Spaces of radicalization : an explorative study of the role of space in jihadist radicalization in Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch

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Graduate School of Social Sciences Master International Relations Final Thesis

Spaces of Radicalization:

An explorative study of the role of space in jihadist radicalization

in Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch

June 24 2016

Student: Dario Nassal 11127023

Email: darionassal@web.de

Supervisor: Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank all participants in the study for sharing their insights and personal accounts of daily meaning-making practices in Sossenheim and Tan-nenbusch1. Secondly, I would like to specifically express my gratitude to my family, who empowered me to enjoy this year of educational experience in Amsterdam. I want to thank my supervisor, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, who met my research interest with a great degree of openness and Maxime Kern, who provided useful tips in the process of writing. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to space itself and all which is not yet manifested. Without you this thesis could not have been written.

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Abstract

This thesis employs an interpretivist approach and seeks to gain in-depth under-standing of two suburban spaces in Germany that are seen as hotspots of homegrown jihadist radicalization: Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch. Thereby, it ad-dresses a two-fold gap in the existing literature. First, it goes beyond existing expla-nations for radicalization that treat space as a mere container of influential variables. Second, it chooses interpretivist methodology in a field that is mainly based on pos-itivist assumptions. Radical hotspots are theorized in this thesis as spatial overlaps between push- and pull-factors. Employing sociological literature on the connections between space and identity as well as Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus, a framework is constructed that allows to investigate how spaces as embodiments of social struc-tures might create and emphasize sentiments of radical exclusion that can create vul-nerabilities conducive to radicalization.

The results from one month of fieldwork emphasize that space as a theoreti-cal concept is helpful to understand the concentration of raditheoreti-calization in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch. The main findings demonstrate that architecture and the web of social relations manifest and reinforces “economic group based deprivation”; “soci-etal stigmatization” and “securitization”, themes that are closely linked to radical-ization, while at the same time provides networks with the opportunity to carry out recruitment.

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1 Introduction

A world within a world within a world my friend And borders that will never end

We strive for bold consistency And must pretend

To comprehend2

Mustafa recalls that night in 2012 as if it was yesterday3. It was around 6 p.m. They were lifting weights like every Wednesday in the small fitness room in their local youth club; Mustafa was almost done with his work out, sweat was pouring down his face as he went to the bench for one last set. Then Marco, a guy who had just recently started working out with them, started talking to a teenager next to him “Brother, is it not a shame what is happening in Syria? As Muslims we should go and do something, brother.” Mustafa paused irritated, while Marco continued: “We should help them fight the unbelievers, the takfir!” Mustafa dropped his dumbbells and interrupted: “Are you trying to say what I think you are trying to say!?” He began arguing with Marco and eventually threw him out of the fitness room.

Marco never came back, but only several months after this conversation, his name appeared in newspapers all over Germany. As it turned out, Marco G. was the infamous Jihadist suitcase bomber of Bonn (Löer and Schröm, 2014). Only several meters from the fitness room in a small flat of a 12-storage apartment block in Oppelner Street, Marco G. had lived and planned in cell with three other Jihadists what could have been the largest terrorist attack on German soil: A bomb in the center of Bonn main station in the midst of December during Christmas time that only did not detonate, because there was a construction error in the bomb (Franz, 2014). Not far from Marco G.’s flat, in the same suburb only several hundred meters apart, Bekkay Harrach, the head of German Al-Qaeda, was running a call shop for years before emigrating to fight in Afghanistan in 2007 (Meifert, 2009). In that exact same neighborhood, numerous other homegrown Jihadists grew up, lived and radicalized. Examples are Yamin A.-Z., who published the first German propaganda video for

2_{Last stanza of an untitled poem written by the author.}

3_{The following anecdote is taken from the interviews. It was told by college student Mustafa who}

is employed as a part-time social worker at Jugendhaus Brücke, the local youth center in New Tannenbusch.

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the IS (Seher, 2016) or Abdiarazak B., who blew himself up in front of a luxury hotel in Mogadishu in Somalia last year killing 18 people (FAZ 2015b); and the list does not end here (e.g. Seher, 2016). All of these Jihadists are from Tannenbusch, a small suburb northwest of Bonn.

Tannenbusch is not alone in Europe. Next to Tannenbusch, I stumbled across another spectacular case in Germany not all too far from Bonn: Frankfurt Sossen-heim. It was here that Arid U., the first terrorist that had committed a lethal attack on German soil had lived (e.g. Bartsch, Gebauer and Musharbash, 2011); in the same neighborhood as Bilal G., one of the heads of the German Salafi network Dawa FFM (Voigts, 2014b), and Rami M., who gained a reputation as a jihadist fighter on Youtube (e.g. NH24, 2011). In recent months, Molenbeek, Schaerbeek or Saint-Denis have been mentioned in the media again and again (e.g. Burke, 2016; Kern, 2015). But media also reports of other suburbs in cities such as London, Berlin, Madrid and Frankfurt that point to a similar tendency. A trend appears to arise, where specific low-income suburbs on the fringe of European cities develop into places where not only terrorists hide and organize, but also where specifically high numbers of residents radicalize for Islamist jihad as suicide bombers at home and abroad (e.g. Hetrodt, 2015b; Kopi-etz, 2014; Sageman and Atran, 2009; Vermeulen, 2014; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

These anecdotes and instances emphasize that the puzzle why certain sub-urbs in Europe are such radical hotspots is becoming more and more relevant. I was intrigued and motivated to find out more: How is it possible that in a suburb like Tan-nenbusch, in a relatively rich country such as Germany, in the heart of our continent, bulks of people decide to turn radically against the land and society they had been brought up in? Why is radicalization so concentrated in Tannenbusch and Sossen-heim? Is there something about these radical hot-spots that makes them spaces of rad-icalization or is it pure coincidence that radrad-icalization happens to happen somewhere and not elsewhere?

Choosing an interpretivist approach, this thesis seeks to improve our under-standing of the spatial concentration of radicalization in both Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch. Thereby, it addresses a two-fold gap in the existing litera-ture. First, it goes beyond existing explanations for radicalization that treat space as a mere container of influential variables. Second, it chooses interpretivist methodology in a field that is mainly based on positivist assumptions.

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space as an intrinsic part of human identity and subjectivity. In this strand of soci-ological literature, space is both a physical and social phenomenon (Bourdieu, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991). Urban spaces, in that sense, are not only a collection of buildings, but also carriers of a specific set of social structures (e.g. Sassen, 2013). Drawing from these concepts, this thesis explores the spaces of radicalizationactive role of physical and social space in producing and reinforcing conditions conducive to radicalization in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch.

It proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 defines key terms and revises existing lit-erature on Islamist homegrown radicalization in Europe in order to emphasize com-monalities and to clearly demarcate the research gap. Chapter 3 employs theories from sociology and urban space as well as Bourdieu’s habitus in order to derive a framework and lens to identify important themes of spatial interactions in the two radical hotspots. Chapter 4 reports on methodology. Chapter 5 contains the findings of one month of fieldwork in the two German suburbs. Chapter 5 discusses limita-tions of the thesis and concludes with implicalimita-tions for further research.

