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Towards a New Understanding of Social Media:

Differential Effects of Digital Activism and Digital Passivism on Protest Participation

Laura Taylor

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Abstract

This research examines the interaction between social network sites, Facebook and Twitter, and protest activism. Through placing particular emphasis on disaggregating time spent on social media this research looks at the differential effects of online political behaviour. Focusing on the British protest movement against the implementation of austerity measures and relying on data taken from an Internet survey of the British adult population (N = 153). The findings lend support to the argument that actions online have a far greater predictive power than duration. With the results returning no relationship between duration of time on social network sites and participation in protest activities. Regression analysis demonstrates the importance of differentiating between political acts on social network sites. With online actions encountered under digital activism, such as opinion expression and political discussion, highlighting social medias ability to mobilise and motivate individuals to become engaged in protest politics. Whilst more passive forms of online political behaviour, such as following politicians and news organisations, were found to be unrelated. Overall, the research will contribute to our understanding of the interaction between social media and protest action highlighting the positive political role it can take in the 21st Century.

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Towards a New Understanding of Social Media:

Differential Effects of Digital Activism and Digital Passivism on Protest Participation

Protests have become commonplace in many countries across the globe, democratic and emerging democracies alike, with questions surrounding the role social media has played in instigating the wave of societal unrest (Gerbaudo, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2011). Moreover, where protests were once viewed as an unconventional method of participation it is now an accepted and legitimate method of voicing grievances and enacting change (Norris, 2003). This research is focusing specifically on the protest movement in Britain that emerged out of a nationwide reaction to austerity measures introduced by the current government. Thousands of individuals have taken to the streets to demonstrate against cuts to public services, subsequent job losses and changes to the funding of higher education (BBC, 2011). What is striking about this continuing wave of protests is its use of social media sites Facebook and Twitter (Casciani, 2010). The use of hashtags, Events and Groups aided both the organisation and the widespread awareness of the anti-cuts movement enabling it to spread in an unprecedented way across the country (Lewis, Gabbatt, Taylor & Jeffery, 2010).

Considering the disenchantment towards Westminster politics and a decline in more traditional means of participation, such as voting and party membership (Harrop, 2001; Norris, 2001). Social media provides an easily accessible forum for people to exercise the basic and essential pillars of a democratic society, enabling people to come together, discuss ideas and engage in debate. Moreover, with 728 million people, a large proportion of them under 24, logging into Facebook everyday it necessitates an understanding of how politics and technology interact (Facebook,

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2013). Social media seems to be simplifying democratic participation in terms of protest and could in the future be a vital tool to reengage the electorate.

Extant research on the online environment initially focused on the benefits of the Internet for fostering social capital and reigniting political interest amongst a disenchanted citizenry (Gibson, Lusoli & Ward, 2005; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2001; Shah, Kwak & Holbert, 2001; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). It was in the aftermath of the Iraq war protests that the Internets capabilities in facilitating protest activity became increasingly apparent (Bennett, Breunig & Givens, 2008; Hwang et al, 2006; Nah, Veenstra & Shah, 2006). Further to this the development of Web 2.0, social media sites and smart phones heralded a new era of global connectivity allowing the coordination of world-wide protests as witnessed recently under the Occupy Movement (Juris, 2012) and Million Mask March (Fishwick, 2013).

Whilst the mediums democratic potential is there, this research raises the question of whether individuals are utilising the political functions and opportunities that social media can provide. Looking specifically at those actions, which facilitate the organisation of protest and mobilise individuals to take an active part. Past research focused on the relationship between time spent online and engagement in civic and political life (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007; Nie & Erbring, 2000). Through drawing focus away from duration this research aims to establish which actions are correlated with protest participation. Focusing on the mediating effect of opinion expression, newsgathering and mobilising actions Valenzuela, in one of the only and most recent studies on this subject, demonstrated the necessity of breaking down the facets of social network sites (2013). In this research a new distinction will be introduced between innately political actions conducted on social media, distinguishing between digital activism and digital passivism adapted from a recent study conducted by Bakker and de Vreese (2011). The focus on this research, in

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contrast to Bakker and de Vreese, is on social media as a facilitator and mobiliser to offline protest activism rather than medias ability to stimulate online and offline participation.

The view of what part social media plays in protest activism is still debated both in academia and the press (Gladwell, 2010; Waldram, 2011). This research will provide us with an understanding of how protest politics has been evolving since the advent of social media. Questioning the assumption that the availability of a platform, which has the possibility to foster civic engagement, political participation and protest activism, will be utilised by users to do so. Focusing specifically on the anti-cuts protest movement in Britain and relying on survey data taken from a sample of the British adult population.

