BLURRING THE
BOUNDARIES
HOW THE ISLAMIC STATE INFLUENCES
THE EU'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
SECURITY
M A T H E S I S I N E U R O P E A N S T U D I E S G R A D U A T E S C H O O L F O R H U M A N I T I E S U N I V E R S I T E I T V A N A M S T E R D A M A U T H O R : C H A R L O T T E H A M A R D E L A B R E T H O N I È R E S T U D E N T N U M B E R : 0 5 5 5 9 3 2 M A I N S U P E R V I S O R : M R S . P R O F . D R . L U I Z A B I A L A S I E W I C Z S E C O N D S U P E R V I S O R : M R . P R O F . D R . M I C H A E L K E M P E R J U N E 2 0 1 5"My life is my message."
C O N T E N T
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms... iii
List of Figures... v
Introduction... 1
Internal and external security... 4
Introduction... 4
Security, democracy and citizenship... 6
The relation between internal and external Security... 7
The Islamic State and the danger of foreign fighters... 16
Introduction... 16
The emergence of the Islamic State... 19
The fight against Islamic State... 24
Foreign fighters... 28
Dealing with (potential) foreign fighters... ... 34
Islamic State and the media... 39
Introduction... 39
How the Islamic State uses the media... 42
(YouTube) Videos... 43
Al Hayat Media Center... 45
Facebook... 46
Twitter... 47
Responding to cyber jihad... 52
Case Study: Media discourse on the Islamic State in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands...54
Introduction... 54
First findings... 56
Media discourse on Islamic State in Europe... 58
Critical Discourse Analysis... 59
Analysis... 61
Conclusions... 69
Conclusion... 72
L I S T O F A B B R E V I AT I O N S A N D
AC RO N Y M S
App Application
AQI al-Qa'ida in Iraq
AQIM al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EEAS European External Action Service ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EU INTCEN EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
EUMS European Union Member States
Eurojust EU Judicial Cooperation Unit Europol European Police Office
EU TE-SAT EU Terrorist Situation and Trend
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU Member States
GCTF Global Counterterrorism Forum
HCSS The Hague Center for Security Studies
HR High Representative
HR/VP High Representative/Vice President (of the European Commission) INTCEN Intelligence Analysis Centre
IS Islamic State
ISI Islamic State in Iraq
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MSM Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SIS Schengen Information Service
SitCen Situation Centre
TE-SAT Terrorist Situation and Trend Reports
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN United Nations
U.S. United States
VIS Visa Information Service
L I S T O F F I G U R E S
Figure 1: IS areas of influence as of April 2015... ...27
Figure 2: The flow of foreign fighters to Syria... ...30
Figure 3: Number of news items per newspaper and per event... ...56
Figure 4: Percentage of news items per event... ...57
Figure 5: Percentage of news items per newspaper...57
I N T RO D U C T I O N
here will probably not be many words which were integrated in the global mass media vocabulary as quickly as the word 'jihad', last year. The media platforms would not stop writing news items about Muslims going on jihad, and how jihadists in Iraq and Syria committed terrible crimes. But although the word seems widely accepted in our vocabulary these days - many of the people who have read or watched the news are not entirely sure about the precise meaning of it. According to David Suurland, philosopher of law, it could be defined as 'fighting for Allah', intending both a wider religious struggle, but also physical and direct conflict. He bases his claim on what the handbooks of the four Sunni schools of thought write about this. However, Nazreen Sahebali, practicing Muslim and student in Middle Eastern Studies at Leiden University, quoted in a popular Dutch news weekly, claims it to be "the internal battle to bring the rules of Islam into practice. Rules about your relationship to God and how to interact with other people. It is about your submission to God and bringing peace to your surroundings, because that is what Islam means".1 Nonetheless, when watching the news or reading newspapers in the past year, paradoxically viewers and readers will find few - if any - messages which link jihad to peace instead of brutal murders, seizing of powers or demolishing of world heritage.
It should be taken into consideration that only a minority of all Muslims are radicalised or have as extreme ideas as the followers of the Islamic State (IS), as we have predominantly seen in the media the past year. As a matter of fact, this radicalised group only makes up for a small part of the ummah - the Muslim community. Still, Suurland doubts we should expect a counter movement within the ummah against the committed atrocities in the name of jihad: it would mean having to renounce the entire shari'a, the Islamic law, and only few Muslims, albeit moderate, will be willing to do so. However, we do see a rising trend where fellow Muslims condemn the actions of the jihadis, claiming their deeds are not in the name of 'their Islam'.2
1 Bart Schut, 'Vechten op het pad van God', De Groene Amsterdammer, 138:51/52, accessed online. 2 Ibidem.
The reason that the word 'jihad' got integrated in the global mass media vocabulary this fast probably has to do with the rise of the Islamic State, conquering big pieces of land in Iraq and Syria and proclaiming a renewed 'Islamic Caliphate' based on the Quran and shari'a law. They have been shocking the world with their committed crimes and their rapid uprising, being more cruel than we have seen jihadists to be in a long time. The problem for the Western world is that the fight does not stop at the border of the caliphate: through mainstream media and especially new (social) media messages and propaganda are disseminated ubiquitously, addressing more people than ever, all over the world. Moreover, through new technology, travelling nowadays is quicker and cheaper than it has ever been. That is what makes this such a relevant issue, for these acts of jihadism and terrorism are not limited within borders anymore but transcend toward an increasingly globalised world. This thesis will try to address the question of how the war against the Islamic State is seen as influencing the direct security of Europe. A great number of Europeans have joined foreign fighters from all over the world and travelled to the caliphate in order to fight for IS - in the name of jihad.
In the first chapter, I will scrutinise the relationship between internal and external security. In order to fully understand the significance of this interrelation, it is important to understand the developments this relationship has been going through, and why. Therefore, I will first give a historical background, describing how the situation used to be some decades ago. Afterwards, I will consider the different concepts of security, democracy and citizenship. Subsequently, I will analyse the changes the internal-external security nexus went through, and focus on the measures the European Union (EU) has taken to deal with this nexus and the consequences of its development. I will elaborate on several strategies and treaties the EU has adopted and why there is a need to adjust the European policies. Thereafter, I will shortly mention some measures the United Nations (UN) and NATO have taken to deal with the increasing interrelationship of the internal and external security nexus.