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2 The Missing Link to Space

2.1 Denition of key terms

In order to avoid ambiguity, I want to give a brief definition and elaboration of the key terms that will be used in this thesis.

Space: According to the theory section below, space in this thesis is understood as a synthesis of physical structures (such as architecture) and social structures (the web of daily interactions and experiences of inhabitants at a given location). It is defined as the positioning of a social grammar that finds physical expression in actual locations on the ground.

Radicalization: Radicalization shall be defined as the positioning of a social grammar that finds physical expression in actual locations on the ground.By defining radicalization in such terms the thesis follows other prominent definitions that stress intergroup violence (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, p.416) and see radical beliefs as part of a process towards radical actions (e.g. Steven and Neuman, 2009; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The focus on ‘thinking radical’ instead of ‘acting radical’ allows this thesis to shed light on the root causes and the broader milieu out of which single individuals engage in terrorist activities.

Jihadists:are Islamists that go beyond radical thinking as defined above and commit lethal violence against others4.

Salafismis commonly described as a radical, neoconservative branch of Islamism that sees the establishment of a society exclusively based on Islamic law as politically de-sirable goal (BfV, 2012, p.6). This thesis treats Salafism and the Salafist milieu as being in line with the definition on radicalization stated above. I do so because the ideolog-ical boundaries between militant and non-militant branches are blurred (Horst, 2011, p.4) and specifically in Germany, more than 90 percent of all homegrown jihadist ac-tivity emerges directly out of the Salafist milieu (BKA, 2015, p.30)

4_{It must be noted here that the great majority of Muslims believe that all types of violence against}

other human beings, especially lethal violence, are entirely against the principles of Islam (Nelson-Pallmeyer, 2005). The term Jihad is usually understood as the great jihad, the inner struggle to remain a good Muslim and carry out good deeds towards others (Marranci, 2006); ‘jihadists’, however, focus mostly on the concept of the small jihad, the right to defend fellow Muslims with weapons and use this concept for Islamist militancy (Horst, 2011, p.4).

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2.2 Models on Homegrown Radicalization in the West

Before theorizing on the active role of space, in the following, I outline some of the commonalities and findings from existing literature on jihadist homegrown radical-ization in Europe. Doing so will more clearly demarcate the research gap this thesis seeks to address and provide first themes for contextualizing conditions for radical-ization in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch.

The existing literature views radicalization as a process rather than an event (i.e. McGilloway et al., 2015). According to the mainstream understanding in the literature, radicalization means that the individual begins to see extreme forms of violence against out-group members as legitimate (e.g. McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, p.416) due to a mixture of (1) personal predispositions, (2) situational factors, (3) and group dynamics. Generally speaking, the literature differentiates between “push” and “pull” factors in these concepts (Mazarr, 2004, p.39). On the one hand, there is some form of vulnerability, some grievance that pushes the individual with certain predispositions into a cognitive opening, a period of meaning seeking. On the other hand there are social groups that make use of this cognitive opening and pull the individual into a radical worldview (ibid.).

The existing literature does not agree on the relative weight of push- or pull factors, nor on the form in which radicalization comes into being. Some models see it as a linear set of consecutive steps (e.g. Moghaddam, 2005), others name a vari-ety of coexisting factors that work interdependently and reciprocally (Precht, 2007; Sageman, 2008). Within the linear models, the number of stages or “steps” greatly varies. Silber and Batt for instance argue for four (2007); Moghaddam for five (2005); and McCauley and Moskalenko for 12 steps on the “staircase” towards becoming a terrorist (2008). Moreover, as King and Taylor point out, the literature is ambivalent on how active or passive organizations are in the process (2011, p.612) and what the ratio is between personal and situational factors in radicalization (ibid., p.614). If the literature can agree on something than that there is “no single cause or route responsi-ble for engaging in violent extremism” (McGilloway et al., 2015, p.49); radicalization, thus, is a multi-causal phenomenon; it develops due to some sort of interplay be-tween various influencers on push- and pull-side and it is depicted as some sort of process.

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publications that are treated as main conditions conducive to radicalization. I limit the following section on three that are perhaps the most mentioned in the literature.

Firstly, all conceptual models but also the empirical studies point to the fact that homegrown jihadists share certain demographic traits: They are mostly young (under the age of 30) and predominantly male (Bakker, 2006; Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2008; McCauley 2012)5.

Secondly, literature emphasizes the role of offline social networks. While the virtual realm gains importance in hardening radical attitudes, the existing models and empirical studies all highlight the important role of social networks in the offline world. Veldhuis and Staun for instance stress how radicalization is always connected to circles of friends and like-minded individuals that appear offline (2009); Sageman points to the importance of close networks of friends and kinships among radicalized Islamists (2008).

Lastly, all conceptual models argue that jihadist radicalization builds on some form of vulnerability that makes room for a cognitive opening (e.g. Borum, 2004; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2004; Precht, 2007). Numerous authors link this vulnerability to conditions of economic, political or societal depri-vation (e.g. Borum, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005). However, it is important to note here that the key is not the objective condition of being deprived, but rather the perception that it is so (King and Taylor, 2011, p.609); thus, it is the sentiment of being treated un-fair, unjust, worse off by groups of individuals that is channeled through the Jihadist frame into radicalization; not the condition itself.

Increasingly, scholars find that the vulnerabilities of radicalized individuals are oftentimes connected to processes of identity formation (i.e. Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2008). Many young second- and third generation im-migrants are struggling to reconciling their Western identity with that of their family heritage; they struggle to manage their relationship with the social world around and the roots they carry within (McGilloway et al., 2015; Mythen et al., 2009); and these identity management issues may produce cognitive openings that push the individ-ual towards radical worldviews. Especially in Europe where many second- and third generation Muslims live, the issue may be crucial (King and Taylor, 2011, p.611).

In short, the existing literature provides us with reoccurring themes that are

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commonly expected to be conducive of jihadist radicalization: Vulnerabilities that act as push-factors such as deprivation and identity problems; offline social networks that seek to pull the individual and a set of demographic traits.

2.3 The Missing Link to Space

Despite the abundance of publications in recent years (McGilloway et al., 2015), there is a remarkable absence of insights into whether the space where radicalization oc-curs makes a difference. If space is mentioned, authors treat it as a mere location. Au-thors, for example, argue that certain locations on the micro-scale are more suitable for radicalization than others; some authors focus on the radicalization in prisons that appears to increase in recent years (e.g. Jeswal, 2013) and others emphasize the im-portance of ‘recruitment magnets’ like radical mosques (Neumann et al., 2007, p.26). Yet, rather than actively investigating why it is that these spaces produce vulnera-bilities and recruitment, the existing literature suffices itself with referring to them as mere localities: As places where things happen. There are no explorations on the effects of specific urban spaces, such as those of entire neighborhoods or suburbs. Where such urban space is mentioned, literature fails to see spatial influence beyond demographic conditions (e.g. Mousseau, 2011, p.35). There is no theoretical frame-work applied to gain a more thorough understanding why it is that certain spaces correlate with radicalization and not others, and consequently no thorough analysis is being carried out. If the existing literature mentions space at all, it sees in it no more than a container of influential variables.

