Anti-Islam debate in perspective: a comparative discourse analysis of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders

(1)

Anti-Islam debate in perspective -

a comparative discourse analysis of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders

Merel Landeweerd

5755492

Master thesis European Studies; Culture & Identity

University of Amsterdam

15-01-2016

1

st

supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper

2ed reader: Prof. Erik van Ree

(2)

(3)

3

Introduction

Willen jullie, in deze stad en in Nederland, meer of minder Marokkanen? - ‘Minder! Minder! Minder!’

Dan gaan we dat regelen. (Speech Wilders, 19-03-2014 )1

In this fragment above, the Dutch political shooting star Geert Wilders asked the supporters of his Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) in a gathering after the municipal elections in March 2014 whether they wanted more, or fewer Moroccans. When the crowd

enthusiastically chants ‘fewer, fewer!’, Wilders concluded: ‘Then we will arrange that’. The current anti-Islam debate in the Netherlands is inflammatory. The attack on the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo, the assaults in Paris last November in the name of Islam and the rise of IS, increased the intensity of the debate around Islam in Europe. Now, more than ever, it is important to take a closer look at the shape and content of the discourses of anti-Islamic critics like Geert Wilders.

As a result of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, a climate of distrust against Islam emerged. There was a growing atmosphere of fear in the West that appeared with the open expression of anti-Islam sentiments, which had been taboo for a long time. The new

millennium brought a range of extreme violent events such as the Madrid bombings and the killing of Theo Van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands, through which the lines between Islam as a religion and ‘radical Islam’ as an anti-Western political ideology were blurred in public opinion. Despite the enormous cultural and theological differences among Muslims and their Islamic practices, the media often presents Islam as a monolithic block. In this anti-Islamic discourse, Islam is seen as incompatible with Europe’s allegedly fundamental values such as democracy and individual freedom. Moreover, Islam has been criticized that it does not subscribe to the universal understanding of human rights (referring to ‘honour killings’ and terrorism against ‘unbelievers’ in the name of Islam), and is therefore perceived by supporters of the anti-Islamic discourse as a threat to Europe. The growing attention for Islam has led to a review of the immigration policies in different countries, resulting in the introduction of ‘citizen tests’ that examine whether the values of the immigrants are compatible with those of the majority community. In whole Europe, in the last decade governments have shifted their

1_{L. Boon, ‘Minder, minder enz. enz. Wat zei en deed Wilders gisteren precies?’ in NRC Handelsblad,}

http://www.nrc.nl/verkiezingen/2014/03/20/minder-minder-enz-enz-wat-zei-en-deed-wilders-gisteren-precies/ , accessed at 11-09-2015.

(5)

5 focus from multiculturalism to a more pro-assimilation approach. This distresses the Muslim population, which after 9/11 and other events, is viewed as a group reluctant to integrate and accept national values. Islam became an problem, which facilitated the rise of radical right wing parties in Western Europe that advocate a strong anti-immigration rhetoric, like the FPÖ in Austria, the Front National in France, and the British party UKIP. They have gained votes at regional, national and European elections throughout Europe with an explicitly endorsed anti-Islamic agenda.2 Especially in the Netherlands, which has the image of being a

traditionally tolerant country, a dramatic change in the national immigration policy has occurred, for it has now one of the strictest immigration and integration policies of Europe.3 The assassinations of the maverick politician and Islam critic Pim Fortuyn in 2002 by an animal rights activist and of the controversial filmmaker Van Gogh in 2004 by a Dutch Muslim led to a new aggressive populism against (Muslim) immigration. These events, linked to issues as the allegedly high level of delinquency among Muslims in the

Netherlands, the alleged mass-immigration of Muslims to the Netherlands (mostly by way of ‘bride import’) and the (mis)-use of state welfare, produces the idea that immigration is endangering the social and economic prosperity in the country.4

In the Netherlands the anti-Islamic discourse was shaped through several outstanding personalities, rather than mass- or extreme right-wing parties like in France or Austria. Exceptional characters like Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Theo van Gogh, Rita Verdonk, Hans Jansen and Geert Wilders are leading voices in the Dutch anti-Islam discourse. Supporters of the anti-Islamic discourse often regard themselves as losers of the previous Dutch policies of tolerance and non-interference. The bashing of Islam allows for a formulation of Dutch national identity that appears to rise from below, but that is in fact created by a small group of opinion leaders like politicians, journalists, academics and writers, who set the agenda for this anti-Islam debate. In this anti-Islamic discourse, Islam is being framed as the opponent of dominant Dutch images, such as tolerance and free speech, which are taken by the Dutch public as elementary conditions for a liberal democratic state. This thesis discusses the way the anti-Islamic discourse in the Netherlands was shaped from the events of 9/11 until now, by focusing on two main characters that were prominent in

2_{R. Imhoff and J. Recker, ‘Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice}

and Secular Islam Critique’, Political Psychology, Vol.6 (2012), p.811.

3

H. Entzinger, ‘The growing gap between facts and discourse on immigrant integration in the Netherlands’,

Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, Vol.21 (2014), p. 694.

4_{M. Kemper, ‘The cracks in civilization: The Dutch public discourse on humanism and Islam, in Stefan}

Reichmuth eds., Humanism and Muslim culture: historical heritage and contemporary challenges, Göttingen: V&R Unipress 2012, p. 163.

(6)

6 modeling the discourse at that period, namely Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. These two politicians are both fierce anti-Islam critics with a strong anti-immigration program. They are considered by the media and Dutch public to be populist figures, which appeals to the

interests and conceptions (such as fears) of the general people, especially contrasting those interests with the interests of the elite. As early as 1997, Pim Fortuyn published his most influential book ‘Against the Islamisation of Our Culture’, where he warns the Dutch public about the threat of ‘Islamisation’ of Dutch society.5 He feared that the ‘Islamization’ of Dutch culture would leave little room for freedom of expression, individual autonomy and the emancipation of women and homosexuals. The book was a direct assault on the ‘so-called multicultural society’, which, Fortuyn maintained, was based on a misplaced ‘cultural relativism’. Fortuyn found that Islamic culture was ‘backwards’ and clashed in many aspects with Western or Dutch culture. He predicted a ‘cultural’ or ‘cold war’ between Western and Islamic culture, where he saw a replacement of the historical ‘cold war’, that of communism versus capitalism, by a new clash of two cultures; that of modernity versus Islam.6 In May 2002, just a few days before parliamentary elections, Pim Fortuyn was murdered by an environmentalist activist. ‘His’ party Lijst Pim Fortuyn still won a tremendous success at the elections. In the following weeks, mourners stated that Fortuyn said ‘what we thought but couldn’t say’, referring to their fear for the increasing amount of foreigners in the

Netherlands. The popularity of Pim Fortuyn was a breakthrough in the Dutch Public Sphere concerning Islam.

Geert Wilders is often considered to be the main heir of Fortuyn. Following the path of Fortuyn, Wilders has also campaigned to stop the ‘Islamisation of the Netherlands’. With his provocative attitude and statements Geert Wilders is a disputed figure, not only in Dutch society, but also in the rest of Europe. In 2008, Wilders released a short movie entitled Fitna, which caused an enormous uprising in the European public sphere. The film attempts to illustrate that the Qur’an motivates its followers to hate all who violate Islamic teachings. He gained a lot of media attention. He has called for an immigration stop from Islamic countries, a prohibition of the building of new mosques, a closing of Islamic schools, and a legal ban on the Qur’an. He has called the prophet Muhammad a barbarian, compared the Qur’an to Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’, and proposed in 2009 a special tax for wearing a headscarf because

5_{S. Vellenga, ‘The Dutch and British public debate on Islam: Responses to the killing of Theo van Gogh and}

the London bombings compared’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, nr.4, pp.455.