 

Theoretical Framework Social Media and Protest Politics

Social media sites Facebook and Twitter were made public in 2007 and 2008 respectively. What ensued was much academic as well as societal disagreement over the impact social network sites have on politics. Some academics argued that social media enables the development of both creativeness and individual political self-expression (Castells, 2009) whilst others still rallied against its self-centered and self involved method of political participation (Fenton & Barassi, 2011).

However, what these sites with their Web 2.0 features brought with them was a heightened understanding of how the Internet could enable loose, fluid and horizontal organisations to develop and in this way facilitate direct collective action (Bennett et al, 2008). The new communication capabilities these sites offer enables an exchange of ideas and the ability to disseminate mobilising information to a wider

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audience, thus contributing to a rise in political and social grassroots movements (Bekkers, Beunders, Edwards & Moody, 2011). Moreover, with declining social ties and group membership of traditional organisations the online community is an open place where like-minded people can be brought together. The capability of social network sites has been witnessed globally in recent years with protests erupting across the globe. The power of social media became immediately apparent from the Middle East to Wall Street not just as a tool for mobilisation but also as a dispenser of real-time news generating worldwide conversation (see Gerbaudo, 2012).

The tie between social media and protest activism has now been well established by scholars (Bekkers et al, 2011; Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen & Wollebæk, 2013; Valenzuela, 2013). There are a number of reasons cited in the existing research that substantiate the link between social network sites and protest activism. Firstly, social network sites replicate the relationship of offline interpersonal discussion with family, friends, colleagues and strangers. Where political discussion can increase an individual’s propensity to participate in politics, due to deliberation of societal issues and shared interpretations of news media (McLeod, Scheufele & Moy, 1999; Scheufele, 2000; Kim & Kim, 2008), so to can the discussions conducted online (Lee, Shah & McLeod, 2012; Nah et al, 2006). Secondly, the size, scope and speed of these online networks constructed around single issues far out reaches those of networks and organisations created prior to social network sites (Bennett et al, 2008). And whilst maintaining existing relationships can be the sole reason a majority of individuals frequent social network sites (boyd & Ellison, 2007), a growing number of people do use the sites to network, and as a result meet and communicate with like-minded people sharing similar ideals (Neumayer & Raffl, 2008). Third, the stimulation of debate and discussions of ideas conducted online can validate and reinforce an individual’s beliefs enabling movements to gain momentum (Gil de Zuniga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012) Furthermore, the online

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environment not only offers the opportunity to meet and enter into dialogue with like-minded people but also the chance to interact with individuals who hold dissimilar stances. Consequently, providing the chance to voice opinions that often remain hidden in offline social circles due to fear of recrimination (Bargh, McKenna & Fitzsimons, 2002). A final link tying social network sites and protest activism are the sites informational benefits, the ease of information exchange they offer is key to the process of mobilisation (Enjolras et al, 2013). Information is transmitted across large networks informing individuals of organisational matters such as meeting places and times significantly reducing the cost of mass coordination.

However, whilst social network sites possess many functions, some of which enable it to facilitate and mobilise individuals to participate in protest, there is a significant caveat. The availability of a platform, which can aid political participation, does not guarantee that individuals are using it in such a way. Social media has numerous uses ranging from posting photos and arranging social engagements to forums of discussion and debate. Moreover, individuals are able to personalise their online media environment. Consequently, individuals who are not political by nature are able to avoid political material, views and information that they do not hold an inherent interest in (Tewksbury, 2003). Furthermore, a vast number of people have social media accounts; at latest count Facebook has 1.19 billion monthly active users (Facebook, 2013). When comparing this number to the amount of people who take part in protest in any given month there is good reason to believe that a majority of people attend to social media for reasons other than political.

In line with this argumentation recent research conducted by Gil de Zúñiga et al found no statistical support for overall frequency of social media use and subsequent increases in political participation and civic engagement (2012). Thus highlighting the importance of specifying social media use in order to ascertain its

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relationship to offline protest participation. For example, Park, Kee & Valenzuela found that “while entertainment-purposed Groups users do not contribute to users’ participation in political actions, information-purposed Groups users are likely to be involved in political events through friend networking” (2009, p. 731). Hence demonstrating that individuals who attend to Facebook and Twitter for leisure and amusement purposes are unlikely to be motivated into political behaviour. Through measuring time we are unable to decipher which individuals are using Facebook and Twitter for informational purposes and which are attending to the sites for entertainment purposes. Consequently rendering us unable to understand the specified use of social media that substantiates its link with protest activism.

Based on these factors I expect to find in my investigation that there is no overall association between frequency of time spent on social network sites and protest activism thus my first hypothesis is as follows,

Hypothesis 1: Frequency of social media use will be unrelated to protest activism (H1).