And yet, as mentioned in the introduction, there are spaces like Sossenheim and Tannenbusch, like Molenbeek and Saint-Denis that appear to work as hotspots of jihadist radicalization in Europe. Variables such as demography or level of in-come cannot truly give an answer to the question why radicalization happens at these places: Not all low-income areas in Europe are focal points of jihadist radicalization; not to mention areas containing an abundance of young males. One can deal with this puzzle in two ways: Either one can assert that it is mere coincidence that in some spaces radicalization grows while in other it does not, or and this is the second way to deal with the puzzle, one goes deeper into theories of space in order to gain a more profound understanding of the cases at hand. I argue that in light of recent de-velopments in Brussels, Paris, and cities like Bonn, the latter is highly relevant – for

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academia and even more so for the society we live in.

On top of that, as mentioned above, the existing literature concludes that there is not one certain pathway towards terrorism (McGilloway et al., 2015, p.49); this appears to make interpretivist approaches especially suitable to study the phe-nomenon. However, rather than looking for thick layers of contextual themes that might increase understanding of individual cases, the existing literature is still mainly focused on singling out specific factors and testing them across a wider set of cases; looking for individual “variables”, instead of emphasizing the contextual links be-tween them (e.g. Goli and Rezaei, 2010; McCauley, 2012; Mousseau, 2011). Tackling radicalization from an interpretivist standpoint and seeing space as an active shaper of conditions conducive to radicalization might provide a refreshing sign-post to-wards a fruitful avenue for future research.

These two considerations motivate the following research question: To what extent does space play an active role in homegrown Jihadist radicalization in the two German suburbs Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch?

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3 Theory: The active role of space and a grammar of

exclusion

3.1 Where? - The convergence of push and pull

Theory in the following must provide the context in which concepts can evolve (e.g. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.38); specifically, then, theory should enable us to find concepts on two questions: First, it should empower us to assess the ‘where’ of radicalization: What is needed at a certain location in order for radicalization to arise? And second, in order to address the research gap, we must have a theory to analyze the active role of space at these locations: How can we theorize space different from being a container of influential variables?

As we have seen in the existing literature, for radicalization to occur ‘push’ and ‘pull’-factors must be present. On the one hand, some form of vulnerability pro-duces a cognitive opening; on the other, radical social networks make use of these openings to pull the individual into radicalization. The literature goes on to mention that vulnerabilities are specifically to be found in certain micro-locations and not in others, for example in prisons, refugee centers or universities (Neumann et al., 2007, p.26), and likewise recruitment occurs more frequently at certain spaces like radical mosques, internet cafes and radical bookshops (ibid.). Surprisingly enough, the liter-ature does not go further than this; it does not combine these two findings. And yet, in order to have a framework to investigate on the locality of radicalization, it appears helpful to look at the combination of push and pull, or, to put it in more spatial terms, the convergence.

The logic behind this convergence is simple: If a given location is a space of vulnerability without there being any opportunity for recruitment at this location, then radicalization is not possible. At the same time, if space provides perfect oppor-tunities for recruitment (due to its hidden location etc.), but individuals are not there that carry vulnerabilities that are conducive to radicalization, then likewise radical-ization is not going to happen. In other words, spaces of radicalradical-ization are spaces where vulnerabilities and opportunities for recruitment meet. This logic is illustrated below.

Thus, if we want to gain a better understanding where radical hotspots are located, we will have to look out for this overlap, this convergence: Spaces where

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Figure 1: The convergence of push and pull.

a large number of individuals feel vulnerable while at the same time providing the opportunity for radical Islamist networks to pull the individual into a process of rad-icalization.

Taking the overlap as a lens provides with a better context to explain why prisons are rising in importance as spaces of radicalization. Not only do individuals feel vulnerable at these spaces. Radical Imams have access to prisons and increasingly returnees from the jihad are establishing in-prison networks (Neumann et al., 2007, p.23); both, thus, push and pull spatially converge. Mosques even in low-income areas, on the other hand, are not necessarily radical hotspots. Due to the fact that they are becoming more and more aware of the danger of radicalism and oftentimes strictly ban all ultra-conservative circles from entering the house (e.g. Slootman and Tillie, 2006), push-factors might be there, but pull-factors, however, are largely absent.

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3.2 How? - The active role of space

3.2.1 Space and opportunities to recruit

The second part to this theory section, then, must provide us with a lens to under-stand how space might be an active producer of the conditions that lead to such an overlap. To begin with, it is important to note that there is a structural difference between the factorvulnerability and the factoropportunity for recruitment opportunity for recruitment. The former is a certain kind of subjectivity or sentiment, the latter presupposes some form of pragmatic possibility. A space either provides the op-portunity to recruit (for example due to its hidden location or access) or it does not; ultimately, whether individuals feel vulnerable is due to a subjective perception of individuals at that space. It is theorized here that specifically two such opportunities for recruitment can be provided by spaces: The access to offline networks and the opportunity for individuals in these networks to make use of public locations as first points of contact.

Firstly, as mentioned in literature review, offline social networks still play an important role in the process of radicalization (e.g. Bakker, 2006, p.53; Sageman, 2008; Withnall, 2015), despite the growing role of the internet in recent years (e.g. King and Taylor, 2011, p.608). These offline social networks have to find manifestations in space somewhere and thus, one may conclude that space is insofar important for providing opportunities for recruitment in that certain spaces allow individuals to have access to these offline social networks. A necessary condition to such access in the offline world is spatial proximity.

Second, these radical networks make active use of space to recruit people. In recent years, recruitment has increasingly shifted to private homes and places un-derground; the importance of so-called recruitment magnets, like radical bookshops and mosques has apparently waned (e.g. Neumann and Rogers, 2007, p.1). How-ever, networks are still dependent to find new recruits; and therefore before shifting the recruitment activity to the private home, they oftentimes establish first contacts at public locations.

In sum, space can play a role in providing opportunities for recruitment by offering access to radical offline social networks (through proximity and for example hidden locations) as well as providing these networks with the opportunity to use certain public locations as first points of contact to find new recruits. Space itself,

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however, plays more of a permissive role in providing these opportunities; it permits individuals to act and recruit other individuals. But space in that part of the process is nothing near an active force; who is really acting are singular individuals in well-organized networks. Space appears to play a more important and a more active role at the push-side of radicalization.

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3.2.2 Space and subjectivity

In order to understand how space might actively shape sentiments and vulnerabilities that push the individual into radicalization, it is wise to go into sociological theories of space. Authors such as Foucault (1977), Bourdieu (1993) and Giddens (1990) go beyond the notion that spaces are mere localities; they emphasize that instead spaces are an intrinsic part of both agency and structure of individuals. In this strand of theory, the conception of space goes beyond the purely physical aspect of environ-ments. Sociological authors examine in what ways complex web of social relations are interrelated with certain physical spaces, such as urban landscapes. Literature on racialized spaces (Haymes, 1995; Gotham, 1998; Pattillo-McCoy, 1998); securitized urban spaces (Cowen and Siciliano, 2011) and gendered space (DeSena, 2000; Haney, 1996; Spain, 1993) builds on this tradition and emphasizes that space is an active shaper of an individual’s identity.

