Master Thesis Political Science: European Politics and External
Relations
Understanding the Radical Left in Times of Austerity:
The Case of SYRIZA
Yusuf Efe Katırcıoglu
11249153
Supervised by: Dr. Franca van Hooren
Second Reader: Professor Sarah de Lange
Submitted to: University of Amsterdam MSc Political
Science, 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ... 3 1.1 Societal and Academic Relevance and Contribution ... 5 2. Theoretical Framework ... 7 2.1 Ideology ... 8 2.1a Radical Left Parties in Europe ... 8 2.1b Populism ... 12 2.1c Commonalities between Populism and Radical Left ... 15 2.2 Impact of Austerity Measures on Party Politics ... 16 3. Research Design ... 19 3.1 Case Study: ... 19 3.2 Selection of the Case ... 20 3.3 Data ... 21 3.4 Data Analysis ... 21 3.5 Limitations ... 22 4. Case Study- SYRIZA ... 24 4.1 Historical Background ... 24 4.1.1 Greek Political History ... 24 4.1.2History of SYRIZA ... 26 4.2 IDEOLOGY ... 30 4.2.1Election Posters of SYRIZA ... 30 4.2.2 TV Advertisements of SYRIZA ... 32 4.2.3 Speeches of Tsipras ... 33 4.2.4 Analysis of SYRIZA Political Documents ... 37 4.2.5 Analysis of Secondary Literature ... 39 4.3 Impact of Austerity on Party Politics ... 40 4.3.1 Alexis Tsipras’ Newspaper Interview ... 41 4.3.2 2013- Speech of Tsipras at the ‘founding congress of SYRIZA’ ... 42 4.3.3 July 2013- Political Resolution of the First Congress of SYRIZA ... 43 4.3.4 September 2014- The Thessaloniki Program ... 43 4.3.5 Interviews with SYRIZA Officials ... 44 5. Overall Analysis ... 48 6. Conclusion ... 51 7. Bibliography ... 551. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis did not only cause economic downturn in many countries, it also affected the politics and party family structures. The economies of the countries in the European South have been severely damaged and this led to social unrest and political instability (Soare, 2014; Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). In order to save the economies, the European Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF) proposed bailout packages. Countries that were affected by the crisis would receive funds from the European Troika, and would have to implement austerity measures, which means government spending cuts, tax reforms, decreasing pensions and wages (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). Austerity measures caused mass demonstrations in countries like Greece and Spain, which led to political turmoil.
Establishment parties approving the bailout packages led to dissatisfaction from the public (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Alternative parties started to emerge and were challenging the status quo. Several of them were far right populist, populist and radical left. It was not only new political forces emerging as an alternative; also several political figures started to influence and reshape the already existing political parties. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership in the British Labour Party as a socialist, Bernie Sanders’ success in the Democratic Party primaries in the US as a democratic socialist are important developments for party politics in the West. Alternative candidates and parties did not only emerge on the left wing spectrum, there were also right wing movements gaining momentum. Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Golden Dawn in Greece, AfD in Germany have been highly influential in the last years both in national and international politics (Soare, 2014; Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). It is important to note that the 2008 financial crisis was not the only reason for such parties to become more prominent.
Several scholars argue that rising economic inequalities benefit challenger and alternative parties. Greece has experienced the most severe economic downturn in Europe after the 2008 financial crisis. The country is still under austerity measures and signed the third memoranda in 2015 (Nikolakakis, 2016). Similar to the other cases, the Greek political establishment started to face public opposition organized around ‘anti-austerity’, called ‘aganaktismenoi’, meaning ‘squares movement’ (Katsambekis, 2015).
SYRIZA (coalition of the radical left) as a marginal political party embraced the spirit of the movement and took part in the demonstrations (Katsambekis, 2015). A historical background on Greek politics and SYRIZA will be provided in the case study chapter, however it is important to share information about the party in the introduction as well. Even though SYRIZA is considered as a new political party, its predecessor, SYNASPISMOS (SYN) has been on the political scene since the 1990s (Ellinas, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). SYN, and SYRIZA in the beginning can be considered as a marginal political party with few seats in the parliament. The party’s successful period began after the 2008 financial crisis; SYRIZA became the main opposition party in the 2012 General Elections (Katsambekis, 2015; Hellenic Parliament n.d.). In 2015, SYRIZA won the general elections, and the leader of the party, Alexis Tsipras, became the Prime Minister, with heavy promises to keep, such as renegotiating the austerity measures.
What makes SYRIZA unique when compared to the other populist and radical forces in Europe is how fast the party came to power in one of the most rigid two party systems. This thesis focuses on SYRIZA’s usage of austerity measures to become a stronger political force in Greece. The expectation of this thesis is to take part in the ongoing scholarly debate on whether SYRIZA would qualify as populist, radical left or both. In order to understand party’s ideological stance and their relation to austerity, the following research question will be at the heart of this thesis, ‘How has the financial crisis contributed to a populist turn in SYRIZA?’ In order to answer this question, there will be sub-questions answered chapter by chapter. ‘What is populism and what are different kinds of populism according to existing studies?’ ‘What do existing studies say about the impact of the crisis on the rise of populism?’ ‘How has SYRIZA responded to and been affected by the financial crisis?’ ‘To what extent are these responses more or less populism?’ Do these findings potentially change our thinking about crisis and populism?’
In order to answer the research question, already existing literature on radical left, populism, impact of austerity on party politics will be analysed. Different theoretical approaches and typologies will be used as criteria to assess SYRIZA’s ideological stance. To provide an example, Luke March’s classification of radical left parties will be established and analysed in the theoretical framework chapter. In the case study and overall analysis chapters SYRIZA will be observed on the basis of this classification with the help of the empirical data that is collected and evaluated. The same approach will be used to assess the party’s populist rhetoric. In the theoretical framework chapter, theories
of populism will be shared with the reader and in the case study and analysis chapters SYRIZA’s populism will be analysed. Luke March’s (2008) typology of the radical left parties will be used as criteria to locate SYRIZA ideologically. To establish how austerity measures had an impact on SYRIZA ideological stance; party’s official documents, election posters, TV advertisements, speeches of Alexis Tsipras and interviews that are held with three SYRIZA MPs for this paper will be analysed.