Early on scholars began to draw attention away from time spent online and political participation (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Polat, 2005; Shah, Cho, Eveland & Kwak, 2005; Shah, Kwak & Holbert, 2001). Differentiating between the Internet being used for informational purposes, social and communicative purposes and for the creation of online public sphere (Polat, 2005; Shah et al, 2001). With the aim to establish which actions online are linked to increased levels of political participation and civic engagement. However, with regards to social network sites there are thus far limited studies breaking down the facets of social media for political purposes (Gil de Zuniga et al, 2012; Park et al, 2009; Valenzuela, 2013). Valenzuela in his study focused on the mediating effect of opinion expression, hard news consumption and

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mobilizing information on protest participation. Questions regarding the use of social network sites for hard news consumption are slightly misguided. The content predominantly found on these sites is not concerned with hard news nor do individuals attend to social network sites to sources news content it is, if anything, an incidental by-product and thus hard to tap into and measure. Moreover, the findings indicated that the mediating effect of hard news via social network sites was not found when the variable was extracted from opinion expression and mobilising information (see Valenzuela. 2013).

A failure to address the different facets of social network sites is a failure to acknowledge that certain activities conducted on these sites, whilst being innately political and demonstrating solidarity with an issue, can be construed as ‘slacktivism’. ‘Slacktivism’ is a term used by Morozov to refer to “feel good online activism that has zero political or social impact” (2009). Slacktivism or “couch potato democracy” (Ward, Gibson & Lusoli, 2003, p.652) refers to online actions such as clicking ‘Like’ on Facebook pages and events for political causes, or mass forwarding online petitions. This research will differentiate between online actions on social network sites that are politically speaking digitally active and digitally passive (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011). Bakker and de Vreese used this differentiation between digitally active participation and digitally passive participation to refer to activities more generally executed on the Internet as a result of spending time with media. This research seeks to adapt and update them for relevance to social media sites, Facebook and Twitter. In doing so enabling us to understand the differential effects these two forms of behavior have on an individuals propensity to engage in offline protest activism.

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Digital Activism

Active political behaviour on social network sites demonstrates an inherent interest in a certain cause and a willingness to demonstrate solidarity with the issue. A key component of digital activism is opinion expression, expressing an opinion shows a greater depth of understanding over an issue through an exercise of cognitive reasoning (Valenzuela, 2013). Moreover, expressing an opinion on social network sites often stimulates online political discussion, and as previously mentioned political discussion online operates in a similar way to interpersonal communication offline. Encouraging people to become involved in protest politics as well as other forms of political participation through an enhancement of political learning and a greater understanding of an issue (Nah et al, 2006).

The mobilising capabilities of Facebook are a key aspect of digital activism. Social influence of a large network of friends encourages others to become politically involved (Bond et al, 2012). By their very nature social network sites publicises peoples choices to create events and attend demonstrations motivating others to do the same (Enjolras et al, 2013).Moreover, the informational benefits of social media for organisational details such as dates, times and locations of protest events and meetings are key factors for enabling people to take action with greater ease. The outlined aspects of digital activism correlate with a process of informational and motivational gain, which is well known for being instrumental in mobilising society into taking action (McLeod et al, 1999). The emphasis here is that by identifying the specific way in which people conduct themselves whilst on social media it enables us to garner an insight into how these actions interact with protest activism. These aforementioned actions demonstrate a sense of involvement with politics and specific issues and subsequently have real political value in promoting offline protest participation. Therefore the following hypothesis has been proposed,

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Hypothesis 3: Digital Activism on social network sites will be positively related to protest activism (H3)

Digital Passivism

Passive political behaviour on social network sites refers to activities, which whilst innately political require less effort, exertion and involvement. Thus are less likely to stimulate offline protest behaviour. This passive political behaviour revolves around the notion of slacktivism, actions such as ‘Liking’ political organisations Facebook Page and ‘Following’ politicians and political parties on Twitter are grounded in this concept (Christensen, 2011). Whilst demonstrating a basic acknowledgement of political matters, politicians and parties it is not an expression of major concern with an issue nor does it correlate with the propensity to take an active role in offline protest activity. Digitally passive online behaviour also refers to the idea of treating social network sites as sources of hard news (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013). Adopting an alternative approach to previous research I advocate that social network sites shall not be treated as sources of hard news. This stance is influenced by two factors; firstly, exposure to hard news is often an incidental by-product of time spent on social network sites due to friends posting articles and links to external news websites. Secondly, traditional news media are not known for their ability to recruit individuals to take an active part in protest. Mainstream news media has an obligation to remain neutral and impartial (Hoffman, 2006), however its portrayal of protest often draws focus to violence and evokes little sympathy to the cause. Moreover, Baumgartner & Morris found in their study that consuming news on social network sites does not lead to increased levels of offline political participation (2010). In considering these passive exercises of political behaviour I present

