to explore this intensively an in depth. Hence why the single case study design fits this research subject.

Finally, this research also follows a qualitative research strategy emphasizing words rather than numbers (Bryman 2012: 36). This qualitative research strategy follows an epistemological position described as interpretivist focussed on ‘the understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants’ in contrast to the scientific model of quantitative research. (Bryman 2012: 380). The interaction between individuals and its outcomes are central here. Especially in this thesis where the concept of crisis-induced learning is central, quantitative analysis would not be sufficient enough to answer the proposed research question.

3.2 Case Selection

Having explained the choices for the research design it is also necessary to provide insight on how and why the case for this study has been selected. The case that has been selected for this research is the volcanic ash cloud of 2010 which has affected European and in particular Dutch airspace. There are several reasons as to why this is an extremely interesting case.

First of all, the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 can be described as a unique or unusual case (Bryman 2012: 70). Even though volcanic ash clouds are not uncommon in aviation, the volcanic ash cloud of 2010 was rather unique. Mainly because Dutch stakeholders had never been exposed to such a crisis situation causing an abrupt standstill in air traffic throughout the whole of Europe. Furthermore, this crisis was not marked by any fatalities, nevertheless it was perceived to be a national crisis. This case therefore provides a unique opportunity to see how organizations learn from a crisis situation they have never encountered before. From indicating what shortcomings were identified all the way up until lessons that were implemented.

Furthermore, studying this case from a Dutch stakeholder perspective is of great added value as this case is still understudied from an academic perspective. While academics carried out a lot of research on the European level of how to respond to and learn from such a crisis situation, not much is known about how Dutch stakeholders have learned from this crisis.

For research purposes it would be interesting to compare the volcanic ash cloud of 2010 to a similar volcanic ash cloud situation after 2010. In doing so one would be able to investigate how stakeholders will apply their new insights, of what was learned to a real case and to see whether or not actual progress is made. In addition to this it will also expose potential weaknesses or shortcomings in their response and lessons learned which can then also be taking into account. Up until now there has

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only been one other volcanic eruption which has caused a volcanic ash cloud to move towards European airspace. This occurred one year after the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010, on 22 may 2011 the largest active volcano of Iceland Grímsvötn erupted. The eruption of Grímsvötn also caused a volcanic ash cloud which led to yet another disruption in European aviation for three days (BBC 2011).

However, I have specifically chosen not to compare the 2010 and 2011 volcanic ash clouds to each other for several reasons. First of all, the volcanic eruption of 2011 generated a much smaller volcanic ash cloud reaching European airspace. Therefore, the volcanic ash cloud had a much smaller disruptive effect on aviation. There were also no airspace closures in the Netherlands during this 2011 volcanic ash cloud and only 8 flights were cancelled (Hofs 2010). In order to be able to figure out whether or not the lessons implemented are successfully implemented one must need at least a

comparable or even bigger volcanic ash cloud to compare to. Hence why this research will be a single case study instead of a comparative case study.

3.3 Methodology and Data Collection

For the empirical section of this thesis data needs to be collected. In this research I have used more than one method of data collection so that findings may be cross-checked which is also known as

triangulation (Bryman 2012: 717). Triangulation is extremely important in this research as each of the used sources do not encompass all there is to know on this topic and are only a small piece of the puzzle. Thus, I have incorporated desk research, document analysis and semi-structured interviews in this research. Desk research also known as secondary analysis will consist of data from previous research. As volcanic ash clouds are not a new phenomenon there is a significant amount of research already available on the topic. However, this data is not necessarily linked together. In this research I will therefore analyse and link these different data sources with each other which will result in a diverse body of knowledge on which one can build new insights on. I will use the crisis management plan of Schiphol, reports of the Royal Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) & the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as letters to Parliament and newspaper articles.

Furthermore, this research will also incorporate document analysis. This document analysis will consist of two parts. For the first part of this document analysis I have chosen two Dutch newspapers: NRC Handelsblad and De Telegraaf. These newspapers are read by a wide audience have been

specifically selected as a representation of Dutch society. I have searched every article published by these newspapers on the topic of volcanic ash & Schiphol in the period of 14 April 2010 up until 22 April 2010. As I am interested to find out what kind of news these newspapers published in regard to this topic and whether or not we can gain a better understanding of what happened at Schiphol during

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the crisis as well as on a national level. These different articles will be coded in order to find a pattern and see if this pattern differs between these different newspapers.