6_{P. Fortuyn, De islamisering van onze cultuur : Nederlandse identiteit als fundament. Met een kritische reactie}

(7)

7 the ‘polluter pays’.7 In 2009 the British government denied him entrance to the country, where he wanted to show his film Fitna, an incident leading to widespread discussions.8 Similar to Pim Fortuyn, Wilders embedded his Islam discourse into a broader anti-establishment attitude. In terms of populism, Wilders criticized the established political elite harshly and appealed to the ‘ordinary people’ even more explicitly then Fortuyn did. Wilders founded a one-man party in 2006 named ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid’, which obtained nine seats out of 150 in the 2006 general election, and which grew to 24 in the general elections of 2010.9 Wilders quickly became an important figure in Dutch politics. Remarkably, Wilders claims to be a fierce advocate for anti-establishment rhetoric, but he himself is already part of the establishment since 1998, the longest sitting of all current parliamentarians. He also developed a strong anti-European discourse, as he strove for an independent and sovereign Holland. In the European Elections of 2014, he managed to win four seats in the European Parliament. He struggled to form an alliance with other EU-critical parties until June 2015, when he accomplished in establishing an alliance after all, the ‘Europe of Nations and Freedoms’.10

In this thesis I will investigate to what degree the two politicians are comparable in their anti-Islamic discourse. Of course, we should not forget the different circumstances in the time period they were active. The attack on Charlie Hebdo and other assaults in Paris, the rise of IS and the following refugee crisis influenced the anti-Islam debate in Europe considerably. It is always risky to compare two situations from the past and the present with each other. According to professor Bert Snel in an article discussing Fortuyn and Wilders, a comparative analysis is only valuable when there are essential similarities, and if the outcome could be useful for the future.11 In this case, I would argue that there are enough similarities between the two anti-Islamic discourses. Moreover, it is no overstatement to say that Fortuyn’s and Wilders’ analysis of the ‘inherent tensions’ between Islam and the Western world appeal to sentiments that are wide spread in many European countries. It is for this reason that it is

7_{[Editors], ‘Wilders wil ‘kopvoddentaks’’, Trouw 16-09-2009,}

http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1166140/2009/09/16/Wilders-wil-kopvoddentaks.dhtml accassed at 21-10-2015.

8_{K. Vossen, ‘Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders compared’,}

Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.11 (2010) p. 23.

9_{H. Entzinger, ‘The growing gap’, p. 700.} 10

[Editors], ‘Wilders vormt Europese fractie tegen immigratie en islamisering’, De Volkskrant 16-05-2015

http://www.volkskrant.nl/voorpagina/wilders-vormt-europese-fractie-tegen-immigratie-en-islamisering~a4078038/ . accessed at 5-01-2016.

11_{B. Snel, ‘Zijn Fortuyn en Wilders vergelijkbaar?’ Civis Mundi 11-05-2011,}

(8)

8 important to analyze the discourses of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. My main research question will be therefore the following:

How did Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders come to their anti-Islamic arguments, and how does this part of their message relate to other arguments and claims they make?

Assuming that the two discourses are comparable with each other, the second part of my research question is; What are the differences between the two anti-Islamic discourses?

First it is important to clarify the concept of ‘discourse’, for this term is becoming vague and more likely to cause confusion than any clarity it might originally have been set to produce. In defining the notion of discourse, most of the scholarly work refers to Foucault and his book ‘The archaeology of knowledge’. Foucault describes a discourse as "a group of sequences of signs, in so far that they are statements […] ”.12 However, discourse is not merely a linguistic notion. A few pages later Foucault concludes: “We shall say that a discourse is a group of statements in so far they belong to the same discursive formation.” 13 Foucault meant that a discourse is a set of statements that provide a language for talking about a particular topic at a particular historical moment. In other words, a discourse is an inescapable formalized way of thinking, which effects our interpretation of the world around us. For Foucault, the dominant discourse is constitutive of the everyday lives and experiences of individuals. This doesn’t mean that a discourse can’t shift over time. However, Foucault places the individual on the background, where they have no (or little) influence on changing the discourse, as individuals are discursively constructed and constituted. He argues that “discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject” .14 Or in other words, an individual does not necessarily applies language to express itself; rather language speaks through the person. This notion of discourse describes a certain kind of practice that is to be conceived as a collective, rather than an individual,

reality. However, Foucault tends to focus on the long historical lines and systems of knowledge that dominated each historical epoch. The frequently cited Dutch political

scientist Maarten Hajer gives therefore another definition of ‘discourse’. According to him, a discourse is ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories that are produced,

12_{M. Foucault: The archeology of knowledge and the discourse on language, translated by A.M. Sheridan}

Smith, New York: Pantheon Books 1972, p. 107.

13_{Idem, p.117.} 14

(9)

9 reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities.’15 Here, the fact that a discourse can be ‘produced, reproduced and transformed’ implies an active role of a group or individual in framing the discourse. In this way, it differs from Michael Foucault’s use of the term ‘discourse’, as an individual can actively change the leading discourse. The ‘set of practices’ refers to the way the discourse is transferred to the public, such as the media or activist actions. The two characters that I will discuss, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, have skillfully used the media to transfer their ideas. Through these practices ‘meaning is given to physical and social realities’. This is important because meanings shape and influence what we do; a discourse has a goal. Through these realities, a discourse can be developed, but it also works the other way around; through the discourse a physical and social reality can be developed.

As I said, this thesis will conduct a comparative discourse analysis of a selected part of the written texts and speeches of Fortuyn and Wilders who were important in modelling the Islamic discourse in the Netherlands. This analysis zooms in on the question why the anti-Islam debate enhanced by Fortuyn and Wilders, is focused on Dutch liberal values, and not, as for example in Italy, the interaction between Islam and Christianity, or, as in France, the consequences for state secularism. The first two chapters are dedicated to the development of the anti-Islamic discourses of Fortuyn and Wilders in Dutch politics, in relation to their media strategies. Politicians in general, and populists in particular, need the mass media to provide them with a stage from which they can transfer their ideas to the public, but also, by

displaying a certain style, to create an image that has a positive effect on their public perception. Image and self-representation are then crucial aspects for populist figures as Fortuyn and Wilders. Fortuyn’s personal qualities, as his unconventional way of speaking and dressing, and his open homosexuality, were considered by the media to be very newsworthy. Wilders, with blond peroxide hair, also received a considerable amount of media attention. I will cover his film Fitna in detail, as it shows Wilders’ ideas about Islam. The media

attention for Fortuyn and for Wilders played a decisive role in explaining the remarkable degree to which they were able to mobilise support and express their ideas in the public sphere.