In the second chapter I will focus on the Islamic State and the foreign fighter phenomenon. In order to comprehend the entire situation, it is crucial to understand how the power relations are divided in the Middle East. There are different terrorist groups, like al-Qai'da, the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and many more. I will describe how these groups relate to each other, what their ideological background is and who supports whom. This also includes becoming familiar with the different leaders. Besides this, it is important to comprehend the base of the sectarian conflict. Therefore I will focus on the position and power relations of the different communities. Afterwards,
I will consider the current fight against IS, which provides a bridge to the problem of foreign fighters. I will focus on why there has been such an incredible rise in number of foreign fighters by investigating what their drive is and how they get in contact with the terroristic organisations in the Middle East. The rising number of foreign fighters is considered as posing a direct threat to the European internal security, especially if they survive the battlefield and decide to return home. Thus, it is needed to consider the effects and look at the ways the EU and its member states are dealing - or should be dealing - with them and articulate counter narratives.
The third chapter will deal with the relationship between terrorism and the media, and focus especially on how IS uses the media to their advantage. Interestingly, IS seems to be dexterous at employing social media to get what they want, even though they have a dissonant idea of modern practises that can distract people from their religion. By getting into the different social media platforms one by one, it will become clear how IS seems to be so successful in recruiting funds and fighters.
The final chapter is an analysis of four newspapers covering six key events in the emergence of IS and the West fighting against them. The Islamic State is not the only one capable of influencing people through media: the West can also influence the public discourse on the Islamic State. By using the critical discourse analysis, the extent of how a right of centre and a left of centre newspaper in the United Kingdom and two equivalent newspapers in the Netherlands frame their news messages and thus shape public discourse is analysed. Quantitative data will be analysed first, followed by the messages' content. All the preparatory work for this analysis, including lists of all the news items and content analyses for one news item per newspaper per event, can be found in the accompanying supplement. As we will see, different news messages appeal to different people, based on their socio-political background, norms, values and beliefs. And although the conflict with IS is mainly based in Iraq and Syria, the fight is brought to Europe through the committed terrorist attacks in Belgium, France and Copenhagen. Moreover, the fear of the fight increasingly being fought on European soil inflames the discussion about and fears towards the Islamic State.
I N T E R N A L A N D E X T E R N A L
S E C U R I T Y
INTROD UCTI ON
nternal security and external security are getting more and more intertwined: security is no longer restricted to a country's border, but is rather seen as increasingly borderless, making it necessary for countries to deal with this interrelation. Although there used to be a clear distinction between the two forms of security, this has been subject to change the last couple of decades. Internal security could be seen in several ways, for example internal security of the European Union (EU) as a whole, or the internal security of an independent member state. The intertwinement of internal and external security is due to many reasons, not the least of which the increasing integration of the EU member states3 and the interdependence of countries throughout the world.4 One of the most compelling examples of the interconnectedness of internal and external security these days, is the rapid rise of the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). The rise of IS does not only destabilise the entire Middle East, it is seen as presenting direct threats and dangers for the Netherlands, and for the EU as a whole as well.5
To take the Netherlands as an example: internal and external security have been traditionally divided between different ministries with different responsibilities. The domestic responsibilities lie with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Justice, and used to rely solely on the national police force. The foreign responsibilities lie with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence,
3 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty, Czech Journal of Political Science, 18:3, 2011, pp. 216.
4 Florian Trauner, The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?, European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper, March 2011, p. 7.
5 Dick Zandee, 'De nexus externe-interne veiligheid', Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en
Crisisbeheersing, 12:5, 2014, p. 32.
I
which used to rely solely on the military. Those ministries have their own strategies, being the Strategy for National Security from 2007 and the International Security Strategy from 2013, respectively.6 Nowadays, this line is blurring, while the distribution of roles is getting more diffuse. Today, the police force is often deployed in peacekeeping missions to ensure external security, while there is an increasing number of, for example, counter-insurgency operations where military instruments are used to ensure internal security.7 According to Rob de Wijk, expert on international relations and security and founder of the Dutch think tank HCSS (The Hague Center for Security Studies), the line between domestic (internal) and foreign (external) security is disappearing due to increasing international terrorism and its link to international crime. De Wijk states that the problem is transnational because terrorist attacks are no longer planned within a country, but often outside the borders. Furthermore, in present times the internet takes a prominent place in our societies, and is more and more used as a key instrument in heading terrorist and criminal operations and recruiting new fighters internationally. The speed and access to almost unlimited information makes it possible for terrorists and criminals to get in contact quickly and relatively anonymously. Moreover, foreign security policies have increasing effects on home security, and vice versa.8 The fact that the Netherlands decided to join the United States-led international coalition against IS and to send fighter planes caused immediate threats for the domestic security of the country.9 This is visible through, for example, video messages of Dutch foreign fighters, often fighting for IS themselves, threatening with terrorist attacks in the Netherlands or recruiting other Dutch Muslims to go on jihad.10 Military personnel was no longer allowed to wear their uniforms in public, and well-known think tanks and institutes were to take several security measures, for they were seen as potential targets.
In this chapter I will scrutinise the internal/external security nexus and the developments this nexus went through. The nexus is an important development to take
6 Dick Zandee, 'De nexus externe-interne veiligheid', Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en
Crisisbeheersing, 12:5, 2014, p. 32.
7 Jan Rood, Een wankele wereldorde, Clingendael Strategische Monitor 2014, Den Haag, 2014, pp.
73-75.
8 Rob de Wijk en Roos Toxopeus, 'Hoe binnen- en buitenlandse veiligheid verweven zijn', De
Internationale Spectator, 59:7/8, 2005, p. 421.
9 See, for example, this news item:
Andreas Kouwenhoven, 'Nederland steunt srijd tegen IS en 'is dus mogelijk doelwit'', NRC Handelsblad, 8 January 2015.
into consideration, because in many ways it influences the national and European policies and helps us understand how the EU and its member states deal with security threats. This is also important to understand the way national media creates and influences the public discourse on the Islamic State framing an external phenomenon as also an internal threat. Moreover, when we talk about internal and external security, we need to have an understanding of how we relate security to citizenship and democracy. In this light I will give a short survey of the relationship between these concepts.