The second part of this document analysis consists of an analysis of the TV broadcast of PAUW en WITTEMAN of 19 April 2010 that was specifically dedicated to the volcanic ash cloud crisis. This broadcast important involved Dutch stakeholders to discuss the current situation of the volcanic ash cloud crisis: CEO of KLM, the Minister of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, CEO of Schiphol Group, CEO of the Netherlands Air Traffic Control and the Institute Director of the Royal Netherlands Aerospace Centre and a geologist. These were all present to discuss the current situation of the volcanic ash cloud up until then. This TV broadcast will be transcribed after which it will be coded and matched to the information published by newspapers. It will be interesting to find out at what point in time various stakeholders posit certain information and what steps are being taken to handle this crisis. This is valuable information for the reconstruction of events during this crisis.

The final part of this triangulation will consist of structured interviews. During these semi-structured interviews respondents will be asked a series of questions in the form of an interview guide (Bryman 2012: 716). This set interview guide will help structure the interview by making sure every respondent is being asked the same questions. Especially when analysing and coding data this will be extremely helpful as it allows for comparison of data fragments between stakeholders and to identify patterns within these interviews. However, even though there is a set interview guide for each

respondent semi-structured interviewing still allows the researcher to divert from this set interview guide to ask further questions on a specific topic if necessary. In this case study research having the possibility to ask further questions is of added value as it allows to go more in depth on specific matters in contrast to the set interview guide which consists of more general questions that can be answered by all of the respondents.

The main reason to introduce semi-structured interviews as a research method in this case study research is because the two other research methods gather do not provide enough information on

shortcomings and lessons learned by Dutch stakeholders during the volcanic ash crisis. Doing interviews therefore is a great opportunity to acquire valuable detailed information. However, interviewing is a time-consuming process and this research is restricted by time, so it is important to select these

respondents wisely. This needs to be taken into account when considering interviewing as a method of data collection.

The selected respondents much be representative for this case study and must meet certain criteria. First of all, the main Dutch stakeholders involved in the volcanic ash cloud crisis must be identified. The main Dutch stakeholders are: Departmental Crisis Coordination Centre of the Ministry of

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Infrastructure and Environment (DCC-IenM), Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL), The Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI), the Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR), and Operational Team Incident Management Schiphol Airport (OT Schiphol). Due to time constraints I have chosen to conduct one interview per stakeholder. This interview must be held with a professional that was at the time of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis working for these organizations but most importantly involved in this crisis. Finally, this respondent must at least to some extent have knowledge of the organization and its policies and procedures and its potential changes during the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010.

3.4 Operationalization

Various concepts are mentioned in the theoretical framework and help to explain or provide insights into how and under what conditions learning may occur. However, as these concepts might still be quite vague operationalization is a necessary step. The concept descriptions and definitions provided in the theoretical framework provide a basis for further operationalization. In addition to the operationalization these concepts are also transformed into measurable units defined as indicators. References to these concepts based on the identified indicators are applied to the interviews, reports, media articles or other sources used in this research.

Concept Operationalization Indicators

1. Crisis response -Focussing event that

requires

decisions to be made under time pressure

-References to potential threat to the initial norms and beliefs preceding the crisis -References to procedures, protocols and policies that were used to deal with the crisis -References to decisions that were made amidst the crisis

2. Shortcomings -Weaknesses, faults or

failures in the crisis response. In essence this translates to knowing what went wrong or what was lacking during the crisis response.

-Shortcomings are a necessary condition for lessons to be implemented. One can only implement lessons if one is aware of what needs to be improved.

-References to difficulties in the process of collecting, allocating and analysing data during the crisis.

-References to failures of recognizing how this crisis might evolve over time.

- References to weaknesses or failures to translate collected, allocated and analysed data into clear actionable information -References to decisions that were made during the crisis that have raised questions amongst stakeholders.

-References to failures or absence of cooperation on an interagency and

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intergovernmental level (Decision Making). -References to failures in knowing who carries what responsibilities and whom can be held accountable (Accountability and responsibility)

3. Crisis-induced

organizational learning

-Learning that takes place during or after a crisis episode. This type of

learning focusses specifically on the organizations and what they have learned during the crisis.

-References to policy changes, changes in procedures, and or routines that have been implemented in during or after a crisis episode specifically by organizations

4. Lesson implemented -A lesson that was not only

identified but there is evidence, in terms of policy changes or innovations, that his lesson was carried out in practice.

-References to policy changes, changes in procedures, and or routines that have been implemented

5. Lesson distilled -A lesson that has been

noticed but in contrast to lesson implemented has not been carried out in practice. As such it has not altered organizational behaviour through implementation of policy changes or

innovations

-References to plans, protocols or other types of innovations that were identified but have not been implemented in practice.

6. Single loop lessons -Flaws and divergences

within the organizations are detected and learned from without making changes to the organizational structure.

-References to policies, routines and procedures that were already in place during the crisis and have now been slightly adjusted.