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the following hypothesis,

Hypothesis 4: Digital passivism on social network sites will not be related to protest activism (H4)

Method Context

The data collected for use in this research is relating to a time in British society that has experienced heightened protest activism and a subsequent increase in political and social movements. In 2010 the incumbent coalition government involving the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats took office. The coming together of these two political parties was the result of a tumultuous week of negotiations and uncertainty in the wake of a hung parliament (Wintour, 2010). In October 2010 austerity measures were announced, outlining a “£40bn package of emergency tax increases, welfare cuts and Whitehall spending constraint” (Elliott & Wintour, 2010). These cuts signified public sector pay freezes, a huge reduction to public services and significant changes to higher education funding. The wave of protest activity, which swept the nation after the announcement, was monumental and unprecedented, with thousands of students, public sector workers, and civil servants taking to the streets (Taylor, 2010). The effect of these cuts and subsequent squeezes to public expenditure are still being felt across the country and year on year are still igniting action, with the most recent demonstrations occurring nationwide in early November 2013 (Quinn, 2013).

The growing presence of social network sites during this time helped to facilitate the organisation of protest activities. Sites Facebook and Twitter were cited in the mainstream news media as being instrumental in orchestrating demonstrations, rousing support and providing real-time reporting (Adams, 2010).

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Moreover, in recent years the use of social network sites in the United Kingdom has exploded, a study conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in collaboration with Eurostat shows that within the European Union (EU) the residence of the United Kingdom are the second most prolific users of social network sites, with 57% of the population accessing sites such as Facebook and Twitter on a regular basis (ONS, 2013). The UK also ranks highly in the EU for proliferation of mobile Internet devices; second only behind Sweden, with social network sites being accessed by 63% of smartphone owners (ONS, 2013). These figures demonstrate the prevalence of social network sites amongst the UK population especially when compared to neighbouring European countries.

Sample

The data for this research was collected via an online survey. In order to maximise responses the survey was kept short and took a maximum of ten-minutes to complete. Participants were recruited using a purposive sampling technique; this refers to a method of sampling that selects participants based on a characteristic that is of particular interest to the research (Bryman, 2008). In the case of this research that specific characteristic was individuals who have and continue to take an interest and active part in the British anti-cuts protest movement. Further to this, individuals who do not belong to a protest movement were targeted through a method of convenience sampling

Recruitment. Data collection was conducted over a 5-week period from 29th October to 28th November. In total 180 protest movements were contacted via email asking if they would disseminate the survey amongst their mailing lists and post it to their Facebook groups. The protest movements were selected from the following websites www.falseeconomcy.org.uk and www.peoplesassembly.org.uk. The former is a working group providing contact details for localised anti-cut protest movements.

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The latter a grassroots movement founded in Spring 2013 with local divisions across Britain. In order to ensure the organisations were still in operation and hence worth contacting, their Facebook pages were checked for recent activity defined as any posts in the previous two months. In addition individuals from the general British population were contacted by e-mail via a convenience sampling method. The participation rate amongst these individuals was 76%. Producing a total sample size of 153 respondents when both the samples were combined.

Respondent profile. The final sample (N =153) was comprised of 69 men (45.1%) and 84 women (54.9%) with 74 individuals in the sample belonging to a protest movement (48.4%) and 79 not belonging (51.6%) (M = 40 years, SD 15.07). In order to determine to what extent the sample was representative of the British population a comparison was run against the most recent census data available. The sample was relatively representative in terms of gender with women making up 51% of the British population in 2011 (ONS, 2012), and age with the average age of British citizens being 40 years old (Beaumont, 2011).

Operationalisation of Variables

Dependent variable. Protest Activism was operationalised by asking respondents to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to five items from the World Value Survey based on early protest work conducted by Barnes et al (1979). The five protest activities were (1) signing a petition, (2) attending a public demonstration, (3) taking part in a sit-in, (4) joining a boycott and (5) taking part in an unofficial strike. One additional question was posed asking respondents if they had taken part in any other activity they would classify as protest activism in the past 24 months. The six responses were re-coded into ‘Yes’ = ‘1’ and ‘No’ = ‘0’ before being computed into an additive scale to provide an overall protest index (α = .80). The scale has a good internal

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reliability indicating that an individual who takes part in one form of protest activism is likely to participate in others.