1.1 Societal and Academic Relevance and Contribution
In democratic societies, emergence of alternative and challenger parties is expected and should be welcomed with respect. The rise of such parties can be considered as an outcome of several issues with the representative democratic system and neoliberalism. According to Hanspeter Kriesi (2012), sharp changes in voting patterns are signs of popular discontent and voting helps citizens to show their grievances (Kriesi, 2012). We are experiencing major changes in voting behaviour in the Western European countries, especially after the 2008 Financial crisis. Establishment parties are facing challenges all around Europe. The latest example is the French Presidential elections. Both of the establishment parties, candidates of Les Republicains and Parti Socialiste could not make it to the second round. Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn reshaped the politics of their parties by challenging the leadership as outsiders. The rise of PODEMOS has caused a significant damage to the two party system in Spain, and SYRIZA has ended the 40 year long two party system in Greece.
Why voters are defecting the establishment and channelling support for the outsiders, alternative and challenger candidates/parties is an interesting debate, and carries importance to understand the political dynamics of the post-2008 period. Impact of the financial crisis on this dramatic political change is undeniable (Kriesi, 2012). Studying this shift in politics of Greece and other countries would be helpful to understand the voting behaviour and changing political and societal cleavages. The rise of populism and the radical left is still an on-going debate, if the reason of this rise is the economic inequalities that are created because of the austerity measures, neoliberalism and problems with the representative democracy, then economic and democratic reforms may be needed. Otherwise a rise in such challenger and alternative parties may continue.
Scholarly research on populism, far right and far right populism is significantly generous. However, research on populist and radical left is scarce when compared to its counterpart (Gomez et al., 2015; Ramiro, 2014; Fagerholm, 2016; Katsambekis, 2016). This paper aims to contribute to the research on radical left and its relation to austerity measures. Already existing literature will be discussed in detail, however it is important to already note that, labelling SYRIZA as a solely populist party would not help one to understand where the party stands clearly since populism is a thin centred ideology (Mudde, 2014). Classifying SYRIZA as a populist party would put them in the same chapter as populist forces of the right. At the same time, not analysing party’s populist rhetoric especially after the 2008 financial crisis would undermine SYRIZA’s populist traits. Overwhelming majority of the literature lacks the understanding and approach that SYRIZA can be both radical left and populist. This paper aims to contribute to the already existing literature on this issue. Populism is a thin centred ideology, therefore political forces needs to be further classified.
Highly valuable works of Luke March, Cas Mudde, Giorgos Katsembekis and many more regarding the populist and radical left ideology is analysed in this paper. Their approaches are referenced in the theoretical framework. What this paper tries to achieve is to discuss the impact of austerity measures on the ideological stance of SYRIZA. At the same time, this paper focuses on the understanding of populism, whether it is used correctly when labelling political parties, especially the ones from the radical left corners.
Several scholars label SYRIZA as populist, others as socialist or radical left. There is no consensus in the academia about the ideological classification of the party. This paper aims to contribute to the already existing literature on populism and radical left on the basis of locating SYRIZA ideologically and try to take part in the on-going debate on impact of the austerity measures on party politics in Europe. Furthermore, this paper criticizes the tendency to label every anti-establishment movement and party as populist, since there are varieties of populism in the academic literature.
2. Theoretical Framework
This chapter is dedicated to discussing and analysing the already existing literature on populism, the radical left and impact of austerity on party politics in Europe. In order to have a fruitful debate and answer the research question, there are sub questions to be answered. The aim of this chapter is to answer the following questions; ‘What is populism and what are different kinds of populism according to existing studies?’ and ‘‘What do existing studies say about the impact of the crisis on the rise of populism?’
As an outcome of the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has pushed the communist parties of Western Europe to redefine themselves. Even though several of them were already ideologically distanced from Moscow, there were a number of soviet-influenced radical left parties in the Western part of the continent (Gomez et al., 2015). According to Luke March and Cas Mudde, leading researchers on this issue, radical left parties in Europe faced decline and mutation in the post-1989 period (March and Mudde, 2005). Therefore one can argue that the end of the Cold War has caused ideological shifts in the party family structure in Europe.
We are experiencing a new disturbance for the political party system in Europe. From the past experiences we can observe that major political and socio-economic changes/revolutions affect political parties/movements. The 2008 financial crisis had an enormous impact on the current party family structure. In the post-2008 period, already existing far right, extreme right, populist, radical left parties and movements have gained momentum and started to influence national and European level politics (Soare, 2014; Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). Austerity measures that are implemented in the bailout countries in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece) have resulted in nation-wide demonstrations with unconventional political parties emerging (Gomez et al., 2015). Research on the Radical Left Parties (RLPs) and Left wing Populist Parties are scarce when compared to the right wing versions (Gomez et al., 2015; Ramiro, 2014; Fagerholm, 2016; Katsambekis, 2016). Therefore it is valuable to do further research on this phenomenon.
In this chapter, the theoretical basis for RLPs and populist parties will be established. Definitions, characteristics and ideological standpoints of such parties will be analysed with the help of academic work of leading scholars in the field. Impact of austerity measures on the party family structure will be another topic of analysis in this chapter.
2.1 Ideology
2.1a Radical Left Parties in Europe
As discussed before, the end of the Cold War has caused an ideological shift in the left wing politics in Western Europe (Fagerholm, 2017; Nikolakakis, 2016). As March and Mudde argued in their paper ‘What is left of the radical left?’ social democratic and green parties started to represent the left (March and Mudde, 2005). According to them; democratic socialist, social democratic and green parties have become more moderate and started to take their place in the post-cold war capitalist era (March and Mudde, 2005). Since the political struggle was not about the proletariat anymore, usage of ‘the people’ in political rhetoric became more prominent in left wing politics, especially within the democratic-socialist circles (March and Mudde, 2005). Guy Standing, in his famous book ‘the precariat’, argues the same, that end of the Cold War has created a new proletariat, ‘the people’ (Standing, 2016).
Luke March discusses the relevance of ‘There is no Alternative (TINA)’ to capitalism that is put forward by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. He argues that the significant rise of RLPs undermine TINA (March, 2016). Andreas Fagerholm also argued that the end of the Cold War has resulted in a victory for capitalism and liberal democracy, therefore this is the only feasible system there is (Fagerholm, 2017). In order to understand whether RLPs challenge capitalism and the global neoliberal status quo, we need to delve into literature and see where such parties stand.
Before defining the radical left, it is important to draw the lines between radicalism and extremism. Luke March and Cas Mudde clarify the distinction by classifying extremism as an anti-democratic stance and define radicalism as a force against liberal democracy (March and Mudde, 2005). They argue that RLPs are not
anti-democratic by nature, they are anti-liberal anti-democratic and anti-neoliberal (March and Mudde, 2005). In Luke March’s words “RLPs want greater democracy and are anti-capitalist” (March, 2016). The authors mention that what makes radical left distinctive and different from other left wing forces is their rejection of the current socio-economic and political structure (March and Mudde, 2005; Gomez et al., 2016; Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013; Fagerholm, 2017).
RLPs offer an alternative system to replace the status quo, where they aim to redistribute wealth and income on a new scale and achieve democratic reforms to increase citizen’s participation in the political processes (March and Mudde, 2005; Gomez et al., 2016; Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013). Therefore one can argue that, RLPs are opposing the current representative democracy and want to include more direct democratic practices. Request of more direct democracy shows us something about how RLPs treat ‘the people’. According to Tsakatika and Lisi, ‘representing the people’ is actually in the nature of the radical left ideology (Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013).
Economically, RLPs defend state interventionism, re-nationalisation of ports, railways and other services. According to March, RLPs believe in state’s responsibility to tackle poverty, unemployment and homelessness (March, 2016). It is important to mention that their opposition to neo-liberalism should not be perceived as anti-internationalism. RLPs believe in international solidarity, but they reject the growth-led corporate understanding of the global economy (March, 2016). Not only neoliberal globalisation, they also reject international military organizations like NATO (March, 2016).
Types of RLPs
Scholars have been arguing that there are several types of RLPs. In order to build a strong theoretical basis, it is important to discuss different types of radical left parties. Luke March came up with four types of radical left parties and numerous scholars have embraced his work. First group of RLPs are the communist parties. Such parties are the first radical left parties that have emerged in history (March, 2008). There is a strong emphasis on Leninism and Marxism within this party family group. According to March, there are two types of Communist parties; first type is what he calls the ‘conservative
communist parties’. These parties are uncritical about the soviet past and they only accept Leninism and Marxism as a left wing stance (March, 2008). Second type is the ‘reform communist parties’. They are not as rigid on Leninism as the conservative communists. Advocates of this type try to touch upon post-material issues such as feminism, environmental issues etc. However their emphasis on these issues are not as strong as other radical left party groups (March, 2008).
The second group is the democratic socialist parties. These parties are known for opposing both authoritarian communism and neoliberalism. It is also important to mention that, according to democratic socialist ideology, neoliberal social democracy does not represent the left wing values (March, 2008, Gomez et al, 2016; Fagerholm, 2017). Protection of and respect for cultural, ethnic and religious minorities are important aspects of this RLP group (March, 2008). Examples of such parties can be found in the European Parliamentary group of European United Left- Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). Raul Gomez et al., argue that these parties pay importance for post-material issues such as; environmental, feminist, and the EU integration (Gomez et al., 2016).
The third RLP group is the populist socialist parties. The ideological core of this group is similar to democratic socialists with vocal opposition to neoliberalism and liberal democracy (March, 2008;Fagerholm, 2017). What makes this party group different from the democratic socialists is the anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric (Gomez et al., 2016; March, 2008). It is understandable since the current establishment supports neoliberalism and liberal democracy; therefore this RLP group opposes the status quo. A controversial debate on populism will be covered and the variety of definitions will be shared with the reader in the upcoming chapter.
The fourth group is the social populist parties. There are criticisms against this radical left party type within the left wing circles on the basis of not being properly leftist (March, 2008; Gomez et al, 2016). Social populist parties tend to combine right wing and left wing approaches with a strong anti-establishment, anti-elite rhetoric (March, 2008; Gomez et al, 2016). These parties have strong one-person leadership (March, 2008), which is not really compatible with democratic socialist values, where the movement is more important than the ruling class of the party.
Both Luke March and Gomez et al. argue that these parties tend to overlap on the majority of issues; there are minor details that create the differences (March, 2008; Gomez et al., 2016). It is also important to mention that even parties within the same party family can differ on several issues. According to March, radicalism of democratic socialist parties depends on the context and setting of the debate (March, 2008). This is due to the de-radicalization of several left wing movements/parties in some countries (Gomez et al., 2016).
Linkage Strategies
Linkage strategies with the public play an important role for RLPs to mobilize the society against austerity measures that are proposed by the Troika. Linkage strategies can be defined as relations between party leaderships and members, but also relations with the civil society coalition partners such as NGOs and unions (Tsakatika et al., 2013). Tsakatika et al. argue that, RLPs have been successful with keeping successful linkages with their roots (Tsakatika et al., 2013). After the crisis, they have the opportunity to reach out to the wider public, since more people become dissatisfied with the political system and the elite. Tsakatika et al. also mention that the 2008 crisis has been an opportunity for RLPs to expand their voter base (Tsakatika et al., 2013). Social unrest and mass mobilization against the austerity measures and the establishment are generally covered by the RLP congresses in order to attract more voters and locate their political stance with the public.
For the RLPs, the primary linkage strategy is the party congresses, where party officials gather with the members and supporters to reshape the party. Tsakatika et al., argue that these congresses are also considered as re-founding events where the party generates excitement and hope for the public (Tsakatika et al., 2013). “They are significant political events that radical left parties deliberately use in order to signal that they have decided to ‘return to grassroots’” (Tsakatika et al., 2013).
2.1b Populism
Populism has been dominating the political arena for decades, keeping scholars and political analysts busy about how to define, place the phenomena in the current political system and party family structure. It is fair to argue that there is no single definition of populism that is put forward by the scholars of political science. Throughout the academic research for this paper, I have come across several definitions, characteristics, regional differences and reasons of populism to come about and dominate politics. After the 2008 financial crisis, Europe has been experiencing a rapid increase in support for populist parties, not only on the supranational European Parliament elections, but also on the national and the local level (Mosca 2014; p. 39).
Defining populism is not an easy task for scholars or political science students. There are dozens of different approaches and definitions depicting this ‘phenomena’. One of the most important contributions came from Cas Mudde;
“Populism as ‘a thin-centred ideology’ that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘‘the pure people’’ versus ‘‘the corrupt elite’’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte ́ ge ́ne ́rale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2014)
The majority of scholars agree on the most basic definition of populism. The creation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy in the society where populists claim to challenge the status-quo (Soare, 2014; Kemmers et al., 2016; Barr, 2009; Schedler, 1996; Luengo et al., 2016; Hartleb, 2015; Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). By ‘us’, populists refer to the people, and by ‘them’ it is the establishment, or what we can call ‘the elite’. Several scholars argue that some populist movements are organized against the political elite and some against the economic elite (Barr, 2009).
Robert R. Barr (2009) argues that Latin American populism in the past challenged the economic elite in the region, but European populism is mainly against the political elite. The anti-establishment rhetoric is also a characteristic of populists; we can observe this from the ‘anti elite’ and ‘anti-incumbent’ approach. Robert Barr argues, “However, as this article seeks to make clear, such rhetoric is but one aspect of the populist phenomenon and is not the exclusive domain of populist leaders” (Barr, 2009). Therefore
it can be argued that, if a political leader/movement/party uses anti-establishment rhetoric, this does not qualify them as populist. Other characteristics and manifestations need to be analyzed as well.
Throughout the research on populism, it is easy to come across several characteristics of this phenomenon. The most prominent characteristic was discussed in the previous paragraph. It is also important to define how populists perceive ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Many scholars argue that creating the image of elite as the evil, corrupt, bad and the people as pure, good, naïve, surrounds the basic perception of a populist (Kemmers et al., 2016; Hartleb 2015; Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Many scholars discuss how populists homogenize what they call ‘the people’ (Soare, 2014; Akkerman et al., 2014). In the literature, I have observed that populists do not cherish the internal diversity of the support group, ‘the people’. From the works of scholars mentioned above, we can observe that populists homogenize the elite as well. According to them, every elite/establishment figure is corrupt, bad and evil (Akkerman et al., 2014).
What populists claim by ‘the people’ depends on the context. According to Luengo et al. (2016) there is a difference between populist parties of the debtor countries and the creditors in the EU. According to them, the majority of the populists of debtor countries are influenced by the left wing ideology and do not use exclusionary rhetoric. Therefore we can argue that minorities, immigrants, LGBT communities are also included in the definition of ‘the people’ that is used by the left wing populist parties (Luengo et al., 2016). When the far right populist parties of the creditor countries use the term ‘the people’, they (in many cases) do not include immigrants, LGBT, ethnic and religious minorities (Luengo et al., 2016). Therefore one can observe from the differences between populist parties; there is no single populism.
Inclusionary/ Exclusionary Populism
In the literature, researchers can come across ‘inclusionary populism vs. exclusionary populism’. Several scholars have argued that the Latin American populism is more inclusionary when compared to European populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). This statement can be understood better with the help of the aforementioned
claim of left wing populism rejecting the exclusion of minority groups as ‘the people’ (Luengo et al., 2016). Latin American populism has been dominated by left wing figures, and until recent years European populism was under the monopoly of the far right. However after 2008, with the rise of Syriza, Podemos, The five Star Movement and many more left wing anti-establishment/populist movements, it is not correct anymore to argue that the populism in Europe is exclusionary.
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) have discussed the differences between the European and the Latin American populism on the basis of inclusion vs. exclusion. Defining exclusion and inclusion depends on the concept. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013), exclusion on material sense is excluding a group of people from state resources, and exclusion on political dimension exists when a social/ethnic/religious group is excluded from full political participation. As discussed before, the authors portray the Latin American populism more inclusive when compared to the European populism. One of the reasons for this difference is how populists of each continent try to protect ‘the people’ economically and represent them politically (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).
On material issues, Latin American populist figures such as Chavez and Morales tried to increase the living standards of ordinary citizens with the help of government spending such as healthcare programmes, subsidized food etc. (Meltzer, 2009). This political action targeted the poorer ones in the society, no matter their ideological, ethnic, religious background (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). On political matters, Latin American populists can be identified as the advocates of ‘radical democracy’ (de la Torre, 2010). They defend direct participation of citizens to democratic practices, and according to them, broader participation does not solely mean increasing the turnout, it means increasing the influence of citizens in politics (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) portrayed the European populists as economically and politically exclusionary. On material dimension, the scholars argue that the European populists try to protect ‘the people’ from losing welfare state benefits to outside forces such as immigrants (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Scholars rightfully discussed the concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’ where a populist figure would defend the welfare rights of ‘the people’ but would exclude ‘the other’, immigrants in many cases (Mudde and
Kaltwasser, 2013). On political issues, unlike the Latin American counterparts, European populists do not seek revolutionary changes (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).
As discussed before, claims of Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) can be challenged with recently emerging radical left/populist left political figures in European politics. In the upcoming chapters, with the case study, it will be easier to understand whether portraying Latin American vs. European populism as representation of exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism is a strong argument.
2.1c Commonalities between Populism and Radical Left
In order to assess the ideological stance of SYRIZA in the upcoming chapters, it is important to figure out the similarities between populism and the radical left ideology. The most prominent characteristics of radical left parties are their emphasis on the need for democratic reforms to make the system more representative for the people and include more direct practices (March and Mudde, 2005; Gomez et al., 2016; Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013). Tsakatika and Lisi (2013) argue that people’s representation is at the core of radical left politics. As it was discussed previously, populist parties claim to represent ‘the people’, ordinary citizens and oppose the establishment (Soare, 2014; Akkerman et al., 2014). It can be concluded that both party families claim to represent the people, the difference is the concrete reforms RLPs propose to tackle the representation issue they want to improve.
Anti establishment rhetoric is an important characteristic of populist parties (Barr, 2009). Not every anti-establishment movement/party is populist however every populist party use anti-establishment rhetoric (Barr, 2009). Not every radical left party is anti-establishment, but some fractions in the party family are. As discussed in the previous sections, populist socialist parties use anti-establishment rhetoric just like populist parties do (Gomez et al., 2016; March, 2008). Therefore it can be concluded that populists and several radical left parties share this characteristic.
Radical left parties believe in state interventionism to tackle inequalities with redistribution of wealth and tax reforms (March, 2016). Radical left parties oppose neoliberalism and its institutions, they would not qualify as democratic, they are
anti-capitalist (March, 2016). As defined by CasMudde, populism is a ‘thin centred ideology’ (Mudde, 2014), and there is no distinctive characteristic of populist parties when it comes to economic issues. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) claim that the populist parties tend to be ‘welfare chauvinists’. When compared to the policies that are proposed by the radical left parties, there is no concrete economic reform plans, that is typical for populists.
2.2 Impact of Austerity Measures on Party Politics
The 2008 Financial crisis has caused a massive shock and downturn in European economies, especially in the south. To express what austerity is, Vasilopoulou et al.’s work “Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame” can be referred to. “The agreements have entailed the imposition of severe fiscal and economic adjustment measures with paramount socio-political implications, including a significant strain on the provision of welfare – for example, health and education” (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). The European Troika have introduced the bailout, so called rescue plans, and did not only pressure welfare state policies, also introduced cuts on government spending. The majority of the Greek public was negatively affected by such cuts, increase of tax and decrease in salaries (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014; Armingeon et al., 2016).
Like the dissolution of the USSR, the 2008 financial crisis has caused a shift in the left wing politics. According to Babak Amini, “The sociopolitical context of post-2008 Europe is ripe for the revival of the radical left as a viable force against the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and the politics of austerity” (Amini, 2015). The financial crash and especially southern European countries’ conditions under the crisis have resulted in a rise in support for RLPs (Gomez et al., 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). Syriza and Podemos are great examples for such increase. According to Kriesi (2012), the economy tends to dominate political debate during economic recession. Therefore voters pay closer attention to economic plans of political parties during elections more when it takes place during crisis, such as the elections after 2008 (Kriesi, 2012).
Hobolt and Tilley (2016) argue that the 2008 financial crisis has helped challenger parties to gain momentum since traditional parties were uniting on the austerity front. The reason why the voters punished such parties can be explained by the theory of retrospective voting. The theory is simple; incumbent gets punished due to bad
economic performance (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Hanspeter Kriesi (2012) argues that, when the voters are considered as rational beings, it is expected for them to punish the incumbent when the economy is doing bad and vice versa.
Hanspeter Kriesi argues that there are two scenarios for voters after an economic crisis (Kriesi, 2012). According to him, voters may defect from the governing party and support the establishment opposition in the next elections. The second scenario suggests that, voters may defect from all establishment parties and start supporting new populist challenger parties (Kriesi, 2012). The second scenario is more suitable for this thesis, since the focus is on the rise of populist and radical left parties. Another important aspect from the work of Kriesi on the rise of populist parties during and after economic crisis is the rejection of mainstream parties all together after voters decide to give the establishment opposition a chance to rule the country (Kriesi, 2012). Kriesi argues that instead of the aforementioned two scenarios, there is an alternative possibility for challenger parties to increase their vote share after crisis. “Once the voters notice that the new government which has replaced the punished parties is forced to take just the same measures as its predecessors whom they had voted out of office, they may resort to punishing the mainstream parties as a whole in the next national elections by turning to new populist challengers” (Kriesi, 2012).
Opposition mainstream parties being punished by the voter can be explained by their support for the austerity policies (Kriesi, 2012). In this case, voters did not see clear differences between the opposition and the governing party, because austerity was a dominant topic for politics after the crisis (Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). Therefore all around Europe, and also in the US, alternative and challenger movements/parties/candidates emerged.
Whether the financial crisis had an impact on the rise of RLPs in Europe is a widely debated topic. There is consensus in academia on the emergence and rise in support for the RLPs during and after the crisis. The important aspect of this debate is the question why there is such a trend. According to Tsakatika et al. one of the reasons is to punish the governing parties and the establishment (Tsakatika et al., 2013). Because in the majority of the cases, such parties are responsible to implement austerity measures which leads to major spending cuts and creates economic difficulties for citizen’s lives (Tsakatika et al., 2013, Hobolt et al., 2016).
This phenomenon is mostly experienced in the poorer countries of the EU. According to Luke March “the radical left still tends to do better in poorer and/or smaller countries, and is regularly dwarfed by the radical right in some of the more prosperous/larger countries” (March, 2016). Opposition to austerity can be one of the reasons why RLPs create a momentum in the post-crisis settings (Hobolt et al., 2016). As discussed before, RLPs defend redistribution of wealth and income; they support government spending and taxing rich over middle classes (March and Mudde, 2005; Gomez et al., 2016; Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013). Therefore when the establishment and the mainstream parties defend austerity measures and the RLPs oppose it, they have a platform to express themselves to the public and show an alternative route.
3. Research Design
This section of the thesis will be dedicated to expression and strategies of research and case study analysis. How this research was conducted, and why SYRIZA was chosen, as a case study is couple of important aspects about this chapter. Qualitative research was at the heart of this work, with the help of interviews, media and speech analysis of party officials.
It is important to mention that Bryman’s (2012) work on social research methods is taken as a core source when designing this research. As he discusses, qualitative research values the words over numbers, therefore importance is given to the words of scholars, politicians and of course Alexis Tsipras.
3.1 Case Study:
Case study analysis is crucial for this paper in order to answer the research question, and as Gerring (2004) defines it, “An intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) unit” (Gerring, 2004). Case studies can be chosen on the basis of representativeness and they should support the theoretical background that is provided (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). “In case studies of this sort, the chosen case is asked to perform a heroic role: to stand for (represent) a population of cases that is often much larger than the case itself” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008)”. According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), several scholars tend to go for pragmatic cases due to time, financial and expertise issues. However it is important to note that these are justifiable concerns. Researchers should provide a methodological background on why they have chosen case X instead of case Y (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
In this paper, the case study is put forward to analyse and understand the relationship of austerity measures with the rise of alternative political movements/parties. At the same time, this paper uses the theoretical typologies on populism and radical left ideology to evaluate SYRIZA’s ideological stance.
3.2 Selection of the Case
This research began when reading academic articles on the coalition of the radical left in Greece, SYRIZA. As it was discussed before in the introduction chapter, academic work on populist left is scarce and there are similarities between the radical and the populist left parties. As it was shown in the theoretical framework chapter, several scholars label SYRIZA as radical left and others as populist. Therefore it is found valuable to evaluate the ideological stance of the party with the existing theories and with the empirical data that has been collected for this paper. “Often researchers begin their inquiry with a theory in search of a case or a case in search of a theory for which it is a good test” (George & Bennett 2005: 83). Research for this paper began with a case, followed by using and comparing theories to evaluate the empirical data.
Another aspect of this paper is how radical and populist left parties of countries, which are affected by the 2008 financial crisis use austerity measures in their rhetoric. Their rhetoric and how they portray the crisis and austerity is a tool to assess their ideology. Therefore the ideological stance and rhetoric on austerity goes hand in hand. Seawright and Gerring (2008) argue that an intensive research and analysis on a single case would help the researcher to understand larger classification of similar cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Therefore SYRIZA can be perceived as a strong case study. The party fulfills the needs of this paper. It is from a country with a severe economic crisis and there is an academic debate going on about the party whether it is populist or radical left.
There are more examples like SYRIZA, such as PODEMOS in Spain, the movements of Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders too. Due to time and financial constraints, conducting research in continental Europe was more feasible. The reason why SYRIZA was chosen as a case study over PODEMOS is clear. SYRIZA has been both in opposition and in government in the last years, therefore it would give this paper a chance to analyse their rhetoric against austerity and how it worked. It can be argued that SYRIZA is an extreme case of radical left parties. Their emphasis on radical economic and democratic reforms, redistribution and anti-austerity stance is similar to other cases and overlaps with the theory on radical left ideology. However, SYRIZA being the only radical left governing party in Europe makes this an extreme case. According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), extreme cases are unusual cases. Rareness
counts for extremeness of the case (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Therefore having a radical left party governing a European country qualifies as an extreme case. Furthermore, this case may help a researcher to see that political and economic crises cause public dissatisfaction with the establishment actors/parties, and even the most rigid two party systems can collapse. In this case, it is SYRIZA and Greece, it can be observed in France with Le Pen and Macron, in Spain it can be seen with PODEMOS.
3.3 Data
Conducting qualitative research, analysing SYRIZA’s ideological stance and trying to understand weather the party is populist, radical left or both, interviews play an important role. In light of this, it was decided to hold interviews with several SYRIZA officials. With the help of the Hellenic Parliament website, contact details of Greek MPs were found. Knowing that the majority of the politicians would not have time for an interview with a Master student, I have emailed at least thirty politicians from SYRIZA. The main point of the interviews was to have a grasp about how SYRIZA representatives portray the austerity measures, whether they use populist rhetoric or not. They are the ones who represent the voters of SYRIZA in the parliament, and representatives of the party when they are campaigning. Therefore their opinion on austerity, neoliberalism, the EU, democratic reforms is important to assess the party’s beliefs and their constituents’.
3.4 Data Analysis
In order to assess the ideological stance of SYRIZA and how the party uses austerity measures, party manifestations, congress resolutions, speeches and interviews of Alexis Tsipras have to be analysed. The SYRIZA website included the congress resolutions and the party manifestoes. Important speeches of Alexis Tsipras had subtitles, therefore there was no need for translators. In order to collect party posters and TV ads, native Greek speakers helped with the translation of several empirical data. They have done translations for the elections posters and the TV ads, which can be seen in the case study chapter. Congress resolutions and party manifestoes carry importance to locate SYRIZA on the ideological spectrum and how the party. As discussed before in
the theoretical framework chapter, party congresses carry importance for the radical left parties. It is where they emphasize their ideology and come together with the grassroots movements who support them. Party congress resolutions can help us to understand how SYRIZA portrays austerity to the public and whether the part officials use populist rhetoric. Speeches are useful to assess the rhetoric of leaders, whether it is populist or not. If it is populist, further analysis is needed to understand the inclusionary and exclusionary versions of populism in the speeches.
Election posters are one of the tools every political party use to communicate with the public. Since the text needs to be short and clear, parties spend a lot of time deciding what to write on the official party posters in order to appeal to as many voters as possible. Analysing the election campaign posters of SYRIZA would help us to understand the party’s rhetoric and would give us a chance to assess whether the party is populist or radical left. These posters are selected because they are the major ones in the election campaigns of SYRIZA. One of them is from the regional coalition of SYRIZA, KOE, and it is used to prove the ideological stance of the coalition partners of the party.
3.5 Limitations
Throughout this research there were several difficulties and limitations faced. Language barrier was one of the biggest challenges for this research. There were plenty of translated sources and help of native Greek speakers. However, there were several speeches and party congress resolutions, which were not translated. Furthermore, SYRIZA became a major political force in Greece after the 2012 general elections and started to challenge the status quo from 2010 onwards. Party documents before this date are not translated in many cases. Predecessor of SYRIZA, SYN carries importance for this thesis to understand the founding principles of the party. Due to the marginal position of the party, not every political documents, speeches, congress resolutions are available on Internet, and not all documents are translated. However, the documents that are used in the academic articles were valuable and useful for this thesis.
Another limitation is the interviews that could not be held in Greece due to time constraints of the MPs. Even though three SYRIZA MPs were interviewed for this thesis, there were several others who would add more to this work. Some MPs who were
contacted in order to interview were opposing numerous SYRIZA policies and especially signing the third memorandum. Interviewing the opposition MPs would help the paper to portray the inner party struggle within SYRIZA. Unfortunately, due to their tight schedule; they did not have the time for the interviews.
4. Case Study- SYRIZA
4.1 Historical Background
This section describes the historical context, which will facilitate the background knowledge of the Greek political system and SYRIZA in order to understand the historical developments that have led to the major success of SYRIZA and the end of the two party system in Greece. In this chapter, as mentioned in the introduction, following sub-questions will be answered; ‘How has SYRIZA responded to and been affected by the financial crisis?’ ‘To what extent are these responses more or less populism?’ Populism and the radical left ideology were discussed in depth in the theoretical framework chapter. This chapter aims to use the knowledge and the empirical data to assess the party’s populist rhetoric and ideological stance. At the same time, impact of austerity on SYRIZA will be another topic of discussion, as it was done in the theoretical framework.
4.1.1 Greek Political History
The history of democratic Greece dates back to 1974. Before this date, the country had experienced German occupation, a bloody civil war between the left and the right wing organizations and military rule (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, n.d.). For this thesis, post-1974 carries more importance since party politics and ideology is at the core of this research. In order to construct democratic institutions and hold free and fair elections, a ‘national unity’ government was established (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, n.d.). Parliamentary elections were held on the November 23rd, with participation of four political parties. Since the ban on the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was lifted, this made the elections more democratic (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, nd).
In 1976, the Greek parliament held a referendum to decide whether the monarchy should be abolished. With an overwhelming majority of 69.2% of the votes, the monarchy was abolished. The parliament decided to introduce a presidency as the head of state (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, n.d.). The president would be elected by the parliament and his/her duties would be similar to the Italian and the German Presidents (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, n.d.). The Greek constitution mentions that the country
is a parliamentary democracy, with 300 seats in the parliament and 150+1 seats is needed to form the government. The election system in Greece provides 50-seat premium for the winning party. Therefore with only 38-40% of the votes; the winning party can form a majority government (Squires, 2015). The country is divided into constituencies; some of them have one representative, and big cities have multiple. There is 3% parliamentary threshold (Squires, 2015); therefore minor parties have difficulties entering the parliament.
From 1974 till the 2015 general elections, the governments were formed either by ND or PASOK. Therefore the Greek political system has always been referred to as a ‘two party system’. There were several elections where none of the parties could form a majority government, such as the 1989 elections (Lyrintsiz and Nikolakopoulos, nd). However, the top two parties were always ND and PASOK. Election results between 1974 and 2015 can be found later in this section. The diagrams are designed to show the seat share instead of the vote share, since in the Greek case, disproportionality causes major difference between the vote and the seat share. The 2014 European election is not included in the diagrams since it does not reflect seat share like the other general elections. However it is important for SYRIZA, since the party won the elections, and it was the first time ND and PASOK could not win. Political parties with less than 5 seats are not included in the diagrams, it is rare to see parties with a couple of seats, and they are normally independent candidates.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 N u m b er o f S ea ts Years Seat Share (out of 300) ND PASOK KKE SYN/SYRIZA DI.K.KI Figure 4.1.1a Seat share in the Hellenic
4.1.2History of SYRIZA
The party was founded in 1992 with the original founding name, Synaspismos (SYN) (Ellinas, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). However the party was participating in elections as a coalition of left forces before that date. Ellinas portray SYRIZA as a“Euro-communist coalition of break-away a“Euro-communists and disjointed radical leftists, which struggled to pass the 3%-threshold and sustain its parliamentary presence throughout most of its history” (Ellinas, 2016). Therefore when SYRIZA obtained 36% of the votes and 50% of the seats in the 2015 elections, it has created a shock for party politics and radical leftists all around Europe. Previously, it has been difficult for SYN to increase their vote share, since there was not much space left in the electoral arena because of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Social democrats (PASOK) (Ellinas, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). One of the most important turning points for SYN was when the party toughened its stance against neoliberalism and its institutions (Ellinas, 2016; 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 2004 2007 2009 2012
(May) (June) 2012 2015 (Jan) (Sep) 2015
N u m b er o f S ea ts
Years
Seat Share (out of 300) ND PASOK KKE SYRIZA/SYN Golden Dawn ANEL TO POTAMI DHM.AR Figure 4.1.1bSeat share in the Hellenic Parliament between 2004-2015
Katsambekis, 2015).
In order to expand their appeal and voter base, SYN started to work closely with the extra-parliamentary forces, and this is where SYN started to become SYRIZA, Coalition of the Radical Left (Ellinas, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). SYRIZA was founded in 2004 with SYN at the heart of the coalition, surrounded by environmentalist, feminist and other left wing fractions and could elect 6 MPs for the Hellenic Parliament in their first election (Nikolakakis, 2016; Katsambekis, 2015). Alexis Tsipras became the party leader in 2008, during the disastrous financial crisis, which has ruined the Greek economy (Ellinas, 2016; Nikolakakis, 2016). Post-2008 ranked a period of dramatic decrease in the vote share of the two main parties of Greece, ND and PASOK (Nikolakakis, 2016).
The 2008 financial crisis came as a shock not only for Greece, but also for the entire world. The European South was economically shattered and the European Union has faced one of the most severe economic crisis in its history. The Union was further divided into debtor and creditor countries and this has caused political and structural problems both in the EU and also in the national level. ‘There is no alternative’ is what can be remembered from the beginning of the crisis, where creditor countries’ governments together with the European Troika was advising debtor states to sign the bailout plans (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). According to Hobolt and Tilley (2016), due to the pro-bailout stance of mainstream parties in the European South, voters started to defect from the mainstream choices and went for the challenger parties. Greece is a strong example for this claim. Katsambekis (2015) argues that SYRIZA targeted ND and PASOK directly during the years when they were in opposition.
Post-2008 ranks not only the economic downturn period for Greece, it also ranks where SYRIZA becomes a contender against the political dynasty of PASOK and ND governments. “SYRIZA was perfectly positioned to benefit from the mass mobilization against the consecutive adjustment programs of 2010 and 2012 and the severe austerity measures they entailed” (Ellinas, 2016). It is important to mention that SYRIZA did not organize the mass demonstrations, but they took part in them with party members and officials, and represented the demands of the demonstrators in the Hellenic Parliament (Greek Parliament) (Katsambekis, 2015). With SYRIZA being one of the only parties to oppose the bailout plans by the European Troika gave them a chance to channel the anti-austerity supporters towards their party. Therefore starting from the 2012 General
Elections, SYRIZA started to shake up the establishment and the mainstream politics in Greece.
In 2012, SYRIZA obtained 27% of the votes and became the second biggest party in Greece after the conservative ND (Katsambekis, 2015). Therefore 2012 ranks as the end of the forty-year long two party system in Greece. For the following years, SYRIZA’s success continued and in 2014, the party won the European Elections (Katsambekis, 2015). For the first time in Greek democracy, a political party other than ND and PASOK won. The 2015 general elections have ranked a new page for Greek politics when SYRIZA got 36% of the votes and was one seat short of an absolute majority in the Hellenic Parliament (Ellenas, 2016). As discussed by Hanspeter Kriesi and shared with the reader in the theoretical framework, voters may turn to the establishment opposition in the first general elections after the crises. In the Greek case, voters turned to ND, since PASOK was the government during the crisis. As Kriesi continues arguing, voters can see that there is no difference between establishment parties in Western democracies on neoliberal economic issues, therefore in following elections; it is a high possibility for them to turn to new populist challenger parties. The diagram below can make it clear for the reader to see the rapid increase in support for SYRIZA by the Greek public after the first memorandum in 2010. The party tripled its vote share between the 2009 and the 2012 general elections.
SYRIZA forming a coalition government with ANEL (Independent Greeks), a populist right wing party, was a heavily criticized decision from several left wing intellectuals and politicians (Nikolakakis, 2016). Even though ANEL and SYRIZA do not share common ground on ideological issues, their anti-austerity stance made the coalition possible. Therefore, the beginning of their term both parties promised the public to renegotiate the bailout plan with the European Troika (Nikolakakis, 2016). It is important to note that this is the first government without ND or PASOK being a partner since 1974 in Greece (Katsambekis, 2015).
The first challenge of the coalition was the third memorandum of the European Troika, which meant further austerity in Greece. Alexis Tsipras made a critical move and decided to hold a referendum and asked public to decide whether the government should approve the 3rd bailout plan or renegotiate (Nikolakakis, 2016). From this decision it can be understood that Tsipras wanted to have an upper hand in the negotiation room against the Troika. The result of the referendum was a decisive victory for the anti austerity camp, 61.31% No and 38.69% Yes (Nikolakakis, 2016). Therefore the Greek people have rejected the third bailout plan. Despite the referendum result, the SYRIZA led coalition government could not renegotiate a new deal, and the third memorandum was signed. Signing the third memorandum caused mass demonstrations in Greece. Several SYRIZA MPs have left the party, leaving no choice but a general election in September 2015 (Nikolakakis, 2016). In the snap general election, SYRIZA received 35.5% of the votes and 145 seats out of 300, and formed a second coalition government with ANEL (Smith and Wearden, 2015).
Figure 4.1.2, vote share for the elections in Greece (Hellenic
4.2 IDEOLOGY
In order to analyze SYRIZA’s ideological stance and link the empirical data, findings and overall analysis with the theory, structure of theoretical framework is employed to the case study chapter. Therefore it will be easier to draw links in between chapters and will be easier for the reader to follow.
4.2.1Election Posters of SYRIZA
An Election poster made by KOE for the 2012 General Elections, one of SYRIZA’s local radical left coalition partners, expressing their support for SYRIZA. The poster says, “The people can do everything, vote SYRIZA!” (Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014). Emphasis on ‘the people’ can be traced to populist rhetoric. As it was explained in the theoretical framework chapter, populists believe that they represent the ordinary citizens, and they see the people as the most powerful above all. Here in this poster, as it says, ‘people can do everything’ would qualify as a populist slogan.
Figure 4.2.1a: SYRIZA poster, prepared by regional coalition partner, KOE. 2012. “The people can do
everything, vote
SYRIZA!”(Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014).
A general election poster from 2012, figure 1.2, is translated as, “they decided without us, we are moving on without them” (Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014). Unlike the previous poster, this is created by the SYRIZA official election campaign. Creation of the ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy can be seen clearly in this slogan. As it was explained in the theoretical framework chapter, creation of the ‘us vs. them’ is the most prominent characteristics of populists. In this slogan, it is not only dividing the society into two homogenous groups; it also talks about the bailout plan that was signed by the PASOK government and supported by ND officially. Therefore the political establishment is criticized by not being representative of the people. Even though SYRIZA is a political party, with the usage of ‘we are moving on without them’, the party tries to portray an image as being equal to the public, as being one of them.
The poster on the left side is also from the 2012 General elections. The translation is, “it is either us or them; together we can overthrow them.” (Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014). SYRIZA once again openly uses the ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy. Here the party depicts itself as the voice of the vulnerable, good, naïve ‘people’ against the evil, corrupt and antidemocratic ‘elite’. The 2012 election posters prove to us that the party tried to use populist rhetoric when attacking the establishment. The party defends substantial democratic and economic reforms but they are not depicted in the posters. Analysis of the election posters are not enough to come to a conclusion about a political party
Figure 4.2.1c: SYRIZA poster, 2012. “It is either us or them; together we can overthrow
them.” (Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014).
Figure 4.2.1b: SYRIZA poster, 2012. “They decided
without us, we are moving on without them”
(Stravkakis and Katsembekis, 2014).
whether it is populist or not, but the posters that are shared with the reader prove that SYRIZA used anti-establishment, anti-elite rhetoric in their election campaign in 2012.
4.2.2 TV Advertisements of SYRIZA
Unlike posters, political parties can express their ideology, beliefs and manifesto well in television advertisements, since it is lengthier and can use multiple visuals and sounds. Therefore analysing SYRIZA’s television advertisements would help one to better understand the party’s stance on issues. The links of ads will be shared in the bibliography section, and in this part, the texts from the advertisements in order for reader to have a grasp of the commercials will be used.
2012 General Election TV Advertisement
The text of the 2012 general election TV advertisement of SYRIZA can be found below. The advertisement begins with blaming ‘them’ for bringing the IMF to Greece. Creation of ‘us vs. them’ can be seen openly in the text. It is understandable that the political establishment is being blamed by SYRIZA constantly because of the austerity measures due to the fact that the two parties, ND and PASOK, have been running the country for almost 40 years without a break, and they both have supported the bailout plans. As discussed in the theoretical framework, Robert Barr (2009) argues that being anti-establishment would not qualify a political movement as populist. Anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric is only one condition and it is not an exclusive characteristic of populism. However in the case of this advertisement, SYRIZA is not only using anti-establishment rhetoric but also portrays the elite as evil. The party claims that the real terror in people’s lives is ‘their policies’ and ‘their loan agreement’.
“From the day they brought the IMF to Greece, can you remember how many times they tried to scare us that we will leave the EU, return the Drachma. Not get the next loan? Go bankrupt, and need the loan to be saved? So many times, that we are no longer afraid. After May 7; with the power of our vote, we open a new road far from the real terror in our lives; their policies, their loan agreements.17 June; we will put the bailout behind us and follow a road of hope. SYRIZA, United Social Front”(Athensnewsweb 2012).
2014 European Elections TV Advertisement
“The medicine has run out. The money has gone. Our businesses have closed. Our kids have emigrated. Our voice has been silenced. Our patience has ended. May 25, we vote-they leave!” (Derek Gatopoulos 2014).
SYRIZA’s TV advertisement for this election covers a variety of issues. The party clearly states the economic and political problems the country is facing in a nutshell. Once again SYRIZA portrays itself as the representative of the people with the usage of ‘our’ and ‘we’. This strategy was visible in the election posters as well. It can be observed that the level of populism in this advertisement is not as strong as the previous one. However, SYRIZA tries to establish itself as the voice of the people, and portray themselves as the ones who also suffer under austerity measures by using the word ‘our’.
4.2.3 Speeches of Tsipras
In this section, Alexis Tsipras’ speeches will be analysed. His speeches that are analysed for this paper are as follows; address to the European Parliament, campaign rally and SYRIZA party conference.
2015- European Parliament speech of Alexis Tsipras
The speech Tsipras gave after winning the snap referendum about the third memorandum was welcomed with applauses from several MEPs, mostly from the European United Left, Nordic Green Left, where SYRIZA’s affiliation is. Below, we can see a small script from his speech, where he expresses his expectation from the Troika and the European Parliament. It is clear to see that as a radical left party, he openly defends taxing the rich over middle-income people. He criticizes the Troika’s plan of not leaving any freedom for SYRIZA government to decide on taxation. He uses the ‘sovereignty’ card, which many populist parties use when criticizing the EU. In the text below, both leftist elements and populist rhetoric can be found. He also goes on by mentioning the ‘undemocratic’ institution structure where he believes that the institutions like IMF should not be able to force policies on nation states.
