Framing Indonesia’s 1965 killings: The effect of news frames on emotions and political opinions
Emke de Vries 6033873 Master Thesis
Graduate School of Communication Master’s programme Communication Science
Supervisor: J. Van de Pol 03-02-2017
Abstract
The violent attacks on the communists that broke out in Indonesia in 1965 have been a taboo in the Indonesian society, surrounded by prejudices towards the proclaimed communists. Recently, the Indonesian government has made steps towards a national reconciliation with the past. This study aims to research what effects episodic vs. thematic framing, and
perpetrators vs. victim framing have on emotions, attributions of responsibility and support regarding a national reconciliation of Indonesian youth. In a 2x2 factorial experimental design with as factors the frames of the article, participants received a newspaper article as stimulus material. The emotion anger at the government led to significantly more support regarding a national reconciliation. Within the perpetrator condition, episodic framing increased
emotional response of guilt compared to the thematic frame group. Furthermore, within the victim condition, the episodic frame led to a higher individual attribution than the thematic frame.
Keywords: Indonesia, framing, 1965, emotions, guilt
Framing Indonesia’s 1965 killings: The effect of news frames on emotion and political opinions
The violent attacks on the communists that broke out in Indonesia in 1965 have until
now divided the country. According to those on the political right (and the Indonesian government) the events are merely a conflict between communists on the one hand and Muslims and “nationalists” on the other hand. Others, mostly those on the political left, see the army as the main perpetrator (McGregor, 2012), and call it a genocide.
The violent and traumatic memory has been taboo, but in the last twenty years more research on the historical circumstances and the framing of the events is being conducted by scholars (Roosa, 2012). The government has made steps towards a recognition of the killings that took place by organizing the two-day symposium “Dissecting the Tragedy of 1965, the Historical approach” (Sapiie, 2016). Survivors, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the government, academics and human rights group came together for the first time to hold an open discussion regarding the events (Hermansyah, 2016). Several human rights organizations and victims expressed a demand for an official apology from the
government. However the government has so far declined to issue an apology.
The official national memory of these events has been shaped by the dominant government frame, which invokes prejudices towards communists (McGregor, 2012). The memories to the events that have been passed through generations on individual and family levels are likely to differ from the official memory. The aim of this research is to discover if different ways of framing information regarding the events can affect opinions or emotions of youth, who did not live through the history themselves.
Previous research showed that framing can have effect on political opinions and attitudes (Iyengar, 1991) as well as on attributions of responsibility (Major, 2011).
The role that emotions can have as mediators of the effects of frames has only recently been integrated in framing theory (Gross, 2008; Lecheler et al., 2013; Gross, 2008). Frames that cause emotional responses can affect opinions and attitudes even stronger (Gross, 2008; Aarøe, 2011). As the topic of 1965 is a highly emotional topic, emotional responses will be taken into account within this research.. It is expected that different emotions will have different effects on opinions (Nabi, 1999). Framing research in non-Western societies is very limited and has never been done on the topic of the 1965 history in Indonesia. This study aims to explore in how far opinions and attributions of responsibility can be affected by different
news frames, and what role emotions play in this. The research question is formulated as following:
RQ:How does framing of the Indonesian genocide affect Indonesiano youth’s emotions, opinions and attributions of responsibility?
1965 Indonesia
Unclarity surrounds the events that lead up to the violent attacks on the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and people affiliated with left wing organizations between 1965 and 1968. According to the official government story, in the night of 30 September 1965 a group of communists tried to seize power of president Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia by abducting and murdering six army generals and an officer. This has however often been doubted by scholars and activists. It was general Suharto, who in the end seized power and gave commands to murder all alleged communists in order to “save” the country. It is estimated that approximately 500.000 to 800.000 people were murdered (McGregor, 2012). After becoming president, Suharto remained in control of a strict dictatorship (“The New order”) until 1998.
During Suharto’s dictatorship, the regime used all sorts of propaganda tools such as
museums, statues, annual commemorations, TV, speeches, radio and textbooks (Roosa, 2012) to invoke prejudices towards members of the PKI or affiliated organizations (Mcgregor, 2006). In the governmental propaganda, the victims were framed as perpetrators and as dangerous to the society (communists), while those involved with the killing and jailing of the accused communists were framed as heroes. Even after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, when Indonesia’s democratisation started, the stigma and prejudices have stayed. A freer media system and greater intellectual openness came into place (McGregor, 2012) and more research and memories from survivors were published. The organization YPKP 1965-1966
(The Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-66 Massacre) was founded in order to investigate the victims of the massacre (McGregor, 2012). However, the government has stayed committed to the official government story regarding the PKI as perpetrators (Roosa, 2012).
When the Oscar-nominated documentary The Act of Killing (Joshua Oppenheimer,
2012) became highly successful in 2013, the history of 1965 became widely known and the topic gained new interest among academics and human rights activists, especially in Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Act of Killing shows the life of two perpetrators who are part of the paramilitary group Pemuda Pancasila, one of the gangster groups that supported the
dictatorship of Suharto. The impunity and power that groups such as these have in Indonesia, as well as the extremely violent crimes that are casually discussed by them, shocked viewers across the world. In 2015 a symposium about 1965 was held in the NIOD institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide studies in Amsterdam. An international people’s tribunal that was formed in The Hague (International people’s tribunal 1965) has ruled that the Indonesian state was responsible for the genocide (Al Jazeera, 2016).
The Act of Killing has however not caused the public controversy in Indonesia as expected and it seems that Indonesian viewers have reacted distinctively different than foreign audiences. Similarly to this research, the viewers received information that was contradictory to the governmental frame and the reactions of the Indonesians to the film can therefore be relevant to this research. Fear of the perpetrators or ignorance of the violence are the assumed reasons that Indonesians reacted less shocked to the film, furthermore Indonesians are also more used to the gangsterism and impunity that were seen in the film (Heryanto, 2016). Next to that they also associate the authoritarianism of Suharto (the 1965 events took place during the Suharto regime), with “sustained economic growth, industrialization and a desire for global consumerism” (p. 166). As Indonesians might associate authoritarianism with
economic growth, they are likely to have more neutral reactions towards the events shown in the film than Western audiences.
Although some experimental framing research about genocides has been carried out
before, this has never been done on the topic of 1965. For instance, research by Imhoff, Wohl and Erb (2013) supported that guilt regarding the genocide in Namibia is undermined when the genocide is framed as having no impact in contemporary society. Furthermore, in their study, collective guilt and reparatory intentions were lower when the holocaust was framed as the result of deliberate intentions of the in-group. Similar to this study, I will also look at how emotions affect reparatory intensions (in this case support for a national reconciliation). However the focus will be on thematic vs. episodic framing (see also Gross, 2008), and perpetrator versus victim framing. Furthermore I will also look at how these frames can affect attributions of responsibility.
Framing
By use of propaganda, the government promoted a certain story surrounding 1965.