Independent variables. Social media use was established by averaging two items asking respondents to report how much they frequented sites Facebook and Twitter based on an eight-point scale. The options were (1) Never, (2) Less than once a month, (3) Once a month, (4) 2-3 times a month, (5) Once a week, (6) 2-3 times a week, (7) Every day once a day, (8) Everyday more than once a day. The two items found an acceptable internal consistency and in addition a correlation was conducted (Cronbach’s α = .53; Pearson’s r(151)= .37, p = < .001). In order to measure Digital Activism nine questions were posed asking respondents to indicate whether in the last 24 months they had spent their time on social network sites doing certain political activities. These were as follows; (1) Expressing a political opinion, (2) Expressing an opinion specifically about austerity measures, (3) Posting a link to a news article, (4) Posting a link to a news article about austerity measures (5) Joining a protest event via a social network site, (6) Joining a protest event related to austerity measures via a social network site, (7) Inviting others to join a protest event via a social network site, (8) Organising a protest event on a social network site, (9) Posting in a political organisations Facebook Page. Responses were measured on a ‘Yes’, ‘No’ basis with positive responses being coded ‘1’ and compiled into a scale with excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α = .94). To measure Digital Passivism eight questions were asked to the participants relating to activities which whilst political in nature show less commitment and motivation to become involved in offline protest. These were (1) Following politicians on Twitter, (2) Re-tweeting politicians, (3) Following political parties on Twitter, (4) Re-tweeting political parties, (5) Following news organisations on Twitter, (6) Re-tweeting news organisations, (7) ‘Liking’ political parties on Facebook (8) ‘Liking’ other political organisations on Facebook.

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Participants responded to each question with a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer and the responses were compiled into a scale (Cronbach’s α = .87).  

 

Control variables. To ascertain the demographics of the sample three questions were asked, respondents were asked to indicate their Gender this was then dummy coded with female being coded higher, Age which was measured through an open question and Education measured on a six-point scale from No Formal Education through to Post-Graduate. News Media consumption was measured by asking respondents to indicate how many hours on a typical weekday and how many hours on a typical weekend day they watch televised news and read on- and offline newspapers. The weekday responses were then multiplied by five and the weekend responses were doubled before being combined to provide an overall index of news media consumption derived from a scale used in Valenzuela’s study (2013). Political Interest was measured by asking respondents to indicate their level of interest on a four-point scale from ‘Very interested’ to ‘Not at all interested’. The responses were then reverse scored so that a higher value represented a higher level of interest. For Political Orientation respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point scale from ‘0’ Left-wing to ‘10’ Right-wing. Both of these scales are items included in the World Value Survey (2011). Internal Political Efficacy was measured by averaging two items taken from Craig, Niemi & Silver’s pilot study that asked participants to respond to the following statements ‘I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics’ and ‘I think I am better informed about politics and government than most people’ on a five-point scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’ (1990) (Cronbach’s α = .83; Pearson’s r(146) = .71, p = < .001). External Political Efficacy was measured by averaging two items that asked participants to respond to the following statements ‘I think the government is responsive to my needs’ and ‘I think people like me have a say in what the

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government does’ from (1) Strongly disagree to (5) Strongly agree (Cronbach’s α = .63; Pearson’s r(140) = .47, p = < .001). Political Discussion has long been considered instrumental in mobilising people to participate in politics (McLeod, Scheufele & Moy, 1999; Scheufele, 2000), in order to measure the frequency of political discussion the participants were asked to indicate how often they spoke about politics with family, friends, neighbours and strangers on a ten-point scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Frequently’ (Cronbach’s α = .84). These political variables are all closely tied to both an individual’s tendency to be actively involved in politics and the likelihood that they attend to social media for political purposes. Therefore, by entering these variables into the model as control variables it enables us to determine that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is not a spurious one in each model of analysis. As an example, political discussion is being controlled for because extant research has established its ability to foster political knowledge and subsequent political participation (McLeod et al, 1999; Scheufele, 2000).Consequently, if political discussion was not controlled for, it would be a confounding factor in the analyses.

Results

In order to provide an overall composition of the dataset a series of descriptive analysis were conducted. As anticipated only a small number of individuals have carried out all of the protest activities (3.9%) with the largest percentage of respondents having only conducted one protest activity in the past 24 months (20.9%). Figure 1 shows that a majority of individuals in the dataset have signed a petition indicating that it is a seemingly commonplace activity. In comparison only a small number of individuals indicated having taken part in an unofficial strike. Considering the acts illegality this is relatively unsurprising.

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Facebook use is high amongst the respondents (see Figure 2) with a majority of individuals accessing the site everyday (71.9%). In comparison Twitter use (see Figure 3) is relatively low with nearly half of respondents ‘Never’ accessing the site (43.1%). This is reflective of larger trends within society that sees 71% of online adults using Facebook compared to the 18% who use Twitter (Brenner, 2013).

[Figure 2 and Figure 3 goes here]

The two most common activities measured under digital activism (see Figure 4) are expressing a political opinion and a posting a link to a news article with both having been conducted by over 50% of respondents. The most common activities encountered under digital passivism (see Figure 5) are ‘Liking’ political organisations on Facebook and both ‘Following’ politicians and news organisations on Twitter although all rest under the 50% mark.

[Figure 4 and Figure 5 goes here]

To test H1, which predicted that time spent on social network sites would be unrelated to protest activism; I ran a multiple regression (see Table 1). These variables explain 64% of the variance and are a significant predictor of increased protest activity (F = 19.34, 10 p = <. 001). However, as predicted measuring the amount of time an individual attends to Facebook and Twitter is ineffective at predicting an individual’s propensity to participate in protest. With the model of analysis showing that social media use is unrelated to protest activism hence the hypothesis is supported. Both political discussion and political orientation are the only significant predictors of individuals engaging in protest. Table 1 shows that as political discussion increases by 1-point protest activism increases by 0.25, and as political orientation increases by 1-point protest activism decreases by -0.24, this demonstrates that engaging in political discussion and being positioned on the left of

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the political spectrum increases the likelihood of individuals participating in protest politics.

[Table 1 goes here]

To test H2, digital activism on social network sites will be positively related to protest activism, I ran a multiple regression (see Table 2); the model was a good predictor of protest activism (F = 32.76, 10 p = <. 001) accounting for 75.2% of the explained variance. The model of analysis lends support to the relationship predicted in H2 demonstrating that an individual who politicises their online environment on social network sites is consequently more present in offline protest politics. With each additional point of digital activism protest activism increases by 0.25, this is a significant effect size and shows the important role that interactive online communication plays in instigating offline protest participation.

[Table 2 goes here]

To test H3, which predicted that digital passivism would not be related to protest activism, I conducted a multiple regression (see Table 3). The model is significant (F = 20.13, 10 p <. 001) and can therefore be used to predict levels of protest activism accounting for 62% of the explained variance (R2= .62). However, as

hypothesised digital passivism is unrelated to protest activism, this indicates that following politicians on Twitter and ‘Liking’ political parties on Facebook does not prompt individuals to participate in protest. Whilst this result should be interpreted with caution, the effect size shown in table 3 demonstrates that the increase in protest activism would be minimal for each additional point of digital passivism. Thus indicating that digital passivism is less likely to instigate protest activism even in a larger, significant and more representative sample. In the model both political discussion and political orientation significantly predict protest participation, with an

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extra point on the political discussion scale leading to a 0.23 increase in protest activism and an additional point on the political spectrum resulting in a -0.23 decrease in protest activism.

[Table 3 goes here] Discussion

This study aimed to disaggregate time spent on social network sites Facebook and Twitter, and their subsequent connection with heightened levels of protest activism. The findings contribute to our existing understanding of the interaction between the online environment and protest activism by reaffirming the importance of focusing on specific actions over frequency. Furthermore, through introducing a differentiation between different levels of online political behaviour, namely active and passive forms, this research presents a new understanding of which actions are able to mobilise and motivate individuals to take an active part in offline protest politics.

The first hypothesis posited that frequency of social media use would be unrelated to protest activism; the model of analysis lends support to this argumentation. Reaffirming the necessity of drawing focus away from time spent with technology and its subsequent implications for protest participation. Often social network sites are attributed with the ability to mobilise individuals to take an active political role due to the political ends they facilitate, such as ease of coordination (Enjolras et al, 2013) and a forum for discussion and debate (Lee et al, 2012). However, as advocated the presence of such features should not include a presumption that individuals who frequent these sites attend to them for political purposes. Previous research has also drawn similar conclusions with regards to measuring time, finding no overall link between social media use and political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2012; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer & Bichard, 2010).

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The results to H2 and H3 provide an important insight into the proposed relationship between specified social network use and protest activism. A key finding of this research is that not all actions on social network sites considered to be political are related to protest participation. As the results testing H3 show I found that ‘Liking’ political Facebook groups and ‘Re-tweeting’ politicians and parties on Twitter whilst perhaps feel good activities with inherently political connotations don’t as predicted translate into offline protest participation. These activities resonate around the concept of slacktivism whereby individuals are mass-forwarding petitions and engaging in online political acts which have little or no real impact on the political stage (Morozov, 2009; Christensen, 2011). Consequently, this demonstrates the importance of not only distinguishing between individuals who attend to social media for purposes other than political ones but also within political activities.

The findings from testing H2 demonstrate the instrumental role that social media can have for facilitating political engagement in the 21st Century. If as suggested there has been a fundamental shift in Britain away from more traditional forms of political participation (Norris, 2001). Then the presence of a platform to encourage new and diverse forms of political engagement will be key for the future of the democratic state. Where previous research has slowly begun to unravel the different tenets of social media (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2012; Valenzuela 2013) this research emphasised not only the importance of focusing on specified social media use but also introduced a distinction not previously used in this context. In general the results demonstrate that being politically vocal on social media plays an important part in the role of protest politics. Instigating debate on an online platform stimulates acknowledgement of ideas and produces offline movements. Thus contributing to existing literature that advocates the important role that online discussion and mobilising information holds (Valenzuela, 2013). It can be determined that Facebook can play a key part in mobilising for offline protest demonstrations,

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this is due to the function it plays in providing information and access to relevant actors in protest movements (Enjolras et al, 2013). Whilst, social media seems to supplement offline protest through its organisational capabilities, it is important to guard against social media being a sole alternative to proven successful methods of offline protest. Facebook and Twitter have established their ability to draw attention to an issue but participation in street demonstrations and occupations shows through its physical manifestation a greater commitment to a cause due to a willingness to sacrifice time and resources.

Finally, the results consistently show that the biggest predictors of protest activism are political orientation and political discussion. This is consistent with previous work advocating the instrumental role that political discussion has in engaging individuals with political affairs (Scheufele, 2000, Kim & Kim, 2008). Furthermore, these findings are inline with previous research that found the effect of political measures consistently larger than the effect of social media use (Johnson, Zhang, Bichard & Seltzer, 2011). It is also unsurprising that affiliation to Left-wing politics increases the likelihood of individuals having taken part in the anti-cuts protest movement. With previous research advocating that individuals on the Left of the political spectrum are more likely to engage in protest politics (Schussman & Soule, 2005). In all three of the regression models political interest was an insignificant predictor of increased levels of protest activism, this is contrary to previous work where political interest has generally been a significant predictor of political activity (Boulianne, 2009). The differing result in this case could be explained by an individual level interpretation of what constitutes politics. Whereby it is frequently taken to refer solely to traditional Westminster politics and not inline with less traditional although by no means unconventional protest politics (O’Toole, 2003).

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Key limitations encountered in this research relate to the data collection; namely the non-probability sampling technique, the small sample size and the distribution of an online survey. A small sample size increases the probability of statistical tests producing insignificant results therefore with a bigger N this research may have yielded different and varied results. However, the effect size in an analysis is wholly more informative than a p value. Hence in this research having a statistically significant result for digital activism and a moderate effect size demonstrates that there is a clear relationship between these activities and protest activism consequently warranting further and more in-depth analysis. Moreover, the effect size for both social media use and digital passivism are small. Consequently, implying that even in a more representative sample similar results would be encountered. A further and related limitation is the low reliability of the social media scale (α = .53), the low internal consistency can be deduced to the format of recruitment whereby a number of individuals were recruited via Facebook groups. Whilst the survey was also posted out on Twitter, it is more difficult to directly contact organisations as Twitter restricts such activity this presumably also contributed to the high number of people who indicated that they ‘Never’ use Twitter (see Figure 3) as compared to the high number who indicated they frequently use Facebook (see Figure 2). These limitations make the findings in this study less generalisable to the British population at large and therefore the results should be interpreted with relative caution. However, this is not to say that the findings do not develop our understanding of a burgeoning and interrelated world of social media and protest activism.

A further shortcoming is the protest activities included under the protest activism scale. The activities are taken from early protest work (Barnes et al, 1979) and can be considered slightly out-dated for the 21st Century. The inclusion of acts such as attending protest meetings and contacting media and politicians would have

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been more suited to the British protest movement. Careful consideration of the political and social environment of the country being researched is essential for accurate representation of levels of protest in that society and would be a significant contributor to yielding different results (Dalton, Sickle & Weldon, 2009). Finally, this research does raise questions surrounding Pippa Norris’s theory of the virtuous circle. Whereby Norris advocates that the Internet will be a tool for those already politically engaged rather than mobilising a wider audience (2000). The direction of the relationship between protest activism and social media is unexplained within this research; in order to address this directional dilemma it would be advisable to conduct longitudinal research.

Despite its limitations, this study has provided a small insight into the interrelatedness of social media and protest activism in a British context. Highlighting not only the need to focus on actions online instead of frequency but also which actions are most likely to stimulate offline protest activity. Distinguishing between political acts online has provided an elaboration on previous research by Bakker and de Vreese (2011). Whereas Bakker and de Vreese used digital activism and digital passivism as dependent variables I used them as independent predictors of participating or not participating in offline protest. Consequently, this enables a distinction between online political acts that demonstrate engagement with an issue and thus an impetus to become involved in an offline capacity. Furthermore, this research has questioned the presumption of a link between news acquisition on social network sites and protest activism, finding that the relationship between the two constructs should not be assumed as it has been in the past. I advocate that this relationship warrants further research due to the nature and tone of news reports on protest movements, specifically street demonstrations and occupations (Hoffman, 2006). The use of a particular case study enabled this research to focus on a period of time in Britain, which has experienced heightened protest activity, hence giving an

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insight into the interaction between social media and protest in a particular context. However, the effectiveness of the austerity protests is still in question. There has been little to no acquiescence from the government to protester demands and further measures continue to be implemented (Wintour & Stewart, 2013). So whilst the speed of cross-country mobilisation and coordination has certainly been aided by the presence of social media, questions around its capability to enact change still remain. Perhaps in the British case the current government is unable or unwilling to hear and meet citizen demands or perhaps the fluid networks and weak-ties relationships that social media creates are a hindrance to securing desired changes. Questions regarding the interaction and effectiveness of protest and the online environment continue to be raised which are far beyond the scope of this paper. However, the differentiation in the present study between online political actions is an important addition to the existing literature and is constructive to our understanding of how social media can hold a positive political role.

 

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Appendix Descriptive Statistics for Variables

M SD Min Max Valid Cases

Protest Activism 2.32 1.81 0.00 6.00 153

Digital Activism 3.95 3.65 0.00 9.00 153

Digital Passivism 2.27 2.52 0.00 8.00 153

Social Media Use 5.09 2.09 1.00 8.00 153

Internet Use 27.52 16.87 6.00 90.0 152 Political Interest 3.29 0.88 1.00 4.00 151 Political Discussion 4.94 2.50 0.00 10.00 151 Political Orientation (L=0, R=10) 3.23 2.99 0.00 10.00 137 News Media 13.81 9.74 0.00 47.00 153 Gender (M=1, F=2) 1.55 0.50 1.00 2.00 153 Age 40.41 15.07 18.0 76.0 148 Education 4.80 1.05 1.00 6.00 153 External Efficacy 1.36 1.18 0.00 5.00 140 Internal Efficacy 3.00 1.30 0.00 5.00 148 Figure 1 Protest Activity 0   20   40   60   80   100   120   140   160   Peition Demonstration Occupation Boycott Unofficial Strike Yes No

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Figure 2 Facebook use

Figure 3 Twitter use

Never Less than once a month Once a month 2-3 times a month Once a week 2-3 times a week Every day, once a day Every day, more than once a day

0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70   80   90  

Facebook

Facebook Use

0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70  

Never Less than once a month Once a month 2-3 times a month Once a week 2-3 times a week Every day, once a day Every day, more than once a day

Twitter

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Figure 4

Digital Activism

Figure 5

Digital Passivism

0   20   40   60   80   100   120   140   160  

Posted in political Facebook page Expressed a political opinion Expressed opinion over Austerity Organised protest event on SNS Joined a protest event via SNS Invited friend to join protest via SNS Joined protest event related to austerity via SNS Posted a link to a political news article Posted a link to news article on austerity

Yes No

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Follow politicians on Twitter Re-tweet politicians Follow political parties on Twitter Re-tweet political parties Follow News organisations on Twitter Re-tweet News organisations 'Like' political parties on Facebook 'Like' other political organisations on Facebook

Yes No

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Table 1

Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Protest Activism Protest Activism

Variable B SE B β

Social Media Use 0.03 0.06 .03

Political Discussion 0.25 0.06 .34*** Political Orientation (L=0, R=10) Political Interest Internal Efficacy External Efficacy News Media Age Gender (M=0, F=1) Education -0.24 0.46 0.02 -0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.45 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.89 -0.01 0.01 0.22 0.11 -.41*** .20 .02 -.08 -.05 .05 .13 .03 R2 .64 19.34*** F Notes: ***p < .001, (N =119)

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Table 2

Multiple Regression Analysis for variables predicting Protest Activism Protest Activism Variable B SE B β Digital Activism 0.26 0.04 .54*** Political Discussion Political Orientation (L=0, R =10) Political Interest Internal Efficacy External Efficacy News Media Age Gender (M=0, F=1) Education 0.13 -0.10 0.24 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.37 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.09 .18 -.17 .10 -.02 -.08 -.04 .02 .12 .06 R2 .75 32.76*** F Notes: ***p < .001, (N =119)

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Table 3

Multiple Regression Analysis for variables predicting Protest Activism Protest Activism Variable B SE B β Digital Passivism 0.09 0.05 .12 Political Discussion Political Orientation (L=0, R=10)0 Political Interest Internal Efficacy External Efficacy News Media Age Gender (M =0, F =1) Education R2 0.23 -0.23 0.42 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.42 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.11 .31*** -.40*** .19 -.01 -.08 -.05 .05 .12 .04 .62 20.13*** F Notes: ***p < .001 (N =119)

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