Off the beaten path : the undersecuritization of transnational wildlife crime in the Netherlands

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Bachelor Project – Transnational Spaces: Political Geographies of

Security

Dr. Stephanie Simon

Off the Beaten Path

The undersecuritization of transnational wildlife crime in the

Netherlands

LEUPEN Boyd - 10003691

28-01-2014

“I realize that the issue that we are going to discuss today may seem to some to

be slightly off the beaten path of the usual topics, but I believe that issues

deserving attention should receive focus.”

Introduction ... 4

Conceptual Framework ... 5

Securitization ... 5

Risk ... 7

Transnational Wildlife Crime... 8

Undersecuritization of TWC according to Elliott ... 10

The undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands ... 12

TWC security threats to the Netherlands ... 12

Methods and Resources ... 13

Results ... 15

Securitizing moves ... 15

Securitizing actors ... 17

Psycho-cultural context & Audience ... 18

Measures & Regulations ... 19

How can the undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands be explained? ... 22

Communication ... 22

Lack of knowledge ... 22

Securitizing actors ... 23

TWC as a far-flung issue ... 24

The Netherlands as a transit-hub ... 24

General security climate ... 24

European Union membership ... 25

Introduction

On January 6th 2014, 19 Common Marmosets were seized from a home in Drenthe after a tip-off. The Dutch owner had bought the Brazilian monkeys from a Polish truck driver eight years ago and claimed not to be aware of the national ban on keeping these animals as pets (Dagblad van het Noorden, 07-01-2014). This seizure shows the extent and the contemporaneity of the international trade in illegal wildlife.

Transnational wildlife crime (TWC) is among the largest forms of transnational crime in the world. Currently estimated to be worth at least US$ 17 billion annually, it ranks 4th after drug trafficking, counterfeiting and human trafficking (EIA, 2013). Due to its low-risk/high gains character and the increasing street value of wildlife products as natural resources are becoming more and more scarce, TWC is steadily growing in size.

In spite of its severe environmental, political, and economic consequences, and proven links to terrorist groups, TWC is still undersecuritized - not communicated and accepted as a serious security threat on a national or international level - in many places around the globe. In her 2007 article, Lorraine Elliott proposes several explanations for TWC’s undersecuritization in developing countries in the Asia Pacific. However, TWC undersecuritization does not seem to exclusively occur in developing countries, which suggests that a. Elliott’s explanations concerning developing countries can also be applied to developed countries and/or b. additional explanations need to be sought in order to fully understand TWC undersecuritization in developed countries. This thesis examines this matter by determining the status of TWC securitization in the Netherlands and by speculating about its possible explanations. Through the analysis of Dutch political discourse, context, and measures relating to TWC, the conclusion is reached that the issue is indeed undersecuritized in the Netherlands. Some of Elliott’s explanations, such as the novelty of TWC and the lack of relevant securitizing actors, apply to the Dutch case. However, additional explanations, some of which are unique to the Netherlands, should also be considered. These include the Netherland’s role as a transit-hub for wildlife, and the Dutch perception of TWC as a far-flung issue.

First, securitization theory will be discussed and then applied to TWC. Second, Elliott’s explanations for the undersecuritization of TWC in developing countries is discussed. Third, the TWC’s securitization status in the Netherlands is explored and explained.

Conceptual Framework

Securitization

Before analyzing the (under)securitization of TWC globally and in the Netherlands, it must first be made clear what is understood by securitization. In this thesis, the conceptualization of securitization is based on the Copenhagen School (CS) theory. Legitimate criticisms of this theory will be incorporated in this conceptualization in order to arrive at a more complete definition of securitization.

The CS theory of securitization is based on a traditional military-political notion of security, in which security is about survival. In CS theory, security threats are thus necessarily existential threats. The object that is under existential threat is also called the ‘referent object’. These referent objects can be different things. Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998: p.22-23) name the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors as possible referent objects. As will be shown below, TWC threatens different referent objects in different ways. CS theory stresses the centrality of speech acts in the securitization of an issue. It claims that security issues do not exist outside the speech act of a ‘securitizing actor’ (Buzan et al., 1998: p.24). When uttering a security issue, the securitizing actor undertakes a ‘securitizing move’ and creates the security issue. It does not matter whether the issue poses an actual security threat; once the securitizing actor presents it as such and the audience accepts it, it has become one. After the securitizing move (Buzan et al., 1998: p.25) has been accepted by an audience, the security issue is moved beyond the realm of ‘normal’ politics into the realm of emergency politics, where exceptional (sometimes secret) measures are legitimately put into effect. Only if all three steps, namely: 1. the securitizing move, 2. acceptance by an audience and 3. the translocation of the issue into the realm of emergency politics, have been completed can one speak of a successful securitization of an issue.

The audience plays a very important role in securitization. It has to accept something as posing an existential threat to a referent object. Successful securitization is largely dependent on “the way the securitization processes of one actor fit with the perceptions of others about what constitutes a “real” threat (…), the extent of shared intersubjective understandings of security is one key to understanding behaviour” (Buzan et al., 1998: p.30). The relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience influences the extent to which a securitizing move is accepted. Buzan et al. argue that the social standing of the securitizing actor can play a significant role in this process. This relationship between

securitizing actors and their audience is one example of what CS theory calls ‘facilitating conditions’: “facilitating conditions are the conditions under which the speech act works” (Buzan et al., 1998: p.32). CS theory includes two more important facilitating conditions. First the internal grammar of the speech act; that is to say the persuasiveness of the speech act based on whether the appropriate terms are being used for the appropriate sector, audience etc. Second, the features of the claimed threat. In other words the characteristics of a security issue that will impede or enhance acceptance by an audience.

