Chinese Defence Diplomacy and the Perception of India A focused disquisition of the bilateral relationship of Chinese intentions and Indian interpretations

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Chinese Defence Diplomacy

and the Perception of India

A focused disquisition of the bilateral relationship

of Chinese intentions and Indian interpretations

BACHELOR THESIS

Bachelor of science in political science: international relations The University of Amsterdam

Student: Maxime Lubbers Student number: 10243712 Supervisor: Paul van Hooft

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Summary

Although China claims to be rising peacefully, the actions that it undertakes to operate peacefully may not be interpreted in accordance with its intentions. India is a critical case study, as the country seems to pose a threat to China in the region. This thesis will try to answer a question with a specific focus on Chinese actions of defence diplomacy vis-à-vis India. The starting point of the analysis is 2003, when China announced its peaceful rise. 2009 follows as a second point of analysis due to a series of events that alternatively supported and contradicted the declaration of peaceful intentions. Additionally, 2015 has been analysed to consider the current state of diplomatic relations between the two nations. The main hypothesis is that an action of defence diplomacy will positively influence the Indian perception of China, as it is a way to built mutual trust and confidence. The first part of the analysis investigates the influence of both state visits and joint military trainings on Chinese perceptions of Indian political leaders. The second and third parts examine the effect of the intervening variables, ‘similarity’ and ‘symmetry’. To answer the research question, three semi-structured interviews have been conducted with experts. Furthermore, academic literature and official documents of the Indian government and the Military Balance have been used. The main finding of this thesis is that Chinese actions of defence diplomacy have a positive effect on Indian perceptions. Both similarities and symmetry could behave as supporting intervening variables and positively influence Indian perceptions. This thesis does not examine all actions of defence diplomacy, which provides a point of discussion later in the argument. Furthermore, it is difficult to generalize the outcomes of Chinese defence diplomacy with India to the rest of the Asian region due to cultural differences. However, this research is highly pertinent to understanding Sino-Indian relations and their effects upon global politics.

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1. Introduction

China is perceived as a state with a major impact on international order and security, and as such it is a centre of focus in the international community (Buzan 2010, d’Hooghe 2015, Johnston 2003; Shambaugh 2011). As China operates its peaceful rise, it is questionable whether neighbouring countries interpreted China’s actions in accordance with its intentions. Assertive security policies of China have led to tensions between China and its neighbours in the recent past, for example concerning border disputes (The Military Balance 2015, chapter 6:213). However, if China is serious about its rise in the global order, it needs to communicate that its intentions are peaceful rather than aggressive (Randal 2008:224), which would help to assuage its neighbours’ concerns and improve its international reputation. In order to examine if China’s peaceful rise is perceived as it is intended, it is useful to investigate China’s relationship with a neighbouring country.

This investigation analyses Chinese actions of defence diplomacy, such as state visits and joint military trainings. Defence diplomacy is a way to build confidence between states by establishing relationships of trust and mutual confidence among former rival militaries (Blank 2003). It has been employed in Europe in the post-Cold War era. Shortly after its success in Europe (Capie 2013; Strategic Survey 1999), the concept of defence diplomacy spilled over to the Asian Pacific region, where it was appropriated for national security policy (Capie 2013:4). Defence diplomacy is a valuable framework to assess China’s actions and the perceptions of a neighbouring country such as India.

China’s interest in India originated in its desire to maintain a peaceful international environment while also preventing anti-China blocs in India with the U.S. and Japan (Mitchell & Bajpaee 2007:154). Policies between China and India can be seen as a direct reflection of their perceptions of each other (Randal 2008:211). Therefore, as India could be a threat to China’s future growth and peaceful rise, it is useful to investigate Indian perceptions of China. India’s emerging economic strength, growing population and geopolitical location (Ryan 2011:21) has spurred China to invest more in a relationship between the two nations. The way these two countries will behave towards each other in the coming century will have a profound global impact (Randal 2008:212).

The time frame that is used in this thesis spans from 2003 to 2015, beginning with China’s announcement of their peaceful rise in 2003. The second point of analysis is 2009, which is the midpoint of the 2003-2015 period. In addition, 2009 is a valuable year to analyse because many important civic events took place, such as China’s celebration of the 60th birthday of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and subsequent deployment of the most state

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visits ever in one single year (Allen 2015). Regardless of this increase in actions of defence diplomacy, China vetoed a development plan for India, which internationalized a bilateral territorial dispute (Malik 2012). These two actions seem contradictory, as the first supports foreign diplomacy to positively influence Indian perceptions and the second does not seem to encourage positive relations.

Mutual distrust between the people of China and India expanded from 2007 to 2009. New Delhi kept Beijing out of multilateral frameworks such as: the Bay of Bengal Initiative for multi-sectorial technical and economic cooperation (Malik 2012). India and China also agreed to cooperate on a climate change policy in 2009 (Watts 2009). However, China remained the major focus for India due to the importance of maintaining inter-institutional coordination (Godbole 2009). Besides this both countries value their joint position in international forums such as the Brazil Russia India China Soviet Union (BRICS) (Godbole 2009). India is wary of China’s rise due to the nation’s contradictory behaviour, despite the two countries’ strong mutual economic interests and cooperation in international affairs.

The Sino-Indian relationship has changed over the years. Therefore, international relations scholars question whether China and India are becoming more conciliatory as they develop and grow wealthier. It is also debateable whether the two countries will become more amenable to peaceful resolutions over the state-to-nation conflicts of Taiwan and Kashmir or if it will create more conflicts in the absence of resolution of the current conflicts. There is in reality a considerable gap between the Indian and Chinese aspirations and actions. Each country blames the other for working against its interests; however, neither side needs nor seeks a conflict. Threat perceptions thus play a meaningful part in managing the relationship with a complex mix of both antagonistic and cooperative elements.