In the third chapter I will argue how Islam is represented in their written texts and speeches of Fortuyn and Wilders as the other side of alleged Dutch core values and images,

15_{M. Hajer, The politics of environmental discourse: ecological modernization and the policy process, Oxford:}

(10)

10 particularly freedom of speech, individual sexual self-determination, tolerance and gender

equality, which are taken by them as elementary conditions for a modern liberal democratic

state. They use those values in order to frame Muslims as ‘unintegrated’ and ‘uncivil’

citizens. However, as I will show, Fortuyn’s and Wilders way of argumentation is, above all, somewhat problematic. The problem is not so much that they put cultural issues in the center of the immigrant integration debate, but rather that they depart from an ‘essentialist’ or ‘culturalist’ notion of culture.

Other Dutch politicians like Frits Bolkestein and former leader of the socialist party SP Jan Marijnissen also expressed their concerns about immigration and Islam, but they weren’t as influential as Fortuyn and Wilders. The reason for Fortuyn’s and Wilders’ success is often explained through the notion of ‘populism’. Fortuyn and Wilders have linked their anti-Islam discourse to a strong anti-establishment attitude. They emphasized that previous Dutch policy of tolerance and non-interference or ‘multi-culti’ had supposedly ‘failed’, of which ‘the people’ are considered the victims. In the last chapter, I will look if the label of ‘populist’ is suitable for them. Finally, I will note how Wilders has linked his anti-Islam and anti-establishment attitude to a broader anti-EU critique.

(11)

11

H.1 Development discourse Fortuyn

On the 6th of May 2002, the maverick politician Pim Fortuyn was murdered in Media Park in Hilversum by the environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf. The whole country was in shock; emotions ran unusually high in the Netherlands. Fortuyn’s mansion in Rotterdam, with the kitsch name ‘Palazzo di Pietro’, was flooded with flowers and thousands participated in a huge procession led by the Mayor. His time in Dutch politics lasted hardly a year, however within that period he acquired a massive following throughout the country and political victory in his hometown of Rotterdam. In short time, Fortuyn had become a phenomenon in Dutch Public Sphere, as he ‘says what he thinks and does what he says’.16 The popularity of Pim Fortuyn was a breakthrough in the Dutch Public Sphere concerning Islam. In this chapter, I will investigate the development of Fortuyn’s discourse, in relation to his media strategies.

§ 1.1 New Realism and the Rise of Fortuyn

According to Baukje Prins, a shift in tone in the public debate on immigration and integration occurred around mid-1990’s, where it was no longer a taboo to discuss the fears and problems about immigrant minorities. In her article The Nerve To Breake Taboos (2002), Baukje Prins claims the arrival of a new genre of discourse what she calls New Realism.17 One of the most important features of this new discursive genre is that a new realist presents himself as someone who dares to face the facts about immigrants. Having the ‘guts’ to solve problems around immigration and integration issues leaves no room either for ‘compromises’ and ‘taboos’. Another characteristic of a new realist is that he positions himself as a spokesperson of the ordinary people. A third feature is that the frankness of the author is presented as ‘typically Dutch’. The last feature is a resistance to the left and political correctness. According to Baukje Prins, the new realist discourse was first introduced by the former parliamentary leader of the Liberals Frits Bolkestein, and gained vitality with Pim Fortuyn. In 1991, Frits Bolkestein triggered the beginning of the ‘national minority debate’ in the Netherlands, by declaring that the integration of immigrants should be taken into account with ‘guts’. Bolkenstein was the first Dutch opinion leader that stressed the cultural aspects of immigrant integration. He emphasized the alleged incompatibility between Islamic and Western values and argued for stronger policies to pressure immigrants to integrate into

16_{B. Prins, ‘The Nerve to Break Taboos’, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol.3 (2002),}

p.376.

17

(12)

12 Dutch society and accept its norms and values, such as separation of church and state, freedom of expression and non-discrimination18 His statements caused some commotion since until then such visions are associated with extreme right. It was the first time that Islam had been publicly problematized in relation to immigration, but the debate he had triggered came too early for many. In 2000, the publication of an essay by Paul Scheffers in the NRC entitled ‘The Multicultural drama’ caused a fierce public and political debate about national identity and the increasing amount of immigrants in the Netherlands. He stated that the Dutch multiculturalism approach had failed and that there was an emerging class of immigrants who did not identify sufficiently with Dutch culture and society, and who were unwilling and unable to integrate. Especially Islam was considered by the media as a major cause of many integration problems. In this climate of increased sensibility regarding immigration in general and Islam in particular, the Dutch libertarian politician Pim Fortuyn entered the political scene and expressed his aversion for, among other things, the welfare state, European unification, Islam and the continuing numbers of immigrants. According to Baukje Prins, Pim Fortuyn proved to be the consummate champion in the new realist discourse, as he showed all the characteristics of this new genre. Fortuyn did not abide to political correctness, he did not refrain from making blunt and controversial statements about Islam and other issues, and he was among the first who openly demanded a halt to Muslim immigration and the building of new mosques in the Netherlands in 2002. He accused the left political elite for not defending the Dutch identity in the ‘so-called multicultural society’, and claimed that he spoke for the ‘ordinary people’. Pim Fortuyn was highly charismatic with a unique political personality. These factors have, of course, always mattered in politics, but especially given an increasingly volatile Dutch electorate. Fortuyn claimed that his party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) represented a form of ‘new politics’. Indeed, Fortuyn political strategies were fundamentally different than the conventional way of politics. First of all, Fortuyn partially moved politics from the parliament into the domain of the media. Moreover, there was a shift in style and tone in this new kind of politics. The LPF was the first time that a political movement was named after an individual. Later more parties would follow (Groep Wilders, Lijst Verdonk). Fortuyn introduced to the political establishment and the Dutch public a new kind of politician, which offered ‘personalized politics’. Fortuyn was very successful in attracting attention of the media. His skillful and entertaining debate style, coupled with his flamboyant lifestyle and persona, turned him into a celebrity, creating a

18_{C. Roggeband and R. Vliegenthart, ‘Divergent framing: The public debate on migration in the Dutch}

(13)

13 distinctly Pim Fortuyn ‘brand’. Pim Fortuyn was “a tall, elegant man, a dandy whose choice of suits and ties were as important as his statements”, as described by scholar Peter van der Veer.19 Various media had actively contributed to establish Pim Fortuyn as a brand name, but it appears that Fortuyn himself also had a wisely devised strategy of self-representation. He liked to present himself as a well-educated, sophisticated gay man with knowledge of business and leadership. His homosexuality was very important to the content of his politics. Fortuyn wanted to embody the modern, free, tolerant, Dutch nation and did so by liberating the sexual norms by bringing homosexuality into the Dutch public domain. To an unprecedented degree, Fortuyn brought his personal life into politics, something what in the Netherlands wasn’t customary, and the public responded with emotional sympathy.