CS theory has received much criticism. Most of this criticism has been directed at the theory’s presumed lack of attention to context. The above mentioned external facilitating conditions should be considered as context. But critics like Balzacq and Stritzel claim that the notion of facilitating conditions has not been elaborated on properly by the CS and does not cover the broader interaction between context and speech acts. Stritzel (2007: p.360) adopts an external position towards the theory of securitization by stating that: “security articulations need to be related to the broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power.” He argues that CS fails to sufficiently pay attention to the embeddedness of securitization. He presents this embeddedness as a ‘triangle of text, context and positional power’ (Stritzel, 2007: p.369). In this case context is divided into linguistic and political dimensions. The socio-linguistic dimension entails the rules and narratives that form socio-linguistic acts. The socio- political dimension is broadly defined as the social and political structures within a society. Stritzel introduces the idea of a ‘threat text’. This can be broadly described as a security narrative that is interactively constructed through social processes. In contrast to the notion of speech acts, threat texts are not “temporally and substantively limited to the speech act event” (Stritzel, 2007: p.374); they are complex and have sequentially evolved over time under multiple influences. Context predates and influences the security move. This suggests that the timing of a securitization move can be strategically planned by a securitizing actor (Balzacq, 2005: p.172). Salter (2008: p.327) acknowledges the importance of the psycho-cultural context of a populace but suggests that this populace should be further disaggregated into different sociological, political, bureaucratic, and organizational contexts. He claims that “different actors possess different authorizations to speak in different settings” (Salter, 2008: p.331). He also claims that issues can be moved in and out of the realm of securitization over time and can receive varying degrees of attention in different sociological sectors.

The definition of securitization that will be used in this thesis takes the classic CS theory and incorporates the above mentioned externalist criticisms. Securitization is still based on speech acts, but these speech acts should be seen as a product of the interplay between securitizing actors and the psycho-cultural context in which they are embedded. This means that it is acknowledged that speech acts are often part of a broader threat text and that more emphasis is placed on context than on audience acceptance. Audience acceptance can only occur if the psycho-cultural context is favourable to the speech act and should thus be seen as an integral part of this broader context. In sum, securitization is the acceptance of contextually generated speech acts or threat texts that frame something as a security issue after which the issue is moved out of the realm of normal politics and into the realm of emergency politics. One can only speak of successful securitization if 1. a securitizing move is made by a relevant securitizing actor, 2. the psycho-cultural context allows for this securitizing move to be made and makes that the securitizing move is accepted by an audience, and 3. exceptional measures are undertaken in order to eliminate the threat.

Consequently, undersecuritization occurs if one of these steps has not been completed. Instead of speaking of ‘unsecuritization’ or ‘non-securitization’, the term undersecuritization is used in this thesis. This refers to the characteristics of the issue that is under investigation. In this particular thesis, it will be show that TWC poses real security threats. If the issue is not securitized, in spite of the security threats it poses, undersecuritization is a more significant terminology. Before we apply this framework to the Dutch case, the rising notion of risk must be addressed.

Risk

Corry (2010: p.2) claims that the CS security logic of existential threat elimination and defence, is currently being challenged by a growing literature on risk-management. The notion of risk logic differs in several important ways from securitization logic. First of all, it is heavily based on potentialities. The threat is not yet concrete and needs to be prevented from developing itself, or at least needs to be accounted for so when it arrives, it can be successfully eliminated. This is not to say that securitization logic does not account for future scenario’s. As Buzan et al. (1998: p.32) state: “security arguments are about the future, about alternative futures-always hypothetical-and about counterfactuals.” However, this mostly refers to the near future; to the uncertainty of how security measures will effect an already

identified threat. Risk-management looks further into the future and sees the unpredictable nature of risk, in stead of concrete threats, as the main stimulator of security policies. Second, the notion of an existential threat expires if risk-management is based on future potentialities. Threats that may not be existential are now also accounted for (van Munster, 2005: p.6, Corry, 2010: p.11). Third, the notion of a referent object becomes a lot less clear. This is because the threat itself has become unclear. We don’t know the exact character of the threat and whether the threat will ever become a reality. Finally, there is a temporal difference between risk-management and securitization. Whereas securitization deals with instantaneous threats that can be eliminated, risk-management attempts to control, or indeed, manage risks, in stead of eradicating them (Corry, 2012: p.14). This inherently suggests a permanent nature of risk.

Corry (2012: p.3) claims that ‘riskization’ logic should not be seen as a replacement of securitization logic. Instead he argues that they should be treated as “separate, ideal-typical accounts of security logics and practices.” Van Munster (2005: p.10) claims that riskization theory can and should complement securitization theory. He states that both logics are not mutually exclusive.

In this thesis, Van Munster’s view is acknowledged. However, in the analysis of TWC in the Netherlands, securitization logic will be the frame of reference. This does not mean that riskization does not apply to TWC. In fact, some characteristics of TWC fit the risk-management theory. For example, most TWC related existential threats have not yet fully manifested themselves. There are two reasons why a securitization approach has nonetheless been chosen. First, securitization theory logic is still valid and can provide a useful way to analyze the framing of security issues. Second, Elliott uses securitization theory in her analysis, which will make it easier to compare her work with the analysis of the Dutch case. Before turning to Elliott’s analysis, TWC will briefly be discussed.

Transnational Wildlife Crime

Drawing on Elliott’s (2012: p.89) definition of transnational environmental crime (TEC) (which constitutes both wildlife crime and crime related to hazardous substances), I will conceptualize TWC as the movement across borders of species of wild flora and fauna in contravention of domestic law or in violation of prohibition regimes established by multilateral environmental agreements.

TWC does not seem to be securitized in most parts of the world. No international treaties to prevent, suppress and punish TWC are in place (in contrast to other transnational crimes) (Elliott, 2012: p.87). However, different multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) doe exits, of which the most important one is the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES currently has 178 parties (CITES, 2013). The convention regulates global wildlife trade by assigning species to three different appendices according to their level of endangerment. CITES prohibits the trade in certain particularly endangered species and strictly regulates the trade in species with a less alarming status. However, CITES has no power over its parties’ methods of combating illegal wildlife trade. Lin (2005: p.192) therefore rightfully states that “CITES remains a toothless treaty regime unless states implement its provisions into domestic law and effectively enforce them.”