China acknowledges the need to counteract the perception that its rise is a threat for others, as its peaceful promises alone are not enough (Tiezzi 2014). The challenge for China is to ensure that any military role in providing public goods demonstrates goodwill. If China chooses to undertake actions of defence diplomacy, such as state visits and joint military exercises, this could mean that China wants to cooperate in its peaceful ascent. This research paper will focus on several defence diplomacy actions undertaken by China with India to improve the nations’ relationship. As most articles about the China-India relation are concerned with economic development, their diplomatic bond is often under-examined (Randal 2008:212). Therefore, examining the Indian perception of China based on actions of defence diplomacy adds to the current debates on China-India relations and the peaceful rise China claims. This paper will address the following research question:

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“What is the influence of Chinese defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2015 on the perception of the Indian political leaders of China?”

This thesis is structured as follows: in chapter two the main argument will be further specified and theory related to China’s peaceful rise and core concepts will be introduced. Chapter three presents the research methods and design of this research, followed by the data collection methods and the operationalization. Chapter four contains the analysis, which is divided in three sections. The first section discusses the actions of defence diplomacy undertaken by China. The second part examines the similarities between China and India and their influence on the perceptions of Indian political leaders of China’s ‘peaceful’ rise. The third part assesses the influence of the symmetry in the relations China and India have besides their bilateral relationship. Chapter five contains the implications of the results of the analysis and attempts to answer the research question. Lastly, the implications of this research and possibilities for further research are discussed.

India as a critical case

This section will set out an overview of Chinese-Indian relations and will continue to explain current relations based on conflict and cooperation between the two countries. This is necessary to demonstrate why India is a critical case in the examination of China’s intentions towards their neighbouring countries.

The term “China-India relations” refers to the bilateral relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India. The fact that both China and India have fast-growing economies has contributed to their strong international diplomatic and economic influence and increased the significance of their bilateral relationship.

In the 1950’s the relationship between both countries was based on peaceful co-existence (Jain 2004:253). This relationship changed and the peaceful co-co-existence faded when border disputes resulted in three major conflicts: the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Chola incident of 1967 and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish (Jain 2004). After these events, the countries’ relationship continued to deteriorate until the late 1980’s when both countries attempted to rebuild diplomatic and economic ties. The two countries have also attempted to expand their strategic and military relations (Lancaster 2005; Shrivastava 2010; Krishnan

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2011). The post-Cold War era offers significant opportunities for both New Delhi and Beijing to move in the direction of a ‘productive relationship’ as several power relations changed then (Jain 2004:253). Both countries are willing to cooperate for their mutual interest in peace and stability in the region, as well as faster economic development and greater prosperity at home (Jain 2004:253). These events demonstrate that China and India have a history of both conflict and cooperation.

Maintaining positive relations with India is vital to China’s peaceful rise. India’s relationship with China could also provide support for modernising Indian infrastructure and strengthening the Indian retail industry. According to Homan (2006), the Grand Strategy of India divides the world into three circles. In the first circle, which is the surrounding area, India aims to be a leader and to have the ability to veto concerning actions of other powers outside of this circle. The second circle encompasses Asia and the waters of the Indian Ocean. In this circle India aims to become a counterweight against the influence of other powers and to prevent damage to their own interests. The third circle covers the entire world, where India aims to become one of the major powers. To summarize India’s intentions, the country strives to play a strategic role in the international order of peace and security (Homan 2006). India is willing to cooperate with China because of China’s prominent influence in world affairs and India’s desire to achieve international prominence.

Although the relationship between China and India has been rife with conflict throughout the past fifty years, relations between the two nations have transformed since the year 2000, when China announced their engagement in a peaceful rise. Chinese and Indian leaders have even resurrected the idea of a partnership in which cooperation and peace seem inevitable due to strong interdependence (Holslag 2009:812). In contrast to the stronger relationship, China and India are economic competitors together with other moderating and outperforming countries in Asia and the Pacific (IMF 2015). The prospects for emerging markets in Asia indicate that India poses a substantial and increasing threat to the Chinese economy (IMF 2015; see figure 1). This supports the theory that China has to focus diplomatic attention on India to stay in control of the region. Therefore, India is a critical case in examining the behaviour of China in response to developing threats in the region.

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Figure 1: Emerging and developing Asia (IMF 2015).

The Chinese perception of India has changed because of the growing economy and its strategic implications (Pardesi 2010:569). Chinese scholars recognize India as an emerging major power in Asia and an important contributor to the emerging strategic architecture of the Asian pacific. China recognizes that the purpose of the Indo-U.S. relationship is to balance the development of China (Pardesi 2010:569). In addition, Chinese scholars have noticed the cooperation between Japan and India. Because of India’s other international relationships, China sees possibilities for India to outgrow them and therefore considers India a threat to their development. Moreover, if states already have peaceful relations, the use of defence diplomacy as a means of conflict prevention is unlikely to be necessary (Cottey and Forster 2010). To be able to build mutual trust with India while simultaneously attempting to maintain a peaceful rise, China will likely employ actions of defence diplomacy towards India.

China’s aim for a peaceful rise indicates the country’s avoidance of confrontational relations with other major powers. India is seen as an emerging major power in the region that could threaten China’s future vision. Therefore, it is expected that China will act to influence the perceptions of Indian political leaders on China’s ‘peaceful’ actions. When using India as a critical case, it is assumed that if the hypothesis is strengthened by this research, the findings can be used for analytic generalization. If the theory works for investigating India, it is likely that the theory of defence diplomacy will also work with other neighbours of China, who may also become threats to the nation’s rise. Cultural factors and other differences between India and other neighbouring countries need to be taken into account if generalizing is to proceed accurately. The following section discusses the perceptions and the contextual definitions used in this thesis.

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2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Literature review

The literature that discusses and tries to explain whether China’s behaviour is peaceful can be roughly divided into three subcategories: realist, liberal and constructivist views. This thesis will address all three subcategories and illustrate how this paper contributes to the existing body of literature.