This way of presenting information was dominant. To what extent these ‘frames’ can
influence people’s opinion and knowledge is examined within the field of framing research. I will first introduce framing research a bit more extensively, and then explain the possible effects of framing on emotions and opinions.
Framing means “making aspects of an issue more salient through different modes of
presentation” (Scheufele, 1991, p. 107). Framing focuses attention on certain aspects of reality, while also directing attention away from other aspects (Entman, 1993). What part of a story is selected can have an effect on individual attitudes and ideas as they suggest a certain motivation (Lecheler, Bos & Vliegenthart, 2015). A distinction is made between generic frames and issue-specific frames (de Vreese, 2012). Issue-specific frames are tied to a specific
topic, while generic frames can be applied to a variety of topics. One example of generic frames are the thematic and episodic frame, which will be used within this study. Gross (2012) notes that “episodic frames present an issue by offering a specific example, case study or event oriented report,” and “thematic frames, on the other hand, place issues into a broader context” (p. 171). The second set of generic frames that will be used in this study are the victim and perpetrator frame. The perpetrator frame is a typical frame that the Indonesian government used by framing the victims as perpetrators and as a danger to the society. This frame caused prejudices towards the PKI and its members that are still visible in today’s society (McGregor, 2012). Recently, more alternative interpretations of the history appear in the media. These interpretations frame the army and the government as the main perpetrators and the “communists” as victims. This study will look at how these alternative ways of
framing the events can have an affect on emotions, opinions and attributions of responsibility.
Framing and emotions
News frames can also have effects on emotions that are different among different individuals (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004). Emotions are likely to have a mediating role on the effect of frames on political opinions and attitudes (Gross, 2008; Lecheler et al., 2015). Especially when looking at highly emotive topics within the society, taking emotions into account can increase the understanding of framing theory. The discourse around 1965 is a highly emotive topic, and especially fear, anger and guilt seem to be central in the different societal discourses. Strong emotions can alter effects on for instance opinions (Gross, 2008).
Within this research we look at emotional states, that can easily change after reading
different information.
One theory that is used in order to understand the ways framing work on emotion, is
appraisals of events, and that these therefore differ strongly among people. The theory claims that people experience emotions as a reaction to their cognitive evaluations (Gross, 2004). Lazarus (1991) mentioned that emotions are shaped by the way individuals experience and interpret events. People experience emotions according to what is accessible to them at that time. And as they have different information, perspectives or values and might experience things differently they therefore experience different emotions (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004). This predicts that emotional reactions are different when frames are different.
Within this research I will look at the negative emotions guilt, shame, anger and fear.
When a traumatic event has happened in the past of a nation, this often goes together with feelings of collective shame and guilt (Marques et al, 2006). According to previous research, guilt is “strongly related to reparation and apology” and shame with “tendencies to escape, hide or distancing motivation” (Marques et al, 2006, p. 61). Within Lazarus’
cognitive-motivational-relational framework (1991), each specific emotion is related to a core relational theme, the harm or benefit that is experienced. These thematic relationships are followed by an action impulse and the emotion that flows from it.
Lazarus mentions that the action tendency related to guilt is to make a reparation for
the harm that has been done. A way to cope with a guilt-centered encounter is to deny control or to project blame onto the other, which can be “facilitated by dehumanizing the victims” (1991, p. 243). Perhaps this is a strategy that the government has used by producing propaganda that facilitates the dehumanization of victims. These coping strategies help avoiding feelings of guilt from the public. Following this line of reasoning, the perpetrator frame is assumed to lead to lower levels of guilt than the victim frame.
According to Lazarus (1991), the action tendency related to shame is to hide. It is therefore expected that when Indonesians feel shame, they are more likely to want to avoid anything related to the thing that causes them to feel ashamed. When they feel more guilt than
shame, they might be more likely to make a reparation for the harm that has been done, and therefore are more likely to support a national reconciliation.
Another expected emotion is anger, which Lazarus connects to blame (1991). The idea related to blame is that is believed that those demeaning the offense could have acted differently, and that they had control over their actions (Lazarus, 1991). In this case, the anger could be directed either at the victims or at the government. When an individual sees the victim as responsible for “being communist”, the anger could be directed at them. However, when one sees the government as responsible for demeaning the offense, then anger will be directed at the government. As anger is a mobilizing emotion, it is expected that those who feel very angry (at the government) are more likely to support a national reconciliation (Lecheler, Schuck & de Vreese, 2013).
Furthermore, instead of anger also fear is an expected emotion. According to Lazarus (1991), the appraisal of anger is that the offense can be best dealt with by an attack. However, when it is appraised that an attack will place the individual in danger, fear is more likely to follow. Fear is a nonmobilizing emotion (Lecheler et al., 2013) and it is therefore likely that those who feel very afraid are less likely to support a national reconciliation.
The fact that most emotions have been researched in Western context should be taken
into account. Emotions can differ widely in different societal contexts. What emotions and emotional displays are seen as appropriate, is influenced by social values and beliefs (Hochschild, 1979). We tailor our reactions to fit the social rules and also internalize these rules (Lazarus, 1991). According to Geert Hofstede, Indonesia is a strongly hierarchical and collectivist society (Hofstede, 2014). Therefore it is more important for an individual to keep harmony than to express one’s opinion. Lazarus (1991) mentions that anger and other
negative emotions are more likely to be suppressed in collective cultures. This could lead to lower framing effects. According to Hofstede (2014), the transgression of norms in collective
societies leads to shame feelings, in contrast to individualistic societies where people tend to feel guilt. It is therefore expected that Indonesians will feel shame rather than guilt.
Effect of emotions on opinion
Previous research supports that episodic frames are emotionally more engaging
(Gross, 2008; Aarøe , 2011). Research by Aarøe (2011) showed that the influence of episodic and thematic frames depends on the intensity of the emotional reaction of citizens. She mentions that when an emotional reaction is intensified, they are also expected to influence opinions more than thematic frames. Based on this research, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1: Episodic framing leads to stronger negative emotions such as guilt and shame than thematic framing.
As was mentioned previously, the frame employed by the government, that refers to
the “communists” as perpetrators and puts the blame on them could be a strategy to avoid feelings of guilt among the public. The victim frame, that refers to the “communists” as victims, on the other hand is more likely to lead to higher levels of guilt and shame. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Victim framing leads to stronger negative emotions such as guilt and shame than perpetrators framing.
As has been mentioned before, stronger emotions can also lead to stronger effects on
opinions (Gross, 2008). Within this research we will look at opinions on a national
reconciliation, which would include a revision of the history by the government as well as a possible official apology towards the victims. An official apology by the government that has
been demanded by many human rights organizations has so far been rejected by the government.