7. Double loop lessons -Error detection questioning

the functioning of the entire organization in terms of basic norms and

organizational structure

-References to new policies, procedures or routines that have been developed in the aftermath of the crisis

-References to changes or developments of a new organizational structure

8. Focus of learning -Learning can either aim to

a) prevention or b) respond to a future crisis

a) Prevention:

References to changes focussed on seeking to find the root cause in order to make sure a similar crisis will not occur in the future b) Response:

References to minimizing the consequences of a similar crisis situation in the future

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9. Locus of learning -Focusses on when lessons were learned; a) inter- or b) intracrisis.

a) Intercrisis:

References to evidence that learning occurred after the crisis.

b) Intracrisis:

References to evidence that learning did occur amidst the crisis situation

10. Barriers to learning -Factors that either impede or prevent organizational learning to be translated into practice.

-References to evidence that a shortcoming has been identified but has not been translated into policy changes, changes in procedures or routines

11. Barriers to Institutionalizing

-Barriers that occur in the implementation stage of organizational learning. -Four blocks of barriers to institutionalizing:

1. A lack of trust in innovation

2. A lack of skill on the part of employees to implement the innovation

3. A lack of management skills

4. Rejecting the adoption of an innovation by

organizational units and their members

-References to policies or innovations that have been developed but have failed to be implemented

-References the lack of skill on part of the employees to implement the innovation -References to a lack of management skills -References to a

-References to insufficient level of financial resources available to make changes -References to struggles of dedicating time to this issue because of other (routine) work -References to a low level of trust of the manager regarding successful

implementation of the innovation

-References to a laissez-faire management style indicating managers are less involved in the implementation of innovations

-References to rejection of innovation by employees

3.5 Validity and Reliability

The credibility of a study and its findings is strengthened by, and depending on, validity. ‘Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research’, are the results for instance trustworthy and meaningful (Bryman 2012: 47). Validity can be divided into two different types: Internal validity and external validity. In the following sections both internal- and external validity as well as the reliability will be discussed and applied to this research.

3.5.1 Internal Validity

Internal validity looks at how trustworthy and reliable the findings of the research are. Do you measure what you intend to measure is considered to be one of the main questions pertaining to internal validity

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(Bryman 2012: 47). Especially in depth and detailed analysis eliminates alternative explanations for a certain finding. In practice internal validity is very much focussed on how the research is conducted and structured. In this research the concepts that are used such as shortcomings and lessons learned can be perceived to be vague concepts. It is therefore of great importance to operationalize these concepts but also to ascribe specific indicators to each of these concepts. In doing so one minimizes the possibility of there being any unclarities about what is measured here.

In addition to operationalization, the credibility of this research is also enhanced through triangulation. ‘A major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (…) Any case study finding or conclusion is likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information (Yin 2015: 128-132). Triangulation is the rationale for using multiple sources of evidence so that findings can be cross-checked and alternative explanations for that certain finding are minimized. In doing so triangulation will increase the internal validity of a study. In this research data- and methodological triangulation were used.

Data triangulation focusses acquiring information from different sources whom confirm the same finding. This technique of data triangulation has been applied in the interviews. By using

semi-structured interview questions every respondent was asked both a stakeholder specific set of questions as well as some more general questions on the crisis response and cooperation between stakeholders. The main reason for doing this was to separate atypical data from similar patterns. Detection of such similar patterns would increase the credibility of a particular finding. In addition to this, methodological

triangulation has also been applied in this research. This technique of triangulation involved using more than one option to gather data. In this research academic articles, reports, media articles and interviews have been the main sources of data collection. Using these different data sources allows one to cross check findings between sources but methodological triangulation was also used because each of these sources on their own did not encompass all the information and data available on this topic.

Both operationalization and triangulation are applied in this study in order to account for some of the limitations of this research in regard to validity. This research relies on data from interviews as other data sources do not suffice enough. However, one must keep in mind that data acquired through

interviews might be biased. On the topic of shortcomings and learning not every respondent might be willing to admit shortcomings of the organization during this crisis response for example. Furthermore, the line between ‘real’ learning and ‘quasi’ learning might sometimes be very thin as such it is necessary to know exactly what or what has not been done in terms of lessons implemented. As the volcanic ash cloud crisis already dates back to 2010 one must also keep in mind the limitations of recollection of

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respondents on this crisis. These are all things to keep in mind and reflect upon during the whole research process.

3.5.2 External Validity

In addition to internal validity the credibility of a study also depends upon external validity. External validity has to do with whether a study can be generalized beyond the immediate case (Yin 2015: 45). The external validity of case studies and especially single case studies is limited as there is only one case is studied. In this study it is rather difficult to generalize cannot be generalized beyond the immediate case because beyond the Dutch context. It is unlikely that a volcanic ash cloud affecting Dutch airspace will be exactly similar to the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis. Furthermore, the crisis-induced

organizational learning patterns of 2010 do not necessarily apply in a future volcanic ash cloud crisis. Finally, this study cannot be generalized beyond the Dutch context as each of the cases are unique, other norms and regulations apply, and last but not least one should also consider the idea of there being cultural differentiations within these countries. While this study may not be generalized beyond the Dutch context the outcomes and findings of this research is still generalizable to the existing theories on crisis-induced organizational learning.