Interestingly, similar arguments are brought forward by a set of psycholog-ical studies (e.g. Lalli, 1992; Proshansky, 1978; Relph, 1976). Psychology focusses more on the micro-level, but the proposed logic is similar: Physical environments are not purely physical, but they contain social meanings. Individuals connect a specific set of experiences with locations such as the home, the workplace or the school and these experiences shape the individual’s sentiments and ultimately construct and re-construct the individual’s sense of self (Lalli, 1992, p.285). Accordingly, certain spaces produce certain place identities; part of this literature even sees common place iden-tities on the level of entire suburbs and cities (ibid.).

To construct a theoretical framework, it is essential at this point to examine how these strands of literature define space. Analytically, especially sociological au-thors differentiate between two aspects of space. Space has a physical and a social layer (Bourdieu, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991). The social layer consists of the web of social experiences, meanings and behavior of individuals. It is the sum of daily interac-tions that individuals live out somewhere and not elsewhere. Lefebvre uses the term ‘lived space’ to describe this layer (1991, p.39); Bourdieu refers to it as social space (1989). Thus, at any location, where individuals live and act, where they live and assign meaning, there is such a layer of social space that is pinned upon physical space. And it is the synthesis of physical and social space that produces certain sets of identities and subjectivities.

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But what is the connection between these two layers, between physical and social space? How is the one connected to the other? In order to answer these ques-tions and formulate a theoretical framework that can help us understand how space in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch has the ability to transform identities, it is helpful to look at Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus. According to Bourdieu, the habitus is a scheme that structures the individual’s repertoire of possible interactions (ibid., p.72). Put simply, it is a structure of behavior learned in the past that one keeps on perpet-uating by acting it out. Thus, the habitus is both agency and structure at once.

In its basic logic, the habitus takes the form of a social grammar. Bourdieu gives the example of a child learning to behave like an adult (ibid., p.87): Instead of observing every single piece of behavior that makes for an adult, the child at some point understands the basic logic, the grammar, behind the behavior of the adult. And this grammar will determine the behavior of the child during her life as a grown-up (ibid.).

The habitus, the social grammar, is in itself a spatial structure, because like any language or grammar, it assigns meanings to certain positions (ibid., p.90). The taxonomies are ordered through relations of proximity and distance, like any lan-guage that has synonyms and antonyms and meanings that are closely related and far apart.

But the habitus is not just spatial on a meta-level. It also finds manifestation in physical space. Certain actions, certain meanings are assigned to certain physical spaces (ibid., p.89). Bourdieu gives the example of a house where the traditional gen-der division of labor is acted out according to rooms (e.g. women in the kitchen; men outside at work), but one may think of countless additional examples where inter-actions are assigned to spaces and thus reinforce social grammars such as teachers in the school talking in front, students sitting in the back; or for example first- and second class seats in trains, but also normal daily interactions like urinating in the bathroom or eating at the table – all of these actions are assigned to specific spaces. In that sense space is extraordinarily important because it is here that the embodiment of social action takes place. Spaces objectify social grammars. They do not necessarily translate them in linear terms (a great social distance does not have to be assigned a great spatial distance as Bourdieu argues in 1989, p.16). But certainly, they translate them into some form of specific spatial usage. Thus, the way spaces are used and the way bodies act in space ensures the reinforcement of a habitus. For Bourdieu, then,

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space is both a locus and an objectification of agency and structure at once. It not only shows us what the social grammar at a location is like, but it also creates and reinforces this grammar.

Despite all the advantages that the habitus provides in helping to under-stand connections between space and identity, existing literature criticizes two as-pects of Bourdieu’s theory which are important for the argument at hand. Authors such as Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Shields (1991) and Gotham and Brumley (2002) have criticized specifically two points: First, they argue that the relationship be-tween space, agency and structure remains somewhat unclear. Bourdieu separates social grammar ontologically from space while asserting that they are conflated (e.g. Gotham and Brumley, 2002, p.282). And this makes it difficult, according to these critics, to determine how these elements influence each other. Second, scholars have criticized that Bourdieu overemphasizes routine and assigns too little weight to cre-ative action and change (e.g. Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Wright, 2000). Emirbayer and Mische argue that one may not forget that actors are at times able to distance themselves from their past and through this ‘distance experience’ break away from behavioral patterns they inherited, innovate and reconstruct (1998, p.384).

To meet these challenges, Gotham and Brumley argue for a concept they refer to as "using space" (2002, p.282). In accordance with Bourdieu they agree that movement in space is the embodiment of social grammars, however, they content that actors can challenge and change these grammars – simply by assigning new mean-ings to space over time (ibid., p.269). They give the example of urban poor in the US, who fight the stigma of public housing neighborhoods by using and defining spaces in new ways that challenge meanings that are imposed onto these structures from the top-down (ibid., p.283). For example, residents would designate ‘safe spaces’ and ‘hot spaces’ within the problem neighborhood in order to increase the life-quality of their daily interactions (ibid., p.279).

In sum, space in this thesis is approached asthe synthesis of physical and social layers of space. It is defined as the positioning of a social grammar that finds physical expression in actual locations on the ground. Space approached from such a stand-point can be seen as an active shaper of subjectivities and identity. To take recent critique into account and leave room for agency, the thesis will employ the concept of using space and look out for concrete ways in which residents in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch actively assign meanings to space (independent of possible social

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meta-grammars). In order to find out in what ways space shapes vulnerabilities conducive to radicalization, then, we must investigate the synthesis of physical and social space and analyze how the daily usage of space creates and reinforces these vulnerabilities.

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3.3 What? - A habitus of radical exclusion

The theoretical framework so far, thus, helps us to identify the ‘how’. It gives us a framework to understand in what ways space actively may shape subjectivities of individuals. Yet in order to conduct a fruitful analysis, it may be useful to employ a lens that tells us what theme we have to look out for in space. Bourdieu’s theory again provides a helpful theoretical lens. In ‘Outline of a Theory of Practice’ he asserts that the habitus is essential to all forms of communication (1977, p.81). Bourdieu argues that the social grammar that guides the movement of bodies in space also creates and reinforces the mental structures within the individual; both are manifestations of the same categorizations, the same habitus (ibid., p.91). The more these mental and spatial structures correspond between individuals, then, the bigger the overall communalities and the easier communication becomes (ibid., p.86).

Each individual of course has a somewhat different habitus, but nonethe-less, great commonalities exist between the social grammars of individuals with sim-ilar capital or resources and past experiences. Bourdieu refers to these as class habitus (ibid.). Individuals more closely connected through a social grammar have resonating ways of viewing the world; they move according to similar structures and commu-nication between them is easier established. Professors, for example, might for this reason have a difficult time communicating with factory workers and vice versa.

Applying the theory of the habitus to radicalization also implies assuming that the social grammars between radicalizers and radicalized resonate to a great ex-tend – there must be commonalities between the habitus of the jihadist frame and the habitus of those that radicalize; there must be a similar logic at play that gov-erns interactions in order for radicalized and radicalizer to attract each other through communication.