SEC URITY, D EMO CR AC Y A ND CITIZ EN S HI P
When we consider security, we cannot ignore its intertwining with questions of citizenship and democracy. As both Jef Huysmans and Xavier Guillaume have suggested, these concepts have been closely connected in modern politics. They argue that citizens demanding security and governments securing them have been one of the basics modern states and politics are built on and that conceptions of security and its implications become politically negotiated through citizenship.11
The link between security and citizenship goes all the way back to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, a fundamental document of the French Revolution, from 1789, where article 2 of this declaration already presents security as a central right to state's citizens. Huysmans and Guillaume point out that in order to provide security to citizens, a state has to impose a certain order for citizens to live in, thereby violating citizens democratic sphere. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established by the United Nation General Assembly in 1948, enforces the former Declaration by formulating security of person a fundamental right in its third article. Furthermore, looking at the Stockholm Programme of the EU, which provides a roadmap for the EU'swork in the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010-2014,12 it is clear from the very first article that it tries to combine the assertion of rights and justice of citizens with protecting them. Nowadays, individual states are fading to the background, with the consequence that security and citizenship are increasingly defining global governmental
11 Xavier Guillaume and Jef Huisman, Citizenship and Security. The construction of political being,
London, Routledge, 2013, pp 1-2.
regimes, taking internationalisation and transnationalisation in account, e.g. sharing intelligence and the standardising of border controls.13
As mentioned earlier, security encroaches on democracy as well. This has become increasingly apparent in the debates after 9/11 and the war on terror. In his book Security Unbound, Huysmans researches Franz Leopold Neumann, who advocates that security itself is an anti-democratic concept, due to the conception of politics and society. It does not respond to enemies and fear, but it is creating them.14 The Western world tends to look at democracy as a condition for global (and thus also regional) security, creating peace and stability, whereas dictatorships are seen as a threat to that same global security. However, security conditions are also undermining democracies because they limit citizens fundamental rights as well. Because of the security-democracy nexus, these two concepts are usually looked at as reinforcing one another. Security protects democracy against internal and external threats. At the same time, democracy is a condition for security, and according to former NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer "the best answer to terror".15 In this way, security and democracy seem to be reinforcing each other more than undermining each other.16 After 9/11, security, democracy and citizenship have positioned themselves more and more in the picture, especially in the United States and in Europe. Through the research of Stasiulis and Ross on how post 9/11 dual citizenship with certain nationalities has become a marker of unwanted citizens, which is pointed out by Huysmans and Guillaume, it also became clear that the war on terror showed citizenship as a marker of identity.17
THE R ELATI O N BET W EE N INT ER NAL AND E XTERNA L S ECU RITY
When we look at the increasing intertwinement between internal and external security, we can see this trend has been going on for many years now. Tomáš Weiss, associate research fellow at EUROPEUM institute for European policy, states that ever since the end of the Cold War in 1989, scholars have suggested that the lines between the two
13. Xavier Guillaume and Jef Huisman, Citizenship and Security. The construction of political being, pp.
2-5.
14 Jef Huysmans, Security Unbound. Enacting democratic limits, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 2-4. 15 NATO update, 14 March 2005.
16 Jef Huysmans, Security Unbound. Enacting democratic limits, pp. 20-23.
forms of security have been blurring, at least in the West.18 This has partly to do with a decline of the nation state and the fact that the distinction between inside and outside became less clear. 'New threats' arose, with as a consequence a new division in police and military tasks and working methods.
With the intensification of European integration, certain territorial borders started to fade away, due to supranational policies. In some cases this makes it harder for member states to act in a sovereign way and control its own territory. In the 1990s, EU member states decided to include cooperation on several security issues in the new Treaty on European Union (TEU), which came into force in 1993. New institutions were created to head operations outside the EU's borders. After signing the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, even more new bodies were established to implement more new policies. Many of those bodies worked tightly together, challenging the traditional distinction of internal and external security at the national levels of the member states. With for example the Schengen cooperation, internal security of sovereign member states increasingly turned in internal security of the EU as a whole.19
In the European Security Strategy (ESS), titled A Secure Europe in a Better World and established in 2003, member states defined security threats together and recognised that they could not simply be classified as either internal or external, but should be thought of as dynamic. As they state in the document, the two types of security are indissolubly linked.20 The member states of the European Union (EUMS) decided to tackle the threats with a mixture of instruments, combining military and non-military resources. They started to realise that threats were getting more interdependent as well, and that they could not tackle them separately without taking the situation on the ground into consideration. In the ESS, member states did not only state that all security threats were connected with each other and reinforced one another, the nexus between security and development also got recognised for the first time, claiming, for example, that in some cases state failure could be identified as one of the most important threats, causing terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To tackle these threats, the European member states had to approach these problems comprehensively, trying to prevent conflicts from breaking out as much as possible. However, this did not go without a hitch. Because of a lack of coordination, and the EU being aware of this
18 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty', pp. 215-217.
19 Ibidem.
problem, the European Council called for an increased involvement of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is part of the bigger Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the fight against terrorism. Looking at all this, it is clear that even before the member states signed the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, which included the most important changes of the last decades, there were several new bodies and processes created to deal with the new security threats. As a consequence, these bodies and processes contributed to the blurring of the line between internal and external security.21
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on 11 September 2001 (9/11) were the first ones on United States' territory. They were the first clear occurrences which showed that intervening abroad could lead to a direct threat of national security. The United States (U.S.) were not the only ones taking safety measures: the EU, its member states and NATO all took action in securing their citizens, albeit often on paper only. When the Madrid-bombings happened in 2004, the EU made sure the member states would accelerate converting these measures in their national policies.22 An example of an emerged body which combined internal, external, military and civilian aspects of security is the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) which the EU took under its wing after the Western European Union23 got dissolved. After 9/11, SitCen became a monitoring centre, processing information and intelligence from member states with the purpose of identifying potential crisis situations and areas in the world. After the Madrid bombings, SitCen started focussing on potential threats on internal EU territory as well. Later, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2007, SitCen was turned into the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, (EU INTCEN), part of the new European External Action Service (EEAS) and under the authority of the EU's High Representative. With the re-interpretation of external security threats, immigration and terrorism made a rise on the European agenda, with new measures, like inserting counter-terrorism clauses in treaties with third countries. Furthermore, institutions with the initial focus on the internal space of the EU would start to cooperate with external
21 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty', pp. 217-219.
