MA Thesis in European Studies: Governing Europe
Graduate School for Humanities
The performance of the EU’s High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
The Iran nuclear deal and the conflicts in Ukraine compared
Author: Lisa Soldaat Student number: 6080642
Main supervisor: dhr. dr. László Marácz Second supervisor: mw. dr. Marjet Brolsma Word count: 21.878
Outline
Introduction 3
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 5 1.1. Foreign policy of the EU before the Lisbon Treaty 5
1.2. The HR/VP’s mandate 7
1.3. Shortcomings to the position of the HR/VP 9
1.4. Conclusion 11
2. The European Union in international affairs 12
2.1. The EU in global affairs 12
2.2. EU ambitions for its foreign policy 14
2.3. The EU’s lack in political power 16
2.4. Conclusion 17
3. The Iran nuclear deal 19
3.1. The Iran nuclear talks, 2003-2015 19
3.2. Analysing the actors 22
3.3. Analysing the context 24
4. The crisis in Ukraine 26
4.1. The Ukrainian conflict, 2015 – present 27
4.2. Analysing the actors 31
4.3. Analysing the context 34
5. The performance of the HR and HR/VP 35
5.1. Similarities and differences between Iran and Ukraine 35
5.2. Alternative explanations 38 5.3. Conclusion 40 Conclusion 41 Literature references 43 Academic literature 43 Grey literature 45 News articles 50
Introduction
The position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) was created with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The HR/VP was to function as a sort of foreign minister of the European Union (EU), representing the EU in international affairs and coordinating the many aspects of EU foreign policy. The EU had experienced many difficulties in its foreign policy in the past. EU foreign policy is a complex system: to choose foreign policy objectives and policies all member states must be in agreement, for which qualified majority voting (QMV) is necessary.1 The EU does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
foreign policy while member states can act autonomously in international affairs. Moreover, the EU institutions can also conflict with each other over foreign policy matters (Smith 2014: 8). The creation of the HR/VP therefore met with great expectations: the individual occupying the office had the possibility to provide EU foreign policy with more continuity, coherency and visibility (Piris 2010: 245). During the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal from 2003 until 2015 HR/VP Catherine Ashton played the leading role among other global powers in negotiating a solution on Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demonstrating the EU’s capability to contribute in solving high-profile international conflicts. However, during the crisis in Ukraine since 2014 the EU member states are taking over the leading tasks of the current HR/VP Federica Mogherini in EU foreign policy, marginalising her position. Consequently, the crisis is merely negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France, without representation of the EU. To analyse this difference, this paper will discuss the performance of the HR/VP using these two case studies. Why has the HR/VP been successful in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal, but rather unsuccessful in the negotiations over the crisis in Ukraine?
In July 2015 the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, between Iran, China, Russia, the United States (US), France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU. The EU was included in the document because it was represented by the HR/VP. The Iran nuclear deal ensured Iran’s restriction on creating or acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, by regulating Iranian resources. Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had been an issue since the twentieth century and has troubled all global powers. The talks with Iran were first initiated by the E3 (the ‘big three’ of Europe: Germany, France and the UK) but soon joined by the HR/VP, adding the weight of the EU to the negotiations. Three years later these talks were joined by Russia, China and the US, still led by the HR/VP. The HR/VP had been crucial in improving the bad relationship between the US and Iran, which proved to be essential in reaching the final agreement in 2015. Because of the HR/VP’s effective performance in the case of Iran, the EU was able to demonstrate its possibility to be an influential actor in the international system. The Euromaidan protests that led to the Ukrainian crisis broke out during the last phases of the Iran nuclear talks in 2014. After Putin annexed Crimea it was clear that this was going to be a direct threat to EU security, causing conflict in the EU’s close neighbourhood. Consequently a ceasefire
1 Under QMV a proposal would be approved if 55 percent of the member states vote in favour, representing at
agreement was negotiated with additional arrangements to end the violence in eastern Ukraine. This agreement was called Minsk II, negotiated by Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. The EU as a whole was missing in the Minsk II agreement, because the HR/VP was absent. After the signing of this agreement France and especially Germany have taken over the lead in EU foreign policy, further marginalising the role of the HR/VP. Currently, the fighting in the eastern region has still not come to an end and Ukraine and Russia have still not implemented the full Minsk II accords. The EU’s response to the Ukrainian crisis is more frequently questioned for its weak sanctions, which are missing the core areas of the Russian economy and are only partially targeted against high politicians (Markus and Veebel 2015: 167). The relevance of this paper lies in the fact that although the office of the HR/VP which was created with the Lisbon Treaty is already seven years in practice, research on the HR/VP’s performance is still very narrow, especially when it comes to the actorness of the HR/VP in recent crises such as the Iran nuclear talks and the Ukraine crisis.
The paper will be constructed as following. The first chapter will analyse the office of the HR/VP and will discuss the reason for creation of the office, the mandate of the HR/VP and the shortcomings of the office that complicate its sufficiency. This chapter will argue that the HR/VP was created to make EU foreign policy more visible, coherent and consistent, but that for various reasons the HR/VP is not always able to do so. The most important reason for this is the EU’s complex intergovernmental structure. This will be further elaborated upon in the concluding chapters.
The second chapter will provide an overview of the EU in international affairs. It will analyse the difference between EU ambitions on the international stage and the limited political influence the EU in reality has. It will be argued that a strong and effective HR/VP is necessary and desirable for the EU to gain more influence in international affairs. The first two chapters will provide a theoretical perspective necessary for the following two case studies, adding more precision to the later analysis (Yin 2012: 9). They will conclude that despite the fact that the HR/VP is marginalised in some cases, a strong and effective leadership of EU foreign policy is however required.
The two case studies of the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal and the crisis in Ukraine will be analysed in the third and fourth chapters. These two chapters will both first be provided with a description of the relevant occurred events. Then they will analyse the different actors and the context of the case. With these two chapters focused on explanation building, the next chapter will be more effective in analysing and comparing the two cases.
The fifth chapter will therefore analyse the similarities and differences between the actors and characteristics that are relevant in analysing the HR/VP’s performance. This section will for example look at the most visible EU actors, the leaders of the US, Iran and Russia, the individual occupying the office of the HR/VP and the interaction between the HR/VP and other EU actors. Before concluding on what factors have caused the HR/VP to play a less significant role in the crisis in Ukraine, rival explanations to this question will be given. This chapter will conclude on why the most visible EU actor has been different during the negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal and the crisis in Ukraine and what the main reasons for this difference were.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
The foreign policy of the European Union (EU) has always been a complicated issue. EU foreign policy is conducted by its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), created in 1991 with the Treaty of Maastricht. Since its creation it has been based on intergovernmentalism. The 28 member states control their own security and defence policy. Decisions on foreign policy on EU level require unanimity among the member states. However, the EU holds more power on the international stage when it speaks with one voice. Therefore the office of the HR/VP was created with the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, to represent the EU in external affairs in matters relating to the CFSP. The implementation of the HR/VP created a lot of expectations, because the person filling the position could ensure more continuity, coherency and visibility in the foreign policies of the EU (Piris 2010: 249). The Lisbon Treaty also introduced an European External Action Service (EEAS) to support the HR/VP. The treaty improved EU foreign policy significantly by implementing additional modifications in the field of the CFSP as well. The question that remains is whether the office of the HR/VP is sufficient enough to fulfil its objectives. Member states often take matters into their own hands in foreign affairs, neglecting the HR/VP and undermining its position in being the single voice in EU external representation.
This chapter will analyse the position of the HR/VP. First the reasons for its creation will be analysed by looking into the criticism on EU foreign policy that existed before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Then the focus will be on the mandate of the HR/VP: what is its nature, what are its tasks and how is the position filled? Finally it will be argued that there are several shortcomings to the office of the HR/VP that complicate its sufficiency.
1.1. Foreign policy of the EU before the Lisbon Treaty
Member states are the major actors in EU foreign policy, because of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. From the beginning they have wanted to keep a firm grip on the direction of the foreign policy (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2013: 1316). The CFSP originally had a six-monthly rotating presidency consisting of a foreign minister from a member state, which was seen by the member states as an enormous opportunity to improve their position on the international stage (Regelsberger 2011: 18). But because this presidency rotated every six months, EU foreign policy often lacked in continuity and direction (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2013: 1316). Therefore the Treaty of Amsterdam, which became effective in 1999, introduced the office of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR) for the first time. The Spanish Javier Solana took up this function, who had been the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) prior to his appointment as HR. Solana had much less influence than the later HR/VP that was created with the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam proposed a coordinating role for the HR in the CFSP and stated that the HR should represent the EU in external matters,
but only “if appropriate” (Regelsberger 2011: 21). This coordinating role is still most essential in the HR/VP’s mandate: to diminish the differences between member states. This is necessary because the HR/VP cannot represent a policy position when there is no consensus among the member states, which undermines the coherency and visibility of the EU in international affairs. Since the Treaty of Lisbon the HR/VP also has the right of initiative to bring the member states together if the HR/VP thinks this is necessary.
At the heart of EU foreign policy stood the ‘troika’ of the Council Presidency, the Relex Commissioner and the HR (Bengtsson and Allen: 128). Because these were three different individuals with different positions an effective foreign policy was often complicated by uncoordinated messages, late responses and competition within the troika to gain more influence in the making and implementation of important international matters. (idem: 109). Consequently, the foreign policy of the EU lacked in continuity and in coherence: between different policy frameworks and between different EU actors (Rüger 2011: 204). The six-monthly rotating presidency of the CFSP had a member state to back him or her up, but Solana did not. Therefore he often found himself with no true authority (Płeszka 2010: 87). EU foreign policy has been criticised as being an inefficient, burdensome and especially incoherent system because of this triangular relationship (Bengtsson and Allen 2011: 109). Additionally, the EU did not have a single voice in its external representation, which resulted in a lack of visibility in international affairs (Rüger 2011: 204).
Another major factor that complicated matters was the member states' insistence on maintaining sovereign control over their foreign and security policies. This has obstructed Solana significantly in his ability to shape foreign policy (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger 2011: 269). The possibility of the EU to react swiftly was obstructed as well, because of the requirement of consensus of the member states in the decision-making process of foreign affairs (Rüger 2011: 204). This has often been a point of criticism, for example with the performance of the EU during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Bickerton 2011: 27-29).
In 2004 the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was drafted, which hoped to tackle the existing problems by introducing the office of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. This office would become a combination of the offices of the HR and the Relex Commissioner, under a ‘double-hatted’ position (Płeszka 2010: 89; Rüger 2011: 207). The introduction of a foreign minister for the EU resulted in resistance from different member states, because they feared a European super-state (Rüger 2011: 209).2
Another stumbling point of the TCE for the member states was the proposed replacement of unanimous voting by QMV in the field of EU foreign policy. However, the proposed reformations of the TCE were put on hold when the referendums of 2005 in France and the Netherlands blocked its ratification. The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007 and put into effect in 2009, improved EU foreign and security policy significantly. The treaty incorporated many aspects of the blocked TCE, but the CFSP retained its unanimous voting and the name of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was changed into that of the HR/VP. The main changes in the Treaty of Lisbon in the area of external affairs were the establishment of a ‘triple-hatted’ HR/VP, the
2 Particularly the United Kingdom (UK) did not feel comfortable with the title of the new position. Also Sweden,
Spain, Poland and the Czech Republic were against a EU foreign minister. Eventually all member states signed the TCE despite their initial resistance (Rüger 2011: 208-209).
introduction of the EEAS, and various modifications in the field of the CFSP and EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), that covers defence and military aspects (Piris 2010: 243).
1.2. The HR/VP’s mandate
The newly formed position of the HR/VP combined the tasks that were assigned to three individuals before the Treaty of Lisbon: the tasks of the HR, the Relex Commissioner and the President of the External Relations Council (Piris 2010: 244). This combination of offices made the position a triple-hatted one. The transformation of the HR into the HR/VP position created a lot of expectations: a more visible EU within international relations, more stability regarding the external representation of the EU and more consistency between the various sectors of EU foreign policy (idem: 245, 249). However, this triple-hatted nature of the HR/VP makes it a very complicated job. To give a more comprehensive overview of its responsibilities, the HR/VP is:
One of the Vice-Presidents over the Commission (Article 18(4) TEU), with weekly meetings (Piris 2010: 249);
The President of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) (Articles 18(3) and 27(1) TEU), which meetings are once a month (Piris 2010: 249);
Responsible for the consistency of the Union's external action (Article 18(4) TEU), which besides the CFSP also includes the CSDP (Cameron 2011: 240);
Responsible for contributing through proposals to the development of the CFSP (Article 18(2) TEU);
Responsible for the implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and Council (Article 27(1) TEU);
To represent the EU for matters relating to the CFSP, which means engaging in “political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf” and to express “the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences” (Article 27(2) TEU);
Responsible for regularly consulting the European Parliament on “the main aspects and the basic choices” of the CFSP, “to inform it of how those policies evolve” and to make sure that the views of the European Parliament are taken into consideration (Article 36 TEU);
Exercising authority over the EEAS, which will assist the HR/VP (Article 27(3) TEU);
Exercising authority over special representatives with mandates in particular policy issues (Article 33 TEU).
The HR/VP is the “coordinator, motor, mediator, watchdog, and spokesperson – in short, the linchpin of European foreign and security policy” (Rüger 2011: 212). The HR/VP may prepare foreign policy initiatives, although decisions have to be made by the member states and the Commission has to implement these (Rettman 2009). He or she has to travel frequently, because the imposed tasks cover a wide range of activities (Piris 2010: 246, 248). In order to be able to exercise this complicated mandate, the HR/VP will be assisted by the EEAS.
The Treaty of Lisbon laid the foundations for the establishment of the EEAS by stating that preparatory work on the creation of the EEAS should begin right after the signing of the treaty, but it did not provide any details on the structure, organisation and functioning of the service (Declaration on Article 27 TEU). The Lisbon Treaty only stated that the EEAS “shall be established by a decision of the Council” acting “on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission” (Article 27(3) TEU). This made the British Catherine Ashton responsible for creating the EEAS when she was appointed as the first HR/VP in 2009. Creating the EEAS appeared extremely difficult. A year after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, member states and the Commission were still debating over the degree of influence the EEAS would get. Ashton was often “caught in the middle” when negotiating (Vogel 2010a). Significant differences in opinion were visible, for example over the supposed size of the EEAS and over what its relation should be to the Commission and the Council of Ministers (Vogel 2008). The EEAS was to become an independent EU agency, separate from EU institutions and member states. It proved problematic that it was being created exactly by these actors, all wanting to impose their own vision and incorporate their own people into the structure of the EEAS (Vogel 2010b). Member states feared that the EEAS staff would consist of EU officials instead of diplomats from national governments (ibid). Eventually the EEAS was officially established in 2010 with a Council decision (Council of the European Union 2010). Discussion remains upon whether the full potential of the EEAS has been fully reached (Balfour 2015: 32). The EEAS “seems more of an instrument of than an actor in EU foreign policy”, primarily because of national and institutional boundaries that limit the functioning of the EEAS (ibid).
Just as the Treaty of Lisbon did not elaborate on the structure organisation and functioning of the EEAS, it did not provide the HR/VP with a specific legal framework of its function (Płeszka 2010: 106). That is why critics have argued that a certain degree of ‘vagueness’ is characterising the Lisbon Treaty (Rüger 2011: 217; Koutrakos 2012: 195). An example of how this vagueness can have serious consequences in practice was the EU representation during the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009. Although the Lisbon Treaty stated that the HR/VP should represent the EU’s position, EU presidents and national prime ministers were still sending out conflicting messages on behalf of the EU. In practice it was still not clear who was to represent the EU in international affairs (Rankin 2010). The vagueness of the Lisbon Treaty makes it open to different interpretations in the EU’s day-to-day foreign policy practice (Rüger 2012: 152).
Because of these grey zones in the Treaty of Lisbon the effectiveness of the HR/VP is for a great part dependent on the individual occupying the office (Rüger 2011: 217). Differences are visible in how Solana, Ashton and Mogherini have shaped the position of the HR/VP. Antonio Missiroli, the director of the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the EU agency that deals with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues, has argued that Solana was extremely successful in expanding his job description without going beyond what the Amsterdam Treaty said or did not say (“Solana leaves Ashton ‘impossible job description’” 2010). When Ashton succeeded Solana in 2009 she faced an unclear definition of the office although it was clear that she had to develop the HR/VP’s position and create the EEAS (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 1). Prior to her appointment as HR/VP Ashton functioned as the member of the Commission responsible for trade and had led major negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement with Korea
(“The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, n.d.). Although she had experience, she had not been an important figure and was relatively unknown in comparison to Solana, previously the Secretary-General of NATO. After her appointment she said she was “slightly surprised, but deeply privileged” (“Baroness Ashton appointed as EU’s foreign policy chief”, 2009). During her term Ashton has nevertheless represented the EU effectively in international affairs in several cases, for example during the Iran nuclear negotiations (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 13). Ashton transformed the position of the HR/VP as a foreign policy leader into a more bureaucratic role, focused upon quiet diplomacy, although the financial crisis complicated the possibilities of cooperation within EU foreign policy (Larivé 2014: 181). Since November 2014 the Italian Federica Mogherini is filling the office of HR/VP. Because she does not have to oversee the creation of the EEAS, Mogherini has more time to operate as a full member of the Commission and to shape EU foreign policy (EUISS 2014: 4).3 In comparison to Ashton, Mogherini is
focusing on making EU external policy more strategic. She will for example introduce a new strategic report on the foreign policy of the EU by June this year. It has been argued that Mogherini should be more involved in EU political processes that member states support, instead of focussing solely on cooperation with the Commission (PISM 2015: 5). Ashton and Mogherini were both not the strongest candidates for the position of the HR/VP (Howorth 2011; Helwig and Rüger 2014: 15; Wright 2014). To strategically not choose an HR/VP with a stronger personality, member states have tried to maintain their control over EU foreign policy (Bardi and Pizzimenti 2013: 60).
1.3. Shortcomings to the position of the HR/VP
More visibility within international relations, more stability in external representation and more consistency in EU foreign policy: these were the expectations of the new HR/VP at the time of creation (Piris 2010: 245). But is its office sufficient enough to fulfil these objectives? Although the introduction of the HR/VP did make an improvement to EU foreign policy, the position still suffers from severe shortcomings.
The strongest limitation that the HR/VP faces in exercising her mandate is the limitation provided by the EU member states, because of EU foreign policy’s intergovernmental structure. The member states still insist on maintaining control over their foreign policy, unlikely to surrender that control to achieve a more effective common foreign policy (Smith 2014: 8). When there is no consensus between member states the HR/VP cannot represent a policy position and has to remain silent, because the HR/VP cannot decide autonomously on the position of the EU (Thym 2011: 456). In the last few years the EU has been dealing with several troubling situations, such as the crisis in Ukraine, tensions with Russia, migration issues, terrorism, the threat of the Islamic State and the conflicts in Libya. Mogherini has acknowledged from the beginning of her office that her role will be primarily to bridging member state positions, being aware of
3 After being appointed as HR/VP, Mogherini stated: “We have our tools. I would say that, after the Lisbon
Treaty, we do have these. We do have an External Action Service in place. We need to spend the next five years shaping our common policy, our common vision and our common strategy. That is my first task for the next five years – to shape a real common policy” (Mogherini 2014c)
the fact that the member states will limit her mandate (PISM 2015: 1). But Mogherini is being marginalised by member states more and more in important diplomatic matters of EU foreign policy (idem: 5). Initiatives that Mogherini proposes are often neglected by the member states. She is only rarely able to play a role in the implementation of member states decisions. Most of the time she is left to work on the continuing of making diplomatic contacts (ibid). Ashton faced similar restrains, but it has been argued that Mogherini has even more difficulties in finding her place in EU foreign affairs (ibid). The strong limitations that the member states in EU foreign policy bring is contradictory to the founding idea of the HR/VP (idem: 6). Big member states often operate without consulting the HR/VP or the EEAS in current issues in international affairs, as is for example visible with the negotiations between Germany, France, Ukraine and Germany over the Ukrainian crisis (ibid).
Additionally, EU institutions can pose obstacles to common foreign policy making (Smith 2014: 9). The relationship between the HR/VP, the President of the Council and the President of the Commission within EU foreign policy is crucial. The Treaty of Lisbon stated that the HR/VP represents the EU and speaks on the EU’s behalf in international affairs, but this may differ in practice. Since the Lisbon Treaty did not elaborate on this relationship, this will again be determined by practice and on who is filling these offices (Piris 2010: 248). The HR/VP works in close cooperation with the President of the Commission, currently the Luxembourgish Jean-Claude Juncker. When he became president in 2014 he introduced a new college with seven vice-presidents, organised in thematic clusters (EUISS 2014: 1). Ashton had previously functioned as HR/VP as primus inter pares without any authority over colleagues and was heavily restricted by president Barroso, most prominently in the establishment of the EEAS (Blockmans and Erkelens 2012: 9, 30; Bindi 2011: 128). The newly organised Commission introduced more potential to let Mogherini develop her mission of ensuring consistency in EU foreign affairs, although strong political will of the HR/VP and support by the member states is still required (idem: 2). Additionally, the HR/VP has to work with the President of the European Council. Before the Treaty of Lisbon this office rotated every six months among the member states, but the treaty transformed the office into a permanent post. Since 2014 the Polish Donald Tusk has taken up this position. Whereas this triangular relationship between the HR, the Commission President and the President of the European Council during Ashton has been called “poor and unproductive”, staff inside the institutions have testified that it has improved significantly since the appointment of Mogherini, Juncker and Tusk (King 2015). Junker has even moved Mogherini from the EEAS building to the Commission headquarters to improve cooperation and collaboration. Although points of friction still exist and cooperation between EU institutions should not be exaggerated, the gaps have undoubtedly narrowed (ibid).
Besides the limitation by the member states and the EU institutions, it has been argued that another shortcoming to the HR/VP’s office is that her job is too demanding to be carried out by one individual. Its triple-hatted nature requires a demanding travel schedule (Rüger 2011: 212). It has been argued that the HR/VP faces a “real danger of schizophrenia” (Cameron 2011: 21), and that the workload eventually “might prove too much to handle” (Płeszka 2010: 106). A member of EUISS argued in an interview that the HR/VP is a ‘mission impossible’ (personal communication, 2016, January 27). This EU official argued that nobody foresaw the enormous workload the office would bring at the moment of design and that the expectations
of the HR/VP were very high, but that only a couple of years ago it became apparent that the office was indeed impossible. Solana has proclaimed the new HR/VP to be an impossible office as well (Rüger 2011: 212). The so-called impossibility of the job is for example visible in Mogherini’s attendance in Commission meetings. According to a list submitted by the European Parliament and the Commission at the beginning of this year, she attended only 68 percent of the 47 mandatory Commission meetings since November 2014 (Palmeri 2016). Within this report Mogherini has the lowest attendance figure of all commissioners, even though her office situates in the Commission headquarters. It can however be questioned whether the job of the HR/VP is indeed impossible. Mogherini has the entire apparatus of the EEAS at her disposal, which was already created by Ashton. Therefore it would be reasonable to argue that she should have enough assistance to carry out her mandate effectively.
1.4. Conclusion
After problems with consistency, visibility and coherency, the Lisbon Treaty made significant changes in EU foreign policy by establishing the position of the HR/VP, introducing the EEAS and developing the CFSP in other manners. But the complex system of intergovernmentalism remained. Both the HR/VP and the EEAS had to be developed in practice because the Lisbon Treaty remained vague on their precise functioning. Currently the office of the HR/VP is not effective enough, because it is not always able to fulfil its initial objectives of ensuring more visibility within international relations, more stability in external representation and more consistency in EU foreign policy. The most important factor that complicates the effectiveness of the HR/VP is the power of the member states, because of the EU foreign policy’s the intergovernmental structure. Additionally, the HR/VP can be restricted by EU institutions. It has also been argued that the HR/VP’s mandate is too extensive, which causes the HR/VP to be unable in practicing its full mandate. An ineffective HR/VP is problematic, because the limited political power that the EU can exert in international affairs will not be improved.
2. The European Union in international affairs
The previous chapter has already partially elaborated upon the maters that can hinder effective EU foreign policy. This chapter will discuss the EU in international affairs. First, the EU in global affairs will be discussed. What is the EU’s nature as a global actor and what kind of instruments can be used? Second, an overview will be given of the EU’s difficulties in developing a sufficient foreign policy strategy, which is to be drafted by the HR/VP. Moreover, the main EU strategic documents will be analysed to argue that the EU already sees itself as a global power and has the ambitions to increase its influence. The third section of this chapter will however argue that the EU lacks in political power.
2.1. The EU in global affairs
To provide a better understanding of the EU as a global actor, this section will analyse the nature of the EU in external affairs, the main instruments it can wield, and it will be discussed when member states are most likely to make use of EU foreign policy instead of exerting their foreign policy individually.
The EU, not being a federal state nor an international organisation, has been referred to as sui
generis: ‘unique’ and ‘one of a kind’ (Phelan 2012: 365; Øhrgaard 2004). EU foreign policy in itself has been
addressed as sui generis as well, because the CFSP is regarded as being a unique form of European cooperation (Øhrgaard 2004: 27). The EU has been referred to as sui generis by academics who argue that the EU should not be analysed by international relations theories used for other global powers, because the EU is not a state but rather an entity that can be compared to regional organisations (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 1-2, 15). Together with the US and China, the EU is one of the three major poles of economic power in the world (Poladian and Oehler-Şincai 2014: 478; Bryan 2015). But the EU is exceedingly lacking in political power, often failing to exert its influence on international matters. Compared to other global powers, such as the US, China and Russia, the especially differs when it comes to its governance system, its borders and its means of governance (Zielonka 2011: 281). The EU’s governance system is entirely different, because decisions are taken by 28 sovereign states, usually by unanimous voting. The EU has no clear borders since the EU has blurry and overlapping legal, economic, security and cultural spaces while it exports its governance to neighbouring countries (idem: 292, 296). The EU also differs in its means of governance because it tries to shape its external environment (idem: 289). The debate on the specific entity of the EU is very extensive. Although there are many ways in how the EU can be perceived as a global actor, the EU has been labelled by most academics as civilian or normative, using civilian means which are non-military and rely on persuasion to pursue civilian ends, for example to export certain EU values to its external peripheries (Bachmann 2013: 461; Smith 2014: 18; Zielonka 2011: 296) The EU is however not typical civilian, because it does have some very limited military instruments which will be discussed below. Therefore Smith argues that the EU is a power bloc, because it “can and does use its (considerable)
economic and diplomatic (and even to some extent military) strength to promote and protect its interests” (Smith 2014: 18). It has been argued that for this reason civilian and power are interrelated with each other when it comes to the external relations and perceptions of the EU (Bachmann 2013). This leads to the ‘civilian/power dilemma’, a term developed by Bachmann, which according to him “undermines the EU’s credibility and legitimacy as a major actor in international development, a policy field in which the EU attempts to exercise global leadership” (idem: 459).
Because the exact entity of the EU as a global actor is hard to define we can get a better understanding of the EU on the international stage by looking at what the EU does, instead of looking at what it is (Bickerton 2011: 118). To act in international affairs the EU can make use of three main instruments, as has been differentiated by Smith: diplomatic, economic and military instruments (Smith 2014: 44). According to Smith the EU especially uses economic and diplomatic instruments (idem: 45). She argues that “two of the EU’s most powerful foreign-policy instruments are economic: the capacity to enter into international agreements, and the provision of financial assistance to third countries” (ibid). These economic instruments can also be used by member states on behalf of the EU without control of the latter (idem: 53). The EU can also impose sanctions, which are implemented by the Council upon a unanimous decision taken in the CFSP framework (idem: 49). Most common are sanctions targeted at particular individuals or goods. The use of sanctions has increased tremendously in the last couple of years (ibid). The EU can also use a broad variety of diplomatic instruments through the CFSP, but these usually require unanimous voting by the member states. The EU does not have the exclusive competence to wield these instruments on its own (idem: 54). In the last ten years the EU has increasingly used some of its military instruments, mostly military instruments of a soft type such as peacekeeping missions (idem: 45; Blommestijn and Keohane 2009: 1-2). These military instruments are very limited and only used rarely, because the member states are still not providing the EU with capabilities as was first envisaged with the Helsinki Council decisions on the CSDP in 1999 (idem: 59).4 The use of diplomatic and economic
instruments can be problematic as well. Although the EU can make use of more foreign policy instruments in comparison to international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the EU’s use of instruments are often hindered according to Smith, “because the division of competences between EU institutions, and between the national and European levels, is still contested” (idem: 65). The introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS was to resolve these problems, but they often fail to do so. Additionally, the fact that member states have to vote unanimously on using many EU instruments obstruct their efficiency as well.
Member states are most likely to control EU foreign affairs, but they can also pursue their foreign policy objectives through their own foreign policy or through international fora such as the UN (Smith 2014: 15). When do the member states choose EU foreign policy? Lehne argues on behalf of the Commission: “Member states can look at the EU’s foreign policy as a set of instruments to be used for the purposes of their own national foreign policy, but they can also perceive themselves as constituent part of the EU as an international actor in its own right”, although their approach is often a mixture of both (Lehne 2015: 16). Member states mostly look at the EU more in terms of a toolbox when issues of national interests
4 The Helsinki European Council Decisions of 1999 stated: “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations,
member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks” (European Parliament 1999).
are concerned. They however often choose EU foreign policy as well, because they improve their chances of efficiency when they put their weight together (ibid). Because the EU mostly has soft power instruments, the member states will use EU foreign policy especially when these instruments are required. Additionally, when issues of certain EU values are concerned such as democracy or the rule of law, member states often find the EU the most appropriate forum to exert their foreign policy (Smith 2014: 16).
2.2. EU ambitions for its foreign policy
Clear strategic objectives are crucial for any effective and consistent foreign policy. The first and only official strategic document that the EU has published is the European Security Strategy (ESS), drafted by Solana in 2003. However, the ESS has been criticised for being too vague and ambiguous, lacking any specificity (Bickerton 2011: 35-36). With an ineffective strategic document, the EU lacks a clear strategic vision which prevents itself from being able to exert more influence in international affairs. The EU has set out common foreign policy objectives through various treaties and strategies over the years which has been an important step towards becoming an effective international actor (Smith 2014: 3). The EU has also been active in adopting several sectoral and regional strategies, such as the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council of the European Union 2003a). However, only the ESS of 2003 can perceived as a ‘grand strategy’, including all instruments of the EU for all its goals, in war and in peace (Smith 2011: 45).5
The ESS was embraced as a sign that the EU would finally emerge as a strategically oriented actor (Bickerton 2011: 35). The strategy argued that the EU was “inevitably a global player” and that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (Council of the European Union 2003b: 1). It singled out five key threats: that of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. Although the ESS certainly marked a shift in the development of the EU as a world power and in its ‘maturation process’ (Larivé 2014: 115), it is not unable to provide the EU with clear strategic vision. The ESS focuses for a large part on internal strategies: it argues that the EU should be more active in pursuing strategic objectives, more capable and more coherent (Council of the European Union 2003b: 12-13). It has been argued that the ESS’ primary purpose even was mainly internal as the member states were highly divided over the Iraq war and needed to be brought back together (Missiroli 2015: 116).
In 2008 the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (RIESS) was published to revise the ESS and give a better and more realistic understanding of the role of the EU in the world (Berindan 2013: 403). The RIESS pointed out the EU’s main challenges and threats, but also stated how the EU wanted to address these.6 This document also focused a lot on the strengthening of coherence within EU
5 In this a grand strategy differs from a normal strategy, which refers only to the application of resources or
instruments of a polity for specific goals or interests, such as an economic or military strategy (Smith 2011: 145). In a grand strategy all available government instruments are used, including for example economic and diplomatic means (Gray 2007: 1).
6 The RIESS singled out the key threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and
foreign politics (idem: 9). The RIESS stated that the EU has achieved much in the past years, but that its full potential still needs to be realised and that the EU must therefore focus on being “more capable, more coherent and more active” (Council of the European Union 2008a: 2). Although the RIESS corresponded better with the actual capabilities of the EU in reality, the demand for an even more comprehensive security and defence strategy continued after its publication (Berindan 2013: 398). A year later the Lisbon Treaty came into force which also set out a list of common foreign policy objectives for the EU. It stated that the EU “shall work for a high degree of cooperation” in order to:
“(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, (…); (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, (…); (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, (…); (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment (…); (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (Article 21(2) TEU).
The Lisbon Treaty however did not elaborate on how these objectives must be achieved and therefore lacks in the qualifications for being a real strategic document.
Thirteen years after the first and last articulated strategic document of the EU, Mogherini has been handed the duty to come up with a new strategy by the 30th of June 2016 “to guide the European Union’s
global actions in the future” which will be published under the name EU Global Strategy on Foreign and
Security Policy (“A global strategy for the European Union”, n.d.). It has already been stated in the previous
chapter that Mogherini her focus is more on the strategic level than Solana’s and Ashton’s. She already expressed her clear intention to produce a new strategy for EU foreign policy several times before (Tocci 2015: 115). Mogherini herself stated that coherence among member states is crucial to achieve the objectives that will be presented in the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, because “an arc of instability surrounds the Union” (Mogherini 2015f: 1). The primary purpose of this new strategy will again be internal, because the divisions between the member states are again increasing (idem: 116). A year ago Mogherini already presented a strategic assessment to EU leaders, in which she argued the following:
“A joined-up approach is now needed not only in external conflicts and crises, but in all aspects of the EU’s role in the world. (…). Vertical and horizontal silos hamper the EU’s potential global role. And in a world of mounting challenges and opportunities this is a luxury we cannot afford. In a more connected, contested and complex world, we need a clear sense of direction. We need to agree on our priorities, our goals and the means required to achieve them. We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy” (idem: 3).
Europe, greater engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood and effective multilateralism (Council of the European Union 2008a: 3-12).
Despite the fact that the EU is one of the biggest economic powers in the world, its political power is very limited. Since clearly formulated strategic objectives are crucial for any effective foreign policy, strategic documents with a clear strategic vision can significantly improve EU foreign policy. Mogherini can make an important contribution to EU foreign policy with her EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, but since the primary purpose of this strategy will again be internal the question remains whether this document will be more effective than the ESS was. The next section will analyse some of the main reasons for the lack of political power that the EU has in international affairs.
2.3. The EU’s lack in political power
One of the main reasons why the EU lacks in political power is that it has an insufficient strategy for its foreign policy, as has been argued above. However, the most fundamental obstacle to EU foreign policy is its intergovernmental structure that is causing the EU member states to pursue their foreign policy interests separately. Member states do not often share extensive common interests and therefore any foreign policy articulated at EU level is regularly weak as it represents the lowest common denominator (Smith 2014: 8). Member states have not established collective capabilities to match international expectations of the EU as a coherent and effective power, because they prioritise their own national interests over a more effective common foreign policy on EU level (ibid). A crucial consequence of these different interests of member states is that the EU is not able to become an influential military power (Ramadani 2015: 6). Although the EU has military instruments it has been argued that the EU is the weakest in its military field, because the EU can only wield tools and objectives that do not contradict member states’ interests or offend their sensitivities (Smith 2014: 8). Smith has argued that “for many observers, this means the Union cannot exercise much influence – if it cannot back up its diplomacy with the use of force, then it will never become a ‘complete, not merely a civilian power’”(ibid).
It has been argued by many, especially before the Lisbon Treaty, that the limited influence of the EU derives from the fact that EU is still a developing actor on the international stage (Ginsberg 2001: 16; Wright 2011: 28). As has been argued, the EU is often referred to as sui generis because it cannot be compared to other global actors that are states. Regarding the EU as a sui generis actor however leads to the treatment of the EU as a special case, not fitting in the concepts of international relations, which often prevents a meaningful comparison of the actorness of the EU (Wunderlich 2012: 643). It has however been argued that the EU is not that unique as an international actor, as EU for example has been compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), another regional organisation (idem: 664). This study by Wunderlich argues that the capability-expectations gap is crucial in both cases, where external recognition and the EU’s own ambitions in foreign policy is exceeding actual capabilities (ibid; Hill 1993: 321-322).7
7 The ‘capability-expectations gap’ is a term introduced by Hill. Capabilities include “cohesiveness, resources
and operational capacity”, while expectations refer to the expectations of outsiders, but also the EU’s own ambitions in foreign policy (Hill 1993: 321-322). Helwig has argued in 2013 that this capability-expectations gap also refers to “what the EU is expected to do and the political will of the member states to use existing capabilities to deliver” (Helwig 2013: 238).
This capability-expectations gap is widely used in research on EU foreign policy and it has been argued that has the potential to reduce this gap with the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy:
“(…) the gap cannot be filled with new procedures, instruments and resources. Instead, the capability of the [HR/VP] to act is mainly a function of structural factors such as the political will of member states to leave scope of manoeuvre for the [HR/VP] and the [EEAS]. The performance of the [HR/VP] is contingent on the support of its policy initiatives. Co-leadership, defined here as the leadership in by the [HR/VP] in close cooperation with its EU partners, can reduce the capability-expectation gap. (…). The [HR/VP], (…), possesses the necessary instruments to exert leadership. However, the [HR/VP] lacks structural power of the member states in the form of material, hard power resources (money and troops) and the democratic legitimacy to activate those. Thus it has to fulfil this leadership function together with the Commission and a number of member states; the [HR/VP] has to exert co-leadership with those actors to help the EU to live up to its expectations” (Helwig 2013: 236, 238).
In sum, regarding the EU as sui generis or to expect that the EU should be a more powerful global actor, leads to assuming that the EU is still an actor in the making. Although often used, this argument neglects the fact that the EU has never agreed upon a finality for European integration. Agreeing upon such a political finality would be considerably hard, since even the EU’s geographical finality is unknown (Cameron 2003: 69).
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter proposed to give a better understanding of the EU in international affairs and analyse the problems that persist to exist in EU foreign policy. The EU can best be characterised as a civilian power: pursuing civilian ends through soft power such as diplomatic and economic instruments, with the possibility of using limited military instruments as well. However, the complex structure of EU foreign policy makes it difficult to reach common foreign policy objectives and policies. Member states usually pursue their own interests, often at the expense of an effective common foreign policy on EU level. When it is useful to put their weight together, when soft power instruments are required or when EU values are concerned, the EU member states are however likely to choose EU foreign policy instead of exerting their own foreign policies individually. The lack of clear strategic vision is an additional problem for an effective EU in international affairs, because it reduces the change of consistency in EU foreign policy. It has also been argued that the limited political power of the EU derives from the fact that the EU is still an actor in the making on the international stage, because of its sui generis nature and because of external recognition and the EU’s own ambitions in foreign policy which is exceeding the EU’s actual capabilities. The HR/VP has the possibility to diminish these problems: by coordinating EU foreign policy the HR/VP can reduce differences between member states and achieve a more common foreign policy, the HR/VP can draft an
effective strategic vision for the EU and with such a strategic document the HR/VP can decrease the capability-expectations gap. Evidently, an effective HR/VP is crucial.
3. The Iran nuclear deal
On July 14th 2015 Mogherini and the foreign minister of Iran, Mohammad Zarif, announced that an
agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue had been reached: JCPOA. The JCPOA is also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This agreement was reached in Vienna between Iran, China, Russia, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and the EU. The EU as a whole was included in the agreement, because it was represented by the HR/VP. The Iran deal made sure that Iran would not have the possibility to create or acquire nuclear weapons in the near future by regulating Iranian resources. During the negotiations leading up to the Iran deal which took over more than a decade, the HR Javier Solana and the HR/VP’s Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini have been highly significant actors. They have functioned as the lead negotiators in the talks and have been given much praise in the international press for their achievements, stating that “Catherine Ashton and Javier Solana played a fundamental role in mediating between the US and Iran” (Ramani 2015); proclaiming Ashton to be “the EU’s diplomatic secret weapon” (Perkins 2013), who went “from ‘zero’ to hero” with the Iran nuclear talks playing “the most important role in world diplomacy” (Blair 2013); and Mogherini who “was front-and-center as European and American political leaders congratulated each other over a historic nuclear agreement with Iran” (Baume, de la 2015). Especially Ashton her contributions have been regarded as crucial in the process of reaching a solution for the controversial Iran nuclear programme.
This case study will look into the involvement of the HR and later the HR/VP in the negotiations prior to the Iran nuclear deal from 2003 until 2015. The relevance of this case lies in the fact the EU member states cooperating effectively in these talks under the leadership of the HR and HR/VP. First a description of events will be provided with the focus upon the role of the HR and HR/VP. Then the Iran case will be analysed by looking at the different actors, after which the focus will be on the context of the Iran talks.
3.1. The Iran nuclear talks, 2003-2015
Throughout the twentieth century Iran had made steady progress in its procurement of nuclear materials. The international community had always been cautious of Iran’s nuclear programme, because it had concealed its possible military nuclear activities before while building facilities in secret (Albright and Stricker 2010: 77). In 2002 a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant at Arak were discovered. The international organisation supervising military usage of nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concluded that Iran failed their obligations with the existence of these facilities. Meanwhile Iran relations worsened during the Iraq war since 2003. A year before US-president Bush had referred to Iran as one of the “axis of evil”, because “Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom” (“Text
of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address” 2002). To address Iran’s nuclear policy a joint diplomatic effort was launched by the ‘E3’: the three biggest EU member states, namely the UK, Germany and France. With the Tehran Declaration of 2003 and the additional Paris Agreement in 2004 Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear activities. Negotiations on these agreements were joined by Solana, representing the EU as HR, which led the E3 to become ‘E3/EU’ in the documents (International Institute for Security Studies 2015). The Tehran and Paris agreements showed the effectiveness of joint EU diplomacy and became the method of approaching transatlantic diplomacy with the US and nuclear diplomacy with Iran from now on (Posch 2016; Alcaro and Bassiri Tabrizi 2014: 16).
Tides changed when a regime change found place with presidential elections in Iran in 2005. Direct after the Iranian elections Solana stated in a press conference that “nothing, nothing, nothing will be accepted by us which is not in terms of the Paris Agreements”, considering that a new president might change Iran’s nuclear stand (Solana 2015). The new Iranian government nevertheless renounced the agreement. Consequently, Iran was directed to the UN Security Council in 2006. Within the UN Security Council China, the US and Russia joined the E3 in negotiations with Iran. Together they formed the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany (referred to as the ‘E3+3’). The US did not fully engage in these talks, as they required Iran to meet UN demands first (Davenport 2015). After the E3+3 formation the E3 and Solana continued to take the lead in negotiating with Iran, trying to convince its leaders to cooperate with the international community (Posch 2016). In this period Solana became the sole negotiator with the Iranians, while Iran continued to publicly insist that it will never suspend enrichment of nuclear materials (Blair, E., Hosseinian, Z. and Roche, A. 2007; Tran 2007). Solana drafted two negotiated solutions in 2006 and in 2008 consisting of economic and diplomatic incentives, supported by the countries of the E3+3 (“Iran ‘positive’ on nuclear offer” 2006; Council of the European Union 2008b). However, Iran rejected both offers.
As negotiations between Iran and the West broke down, a period of sanctions imposed by the West started. Between 2006 and 2010 the UN Security Council implemented a total of six resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran which were binding on all its member states. These sanctions froze assets and banned the supply of nuclear materials (Laub 2015). Additional to the sanctions by the UN Security Council, the US implemented sanctions as well, targeting Iran’s financial system, oil exports, asset freezes and travel bans, trade and weapons development (Laub 2015).
Meanwhile Barack Obama became the next US president in 2009. Obama wanted a new approach for Iran in which the US would fully participate in the E3+3 talks (Davenport 2015). Tensions increased when the US, together with France and the UK, revealed the existence of an Iranian enrichment facility near the city of Qom. The international community was shook up by the fact that Iran had been constructing the facility in secrecy and that Iran might not be interested in pursuing a diplomatic solution after all (Meier 2013: 16). Consequently, the E3+3 and Iran met in Geneva in 2009 and in Istanbul in 2010. Nothing concrete came out of these talks which caused the tensions and distrust surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme to deepen further, although the general consensus was that at least negotiations were taken place (Borger 2010). Ashton took over from Solana in 2009 as the new HR/VP. Although Solana had a more limited legal basis, he managed to leave an impressive blueprint for the job by giving the EU a ‘face’ through
his diplomatic activities (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 3). Ashton introduced a different style to the negotiations with Iran: she was more sober and reserved (Meier 2013: 15), and more focused upon quiet diplomacy (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 10; “Baroness Ashton appointed as EU’s foreign policy chief” 2009).
Following the US on hardening sanctions against Iran, the EU imposed a round of harsh economic sanctions in 2010 and two additional rounds in 2012. All three rounds of sanctions by the EU went well beyond UN requirements and most primarily targeted Iranian gas imports, trade and transport, transactions between the EU and Iranian banks, and Iranian individuals and entities by freezing assets and ban travel (Patterson 2013: 135). These sanctions were received very positively in the international press. The Chicago Tribute for example stated that the “’EU’ and ‘bold action’ don’t often share the same sentence. But they did on Monday”, referring to the second round of sanctions in 2012 (“Iran’s oil shock” 2012). The EU sanctions have been effective in pushing for a softening of the Iranian negotiation position (Bergeijk, van 2015: 56). Meanwhile tensions continued to rise although negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran continued, albeit without any positive developments (Davenport 2015).
In 2013 Iran elected its new president: former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani. He became assisted by foreign minister Zarif, previously Iran’s UN ambassador. Three days after Rouhani’s inauguration he called for the resumption of serious negotiations with the E3+3 (Davenport 2015). The US and Iran began to held bilateral talks in secrecy on the nuclear issue, which resulted in about nine or ten secret meetings in total (Rozen 2015). The re-establishment of communication between Iran and the US was a critical development, because improved US-Iran relations were necessary for reaching the JCPOA. Some have argued that the EU’s main function in the negotiations prior to the Iran deal had already been accomplished when the US and Iran showed willingness to talk directly to each other on the issues (Posh 2016). Relations did however not improve immediately. During this period Ashton and Zarif were the lead negotiators in finding a peaceful resolution to Iran’s nuclear programme (The Iran Primer 2014). Ashton her primary contribution in the Iran negotiations was the help she offered to ease negotiations with Iran at this time of high tensions with the West (Baume, de la 2015).
Negotiations continued in Geneva between Iran and the E3+3, chaired by Ashton. These talks eventually resulted in the agreement called the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), signed by Ashton and Zarif in 2013. The JPA functioned as a broad framework to guide further negotiations for a comprehensive solution (Davenport 2015). The JPA limited Iran’s nuclear programme and sanctions were partially lifted and assets unfrozen (Lyons 2015). Ashton was highly praised after the achievement of this agreement. Barroso argued: “I would like to congratulate in particular Catherine Ashton, (…), for this accomplishment, which is a result of her tireless engagement and dedication to the issue over the last four years” (“EU hails nuclear deal with Iran, credits Ashton” 2013). According to Van Rompuy, “her dedication and perseverance have been key in brokering this first agreement” (ibid). Also US Secretary of State John Kerry hailed Ashton as a “persistent and dogged negotiator” (Mayer 2013).
Negotiations concerning a more comprehensive agreement with Iran took place in Vienna in 2014. Although these talks resulted in a failure, it was an important step in closing the gaps between Iran and the West (Borger 2014). Meanwhile Ashton was succeeded by Mogherini. Mogherini appointed Ashton as Special Advisor for facilitating the nuclear talks with Iran to ensure the continuity of negotiations
(European External Action Service 2014b). Mogherini’s role as HR/VP was partially marginalised, because the US took over the leading role in the negotiations in the final stages of the talks (Kaca 2015: 6). The final agreement of the Iran deal began with bilateral discussions between the US and Iran, followed up by negotiations between Iran and E3+3. Eventually Mogherini and Zarif issued an official joint statement on April 2nd 2015 in which they outlined the parameters of the final nuclear deal agreed to by Iran and the
E3+3. Obama responded with additional measures, which formed the eventual Iran nuclear deal: the JCPOA. The JCPOA established the security of the impossibility of Iran to create or acquire nuclear weapons in the near future by regulating Iranian resources. It is whether to see how the JCPOA works out in practice, but the agreement nevertheless ended a long during stand-off and can be regarded as the beginning of a new era in relations between the West and Iran (Lyons 2015).
The HR and HR/VP’s took the lead over almost all negotiations by chairing them during the Iran talks for 12 years, from Solana in 2003 until Mogherini in 2015. They have been the most important negotiators between Iran and the US when their relations were at their worst. During the most crucial period in the Iran talks when tensions were high, the HR and HR/VP’s, especially Ashton, came up with several initiatives to proceed talks, always signalling their readiness to resume negotiations. To conclude on why HR Solana and HR/VP’s Ashton and Mogherini were effective in this case, the next section will provide an analysis of the Iran nuclear talks. First an analysis will be given of the different actors in play, such as Solana, Ashton and Mogherini, the EU member states, and the US and Iranian presidents. Then the context of the Iranian talks will be analysed, looking at long-term diplomacy, the economic situation and the fact that this has been a high-profile non-proliferation issue.
3.2. Analysing the actors
First of all, the personalities of the HR and HR/VP’s play a role in how effective they can be. Solana set the stage as the official spokesperson for the E3 and the later E3+3, a responsibility that Ashton and Mogherini inherited (Martin 2015). The Spanish Solana has been depicted as relatively outgoing and temperamental (Meier 2013: 15), with a good understanding of diplomacy (Pifer, S., Samore, G. and Solana, J. [Interview transcript] 2013). Solana appointed a Personal Representative on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to help him coordinate, implement and develop EU policy in 2003 (Cottey 2014: 48). By delegating these tasks, Solana had more time to focus on diplomacy. Ashton introduced a different, more reserved approach than Solana in the Iran talks, praised by many but also criticised by others. It has been argued that her “personal qualities are a further factor in the HR’s achievement as a diplomat” (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 11), but also that she has the “charisma of a caravan site on the Isle of Sheppey”, lacking in leadership (von Mittelstaedt, Neukirch and Schult 2012). Ashton’s focus was especially on brokering common denominators between the parties’ different positions and less on driving the EU’s foreign policy agenda (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 13). However, the JPA as the first step towards a final solution would probably not have taken place if it had not been for Ashton her diplomatic efforts. Mogherini was in certain extent less involved than Ashton in the talks: she had appointed Ashton as Special Advisor to continue the
negotiations in the Iran talks, and in the final stages of the negotiations the US took over which partially marginalised her role. She did however took the lead in announcing the final Iran nuclear deal, and had been pushing for a better agreement. Mogherini for example threatened to leave the negotiations in Vienna in 2014 and return to Brussels if there would not be a greater flexibility from the Iranians (Borger 2015).
Support of the member states was also crucial for the success of the HR and HR/VP’s to put into effect institutional support and personal diplomatic qualities (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 11-12). The HR and the HR/VP’s proved to be the necessary links in establishing a common European Iran policy as the coordinators and spokespersons of the E3 (Kienzle 2013: 436). Leadership of the HR and HR/VP’s were in addition needed for the acceptance by the other member states for letting France, the UK and Germany act on their behalf (Meier 2013: 4). The EU and its member states were especially coherent before Russia, China and the US joined the negotiations (Kienzle 2013: 429). After the formation of the E3+3 the E3 remained united on the Iran issue. The addition of China, Russia and the US to the negotiations enhanced their position and it provided them with more leverage (Meier 2013: 4). The deepening of the crisis after 2009 caused tensions for EU unity, for example over the human rights situation in Iran, a matter on which the E3 and the US eventually decided to put aside to avoid damage to the nuclear talks (idem: 14). There were also small differences visible in how confrontational member states acted towards Iran, which had to do with how strong their alliance was with the US (Onderco 2015: 61).
The EU institutions and its presidents were important actors in the Iran talks as well. Support from the Commission and the Council was crucial for the effectiveness of the HR and HR/VP’s, also because the ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ offered to Iran that facilitated negotiations fell mainly under their umbrella (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 11). Council president Herman van Rompuy and Ashton did not get in each other’s way, although they did not work together extensively either (Helwig and Rüger 2014: 12). President of the Commission Barroso, who previously had tried to restrict Ashton in creating the EEAS, supported Ashton and later praised her “tireless engagement and dedication” to the Iran negotiations (“EU hails nuclear deal with Iran, credits Ashton” 2013). The EEAS proved valuable as well by showing with the Iran talks that it can contribute to developing a more coherent European foreign policy, making the EU more effective than if the talks were solely in the member states’ hands (Martin 2015). Helga Schmid, the Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS, was intensely involved in the negotiations (“Keynote speech: Helga Schmid” 2015).
Another important actor in the Iran nuclear talks is the US. Under president Bush Iran-US relations worsened. At a time of high transatlantic tensions and public differences between the EU member states and the Bush administration on how to respond to Iran, Solana took on the leadership role as negotiator (Maloney 2014). When the Bush administration finally agreed to engage in the Iran talks in 2006 under the E3+3 negotiations, Solana still represented the E3+3. The US became a full participant in the Iran negotiations under the presidency of Obama. The bilateral talks between Obama and Iran in 2013 were an important factor in establishing the eventual JCPOA agreement. Although US-Iran relations improved because of these bilateral talks, Ashton remained the lead negotiator with Iran in this period. In the final stages of the negotiations with Iran the US took over the lead negotiator role of the HR/VP, although Mogherini did announce the eventual agreement together with Zarif. John Kerry also had a prominent role in establishing the eventual nuclear deal. He established a valuable channel of communication with Iran for