I argue that the similarity is to be found in aradical habitus of exclusion; a habitus of an extreme us versus them logic. I do so, because as mentioned above in the definitions section, one essential theme of radical thinking is drawing mental boundaries between in- and out-group to such an extent that members of out-groups become dehumanized and lethal violence justified. This process of hardening the boundaries to out-group members is, as the literature argues, the psychological core of radicalization (e.g. Borum, 2003; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam,

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2005)6; and arguably it builds on mental and social grammars that revolve around a logic of radical exclusion. The Jihadist worldview is made up of such logic of us versus them. And it is also objectified in distinct usages of space. There are firmly established boundaries between believer and non-believer, between saint and sinner, but also between different members within the community of believers: The woman is assigned to the home, the man to work; men pray in the front, women in the back; clubs, bars and parties are ‘no-go areas’, streets are ‘unsafe zones’ in which women are accompanied by men or family. Radical jihadists not only strictly reinforce spatial demarcations that can be found in conservative Islam, but they also establish further demarcations of their own: Slootman and Tillie report for instance how Salafists in Amsterdam pray in a separate circle apart from other Muslims in the mosque (2006, p.96).

It appears plausible that individuals who are used to govern their daily in-teractions through this logic of radical exclusion are also more likely to communicate and respond to a frame that is built around a similar logic. In other words, if one already perceives of oneself as an outgroup (because of demarcations embodied in space) and is used to think in a radical us versus them mentality, then hardening this already existing division through radicalization is not a far way to go; it is only an intensification of an inherited logic. Individuals that already feel excluded from Western society, might therefore be more likely candidates to radicalize against this society; the divisions between us and them are already present, they only become intensified. Vulnerable individuals already perceive of ‘Western society’ as an out-group; or to be more precise, they perceive of themselves as an outgroup excluded and in opposition to a privileged in-group of native born Europeans with European roots. What jihadist radicalization does is to switch the labels of in- and out and make them more extreme; us and them remain, only the sentiment of exclusion is turned into a feel of inclusion and belonging. The logic behind the thought-pattern, however, remains.

Numerous studies on radicalization also point to the significance of senti-ments of exclusion (e.g. Boukhars, 2009; Buijs, 2009; Della Porta and Bosi, 2010;

6_{Borum, for example, sees the attribution of blame to an out-group and the dehumanization of this}

group as essential steps towards jihadist radicalization (2003); some authors use in- and out-group separation as part of their definition of radicalization (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). It is also intrinsic part of the jihadist frame that the West is seen as an outgroup that fights against Islam (Sageman, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

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Dowd, 2015; Vermeulen, 2014). However, there are findings by other authors who draw the significance of exclusion as factor for radicalization into doubt (e.g. Goli and Rezaei, 2010); and certainly counter-examples could be stated of individuals who radicalized and appeared to come from well-integrated backgrounds7. To these cri-tiques, I answer twofold. First, a logic, a habitus of exclusion goes far beyond of what a single, oftentimes numerically coded variable such as “integration” could asses; as will become evident in the analysis below, radical demarcations between in- and outgroup embodied in space are closely connected to the great majority of vulnera-bilities and grievances the existing literature argues for. Second, this theory section aims to define a framework that provides a context out which concepts can arise from the field. It does not expect to find a positivist explanation that holds against all odds and individual exceptions; rather it seeks to understand how in certain cases physical and social layers of space interplay to create conditions conducive to radicalization. Thus, for the theoretical reasons stated above, it seems plausible that social grammars embodied in space which follow alogic of radical in- and exclusion have an active part in shaping vulnerabilities conducive to radicalization. In the following analysis, I will therefore explore in what ways physical and social layers of space work actively to bring about conditions conducive to radicalization.

7_{One example would be Mohammad Siddique Khan, one of the perpetrators in the London Bombings}

2005, who is described as “a professional, married man with a steady job, a pregnant wife, a baby daughter, a new council house, a season ticket to the gym and a silver Honda Civic” (Rai, 2006, p.27).

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4 Methodology and Methods

4.1 Research Design and Methodology

This thesis builds oninterpretivist methodology and employs qualitative methods to gather data. The ontological and epistemological basis of the research design is there-fore post-positivist. It is not assumed that objective facts exist outside and separate from subjective and intersubjective experiences; nor is it assumed that research can find and know objective facts because researcher and object of research are seen as mutually influencing each other (e.g. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

Accordingly, instead of testing hypotheses from the literature in the field (as a positivist researcher would do), my goal is to find conditions that make certain outcomes possible; Salter and Mutlu refer to this as “emergent causality” (e.g. 2013, p.3). The thesis builds on anexplorative research design; I explore the field to gain a more profound understanding how themes and patterns from the literature play out in specific meaning-making practices in the two suburbs Sossenheim and Tannenbusch. Such an interpretivist, explorative research design was not simply chosen due to personal preference of the researcher, rather it appeared to be the optimum approach to tackle the puzzle to this thesis for three reasons: Firstly, as mentioned above, the absence of existing literature does not provide a substantial basis for re-search according to pre-given hypotheses. Secondly, the puzzle to this thesis is moti-vated by the question onthe role of space; space, however, is too broad a concept to be treated as a simple independent variable. To unravel the role of space, we must look at how context shapes identity, and explore how “specific meanings and meaning-making processes” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.1) play out at locations on the ground. Thirdly, it is likely to assume that my role as a white Non-Muslim researcher had effects on the tone and content of conversations during interviews, especially during the more informal ones. Neglecting positionality would therefore be likely to disguise factors that may be relevant for interpreting the results.

4.2 Methods and Data Collection

The analysis of this thesis is based on one month of ethnographic fieldwork in the German suburbs Frankfurt Sossenheim and Bonn Tannenbusch. Observations, semi-structured interviews with experts and informal conversations with residents were

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used as methods to collect data. These qualitative and interpretivist methods were chosen, because as many methodology books argue, they specifically allow to explore cases in great depth, to engage in “thick description”, and trace subjective and human experiences (e.g. Salter and Mutlu, 2013; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

First, in order to immerse myself in the field and reflect on the subjective aspect of physical and social layers of space, I conducted ethnographic field observa-tions. I documented my impressions and thoughts on architecture, physical appear-ance of buildings, atmospheres and social whereabouts in the suburbs by taking de-tailed field notes and pictures. Ethnographic observations proved a fruitful method to capture the subjective aspect of space from the perspective of a reflexive observer and the observations were used together with the secondary sources on architecture and demography for analyzing the physical components of space.

Second, I conducted 27 semi-structured in-depth interviews with people that qualified as experts on the respective suburbs and their Muslim and migrant popula-tions. In accordance to methodology books (e.g. Kvale, 2008; Brinkmann, 2014), these were chosen to gain access to personal and human accounts on the daily interactions and meaning-making processes of residents. The idea was to get an overview over daily social interactions in the suburbs that is as representative and diverse as pos-sible by talking to a large set of people who deal with the interactions of residents professionally on a daily basis. The duration of these interviews varied between 45 minutes and one and a half hours.

The informal conversations were used as a path to gain first-hand and face-to-face insights on the micro-processes at work in the daily lives of residents (ibid.). 17 informal conversations with youngsters and residents as well as one focus group discussion with 8 teenagers in Bonn Tannenbusch have been held and documented for this purpose. Their duration varied from 15 minutes up to one hour.

A great majority of the respondents stated that given the sensitivity of the subject they felt they could talk more freely without being recorded, which is why for most of the interviews I took very detailed handwritten notes and transcribed the exact words only for parts that appeared of special interest for the key variables I investigated on. I decided to do so, because I felt that the trust-relationship especially during informal conversations was of prime importance for the relatively vulnerable and stigmatized population of this research; and after several respondents had stated that a recording device was something they felt not comfortable with, handwritten

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notes appeared to be a viable alternative. Additionally, I did not want to distort the power relationship between experts and informally questioned residents, which is why I ended up applying the same technique to both groups.

The analysis of key notes and transcribed paragraphs was done by thematic analysis, involving two steps: Firstly, I grouped all statements within each interview according to recurrent main themes. After this coding procedure, I collected all main themes for each suburb and grouped them so that I ended up with a document that contained all statements made on concepts such as ‘societal distance’ or ‘economic deprivation’. Such an open coding allowed for the exploration of new themes previ-ously not thought of by the researcher. But it also granted the possibility to gain an in-depth portrait of the culmination of sentiments per theme.

In addition to these primary data sources, I chose to employ secondary sources to gain greater insight on the context of the two suburbs. Specifically I collected back-ground information from newspaper articles and statistical offices on architecture, history and demography, as well as journalistic publications on the proximity and operation of radical Salafi networks.

4.3 Focus on Germany

Despite the fact that this study is interpretivist, it nevertheless seeks to lay out clear principles what type of cases the selected localities are and why they are specifically relevant to study the phenomenon of radical hotspots (and in doing so following the advice of interpretivist methodology books such as Salter and Mutlu, 2013, p.16). The focus on Germany had been chosen for three reasons: Firstly, Germany has de-veloped into a hot-spot of radicalization within Europe (Boukhars, 2009, p.307; BKA, 2015; Horst, 2011, p.2). The radical Salafi milieu has been growing (Horst, 2011, p.2; BfV, 2012, p.6; BKA, 2015); the number of attacks planned on German soil has sig-nificantly increased (Horst, 2011, p.2) and there has been a rise of radicalization for Jihadists who emigrate to fight in Syria and Iraq in recent years (BKA, 2015, p.48)8. Secondly, Germany has experienced growing levels of Islamophobia against its Mus-lim minority (e.g. Boukhard, 2009, p.313; Horst, 2011, p.5; Vermeulen, 2014). Ex-ploring the theme of radical in- and exclusion appears to be especially relevant in

8_{From 2014 to 2015, alone, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered 677 cases of}

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Germany. Thirdly, for me as an author it was especially feasible to conduct fieldwork in Germany. Because I was born and grew up in Stuttgart, language skills of a native speaker (including knowledge of youth slang) and my nationality facilitated rapport and logistics of the fieldwork.

4.4 Focus on Sossenheim and Tannenbusch

Within the macro-social context of Germany, Tannenbusch and Sossenheim are specif-ically relevant and interesting cases. Firstly, and most importantly, they are spaces that could be considered radical hot-spots, because in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch, there is an extraordinarily high number of individuals that radicalized to fight as Ji-hadists in Germany and abroad (see section below). On top of that, both cases share interesting characteristics with other radical hotspots in Germany; for four specific reasons, they could in a sense be considered typical or representative cases of radical hotspots.

First, they are suburbs on the outskirts of European cities. Second, they en-tail a larger than city-average proportion of Muslim and migrant youth9. Third, they have income levels lower than city average and higher than average unemployment rates10. Fourth, they are suburbs that have been known as problem neighborhoods, even before they began being known for radicalization11. This is useful to know be-cause despite the fact that the goal of this research is not to make generalizations, it puts the insights gained from the fieldwork into perspective of dynamics that play out on a European scale.

On top of all these considerations, I specifically chose to focus on under-standing two and not just one such cases of radical hotspots for three reasons. Firstly, as an interpretivist researcher I dare to admit that the spark that initiated me to pur-sue the research gap was lit by great personal curiosity. Sossenheim and Tannenbusch are not only epicenters of radicalization; as mentioned in the introduction, they are also the locus of perhaps some of the most spectacular instances of homegrown

ji-9_{This demographic trend is emphasized for suburbs such as Molenbeek in many online}

ar-ticles (e.g. El Ghabri, 2016).Demographic data for Sossenheim available at Frankfurt, 2014a; for Sossenheim retrievable from Bonn Office of Statistics, which can be contacted: http://www2.bonn.de/statistik/default.asp

10_{Examples for this structure from other radical hotspots can be found in El Ghabri, 2016;}

11_{Examples are Molenbeek, Schaerbeek or Berlin Neukölln; on the stigma of Tannenbusch and}

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hadism that had occurred on German territory so far, such as Arid U.; Marco G. or Bekkay Harrach. I was highly motivated to find out what was happening at both of these locations, which is why I decided for conducting fieldwork in both. Secondly, I argue that if it is possible to understand two specific cases, this is preferable from un-derstanding one because it increases general knowledge. Despite the temporal con-straints, I was able to conduct a high number of interviews in both suburbs; I doubt that double the amount of interviews for one case instead would have increased the knowledge on the phenomenon as much as knowledge on two cases does. Moreover, even though this study does not focus on comparison, striking parallels between two cases could nonetheless be detected. Thirdly, and even more importantly, two il-lustrative cases strengthen the plausibility of the theoretical argument of this thesis. Looking at both Sossenheim and Tannenbusch renders the theoretical contribution of this thesis more credibility because it shows that active layers of space are a helpful context to understand both cases better. For these three reasons, I chose to look at Sossenheim and Tannenbusch and not only at one of them.

4.5 Units of analysis

The following analysis is conducted at two units. At the core of the analysis lay ob-servations at the micro-level. The interview data by experts and residents is used in order to understand what space does to the individual: How do spatial interactions at the workplace, the school and the home foster feelings of exclusion and provide prox-imity to radical social networks in urban areas that are considered radical hotspots? Asking questions like these on the individual level is important because even though radicalization is a group-based process, it always is centered on the individual: Ji-hadists are singular cases in large groups of potential vulnerable seekers; to learn more about individually perceived vulnerabilities, but also about individually acces-sible recruitment points is therefore essential. On top of that, I will conduct analysis at the meso-level. Aggregating the findings from interviews with experts and indi-viduals and taking into account secondary sources on the context, allows the analysis to move away from micro-location and gain an in-depth portrait of the suburbs as such. This will help to answer how individual sentiments and experiences aggregate into a social structure, a social space and how these social structures might produce vulnerabilities and opportunities for recruitment.

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4.6 Participants and Interviews

Two types of target populations were relevant for the interviews. For the 27 official interviews, the target population consisted of people who qualified as experts on the daily interactions of inhabitants at the respective urban spaces. To gain a picture of the suburbs as diverse and representative as possible, I did not restrict the selection criteria to occupation or residency. While most of the respondents from this group were living in Sossenheim or Tannenbusch, some of them did not. However, all of them dealt with problems, complaints, and living conditions of everyday people in the suburbs professionally and on a daily basis and thus qualified as knowing the social fabric of the spaces very well. The 17 informal conversations targeted resi-dents who had spent more than 10 years living in the suburbs. The great majority of these were Muslim youngsters that were migrants from the second or third genera-tion, because they belong to the statistical group that radicalizes the most. But they also involved elderly residents and migrant family mothers. The informal conversa-tions were partly arranged in advance through personal contacts I had made in the expert interviews; but they were also owed to coincidental meetings on streets and schoolyards.

In Frankfurt Sossenheim, I conducted 16 official interviews including four government employees and social workers working for the city of Frankfurt in projects to improve integration in Sossenheim; one court manager; one protestant priest and leader of the local protestant community; two chairmen of two Mosques in neigh-boring suburbs12; one teacher at a mosque and Islamic convert; one chairperson of a regional council; one director at a worker’s welfare association; one local politician; two social and street workers at two local youth centers, one of them a former gang boss; one teacher and one town council.

In Bonn Tannenbusch, I conducted 11 official interviews including two gov-ernment employees and social pedagogues working in projects to improve integra-tion in Bonn; one chairman and one Imam of a Mosque close to Tannenbusch; one di-rector of a non-profit organization for migrants and refugees focusing in the suburb; one city planning architect; four street and social workers at a mobile street work-ing program and at the youth center; one high school director and one high school teacher for Islamic religion.

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The informal conversations consisted of 12 conversations in Sossenheim in-cluding seven conversations with Muslim high school students ranging from age 13 to 18; three elderly German residents and two migrant mothers living in the estates. In Tannenbusch, I conducted one focus group interview including eight second- and third generation teenagers ranging from ages 15 to 19 at the local youth center; and informal conversations with two elderly residents and three Muslim High school stu-dents ranging from age 16 to 19.

I employed the snowball method and cold calling to gain access to these in-formants. To guarantee strong diversity in the pool of participants, I did not start out with snowballing but rather engaged in cold calling community representatives I found through research online to end up with 9 gatekeepers in Sossenheim and 7 in Tannenbusch. The snowball method thereafter granted the advantage of being in-troduced by a direct contact which helped establishing rapport with the participants. It furthermore guaranteed that I could cross-check information provided by respon-dents and that I was granted first-hand insight into which some of the most important figures in the social fabric of the micro-universes Sossenheim and Tannenbusch are. All interviews were conducted, noted and transcribed in German. The excerpts that appear in this thesis were translated by the author.

4.7 Reexivity and Role of the Researcher

Two groups of considerations are especially noteworthy in terms of my role as a re-searcher. First, my background, assumptions and values might have had influence on the research. As mentioned above, I grew up in a suburb of Stuttgart (Stuttgart Nord), a German city with large Muslim population myself. My parents are from a rela-tively privileged background working as teachers in public schools and I was raised as white Non-Muslim German whose opportunities for enjoying college education were comparatively large. This personal context brought advantages and limitations. At times, I felt that my academic standpoint and the relative privileged background I come from created somewhat of a divide between me and residents in the two sub-urbs. Certainly, my upbringing in a privileged household shaped the way I perceived of the block buildings and living conditions in Sossenheim and Tannenbusch and had influence on the way I perceived grievances during the interviews. Additionally, in conversations with chairmen and Imams in Mosques and Muslim youngsters, I had

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to overcome first skepticism by explaining that my intention was not to stigmatize their religion and draw close connections to radicalization per se, but rather the op-posite, to show how stigmatization is projected onto Muslims because of radicaliza-tion. After these explanations, however, rapport was easily established. It appeared that especially Muslim youngsters enjoyed that I as an outsider payed close attention to their feelings of marginalization which are usually overlooked by the mainstream of the societies they live in. In that respect, it was particularly useful that I was fa-miliar not only with German as my mother tongue, but also with the youth slang of specifically Turkish migrants whom I grew up with in Stuttgart-Nord, where a high proportion of Turkish migrants and former guest workers live. Moreover, being male and having a foreign sounding name proved beneficial. At times, I almost saw my-self in the position of a respectable older brother and was referred to as “cool guy” who nonetheless went to college and did “something with his life”. This type of rap-port led to fruitful conversations that sometimes went well beyond the one hour time frame.

On top of that, it should be noted here that ethnographic research as such is always a process where one “re-interprets experiences and seeks to impose some form of retrospective order” (Crane-Seeber, 2013, p.73). Thus, it should not be neglected that albeit unwillingly parts of the findings are always recreated and constructed in the aftermath in the process of writing from my desk in Amsterdam. As a final re-mark, I should mention that my research may have had a negative effect on the object which I was studying. As will become evident below, the stigma of marginalization is also something that is reproduced by the stigmatized themselves through constant reference to it; thus, by putting the focus of my questions on exclusion, I may have reminded respondents of their state of exclusion and reinforced the ‘us vsersus them’ mentality that could be seen as a precondition for radicalization.

4.8 Methodological Limitations

The fieldwork has some methodological limitations and shortcomings. Firstly, it is difficult to assess in how far the image of the social fabric of the two suburbs that the respondents conveyed is truly representative of the suburb as such. The fact that the expert respondents stem from a variety of professional angels and the statements con-verge in numerous points also with that of respondents from informal conversations,

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makes it seem likely that the depictions of Sossenheim and Tannenbusch are ade-quate. Nonetheless, each suburb proves to be a micro-universe and since grievances are always subjective the possibility that other respondents would emphasize a com-pletely set of factors can at least not be excluded from the data at hand.

The second problem is connected to data availability. First hand undercover access to radical networks proved extremely difficult and could not be achieved. The existing prevention networks in Frankfurt and Bonn do not give out contact details to radicalized Muslims, which is understandable given the sensitivity of the subject. Furthermore, it would be questionable if even after such contact has been established, radicalized jihadists would cooperate for research. This had two consequences: For one, research had to focus more on the push-side of radicalization (which also can be read as ad advantage in addressing and the broader and root causes of the phe-nomenon beneficial for future long-term prevention in Europe). Second and con-nected to this, insights on the networks responsible for recruitment - the ‘pull’ side of radicalization – must remain rather limited and was completed by relying on sec-ondary sources as well as limited insights from the interviews.

Furthermore, temporal constraints and access to field data in general limited the depth with which the analysis of the two suburbs could be conducted. One month of fieldwork means two weeks per suburb, this is by far not enough time to observe long-time trends and developments and go in-depth as much as it may be necessary to untangle the complexities that make up societal and physical structures in the uni-verse of urban spaces. At best the findings can be therefore read as a momentary portrait, a snapshot of certain patterns and forces at play.

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5 Bonn Tannenbusch and Frankfurt Sossenheim

-Spaces of Radicalization?

5.1 Setting

5.1.1 Frankfurt Sossenheim

Sossenheim is a suburb approximately 6.2 kilometers northwest of the center of Frank-furt. It has its roots as a peasant’s village out in the open that was incorporated into the city in 192813. Beginning in the 1960s, five social housing estates with high-storage block apartments have been built around the rural village at the center: the Dunant estate in the West (1961); the Carl-Sonnenscheinstraße in the northeast (1962); the estate in the Tony-Sender Straße in the north (1971); the Otto-Brenner estate in the southeast (1980) and the Westpark estate in the West (1993). Nowadays, thus, Sossen-heim consists of two spheres: The village and the estates. How closely the estates encircle the village can be seen in figure 214. Sossenheim’s population amounts to 15.862 residents. Among these, more than two thirds have a migratory background (6307) or foreign nationality (4909 inhabitants)15. The biggest ethnic groups among first-, second and third-generation migrants are the Turks and the Moroccans. 18.6 percent of the population are Muslim16. The great majority of Muslim migrants are living in the estates in Sossenheim; not in the village center . Sossenheim used to be a place of extremely violent gang activity (Iskandar, 2006; Jüttner, 2008); recently, it gained attention due its connections to the radicalization of homegrown jihadists (e.g. Erasmus Monitor, 2015; and see below).