Before the further analysis of its undersecuritization, the consequences of TWC, and the extent to which these can be seen as posing security threats, should be explored. They are in fact multiple and relate to different referent objects. First there is the obvious environmental damage that wildlife crime causes. If wildlife populations are taken as the referent object, TWC directly contributes to the endangerment and sometimes extinction of many species trough the poaching of animals. If national biodiversity is taken as the referent object, the potentially disastrous consequences of the unwanted introduction of invasive species can be added to this depletion of resources. If national biodiversity is under threat, global biodiversity, through its connectedness, is also under threat. If TWC puts the environment under existential threat through biodiversity loss, the environment becomes the referent object. An existential threat to the environment means an existential threat to our living space.

Second, TWC can pose serious health risks to both human and animal populations. Wildlife contraband can carry pathogens that it has obtained in its country of origin or during its transportation (Gomez & Aguirre, 2008: p.16). These pathogens can spread directly to humans, as was the case with the SARS pandemic in 2003. The SARS virus originated from wild bats on sale on Chinese wet markets (Rosen & Smith, 2010: p.28). Foreign pathogens also threaten human populations indirectly through the effects it can have on local livestock health (Siembieda, 2011: p.95). Moreover, the scarcity of published health assessments of wildlife contraband suggests a likely underestimation of the true extent of the problem (Gomez & Aguirre, 2008: p.16).

Third, TWC can have severe political consequences, especially in developing countries. Warchol (2007: p.59) argues that wildlife trade poses serious threats to the political stability in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It stimulates corruption and bribery at all levels of the state which impedes political development. TWC thereby poses existential threats to good governance and the rule of law (Elliott 2007: p.509).

Fourth, there are economic consequences to TWC. In developing countries it impedes the growth of the national economy and hinders the development of a healthy free market system. This is not to say that developed countries are not economically effected by wildlife crime. After all wildlife trade is global. Governments around the world are being deprived of revenues and benefits, now and in the future. Now because the black market constitutes a large part of the global trade in wildlife and exporting, importing and re-exporting countries are consequently missing out on a significant ‘piece of the pie’. In the future because TWC threatens the sustainability of the legal trade in wildlife (natural resources are often non-renewable) and may ultimately result in its demise (Lin, 2005: p.193).

Fifth, there is a growing link between TWC and other transnational crimes such as the above mentioned trades in drugs, arms and humans. International crime syndicates are increasingly getting involved in wildlife smuggling as a result of the above mentioned low-risk/high gain character of the trade. The involvement of organized crime groups does not only increase the violent nature of the illegal wildlife trade (Zimmerman, 2003: p.1672), but also allows these groups to grow stronger, and should be considered a serious security threat by the international community. TWC is also known to be used by terrorist groups to fund their organizations (Lin, 2005: p.207). For example, Somali Al-Qaeda cell Al-Shabaab is thought to be heavily involved in the poaching of Kenyan elephants for their ivory (IFAW, 2013).

Considering these security threats, the lack of TWC securitization is striking and begs for further inspection. Lorraine Elliott has precisely done that. She has written an interesting article on the undersecuritization of TWC in the Asia Pacific, in which she also speculates about the explanatory factors of this undersecuritization.

Undersecuritization of TWC according to Elliott

In her article ‘Transnational Environmental Crime in the Asia Pacific: an un(der)securitized security problem?’, Elliott immediately confirms the undersecuritization of TWC in the

region. She notes that speech acts relating to TWC are extremely scarce (Elliott, 2007: p.513). “To the extent that it is recognized as a form of transnational criminal activity at all, it is likely that environmental crime is not perceived to be of the same gravity as other forms of transnational crime. While these are serious forms of transnational crime, they are rarely taken seriously by relevant security actors” (Elliott, 2007: p.513). Unlike with other forms of transnational crime, the adoption of domestic policies on TWC in Asia has been ‘ad hoc and uneven’ and has not led to an incorporation of these policies into regional programmes (Elliott, 2007: p.511). Elliott also confirms that penalties given for wildlife trafficking are significantly lower than those concerning drugs and arms smuggling.

The author offers possible explanations for this undersecuritization. First, she names the relative novelty of the phenomenon. This, in combination with a lack of clarity as to who or what the actual ‘referent object’ is when it comes to environmental crime, contributes to intellectual inertia and confusion. Elliott hereby agrees with Buzan et al.’s statement that “environmental issues (…) are both new (or newly discovered) and controversial regarding their existential threat.”

Second, Elliott mentions the lack of relevant securitizing actors. She links this to elite dominance in the region. According to her this elite dominance impacts the (non-)proliferation of securitizing actors in several ways. First of all, those who might seek to raise the issue of environmental crime, may not be part of the elite. Actors such as scientists, NGO’s, environmental ministries, custom officials etc. are either not taken seriously by potential elite securitizing actors or suffer from communication problems (Elliot, 2007: p.514). Second, in order to securitize an issue, a situation in which speech is possible is an obvious requirement. However, those people who suffer most from the direct consequences of environmental crime are the ones who are least capable to speak up. Poor urban and rural (indigenous) populations are either completely cut off from political decision making and from security elites, or are pressured by these elites to remain silent (Elliott, 2007: p.515).

Third there is the possibility of active elite resistance to the securitization of environmental crime. One reasonable explanation for such resistance would be elite involvement in the illicit environmental trade (Elliott, 2007: p.515). If members of the elite are themselves economically or politically benefiting from the trade, they obviously have little incentive to securitize (or allow the securitization of) environmental crime. Now let’s turn to TWC in the Netherlands and examine its consequences and the status of its securitization.

The undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands

TWC security threats to the Netherlands

The consequences of TWC and the security threats that it poses have been discussed in a global manner in the general discussion of TWC above. However, before the analysis of the Dutch case is laid out, it is important to elaborate on these security issues and examine how they specifically effect the Netherlands. Seeing how the Netherlands is a developed country (as opposed to the countries in Elliott’s analysis) for whom TWC poses different challenges, this elaboration will help in better understanding the status of TWC securitization in the Netherlands.