§1.2 Media strategies Fortuyn

Before the massive media attention, Fortuyn already established himself in intellectual and political spheres by publishing various columns and books. The topics were particularly about the decline of the country and the failings of the country’s established political elite, where he promoted himself as an appropriate leader for the nation in its time of crisis. Already in 1992 he wrote the pamphlet Aan het volk van Nederland (To the people of the Netherlands) in which he expresses his distrust for the current political establishment and declared that he was the successor of the charismatic but controversial 18th century Dutch politician Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Tol.20 In his weekly columns of the Dutch news magazine Elsevier, Fortuyn was a fierce opponent of the ‘Purple’ government, consisting of the ‘red’ Labour party and the ‘blue’ Liberal party. Fortuyn heavily criticized how the government was handling the problems of immigration, crime, health care, education, and public transport. His provocative columns led several times to public discussions. The same is true for his many books. In the period 1994 – 2002 he published more than ten books, most of which present revisionist views on sensitive topics, such as the European Union and Islam. His outspoken ideas led to invitations for many television shows, where he was seen as a guest who did not refrain from making blunt and controversial statements. From the mid-1990s, Fortuyn began to appear repeatedly on television. Fortuyn was invited as a regular guest on the Sunday program called Business Class, which was owned by his wealthy friend

19

P. van der Veer, ‘Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands’, Public

Culture, Vol.18 (2006), p.111.

20_{P. Fortuyn, Aan het volk van Nederland: de contractmaatschappij, een politiek-economische zedenschets,}

Amsterdam: Contact 1992. The title refers to the famous pamphlet of J.D. van der Capellen tot den Tol published in 1781.

(14)

14 Harry Mens, who was hosting the show with his daughter. ‘Professor Fortuyn’, as he liked to be called, was weekly being interviewed about politics in an informal setting including a kitchen and a dining room table.21 Fortuyn used the opportunities in the media to get a

broader platform for his ideas. Through the media and publishing industry, Fortuyn spread an image of crisis of the second purple cabinet, a negative image of which the established political parties could not readjust. In that way, the media brought not only opportunities to reach the public, they were also instrumental in Fortuyn’s rise to political power. More and more Fortuyn became the voice of a worthy opposition to the political establishment. By the time Fortuyn entered politics with Leefbaar Nederland, he was a well-known talk-show guest, columnist, and speaker. He announced his political aspirations in the television show

2Vandaag on 20 august 2001. The once communist and a former member of the

Social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA), was elected leader of the newly formed party Leefbaar

Nederland (LN) in November 2001, prior to the Dutch parliament election of 2002. At his

acceptance speech, he finished by stepping away from the podium, smiling, and saluting the audience with the words “At your service”, which later would become his slogan. He gave the speech with conviction, authority and whit: Fortuyn understood in what way he could attract the attention of media and of voters. With Fortuyn as newly elected leader, Leefbaar

Nederland went from 2% in opinion polls to about 17%.22 Helped by the many speeches and interviews given by Fortuyn, immigration issues became the major topic of the national political agenda, thereby forcing other parties to react. Fortuyn was the largest contributor in the immigration issues, but also triggered most of the debates himself. He made the issues of Islam and migration a normal part of political discourse. The following reactions of media and other politicians created dynamic feedback processes that raised his popularity among the electorate - a phenomenon that Muis and Koopmans refer to as a “spiral of discursive

escalation”.23

Fortuyn was deliberate in his choice of timing to enter formal politics. Economically, the country was doing well, which made his sudden popularity confusing for most observers. Nevertheless, Fortuyn arrived on a stage of issues the established parties mostly avoided: criminality, unemployment, and the integration of minorities. All of those issues were considered politically incorrect. The terroristic events of 9/11 provided visibility for a key

21

Fortuyn preferred to be called ‘professor’ and unrightfully maintained the name even after 1996.

22_{S. van Kessel, ‘Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Netherlands as a Case Study,}

Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.12 (2011), p. 74.

23_{R. Koopmans and J. Muis, ‘The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in The Netherlands: A discursive}

(15)

15 issue of Fortuyn’s discourse, Islam, which fuelled his political success. Nowhere in Europe, it seemed, did the events of 9/11 triggered such outbreak of public distrust against Islam as in the Netherlands. The traditional view of a supposedly tolerant Netherlands was contradicted by the surprisingly high incidence of violent attacks on mosques and an increase of

aggressive behaviour against individual Muslims.24 Fortuyn’s real breakthrough would come with the republication of his book in 2002, Tegen de Islamisering van onze Cultuur (‘Against Islamisation of our Culture’), in the wake of the events of 9/11. The new edition of the book carried the same message as the one originally published in 1997, but now it had a new cover and a new audience. The cover included a photograph of Fortuyn, seated face-to-face with the imam Abdullah R.F. Haselhoef. Pim Fortuyn, dressed with his perfect tailored suit and his characteristic bold head, was in clear contrast with the traditionally clothed imam, with his dark beard and white turban. The significance was obvious; Fortuyn, representing the Western culture, was prepared to confront the supposedly ‘Islamic threat’. I will further go into depth about this book and his anti-Islamic statements in chapter three.

§ 1.2.1 The interview

An interview with Fortuyn published by the Volkskrant on 9 February 2002 led to a dramatic turn in his political career. The headline of the article was captivating; “Fortuyn: Borders closed to Islamites”. Fortuyn stated that the Netherlands was ‘a full country’. 25 Besides proclaiming that the borders should be closed to ‘Islamites’, Fortuyn labeled Islam as a ‘backward culture’, and stated that Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, the

anti-discrimination principle, should be abolished with regard to Islam because the religion

supposedly discriminated against homosexuals and women. Fortuyn used the word achterlijk, literally meaning "backward", but commonly used as an insult in the sense of "retarded", though Fortuyn denied intending to use the word in this way. According to the interviewer, Hans Wansink, Pim Fortuyn, though not planned, intentionally crossed the orders of his party

Leefbaar Nederland, which strongly advised him not to make such controversial statements.

The article shocked the political establishment: Fortuyn was ‘dangerous for the country’,

24

B. Prins, ‘The Nerve to Break Taboos’, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol.3 (2002), p.376.

25_{H. Wansink and F. Poorthuis, ‘Pim Fortuyn op herhaling. ‘Islam is een achterlijke cultuur’, De Volkskrant}

5-05-2012 [Originally published as ‘Fortuyn: Grens dicht voor Islamiet’ at 9-02-2002]

(16)

16 according to Gerrit Zalm (VVD).26 It also caused a lot of commotion among Fortuyn’s party

Leefbaar Nederland. Fortuyn was ousted from the leadership of the party the next day for his

interview in de Volkskrant, but this only boosted his renegade image. He quickly formed his own party Lijst Pim Fortuyn. A huge part of the electorate that had supported Leefbaar

Nederland followed Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn launched a frontal attack against the government.

Instead of a party manifesto, he wrote an indictment of the purple coalition: De Puinhopen

van Acht Jaar Paars (The ruins of eight purple years) (2002). At this occasion, he also

claimed that his reason for publishing it was the laziness of the Dutch media. “As you may know, the press is too lazy to read anyway. So I have summarized my thirteen books in De

puinhopen van acht jaar Paars,” Fortuyn was quoted as saying.27 Fortuyn’s campaign of 2002 was heavily mediatized. While Fortuyn’s discourse was hard-hitting, his fame came from his media appearances. Night after night, Fortuyn provided prime-time political drama. In the post-9/11 mood, Fortuyn’s controversial views on Islam, strong personality and his skilful debating style quickly made him into a media star. Fortuyn fitted well within what Elchardus called ‘drama democracy’28, in which the media played a crucial role in politics. Fortuyn partially displaced politics from the parliament into the domain of the media. Fortuyn stood out as a remarkable television personality, whereas most other leading politicians performed rather poorly. On 6 March 2002, the day of the municipal elections, while Fortuyn continued to be officially head of the party Leefbaar Nederland, Fortuyn and his local LN party (Rotterdam) grew from 0 to 17 seats, approaching a majority. Just as remarkable, the same evening Fortuyn was invited to a popular talk show to discuss the results of the municipal elections with other national party leaders. His appearance visibly frustrated the other national politicians, as Fortuyn dominated the debate. Fortuyn reiterated that the Purple government had failed to stop the influx of immigrants, and emphasized that he was the visionary who would lead the way out of the crisis. Fortuyn was completely comfortable and glowed of success, while Ad Melkert (Labor Party, PvdA) in particular, and Hans Dijkstal (right-wing Liberals, VVD) appeared to be very irritated and sat in their chairs with long faces. During the remainder of the campaign, neither was fully able to shake off this image of the ‘poor loser’. The television debate was a perfect visualization of the clash between the stagnant ‘old’ and energetic ‘new’ politics. After the municipal elections, the national