Realists argue that China focuses on its own interests as the country’s power grows in terms of territory, population, and economy (Mearsheimer 2005; Shambough 2012). According to Shambough (2011:12), offensive realists claim that China wants to establish a much broader military presence, particularly with naval forces. However, although China has increased the size of its military and naval capabilities, this does not necessarily support the realists’ claims. The number of defensive diplomatic actions, which support the building of confidence and mutual trust, has increased significantly since the introduction of China’s peaceful rise in 2003 (Bijian 2003). Moreover, growing military capabilities do not directly correspond with a more aggressive country, as China has embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes (Ikenberry 2008:31). China is protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by becoming involved in regional and global government organizations (Ikenberry 2008:31).

Defensive realists claim that China should only use military strength to deter aggression (Shambough 2011:12). In addition, Mearsheimer (2005) states that “China cannot rise peacefully and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next two decades, the U.S. and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war”. The growth of China’s economy, population, and military expenses all contribute to the expected role of China’s hegemony. While Mearsheimer (2010:89) argues that striving to become a hegemon is the best method to assure a great power’s survival, this strategy does not necessitate the use of force; rather, it may be more effective to change the preferences of the actors in other ways (Kim 2007:437). China has already established productive and increasingly solid relationships throughout the Pacific region through a combination of pragmatic security policies, a growing economy, and an increase in diplomacy (Gill 2010:1). While increased military strength has created greater strategic space for China to expand its influence at the regional and global level, it is unlikely that China will reverse its peaceful policies (Gill 2010:1).

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Besides realist scholars, neoliberal scholars have also written about China’s ‘peaceful’ rise. As large states expand their range of interests and integrate more fully into the global order, neoliberals argue that these states will automatically be drawn by the functional benefits institutions offer (Hurrel 2006:6). According to Hurrel (2006:6) China would be pushed towards more cooperative patterns of behaviour. The complex interdependence theory within the neoliberal school of thought emphasizes the importance of “reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” and focuses on states that view each other as interdependent, according to Keohane and Nye (1989:8). In examining global and economic issues, complex interdependence offers a useful framework.

The three assumptions of complex interdependence are as follows (Keohane and Nye 1989): 1. All societies are interconnected through organizations, arrangements and informal ties. 2. There remains no hierarchical agenda within states (as opposed to realism wherein the

state security plays the crucial role).

3. Complex interdependence precludes military force among governments.

Keohane and Nye (1989:5) argue that societies are connected through informal ties, transnational organizations, and nongovernmental elites that aim to establish rules and institutions created by governments to control interstate relations. Complex interdependence theory suggests a bigger role for organizations in comparison with realism. Organizations can be seen as agenda setters, political resources, and a tool for weak states (Keohane and Nye 1989:37). There are several formal international ties between China and India. Both countries are members of the so-called BRICS countries, and India will soon also become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Founded in 2001, SCO is a Chinese political, economic and military organisation. On July 10 2015, the SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan into its membership the countries are expected to join in 2016.

The second assumption, which concerns the absence of hierarchical issues among nations, theorizes that states make decisions based on several reasons besides their own security. Other important influences include economic prosperity, living standards, and environmental challenges (Keohane and Nye 1989:31-40); the military agenda does not solely determine the agenda. Furthermore, China uses defence diplomacy in line with its peaceful rise, which embodies a responsibility for a stable region and indicates that China highly values international cooperation.

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The third assumption of complex interdependence theory centres on the role of the military. When the military plays a minor role in a system, states will depend more on other actors, which possibly entails economic interdependence and transnational organization. A fixation on state power is seen as an exaggeration that is unrelated to the reality of integration and transnational activity within world politics. All of these actors influence the world politics (Keohane and Nye 1989:30). This part of their theory is less useful to explain China’s peaceful rise, since China’s military and naval expenses have been increasing rapidly over the past circa 20 years (Laksmana 2012). However, this does not directly imply that China does not have peaceful intentions. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is more integrated into the regional order than ever in history (Johnston 2003). China seems less enamoured of revolutionary power nowadays; for example, it has abandoned its earlier goal of spreading communism throughout Asia (Friedberg 2005:27). Additionally, the international community has accepted some of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and China’s expansionist ambitions are moderate enough that the prospects for conflict with the U.S. should be limited (Friedberg 2005:27).

In addition to the realist and liberal theories discussed, the approach of constructivism also seems applicable to China and its peaceful intentions towards neighbouring countries. Constructivism criticizes neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism for their failure to explain contemporary global transformations. World orders are created and sustained not only by great power preferences, but also by understanding of what constitutes a legitimate international order. Constructivists state that participation in international institutions and support of the international order has helped to foster international cooperation and strengthen China’s rise (Wang and Blyth 2013:1284).

As discussed above, several approaches and theories help explain China’s ‘peaceful’ behaviour in the Pacific region. As China focuses on developing a new security strategy and establishing an international order to create world peace and security, it retains peaceful intentions. Through its efforts to create and maintain multilateral and bilateral relations, China has become increasingly interdependent with other states. China’s liberal diplomacy and economic engagement is seen as another way of building regional trust, treading a path towards hegemony. This behaviour partially accords with the complex interdependence theory. On the other hand, this theory states that the military and navy play a minor role, if any role at all. Therefore, many scholars argue that this theory cannot fully explain China’s situation. Taking growing military and naval expenses into account, strategic moves seem to

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play a substantial role in China’s behaviour. Thus, a combination of theories is required to accurately gauge Chinese behaviour towards India and the global community.

In spite of the long-term realist concerns, this thesis expects the rapprochement from China towards neighbouring countries to continue, as it is a more sustainable way for China to reach and maintain its hegemony. China’s rapid rise in global power raises concerns in regional neighbours such as India, implying that focusing on peaceful intentions is a better fit for China than realist aims. If China does operate peacefully, particularly through defence diplomacy, these intentions should be recognized.

Although the existing literature provides valid insights, there is a dearth of analysis regarding China’s peaceful intentions in its surrounding political environment. Current theories seldom offer an explanation regarding the areas in which China acts to support their peaceful intentions. In addition, the literature does not adequately explore the influence of the actions undertaken in relation to their interpretation by other countries. Although research has been conducted to discuss whether China’s intentions are peaceful, the perceptions of recipient countries are under-examined. By considering defence diplomacy as a tactic to improve bilateral relations, it can be argued that leaders in China are making decisions to avoid conflict for the purpose of consolidating their regional power.