3.5.3 Reliability

Different criteria are used for the evaluation of social research design two of which are validity and reliability. ‘Reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of the study are repeatable’ (Bryman 2012: 46). Whether or not research is perceived to be reliable depends on the replicability of the research which is also known as external reliability. Replicability in research is achieved through showing each step in the methodology so future researchers are able to replicate this research again. In contrast to qualitative research where experiments can be replicated exactly the same there is some critique on reliability in qualitative research. Research would not be conducted in the same controlled environment as experiments would and different interpretation by other researchers of certain concepts could completely change the outcomes of certain research. This is therefore the main shortcoming of reliability in comparative case study research design. However, in this research I try to account for this by providing definitions of all of the used concepts while also providing certain research indicators. By showing the whole methodological process step by step one can minimize the risk of misinterpretations making it easier for other researchers to replicate this research.

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4. CASE RECONSTRUCTION

This chapter is specifically dedicated to the case under research in this thesis. In short, this chapter will start off by identifying the main Dutch stakeholders involved in the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis and their role in this crisis. This chapter will then continue with a technical section explaining the damaging effect of volcanic ash on aircrafts. Sharing this technical information with the reader is important as it will help the reader to gain a better understanding as to why the volcanic ash cloud had such a major impact on the aviation sector and why certain decisions were made. Finally, this chapter also contains a detailed and chronological reconstruction of the Dutch crisis response during the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010.

4.1 Identifying Stakeholders

During the volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 various Dutch stakeholders were in their own way linked to the crisis. In the Dutch context I have identified five different stakeholders that have played a significant role in managing the crisis: The Departmental Coordination Centre for Crisis Management of the

Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (DCC-IenM). Dutch Air Traffic Control (LVNL), The Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI), The Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) and the Operational Team Incident Management Schiphol Airport (OT Schiphol). In the following section I will provide a short description of each of these stakeholders in which I will also further elaborate on their role during the volcanic ash cloud crisis and their relation to the other stakeholders.

4.1.1 Departmental Coordination Centre for Crisis Management of the Ministry of

Infrastructure and Environment (DCC-IenM)

The first stakeholder to be identified is the Departmental Coordination Centre for Crisis Management of

the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (DCC-IenM).1_{The DCC is the main crisismanagement}

organisation for the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and focusses on preparing for a potential crisis situation as well as responsive crisismanagement (DCC-IenW n.d.). As such the DCC-IenM has a central role in coordinating a variety of incidents, crises or disasters in the field of infrastructure, water and environment. The DCC will prepare the ministry of infrastructure and Environment to control a crisis situation. They will do this by coordinating the flows of information (DCC-IenW n.d.).

The volcanic ash cloud crisis of 2010 was however a unique a crisis for the DCC because of the high level of involvement of the Minister. This had to do with the fact that the Minister of Infrastructure

1_{Note: During the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis the Ministry in charge was called the Ministry of Infrastructure and}

Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation: An in-depth case study on the shortcomings and lessons that were identified in the aftermath of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis

Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation

An in-depth case study on the shortcomings and lessons that were identified in the

aftermath of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud crisis

Finishing this master thesis would not have been possible without the help of the following

people:

I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to all respondents at the LVNL, OT

Schiphol Airport, KNMI, NLR and DCC-IenW for participating in this research and sharing

your knowledge. I very much enjoyed all of our conversations!

Many thanks go to DR. S.L. Kuipers for the much-appreciated advice and guidance during

the whole thesis process.

Last but not least, a special thanks to all my family and friends who have always

expressed their interest and endlessly encouraged me throughout my studies.

Table of Contents:

List of abbreviations:

Crisis-Induced Organizational Learning in Aviation

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Question

1.2 Academic Relevance

1.3 Societal Relevance

1.4 Reading Guide

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Transboundary Crisis Management

2.2 Crisis-induced organizational learning

2.3 Five critical tasks in crisis leadership

2.3.1 Sense making

2.3.2 Decision making

2.3.3 Crisis termination and accountability

2.4 A conceptual framework of crisis-induced learning

2.5 Barriers to learning

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

3.2 Case Selection

3.3 Methodology and Data Collection

3.4 Operationalization

3.5 Validity and Reliability

3.5.1 Internal Validity

3.5.2 External Validity

3.5.3 Reliability

4. CASE RECONSTRUCTION

4.1 Identifying Stakeholders

4.1.1 Departmental Coordination Centre for Crisis Management of the Ministry of

Infrastructure and Environment (DCC-IenM)