26_{P. Fentrop, ‘De demonisering van Fortuyn’, Trouw 11-05-2002}

http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/5009/Archief/article/detail/2779314/2002/05/11/De-demonisering-van-Pim-Fortuyn.dhtml , accessed at 22-12-2015.

27_{B. Haveman, ‘Vlak voor de val’, De Volkskrant 17-02-2002,}

http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/vlak-voor-de-val~a626223/ , accessed at 5-01-2016.

28

(17)

17 campaign centred as much on Fortuyn as on the issues. The new party flourished. Fortuyn was headed towards an even bigger victory in the national elections of 2002. However, a few days before the elections, Fortuyn was shot. The LPF did not withdraw and in the elections of 15 March, just ten days after Fortuyn’s death, the party came in second, with 17 % of the votes.29

29_{S. van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: The Netherlands as a case study’,}

(18)

18

H.2 Development discourse Wilders

In public and academic debates about Dutch politics, Geert Wilders is often considered the main heir of Pim Fortuyn.30 Wilders moved in the footsteps of Fortuyn, as he also showed the ‘nerves to break taboos’, and despises abide political correctness. Since 2003, Wilders started to develop an intensive anti-Islam agenda. Interestingly, Wilders, the now so fierce anti-Islam advocate has made a significant shift in his opinion over the years. Whereas before 2003 Wilders stated that he “does not have a problem with Islam”31, after 2004 he started

identifying (radical) Islam as the “absolute evil”32 and increasingly doing so after 2006, when he founded his own party Partij voor de Vrijheid. In this chapter I will investigate this

development of Wilders’ anti-Islamic discourse. After that, I will look at Wilders’ media strategies, of which Fitna is the most outspoken example.

§ 2.1 Shift

Wilders started his political career in 1990 as a speechwriter and assistant for the

parliamentary group of the Liberal party, VVD. As a pupil of Frits Bolkestein, he became a member of the VVD in 1998. Bolkestein was a model to emulate for Wilders, not only because of his political ideas, but also because of his confrontational style and his ability for breaking political taboos. Already in his early years in politics, Wilders presented himself as a ‘whistle blower’ with regard to what he saw as the danger of Islam. In 1999 Wilders presented a large report on Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to the Dutch parliament, expressing his concerns on Islamic extremism coming to the Netherlands. The report, however, was for the greater part ignored. According to his (semi-) autobiography Wilders has visited the region extensively, the state of Israel in particular.33 He had a strong affinity with Israel, since a one-year stay in a kibbutz as a Catholic teenager. His journeys in the Middle East have deeply influenced his political ideas. After 9/11 Wilders became a fierce supporter of the American ‘war on terror’ and all its policy measures, such as the military invasion in Iraq. He argued that the European Union should take a more active role in ‘democratizing’ the Middle East. With his support for the American foreign policy,

30_{K. Vossen, ‘Classifying Wilders: The ideological development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom’,}

Politics, Vol.31(2011), p.187, and S. van Genugten, ‘The Netherlands and Islam: In defense of liberalism and

progress?’, The International Spectator, Vol.48 (2013), p. 75.

31_{Geert Wilders in 2001 as cited by F.Abrahams, ‘Een lastig parket’, NRC Handelsblad 25-02- 2010.} 32_{[Editors], ‘Wilders spreekt: Ik capituleer niet’, HP de Tijd,}

http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/interviews/37-wilders-spreekt-ik-capituleer-niet-interview-hpde-tijd.html, accessed at 8-01-2016

33

(19)

19 Wilders took a different path than the more sceptical Bolkestein, who considered the

American invasion of Iraq and American attempts to democratize the Middle East as naïve and reckless.34 Wilders became more and more outspoken about Islamic radicalism and its influence on the Dutch Muslim community. Nevertheless, even after 9/11 and the rise of Fortuyn, Wilders still distinguished between Islam as a religion and Islamic fundamentalism. Two weeks after the events of 9/11, Wilders stated in the television show Barend en Van

Dorp, that “Islam is a respected religion, of which only a small part displays extremism”.35

According to Wilders, Fortuyn’s call for a ‘crusade’ or a ‘cold war’ against Islam is an offensive remark as it ‘generalized all Muslims’. Wilders explicitly distanced himself from Fortuyn, who in that period of time still appeared to be more radical than him.

Whilst before 2003 Wilders merely took a hard-line stance as a liberal Member of Parliament against radical Islam, after 2003-2004 he started to criticise Islam as a dangerous totalitarian ideology. Two events have caused this shift. In 2002, the Somali-born politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali joined the VVD. Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim herself, became a prominent critic of Islam within the Liberals. She castigated Islam for being an authoritarian religion and especially ‘backward’ when it came to the position of women. She also accused the Prophet Muhammad of being a ‘pervert’.36 Hirsi Ali obtained political asylum in 1992 in the

Netherlands, under circumstances that later became the centre of a political controversy.37 In 2000 she earned a Master’s degree in Political Sciences and joined the Dutch Labour Party. She eventually became a member of parliament for the liberal party VVD in 2003. Ayaan Hirsi Ali has become a phenomenon through the way she presented herself, as well as others represented her in mass media. According to scholars Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van

Wichelen, the media and Hirsi Ali herself constructed two versions of mediatic selves, including ‘the other’ and ‘one of us’.38 By representing Ayaan as ‘the other’, she receives the status of an insider with ‘expert-knowledge’ in talk shows and programs. As Ayaan stated in her biography, she had liberated herself from the confines of religion that, in her opinion, was

34

K. Vossen, ‘Classifying Wilders’, p. 183.

35_{G. Wilders, in: F. Abrahams, ’Een lastig parket’, NRC Handelsblad 25-02-2010.}

36_{C. Roggebrand and R. Vliegenthart, ‘Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch}

Parliament and Media, 1995-2004’, West European Politics, Vol. 3 (2007), p.537.

37

Ayaan Hirsi Ali used misleading information on her asylum and citizenship applications, for which the former minister of Integration Rita Verdonk decided to strip her of her Dutch citizenship. As a result, the centre-right Dutch government collapsed and the decision was in the end overturned by the Prime Minister.