To consider whether Chinese intentions are truly peaceful, it is useful to investigate the interpretations of countries that receive China’s peacefully intended actions. If these countries interpreted the actions as they were intended, it can be said that China does rise peacefully. Thus, the assumption of this thesis that China is rising peacefully, which allows us to investigate the concerning intentions and determine whether India’s perceptions match China’s intentions.

2.2 Conceptual framework

This section will introduce various interrelated concepts and theoretical frameworks that augment an understanding of China’s peaceful rise. To investigate India’s perception of Chinese actions of defence diplomacy, the concept of a peaceful rise to power will first be defined. Second, the concept of defence diplomacy will be specified, which offers a useful framework to analyse whether India experiences Chinese actions in China’s intended way. Furthermore, perceptions and symmetry will be further specified, as they are of major importance for the theoretical argument. India could have no opinion; India could see the activities as undesirable; or India could perceive the actions of defence diplomacy as supportive. Moreover, a combination of these options is possible, as India could perceive the

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actions of defence diplomacy as desirable, but only under certain conditions. The dependent variable is defence diplomacy, which supports the peaceful rise of the Chinese. If actions of defence diplomacy take place, this will influence the perceptions of Indian political leaders (independent variable) and the Indian people. Possible intervening variables are similarities between the two countries and symmetry in international relations in which both countries are involved.

China’s peaceful rise

The concept of peaceful rise was one of the first concepts introduced under the official foreign policy of the Hu Jintao administration (Glaser and Medeiros 2007:292). In the 1990’s, Chinese leaders sought a way to adjust the focus of China’s diplomacy towards engagement, confidence building, and reassurance (Glaser and Medeiros 2007:293). By improving the quality of its bilateral and multilateral policy, Beijing presented other Asian nations with a much more benign image of itself (Glaser and Medeiros 2007:293). Chinese officials and analysts started to think about a concept surrounding China’s rise and how the concept of “peaceful rise” emerged in China in the late 1990’s.

Zheng Bijian, senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advisor, appeared on Shanghai Oriental Television for a rare interview to announce this strategy (Lynch 2009:87). According to Bijian, a peaceful rise would also ensure avoidance of confrontational relations with other major powers (Glaser and Medeiros 2007:296). Furthermore, he argued that there was nothing to fear from China’s rise, as the only way a country can develop is through economic interdependence and political co-operation (Lynch 2009:87). For China to embark upon an internationally destructive course to retain hegemony similar to the paths taken by Japan and Germany prior to the Second World War would be unthinkable (Lynch 2009:88). In addition, both the way the U.S. and the Soviet Union created their power through military and economic power did not seem to be a viable path for China. China did not consider the way other major powers created their regional hegemony to be a viable option, as it did not lead to sustainable hegemons according to China.

Because of the economic and military stability associated with China’s peaceful rise, it may be possible for the country to achieve economic development and raise the standard of living of its people over the next half-century. In addition, China’s rise will neither destabilize the international order nor oppress China’s neighbouring countries (Glaser and Medeiros 2007:296). Therefore, the deployment of defence diplomacy is a constructive way to improve

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international perception of China. The concept of defence diplomacy will be further explained below.

Defence diplomacy

There is no single definition used to describe the concept of defence diplomacy. It can generally be understood as “the peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence, to achieve positive outcomes in the development of a country’s bilateral and multilateral relationships” (Winger 2014). Military diplomacy is a subset of this strategy, referring only to the role of military attachments and their associated activity. Defence diplomacy can be considered an organizing concept for defence-related international activity. While the term originated in the West, the conduct of defence diplomacy is by no means confined to Western countries.

Examples of defence diplomacy include (Cottey and Forster 2010; Laksmana 2012): -‐ Officer exchanges

-‐ High level engagement (state visits) -‐ Joint exercises

-‐ Coordinated patrols -‐ Intelligence sharing -‐ Training activities

As this thesis is focused on defence diplomacy between China and India, the summarized contextual definition of defence diplomacy for the purposes of this research is:

Even though the absence of violence is a key feature of defence diplomacy, it is not the sole characteristic. At the heart of each instance of defence diplomacy lies an effort by one country to influence the strategic thinking and institutions of another in a way that is beneficial to the “The peaceful application by China in the form of state visits, or an invitation for India to China, or joint military trainings, to support the development of positive bilateral relations. Defence diplomacy can reassure and build confidence with the partner state; moreover, these actions of defence diplomacy can be used to show that a state does not have offensive intentions towards the other state.”

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practitioner (Winger 2014). Defence diplomacy is thus not cooperation for its own sake, but rather a method of bringing the strategic thinking of one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner) (Winger 2014). This nonviolent use of military institutions to convince officials from the recipient government that their best interests are in line with the practitioner’s is the essence of soft power (Winger 2014).

Defence diplomacy works in different ways and at several levels. It performs a primarily political role and signifies willingness to pursue broader cooperation, mutual trust, and long-term commitment (Cottey and Forster 2010:16). High-level discussions of defence diplomacy may be used to show that a state does not have offensive intentions and that its armed forces are primarily defensive in character (Cottey and Forster 2010:16). In this case, defence diplomacy can reassure and build confidence with the partner state. Military cooperation through actions of defence diplomacy can also support the realignment of partner states’ militaries perceptions (Cottey and Forster 2010:17).

According to Winger (2014), the use of defence institutions beyond the use of force, in conjunction with an understanding of defence diplomacy as a tool of statecraft, is no longer a choice but a necessary component in our analysis of world affairs. Defence diplomacy is a long-term process and China will remain committed to that policy as long as political, economic, and security interests in the region continue to expand (Storey 2012). It is China’s best interest to seek solutions to current disputes through political negotiations rather than by military conflict (Snyder 2001). Deploying defence diplomacy vis-à-vis other regional powers is therefore a useful way for China to maintain and increase their cooperation with other nations in the Asian region.

Indian Perceptions

A theory of perception is needed to analyse Indian attitudes towards China. According to Jervis (1976), the key elements to understand policymaking in the China-India relationship are collective and individual perceptions, views of identities and ideologies, and social beliefs. The war between China and India in 1962 was perceived as traumatic by both countries and had a strong impact on New Delhi’s current policies toward China (Egreteau 2012:12). Aside from the lasting effects of war on India, the Sino-Indian border dispute is the most salient source of rivalry between the two nations (Egreteau 2012:12). Although both collective and individual perceptions are relevant elements of the Indian perception of China, this thesis will focus on the perception of the Indian political leaders, whose opinions often determine the perception of the Indian population as a whole and provide a more practical

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mode of analysis than conducting a public survey. The perceptions of India’s political leaders can be influenced by similarities and symmetry between China and India, as explained below. Similarities and symmetry

It is more likely for country A to trust country B if country A knows country B trusts them (Kim 2007:423). Symmetric attitudes are based on the assumptions that similarity and contact are of vital importance in understanding international affect (Kim 2007:426). Therefore, similarities between China and India will be the focus of this discussion. According to Kim (2007:426) the dyadic nature of affective relationships creates reciprocity between states since one state’s actions or emotions are conditioned by another’s actions or emotive rhetoric. Actions of defence diplomacy, with a focus on building mutual trust and confidence, will therefore increase the affective relationships between countries. The reciprocity between states fits within the complex interdependence theory developed by Keohane and Nye (1989:8), which asserts that reciprocal effects among countries will develop when states are dependent upon one another. Reciprocity therefore creates a more resilient relationship. In addition, Miller (2005:230) argues that sources of regional conflict and regional peace making are not only found in intrinsic motivations, but are also a direct result of issues related to international security.

In addition, perceptions and misperceptions of threat are important variables in the strategic policies of states. International relations theorists have long analysed threat perceptions as the estimated intent and capabilities of the adversary state. States adopt countermeasures to cope with perceived threat (possibly by external partnerships with allies). Some other states try to ally themselves with another power, while others seek a constructive engagement through Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) to reduce threat (Raghavan 2014).

Asymmetrical relations are the opposite of symmetrical relations and are associated with asymmetrical attitudes. These attitudes most often occur between countries that differ greatly in size (Van Oudenhoven et al. 2002). Hostility can occur as a result of fear based on ambition of the opponent to achieve a regional hegemony and on past experiences of conflict (Kim 2007:427). Besides emotion or affect, current relations between countries also depend on national factors. Country-to-country asymmetry exists when there are nationalist challenges to the existing regional state system (Miller 2005:233), while symmetry exists if there are similarities that improve the relationship of two nations. Regions with a high state-to-nations imbalance often suffer from the presence of revisionist states. These states are

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dissatisfied with the current regional order on nationalist grounds and are willing to use force to change the territorial status quo (Miller 2005:233). The reasons why a territorial dispute ends in a war or conflict are highly variable, but the likelihood of escalation increases in cases of state-to-nation imbalances in comparison to economic or strategic conflicts (Miller 2005:233).

Beijing and New Delhi both have a shared interest in a just and stable international system while seeking a multi-polar world. Nonetheless, China has clearly shown its hand against India by working against the latter’s entry as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The idea of a parallel rise of India and China has been voiced by Indian leaders and supported by the Indian media (Raghavan 2014). The extent of the unresolved problems between the two countries is related to security dilemmas and volatility in various disciplines, such as diplomatic and economic.. If there is a high state-to-nation symmetry and general acceptance of the territorial boundaries among the regional states, the intensity of the security dilemma is lower and it is less likely that mutual fears of being attacked will dominate relations among the regional states. The security dilemma is especially likely when there is high state-to-nation asymmetry, resulting in sharp territorial disagreements (Miller 2005:242). The next chapter describes the research design and data collection process.

3. Research methods

3.1 Research design

As argued in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to assess the influence of the actions of Chinese defence diplomacy (the dependent variable) on India. To be able to determine if China’s deployment of defence diplomacy with neighbouring countries is interpreted as it is intended, this thesis will use India as a critical case. The interpretation is seen as the independent variable, which can be influenced by similarities between India and China and symmetry in relations between those two countries. Therefore similarities and symmetry will also be investigated as possible intervening variables. The first intervening variable is thus based on detectable similarities between China and India. The second intervening variable is based on the symmetry of the relations China and India have with other countries.

The two actions of defence diplomacy that will be considered in this thesis are state visits and joint military exercises. State visits intend to make leaders of a country feel that they are taken seriously, subsequently having a positive effect on the perceptions of the recipient country. As China aims for India to have a positive perception of its country, the

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amount of Chinese state visits paid to India should rise. In addition, agreements and cooperation between the two countries would be a logical consequence of a state visit and would have to be visible in Indian governmental documentation. This thesis includes analysis of joint military exercises because they are expected to have a different effect on Indian perception (as described on the previous page) and will therefore provide additional information to answer the research question of: ““What is the influence of Chinese defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2015 on the perception of the Indian political leaders of China?”

Considering India’s potential to hinder China’s growth and setback its peaceful rise, China should ensure that India has a positive perception of Chinese intentions. It is therefore likely that China initiates agreements and interactions with India to achieve positive perceptions of China and its peaceful rise. Besides the expected effect on political leaders of India, the effect of joint military exercises could also trickle down and determine the perspectives of other Indian groups and populations, as joint military exercises seem to leave a more imposing impression than state visits.

3.2 Data collection methods

In order to test the hypothesis, multiple data collection techniques are used to understand the various concepts, historical developments, and theories. First, three semi-structured interviews have been conducted with three experts on the following topics: China’s rise as a global power and regional security in Asia, China’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and contemporary Chinese history and society (see appendix for transcribed interviews). The experts are chosen based on their relevance for this study. The following is a list of the interviewees with brief descriptions of their qualifications:

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In addition to the interviews, this paper utilizes multiple types of secondary data. The first type of secondary data is academic literature. The second type consists of reports and other official documents and datasets. Most official documents are derived from the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India. These documents are used to obtain information about state visits, joint military exercises, and the reactions and responses of Indian political leaders to these Chinese actions of defence diplomacy. In addition, this paper has examined Indian newspapers, such as The Hindu and The Times of India. An additional data source is The Military Balance of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, which consists of the annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. The Military Balance has been used to derive information about defence statistics. The Diplomat, a

current-1. Frans-Paul van der Putten of the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael has expertise in China’s rise as a global power and regional security in East Asia. Van der Putten is a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael. Relevant topics in this context include China’s security relations with Europe and the United States, with neighbouring countries in Asia and with the developing world. He is editor of the Clingendael Asia Forum and a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the track two-organisation promoting security dialogue in Asia.