First there are the economic threats TWC poses to the Netherlands. They are, again, multiple and different, depending on what is taken as a referent object. At least two main referent objects should be considered. First, if the national economy is taken as a referent object, one cannot speak of a direct existential threat. It has been described how TWC hurts national economies in developing countries. Its consequences are much less severe in the Netherlands for two main reasons: 1. the Dutch economy is developed and much stronger than those of developing economies. It can thus less easily be hurt. All the more because: 2. The trade in endemic wildlife is, unlike in developing countries, not a large part of the Dutch economy. Not many exotic species exist in the Netherlands and thus its role as an exporter of wildlife is relatively small. However, TWC can still pose an indirect threat to the Dutch economy through its devastating effects on biodiversity. If Dutch biodiversity is taken as the referent object, invasive species or TWC related health hazards jeopardise Dutch biodiversity, which can potentially hinder the economical exploitation of Dutch natural resources and cripple the economy. If global biodiversity is taken as a referent object, its devastation will again directly threaten the Dutch economy. In a letter to the House of Representatives, the Dutch State Secretary of Economic Affairs acknowledges the Netherlands’ reliability on global biodiversity. She stresses the country’s open economy and implies its heavy reliance on external resources (Tweede Kamer, 2010). Second, if the Dutch legal trade in wildlife (be it endemic species or exotic species) is taken as the referent object, TWC should also be considered a threat. As mentioned, it directly undermines the legal trade in wildlife by depleting natural resources worldwide and by establishing a ‘shadow market’ that steals away legitimate business.

Second, the Netherlands faces security threats on a political level. The Dutch political system is regarded to be strong, with low levels of corruption and high levels of democracy (Freedom House, 2013, Transparency International, 2013). This forms a stark contrast with the democratically weak and corrupt countries that Elliott has taken as the basis of her analysis. TWC consequently forms less of a threat to Dutch good governance and rule of law than it does in those countries. However, TWC still politically threatens the Netherlands in at least two ways. The first is strictly based on a CS reading of sovereignty. In CS theory it is argued that as soon as a state loses (part of) its ability to regulate cross border transactions, its sovereignty is under existential threat. TWC constitutes black market activity in which states regulations are bypassed. Thus, if TWC constrains the Netherlands in its ability to control cross border transactions, CS theorists would argue that it poses an existential threat to Dutch sovereignty. Second, and more concrete, TWC’s mentioned contribution to the power of transnational crime syndicates and terrorist groups, concerns (the sovereignty of) the entire international community, including the Netherlands.

Third, there are the environmental consequences of TWC in the Netherlands, multiple referent objects should again be identified. If Dutch biodiversity is once again taken as the referent object, TWC can be seen as threatening it in different ways. First, the illicit trade in Dutch species of wildlife contributes to a depletion of these species. As noted above, the Dutch (illicit) trade in endemic species is relatively small, but it is definitely not unheard of (as multiple juridical wildlife crime cases show). Second and third, it is threatened by the previously mentioned introduction of foreign species and by the diseases that imported animals may carry. It was shown above that is global biodiversity is taken as the referent object, the global environment becomes threatened too. If the global environment is under threat, inherently, the Netherlands is. Put more bluntly; if the global environment ceases to exist, the Netherlands ceases to exist.

In sum, TWC poses several direct and indirect threats to different aspects of Dutch society. Now it shall be examined whether this has resulted in the securitization of the issue in the Netherlands or not.

Methods and Resources

In order to assess the status of TWC securitization in the Netherlands, the three elements of successful securitization will be applied to the issue of TWC in the Netherlands. First, securitizing moves and securitizing actors are discussed, then the psycho-cultural context, and

lastly measures and regulations, and the extent to which they can be considered to be exceptional. Only if all three elements of securitization are sufficiently existent, can we speak of a securitization of TWC in the Netherlands.

In order to identify securitization moves and actors in the Netherlands, official government documents have been analyzed. These documents are mostly official letters from the Dutch Minister and State Secretary of Economic Affairs to the House of Representatives. Other documents include official accounts of parliamentary debates. Documents have been searched for the period between 31-12-2008 and 13-12-2013. This five-year time frame helps in dealing with the enormous database. It also covers a significant period of time in which TWC has grown in scale and recognition worldwide. In order to further filter the database of government documents, specific search terms have been used. These include ‘wildlife’, ‘wildlife crime’ (‘wildlife criminaliteit’), and ‘CITES’. This last search term has been used because CITES is, as shown above, the most important convention on the regulation of transnational wildlife trade. Therefore, in political discussion about wildlife crime, the convention is likely to be brought up. The use of these documents aids the analysis of securitizing moves in three ways. First, by counting the amount of wildlife related government accounts, conclusions can be drawn as to the frequency (and thus urgency) with which the TWC issue has been discussed in Dutch politics. Second, analyzing the content of these documents helps determine whether TWC, when discussed, is being framed as a security issue or not. Third, content analysis enables the identification of securitizing actors, which helps in understanding the level of success of the securitization move. Other government documents about more general subjects such as environmental health and the conservation of Dutch nature have also been used. These documents have not been actively searched for. They have been mentioned in other, TWC related, documents and then used in the analysis. A possible disadvantage to using government documents to analyze securitizing moves is that they inevitably focus on governmental actors. Actors such as NGO’s, celebrities and so on are now kept out of the equation. However, the use of only government documents can still be defended if one assumes that successful securitizing moves by non-government actors will eventually result in political attention and should thus surface in official government documents.