38_{M. de Leeuw and S. van Wichelen, ‘ “Please, Go Wake Up!”: Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the “War on Terror”}

(20)

20 the source of the violent practices of her upbringing.39 The fact that she was a refugee, a woman, an African, and an ex-Muslim atheist lent political credibility to her views. She also became ‘one of us’ as she advocated Dutch values and integration of immigrants. Influenced by Hirsi Ali, Wilders began to claim that ‘pure Islam’ is a dangerous political ideology, as it follows the Qur’an in every aspect. Here, ‘pure Islam’ implies that there also exists an ‘impure Islam’ which is supposedly less violent. Wilders placed Islam at the same level as communism and fascism, which poses a comparable threat to the West. According to

Wilders, (radical) Islam was a totalitarian ideology, like communism and fascism, as it wants to control all aspects of public and private life. Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders published together a letter in NRC Handelsblad in 2003 calling for a ‘liberal jihad’ against Islamic radicalism.

Tot behoud van een tolerant en liberaal Nederland moeten ook elementaire rechten en wetten opzij worden gezet bij de aanpak van de mensen die ze misbruiken en vervolgens willen verwijderen als fundament van onze maatschappij. Het enige antwoord is een liberale jihad. 40

For this liberal jihad, a fundamental change in the in Wilders’ eyes ‘pacifist’ Dutch political culture was necessary. According to Meindert Fennema, who wrote a biography on Wilders, Wilders adheres to the concept of a ‘militant democracy’, where there is no freedom for the enemies of freedom.41 Wilders and Hirsi Ali stated that freedom of expression should not apply to people who wanted to use this freedom of speech for the purpose of abolishing democracy.Therefore, they wanted to abolish fundamentalist mosques and schools preaching hatred of nonbelievers.

Another event had accelerated this change in Wilders Islamic viewpoints; the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. A so called “radical Islamic” young Moroccan-Dutch man, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered the Dutch controversial filmmaker in broad day light in Rotterdam. The killer had left a note pinned into Van Gogh’s chest, in which he also

threatened Hirsi Ali with death. The murder, which was amply mediatized in and outside the Netherlands, caused a wave of anti-Islamic resentment, polarization and social unrest within Dutch society. Wilders’ battle against Islam became personal. He had received death threats before, but after the death of Van Gogh Wilders received permanent security. It was

39_{A. Hirsi Ali, Mijn Vrijheid : De Autobiografie, Amsterdam: Augustus Cop. 2006 [translation by Carla Bennink}

et.al.]

40_{G. Wilders and A. Hirsi Ali, ‘Het is tijd voor een liberale jihad’, NRC Handelsblad 12 April 2003.} 41

(21)

21 Holland’s 9/11, as it was immediately cast by the media in the framework of the “war on terror”. In this climate, Wilders’ popularity rose. Wilders became a fierce advocate for all kinds of measures against those who could threaten Dutch security, such as preventive arrests and the possible denaturalisation and deportation of suspects. These measures provoked multiple disputes with fellow liberal politicians, as they were a clear break with the

constitutional heart of Dutch liberalism. After an interview in which Wilders scorned fellow politicians for their alleged ‘blindness’ on the issue of Islam, party leaders warned him to be more careful in his public statements.42 A fierce disagreement about the possible Turkish membership in the European Union caused the definite break of Wilders with the VVD in 2004. Wilders became an independent member of the parliament as Groep Wilders (Group Wilders). On 22 February 2006 Wilders established the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party), which obtained nine seats in the parliament in the elections later that year.

After 2006, Wilders’ anti-Islamic expressions became more and more radical. Previous nuances of ‘pure’ and ‘impure Islam’ disappeared, and Islam as a whole was being attacked, as he stated in 2008 that “moderate Islam is a contradiction”.43 Going even beyond Hirsi Ali, Wilders started to identify Islam as the main cause of all kinds of problems, such as Moroccan youth criminality, the high percentage of unemployed and drop-out rates among Muslims, honour killings and the riots in the French banlieues in 2005.44 Moreover, Islam more and more became an argument in many other topics, as European Union and socio-economic issues.

§ 2.2 Media strategies

Wilders managed to attract a massive amount of national and international media attention by making controversial statements and offering a whole series of spectacular storylines and events. In the footsteps of Fortuyn, he offered ‘personalized’ politics as his party centred around him. Characteristic for Wilders’ media strategy is that he himself determines when he wants to be on television. After making a (most of the times controversial) statement, he left the discussion for his opponents and the media. Journalist Tom-Jan Meeus of the quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad argues in an (opinion-) article about the media-strategies of Wilders, that the latter tries his best to have spoken at a parliamentary debate before 7

42_{M. Fennema, Geert Wilders: Tovenaarsleerling, p. 78}

43_{G. Traufetter, ‘Interview with Dutch populist Geert Wilders: ‘Moderate Islam is a contradiction’’, Der Spiegel}

31-03-2008. (retrieved from Lexis Nexis Academic; http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/ ).

44

(22)

22 o’clock, with the intention to make it in the Achtuur Journaal (Eight o’clock news).45

Whether true or not, it is clear that Wilders knows the power of the media and uses it cleverly. Through using blunt and vulgar language and simplistic arguments, he received quite some attention from the Dutch public. In the media, Wilders depicted immigration issues as if a “tsunami of Muslims” was coming to the Netherlands. More than Fortuyn, he uses the emotion of fear in order to win political support for his anti-Islam statements. Wilders lives under strong protection, as he is threatened for his radical anti-Islamic

statements. Obviously, Wilders poses as a victim who suffers for his nation, and for speaking out the truth. Following the (infamous) apocalyptic conspiracy theory of the scholar Bat Ye’or, Wilders believes in ‘Eurabia’, a mythological future continent that will replace modern Europe with Islamic rules, where ‘Nederabia’ is the worst scenario. In a parliamentary debate in 2007, Wilders said the following:

Voorzitter, de toenemende islamisering moet worden gestopt. De islam is het paard van Troje in Europa. Als we de islamisering niet stoppen zijn Eurabië en Nederabië slechts een kwestie van tijd.[…] We stevenen af op het einde van de Europese en Nederlandse samenleving zoals we die nu nog kennen.46

By referring to the Trojan Horse, Wilders states that Islam is untrustworthy and that Europe and the Netherlands should be aware for a creeping ‘islamisation’. Wilders more than once ‘unmasked’ the immigration of Muslims as an integral part of a deliberate strategy of

Islamisation of Europe, an old strategy allegedly known in Islam as ‘al Hijra’. By constantly linking Islam with issues such as immigration, public safety and terrorism, a paradigm is created in which Islam is the problem, and erasing it becomes the solution.

Wilders had not published an impressive amount of books and columns as Fortuyn, but he turned to another medium to transfer his anti-Islam views to the public; the short film. In March 2008, Wilders presented a short film on Islam, entitled Fitna, which caused global public outrage and a brief media storm.47 In sixteen minutes, the film shows (almost without commentary) a combination of allegedly hate-inspiring verses from the Qur’an and footage designed to arouse fear, such as fragments of terror attacks like 9/11. This presentation of the

45_{T. Meeus, ‘Haagse invloeden : Stiekem verzet dat het verval van de politieke cultuur blootlegt’, NRC}

Handelsblad 19-09-2015 , retreived from www.blendle.nl.

46_{Speech Geert Wilders during a parliamentary debate about Islam in 2007}

http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article.html?id=484:inbreng-wilders-tijdens-debat-islamitisch-activisme , consulted 29-12-2015.

47

(23)

23 information suggests that Islam, the Qur’an, and by implication, all devout Muslims are the cause of the dangers portrayed in the movie. In the next paragraph I will elaborate on in what way Fitna frames Islam, and how the film is especially focused on a Dutch non-Muslim public.