2. Stefan R. Landsberger is a lecturer at Leiden University with an expertise in the society of modern China. His field of interest consists of contemporary China, both social and political. Got his PhD in 1994 at Leiden University on Visualizing the Future: Chinese Propaganda Posters from the ‘Four Modernizations’ Era, 1978-1988.

3. Ingrid d’Hooghe of the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael is an expert in China’s rise, China’s foreign policy and diplomacy, China’s position in the global governance structure, China-EU relations, and public diplomacy. She is a senior research associate at Clingendael and a Chinese strategy advisor at China Relations. She lectures about and conducts research on China’s

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affairs magazine and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a public policy research institution have also been consulted.

3.3 Operationalization

The analytical framework of this study consists of causal mechanisms that assess how processes unfold. Chapter two discusses why China wants its neighbouring countries to be fully aware of its aim of peaceful rise. To assess whether China engages in actions of defence diplomacy, this study assesses how China could use these actions to obtain positive perceptions from its neighbouring countries. To answer these questions and examine whether the expected causal mechanisms occur, actions of defence diplomacy and their consequences will be considered. As the actions of defence diplomacy deployed by China are intended as positive, the question is whether the activities are also interpreted in this way. As discussed, India could experience it in the intended way, India could have no opinion, or India could see the activities as undesirable. A combination of these options is also possible. The causal mechanism underlying the main hypothesis is as follows:

The sub-hypotheses, which are used as a framework to answer the research question, are divided into three categories. The first category contains the actions of defence diplomacy deployed by China and influence of these tactics on the India’s perception of China. The second category consists of the examination of the intervening variable of similarities between China and India on the Indian perceptions of China. The third category analyzes the impact of the intervening variable of symmetry in India’s international relations.

A state visit gives the political leaders of a country the feeling that their country is taken seriously in the international landscape (Landsberger 2015). According to Kim (2007:426), several studies have demonstrated that peoples’ attitudes towards one another become more positive after direct interpersonal contact. The underlying human psychological process here bolsters the claim that state leaders will act in this way. To investigate whether Chinese state visits to India have led to an immediate positive response in Indian perceptions of China, this paper examined Indian newspapers and official documents of the Indian government. Furthermore, it is important to note that an increase in the level of positive perception of an

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action does not necessarily lead to an immediate action in the form of an agreement of cooperation. For example, an increased level of perception has not always correlated to an increase in cooperation on border disputes between India and China. As d’Hooghe also supports the argument that joint military exercises seem to have a greater impact on the Indian political leaders because of a more commanding impression, these actions of defence diplomacy will also be analysed.

Besides investigating the effects of the deployed actions of defence diplomacy, two other intervening variables are also taken into account and will be tested based on two hypotheses supporting the main hypothesis. The first theory argues that similarity between nations may lead to attraction (Kim 2007:426). This stems from the idea that people have a tendency to like others similar to themselves, which may be based on religion, language, or other interests and characteristics. If countries are attracted to each other based on similarities, this implies that the perceptions towards that other country are positive.

Therefore, international affect will be symmetric if positive attitudes are based on similarity (Kim 2007:426). This theory states that positive perceptions can also be based on symmetry (Kim 2007:427). Country A’s positive perception of country B does not correspond to similar perceptions country B has of country A. It is expected that a country’s positive perceptions of country B will rise with increasing levels of similarities between the two countries, and this theory extends to relations between China and India. Based on the symmetry between India

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and China, this thesis posits the following hypothesis: India is more likely to trust China when other states India cooperates with trust China.

The first part of the next chapter (4.1) discusses the influence of Chinese state visits and joint military trainings on Indian perception of China. The importance of state visits and joint military training will be further specified, followed by the reactions of Indian political leaders and the Indian media. The second part (4.2) will discuss similarities between China and India. Both the history of China-India relations will be taken into account, as well as the domestic goals of both countries. The third part (4.3) will discuss the states India cooperates with in addition to China. This part will examine the degree of trust India has towards China, and how that influences Indian perceptions of China.

4. Analysis

4.1 Chinese actions of defence diplomacy

This section is divided into two parts. Part one discusses the effects of a state visit to another country, particularly those made by to India in 2003, 2009, and 2015 The responses of both the Indian media and of Indian leaders will be analysed. Part two will discuss the effects of joint military exercises.

4.1.1. State visits

Both d’Hooghe (2015) and Landsberger (2015) argue that state visits are one of the known actions of defence diplomacy that assure leaders of another country that their country respected (Interview 2; Interview 3). d’Hooghe added that a state visit is a sign of friendship and of mutual appreciation; it shows goodwill from one country to another. Furthermore, she contends that a state visit affects the perceptions of political leaders and that it also gives an important signal about the military apparatus of a country. State visits and joint military

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exercises do not have immediate effects on wary Indian leaders’ perceptions of China (d’Hooghe 2015). State visits can, however, be used as a way to show the people of India that the countries enjoy a stable diplomatic relationship, and moreover, that cooperation between China and India ultimately leads to prosperity for both nations (Interview 1; Interview 3). Academic literature supports d’Hooghe and Landsberger’s arguments, contending that state visits between China and India signal that both countries want to establish peace, security, and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (Jain 2004:259). Furthermore, Laksmana (2012:255) posits that deepening the relationship between India and China through in-person engagement in the form of state visits would provide valuable socio-political capital in the event of an erupting crisis and for future engagement in other issues such as national defence. The following paragraphs will discuss Chinese state visits to and invitations extended towards India.