To study the psycho-cultural context, academic reports on the Dutch population’s feelings towards nature and animal welfare have been used. These reports neatly describe current sentiments towards these issues. No reports on people’s feelings towards TWC exist. However, if people feel a certain way about nature and animals, strong assumptions can be

made about the way they will feel about TWC. This is why the used reports are highly relevant, even though they don’t directly touch upon our main subject. In order to analyze international context, speeches of the heads of state of the US, UK and France on TWC have been used. By analyzing the content of these speeches, conclusions can be drawn about TWC securitizing moves in the international field and their effects on Dutch TWC securitization.

In order to analyze Dutch measures against TWC, multiple resources have been used. First the ‘flora- en faunawet’ (flora- and faunalaw) has been analyzed. This law directly relates to TWC and shows the ways in which Dutch law complies with international treaties such as CITES. Second, juridical judgments concerning CITES violation have been studied. By assessing given wildlife crimes sentences, the urgency of TWC in Dutch juridical spheres can be analyzed. This urgency in its turn says something about the level of securitization of the issue. Third, an interview with a Dutch environmental lawyer and former flora and fauna policymaker has been conducted. The information extracted from this interview will be used to determine the prioritization (and thus securitization) of TWC at Dutch customs. The obvious critique towards these analyses of measures is that exceptional measures exist outside the realm of normal politics and are often secretive and thus impossible to study. In other words it would be impossible to determine whether an issue is indeed securitized. A response to this argument would be that this is true if the measures are studied in isolation of the other two elements of securitization. The other two elements and the non-exceptional measures that are under analysis here, indicate that TWC is undersecuritized (as will be shown below) and that the existence of secret exceptional measures (i.e. secret securitization) is thus highly unlikely.

Results

Securitizing moves

In the given time period, a total of 393 official government documents has been published in which ‘CITES’ is mentioned. This may seem like a fair amount, but this number can be misleading if the following consideration is not taken into account: this concerns documents in which the word CITES appears. This means that most of these documents don’t have CITES as their focal point. In order to select those documents that have CITES as their main point of focus, the search has been narrowed down to documents that mention CITES in their title. This selection consists of only 24 documents over our five year time span. Six of these documents concentrate on the 16th Conference of the Parties (CoP16), held between the 4th

and 13th of march 2013. They mostly focus on ivory trade, as this was the main theme of CoP16. Another six documents are also specifically about the ivory trade, but are not directly related to CoP16. Five are on the results of CoP15 (held in Doha in 2010). Two are on European Union (EU) regulations. The rest of them do not mention wildlife crime but are concerned with legal wildlife trade related matters, such as the annual publication of CITES permit applications. In sum, 19 of these 24 documents are about TWC. A total of 268 documents was found that mention the word ‘wildlife’. Obviously, the subjects of these documents were very broad. No additional wildlife crime related documents were found that did not also mention CITES. No documents were found that mentioned wildlife in the title. Only nine documents were found that mentioned ‘wildlife crime’. Only three of them specifically focused on wildlife crime and are included in the documents that mention CITES. The other six documents only briefly mentioned wildlife crime in a discussion of a different subject. Logically, no documents were found with ‘wildlife crime’ in the title.

The content of this meagre selection of relevant documents has been thoroughly analyzed. Throughout these documents, TWC is never directly presented as a (national) security issue. This is not to say that the urgency of the issue is not acknowledged. There is a broad consensus that TWC is a bad thing that should be combated. But not for national security reasons. The ivory trade discussion provides a good example. As mentioned above, 12 out of the 24 relevant documents are related to this topic. In one particular document, attention is paid to a conflict between a Dutch conservationist and the Thai government (Tweede Kamer, 2012). In this case, the House of Representatives asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs for full clarity on a supposed raid that the Thai government would have carried out on the conservationist’s rescue centre in Thailand. The speakers say they fear that the confiscated elephants (or their parts) have ended up being illegally traded and ask the Minister to undertake investigative action. Other documents (Tweede Kamer, 2012) show that most parties are in favour of a total ban on ivory trade (which currently exists). In yet another debate, the State Secretary of Economic Affairs expresses his concerns about the magnitude of elephant poaching in Tanzania (Tweede Kamer, 2012). Most parties stress the importance of international cooperation and regulation of wildlife trade (Tweede Kamer, 2013). However, what drives this sense of urgency is not explicitly mentioned. Remarks made by some Members of Parliament suggest that for them, the fight against TWC is more about the protection of species than about eliminating a security threat. To illustrate, Dion Graus (PVV), in a discussion on ivory trade, says that he hopes that the abuse and slaughter of animals is ‘more important than party politics’ (Tweede Kamer, 2012). Only once does a

party hint at the security threats that TWC poses, when the VVD links the ivory trade with civil war in developing countries. However, no connection is made to the potential threats TWC poses for the Netherlands. Interestingly enough, the VVD (currently the Netherlands’ largest party) also is the party that shows the least sense of urgency when it comes to TWC. In the ivory trade discussion they are the only ones to plead against an global ban and in a discussion on the trade in rhinoceros horn, they disapprove of Dutch funding of enforcement efforts in Africa. They see TWC enforcement as a country’s own responsibility. They also are against a global ban on the trade in polar bear products.

When analyzing reports and government documents on the broader subjects of environment and biodiversity, a security narrative was found to be much more pronounced. In a debate on environmental policies (Tweede Kamer, 2013), biodiversity is framed as being ‘of vital importance’ to society and economy. In this debate, it is even stated that it is the Netherlands’ duty towards the international community to conserve Dutch biodiversity. This implies that (local) biodiversity is seen as part of a global natural heritage that should be maintained. If biodiversity is seen as being of vital importance, threats to biodiversity such as TWC should consequently be seen as indirect existential threats. The effects of invasive wildlife on Dutch biodiversity is mentioned in a parliamentary paper on the adjustment of a wildlife law. It prohibits the sale and possession of three foreign species of squirrel, because they pose a threat to endemic squirrel populations and human health (Tweede Kamer, 2009). Although the emphasis is on legal wildlife trade here, the potential threat of invasive species is acknowledged. At the same time, the Secretary of State de-prioritizes the protection of species when he states that creating a healthy, resilient environment is more important than strict rules on species protection.