§ 2.2.1 Fitna (2008)

Fitna gathered enormous attention in the months preceding its release, with tensions running

high as national and international media and politicians speculated about the film’s potential (violent) repercussions. Death threats, diplomatic questions, international riots and a fierce public debate followed, even before the film was made. Although the content of the film remained unconfirmed, the cabinet acted on a worst-case scenario basis, stressing that it had measures in place in the case of turbulence. Minister Verhagen emphasized that Wilders’ opinions were not representative of those of the Dutch government as a whole, and accused Wilders of provocations that placed his fellow Dutch in danger. Meanwhile, the Muslim community remained relatively silent and was excluded from active participation of the Islam debate. Nevertheless, as Sipco Vellenga and Gerard Wiegers pointed out, Muslim

organisations were pleased with the Dutch policies. They felt encouraged to not only to urge their publics to respond ‘with calm and dignity’ to the Islam-critical expressions, but also to defend the Netherlands in the Muslim world.48 As no Dutch broadcaster wished to show the film, it was released on LiveLeak, a British video-sharing website on 27 March 2008, which attracted three million visitors in three hours.49 The first reactions however, did not lead to the riots that the Dutch government probably expected. Although some Dutch and

international blogs celebrated the release of Fitna as being an example of freedom of

expression, or indeed believed it to be the truth, Fitna should be seen for what it is: an act of political propaganda.

Fitna works in three ways; it displays ‘Islamisation’ as a source of fear, conducts offense

against images central to Islam, such as violating images of the Prophet and Qu’ran, and claims to tell the truth about the real (violent) character of Islam. The ticking (time) bomb sketched into the turban of Prophet Mohammed in the beginning of the film, followed by terrifying images of Islamic extremism and a graph of the increasing Muslim population in

48_{S. Vellenga and G. Wiegers, ‘Polarization or Bridging? Responses of Muslim and Non-Muslim Organizations}

to Criticism of Islam in The Netherlands’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol.24 (2013) p.127.

49 _{L. Van Zoonen, F. Vis and S. Milhelj, ‘Youtube Interactions between Agonism, Antagonism and Dialogue:}

(24)

24 the Netherlands, paints a strong image of the West under ‘threat’. These images are supported by verses of the Qu’ran, carefully selected by Wilders for their explicit violent character. In the film, Wilders refers to Sura 8:60, which talks about preparations for warfare against the Unbelievers. Wilders uses the phrase turhibuna bihi ‘aduwwa llahi, which is translated with ‘to strike terror into the hearts of enemies of God’.50 Given the context, (the term ‘terror’ is presented together with footage of the 9/11 airplanes flying into the World Trade Center), this is not a minor mistake, but a deliberate attempt to falsify and create the idea that the Qu’ran calls for terrorism. This clever manipulation is also recognizable in other verses, where they are taken out of their historical contexts and presented as direct explanations for religiously motivated terrorism in the West and in the Netherlands.

The film covers a number of topics that are especially sensitive in Dutch society, in particular the rights of children, women and homosexuals, which are presented as the current and future victims of the oppression of Muslim men and Islam.51 In Fitna, we see genital mutilation, showing a screaming woman and pool of blood at her feet, we see the still veiled head of a beheaded woman, the hanging of gay man in Iran. Furthermore, Fitna suggest that Islam encourages anti-Semitism and anti-Western sentiments, as a three-year-old girl in a hijab declares that the Qu’ran tells her Jews are ‘pigs and apes’. Also, there are shots of Muslims in demonstrations holding up radical slogans in praise of Hitler, or signs that said ‘Freedom go to hell’. Fitna explicitly puts these issues into a Dutch background, as you see a changing Dutch landscape with Muslim women wearing niqabs in everyday settings, such as the supermarket, the park etc.52 In another fragment, a postcard is shown, apparently from the Netherlands, with pictures of mosques instead of visitor attractions, with the words "Groeten

uit Nederland" ("Greetings from the Netherlands") superimposed. The accompanying audio

track broadcasts Arabic, and subtitles note that the speech (recorded in a Dutch mosque) condones stoning women. These fragments suggest that the influence of Islam in the

Netherlands was real and extensive, threatening Dutch culture. A considerable part of Fitna’s depiction of the Islamisation that was supposedly threatening the Netherlands consists of a serialization of headlines from Dutch newspapers, such as “Throw gays from tall buildings”; “Van Gogh murdered after proclamation fatwa”; “Explosive increase in honour killings in Amsterdam”. It may be clear that Fitna was made for a Dutch non-Muslim public. By

50

M. Kemper, ‘The Cracks in Civilizations: The Dutch Public Discourse on Humanism and Islam’, in: S. Reichmuth et.al. (eds.) Humanism and Muslim Culture: Historical Heritage and Contemporary Challenges, Göttingen, V&R Unipress 2012, p. 167.

51_{Idem, p.168} 52

(25)

25 focussing on these facts it appears the real problem is Islam.

Fitna is a clever manipulation that places Islam as the pure evil, with Muslims as

‘blind puppets of the hateful book’.53 The film presented series of stereotypes, prejudices, decontextualized images and (purposeful) mistranslations. In this way, Fitna argues that Islam encourages acts of terrorism, anti-Semitism, violence against women and homosexuals, subjugation and violence of infidels and Islamic universalism. One of the last images of the film, we see an open Qu’ran and a hand reaching into the frame to grasp and tear the page from the book. The screen turned black when you hear the sound of paper tearing. Printed text emerges stating: “the sound you just heard was a page being removed from the phonebook.” The print continues, white text fading in line-by-line:

For it is not up to me, but to Muslims themselves to tear out the hateful verses from the Quran. Muslims want you to make way for Islam, but Islam does not make way for you. The

Government insists that you respect Islam, but Islam has no respect for you. Islam wants to rule, submit, and seeks to destroy our western civilization. In 1945, nazism was defeated in Europe. In 1989, communism was defeated in Europe. Now, the Islamic ideology has to be defeated. Stop Islamisation. Defend our freedom.

As a visual depiction of Muslims and Islam produced within a western context, Fitna invites interpretation as an orientalist text. Fitna argues that Islam has waged a war against the West, and more specifically the Netherlands. Wilders seems to imply that Islam is intrinsically violent and aiming at world dominance. Wilders works up this representation by an

anthropomorphic objectification of Islam, through claiming that Islam wants to ‘rule, submit and destroy’, as for it was a person. In this way, the idea of a real threat becomes more salient. The notion freedom plays a vital role in his anti-Islamic rhetoric, and features therefore prominently in the title of his Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) and the title of his first book ‘Choose freedom’ (Kies voor de vrijheid). Fitna asserts that the Qur’an is no different than Mein Kampf. This is an especially sensitive issue, for the ‘heroic’ Dutch resistance against Nazi occupation is still an important element of Dutch national identity.54 Wilders turned Islam into a political ideology similar to fascism and communism. In this way, Wilders is able to describe Muslims as victims of bad ideas. The use of the term ‘ideology’ is politically significant because, as Wilders himself argues, this means that his plea for specific anti-Islam measures does not contradict the constitutional rights of freedom

53_{M. Kemper, ‘The Cracks in Civilizations’, p.168.} 54

(26)

26 of religion and education, and therefore is non-discriminatory. He claims that he makes a distinction between Muslims and Islam, which enables him to frame his discourse as a liberating crusade against ‘barbaric’ and violent otherness; a fight of good versus evil. Wilders justified the debate about Fitna on the idea that he represented a great part of the Dutch people with concerns about Islam, rather than bringing on political or historical arguments for publishing his film. Although the Dutch government decided not to press charges in 2008, prosecutors ultimately brought charges in 2009. After two trials, the judge dismissed all charges in June 2011, ruling that although Wilders' views were “gross and condescending” toward the Islamic faith, they were "acceptable within the outline of public debate”. 55 A more thorough analysis of Wilders anti-Islamic discourse will be given in the next chapter.