Prime Minister Vajpayee was invited to China in June 2003, the same year that China first announced its peaceful rise (MEA 1). During this visit, the first comprehensive document on development of the two countries’ bilateral relations was signed at the highest level: a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation. Later that year, on November 22nd_{, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s}

Political Consultative Conference, visited India (MEA 1). Qinglin met Shri Manohar {who is he? Add a quick title} and the two leaders discussed positive developments in the two nations’ bilateral relations.

To assess whether the state visits of 2003 have had a positive influence on the Indian perception of China, it is relevant to investigate the agreements on cooperation that have been signed since 2003. In March 2004, the Chinese Minister of Defence Gen Cen Gangchuan visited India (Indian Embassy 2009). Then in 2005, the two nations signed a joint Statement establishing a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (MEA 2). In November 2006, Hu Jintao visited China and the two countries signed a statement concerning the intensification of cooperation in all areas to give greater content to the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership (MEA 2). The 2006 visit reflected a continuing rapprochement in China-India relations (Mitchell and Bajpaee 2007:151).

In 2009, the Indian Minister of External Affairs made a statement following his meeting with the Foreign Minister of China (MEA 3), noting how the two nations agreed on the importance of continuing to develop high-level exchanges, enhance trade and economic cooperation, and progress in their defence contacts. The Indian Minister of External Affair went on to accept an invitation to visit China. He concluded his statement positively: “We

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both see this as part of the process of building trust and understanding at the political level” (MEA 3). At the Conference “India-China: Drivers of the Asian Century in a Post-Crisis World” the chairman also made statements directed towards Zhang Yan, the Ambassador of China, in which he discussed the post-crisis scenario to illustrate India’s recovery and optimism (MEA 4).

In 2015, Jaishankar, the Indian Minister of the Foreign Secretary, stated that he sees the relationship between China and India as a constructive model, stressing the ‘strategic communication’ and ‘strategic cooperation’ between the two countries. Moreover, India considers the political dialogue between the Foreign Ministers of India and China as a platform for the synchronization and enhancement of regional and international issues of mutual interest (MEA 6).

As previously discussed, there have been several state visits between China and India after the first comprehensive document on the development of their bilateral relations in 2003. Documents may be signed either during or after a state visit (d’Hooghe 2015). For example, 24 deals worth over $10 billion were signed during Modi’s visit to China (Times of India 2015). This high number of signed deals could not have followed from one state visit alone. Additionally, d’Hooghe argues that when political leaders achieve positive collaboration through a state visit it trickles down to the Indian people as well (Interview 3). Thus, state visits tend to have a positive influence on the perceptions of both Indian political leaders and the Indian people. An overview of all the discussed state visits and their consequences has been placed in table 1:

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Table 1: Results of state visits

Year state visit took place Resulted in Effect on perception

political leaders

2003 _{• Another state visit in}

2004 (CHN à IND) • Joint statements in 2005 & 2006 Positive 2009 _{• Joint statement in} 2009 • Agreement on further developing high-level exchanges, of

enhancing trade and economic cooperation and on progressing their defence contacts

Positive 2015 _{• India considers} political dialogue as a platform for synchronization and enhancement with China Positive

4.1.2 Joint military exercises

As previously mentioned, joint military exercises can both influence the perceptions of the Indian political leaders and those of the military apparatus. This section will analyse joint military exercises in the years 2003, 2009 and 2015 their consequences.

Both d’Hooghe and Landsberger (2015) argue that military cooperation can work as a confidence-building measure: instead of demonising the other country, they can be used to familiarize countries with each other (Interview 2). Both countries gain insight in the possibilities of the other state and this could positively influence perception. Van der Putten (2015) argues that China and India did not often interact with each other in earlier years, because of the mountains between the two countries (Interview 1). This has changed recently, since China has been more visible in the area around India, for example in the Indian Ocean (Interview 1). Therefore, India has been paying close attention to the rise of China in the context of China’s increased influence and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean (Khurana 2008:1). An explanation of Indian perceptions towards China based on joint military exercises, beginning in 2003, is set out in the following paragraph.

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The first joint military exercise between China and India was held in November 2003 in the East China Sea (Mitchell 2005). This joint exercise was followed by another joint military and joint naval exercise in 2005 that took place in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, China and India also issued a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation (Mitchell 2005). Joint exercises were further visible in 2007 and 2008 (MEA 7). In 2009 no exercises occurred, leading to significant media speculation (fpri.org 2011). Two years later, The Foreign Policy Research Institute stated that: “bilateral ties between China and India nosedived so dramatically in 2009, that Indian strategists were even predicting the year of a Chinese attack on India” (fpri.org 2011). An official spokesperson responded to the media indicating that it was mutually decided during the last exercise that the next joint military exercise would take place in 2010 (MEA 7). Despite media speculations, political leaders did not despair and instead communicated a nuanced response to the press. D’Hooghe (2015) argues that this is generally the way India responds in the media; both China and India are looking for stability and acknowledge each other’s importance, so Indian responses are generally nuanced (Interview 3). Responding in this way also supported a positive narrative for the Indian population.

New developments were visible by 2015. At first, China deployed a joint military exercise with India to help both countries combat terrorism (Gady 2015). In May 2015, speculations about a military hotline, a direct phone line between the general military headquarters of two countries, were derived from the Indian news medium “Times of India” (Ians 2015). According to Yang Yujun, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, the military hotline is a mechanism to increase mutual trust and to avoid misjudgements (Ians 2015). Then, in July 2015, India was invited in Beijing, a state visit during which China and India agreed on their military hotline (Mitchell 2015). This shows that after a joint military exercise the two countries have discussed possibilities for a military hotline. The state visit that happened later that year seems to have been the final push needed for India to cooperate with China again. From these events it can be concluded that the combination of a joint military exercise and a state visit has led to a positive Indian perception, as the Indian leader visited China afterwards to sign the military hotline agreement.