22 Rob de Wijk en Roos Toxopeus, 'Hoe binnen- en buitenlandse veiligheid verweven zijn', pp.
421-422.
23 The Western European Union was a defensive alliance composed of ten member states:
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The main purpose of the organisation was to offer mutual military assistance in case of an attack on any of their territory.
actors.24 Agencies like Europol (European Police Office), Eurojust (EU Judicial Cooperation Unit), FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU Member States) and EASO (European Asylum Support Office), which were mainly focussed on internal information exchange, analysis and cooperation, got assigned powers concerning external security.25 Moreover, the EU puts extra focus on infrastructure which crosses borders: member states now use the Schengen Information System II (SIS II)26 and Visa Information System (VIS)27. In the Stockholm Programme member states also included a desire for Europol to work together with the CSDP police missions, in order to improve coordination of prosecution with third countries as well.28
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced new developments in the increasing intertwinement of internal and external security. Firstly, the EU abolished the former European pillar structure, which created a more unified procedure for member states to negotiate with each other and come to new agreements.29 Secondly, the Union redefined the role of the High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and gave her a double-hatted role as Vice President of the European Commission as well. The HR/VP would now basically function as a European minister of foreign affairs, with the European External Action Service as her ministry.30
With the abolishment of the pillar structure, a new decision-making procedure got introduced as well. This shift in procedures has had great consequences on the development of police cooperation across the EUMS. However, although the decision-making procedure was made easier, it still meant that already existing cooperations, as a
24 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty', pp. 219-220.
25 Isabelle Ioannides, 'Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood', The
International Spectator, 49:1, 2014, p.116.
26 The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) is a large-scale information
system containing alerts on persons and objects. It is used by border guards, customs officers, visa- and law-enforcement authorities throughout the Schengen area, with a view to ensuring a high level of security.
27 The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. Among
other things, it processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, the Schengen area.
28 Jan Rood, Een wankele wereldorde, p. 98.
29 Florian Trauner, The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?, European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper. p. 23.
30 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
result of the Schengen agreement, still needed trust and political will between the member states. In practice, the role of the European Commission got reduced, and both the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice got very little authority allocated to them. Decision-making remained under the control of the member states, which are not always willing to give up their sovereignty.31
Lisbon also created several new institutions, not the least of which being the European External Action Service to accompany the redefined High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Since Lisbon, the HR/VP connects the works of the Commission and the Council at the highest level, being chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council and at the same time Coordinator of External Relations in the European Commission. The creation of the EEAS might be the most significant reform in the EU's external policy.32 The Situation Center and Civ/Mil Cell, which deal with both internal and external security matters, got transferred to the EEAS, with the HR/VP as their direct supervisor. However, all terrorism and immigration related bodies stayed under the Council Secretariat, chaired by the rotating Presidency. The initiative the European Commission had in the CFSP before Lisbon got turned into an initiative purely of the HR/VP. He or she might get influenced by his or her position in the Council though, which might have more influence on his or her decisions than the Commission does, based on the fact that the EUMS have the right to appoint the HR/VP and end his or her term if they see fit, as opposed to European Parliament. One of the main goals of the EEAS is to contribute to a more comprehensive European approach on foreign policy and security matters.33
Other than the two big changes described above, the Lisbon Treaty introduced lower level changes as well. Several working groups concerned with counter-terrorism are now supervised by an umbrella Working Party on Terrorism. More importantly, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) got renamed to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and introduced both a mutual defence clause and a solidarity clause. This contributed to a better cooperation between internal and external security. Especially the solidarity clause, covered in article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
31 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty', pp. 220-224.
32 Florian Trauner, The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?, pp. 30-32. 33 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union (TFEU), had a big impact. It does not only contain regulation of assistance from the EUMS and the EU as a whole given to a state hit by a man-made or natural disaster, it also includes a call for use of military units within the territory of a member state. Hitherto, military intervention was solely used outside EU borders in external action. Besides, the EU acknowledged that most of the CSDP missions had been civilian missions, and with Lisbon the EU broadens its vision and aims at issues as the fight against terrorism and disarmament as well, fulfilled by both civilian and military means.34 The initiative of the clause lies with the member states, but is only supposed to be turned to in special circumstances and when a member state is overwhelmed and cannot cope with the situation using its own capacities.35
The internal and external security nexus has also been a base for the EU Internal Security Strategy which sets out challenges, principles and guidelines on how to deal with security issues in the EU.36 It focuses on better coordination and activity and was supplemented by an action plan by the end of 2010.37 The Strategy includes five strategic objectives to make the EU more secure, including preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment, which include international criminal networks, terrorism, cyber security, border security and disasters.38
Even though the EES marks that internal and external security are indissolubly linked, the EU still has different strategies for external- and internal action. Obviously, it has the EES for external action, and the EU Internal Security Strategy for internal action.39 In practice, a cooperation between European bodies which implement these policies and lead planning and action is non-existent. The gap between the CSDP and internal security policy is mainly due to the juridical division between the two, caused by cultural differences between the EUMS. In some member states there exists a fear for militarisation of internal security, which, in general, has traditionally only dominated the
34 Tomáš Weiss, 'The Unclear Border between Internal and External Security in the European
Union: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty', pp. 220-224.
35 Margriet Drent, Kees Homan and Dick Zandee, Civil Military Capacities for European Security.
Clingendael Report, Den Haag, 2013, pp. 19-20.
36 Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model, Council
Document 5842/2/2010.
37 European Commission, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a more secure
Europe, COM (2010) 673 final, Brussels, 22 November 2010.
38 Margriet Drent, Kees Homan and Dick Zandee, Civil Military Capacities for European Security, pp.
18-19.
external policy. There does not seem to be the willingness to make profound alterations to the current treaties, so practical ad-hoc arrangements seem to work best for now.40 Looking at the security of the EU as a whole, the Union can be seen as trying to pursue security in its neighbourhood in order to ensure the internal security of the EU's citizens. However, if the EU wants to extend this external security towards more third countries, it will have to increase the attractiveness of the EU in the economic, political and social fields.41 By expanding, the EU has lost its buffer zone between the core of the EU and its outside. This explains why it is so pressing for the EU to tackle security threats in its neighbourhood. As contradictory as it may sound, where European integration is one of the main causes for more external security threats, the EU is trying to fight it with even more integration. This is set off by the perception of the 'outside' being dangerous because of weak administrative capacities of third (neighbouring) countries. By the EU working together as one and together with these countries, they have to fight security concerns which they moved closer to by expanding both eastwards and southwards. This means: closer to former communist countries, regions which have been torn by (civil) wars and countries with other norms and values than the EU. Especially threats coming from the southern Mediterranean are aggravated by perceived individual and terrorist jihadist links to different European societies. Although the absolute number of terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU has fallen, the threat has not yet been decreased in the last couple of years.42 In its yearly EU Terrorist Situation and Trend Reports (EU TE-SAT), Europol reports on its monitoring of the terrorist trends in EU member states. In its 2011 report, Europol stated that Islamist terrorist networks have obvious influence in EU member states, even though these networks are based outside the EU.43 In the time after the Arab Spring, extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Nigerian Boko Haram have strengthened their status. Several kidnappings of Western nationals have taken place in their spheres of influence, and several direct attacks on the European continent have taken place as well.44 AQIM is
40 Jan Rood, Een wankele wereldorde., pp. 77-78.
41 Isabelle Ioannides, 'Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood', p. 114. 42 Idem, pp. 116-119.
43 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2011.
44 For example, the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 24 May 2014, the attacks on
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 and on a Jewish supermarket on 9 January 2015 in Paris and the attempted murder on cartoonist Lars Vilks in Copenhagen on 14 February 2015.
known to finance individual jihadists with connections in European countries, willing to lead (suicide) attacks for them.45 When we take a closer look at the terrorism threat, exact numbers of terrorist incidents are missing. Moreover, there is no commonly accepted definition of what a terroristic attack is. We also have to take into consideration that there is a certain degree of secrecy around the subject: not all (attempts to) terrorist attacks are always brought to the outside. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, several jihadist groups have been manifesting themselves in countries which have difficulty democratising. Since there is a fear that returnees to Europe could be traumatised and radicalised, and most of all, that they have received training by jihadist groups with the purpose of committing a terrorist attack,46 the growing number of foreign fighters emphasises the growing intertwinement of internal and external security when it comes to terrorism. The EU deals with violent extremism through the strategy of Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. Through this strategy, the EU wants to fight causes of radicalisation by promoting democracy, dialogue and good governance.47
All in all, in the last decade is has become clear that internal security concerns have had a notable impact on the EU's foreign and security policy. The fact is that Europe and the rest of the world have changed drastically in those years, and that it is hard for the European institutions and member states to keep up and adjust to the worldwide changes. In the past ten years working with the CSDP, the EU has gained experience and learned that fields like internal security, external security, development and justice cannot be seen separately. The EU introduced a 'comprehensive approach', which involves addressing the full range of crisis prevention, response and recovery by making use of all the instruments the EU has available. In any way, Isabelle Ioannides, Senior Associate Researcher at the Institute for European Studies, part of the Free University in Brussels, stresses that recognition of the link between internal and external security and the challenges that come with them is crucial for dealing with security challenges in the future.48
45 Isabelle Ioannides, 'Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood', p. 119. 46 Jan Rood, Een wankele wereldorde, pp. 91-94.
47 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30 November
2005.
48 Isabelle Ioannides, 'Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood', pp.
It is also important to note, however that besides the EU, more international organisations deal with the internal-external security nexus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) recognises the increasing intertwinement between internal and external security as well. The difference is that the EU has profound competences when it comes to internal security, while NATO's competences are purely military.49 Fighting terrorism is one of NATO's main priorities. On the Chicago NATO Summit of 2012, NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism got adopted, focussing on awareness, capacities and engagement.
Similarly, the United Nations (UN) is working with, besides its own instruments of the Security Council, the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. This Strategy focuses, among other things, on fighting factors of radicalisation. Furthermore, the UN Security Council emphasises the discouragement of paying ransom to release people who were taking hostage, because this would benefit financing terrorism. The UN also launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral platform working on many different fields countering terrorism.50
49 Jan Rood, Een wankele wereldorde, p. 7. 50 Idem, p. 99.
T H E I S L A M I C S TAT E A N D T H E
DA N G E R O F F O R E I G N
F I G H T E R S
INTROD UCTI ON
he Islamic State is often depicted by the Western media as a bloodthirsty and violent group of radicalised extremist jihadists. Even when we look at the Islamic State's roots - the Sunni jihadist group sprouted from al-Qa'ida Iraq (AQI) - the violence the former uses is so extreme that al-Qa'ida itself averted from its actions.51 Charles Lister, expert on terrorism and insurgencies in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, also emphasises this by stating "Zarqawi’s relationship with al-Qa'ida was fraught with tension, particularly because of AQI’s brutality and mass targeting of Shia civilians.".52 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the founder of AQI.
It is undeniable, however, that in their perspective, IS achieved great successes in 2014. These successes came quite unexpectedly for the Western countries, and the West only got a wakeup call when IS besieged Mosul relatively easily in June last year. Patrick Cockburn, author, journalist and Middle East correspondent for The Independent, claims that "the "war on terror", the waging of which has shaped the political landscape for so much of the world since 2001, has demonstrably failed"53, and the ongoing battles and increasing violence in the region have forced Europe to face the facts.54 The United States of America sent 300 military advisors back to Iraq in June 2014 to intervene and help the Iraqi military55 and in early August established an international coalition to fight IS, other countries joined
51 William McCants, 'State of Confusion. ISIS' Strategy and How to Counter it', Foreign Affairs, 10
September 2010.
52 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper no. 13, Doha,
2014, p. 8.
53 Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadis Return. ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, London, OR books, 2014,
p. 45.
54 Idem, pp. 41-45.
55 Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon, 'U.S. to Send Up to 300 Military Advisers to Iraq', The
New York Times, 19 June 2014.
T
this coalition shortly after.56 One of the key motives for EU member states to join this coalition is because the war is no longer fought in the Middle East alone. An increasing number of young radicalised Muslims - mainly men, but also women - prepare to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and fight in their name. These foreign fighters are seen to pose a direct threat to Europe and their national governments: the latter fear that after a while the fighters might return to their home countries with even more extreme and radicalised ideas, trained to fight and use - which may or may not be - heavy weapons and with severe mental health issues and post-traumatic stress.57 Therefore, countries try to keep these radicalised Muslim fighters relatively safe at home. But whether or not this actually is more safe remains to be seen: it might be that stopping these jihadists gets them frustrated and more likely to commit a terrorist attack in their home country, which is also instructed by IS.58
Although the foreign fighter phenomenon is not new, many national governments were surprised to find out that not only a few, but several tens and sometimes hundreds of people from their countries were preparing to fight in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, teenagers and young adults seemed to radicalise surprisingly quickly: it only took several weeks for some of them to go from not interested in jihadism or the ongoing battles of IS at all to dedicating themselves to the jihad and prepared to die for their cause.59 The growth of the number of foreign fighters could have several causes. Firstly, nowadays it became relatively easy to travel to these countries. Potential jihadists already tried travelling to countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Chechnya and other countries to join the then jihadist fighters at the front in earlier wars in the past. However, at the time they would often either not even make it to the intended country, or lack the right contacts or financial and practical means to end up in training camps or in the battle field.60 The current situation in Syria is different. In order to attract as many fighters as possible, new jihadist battle groups do not set high requirements for foreigners, and through modern technology, it is easier to get in contact with these groups as well. Many
56 Ashley Fantz and Michael Pearson, 'Who's doing what in the coalition battle against ISIS',
CNN, 28 February 2015.
57 Edwin Bakker, 'Nederlandse strijders in Syrië: een gevaar?', De Internationale Spectator, 67:6, 2013,
p. 6.
58 Robbert Salome and Tobias den Hartog, ''Laat jihadisten naar Syrië gaan om daar te strijden'',
Het Algemeen Dagblad, 24 October 2014.
59 Edwin Bakker, 'Nederlandse strijders in Syrië: een gevaar?', p. 3. 60 Ibidem.
of the foreign fighters would be used for, for example, suicide attacks or plain man-power.61 Once a small legion of Western fighters got connected in Syria, they made it even easier for new foreign fighters to join them, providing them with the necessary information and help. Another reason for the increasing number of foreign fighters might be the accessibility of the war pictures. What could be considered as a far flung war by Westerners, is different for many Muslim communities. In many Muslim families the war is followed closely, with dreadful images along with professionally made propaganda from IS to join the fight entering their living rooms through foreign satellite-television and the internet, not to mention the impact that social media has these days. Religious incentives mixed with personal ones and peer pressure might also be cause for the significant increase in the number of foreign fighters.62 IS cleverly seems to cultivate the myth of unity as well: Abu Mohammed, a Dutch Muslim who decided to go fight in Syria and Iraq, said in an interview: "The Muslim society could be seen as one body. If one part is hurting, we are hurting as well."63
Fighters who either do not succeed in making contact with battle groups on site or who survive the combats have to make the choice whether or not to return home. Based on information from previous wars, it is expected that most of them do so - often disillusioned by the poor circumstances, the fierce fights and excessive dangers they have faced. In the last few months, discussions have arisen in Europe about these so-called 'returnees'. Security authorities assume the worst case scenarios, despite the fact that previous returnees have hitherto seldom proceeded to committing terrorist attacks in Europe.64 Yet, the recent events in Paris concerning the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish supermarket and the thwarted attack in the Belgium village of Verviers last January and the failed attack on Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks in Copenhagen last February prove that returnees do cause a substantial threat to European member states, and even if only 'a very limited number' of returnees would commit such an attack, when
61 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The threat of Terrorism from
Westers Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Policy Paper, Foreign Policy at Brookings Washington, November 2014, pp. 5-7.
62 Edwin Bakker, 'Nederlandse strijders in Syrië: een gevaar?' pp. 1-7.
63 Martijn de Koning and Jeroen Kostense, 'Oh, Oh, Aleppo', De Groene Amsterdammer, 138:38,
accessed online.
it concerns an increasing amount of jihadists this might become a substantial number all the same.65
In order to understand the situation in Syria and Iraq and the way IS has managed to become so 'successful', I will give a brief overview of the run-up of events before focussing on the current situation. Afterwards, I will go deeper into the supposed threat that foreign fighters pose to the EU and its member states and what causes them to leave their lives in Europe behind to join the Islamic State in their fight for the Islamic caliphate. Thereat I will focus on the current discussions going on in Europe about how to deal with radicalised Muslims.
THE EM ERGE NC E O F THE ISL AMIC STAT E
When we scrutinise the rise of IS in Iraq, it is important to keep the basis of their belief in mind. The ideological base of IS is salafism, a very orthodox branch of Islam. Salafists strictly comply with the word of the Quran and, according to Robert Soeterik, am anthropologist specialised in Iraq, they "do not make room for human logic and reason, nor do they accept 'new' religious practises".66 They started re-examining the Quran and Sunna in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which led them to believe that modernity was no good. Although Salafists usually make use of modern technology, they presume modern
65 On 7 January 2014 the head office of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo got
attacked by two Islamist terrorists, armed with rifles, Kalashnikovs and other weapons. They killed 12 people. The motive is considered to be hatred against Charlie Hebdo due to its controversial and satirical depictions of the prophet Mohammed, which is forbidden by Islam. The terrorists, the brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, shouted "Allahu Akbar" while committing their attack, which is Arabic for "God is the Greatest". Shortly after the attack, al-Qa'ida claimed the responsibility. After a massive manhunt, the two offenders got shot when they held another victim hostage. While many heads of government and (Islamic) groups condemned the attack, several jihadist organisations were supportive of the event. Simultaneously with the hostage crisis of the terrorists of Charlie Hebdo, another terrorist, Amedy Coulibaly, entered a kosher supermarket elsewhere in Paris and killed four people and took several hostages. He reportedly was in contact with the brothers Kouachi and threatened to kill more people if they were harmed. After the police stormed the supermarket, Coulibaly got shot and fifteen people were saved. Only a few days later, Belgian security agencies managed to thwart a terrorist attack in the city of Verviers, a few hours before it was about to happen, and arrested the suspects.
66 Robert Soeterik, 'Irak, de Islamitische Staat en de revanche van soennitische Arabieren', De
Western values to have a form of barbarism as result, and thus reject them.67 Salafists see Allah as unique. The Tawhid (monotheism) is the key principle, honouring others is considered as idolatry. The shari'a, the Islamic law, should be based solely on the Quran, and everybody who does not obey this is seen as a sinner and should be punished. Salafists carry out their ideology in different ways: this varies from complying to their ideology on a personal level, to actively carrying out the ideology to others, and even the most extreme one: aggressively forcing it onto other people through the jihad, with the aim of creating an Islamic caliphate based on the shari'a. IS distinguishes itself from other salafist groups by considering the need to create a territorial unit as a base for the fight in other parts of the Islamic world, and even beyond, instead of the cause they are fighting for. The salafists in Iraq mainly line themselves up against the Shia, who according to the Sunni salafists reject three of the successors of the prophet Mohammed.68
In June of 2014, IS managed to make a spectacular breakthrough by capturing the city of Mosul. Although quite unexpected to Western countries, their rise did not come out of nowhere. The process is inseparable from the deep crisis the Iraqi politics have been going through as a result of the fall of Saddam Hussein and his regime in 2003 and the shift of power that followed. Three great communities play an important role here: the Sunni, the Shia and the Kurds.69
In the name of 'The War on Terror' the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, not long after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Many Arabic Salafists fighting for al-Qa'ida and the Taliban found themselves fleeing the country. In March 2003, the US invaded Iraq, where it made an end to the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein and defeated, among others, the Salafist-jihadi group Ansar al-Islam. One of their members was Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi. As an answer to the defeat, he set up a new jihadi organisation: Jama'at al-Tawid wa al-Jihad (the Organisation for Monotheism and Jihad). This organisation swore their allegiance to Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida and soon after changed its name to al-Qa'ida fi Iraq (AQI). AQI would rapidly formally become one of the six branches of Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida. Together with nationalists, supporters of the previous regime of Hussein and
67 Daniel Ungureanu, 'Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist
Ideology', Argumentum, Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, 9:2, 2011, pp. 143-144.
68 Robert Soeterik, 'Irak, de Islamitische Staat en de revanche van soennitische Arabieren', pp.
11-12.
Islamic groups, AQI has been responsible for most of the violence which Iraq saw at the time. Initially, this violence was directed at the American invaders, but later also at supporters of the new order which got established by the Americans, and other people related to this new order. More radical, however, were the (suicide)attacks of AQI, committed against the Shia civilians and mosques.70
The Sunni AQI committed those attacks with the aim of provoking a sectarian conflict between the two communities.71 The main reason for this was that after Saddam Hussein's regime got dissolved, the Sunni had to render the power to the Shia majority in Iraq, under the leadership of Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. By provoking a sectarian conflict, the AQI tried to persuade Sunni Arabs to join the AQI in their fight against the Shia government. With the provoking bomb attack at one of the Shia's most important mosques, the al-Askari-mosque, in February 2006 in Samarra, the AQI got their wish. In his report Isis and the New Sunni Uprising, Patrick Cockburn describes the image of Baghdad: "Many of the armed men who started appearing in the streets of Baghdad and other Shia cities were Shia militiamen. [...] Soon dead bodies were being dumped at night. They were stripped from their ID cards but were assumed to be Sunni victims of the militia death squads." Whole cities and areas where Sunni and Shia used to live together peacefully got culled sectarian. Cockburn stresses that although Shia groups reacted in kind of the Sunni attacks, most victims were Shia.72
However, Zarqawi and his masters of al-Qa'ida did not see eye to eye about how to reach their goals. The leaders of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan did not agree with the extent of violence used by the AQI and insisted on avoiding damage being done to the image of jihad. Nonetheless, AQI succeeded in gaining support of other rebellious groups in Iraq and merged with five of them in January 2006 to form Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM). As one, they wanted to unite Iraq's jihadi insurgency and better coordinate it. Zarqawi died in an attack by the United States in June, and got succeeded by Abu Ayyub al-Masri as the new leader of MSM. The attack by the Americans was supposed to defeat MSM, but instead rather strengthened the organisation. Four months later, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq got established, in the West better known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its new leader. Due to a lack of any formal pledge of allegiance of ISI to al-Qa'ida, a gradual break-up between the two
70 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 6-8.
71 Robert Soeterik, 'Irak, de Islamitische Staat en de revanche van soennitische Arabieren', pp.
9-10.
organisations followed.73 The proclamation of a 'state' is considered to be very important in this context. It shows that ISI was looking to control territory and establish a government, including ministries and financial, military, political and civil duties, but also perform 'state' functions.74 In the years that followed, ISI suffered significantly. They intended to transform into a military-political actor, but could not win over the communities opposing to them due to the ISI's unwillingness to compromise their absolutist ideology. Nonetheless, by the end of 2006, ISI reached financial self-sufficiency. Trough extortion, oil smuggling and ransoms, the jihadi organisation raised between 70 and 200 million American dollars a year. From 2007 on, local councils, named Sahwa, together with U.S. security forces, began to combat the territory ISI had seized. They proved rather successful and ISI found itself under great pressure in Iraq. With many foreign fighters leaving the country, the amount of sectarian violence dropped significantly.75
Starting in June 2009, the United States gradually pulled back its troops in the region, causing the Sahwa to have reduced capabilities. ISI benefited from this situation, gaining more confidence and starting to recruit again. The organisation underwent an impressive resurrection. One of the most important changes they made was recentralising their leadership in Mosul, where Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani, current leader of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) in Syria, became al-Baghdadi's deputy. By 2010, ISI was offering bigger salaries than Maliki's Shia-led government, leading Sahwa militias right into their arms. Fighters received between a few hundred and two thousand Euros a month, depending on the position they would have.76 Besides, fighters received housing, sometimes in confiscated homes from non-Sunnis or people who have fled the area77, and, as a form of life insurance, ISI had a policy of continuing to pay the families of martyred fighters. The bigger the family, the more they would receive after their beloved one had died on the battlefield.78 Moreover, by committing well-planned attacks on prisons in order to free
73 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 6-10. 74 Idem, p. 21
75 Idem, pp. 6-10.
76 Harm Ede Botje and Abdou Bouzerda, 'De Anatomie van de Islamitische Staat', Vrij Nederland,
11 September 2014.
77 Mariam Karouny, 'Insight - In northeast Syria, Islamic State builds a government', Reuters, UK
edition, 4 September 2014.
78 Jacob N. Shapiro and Danielle F. Jung, The terrorist bureaucracy: inside the files of the Islamic State in
captured ISI leaders, the ISI managed to rebuild their leadership for a large part.79 Besides prisons, which later would prove to be an important hearth for radicalised Muslims, terrorist attacks were committed in many Iraqi areas.80 Charles Lister points out that by that time ISI had become 'far more Iraqi' in terms of its membership. This had a positive effect on the social basis and gave ISI the ability to get information from inside the Iraqi security services.81
The Arab Spring provided a launch pad for ISI. When the revolts in the region started in the spring of 2011, they initially looked like they were struggles for democratic values and personal freedoms through peaceful protests. However, this changed over time, and some of these protests got beaten down with brutal force. In this situation, salafist jihadi organisations like ISI seized their opportunity to rise even further.82 Following up the former attacks at prisons, ISI launched new attacks to free more of their leaders. They reached big successes, as the attack on the Tasfirat Prison in Tikrit and the Abu Graib prison in Baghdad liberated hundreds of prisoners, including dozens of ISI senior leaders.83 The Islamic State of Iraq had already been expanding to Shia and Kurdish areas in the North. With the outburst of the civil war in Syria, the ISI boosted its own organisation's base by expanding operations into that country, with which they had links since 2003. Fighters from the Arab world were funnelled into Iraq through Syria. By 2007, the U.S. even claimed that 85 to 90% of the foreign fighters came through Syria as well. As a result, al-Baghdadi focussed on Syria when the Arab Spring triggered a revolution in 2011. He sent his chief of operations to Syria to establish a Syrian branch of ISI in the country: this would become Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). In the first year JaN operated similarly to ISI, with civilians having to pay for that and making the jihadist group unpopular with the Syrian opposition. Later, JaN itself claimed to have nothing to do with either al-Qa'ida nor ISI. By the end of 2012, al-Nusra had grown into a militant organisation of about 2,000 members and had led the Syrian opposition to some substantial successes, transforming their reputation into a valued one in the fight against the government. In April 2013 al-Baghdadi tried to seize the power of his subordinate organisation, reporting in an audio statement that ISI and JaN would further exist as the
79 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 6-10.
80 Martin Chulov, 'ISIS: The inside story', The Guardian, Thursday 11 December 2014. 81 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 6-11.
82 Robert Soeterik, 'Irak, de Islamitische Staat en de revanche van soennitische Arabieren', p. 9. 83 Martin Chulov, 'ISIS: The inside story'.
expanded Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, Al-Jowlani, JaN's leader, rejected this statement and kept al-Nusra independent.84 To gain more power in the Syrian conflict, ISIS had to re-establish itself. The Syrian branch of ISIS began expanding aggressively in northern and eastern areas in Syria, resulting in a war between the two jihadist groups, and later even between ISIS and a coalition of more moderate groups.85 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, an Iraqi journalist, spoke to an Iraqi general in Ramadi who told him that the war was only a Sunni-Shia fight on the surface. When you take a closer look, the general claimed, there are no less than fourteen parties fighting each other, only one of them being Shia and thirteen being Sunni.86
Nonetheless, ISIS managed to make Raqqa its capital and soon after took over power in Fallujah and Ramadi.87 ISIS began a counter-attack against the groups fighting them, and by this time the battles in Syria and Iraq were getting more and more interrelated. Not only fighters and guns would increasingly cross the border, funds would also be used for both fights. When ISIS seized the city of Mosul seemingly easy in June 2014, followed by Tikrit soon after, the armed Sunni uprising across Iraq got another boost. On the 29th of June, ISIS proclaimed a renewed Islamic caliphate, and at the same day it would send videos into the world showing the demolishment of physical borders between Syria and Iraq. Simultaneously, they changed their name into 'Islamic State' (IS). While even Imams are not entirely sure whether ISIS was entitled to declare a caliphate, al-Baghdadi functions as its current leader, as 'Caliph'.88
THE FIGHT AGAI N ST T HE IS L AMIC STATE
With the established new caliphate, IS got another step closer to achieving their goal: a sphere without national borders but with unity in the Islamic religion. The flow of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq to join IS still did not decrease, and neither did the crimes which IS was committing. In the last couple of months, several videos have been published, which show IS combatants beheading captured journalists,
84 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 10-14. 85 Ibidem.
86 Henriëtte van Lyndenlezing, Jihad on our Doorstep: inside the minds of jihadis in Syria and Iraq, De
Rode Hoed, Amsterdam, September 2014, 7.45'.
87 Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadis Return. ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, pp. 16-17. 88 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, pp. 11-14.
workers and prisoners of war. In some of these videos the executioner is clearly European, urging Western governments to deal with this problem even more intensively. Being financially independent and structurally not bound to any other terrorist group helped IS to establish themselves as the organisation they are today. Contrary to the traditional al-Qa'ida model, they do not rely on external donors or financiers.89 By 2014, IS generated $12 million per month, partly by illicit oil sales and efficient kidnapping for ransom operations. However, according to Lister, this is their strength as much as their weakness, which could be exploited.90 IS has been professionalising since 2013, increasing the number of training camps to prepare the new accretion of foreign fighters. By attacking on several locations on multiple occasions, IS made it extremely hard for the Iraqi and Syrian governments to defend themselves. Moreover, IS has managed to find a balance between the insurgent strategy and the use of fierce brutality, which made it possible for them to become very dominant locally. Ever since al-Baghdadi took the lead within IS, the top leadership structure has become smaller and more exclusive, making it harder for the U.S.-led coalition to find and eliminate them. But one of the most important factors why IS was able to grow this much was their financial capability. By funding food provisions and fuel subsidies, IS induced tribal loyalty and popular support. Furthermore, IS presented themselves as wealthy and successful, making it easier for them to recruit new (foreign) fighters. They would perform para-state functions, e.g. governing by combining municipal administration, such as police and shari'a courts, with aid-based services. This combination led to a relative stability. The implementation of shari'a law is one of IS' most important aim, which also caused them to impose so-called dhimmi, a protection pact for monotheistic non-Muslims. If the latter obey to strict regulations and pay regular poll taxes, these non-Muslims receive 'protection' under IS, which in practice comes down to a second-class citizenship. If these groups do not agree to pay the taxes, convert to the Islam or flee within 48 hours, IS executes them, causing most Christians and Shia to flee the cities that IS seized. Moreover, when seizing such a city, IS immediately takes control over the core needs of a population: electricity, water, gas, even bakeries. They attempt to provide the same need to civilians as state-actors, only, according to themselves, in a 'more ethical' manner.91
89 Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, p. 2. 90 Idem, pp.8-16.