Previous research supported that mobilizing emotions such as anger (Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz & Hutchings, 2011) more actively change opinions than non-mobilizing emotions, such as fear or contentment (Lecheler et al., 2013). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, feelings of shame are more likely to lead to tendencies to escape, whereas guilt is more likely to lead to a reparation with the past (Lazarus, 1991). In this context escape would mean that the participants are not willing to face reparation with the past but prefer to hide and do nothing. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Feelings of guilt and anger (towards the perpetrators) lead to more support regarding national reconciliation than feelings of shame or fear.
Framing and attributions of responsibility
Previous research supported that frames can affect how someone attributes the
responsibility for a certain problem; in this case the alleged genocide (Matthes, 2009; Iyengar, 1991). This involves two views; one is that this genocide is caused by flaws of individuals, or it is the result of a larger societal problem (Weiner, 1995). These views are called either individual attribution or societal attribution. In the context of Indonesia, the government has put blame on those affiliated with the communist parties. Different frames could perhaps change the attribution of responsibility towards societal attribution. A study by Major (2011) found that thematic-framed stories increased societal responsibility attribution and episodic-framed stories increased individual responsibility attribution (see also Gross, 2008). As the victim frame shows the proclaimed communists as innocent and not in control over what happened to them, logically the blame would not be put on the individual but more on the society as a whole. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H4: Episodic framing leads to higher individual attribution than episodic framing. H5: Perpetrator framing leads to higher individual attribution than victim framing. For the full conceptual model of the hypotheses, see figure 1.
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of the research design
Design
Design
In a 2x2 factorial experimental design, participants were randomly assigned into one
of four conditions. Participants received a newspaper article as stimulus material. The first factor, the overall frame of the article (with the levels episodic and thematic) as well as the second factor, the victim frame of the article (with the levels victim and perpetrator) are between-subjects variables. Before reading the article, participants were first asked some socio-economic information such as their age, gender, whether they were students and from which part of Indonesia they came from. After reading the article they were asked about their emotions and their opinion regarding the national reconciliation. Also several questions were asked to estimate their individual or societal attribution. At last two questions were asked in Episodic vs thematic frame Perpetrator vs victim frame Guilt Shame Fear Anger Attitude towards national reconciliation Individual attribution H4 H5 H1 H2 H3
+
+
+
+
+
order to check whether the manipulation had worked. For the full questionnaire, see appendix B (both in English as well as in Bahasa Indonesia).
Ecological validity is high as the different ways of framing can be found in real news coverage on the events. The government has always framed the victims as threats and as communists, whereas the more critical news media (especially the English-language media) and foreign media will most likely frame them as innocent victims. Framing experiments are also still the most suitable methodological approach to investigate the mechanism of framing effects as well as to tap emotional responses that are short-lived and stimulus-related mental experiences (Lecheler et al., 2015). In order to increase the ecological validity and
measurement validity the questionnaire as well as the articles were translated to Bahasa Indonesia and double-checked by an Indonesian researcher.
Sample
The sample exists out of Indonesian youth (under 30), who were not directly involved with the events and often have a lack of information about this. As their knowledge has only been passed to them through stories of other people or through media they might be easily influenced by different media frames. Researchers have mentioned that there is a lack of interest and knowledge among youth (De Vries, 2014) and this is a reason why it is important for human rights and victim organization to know whether media framing can mobilize or interest youth in this topic.
Participants were approached through social media and by help of several Indonesian researchers who distributed the online questionnaire towards students by email. Due to the fact that participants were recruited from a distance and due to time limits, the sample was a convenience sample. Participants who did not finish the survey completely or who were over 30 were removed from the analysis. The sample (N=126) existed out of 46 female and 80 male participants. Participants were on average 22,22 years old (SD=2,87). Of all
participants, 76.2 % were students. Most participants were from Java (52.4%), Kalimantan (20.6%) and Sumatra (14.3%). The majority of the participants were Muslim (71.4%), and a smaller part was Christian (19,8%). According to the 2010 Consensus, Indonesia’s population exists out of 87 % Muslims and 9.87% Christian (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010). And about 56.7% of the population lives on Java, 21.31 % on Sumatra and 5.8 % on Kalimantan (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010). The sample is therefore quite representative, although overall the sample exists out of slightly more Christians than the population, and there was a higher amount of participants from Kalimantan.
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions. A randomization check showed the randomization worked as all four groups did not differ significantly on gender and age. A Chi-square test showed that there were no significant differences in gender χ2 (3) =0,878, p > .05. A one-way ANOVA was conducted for age and proved that also for age there were no significant differences between the group means (F (3, 122) =0.431, p=0.731). Equal variances were assumed by Levene’s test as p>0.05.
Stimulus
The stimulus consisted of one news article per condition. All four articles included some introductory information regarding the 1965 event and the amount of people that were killed. Furthermore in all articles the recent 1965 symposium that was backed by the
government is discussed. The articles with the episodic frame focus on a personal story of a girl whose father had been jailed because of being affiliated with the communist organization PKI. The girl also mentions that it is important that the government apologizes. In the articles with the thematic frame the events and history are introduced by providing more general information on the history. There are some references to groups of people (‘the victims’) but no personal story. Lastly the articles mention that an official apology by the government was demanded during the symposium.
In the victim frame the innocence of the victims is stressed. It is mentioned that they were jailed for no reason, that they have been harmed and that the society should remember the tragic history. The perpetrators frame focuses on the threat of the communist ideology and introduces 1965 more as a conflict between the army and the communists rather than a violent attack on the communists. All articles were formatted to look like newspaper articles. For the full stimulus articles, see appendix A.
Measures
Using a 5-point scale (1= “very much”, 5= “not at all”) the extent to which individuals felt certain emotions was measured (“In how far do you feel the following emotions after you read the text?”). The variable was reverse coded so that a higher number suggests the emotion was felt to a higher extent (guilt: M=2.75, SD= 1.23, fear: M= 2.56, SD=1.23, happiness: M=1.96, SD=1.18, shame: M=3.11, SD= 1.43, anger at the proclaimed communists: M=2.38, SD=1.30, anger at the government: M=3.44, SD=1.29).
The dependent variable support for a national reconciliation was measured by asking respondents “Do you think that the government should undergo a national reconciliation with the history, including an official apology to the victims?”, using a 5-point scale (1=”Yes, the government should absolutely do that”, 5= “No, the government should absolutely not do that”) A short explanation regarding the official apology is given to participants before the question. The results were reverse coded so that a higher number suggests a higher support for the national reconciliation (M=3.35, SD=1.06). Of all participants, 60.3% chose the option “Yes, the government should absolutely do that”, and 28.6% chose the second option “Perhaps the government should do that”. Because most respondents agreed with the statement about the need for a national reconciliation, the dependent variable is strongly negatively skewed. Therefore the variable was recoded into dummy variables, with “1”
suggesting a support for the national reconciliation, and “0” suggesting no support for the national reconciliation (or undecided).
In order to observe the attribution of responsibility, an index for individual attribution was created. The index was measured by four different items (“What happened to those involved in 1965 is their own fault”; “Those who were communists are mostly responsible for their actions themselves”). A higher score on the index suggests a higher individual
attribution. After analysis one item was removed (“People have a lot of control about their lives”), as otherwise the Cronbach’s Alpha would have been under 0.7. The index proved to be reliable with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.81. The mean of individual attribution was 3.47 (SD=0.95).
Manipulation Check
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked whether the article they read is focused more on a personal story or on a broader societal perspective (episodic or thematic frame). Of those in the episodic condition, 55.7% of participants recognized the episodic frame correctly. In the thematic group, 66.7% of participants recognized the thematic frame correctly.
In addition, participants were asked whether the news article portrays those who were jailed or killed during the period as perpetrators (communists) or as victims (innocent). Of all participants in the perpetrators frame, only 37.5% of participants recognized that the
proclaimed communists were portrayed as perpetrators. Of all participants in the victim frame, 57.1% recognized the frame as victim frame. Unfortunately this manipulation did not work successfully at all. Due to this it is likely that we will not find significant effects. In order to see whether the effects are very different between participants that did and those who did not recognize the manipulation, a robustness check will be conducted at the end of the analysis.
Results
For the first hypothesis, which predicts that episodic framing would lead to stronger negative emotions such as guilt and shame than thematic framing, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with the different emotions as dependent variables and the episodic and thematic frames as conditions. However, no significant differences were found between the different groups regarding the emotions guilt (F(1, 124)= 2.435, p=0.12), fear (F(1, 124)=0.211, p=0.64 and shame F(1, 124)=0.528, p=0.46). See table 1 for all emotions.
Also for the second hypothesis, which predicted that victim framing would lead to
stronger negative emotions such as guilt and shame than perpetrator framing, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with as dependent variable the different emotions and as factor the perpetrator or victim frame. Similarly, the results between emotions such as guilt (F(1, 124)=0.005, p=0.94) , shame (F(1, 124) 0.311, p=0.57) and fear (F(1, 124) 0.311, p=0.57) were not significantly different between the groups (see also table 2).
Table 1: Mean differences of negative emotions between episodic and thematic frames
Mean Thematic Mean Episodic Mean difference SE difference
Guilt 2.591 2.933 -0.342 0.219
Fear 2.515 2.617 -0.101 0.221
Shame 3.030 3.217 -0.186 0.256
Anger at government 3.333 3.567 -0.233 0.231 Anger at communists 2.379 2.400 -0.021 0.234
Table 2: Mean differences of negative emotions between perpetrator and victim frames
Mean Perpetrator Mean Victim Mean difference SE difference
Guilt 2.746 2.762 -0.016 0.221
Fear 2.635 2.492 0.143 0.221
Shame 3.190 3.047 0.143 0.257
Anger at government 3.555 3.333 0.222 0.231 Anger at communists 2.444 2.333 0.111 0.234
Note: Asterisks indicate that the difference is significant with * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
In order to explore the results further I have also looked at the interaction effect between the frames by conducting a one-way ANOVA with as dependent variable the different emotions and as factor the four different groups. A post-hoc LSD test showed that within the perpetrator condition, the level of guilt was significantly higher in the episodic group (M=3.06, SD=1.24), than the thematic group (M=2.40, SD=1.03 ), with p=0.035. Within the perpetrator condition, in which the proclaimed communists were framed as a threat to the society, the episodic frame increased feelings of guilt compared to the thematic frame (see also table 3).
Similarly in the victim condition the difference between levels of shame in the
episodic group (M=3.44 , SD=1.42) and the thematic group (M=2.75, SD=1.5) is
approaching significance with p=0.085. Contrary to the perpetrator frame, the victim frame showed the proclaimed communists as innocent and as victims. Within the victim condition, respondents felt more shame after reading the episodic framed article than after reading the thematic framed article. We can conclude that for the first hypothesis, that predicted that emotional levels would be higher in the episodic frame than the thematic frame, we found a
significant effect only for the emotion guilt under the perpetrator conditions. The hypothesis therefore is only slightly supported. No support was found for the second hypothesis, which suggested that victim framing would lead to higher negative emotions such as guilt and fear.
Table 3: Mean differences between the different frames regarding guilt and shame
Note: Asterisks indicate that the difference is significant with * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Effect of emotions on support towards a national reconciliation
The third hypothesis predicted that feelings of guilt and anger towards the perpetrators would lead to more support towards a national reconciliation than feelings of shame or fear. A binary logistic regression was performed with the support for a national reconciliation as dependent variable and the different emotions guilt, anger towards the perpetrators, anger towards the government, happiness, shame and fear as covariates. The model is significant as the Chi-square test is significant with p=0.001. Results are shown in Table 4.
However, there is only one significant covariate, anger at the government; with
coefficient 0.942 (SD=0.245), with p< 0.001. The model shows that an increase in value of the emotion anger at the government by one point multiplies the odds ratio of the support for a national reconciliation by 2.57. It can therefore be concluded that indeed feelings of anger towards the government correlate with a higher support towards a national reconciliation. The positive effect of the emotion guilt on the support for a national reconciliation is approaching significance, with p=0.10.
Perpetrator Victim
Episodic-Thematic Std.err Episodic-Thematic Std. err
Guilt 0.661 0.310* 0.028 0.313
Table 4: Variables in the regression equation
Mediation Analysis
Additionally, in order to see whether the emotions mediated the effect of frames on the
support for a national reconciliation, a mediation analysis was conducted that looks at all these relations at once. The aim of this analysis is to look at the influence of frames on emotions and the effect of emotions on support for reconciliation at the same time. ROCESS (Hayes, 2013) was used with 5,000 bootstrap samples to estimate the bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals (BCBCI). The mediation model (4) with as dependent variable the support for a national reconciliation and as independent variable the episodic vs. thematic frame was used. As there were no effects of the perpetrator vs. victim frame (perhaps due to the fact that the manipulation check did not work well), we did not conduct the mediation analysis with these variables. All six emotions (guilt, shame, happiness, fear, anger at the government and anger at the communists) were used as mediators (M). Similarly to the previous analysis, no significant direct main effects of frames on emotions were found. Only the emotion anger at the government did have a significant positive direct effect on support
Variables B Std. Error Wald p-value Exp (B)
Guilt 0.616 0.376 2.682 0.101 1.851
Fear -0.279 0.349 0.640 0.424 0.756
Happiness 0.155 0.279 0.309 0.578 1.168
Shame 0.084 0.300 0.079 0.779 1.088
Anger at the communists -0.380 0.246 2.392 0.122 0.684
for a national reconciliation (b=-1.26, SE= 0.40, 95% CI [-2.0632, -0.429]) with p<0.001. This is in line with the previous finding.
The coefficient of the total indirect effect of the emotions is -0.5937 (SE=0.8914, 95% CI [-2.3538, 0.7726]). As 0 is included in all the 95% confidence intervals of the emotions it can be concluded that there are also no indirect effects of emotions at support for a national reconciliation.
Framing and individual attribution
In order to see whether episodic framing leads to a higher individual attribution than
thematic framing (H4), a one-way ANOVA was conducted with individual attribution as dependent variable and the episodic and thematic frame as factor. There were no significant differences with F(1, 124)=0.117, p=0.733. Similarly, in order to see whether perpetrators framing leads to a higher individual attribution than victim framing (as predicted by H5), a one-way ANOVA was conducted with individual attribution as the dependent variable and the perpetrators and victim frame as factor. There were also no significant differences between the groups with F (1, 124)=1.099, p=0.296.
In order to see whether there was an effect of the episodic versus the thematic frame in combination with one of the other two frames, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with all four groups as factors and the individual attribution as dependent variable. The model did not prove to be significant with F(3, 122)=1.670, p=0.177. However, a post-hoc LSD test found a significant difference between the episodic victim frame and the thematic victim frame with p=0.035. The individual attribution was significantly higher in the episodic victim condition (M=3.74, SD=0.8), than the thematic victim condition (M=3.23, SD=1.08). Respondents attributed more responsibility to the individual after reading the article that focused on a personal story, but this was only the case if the article showed the proclaimed communists as
victims. The fourth hypothesis, which suggested that the episodic frame leads to a higher individual attribution is therefore only confirmed within the victim condition.
Robustness check
As most respondents did not accurately recognize the perpetrators frame, a robustness
check was conducted in order to see whether this fact influences the results. As no significant effects were found of the perpetrator vs. victim frame, it is important to know whether this is due to the fact that the respondents did not recognize the frame correctly.
For this analysis only the respondents who accurately reported the victim or
perpetrators frame, in line with the article they read were selected. There were only 49 respondents in the victim frame and 9 in the perpetrator frame who recognized the frame correctly. A one-way ANOVA with the different emotions as dependent variable and the victim and perpetrator frame as factor was conducted again. Contrary to previous results that were not significant, levels of shame were now significantly higher in the victim condition (M=3.20 , SD=1.43) than the perpetrator condition (M=2.222 , SD=0.67) with p=0.49. This finding is in line with H2, which predicted that negative feelings such as shame and guilt would be higher in the victim frame condition.
A one-way ANOVA with the individual attribution as dependent variable and the perpetrator and victim frame as factor was also once again conducted. The individual attribution of the respondents in the perpetrator frame turned out to be significantly higher (M=3.670, SD=0.907) than in the victim frame (M=2.778, SD=0.95) with p=0.012. These findings are in line with H5, that predicted that the perpetrator frame would lead to a higher individual attribution than the victim frame. We can conclude that the correct recognition of the different frames in line with the article the respondent read indeed increased the effect of the frames on individual attribution.
Conclusion and discussion
This research aimed to understand how framing of the Indonesian genocide affected
Indonesian youth’s emotions as well as their attribution of responsibility and their support for a national reconciliation. In a 2x2 factorial experimental design, participants (N=126) were randomly assigned to one of four newspaper articles as stimulus and were asked about their emotional responses, opinion and attributions of responsibility.
Within this research different frames caused emotional responses among the participants. This study supported the expectation that episodic framing leads to a higher emotional response than thematic framing, however only under specific conditions and only certain emotions. Within the perpetrator frame, the episodic frame led to more feelings of guilt than the thematic frame. A difference that approached significance was found between the victim episodic group and victim thematic group, as the respondents in the episodic victim group reported more feelings of shame than those in thematic victim group. This study did not support that victim framing would lead to stronger negative emotions such as guilt and shame than perpetrators framing.
Furthermore, Indonesian youth appeared to have a very high support for a national
reconciliation. The study suggested that feelings of anger led to more support regarding a national reconciliation, as higher feelings of anger correlated with more support for a national reconciliation. Overall most respondents reported high feelings of anger at the government. Other emotions did not prove to have any effect on support regarding a national reconciliation and they also did not mediate the effect.
Within the victim frame groups, the episodic frame led to a higher individual
attribution than the thematic frame. However this effect was not there in the perpetrator group. There was no difference between the levels of individual attribution of respondents in
the victim and perpetrator groups. The victim or perpetrator group did not lead to higher levels of individual attribution.
The finding that episodic framing leads to a higher emotional response than thematic framing, is in line with previous research (Gross, 2008). Within the perpetrator condition the emotion guilt increased significantly in the episodic frame compared to the thematic frame. Under the victim condition, respondents in the episodic condition reported higher feelings of shame than those in the thematic condition. Perhaps the episodic victim frame increases feelings of shame as it focuses on the suffering of the victims, especially within the episodic frame. As shame is related to feeling humiliated or disgraced in the eyes of someone else (Lazarus, 1991), the focus on victims perhaps increases the empathizing with victims as well as makes the reader feel the shame of the victim. Previous research showed us that guilt is focused on the violation of internalized standards of moral behavior (Banmen, 1988). The perpetrators frame seem to incite this emotion more as the frame is more focused on behavioral aspect rather than the shameful status of victims in the society.
Furthermore, within the victim frame groups, the episodic frame led to a higher
individual attribution than the thematic frame. This supports previous research (Gross, 2008; Major, 2011). Within this research the effect was only there within the victim frame groups and not in the perpetrator frame groups. Iyengar (1991) stated that episodic framing can lead attention away from societal responsibility and makes people hold individuals responsible for their own deeds. He also mentioned that episodic framing can make societal problems look like unconnected spontaneous events. Similarly, within the victim frame the readers were made aware of the bad position of the victims in the society. Especially in the episodic frame, attention was led away from the problems with the society and made the reader see the events described as incidents rather than a part of a societal problem.
students (and young Indonesians) and that many of them feel angry at the government. This research supported that anger is a mobilizing emotion (Lecheler et al., 2013) as anger at the government led to more support for a national reconciliation. However it is not proved whether this relationship is causal, as it is only proved that anger at the government and support for a national reconciliation are correlated.
A problem within the study is that many participants did not complete the survey. It is
possible that therefore only those who were already interested in the history of 1965 and were already angry were motivated to finish the survey. If this is the case, this could be a cause why most respondents reported similar emotions and there were no strong framing effects found.
Also the variable support for a national reconciliation proved to be problematic within
the research. The question perhaps caused acquiescence bias, as participants received a lot of information about the reconciliation and therefore understood it was important and perhaps wanted to give the most socially desirable answer. The fact that most participants supported the national reconciliation led to the data not being normally distributed. Therefore there was not much variation in the sample which made it harder to find differences in the analysis. This could also be the reason why only anger at the government proved to have a significant correlation with support for a national reconciliation.
Another limitation within this research is the fact that most participants did not recognize the perpetrator or victim frame correctly and it can therefore be concluded that this manipulation was extremely subtle and perhaps did not work well. The robustness check showed a significant increase of the emotion shame in the victim frame condition when compared to the perpetrator frame. Furthermore the check showed a significant increase of individual attribution between the episodic perpetrator group and the thematic victim group, as well as between the episodic perpetrator group and the episodic victim group. These results
support the expectation that the perpetrator frame increases individual attribution, which was not found in the main analysis. The robustness check suggests that if more participants had recognized the correct frame, the framing effects would have been stronger and that the lack of effect is due to a weak stimulus.
Overall more feelings of anger at the government than anger at the proclaimed
communists, or feelings of fear were reported. These results are an interesting indication for human rights organizations that youth widely support a national reconciliation. Perhaps news frames with strong emotional cues will stimulate certain emotions even more and can
mobilize youth. Further research on frames that incite certain emotions within this context could improve tactics to reach youth.
This research proved to be quite a representative sample for Indonesian youth. As
limited research regarding framing effects has taken place within collective societies, more research is recommended. In line with Hofstede’s previous research (2014) which showed that collective societies’ norms lead to more feelings of shame than feelings of guilt, also within this research participants overall reported more feelings of shame than guilt. The emotion that was reported most was anger at the government. It is possible that as emotions might be more suppressed in collective societies (Lazarus, 1991), the effect of emotions in framing is much smaller in collective societies than in individual societies. Comparative research in different societies is needed to understand more about framing effects in different cultural contexts.
References
Aarøe, L. (2011). Investigating frame strength: The case of episodic and thematic framing. Political Communication, 28, 207-226. doi:10.1080/10584609.2011.568041
For?: The Effects of Framing on Ingroup Identification and Allegiance. The Journal of social psychology, 153(1), 25-37.
Al Jazeera. (20 July 2016). Indonesian state ‘responsible for genocide’ in 1965. Retrieved
from
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/indonesian-state-responsible-genocide-1965-160720132832004.html
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2010). Sensus Penduduk 2010. Retrieved from
http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=0000000000
Banmen, J. (1988). Guilt and shame: Theories and therapeutic possibilities.International journal for the advancement of counselling, 11(1), 79-91.
Branscombe, N. R., Slugoski, B. , & Kappen, D. M. (2004). Collective guilt: what it is and what it is not. In N.R. Branscombe & B. Doosje, B, (Eds.) Collective guilt:
International perspectives (pp. 16-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brüggemann, M. (2014). Between frame setting and frame sending: How journalists
contribute to news frames. Communication Theory, 24(1), 61-82.
Gross, K. (2008). Framing persuasive appeals: Episodic and thematic framing, emotional
response, and policy opinion. Political Psychology, 29, 169-192. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9221.2008.00622.
Gross, K., & D’Ambrosio, L. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology, 25(1), 1-29.
Hermansyah, Anton. (19 April, 2016). 1965 Symposium Indonesia’s way to face its dark past. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/19/1965-symposium-indonesias-way-to-face-its-dark-past.html
Heryanto, A. (2014). Great and misplaced expectations. Critical Asian Studies, 46(1), 162-
Hofstede, G. (2014). Cultural tools: Country comparison. Retrieved from
https://geert-hofstede.com/indonesia.html
Imhoff, R., Wohl, M. J., & Erb, H. P. (2013). When the past is far from dead: How ongoing
consequences of genocides committed by the ingroup impact collective guilt. Journal
of Social Issues, 69(1), 74-91.
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lazarus, R. S (1999). Hope: An emotion and a vital coping resource against despair. Social Research, 66(2), 653-678.
Lecheler, S., Bos, L., Vliegenthart, R. (2015). The mediating role of emotions. Journalism & Mass communication, 92(4), 812-838. doi: 10.1177/1077699015596338
Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C. H. (2012). News framing and public opinion: A mediation
analysis of framing effects on political attitudes. Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly, 89(2), 185-204. doi: 10.1177/1077699011430064
Lecheler, S. , Schuck, A. & de Vreese, C.H. (2013). Dealing with feelings:
Positive and negative discrete emotions as mediators of news framing effects. The European Journal of Communication Research, 38(2), 189-209.
Major, L. H. (2011). The mediating role of emotions in the relationship between frames and
attribution of responsibility for health problems. Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly, 88(3), 502-522.
Marques, J., Vincze, O., Garate, J. F. V., & Rovira, D. P. (2006). Dealing with collective
shame and guilt. Psicologia Politica, (32), 59-78.
Matthes, J. (2009). Framing responsibility for political issues: The preference for dispositional
attributions and the effects of news frames. Communication Research Reports, 26(1),
Roosa, J. (2012). The September 30th Movement: The Aporias of the official narratives. In
D. Kammen & K. McGregor (Eds.),The contours of mass violence in Indonesia, 1965-
68 (12-44). Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia.
Sapiie, M.A. (2016, May 31). Govt to draft recommendation from 1965 National Symposium. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/05/31/govt-to-draft-recommendation-from-1965-national-symposium.html
Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). Election night’s alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political
participation. The Journal of Politics, 73(01), 156-170.
Van Gorp, B., Vettehen, P. H., & Beentjes, J. W. (2009). Challenging the frame in the
news: The role of issue involvement, attitude, and competing frames. Journal of
Media Psychology, 21(4), 161-170.
Vries de, E. (2015, October 22). The Truth about 1965.The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/22/the-truth-about-1965.html
De Vreese, C. H. (2012). New avenues for framing research. American Behavioral Scientist, 56(3), 365-375.
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct.
Guilford Press.
Weiner, B. (2010). The development of an attribution-based theory of motivation: A history
Appendix A
Stimulus (Indonesian version follows the English version, in the same order)
Episodic and Victim Frame
Steps towards accountability; will the state apologize to the victims of 1965?
Four months after Suharto’s fall from power in 1998, Marching’s mother told her her father had been a political prisoner in the 1960’s, tortured for his “leftist” ideology.
Marching's father was imprisoned between 1966 and 1968 at Kali Sosok in Surabaya, where up to a dozen prisoners were cramped into cells built for two. "My elder sister said that when she visited my father in prison, his back was totally ruined, he couldn't walk, and they thought he was going to die,” Marching said. "They were tortured and they were not fed, so a lot of people died.".
Marching decided to share her story against the wishes of her mother, who still lives in fear. Marching mentioned she was threatened hundreds of times.
Some historians and activists said that at least 500,000 people were killed in the violence that started in late 1965, after then-general Suharto and the military took power following an abortive communist coup. A million or more people were jailed, often without any cause, other than being affiliated with certain left wing organizations.
Many of the perpetrators remain in power at both local and national levels. The first-ever national symposium legally discussing the events of 1965 was a move by the nation to
confront a controversial side of its history. Backed by the government, it allowed survivors to face whom they believed to be their aggressors.
In a gathering with journalists held days after the symposium, retired Army general Kiki Syahnakri, chairman of the next symposium in June, said the symposium aimed to inform younger generations about the tragedies that happened in the past.
Marching also mentioned, that it is important that the victims receive an apology.
She stressed the fact that victims want the state to acknowledge that they were innocent via an official apology by the Indonesian president. During the symposium victims came forward saying they wanted the government to come clear about any injustices in the past. The success depends on the willingness of the perpetrators to accept their guilt and the willingness of the victims to forgive and to accept the help they get to heal.
Episodic and Perpetrators frame
Steps towards accountability; will the state apologize for 1965?
Four months after Suharto’s fall from power in 1998, Marching’s mother told her her father had been a political prisoner in the 1960’s, tortured for being a communist.
Marching's father was imprisoned between 1966 and 1968 at Kali Sosok in Surabaya, where up to a dozen communists were cramped into cells built for two.
"My elder sister said that when she visited my father in prison, his back was totally ruined, he couldn't walk, and they thought he was going to die," Marching said. "They were tortured and they were not fed, so a lot of them died.".
Some historians and activists said that at least 500,000 communists were killed in the violence that started in late 1965, after then-general Suharto and the military took power following an abortive communist coup. A million or more people were jailed, because they were affiliated with the PKI.
The first-ever national symposium legally discussing the events of 1965 was a move by the nation to confront a controversial side of its history. Backed by the government, it allowed the proclaimed communists to face the people whom they were in conflict with in the past.
Many of the people involved with the events remain in power at both local and national levels.
In a gathering with journalists held days after the symposium, retired Army general Kiki Syahnakri, chairman of the June symposium, said the symposium aimed to protect younger generations from the threat of communist ideology and a re-emergence of the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI).
Marching also mentioned, that it is important that the proclaimed communists receive an official apology by the Indonesian president. During the symposium the accused communists came forward saying they wanted the government to come clear about the conflict and injustices in the past. Both the communists as well as those who fought against them are part of the process.
.
Thematic and Victims frame
During the escalating Cold War, Indonesia of the 1960s saw intensifying political tension under founding president Sukarno, who integrated communism with religion and nationalism into his governing ideals in 1960. While tensions in Indonesian society as well as around the world increased, a violent attack on those affiliated with left wing organizations started. Some historians and activists said that at least 500,000 people were killed in the violence that started in late 1965, after then-general Suharto and the military took power following an abortive communist coup. A million or more people were jailed, often without any cause, other than being affiliated with certain left wing organizations.
The 1965 history has stayed reasonably unknown in current Indonesia. Many of the
perpetrators remained in power at both local and national levels. More and more victims are asking the government to admit the mass killings and imprisonments, and apologize for this.
The official history seems to forget about certain parts; how the army and civilians killed and jailed so many people. The first-ever national symposium legally discussing the events of 1965 was a move by the nation to confront a complex and darkly controversial chapter of its history. Backed by the government, it allowed the survivors to face whom they believed to be their aggressors.
In a gathering with journalists held days after the symposium, retired Army general Kiki Syahnakri, chairman of the June symposium, said the symposium aimed to inform younger generations about the tragedies that happened in the past.
The idea of the symposium is to undergo a national reconciliation. A point of the
reconciliation is that the state should acknowledge that victims were innocent via an official apology by the Indonesian president. The success depends on the willingness of the
perpetrators to accept their guilt and the willingness of the victims to forgive and to accept the help they get to heal.
Thematic frame and Perpetrators frame
Steps towards accountability; will the state apologize to the victims of 1965?
During the escalating Cold War, Indonesia of the 1960s saw intensifying political tension under Indonesia's founding president Sukarno, who integrated communism with religion and nationalism into his governing ideals in 1960. While tensions in Indonesian society as well as around the world increased, a violent attack on communists started.
Some historians and activists said that at least 500,000 communists were killed in the violence that started in late 1965, after then-general Suharto and the military took power following an abortive communist coup. A million or more communists were jailed, often without any cause, other than being affiliated with certain left wing organizations.
The 1965 history has stayed reasonably unknown in current Indonesia. Many of the people involved with the events stayed in power at both local and national levels. More and more of the proclaimed communists are asking the government to admit the mass killings and
imprisonments, and apologize for this.
What the official history omits is the extent of what ensued: how the army and civilian squads killed and jailed so many communists.
The first-ever national symposium legally discussing the events of 1965 was a move by the nation to confront a complex and darkly controversial chapter of its history. Backed by the government, it allowed those accused of communism to face whom they were in conflict with in the past.
In a gathering with journalists held days after the symposium, retired Army general Kiki Syahnakri, chairman of the June symposium, said the symposium aimed to protect younger
generations from the threat of communist ideology and a re-emergence of the Indonesia Communist Party.
The idea of the symposium is to undergo a national reconciliation. A point of the reconciliation is that the state should apologize to proclaimed communists.
During the symposium the accused communists came forward saying they wanted the government to come clear about the conflict and injustices in the past. Both the communists as well as those who fought against them are part of the process.
1
Langkah-
langkah
menuju per-
tanggung-
jawaban
Akankah pemerintah
meminta maaf kepada
para korban kerusuhan
1965?
kalau punggungnya sakit, dia tidak bisa jalan dan para pegawai penjara men- gira bahwa kalau dia su- dah sekarat”, imbuh Soe Tjen. “Para tahanan disiksa dan tidak diberi makanan, jadi banyak yang mening- gal.” Soe Tjen memutuskan untuk bercerita ke publik meskipun ditentang ibunya, yang hidup dalam ketaku- tan. Soe Tjen bahkan pernah diancam beratus-ratus kali.
Beberapa sejarawan dan aktivis berpendapat bahwa sedikitnya 500.000 orang terbunuh dalam kerusuhan di akhir tahun 1965, dimana
tersebut mempertemukan
orang-orang yang selamat dari kejadian 1965 dengan orang-orang yang mereka anggap sebagai pelakunya. Dalam sebuah pertemuan dengan para jurnalis yang diadakan sehari setelah sim-
posium tersebut, Jendral
(purn.) Kiki Syahnakri yang merupakan ketua simpo- sium berikutnya di bulan Juni, menyatakan bahwa acara tersebut diadakan agar generasi muda tahu tentang tragedi yang pernah terjadi di masa lalu. Soe Tjen
menekankan pentingnya
permintaan maaf resmi
pada waktu itu, Jendral Soe-
harto dan militer mengambil
dari pemerintah, khusus-
nya dari Presiden Indone- Empat bulan setelah Soe-
harto mundur di tahun 1998, Soe Tjen Marching diber- itahu ibunya kalau ayah- nya pernah menjadi tahanan politik pada tahun 1960an dimana dia disiksa karena ideologi ‘kirinya’.
Ayah Soe Tjen dipen- jara antara tahun 1966 dan 1968 di Kali Sosok, Surabaya. Dia bersama be- berapa tahanan lain ditem- patkan di sebuah ruang sel yang seharusnya untuk dua tahanan saja. “Kakak saya bercerita bahwa sete- lah dia mengunjungi ayah
alih pemerintahan setelah kudeta komunis yang ga- gal. Lebih dari sejuta orang
dipenjara hanya karena
mereka anggota dari organ- isasi sayap kiri. Banyak pelaku kerusuhan 1965 yang menduduki pemerinta- han lokal maupun nasional. Simposium di bulan April 2016 pertama di tingkat na- sional yang mengkaji ke- jadian tahun 1965 meru- pakan satu langkah yang ditempuh pemerintah un- tuk membahas sejarah kelam bangsa ini. Dengan dukun- gan pemerintah, simposium
sia. Permintaan maaf terse- but bertujuan untuk men- gakui kalau para korban ini tidak bersalah. Selama sim- posium berlangsung, para korban menyatakan kalau mereka ingin pemerintah membersihkan segala keti- dakadilan di masa lalu. Ke- berhasilan hal ini sangat tergantung dari keinginan para pelaku kerusuhan un- tuk mengakui tindakan yang mereka lakukan serta keing- inan dari para korban untuk memaafkan dan menerima bantuan pemulihan hak-hak mereka.
Langkah-
langkah
menuju per-
tanggung-
jawaban
Akankah pemerintah
meminta maaf atas
kerusuhan 1965?
gunjungi ayah kalau pung- gungnya sakit, dia tidak bisa jalan dan para pegawai pen- jara mengira bahwa kalau dia sudah sekarat”, imbuh Soe Tjen. “Para tahanan disiksa dan tidak diberi makanan, jadi banyak di- antara mereka yang mening- gal.” Soe Tjen memu- tuskan untuk bercerita ke publik meskipun diten- tang ibunya. Beberapa se- jarawan dan aktivis berpen- dapat bahwa sedikitnya 500.000 pengikut komunis terbunuh dalam kerusuhan di akhir tahun 1965, di-
yang berusaha memberan- tas mereka di masa lalu. Orang-orang yang terlibat di kerusuhan 1965 banyak
yang menduduki pemer-
intahan lokal maupun na- sional. Dalam sebuah perte- muan dengan para jurnalis yang diadakan sehari sete- lah simposium tersebut, Jen- dral (purn.) Kiki Syah- nakri yang merupakan ke- tua simposium berikutnya di bulan Juni, menyatakan bahwa acara tersebut di- adakan agar generasi muda terlindung dari ancaman ide- ologi komunis dan kehadiran
mana pada waktu itu, Jen-
dral Soeharto dan militer
kembali Partai Komunis In- donesia atau PKI. Soe Tjen Empat bulan setelah Soe-
harto mundur di tahun 1998, Soe Tjen Marching diber- itahu ibunya kalau ayah- nya pernah menjadi tahanan politik pada tahun 1960an dimana dia disiksa karena dia merupakan pengikut ko- munis.
Ayah Soe Tjen dipenjara antara tahun 1966 dan 1968 di Kali Sosok, Surabaya. Dia bersama beberapa pengikut komunis ditempatkan di se- buah ruang sel yang seharus- nya untuk dua tahanan saja.
“Kakak saya bercerita bahwa setelah dia men-
mengambil alih pemerinta- han setelah kudeta komunis yang gagal. Lebih dari se- juta orang dipenjara hanya karena mereka anggota PKI. Simposium di bulan April 2016 pertama di tingkat na- sional yang mengkaji ke- jadian tahun 1965 meru- pakan satu langkah yang ditempuh pemerintah un- tuk membahas sejarah ke- lam bangsa ini. Dengan dukungan pemerintah, sim- posium tersebut memperte- mukan para pengikut ko- munis dengan orang-orang
menekankan pentingnya
permintaan maaf resmi dari pemerintah, khusus- nya dari Presiden Indone- sia, kepada para pengikut komunis. Selama simpo-
sium berlangsung,orang-
orang yang dituduh komunis menyatakan kalau mereka
ingin pemerintah melu-
ruskan konflik tersebut dan membersihkan segala keti- dakadilan di masa lalu. Para pengikut komunis dan pe- nentang mereka merupakan bagian dari kerusuhan ini.
1
Langkah-
langkah
menuju per-
tanggung-
jawaban
Akankah pemerintah
meminta maaf terhadap
para korban kerusuhan
1965?
sedikitnya 500.000 orang terbunuh dalam kerusuhan di akhir tahun 1965, di- mana pada waktu itu, Jen- dral Soeharto dan militer mengambil alih pemerinta- han setelah kudeta komunis yang gagal. Lebih dari se- juta orang dipenjara hanya karena mereka anggota dari organisasi sayap kiri. Saat ini, kejadian sebenarnya di tahun 1965 kurang banyak diketahui. Banyak pelaku kerusuhan itu yang men- duduki pemerintahan tingkat lokal maupun nasional. Se- makin banyak korban yang meminta pemerintah un-
ditempuh pemerintah un- tuk membahas sejarah kelam bangsa ini. Dengan dukun- gan pemerintah, simposium
tersebut mempertemukan
orang-orang yang selamat dari kejadian 1965 dengan orang-orang yang mereka anggap sebagai pelakunya. Dalam sebuah pertemuan dengan para jurnalis yang diadakan sehari setelah sim- posium tersebut, Jendral (purn.) Kiki Syahnakri yang merupakan ketua simpo- sium berikutnya di bulan Juni, menyatakan bahwa acara tersebut diadakan agar generasi muda tahu tentang
tuk mengakui dan mem-
inta maaf atas pembanta-
tragedi yang pernah terjadi di masa lalu. Tujuan sim- Pada masa Perang Dingin,
Indonesia di tahun 1960an
menyaksikan ketegangan
politik yang meningkat
ketika presiden Soekarno
menggabungkan ideologi
komunis dengan agama dan nasionalisme di bawah
pemerintahannya. Seba-
gaimana di belahan dunia lain, ketegangan di ten- gah masyarakat Indonesia semakin meningkat ketika muncul kekerasan terhadap orang-orang yang bergabung dengan organisasi sayap kiri. Beberapa sejarawan dan aktivis berpendapat bahwa
ian massal dan pemenjaraan di masa itu. Sejarah resmi cenderung melupakan be- berapa bagian dari kejadian di tahun tesebut, misalnya bagian dimana para tentara dan masyarakat sipil mem- bunuh atau memenjarakan
banyak orang. Banyak
pelaku kerusuhan 1965 yang menduduki pemerinta- han lokal maupun nasional. Simposium di bulan April 2016 pertama di tingkat na- sional yang mengkaji ke- jadian tahun 1965 meru- pakan satu langkah yang
posium tersebut adalah un- tuk menciptakan rekonsiliasi nasional. Adapun rekonsil- iasi bertujuan agar pemerin- tah mengakui bahwa para korban ini tidak bersalah melalui permintaan maaf resmi dari presiden Indone- sia. Keberhasilan hal ini san- gat tergantung dari keingi- nan para pelaku kerusuhan untuk mengakui tindakan yang mereka lakukan serta keinginan dari para kor- ban untuk memaafkan dan menerima bantuan pemuli- han hak-hak mereka.