As discussed, the first joint military exercise between China and India was followed by several other joint military and naval exercises. After some speculation about the absence of joint military cooperation in 2009, a political Indian leader responded that there was no sign of tension or distrust. The fact that the military hotline was confirmed after a joint military training, leading to a state visit, indicated the positive influence on perceptions of

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India’s political and military leaders. An overview of all the discussed joint military exercises and their consequences can be found in Table 2:

Table 2: Results of joint military exercises (JME)

Year JME took place Resulted in Effect on perception

political leaders

2003 _{• JME and joint naval}

exercise in 2005

• Memorandum of

understanding on

defence cooperation • In 2007 and 2008 joint

exercises were visible

Positive

2009 _{• No JME occurred}

• However, a nuanced response out of India explaining why

No JME

2015 _{• JME to combat terrorism}

• Realization military hotline

• State visit

Positive

4.2 Sino-Indian similarities

In addition to examining the state visits and military exercises that have taken place between China and India, it is useful to elaborate on the similarities between China and India. Similarities support the attraction between countries and could therefore positively influence the perceptions a country has towards another country (Kim 2007:426). This section examines whether similarities between China and India could be an intervening variable on the effect of actions on defence diplomacy, thus influencing the Indian perceptions of China. The opposite of symmetrical relations are asymmetrical relations, which are associated with asymmetrical attitudes (Van Oudenhoven et al. 2002).

The categorization of China and India as so called high context countries might strengthen their relationship. Two high context countries are supposed to have better relations, because their cultural similarity explains things that are left unsaid (Nishimura et al 2008:785). This allows China and India to better relate to each other. Even though diplomacy is a way to understand the other leader better, it is easier to cooperate when leaders of both India and China share the same visions of respect and take the time to get to know each other (d’Hooghe 2015). Additionally, China and India share a non-Western history, enabling the

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two countries to relate to each other better and craft similar visions, as seen in their policies on human rights laws (Van der Putten 2015) Specifically, China and India are unable to cooperate at the same level as Western countries, as those countries have a completely different vision on human right laws (Interview 1). These similarities could make it easier for India to improve their perception of China.

Besides the similarities based on culture, both India and China are struggling to define their role in the global order given their newfound influences. Also several Indian policy shifts have, at least indirectly, been instigated by China (Bagchi 2010). As such, India views China as an economic model to emulate (Mitchell & Bajpaee 2007:154), a response implying that India has a positive perception of China.

Another similarity between China and India can be found in the fact that they are both BRICS countries. This indicates that the countries are cooperating at a strategic level, as they recently set up the BRICS development bank (Van der Putten 2015). India is also becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2016 (Panda 2015). Until now the SCO was dominated by Russia and China. The fact that India has been admitted, is another sign that the two developing BRICS countries know a similarity based on a similar interest, namely at a strategic level. As BRICS countries, China and India will get a chance to play a bigger role in the global order, which supports both of their great power ambitions.

Both countries share cultural values and a non-Western history, making it easier for China and India to relate to each other. Also both countries believe in their imminent rise as global powers. Gross Domestic Product levels have risen and more capacity has been invested in defence. The fact that they are similar in certain ways and that India sees China as a role model could positively impact the possibilities for Chinese actions of defence diplomacy to positively influence Indian perceptions of China.

4.3 Symmetry in China-India relations

As mentioned in the conceptual framework and research design sections, symmetry in the relations India and China have with other states can behave as an intervening variable and thereby influence Indian perceptions of China. Cooperating with the same countries would lead to a prospective ease in cooperating with each other. On the contrary, cooperating with each other’s allies would lead to a prospected negative effect on the Indian perception. In this section two asymmetrical relationships India and China have will be discussed, in order to assess what the intervening effect of those relationships is on the influence on the Indian perception of China.

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According to d’Hooghe, India sees China as a threat based on their collaboration with other nations. One example of this threat is the relationship China has with Pakistan (Interview 3). When examining the China-Pakistan relation and its representation in academic literature, it becomes clear that these nations have had friendly relations from the 1950’s on (Malik 1995; Mitchell 2005; Mitra 2001). In 1950 Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China, which lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1951 (China Daily 2006). Since then, Pakistan has been dependent on China to balance against India, for support on Kashmir and for their nuclear supply (Mitra 2001:372). Their friendly relationship was crowned by China, when their first joint naval exercise ever was with Pakistan (Khurana 2008:6). However, India and Pakistan have had tense relations for decades, notably dominated by conflicts in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Mitra 2001:361).

China has made attempts to assure India that the relationship between China and Pakistan will not hamper the Sino-Indian relationship. China has offered India flexibility on the Kashmir dispute (Malik 1995:320). In return, India has reassured China on the Tibetan issue, which seems of major importance as the Tibetan issue is referred to as the core issue in China-India relations (Chellaney 2014). There have been multiple recent attempts by China to assuage India’s diplomatic concerns. China claims, for example, to have respect for India’s privileges in the Indian Ocean (Medcalf 2012:495). India’s priorities consist of remaining superior over Pakistan and deterring perceived Chinese assertiveness and dominance in the South East Asian Sea and Indian Ocean (Medcalf 2012:557). In this context Van der Putten (2015) argued that Pakistan is an important partner to China, but also a potential cause of terrorism for India. China considers Tibetan movements as dangerous, which is another source of disagreement between India and China. Additionally, Van der Putten contended that terrorism directed towards Muslim minorities would be a bigger problem for China than for India, as India has more experience with Muslim minorities (Interview 1).

Besides the triangle of China, India, and Pakistan, another very important triangle exists between China, India, and the United States, with Japan occasionally serving as an additional player in the power grouping (d’Hooghe 2015, Lou 2012, Mitchell 2005). According to Jain (2004:262), the intensification of China’s military and strategic cooperation has led to increasing defence and strategic cooperation between India and the U.S. A joint military exercise between these two countries was conducted earlier this year (The Military Balance 2015, chapter 10:484). Besides their cooperation, India, the U.S., and Japan have emphasized the need to collaborate with China for peace and prosperity (csis.org 2009). They

Chinese Defence Diplomacy and the Perception of India A focused disquisition of the bilateral relationship of Chinese intentions and Indian interpretations