13_Historical _numbers _on _Sossenheim _can _be _found _at _the

offici-cal portal of the city of Frankfurt (see Frankfurt.de, 2016a): http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=2345266&_ffmpar_az[_stadtteil_name]=Sossenheim

14_{Map taken from the official website of the city of Bonn.} _{Can be retrieved here:}

http://stadtplan.frankfurt.de/frankfurt/html/de/start/staedtisches_amt.html

15_{All demographic data per city district are taken from the electronic reports of the office for Frankfurt}

statistics. Available for download from http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=9036184 (see Frankfurt Office for Statistics, 2014a, 2014b and 2014c).

16_{Demographic data on religion was estimated per city district the last time in 2007; the full report can}

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Figure 2: Map of Sossenheim. The circled region marks the village and "1" the Henri-Dunant,"2" the Robert Dissman, "3" the Carl-Sonnenschein and "4" the Otto-Brenner estate; the "Westerpark" estate lies further West.

5.1.2 Sossenheim as a radical hotspot

Sossenheim lies in the Frankfurt area which in itself is known as one of the centers of radical jihadist networks in Germany. Approximately 1600 Salafists are living in close reach to the metropole at the Main, making for the highest concentration of rad-icalized Islamists in Germany compared to the total number of residents per federal state (Hetrodt, 2015; FAZ, 2015a). Frankfurt offers extensive offline networks with Pierre Vogel, an infamous Salafi preacher and youtube star of the scene, paying reg-ular visits and activities in the city (i.e. FAZ, 2007; FAZ, 2015a); DAWA FFM, one of the largest Germany-wide Salafi recruitment network is operating from Frankfurt (i.e. Eichstädt, 2014; Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2012; Voigts, 2014); and important meetings of the heads the German Salafi scene held in the city (e.g. Voigts, 2016).

Within this center of radical networks, the suburb Frankfurt Sossenheim is a space where recruitment appears to concentrate. Some of the most infamous Ger-man Salafists were born, raised and radicalized in Sossenheim. For example, Arid U., who committed the first Islamist terrorist attack on German soil in 2011 (e.g. Bartsch, Gebauer and Musharbash, 2011; Crolly, 2012) ; Rami M., a jihadist who emigrated to

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Waziristan to fight and send video messages to a German audience (e.g. NH24, 2011); and Bilal G., who has apparently evolved into a leading figure in the recruitment of young German jihadists in Frankfurt (Erasmus Monitor, 2015; Voigts, 2014b). Respon-dents in the interviews also emphasized that radicalization was a serious issue in the suburb and especially that those residents between 20-30, who used to be formerly engaged in the scene of Sossenheim’s youth gangs, now turn more and more towards radical Salafism.

5.1.3 Bonn Tannenbusch

Tannenbusch lies approximately 5.6 kilometers northwest of the city center of Bonn. The suburb consists of two parts: “Old Tannenbusch” and “New Tannenbusch”; both are administrated as separate city districts, but they belong to the same suburb. Like Sossenheim, Old Tannenbusch had originally been a rural village on the outskirts of the city. New Tannenbusch was then built as an attachment on the West of the rural village as new living space was needed in the 1970s (Inhoffen, 2013). Originally, it was designed as a modern satellite city for commuting government employees; how-ever, the city-planning was less popular than originally thought and most apartments turned out to be used as cheap accommodations for migrant guest workers and their families17. The location of New Tannenbusch is illustrated in figure 318.

The suburb is approximately the same size as Sossenheim with 16 425 in-habitants19. The percentage of migrants is comparatively high; specifically in New Tannenbusch: Here more than 83.2 percent of the residents are either foreign by na-tionality (33.6 percent) or have parents who came as migrants (59,6 percent). The biggest ethnic groups are from Syria, Iraq and Turkey. One out of four inhabitants in Tannenbusch is Muslim; especially in New Tannenbusch the group of Muslim mi-grants is significantly larger than in Sossenheim.

17_{This was emphasized in the interviews specifically by the city planning architect and expert}

respon-dent Martin Eder, who works for the neighborhood management of New Tannenbusch. The office can be contacted here: http://www.neu-tannenbusch.de/kontakt/

18_{Map taken from the official website of the city of Bonn.} _{Can be retrieved here:}

http://stadtplan.bonn.de/cms/cms.pl?Amt=Stadtplan&set=0_0_0_0&act=0

19_{All demographic data on Tannenbusch used in this section was ordered from the Bonn Office of}

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Figure 3: Map of Tannenbusch. The circled area with "1" is New Tannenbusch; "2" points to the Schlesienstraße, that serves as a spatial demarcation between the two parts of the suburb; "3" is where Old Tannenbusch is situated.

5.1.4 Tannenbusch as a radical hotspot

Among experts, Bonn is considered one of the centers of radical Jihadism in Germany (e.g. Burger, 2013; Denso, 2009). The average-size city that is sometimes even mocked for its quietude and mediocracy (Berliner Zeitung, 2002) has developed into a focal point for radical networks in recent years. Some examples are: Bekkay Harrach, the head of German Al-Qaeda, who was operating from Bonn (Kölnische Rundschau, 2009); both the Al-Muhsinin and the Al-Muhajirin Mosque in the city that were seen as hubs for Islamists (Denso, 2009; Kölnische Rundschau, 2009); Mohammed B., a key preacher in the German Salafi-scene who was closely connected to Harrach and other Jihadists and resides in Bonn (Denso, 2009); as well as the König-Fahad Academy, a private school financed by Saudi Arabia, that was repeatedly mentioned in the media for its connections to radical Salafism (e.g. Generalanzeiger Bonn, 2012). Journalists report that experts of the secret service refer to Bonn as ‘focal point’, ‘capital’ and ‘center’ for radical Salafist network in Germany (Burger, 2013; Stute, 2012).

Tannenbusch is the epicenter of the radical scene in Bonn. Experts estimate that in Tannenbusch the highest concentration of recruitment of Jihadists in Bonn is found (Vallender, 2014a). Tannenbusch is the place where the illegal organization

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Tauhid Germany is based that was recruiting fighters for Iraq and Syria up until March 2015 (Kölner Stadtanzeiger, 2015), where umerous returnees from Syria and Iraq have apparently settled (Vallender, 2014c) and where the cell of the ‘suitcase bomber of Bonn’ was centered (Diehl and Schmid, 2013; Franz, 2014). Radicalization has evolved into such a serious issue in Tannenbusch, that the city of Bonn has de-cided in 2013 to invest approximately 60 000 Euros each year to finance several Salafi prevention programs for students (Vallender, 2014a). The interviews emphasized Tannenbusch problems with radicalization. Several respondents knew radicalized Salafists in their immediate surroundings. One of the social workers, for example, told me that his neighbor is now fighting in Syria and still keeps sending him emails from time to time.