In sum, the narrative on TWC in governmental documents indicates a sense of urgency. However TWC is not explicitly framed as a security threat. In stead, the socio-linguistic context seems to be concerned with the protection of species. One thus cannot speak of TWC securitizing moves. The security consequences of biodiversity at the other hand are acknowledged. However, in official documents TWC is not mentioned as a threat to biodiversity.

Securitizing actors

In the analyzed government documents, two Members of Parliament are repeatedly calling for attention to TWC, namely Dion Graus (PVV) and Anja Hazekamp (PvdD). Two other

frequent speakers are the Minister and State Secretary of Economic Affairs. These two are not counted as potential securitizing actors of TWC, because they merely react to questions coming from Members of Parliament and don’t actively search for support for TWC issues. Graus and Hazekamp should not be considered securitizing actors in the strict sense of the word because they do not incorporate security grammar in their speech acts. Instead they should be seen as potential securitizing actors. They now actively seek support to combat TWC for reasons of animal welfare. If TWC will increasingly be framed as a security issue (be it nationally or internationally), they are likely to adopt this security discourse in order to establish their goal; cracking down on TWC.

Psycho-cultural context & Audience

When looking at the securitization of TWC in the Netherlands, the Dutch people should be seen as the most important audience. They are the ones that need to except a securitizing move (if one is made in the future). Not surprisingly if one looks at the lack of attention for TWC (as a security issue), when a random Dutch person is asked what he or she knows about TWC, the answer is almost always ‘nothing’. This does not mean that the population does not care about wildlife. Environmental awareness seems to have increased significantly over the past 10 years. We see this confirmed in a report (Van Kalmthout & De Beer, 2013) on Dutch people’s feelings towards nature. This report shows that 4 in 10 actively or less actively contributes to the wellbeing of nature and that 50% of those who don’t contribute, wishes to start contributing. Furthermore, 1 in 5 is willing to make financial contributions to nature and 75% believes that people should take more responsibility for the environment. More specifically, a report on sentiments towards animals (De Cock Buning, Pompe, Hopster & De Brauw, 2012) among the Dutch population shows a strong commitment to animal welfare. It also shows that a majority of the Dutch people feels that in national parks, wild animals’ interests should be placed above those of humans. In sum, there seems to be a favourable psycho-cultural context for the securitization, or at least prioritization, of environmental issues among the Dutch population.

The international context should also be mentioned here, not in the last place because TWC is an international phenomenon. The international context makes for some interesting observations. Contrary to the Netherlands, TWC has recently been accepted as a security issue by big western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Especially the United States stress the link between TWC and terrorist funding. They have

called for international attention to the issue and have offered financial support of more than 24 million over the past six years in the fight against TWC (US Department of State, 2012). In a 2012 speech at a TWC awareness event that she hosted, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated the following: “I think many of us are here because protecting wildlife is a matter of protecting our planet’s natural beauty. We see it’s a stewardship responsibility for us and this generation and future generations to come. But it is also a national security issue, a public health issue, and an economic security issue that is critical to each and every country represented here.” (US department of State, 2012). A clearer example of a securitization move is hard to imagine. Francois Hollande and David Cameron have recently followed the United States’ lead, with the former pressing to get TWC higher on the EU agenda and the latter hosting a global TWC conference on the 12th and 13th of February 2014 for which over 50 countries have been invited. It is peculiar to see that the Netherlands have not yet framed TWC as a security issue, while these political heavyweights have.

In sum, both the audience, namely the Dutch population, and the national and international psycho-cultural context seem to be favourable for the securitization of TWC. Dutch people are environmentally aware and care about the faith of animals. Meanwhile, internationally, TWC is increasingly framed as a security issue.

Measures & Regulations

An analysis of Dutch measures and regulations, further shows the lack of securitization of TWC in the Netherlands. Relatively strong laws and regulations exist on paper, but are not always properly brought into practice.

The Netherlands are party to multiple international conventions and treaties. When it comes to TWC, CITES is the most important one. Within CITES, the Netherlands does not have individual voting power. Instead, the EU represents all its member states and votes as one. This means that, if the Netherlands intents to place something on the agenda at a CITES conference, the proposal will have to pass through an general EU vote first. Sometimes, Dutch policy initiatives do not find support in the EU. This is illustrated when the State Secretary of Economic Affairs states that she is in favour of a total ban on rhinoceros hunting trophies, but doubts if the EU shares the same view (Tweede Kamer, 2012). She also states that if there is no European support for a ban on hunting trophies, a Dutch import ban will be of little use (possibly hinting at the Schengen agreement). The fact that the Netherlands are a member of the EU is also reflected in its environmental policies. Environmental policy in the Netherlands is decentralized. The state draws up the main guidelines, which are then interpreted and

implemented by the twelve provinces. The provinces report back to the state, who in turn reports back to the EU. As a result, Dutch environmental policies are heavily based on EU guidelines. Concrete examples of this include the recent Dutch biodiversity strategy (Tweede Kamer, 2013) which draws heavily on the EU biodiversity strategy (European Commission 2011) and seal protection laws (Tweede Kamer, 2009).

The fact that Dutch laws and regulations are based on EU guidelines may have effects on the Netherlands’ compliance to international treaties. In a 2008 study on the accordance of Dutch environmental law with international treaties, Bastmeijer, De Bruin & Verschuuren conclude that one can indeed speak of a high correspondence. The Dutch/EU regulations and international treaty guidelines are based on the same ideals and principles. However, as is the case with CITES, treaty guidelines are often very broad and rather vague. As a result, Dutch law enforcers are inclined to refer to clearer European guidelines instead. Because these are interpretations of treaty guidelines, deviations between treaty guidelines and national law implementation may occur.

Dutch TWC law is incorporated in the Flora- and Faunalaw, article 13. Compared to other European countries the Netherlands regulations are relatively strict. In a 2003 report on organizes environmental crime in the EU member states, Fröhlich shows that the Belgian maximum penalty for a CITES violation is three months imprisonment, whereas the same violation can lead up to six years imprisonment in the Netherlands. But, after analysis of the sentences given for article 13 violations in the Netherlands in 2013, it must be concluded that high sentences are close to absent. In an interview with a Dutch environmental lawyer and former flora and fauna policymaker, a relatively serious conviction of an exotic bird smuggler was mentioned. The offender received a jail sentence of 10 months. Compared to other 2013 convictions, this sentence seems to be an exception to the rule. In several other bird smuggling and trading cases a €1000 euro fine was given, with no additional jail sentence (LJN BY8791). In another bird smuggling case, the offender received a six months suspended jail sentence and 180 hours of community service (LJN BZ7453). Perhaps the most striking example of a mild sentence is the one given to a person who was found guilty being involved in the trade of two lions, five gorillas, three orang-utans, a caiman, several pythons and more. He was sentenced to six months of suspended jail time and 240 hours of community service (LJN BV5134).

An analysis of Dutch customs practices, also shows an undersecuritization of TWC. The expert I have spoken with states that there are not special task forces within Dutch customs that are concerned with TWC. Drugs remains the major priority. However, compared

to other European countries, the amount of wildlife seizures at Dutch customs is high (Fröhlich, 2003: p.113-114). This may be explained by the importance of the Netherlands as a global transit hub, rather than the thoroughness of Dutch customs. However, the import of illegal wildlife products by tourists has recently received government attention. In 2008, the state invested €2 million in the improvement of passenger controls. A quota of 100.000 border controls per year was set. Furthermore, the collaboration between scientific institutions and customs was improved in order to better identify wildlife species. These resulted in the confiscation of 15.000kg of wildlife products (from non-EU passengers) and the voluntary turning in of another 25.000kg.

In sum, the absence of securitizing moves and exceptional measures shows that one can speak of an undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands. The small amount of government documents found on TWC, shows that political debate is scarce and usually clustered around a particular event such as CoP16. No broad or general attention seems to be paid at the issue. When it is discussed, the focus is mainly on ivory trade and sometimes rhinoceros hunting trophies. However, these two trades are only a fraction of the global illicit wildlife trade. Most importantly, when discussed, TWC is never framed as a security issue. This results in a lack of prioritization at the boarder, low conviction rates and low sentences. It is interesting to see however, that the current national and international context seems to be favourable to the securitization of environmental issues. A majority of the Dutch people finds environmental health and animal wellbeing of great importance. Internationally, important countries have recently framed TWC as a security issue. It is striking to see that the Netherlands still have not.

How can the undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands be

explained?

Now that it is has been established that TWC is currently undersecuritized in the Netherlands, a comparison with Elliott’s explanations for the undersecuritization of TWC in developing countries can be made. Elliott’s statements about the undercommunication of TWC, the novelty of the phenomenon and the importance of securitizing actors in the securitization of TWC seem to apply to the Dutch case. Additional explanations such as the framing of TWC as a far-flung issue, the Netherlands’ role as a transit-hub, Dutch EU membership and the Dutch general security climate do not correspond with Elliott’s work and may offer new insights into the undersecuritization of TWC in developed countries.

Communication

Elliott mentions the lack of framing TWC as a security threat as part of the explanation why undersecuritization of the issue occurs. This also seems to be the case in the Netherlands. As shown, important actors are referring to species preservation; not security issues. When biodiversity is discussed in Dutch politics, security language is more often used. It is peculiar to see that TWC is not referred to as posing an existential threat to Dutch biodiversity and thus indirectly to the Dutch economy and people. Moreover, contrary to other western countries, TWC is not once linked to terrorism or health hazards in Dutch political debates.

Lack of knowledge

This lack of security framing of TWC can partly be explained be a lack of knowledge on the subject. Most Members of Parliament and other political actors, like almost all Dutch people that have informally been spoken with before and during this research, may not know the size and full extent of global TWC. And even if they do know about the amplitude of TWC, they may not realize or recognize its consequences for national and global security. The increasing involvement of international crime syndicates, for example, is a recent development and may not yet have received a lot of attention in the Netherlands. One can see a connection here with Elliott’s argument that the relative novelty of TWC is one of the main reasons for its undersecuritization. However, as mentioned, in other European countries and in the United States, the security threats that TWC poses are increasingly being recognized and articulated.

This makes it more difficult to believe that the Netherlands are still not fully aware of these threats. The lack of knowledge at the border however, remains very real and is of great significance. Customs officials lack the taxonomological expertise and often find it hard to distinguish between legal and illegal species. The forging of CITES documents, which happens abundantly, only complicates this matter.

Securitizing actors

As shown above, the most important advocates in the fight against TWC are Dion Graus (PVV) and Anja Hazekamp (PvdD). Although they should not be considered securitizing actors, they are still important for our analysis. They are the political figures that most actively call for a prioritization of TWC. If TWC indeed receives more attention because of their advocacy, the lack of knowledge as described above will decrease and the likelihood of securitization will increase. Therefore it is relevant to analyze the chances that these actors have at prioritizing TWC. First of all it should be noted that both Graus and Hazekamp are members of rather controversial and criticized parties. The PvdD (party for the animals) is often depicted as being ‘too green’ and not paying enough attention to the needs of humans. With two seats, they are the smallest party in the House of Representatives. The PVV (party for freedom) is seen as rightwing populist. The popularity of the party (currently the third biggest party in the Netherlands) is mostly due to its charismatic leader Geert Wilders. The rest of its members are not high in popularity. Within the PVV, Dion Graus is regarded as an eccentric figure. With his coloured glasses, long hair and unique proposals (such as the establishment of a national police force that would only focus on violence against animals) he does not enjoy a lot of credibility among the Dutch public. The fact that both Hazekamp and Graus are associated with an ‘overdone’ advocacy for animals, may impede their ability to generate support in their fight against TWC. This makes them less than ideal candidates for the securitizing job. There is a chance that the public will not take them as seriously as they might other Members of Parliament. In order for TWC to be securitized, it may need to be advocated by parties and persons that do not have a highly green image. This would not be an unthinkable scenario because after all, TWC is not only an environmental issue.

TWC as a far-flung issue

An possible explanation that deviates from Elliott’s explanations is that TWC enforcement is primarily seen as the exporting countries’ own responsibility. Nowhere in the analyzed documents is TWC explicitly called a Dutch issue. The debates are all about the poaching of exotic species in African countries. As noted above, the VVD party explicitly questions Dutch financial support to ivory trade enforcement in Africa and argues that enforcement should be the responsibility of exporting countries themselves. These statements give forth a sense of TWC as a far-flung issue. Something that not directly effects the Netherlands. If it is not thought to effect the Netherlands, then there is no reason for Dutch securitization of the issue. Although this explanation seems to relate to Elliott’s notion of the lack of clarity as to what or who is the referent object when it comes to TWC, it does not occur in Elliott’s work for the obvious reason that she bases her research on the exporting countries.

The Netherlands as a transit-hub

Instead of an important importing or exporting country, the Netherlands should primarily be seen as an important transit-hub for wildlife contraband. This has consequences for the intensity of TWC enforcement. As mentioned above, Dutch customs do not prioritize TWC. This can be explained by at least two factors. First, TWC does not harm humans directly and is thus found less important than transnational crimes that do, such as drug trafficking. Second, because the Netherlands is mainly a transport-hub for wildlife products (legal and illegal) no excises can be charged by the Dutch government. In other words, the Netherlands do not directly lose money if wildlife is smuggled through its ports. Therefore, if security issues are not taken into account, there seems to be no direct reason for the Netherlands to crack down on TWC.

General security climate

As noted, the undersecuritization of TWC in the Netherlands remains striking, especially in the face of recent securitizing moves by important western countries. One can only speculate about the discrepancy between the levels of TWC securitization efforts between these countries. If the Netherlands is compared to the US, at least two possible explanations for

these deviations can be given. First, the US is the most powerful nation in the world and occupies a very different position in international relations than the Netherlands. The US, through its positional power is more often willing and able to undertake action in global issues. In other words, with the proliferation of TWC, the US is more likely to step up as a securitizing actor than the Netherlands. Second, and as a result of the first, the general security climate in the Netherlands seems to be less urgent than in the US. A good example of this that directly relates to TWC, is the US notion of the ‘war on terror’. The framing of transnational terrorism as a major threat to national security has been significantly more pronounced in the US than in the Netherlands. Recently, the US has started to link TWC with global terrorism. If one treats the US discourse on terrorism as a threat text, the argument can be made that TWC has recently been incorporated into this threat text. In the Netherlands, the discourse on terrorist threats is relatively weak. If TWC’s links with terrorism are playing an important role in the recent securitizing moves around TWC in the US, the weak discourse on terrorism threats in the Netherlands may partly explain its TWC’s undersecuritization in comparison to other western countries.

European Union membership

The Netherlands’ membership of the EU may also offer explanations for the undersecuritization of TWC. As shown, Dutch laws and regulations heavily draw on European guidelines (and therefore sometimes deviate from treaty guidelines). Furthermore, within CITES, the Netherlands do not vote as a country because the EU votes as one. Moreover, Dutch policy proposals such as a ban on rhinoceros hunting trophies can only be implemented with the support of the EU (and in this case the entire international community). When considering these facts, it may not be unthinkable that the Netherlands are viewing the combating of TWC as a European responsibility, rather than a national responsibility. This (especially in combination with the aforementioned perception of TWC as a far-flung issue) may result in less direct attention to TWC related issues in Dutch National politics.

Conclusion

The undersecuritization of TWC seems to be a global phenomenon. It is not limited to developing countries but can also be found in developed countries like the Netherlands. The small amount of Dutch government documents concerning TWC and the lack of securitizing speech acts within these documents has proven the undersecuritization of TWC. As have the apparent under prioritization of TWC at Dutch customs and low TWC related conviction rates and penalties in Dutch courts. TWC seems socio-linguistically framed as an animal welfare issue instead of a security issue. Biodiversity degradation however, is sometimes framed as a security threat to the economy. In these instances, the connection between TWC and biodiversity degradation is never made. This undersecuritization of TWC seems striking considering the contemporary national and international context. Nationally, there seems to be a large concern with animal welfare and environmental health among the population. This suggests that if TWC issues are framed as security issues, they are likely to be adopted by large parts of the population. Internationally, important countries have recently framed TWC as a security issue at international meetings. It thus remains a question why no TWC related securitizing moves have been made in the Netherlands.

When possible explanations for this lack of securitization in the Netherlands are compared with the explanations that Elliott offers, it can be concluded that some are the same and others seem significantly different. This suggests that those explanations that can be applied to both the Netherlands as developing countries, can probably be considered universal. These include the novelty of TWC and the subsequent lack of TWC related knowledge, its undercommunication, and the failing role of securitizing actors (although Dutch securitizing actors differ significantly from those in developing countries). Additional explanations that apply to the Netherlands and perhaps to more western (European) countries are the perception of TWC as a far flung issue, EU membership, the general national security climate and the Netherlands’ role as a transit-hub. These additional explanations can potentially serve as a reference in future research on the securitization of TWC in developed countries.

It has to be said that although TWC is currently undersecuritized in the Netherlands, increasing securitization of the issue may occur in the near future. First, there is the possibility that the Netherlands will join its international allies in their call for increasing prioritization of TWC on international agendas. Second, environmental lobbyists are currently successfully bringing TWC to the attention of Dutch politicians. As a result of these lobbying efforts, a

‘special procedure’ on TWC, with guest speakers from Kenya, will be held in the House of Representatives on the 5th of February 2014. This suggests that undersecuritization in the Netherlands, like in other western countries, may eventually decrease, and that, to use John Kerry’s metaphor, the discussion around TWC will be moved back onto the beaten path.

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