55_{Website ‘De Rechtspraak’, Court of Amsterdam: Final verdict case Wilders, 23-06-2011,}

(27)

27

H.3 Discourse analysis Fortuyn & Wilders

In the previous chapters, I have argued that both Fortuyn and Wilders have adopted an alarmist narrative, warning for an alleged ‘islamisation’, suggesting that their country is on the brink of collapse. Appearing with the suffix –ation, Islam appears as the hostile force threatening to eliminate and weaken a native population. To withstand such a threat,

according to Fortuyn and Wilders, a stronger emphasis on Dutch national values is necessary. This ‘cultural anxiety’, the concern about cultural identity and loss, is the starting point for their anti-Islamic discourse. In this chapter, I will take a closer look at their anti-Islamic discourse, and display the differences and similarities between them. I will show how Fortuyn and Wilders labeled Islam as the opposite of alleged Dutch liberal (core) values, being the ‘backward’, ‘misogynous’ and ‘intolerant’ other, versus the ‘modern’,

‘emancipatory’ and ‘tolerant’ Dutch. For this, I will cover concepts such as ‘framing’, ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘cultural essentialism’.

§3.1 Theory of ‘framing’

As Fortuyn and Wilders actively used the technique of ‘framing’ to support their theories about Islam and Dutch culture, we need to look at the concept of ‘framing’ first. Framing theory has been studied extensively within several disciplines in the social sciences. Erving Goffman (1974) was one of the first scholars to have developed the general concept of framing. He thought that frames help people organize what they see in everyday life. The “schemata of interpretation”, which are marked as “frames”, enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events or information.56 Other scholars, like Todd Gitlin, identify ‘frames’ as “tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. […] We frame reality in order to negotiate it, manage it, comprehend it, and choose appropriate repertoires of cognition and action”.57 Although these definitions are suitable, they don’t cover the whole framing concept nowadays. Frames are not some ‘tacit’ theories, but often deliberately put. An often-cited framing concept is offered by Robert Entman, who speaks of “[selecting] some aspects of perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a

communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular definition of a problem, causal

56_{E. Goffman, Frame analysis : an essay on the organization of experience, New York, [etc.] : Harper & Row}

1974, p. 21.

57_{T. Gitlin, The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley,}

(28)

28 interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.58 Framing could have significant implications as frames highlight some aspects of reality while excluding other elements, which might lead individuals to interpret issues differently.

According to the scholar Maxwell McCombs, framing can be considered an extension of agenda-setting as it “is the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed”.59 By making certain considerations more accessible, they are more likely to be used in the judgement process. However, more recent research suggests that frames work by making particular

considerations more applicable and therefore more relevant to the judgment process.60 Dietram A. Scheufele argues that framing does not rely primarily on accessibility, and that the perceived importance of specific frames rather than salience is the key variable. In this sense, T.E. Nelson concludes that “frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame”.61 In this definition of ‘framing’ we can analyse the frames used by Fortuyn and Wilders concerning Islam.

§3.2 Frame: Islam as a threat to Dutch liberal values

In their texts and speeches, Fortuyn and Wilders have framed Islam as a threat to Dutch society, being the opposite of alleged Dutch liberal values, particularly freedom of speech,

individual sexual self-determination, tolerance and gender equality, which are taken by them

as elementary conditions for a modern liberal democratic state. They put those values in contrast with Islamic values. In this way, they not only defended Dutch liberal values, they also defined them. How are these notions of freedom of speech, individual sexual

self-determination, tolerance and gender equality used to frame The Netherlands as the

representative of freedom and modernity, while depicting Muslim citizens as backward, intolerant and misogynous? This can be best understood in relation to the state’s development of ‘culturalization of citizenship’ in Western European countries, where culture is of

58_{R. M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’, Journal of Communication, Vol.43}

(1993), pp.51-58.

59_{M. McCombs, ‘New frontiers in agenda setting: Agendas of attributes and frames’, Mass Communication}

Review, Vol. 24 (1997), p.5.

60_{D. A. Scheufele, Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of}

Political Communication’, Mass Communication and Society, Vol.3(2000), pp. 297-316.

61_{T. E. Nelson, R.A. Clawson, and Z.M. Oxley, ‘Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on}

(29)

29 increasing importance for shaping citizenship and integration policy.62 Citizenship

traditionally (in an Aristotelian definition) is an instrument for in- and exclusion of states. Various scholars have argued that there are two kinds of citizenship: citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, full membership of a particular political community; and citizenship-as- (desirable)-activity, where the extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that community.63 Whereas before the 1990’s, exercising citizenship used to be predominantly a socio-economic issue, concentrating on language skills and labour market participation, now citizenship has been explicitly linked to culture. Thus, we can contemplate a shift in the framing of citizenship. In this process, Fortuyn and Wilders both blame ‘cultural relativism’ for the alleged integration problems with Muslims in the Netherlands, and

emphasized the need to defend ‘Dutch culture’ against Muslim influence.

§ 3.2.1 Cultural relativism

Cultural relativism is a complex term often used in the field of anthropology, which gained prominence in the second part of the twentieth century. In general, cultural relativism refers to the theory that “any set of customs and institutions, or way of life, is as valid as any other”.64 The scholar Elizabeth Zechenter distinguishes three varieties of cultural relativism. First, descriptive relativism, which holds a commonsense observation that cultures vary. Building on this definition, normative relativism posits that since all standards are culture-bound, there can be no transcultural moral or ethical standards. As Ruth Benedict (1934) observed: “morality differs in every society, and is a convenient term of socially approved rights”, and therefore she saw all cultures as “equally valid patterns of life”.65 In other words, as cultures are both separate and equal and all value systems are equally valid, you cannot judge other cultural morals, ethics and values as better or worse, only simply different. This view forced normative relativists to accept and tolerate all practices engaged by others. The third type of cultural relativism emerged after 1970’s: epistemological relativism, claiming that humans are shaped exclusively by their culture and therefore one cannot distinguish unifying cross-cultural human characteristics. They argued that not only one can’t distinguish

62_{E. Tonkens (et.al.) ‘Culturalization of Citizenship in the Netherlands’, in: A. C. d’Appollonia and S. Reich}

(eds.) Managing Ethnic Diversity After 9/11. Integration, Security, and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic

Perspective. London: Rutgers University Press, 2012, pp. 233-252.

63_{W. Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’,}

Ethics, Vol.104 (1994), p.352.

64_{F. E. Hartung, ‘Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments’, Philosophy of Science Vol.21 (1954), pp.118-126.} 65

Anti-Islam debate in perspective: a comparative discourse analysis of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders