Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions with Western Universities?

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Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions

with Western Universities?

Jack Patfield - 26 June 2020

Masters Programme in Political Science

Programme: Authoritarian Leadership? The Rise of China in International Relations Supervisor: Dr Julia Bader

Second reader: Dr Julian Gruin Candidate Number: 12718637

Department: Graduate School of Social Science Word Count: 22,000

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Acknowledgments

Without the help of the following group of people, this paper would be immeasurably poorer. First, Dr Julia Bader for her patience and inspiration, and for supervising a course that has proven at times interesting, frustrating, challenging and enjoyable. To my classmates, for their good humour and the valuable information they provided over Zoom, Canvas and WhatsApp. To Ms Kim Ribbink, for her administrative nous. The University of Amsterdam, for providing an Australian (with an Irish passport) the opportunity to study abroad, and for being so reasonable when he decided to flee home in the midst of a pandemic. And finally, to my family and friends, for keeping me sane.

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List of Acronyms and Colloquialisms

ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation

ANU Australian National University

ARC Australian Research Council

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CETC China Electronics Technology Group Corporation

CI Confucius Institute

CSSA Chinese Student and Scholars Associations

Hanban Office of Chinese Language Council International

NCSU North Carolina State University

NED National Endowment for Democracy

NUDT National University of Defense Technology

PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China US/ USA United States of America

USYD The University of Sydney

UTS University of Technology Sydney

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Abstract: Since Walker & Ludwig first coined the term ‘sharp power’ in 2017 there has been a

flurry of academic scholarship examining the term. This work has focused on defining the concept, and identifying where it can be applied in international relations. Walker & Ludwig argue the concept can help clarify the nature of malign authoritarian influence over democratic states (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 7). Noting scholarship has not been able to settle on an agreed definition, this paper uses their original definition and examines the case of Chinese interference in western university education to test the concept. It also advances a typological tool to identify sharp power. Because scholars have not been able to precisely define sharp power, this article finds the concept unequal to the task of clarifying authoritarian influence in international

relations. The conclusion seeks to improve the concept, and invites discussion to further develop the utility of sharp power.

Chapter One: Introduction

In 2017 the term sharp power was first coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. Their report for the Washington D.C. based think tank, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) described sharp power as the malicious and intrusive influence that one nation can wield over another. It is distinguished from soft power by the methods of its application, secretive, and malign, and from hard power by its lack of open coercion backed by military force

(Walker & Ludwig 2017: 6). The parameters that define this term are broad. Where does the line between soft power end, and sharp power begin? Where does this then morph into hard power? To a large degree answering this question depends on terminology. Providing a precise and useful definition of the concept is one of the key aims of this paper. This is important for a number of reasons. In its present form the concept is vague, and does not necessarily provide clarity to a researcher looking into the interactions that take place between authoritarian states and democratic states and their institutions. It is only once we have arrived at a more precise definition for sharp power that we can address the central concern of this paper: whether sharp power can explain the interactions that take place between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and western universities.

This topic matters. Since its economy reopened to the world in the 1970s, China has grown richer, and with that wealth, more influential. As an autocratic power, its style of governance, and its interactions with western institutions are necessarily different from democratic western nations. With its newfound global influence, the PRC has engaged with western industries and

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6 institutions to not always positive endings. Universities are vital repositories of learning and knowledge; their work powers a country’s innovation. Influential policy advocates frequently work within universities. Perhaps most importantly - in their goal of educating students, universities shape the future. Their work influences the politicians, policymakers, business leaders, academics and activists of tomorrow. To influence such an institution is to hold sway over what a country might become.

So has China employed sharp power in its interactions with western universities? This is a difficult question to answer; the terms of engagement must be defined. This means unpacking sharp power, a nebulous and as yet ill-defined term. To answer the thesis question, this paper is divided into several chapters. These chapters step the reader through the topic, allowing for a logical progression from definition; to methodology; to analysis; and finally to conclusion.

Chapter Two contains a literature review that surveys the work undertaken by other scholars and identifies ‘gaps’ in the literature. It is in these ‘gaps’ that this paper seeks to place itself. In effect, this review sets the stage for this paper. It demonstrates a scholarly confusion

surrounding sharp power. Clarification of this confusion may well be the key contribution of this paper. The review finds that there is no one commonly held and consistent definition of sharp power. Examples of authoritarian malfeasance and disruption of democratic targets are cited as ‘sharp power’, though no concrete definition is agreed upon. It is left to the reader to assume examples of authoritarian interference constitute sharp power, as and when they are cited.

Defining sharp power is therefore, one of the key tasks of this essay. By parsing the literature, searching through existing definitions of the concept, and discussions of the concept before it was named by Walker & Ludwig, Chapter Two arrives at a reasonable definition of sharp power. Adopting this definition throughout the rest of the paper allows us to address one final important aspect of this Chapter. This is developing a typological tool, whereby we can recognise

examples of sharp power as they are presented to us. The typological tool, and the methods by which it identifies sharp power are justified in Section 2.2: Clarifying Sharp Power.

Following this theoretical chapter is a methodological exploration of how the analytical ballast of this paper, Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis, is organised. Chapter Three is a preliminary chapter, laying out: the subjects to be studied; the organisation of the empirical analysis; the

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7 data employed; the biases that affect this data; the shortcomings and weaknesses involved with this approach and; the timeframe and geographical location within which this paper is situated.

Chapter Four examines several well-known examples of Chinese interactions with western universities. These examples are divided by type, into unique categories. This provides a suitable array with which to perform our analysis. Each category provides a fresh angle with which we can critique the concept of sharp power. While no qualitative study can be exhaustive, this approach provides sufficient evidence to develop a compelling argument on the nature of Chinese influence on western universities, and of sharp power itself. The categories are inspired by an Australian government report, and attempt to holistically account for the most important areas of interaction between the PRC and western universities. The categories contained therein are, in order: students; academics; cyber-attacks; and Confucius Institutes (CI).

The aim of this paper is to answer whether or not sharp power can account for the interactions between the People’s Republic and western universities. If sharp power is inadequate to explain Chinese interference, then we must ask how the concept can be altered. What might need to change in order to explain the malignant Chinese interactions we shall examine? The paper concludes with a discussion of how the idea of sharp power can be improved. It identifies where a refined definition of the concept could be employed for conceptual gain, and where it cannot be satisfactorily applied. With an improved definition of sharp power, we open up avenues for further scholarly exploration.

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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Conceptual

Considerations

The goal of this chapter is to discuss literature that has already examined the idea of sharp power, and how the term is defined therein. Therefore, the evidence provided to demonstrate the concept’s existence shall be examined in this section, so that we might see the ‘proof’ for sharp power, as seen by political scientists. Moreover, because the terminology of sharp power is relatively new, first appearing in 2017, this chapter will also examine literature that employ a similar nomenclature to capture similar concepts. Therefore, articles discussing, but not closely defining, terms such as ‘charm offensive’, or ‘authoritarian soft power’ will also be included in this chapter.

This discussion will be followed by Section 2.2, A Definition of Sharp Power, which critiques literature on sharp power as a whole, and supplies a definition to be used thereafter throughout this paper. The final portion of this Chapter takes this definition one step further, developing a typological tool by which we can know whether or not an instance of PRC malfeasance on university campuses is indeed an example of sharp power. By probing the varied contributions scholars have made to the sharp power debate, this Chapter shall determine what is missing from ‘gaps’ in the literature. The answers this paper aspires to provide will fill the ‘gaps’ identified within this chapter.

Section 2.1: What is Sharp Power, and How Can We Recognise it?

The term sharp power first appeared in a 2017 report by the National Endowment for Democracy’s Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. The authors assert that vast sums of money have been spent in recent years by Russia and China to “shape public opinions and perceptions around the world, employing a diverse toolkit that includes thousands of people-to-people exchanges, wide-ranging cultural activities, educational programs, and the development of media enterprises and information initiatives with global reach” (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 6). While the most visible of these techniques are not ‘hard’ in any nakedly coercive sense, neither can they be considered ‘soft’. The authors label this grey area, ‘sharp power’.

Before launching into a review of the academic discussion on sharp power, it is helpful to sketch the parameters within which it sits. In 1990, Joseph S. Nye coined the term ‘soft power’, to

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9 describe the various ways in which a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects. Such methods “tend to arise from cultural and ideological attraction, as well as rules and institutions of international regimes” (Nye 1990: 168). This might include music and film, sports, certain multinational companies, and democratic political institutions. Standing in contrast to this co-operative approach is the forceful and coercive, hard power, where one state uses military might to force others to do its bidding. Soft power has been described as a “force multiplier” (Nye 2018: 1). When combined with the military might of ‘hard power’, a strong army gains a strong narrative, in itself a potent source of power (ibid).

The literature review that follows charts attempts by various academics to grapple with the concept of sharp power. Here, different descriptions of the concept are offered, along with the empirical basis used to support these claims. Different examples of cases of sharp power in contemporary international relations are provided by these scholars. By comparing and

contrasting the differences between these claims, we will be able to find some common ground, some core components that all academics agree forms part of the basis of sharp power. With these ‘core’ components, a definition of sharp power can be adopted to be employed throughout the rest of this paper.

Before examining the literature that discussed sharp power it is useful to consider the work from which this debate emerged. Joshua Kurlantzick was one of the first to identify China’s “charm offensive”. After years of economic growth, following Deng Ziaoping’s strategy of “hiding (one’s) strength and biding (one’s) time”, from the mid to late 1990s, Beijing began to maneuver to increase its soft power (Kurlantzick 2006: 35). Kurlantzick argued that China’s potent soft power tool was its socioeconomic strength (idem: 36). The PRC began to trumpet its success in

feeding 22% of the world’s population, with only 10% of its arable land, lifting tens of millions out of poverty (ibid). These claims became central to the country’s diplomacy. Chinese-style

governance became an attractive alternative ideology to authoritarian leaders worldwide (ibid). The charm offensive was based on three basic elements: a degree of openness to private enterprise, a large state sector, and a concerted effort to forestall democratic reforms (ibid). The alternative they offered to the aggressive free market-program of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ won wide-spread support. Their success was seen in positive receptions in countries ranging from Latin America to South-East Asia to Africa (idem: 37).

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10 China’s emphasis on ‘win-win’ diplomacy and its policy of non-interference stood in sharp

contrast to the United States, which was in the mid-2000s mired in several unpopular Middle-Eastern conflicts (ibid). Yet as it became more powerful and influential, Beijing began to export some of its domestic problems (Kurlantzick 2007: xi-xii). The poor environmental record of its companies, and their opaque business practices began to appear in the Global South (ibid). Writing in the mid-2000s Kurlantzick describes an overwhelmingly positive response to China’s charms, which corresponds with a decline in the US’ own soft power (idem: 8-10). He did, however, differentiate between the soft power of a ‘mouse’ versus that of a ‘lion’ (idem: 6). If the subject of Beijing’s ‘charm’ refuses to help China with its goals, the carrot can quickly be

substituted for the stick (ibid). For example, China has continued to fund the construction of dams in South-East Asia’s important Mekong Delta. It blithely ignored the protestations of other countries and refused to join multilateral groups monitoring the health of the river. Even in the mid-2000s accusations abounded of China saying one thing, while at the same time single-mindedly pursuing its own interest (idem: 230-231). Some even raised the specter of a

mercantilism, in which raw materials are sold cheaply to China, in return for high-priced Chinese exports (ibid).

Much of this work on China’s early ‘charm offensive’ focused on China’s interactions with developing nations. China’s soft power was not actually seen as being all that soft

(Kurlantzick 2006: 36). This stands in contrast to the new literature on sharp power, which focuses on Chinese influence on wealthier western nations. Some see this sharp power as standing somewhere between the twin pillars of soft power, which depends on voluntarism, and hard power “which rests on inducements by payment or coercion by threat” (Nye 2018: 2). For Walker & Ludwig, sharp power entails a degree of stealth, as opposed to the blunt impact of hard power (2017: 13). Recent media and cultural activities by Beijing and Moscow are neither part of a ‘charm offensive’, nor an attempt to win ‘hearts and minds’. Therefore, these efforts cannot be classed as soft power. Examples such as the “large-scale fabrication of social media posts”, or the establishment of CCP controlled Confucius Institutes at foreign universities are said to be centered on “distraction and manipulation” (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 6). In a 2018 article expanding on the concept of sharp power, Walker noted that the ‘CAMP’ sectors are particularly vulnerable to sharp power penetration. CAMP, meaning culture, academia (including universities more generally), media and publishing are four influential spheres which depend on openness and accessibility as part of their very business model (2018: 13). It is this that has

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11 made them such a vulnerable target for the deceptive and manipulative methods of sharp

power.

Authoritarian regimes like Russia and China are looking to suppress political pluralism and the freedom of expression abroad in order to secure their interests (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 6). Walker & Ludwig caution against viewing this phenomenon as “authoritarian soft power”. The subversive tools of sharp power do “real damage to the targeted democratic societies”, and the “conceptual vocabulary that has been used since the Cold War’s end no longer seems

adequate to the contemporary situation” (idem: 7). Rather, the authors of the NED report argue that sharp power better captures the spirit of foreign policy techniques that are designed to “pierce, penetrate, or perforate the political and information environments in the targeted countries” (ibid).

For Walker & Ludwig, China and Russia are the most notable actors currently exercising sharp power against target countries (idem: 6). This observation is common to most, if not all,

contemporary accounts of the concept. According to Walker & Ludwig, the influence these regimes wield overseas cannot be divorced from the ideology with which they govern their own countries (2017: 12). Rather than engaging in ‘public diplomacy’, their NED report provides several examples of Chinese and Russian sharp power in Latin America and Central Europe. It is worth noting that the authors of individual chapters within this report use the term soft power to describe Russian and Chinese influence abroad. Authors were asked to assess authoritarian influence in the countries in question. Through examination of these reports, Walker & Ludwig developed the concept of sharp power (idem: 35).

In Peru, sharp power, (or, as described by author Juan Pablo Cardenal, authoritarian sharp power) can be seen in qiaowu. This is a Chinese outreach effort aimed at the country’s large ethnic-Chinese minority, which includes up to 2.5 million Peruvians (around 8% of the

population) who are thought to have some Chinese ancestry. The policy seeks to “promote the PRC’s stance abroad, neutralise party-critics, and systematically shut down the regime’s critics” (Cardenal 2017: 69). It employs social and psychological tools that seek to influence—through coercive pressure and positive incentives—the choices, direction, and loyalties of the population that the PRC considers as overseas Chinese (ibid). These tools include the “neutralisation” of party critics and the construction of temporary alliances of convenience (ibid). “While it appears to be a straightforward attempt to encourage transnational cultural interest, raise ethnic

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12 awareness, and promote business, qiaowu is in fact designed to legitimize the CCP and elevate China’s international image” (ibid).

In Poland, Jacek Kucharczyk writes of a polarised political atmosphere, where opponents routinely accuse one another of being under Russian influence. This has the effect of inuring the public into complacency over such threats. Russian “authoritarian influence” can be seen in, among other examples social media ‘trolling’, academics who refute the mainstream distrust of Russia by claiming to understand “geopolitical realities”, pro-Russian think-tanks, and the promotion of narratives potentially useful to the Kremlin, namely highly-conservative traditionalist, anti-gender, and anti-refugee messages (Kucharczyk 2017: 100).

A similar understanding of sharp power has appeared across a number of articles in magazines, think tank reports and academic pieces. The December 14, 2017 edition of the Economist magazine described the concept as (any measure) that “helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad”. The corruption of an Australian politician, alleged to have been bribed into supporting the Chinese position in the South China Sea is offered as evidence. Custer et al. use similar language to describe the term as various methods “seeking regional hegemony and engaging in a game of zero-sum politics” (2018: 1). A 2018 article by Walker offered more clarity on this vision of sharp power, labelling it an “approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship, or the use of manipulation to sap the integrity of independent institutions” (2018: 11). Walker asserts the concept operates beyond the political sphere, where “the corrosive effects of sharp power are increasingly apparent in the spheres of culture, academia, media, and publishing—sectors that are crucial in determining how citizens of democracies understand the world around them” (idem: 12). A deal between the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) with the Shanghai Media Group is a prime instance of sharp power, according to Walker. Initially lauded as an opportunity for Australia to engage with the PRC, closer examination of the agreement revealed the ABC was contractually obliged not to report on issues sensitive to the CCP on its Mandarin-language service (idem: 9).

Other strands of thought on sharp power elect not to define the terms as being somewhere in between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power. In its 2018 report, the California-based Hoover Institution characterised sharp power as an ‘illegitimate’, more assertive, and less-opaque version of soft power (Diamond & Schell 2018: 2). This differs from the earlier academic characterisation we have seen. By aligning the term within the strictures of soft power, Diamond & Schell imply

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13 certain, less coercive or forceful characteristics of sharp power. A case study of Hollywood is employed to demonstrate this claim. As its wealth grows, China is able to leverage foreign organisations to advance its agenda not just domestically, but on the international stage as well. In 2017, Chinese box-office takings were worth $7.9 billion USD to the film industry, versus an only slightly higher $11.1 billion USD in the US itself (idem: 111). For Diamond & Schell, such growth, coming as the industry faces substantial pressure from online-streaming services, raises the specter of self-censorship, the advancement of Chinese narratives, and the risk that the industry will lose its independence (ibid). Actor Richard Gere has stated there are certain movies he cannot take part in because of his outspoken stance on Tibetan independence (idem: 112). The popular Kung Fu Panda series is held up as another example; the third sequel was co-produced with Chinese money and has played an outsized role in positively defining Chinese culture (ibid).

The arguments of Diamond & Schell are reinforced by Sørensen, who channels Nye in arguing that soft power is a force multiplier CCP leaders regard as complementary to more traditional ‘hard’ manifestations of power (2017: 113. Although she does not use the term sharp power, her ‘authoritarian soft power’ is characterised in a similar fashion. Sørensen says that for the CCP, soft power is a “top-down-affair” (idem: 114). Because of the structure of its government, China has been unwilling to allow its citizens to generate the soft power it desires. As such, the party-led presentations of China often lack credibility and come across more as party propaganda, which does not persuade or attract as planned (idem: 116). While interested in soft power, domestic concerns take priority for Chinese leaders. For Sørensen, this ‘top-down’ attempt to generate soft power abroad is best illustrated through the Confucius Institutes, language and cultural organisations set up in foreign countries by the CCP. These bodies, “undoubtedly under a high level of control by the Chinese state” have been met with a number of accusations of espionage, control, and censorship (idem: 117).

Central to this view of sharp power is the Chinese system of government. According to Diamond & Schell, “many nominally independent actors - including Chinese civil society, academia, corporations, and even religious institutions - are also ultimately beholden to the government and are frequently pressured into service to advance state interests” (2018: 3). The two

examples provided above, Confucius Institutes, and the (partial) co-option of Hollywood to suit Chinese narratives by state-approved bodies are key examples illustrating this definition. This is

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14 a vision of sharp power decidedly more malevolent than soft power, yet still cast of the same substance. It wishes to win hearts and minds, yet uses manipulative methods to do so.

Directly opposing this view is the architect of the original definition of soft power, Joseph S. Nye. For Nye, sharp power is a “new term that describes an old threat”. It is “a type of hard power” (Nye 2018: 2). Nor is the deceptive use of information for nefarious purposes a new

phenomenon, Nye argues that both the democratic United States, and the totalitarian Soviet Union made use of such techniques during the Cold War. In the 1980s the USSR seeded the rumor that AIDS was the product of US experimentation with biological weapons. The rumour began with an anonymous letter sent to a New Delhi newspaper (ibid). More recently, the ‘Pizzagate’ scandal spread online in 2016, alleging that some of Hilary Clinton’s senior election staff has been abusing children in the basement of a Washington restaurant (idem: 2). Both these examples rely on untruths and anxieties to smear their opponents. What has changed, and made the malign manipulation of information a much more potent tool, is the speed and lower cost of delivering such tactics (ibid).

While these tools are able to disrupt and undermine democratic processes, they do not win plaudits for the countries that employ them. For Russia, this may be an acceptable cost, however the cost of such measures is far higher for China, which has spent billions on soft power instruments for comparatively little return (Nye 2018: 2). Ultimately, for Nye, sharp power relies on deception to influence the decisions of actors. When this deception limits the voluntary choices actors can make, it crosses the line into coercion, and is therefore, hard power (ibid). Modern methods of sharp power, like the ‘Pizzagate’ scandal, for example, can make it difficult to determine where soft power ends, and sharp (or hard) power begins.

Finally, it is also worth considering the arguments made by Liu in 2018. Liu sees sharp power as “neither soft nor hard power—it is the product of an unskilled mixing of the two, or put simply, ‘unsmart power’. This is not to coin a new term, but rather to make the point that no new term is needed” (Liu, 2018). Liu alludes here to the concept of ‘smart power’, defined in 2007 as “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action" (Armitage & Nye 2007: 7). For Liu, “smart power is the right mix or has the correct ingredients of the hard power of coercion and the soft power of persuasion and attraction”. She argues that “sharp power is better understood as a result of an unsuccessful

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15 combination of the two” (Liu, 2018). In this view then, sharp power is the poorer cousin of ‘smart power’, an unnecessary term that fails to combine the twin concepts of soft and hard power. For Liu, the ‘who’ is more important than the ‘how’. Even if Russia and China are doing the same thing as non-authoritarian countries, the nature of their government means their actions will still fall under suspicion. Chinese New Year celebrations, which should be a relatively innocuous method of soft power projection, are cited as an example. Liu questions how such an event could have a nefarious purpose. “All states’ soft power efforts can have good intentions, but the effects can sometimes be distorted by the application of hard methods” (Liu, 2018).

So far this review has made clear the breadth of definitions of sharp power. While there certainly is a malevolent intent implied, the terms that are frequently used to characterise the concept, ‘distraction’ and ‘manipulation’, are not clarified. Instead, empirical examples are provided and it is claimed that regimes like China and Russia are “surely seeking to manage their target

audiences by manipulating or poisoning the information that reaches them”

(Walker & Ludwig, 2017: 13). Such covert actions are necessarily difficult to source; proving an instance of sharp power may require the use of a ‘smoking gun’ piece of evidence. This

evidence may only be accessible to individuals with privileged access. Reliance on such rare documentation surely limits the analytical utility and conceptual clarity of sharp power. The active nature of this concept must also be emphasised. This is a malignant and political action that one state inflicts upon another. It is not soft power, looking to win ‘hearts and minds’. However, neither is it hard power, seeking coercion through force. This ambiguity, coupled with the disagreements outlined in the literature review lead to this paper’s preliminary argument: Sharp power is too vague a concept to be of analytical use.

Because discussion on sharp power has largely been confined to defining the concept, there has, as of yet, been comparatively little assessment of its analytical utility. Of the literature examined in Section 2.1, only Liu’s contribution comes close to our preliminary argument. However, her conclusion is not enough to ‘plug’ the ‘gap’ left by vague definitions of sharp power. Liu’s short article asserts that sharp power is no more than ‘unsmart power’; and that it describes the unsuccessful combination of soft and hard power. What separates this

assessment from our preliminary argument is the difference between a concept being too vague to be of any analytic utility, and a concept being of zero analytic utility. If the idea of sharp power could be, as it were, ‘sharpened’, more closely defined, it might prove to be of some use in

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16 analysing, for example, Chinese influence over western universities. However, to reach that point, this thesis must first use empirical analysis to ascertain whether or not sharp power can be proved to be too vague to be of any analytical utility. The following section lays the

groundwork for this analysis. It provides a concise definition of sharp power, based on the available literature, and develops the tools we require to analyse it.

Section 2.2: Clarifying Sharp Power

What then, to make of these varying accounts of sharp power? The existing literature examined above used qualitative empirical analysis to define the concept. So how can an idea for which no concrete definition has been provided be of any analytical and conceptual use? Certain key themes like secrecy and malign intent, along with core indicators like manipulation and

deception remain consistent. Despite this, political scientists are seemingly unable to agree whether it represents something new, an instance of soft power, sharp power, or something of no use at all. In the chapters to come, the utility of sharp power will be critically assessed using PRC influence over western university education as a case study. In order to proceed, this paper must adopt a clear and consistent definition of sharp power. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to two goals. First, developing a clear and consistent definition of sharp power, using information contained within the literature review. This definition will aim to be as all-encompassing as possible, given our goal is to examine PRC influence over university education. Secondly, a typological tool will be developed, such that we are able to recognise examples of sharp power as and when they occur.

Before we proceed to this paper’s empirical analysis we must first be confident in our ability to determine that something is, or is not, an example of sharp power. The literature review uncovered some key features of the concept including: malign intent; covert actions;

authoritarian governments; and a desire to shape public opinions and force otherwise unwanted change on a political target. It is not soft power, but neither is it hard power. The literature review also made clear that it was a specifically ‘active’ concept, one that one state inflicts deliberately on another. Finally, we must note that because of its secretive nature,

demonstrating evidence of sharp power carries with it a reliance on ‘smoking gun’ examples, proving one state wished to enact surreptitious harm on another. Understandably, such proof is difficult to find. To this end, a tool must be developed, whereby affirmative answers to a series of questions can only lead us to conclude that a specific case demonstrates both manipulation,

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17 and distraction. Following the examples discussed in the literature review, these actions must be committed by authoritarian states, with deliberate political goals in mind. Operationalisation of these nebulous terms will allow us to show whether or not a specific case constitutes an example of sharp power.

The first task is to settle on a definition of sharp power. Because the discussion of the concept began with Walker & Ludwig’s report, the academic debate that ensued necessarily revolves around their original description. Their definition embodies the key tenets of sharp power that other political scientists sought to discuss and define. Therefore, and hereinafter, this paper shall adopt a definition of sharp power taken from Walker & Ludwig’s contribution to the National Endowment for Democracy report. Sharp power shall be defined as:

Authoritarian influence not intended to attract or persuade, but centering on distraction and manipulation.

Walker & Ludwig provide further context to their definition in saying that the repression exercised by authoritarian regimes at home is applied abroad to secure their own interests. “What we have to date understood as ‘authoritarian soft power’ is better categorized as ‘sharp power’ that pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries” (Walker & Ludwig, 2017: 6).

The logic behind the decision to develop a typological tool is inspired by Oisín Tansey’s 2016 article The Problem with Autocracy Promotion. The tool Tansey develops sets out a series of straightforward questions to determine whether or not something is an example of autocracy promotion (2016: 153). In this paper the typological tool asks three questions, but with the same goal of identifying the presence of an abstract concept. The first question simply asks whether the example being investigated demonstrates some influence from an authoritarian state. China and Russia are two prominent examples of contemporary autocratic states; which are non-democratic, with a non-pluralistic and strong central state (Linz 1975: 264). They are also frequently cited as influential states that employ sharp power to achieve their own ends

(e.g.: Walker & Ludwig 2017: 10; Mesežnikov 2017; 94; Mesežnikov & Pleschová 2017: 124). In this instance, ‘influence’ refers to the capacity for one actor to affect the actions of another. Often this interaction can be political in nature. In our paper, the affecting state is authoritarian:

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18 the People’s Republic of China. The actor being affected is a university, or at a higher level, the state that houses that institution.

This first question seeks to identify authoritarian influence. The nature of this influence, positive or negative is not questioned. In a literal sense, all interactions between states are to varying degrees influential. What is important for our purpose is the political constitution of the state committing the action. The point of this first question is to rule out non-authoritarian influence, as per our definition. Because this essay looks at examples of Chinese influence on western

university education, and because China is an authoritarian state, for every example that we can demonstrate PRC government involvement, we are able to answer this question

affirmatively (Minzner 2011: 1).

The second question seeks to determine whether or not a particular case constitutes evidence of distraction. By its very nature, distraction grabs the attention of an actor. It would logically be easier to identify than manipulation. The largest English language dictionary in the world, Oxford English Dictionary, defines it as “as something that prevents an actor from concentrating on something else” (2020). I take this ‘something else’ to mean the normal course of events the distracted actor would otherwise be engaged in. The final question the tool looks to answer is whether or not manipulative action is at play. Successful manipulation, the ability to control or influence a person or situation cleverly, unfairly or unscrupulously is often covert and difficult to detect (Oxford Languages 2020). Examples that fail to respond positively to these criteria cannot be thought of as conclusive examples of sharp power.

Perhaps the key problem with Walker & Ludwig’s definition is that recognising abstract terms like ‘manipulation’ and ‘deception’ is difficult, and subjective. Operationalising such terms presents a serious problem. Quantitative or qualitative indices presenting evidence of their existence, and hence sharp power’s conceptual worth, are easy to provide, yet difficult to justify. Such is the ‘breadth’ of these imprecise definitions. In a limitless array of examples, from the quotidian to the unusual, we might find evidence of distraction and manipulation. For example, distraction could be demonstrated by noting the large-scale fabrication of social media posts; or counting reports and events hosted by sympathetic think tanks or state-controlled cultural

bodies like Confucius Institutes. Alternatively, convincing cases could be made that distraction is evident in the US ‘Pizzagate’ scandal, or the USSR’s rumor of AIDS being the result of

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19 social media comments, for example. The co-option of Hollywood film studios by Chinese firms could demonstrate distraction if one counted the number of positive or pro-China storylines or characters in films funded with Chinese money. The point here is that distraction is a broad term, and can be demonstrated by any number of indices.

The same can be said of manipulation. If one were looking at the manipulation of elections, then citing evidence of stuffed ballot boxes would be a good indication. Chinese qiaowu in Peru could demonstrate manipulation by examining the means of influencing Peruvians of Chinese

descent, then tracking their voting habits and examining polling of their positions on various policies favourable to China. If you wanted to examine Chinese manipulation of politicians then perhaps examining well-known cases of corruption by Chinese means and examining their legislative record could provide evidence. Again, as with the paragraph on distraction, the point is that choosing one valid means of operationalising terms such as these risks excluding other equally valid interpretations of the words.

To exhaustively cover off all definitions of manipulation and distraction on university campuses with reliable indicators would require an enormous, perhaps insurmountable amount of work. Interpreting this data would be a similarly difficult challenge. In her piece examining the concept of ‘social capital’, Gabriel criticises such a scatter-shot approach to the measurement of abstract terms. “Too many indices with no agreed-on scale” can result in confusion and overwrought claims of relevance (Gabriel 2009: 1517). In any case, there is no authoritative list of every single definition of these concepts. One can never truly know if an accurate account of a term had been captured by the indicators used. Nevertheless, despite this problem, this paper still needs to be able to convincingly demonstrate that sharp power plausibly exists. To do this the first definitions provided by the Oxford English Dictionary shall be used. These are:

1) Distract: Prevent (someone) from concentrating on something (Oxford Languages 2020). 2) Manipulate: Control or influence (a person or situation) cleverly or unscrupulously

(Oxford Languages 2020).

Quality of both analysis and example is important here. To plausibly demonstrate distraction, we will have to walk through the cases studied in Chapter Four and examine by a variety of means whether one actor has prevented another from concentrating on something. In some, this might mean a flurry of journalistic interest, or political speeches. In others, a change of direction, as

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20 the distracted actor resolves to address a separate problem to its pre-distraction goals. Similar measures, for example, espionage, cyber-hacking, or the official CCP sanction of pro-China protestors at foreign universities, will be employed to reasonably identify manipulation. In the absence of physical or quantifiable indices, care must be taken that arguments are clear and reasoned. The aim is to demonstrate our examples would align with the dictionary definitions of deception and manipulation. When deciding whether an example counts as distraction or manipulation, we would do well to recall the nature of sharp power, imparted to us through the literature review. Malign political ends are part of the authoritarian nation’s goals here. Secrecy too, is an integral component of their method.

The advantage of such an approach is that it allows us to demonstrate manipulation and distraction in a variety of different settings. Free from narrow restrictions, sharp power could potentially be a useful concept with which to understand the nature of Chinese interference in western universities. The evidence of malign PRC influence employed here is not bound by overly prescriptive indices using this approach. On the other hand, by choosing not to adopt a particular indicator, we risk imprecise language undermining our analysis, and an

over-abundance of examples of sharp power. The solution to this is precise and literal language, and a ruthless, though not reckless approach to examples that do not qualify as demonstrating both distraction and manipulation. Other scholars may well disagree with how distraction and

manipulation are interpreted here. They may also propose indices that reasonably demonstrate evidence of how they understand our key terms and thus, sharp power. The approach this paper adopts is not conclusive. Rather it seeks to progress the conversation on the utility of sharp power as it is currently ‘understood’. This approach presents obvious avenues for future research.

As a final note on this chapter of conceptual considerations, it is important to take stock of what might occur if our preliminary argument is proved correct. If sharp power is indeed too vague a concept to be of much conceptual utility, it will need to be amended. If changes are to occur, they will become apparent in Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis. Therefore, our conclusion may need to devote time and energy to a discussion of a new definition of sharp power, one that can explain Chinese interactions with western universities.

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Chapter Three: Methodological Approach

Chapter Three: Methodological Approach describes how the evidence for the analytical portion of this paper is organised. Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis is perhaps the most important section of this paper. It guides the reader through several examples of potential sharp power. The groundwork laid out by this preliminary Chapter aids the reader’s comprehension. The method by which Chapter Four’s data is selected is discussed, and the justification for the categorisation of these sources is supplied. In addition, this chapter also defends the paper’s decision to adopt PRC influence on western university campuses as a case study. Biases and the shortcomings of the approach adopted are discussed. Finally, this section also sets up the timeframe and locations within which this paper sits.

The texts examined in the Literature Review repeatedly labelled China as a key player in the use of contemporary sharp power, and universities specifically as major targets

(for example: Walker & Ludwig; Cardenal; Walker; Diamond & Schell; Nye). As such, the case of Chinese influence on western university campuses has been selected with the expectation that under these circumstances, we are very likely to find examples that satisfy the definition of sharp power this paper has adopted. With the discussion of enough potential examples of sharp power, we are able to assess the validity of the concept of sharp power, and its suitability to explain Chinese interference with western university education.

With a definition of sharp power adopted, the findings presented here are arranged in such a way as to holistically explore the academic utility of sharp power as an analytical concept. Different examples of manipulative or deceptive Chinese behaviour on western university

campuses will be examined. This data will be categorised by type, to best provide a broad range of examples, as exhaustive as possible, while avoiding the duplication of similar specimens. These examples will be assessed against the typological tool developed in Chapter Two. By analysing these cases, we begin to see the emergence of an argument about sharp power itself, and whether it is of conceptual use in the case of PRC interactions with western universities. Chapter Five will draw upon this analysis and discuss a refined and more conceptually useful definition of sharp power.

The categories in which the examples sit are based on a 2019 report by the Australian Department of Education. The report: Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the

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22 Australian University Sector (the Guidelines) provides guidance on how universities can

safeguard their people, assess risk, and protect their data (University Foreign Interference Taskforce 2019: 5). It is revealing of the university sector’s sensitivities that potential perpetrators of foreign interference are at no point specified in the report. Because most examples in this paper are taken from the Australian context, it is appropriate to include examples from North American and Europe in these categories. Students, academics and administrators frequently move between institutions across these three regions. Rough cultural similarities mean the universities all operate in similar manners. The paper cites three specific areas of risk: communication and education, which deals mostly with students and teaching; knowledge sharing, which addresses research; and cyber-security (idem: 3). These three categories appear in this paper as: Section 4.1: Students; Section 4.2: Academics; and Section 4.3: Cyber-Attacks.

In addition, a fourth area of analysis has been included, which looks at the role of Confucius Institutes. The Department of Education’s report issues a series of recommendations, one of which urges universities to identify staff affiliated with international institutions (idem: 15). Although not mentioned in the report, this recommendation was widely seen as targeting Confucius Institutes (Bolton, 2019). Such targeted suspicion aligns with the concerns of many sinologists, who see these bodies as little more than an instrument for Chinese influence (e.g. Sørensen 2017:117).

Practically, this means Chapter Four is divided into five sections. Each sub-section describes a different kind of interaction between the PRC and western universities. Beginning with examples of student misbehaviour, the paper will then examine, in order: PRC interference in western academia; cyber-attacks; and Confucius Institutes. The examples used here are taken from well-known cases, and placed in their appropriate category. The final section summarises the findings of Chapter Four, in an assessment of the concept of sharp power.

Chinese influence on western university campuses surely extends beyond the examples

discussed in the coming sections of this chapter. There are likely also examples not cited in this paper that do not neatly fit within the categories used here. In this sense, Chapter Four is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, we are presented with a wide spread of known examples of malign and politically motivated actions by the PRC against tertiary institutions in western nations. While the examples employed below may be subject to some form of editorial bias on

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23 the part of their authors against the PRC, they are not fabricated. Taken from syndicated and respected sources like academic journals, newspapers and think tank reports, the material provided is more than adequate to examine the nature of sharp power. It is only by critically reviewing seemingly unambiguous examples against Walker & Ludwig’s definition of sharp power, and employing the typological tool, that we can know whether the concept captures the nature of China’s action.

Because of the secretive nature of sharp power, the majority of this analysis is employed against qualitative sources, for which inductive analysis is eminently suitable. Databases of quantifiable indicators of covert and secure material are rare indeed. The majority of the sources used here are drawn from academic articles and media sources like newspapers and magazine articles. Published non-fiction sources describing Chinese interactions with western universities reinforce this qualitative analysis. Where appropriate, quantitative sources have also been employed to supplement and reinforce arguments. This holistic blend of sources allows for a thorough and holistic argument. Such a complex approach is necessary given the nebulous nature of sharp power.

It is important to remind ourselves that by their very nature, the tools of sharp power are secretive and not open to ‘outsiders’. Only insiders have access to this kind of knowledge. Without a ‘smoking gun’, it is impossible to fully understand the actor’s intent. Governments do not publicly announce such malign actions. To be sure, such ‘smoking guns’ do exist. Clive Hamilton’s Silent Invasion relies heavily on the PhD dissertation of James To, a New Zealand academic who uncovered a trove of confidential PRC documents (Hamilton 2018: Loc 553). In the discussion to come, well-known examples of Chinese interference on western university campuses are carefully assessed. Using these cases reasoned judgements of plausible government-directed distraction and manipulation can be made. By conducting a detailed analysis of primary and secondary sources, we are able to answer whether or not sharp power can explain PRC interference in western university education.

In addition, it is also important to be conscious of the lack of Chinese-language sources

employed here. With the notable exception of Joske, few if any of the academics and journalists cited in this paper are able to speak or read the languages of the People’s Republic of China. This colours their interpretation of events. Unfortunately this paper is hindered by that same shortcoming. Short of the occasional translation of PRC policy into English, the only remedy to

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24 this weakness is a cognisance of the biases and limitations that accompany such a limitation. These include, among other things: an inability to spot cultural particularities; the potential for editorial bias in the sources employed; and my own unconscious bias as the author of this paper.

The timeframe for this analysis is overwhelmingly centered on the 21st century. This is partly because Walker & Ludwig’s original definition of sharp power was only recently formulated in 2017. It is also because the absolute number of Chinese students attending western universities before the year 2000 was far lower (Babones 2019: 3). So too, was the number of Chinese academics working outside of China. The possibility of PRC interference was therefore, not zero. But it is worth reminding ourselves here of Nye’s point that the basic model of sharp power is not new. Rather, it is the “speed with which such disinformation can spread and the low cost of spreading it. Electrons are cheaper, faster, safer, and more deniable than spies” (2018). China’s power has risen concurrently with the proliferation and widespread adoption of digital technologies across the world. It is only natural therefore, that the examples employed in this paper come from the 21st century. What’s more, these examples are concentrated in the latter half of the 2010s, as the trend of digital integration and rising Chinese power have continued.

The majority of sources adopted in Chapter Four are taken from Australian experiences of malign and politically motivated Chinese sharp power. The logic behind this approach is twofold. First, given its proximity, economic interdependence, and high proportion of citizens with

Chinese heritage, Australia is bound to close PRC scrutiny. As with sharp power, some of this scrutiny is bound to be unwanted. However, the concept itself is by no means limited to

Australia, hence examples from other countries. Where appropriate, some potential instances of sharp power have been taken from Europe, or North America. In a sense, the location of

sources is not important. What matters is the content. Analysis of this content is intended to derive an assessment of sharp power, the better to then answer whether it can explain Chinese interference with western universities.

Some final issues of nomenclature and administration should also be clarified here before we proceed to this paper’s chapter on analysis. First, the umbrella term used for the regions of Australia, Europe and North America is ‘western’. Secondly, the terms ‘PRC’, ‘China’, and ‘CCP’ are used interchangeably to refer to the same authoritarian entity. University education is

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25 italics are used sparingly throughout this paper to emphasise particular words within a sentence or quote. The earlier emphasis on distraction and manipulation in Walker & Ludwig’s definition of sharp power is one example of this. Italics are also used for non-English words and when referring to the names of books, reports, academic articles and papers, and one cartoon film series.

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Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis

In this chapter Chinese influence on western university campuses is examined. The aim of this empirical analysis is not to demonstrate Chinese clout over tertiary education sectors; that is a separate thesis unto itself. Rather, the goal here is to use the typological tool to test whether sharp power can enlighten us of the true nature of Chinese interactions with western

universities. The analysis contained herein employs examples of distracting and manipulative influence employed with political intent. The quality of analysis of the case studies in this chapter will provide answers to questions of the conceptual clarity of sharp power.

As mentioned previously, due to the lack of ‘smoking gun’ instances of sharp power, this

chapter will analyse examples commonly referred to in the literature, using the typological tool to determine whether they are indeed representative of sharp power. They are grouped according to type, to aid comprehension. Obviously, there is no quantitative list encompassing all

examples of Chinese sharp power. Therefore, the ensuing inductive analysis takes a selection of examples to build up a picture of Walker & Ludwig’s definition of sharp power. The examples test the concept’s ability to describe the nature of deceptive actions being used by one country to influence another.

This analysis is presented across several distinct sections. Each of these examines a different aspect of Chinese ‘sharp power’ on university campuses, looking for examples of distraction and manipulation. Beginning with student misbehaviour, the paper continues on to the PRC’s influence over western university academia; cyber-hacking; and finally, Confucius Institutes. Each section ends with a brief analysis, tying it back to the core question this paper seeks to answer: whether sharp power is of any conceptual use in explaining the nature of these

interactions. The significance of these conclusions and their impact on how this paper discusses sharp power will be considered in the final section of this Chapter.

Section 4.1: Students

In recent years many Western universities have enrolled record numbers of international students. Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated than in Australia. Such an extreme example is useful because if sharp power can explain Chinese interactions on university campuses, then surely it is easiest to identify the phenomenon where it is most prevalent. Between 2012 and

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27 2017, international student enrollments in Australia grew at more than twice the rate of domestic enrollments (Babones 2019: 4). In the wake of declining government investment, universities are strongly incentivised to enroll ever greater numbers of international students, taking advantage of a system that allows them to charge their own fees, in a way that enrolling domestic students does not (idem: 3). The more prestigious a university is perceived to be, the higher the fees they can charge. Tertiary education in Australia in 2017 was a $32 billion dollar industry, rising from $19 billion in 2008 (ibid)1_{. This makes it Australia’s third largest export,} behind iron and coal (DFAT, 2019: 19). Partly as a result of this newfound richesse, the international rankings of Australian universities have skyrocketed (as judged by organisations like Times Higher Education) (Ross, 2019). The USYD sociologist and sinologist Salvatore Babones underlined these developments in a recent opinion piece, “the 2010s were a halcyon decade for Australia’s leading universities” (Babones, 2020)

However, this newfound wealth is built upon shaky foundations. The new students funding this expansion are overwhelmingly Chinese. At several leading universities, Chinese students make up more than 50% of all international students (Babones 2019: 1). In 2017, it was estimated that the University of Sydney, the oldest, and arguably most prestigious university in the country, depended on Chinese students for fully 22-23% of its revenue (ibid). These students accounted for more than 35% of its total student body, higher than the 28.5% across all Australian

universities. Similar numbers are repeated across all eight of the prestigious ‘Group of Eight’ research universities. Only two institutions have international students making up less than 10% of their student body: the rurally based University of New England; and the University of Notre Dame (idem: 7).

The revenues derived from international student fees have driven increases in infrastructure expenditure, research output, workforce capacity, and many other projects otherwise beyond the means of a domestically-orientated system (Babones 2019: 16). Fiscal overdependence on international students is one major problem, another is an alleged decline in academic

standards. Investigative journalism by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Four Corners program revealed marked pressure on academics to compromise academic and admission standards to accommodate these valuable international students (2019). The University of Sydney, for example, requires an International English Language Testing System score of 6.5

1_{$32 billion AUD (2017) is roughly equal to 22 billion Euro (2020) and $19 billion AUD (2008) is roughly} equal to 12.9 billion Euro (2020).

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28 (competent user) as a minimum entry standard. However, students who fail to reach that

threshold can apply to a for-profit college partnered with the university, paying up to $34,000 AUD for a 40-week course that advertises a 95% acceptance rate into USYD with a TEFL score of just 5.0 (partial command of the language) (Babones 2019: 11).

In response to well-publicised concerns, several institutions have promised to “diversify” their international student intake to reduce the risk these problems present (Robinson, 2019). However, China’s large population, geographical proximity to Australia, and relative wealth compared to other nations in the region, make diversifying the international student body a challenge for universities (Babones 2019: 18). There is no one nation wealthy enough, or populous enough to maintain the present system without relying on Chinese students in Australia. Babones notes with concern that several political factors, including a confrontation between Australia and China, a change in Australia’s immigration policies, or Chinese concerns about the safety of their students in Australia could affect the number of international students, and hence, the health of Australia’s tertiary education sector.

Such concern is only underscored by the fact that much of this financing comes from an authoritarian state. This concern is not without merit; several times in the past China has used its overwhelming purchasing power in certain industries to pursue favorable political outcomes. One example comes from the luxury fashion industry, for which China is a key market. Brands from Dolce & Gabbana to Givenchy to Versace have apologised to Chinese consumers for clothing designs that did not align with their political sensitivities (Washington Post, via SMH, 2019). In response to a t-shirt design that appeared to show Hong Kong and Macau as independent countries, the head of Versace said she was “deeply sorry” for the confusion, an attempt to ward off calls for a Chinese boycott of the brand (ibid). Such economic coercion smacks of manipulation.

Other Australian export markets have already set a precedent. In early 2019, Chinese officials banned the import of Australian coal. This boycott sent the Australian dollar tumbling, as a key export was momentarily prevented from reaching its largest market (ABC, 2019). It has been suggested that the Chinese boycott is an attempt to safeguard local supply from an abundance of foreign coal (Ralph, 2019). Using their large market share as capital, the threats against the coal and luxury markets certainly appear politically motivated, and we can in certain respects discern a negative intent. It visibly and loudly manipulates industries, instructing them of what

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29 the PRC will and will not accept. It also draws attention, distracting these actors away from their normal course of business, as they scramble to correct the cause of offence. These are

therefore examples of Chinese sharp power. The concern of China critics like Babones and Hamilton is that a similar strike against Australia’s tertiary education industry could devastate the sector.

What follows is an examination of two areas in which the Chinese students on whom Australian universities are so reliant have contributed towards Chinese sharp power. Drawing lessons from these extreme examples, we will be able to examine the utility of sharp power as an analytical concept. As with the other sections, this portion of the paper will conclude with an exploration of the ways in which instances of Chinese student misbehaviour, and the distraction and

manipulation evident therein, contribute, or fail to contribute, towards Chinese sharp power. The typological tool will be employed to determine whether or not the specific instance in question counts as an example of sharp power.

4.1.1: Chinese Student and Scholars Associations

One of the key means by which students organise themselves on Australian campuses is through student organisations. These groups can cover any conceivable topic, from football, to music to chocolate. For international students, a local university Indian, German, or Fijian students’ society can provide an invaluable resource. These bodies can provide information on life in Australia, a means of meeting students from a similar cultural background, and can provide access to familiar cultural events.

Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSA) differ from other international student societies in that their activities are often coordinated by educational attaches at local embassies (To 2014: 29). According to Chen Yonglin, a Chinese diplomat who defected to Australia in 2005, meetings of Sydney university CSSA’s take place in the local consulate, and the heads of each chapter are “hand-picked by the Chinese consulate” (Hamilton: Loc 4202). This

arrangement goes against the policies of most universities, who require executives to be elected by democratic means. According to Hamilton, CSSA’s receive funding through the Chinese government, and liaise extensively with local embassies and consulates. Hamilton also remarks that each year CSSA presidents are flown to the Australian capital, Canberra, to a meeting held at the embassy’s educational office. Here, embassy officials instruct students on the latest party doctrines (idem: Loc 4216).

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30 Guided and supported by agents of the Chinese government, CSSAs have the potential to be a potent source of Chinese sharp power. In countries like Australia, weight of numbers amplifies the influence of these student groups. In 2018, student representative elections at the University of Sydney were won by a group made up of predominantly Chinese students, who claimed to represent the interests of all students, international and domestic (Honi Soit, 2018). The potential here for influence from the authoritarian Chinese state is clear.

One potent example of this potential for influence and distraction comes from the 2008 Olympic Torch relay in the build up to the Beijing Summer Olympics. Passing through Australia’s capital, Canberra, a group of Falun Gong and supporters of Tibetan autonomy were disrupted and outnumbered by a collection of CSSA students mobilised from a number of universities on the Eastern coast (Hamilton & Joske 2017: 18). Protestors were “attacked by a group of about 50 people draped in Chinese flags” (SMH 2008). Hamilton & Joske assert in their submission to the high-powered Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security that other rallies in Sydney and Melbourne witnessed similar outbursts. While such counter-protests can certainly manipulate public opinion, influencing events that promote narratives anathematic to the CCP, they do so in a loud, public and transparent manner. There is none of the covert machinations generally ascribed to sharp power. Nor do they prevent an actor from focusing on a particular issue. If anything, the opposite is true. The actor affected resents Chinese intrusion in its internal affairs.

Seen from this perspective, CSSAs represent a crude tool for enacting foreign interference. Although they are a mechanism for the advancement of CCP policies and positions on foreign university campuses, CSSAs manipulate only insofar as they can disrupt legitimate protests and disagreement. This manipulation rarely if ever wins ‘hearts and minds’, and instead more often stokes disapproving media coverage and commentary (e.g. SMH 2008). It does not distract from an issue, but draws attention to it, and not in a manner that presents any obvious strategic benefit to the authoritarian state. Such occurrences cannot count as sharp power, and sharp power cannot explain this aspect of CCP interaction with western university education. Despite their authoritarian direction, CSSAs lack any covert considerations, and merely serve to set general public opinion against the larger goals of the PRC.

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4.1.2: Patriotic Students

It must be noted that in spite of the vast numbers of Chinese students, and Chinese educational institutions interacting with Western educational systems across the world, there are only a comparatively tiny number of publicly-known instances where the university’s expectations of proper behavior are breached. In questioning whether or not these instances of distraction and manipulation count as examples of sharp power it is worth reminding ourselves of Walker & Ludwig’s charge that the influence that regimes like China and Russia wield cannot be divorced from their ideology. In the absence of ‘smoking gun’ evidence, we would do well to remind ourselves of this key tenet of sharp power when examining individual instances of student malfeasance. Where we detect plausible influence from such authoritarian states over their students, we must also suspect that any distraction or manipulation present is being deliberately orchestrated.

In July 2019, political conflict between Hong Kong and the PRC erupted at the University of Queensland. On one side, supporters of Hong Kong protested against perceived interference by China in the affairs of the semi-independent city. On the other, international students from the Chinese mainland, their national anthem blaring through loudspeakers. Student leaders led chants on both sides (Zhou 2019). Events escalated when pro-Beijing students began ripping up the signs held by supporters of Hong Kong. Students began to push, shove, and punch one another. Eventually, police were called in to disperse the rival groups (ibid). Following the demonstration, the Chinese Consul in Brisbane praised the “spontaneous patriotic behaviour” of his compatriots, his praise providing official vindication for their narrative and actions

(Cave 2019). In response, the Australian Foreign Minister took the unusual step of warning foreign diplomats against attempting to curtail free speech (ibid).

Another example. In 2015 at the Australian National University (ANU), the president of the local CSSA walked into a campus pharmacy, enraged by the fact they were selling copies of the Falun Gong Epoch Times. Yelling at the pharmacist, ‘who authorised you to sell this?’ the student intimidated patrons, removed copies of the newspaper, and threw them into a bin. ANU officials did not respond to the incident, noting that no one had called security. They did criticise the student, adding that ‘tolerance of difference’ was an important component to being admitted to study at the prestigious university (Hamilton 2018: Loc 4148).

Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions with Western Universities?