MSc CSM Thesis
Words: 15.000
Date: 11-09-2020
Viability of Civil War: the Mali 2012-2013 Crisis
Leanne Nijsten S2675676
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs l.k.r.nijsten@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Abstract
Over the past decennia, civil wars have increased in number. In order to grapple this security problem, there needs to be academic attention in order to develop conflict prevention policies. Among academics, there is a debate on the cause of civil war. Feasibility Theory (Collier et al. 2009) offers nine independent risk factors that make countries more viable to experience civil war. However, this theory needs to be supported by qualitative research in order to understand how these factors are linked to civil war. This thesis follows a theory testing process tracing case study in order to do so. The central research question in this thesis is: how does viability of civil war change
after foreign intervention? It thus focuses on adding depth to Feasibility Theory, as well
as on the effectiveness of foreign intervention. The Mali crisis 2012-2013 is used as a case study. The results of this thesis suggest that the underlying factors like poverty, marginalization, lack of addressing grievances in a sufficient way have made Mali into a breeding ground for Islamist extremist groups. Mali was never a strong state, and decades of insufficient governance have left its trace. Furthermore, this thesis has found that the mandate of French and other foreign intervening actors was not broad enough to effectively counter root causes of the conflict like social fractionalization. This made the initial intervention a short-term success, albeit unrest quickly resurfaced in the years after intervention. Findings of this thesis, being highly qualitative in nature, are only directly applicable to the case of Mali 2012-2013. However, policy implications can be deducted from this research.
Key words: Feasibility Theory, civil war, Mali, social fractionalization, foreign intervention.
Foreword
This thesis represents the culmination of the Master program Crisis and Security Management, at Leiden University. It researches how the viability of civil war has changed after foreign intervention, with Mali 2012-2013 as a case study.
Ever since my minor in Conflict Studies during my bachelor studies, I have been interested in contemporary conflict. What intrigued me most was what motivates people into joining armed rebel groups and turning to violence, as use of violence seems so unnatural. Feasibility Theory has offered me a framework to better understand how and why conflicts like the Mali crisis prevail.
I am eternally grateful of my thesis supervisor Dr. James Shires for his never-ending support, belief, patience and most of all solid guidance. Furthermore, I would like to thank my family, roommates and friends as they were always there for me when I would have another meltdown.
Utrecht, September 11, 2020 L.K.R. Nijsten
Inhoudsopgave
1. Introduction ... 5
2. Theoretical Framework ... 7
2.1 Defining Feasibility Theory in the context of civil war literature ... 7
2.2 The Causal Links Proposed by Feasibility Theory ... 10
3. Methodology ... 12
3.1 Research Design ... 12
3.2 Method – Theory Testing Process Tracing ... 13
3.3 Case Selection ... 14
3.4 Data collection ... 14
3.5 Limitations ... 15
4. Case: The 2012-2013 Mali Crisis ... 16
4.1 Grievances ... 18
4.2 Dialogue and decentralization ... 18
4.3 Religious matters ... 19
4.4 Relationship between government and people ... 19
4.5 Other external factors ... 20
5. Initiation of the 2012-2013 conflict ... 21
5.1 Demography and geography ... 22
5.1.1 Proportion of young men ... 22
5.1.2 Population ... 23
5.1.3 Geography ... 24
5.2 Economic incentives ... 25
5.2.1 GDP per capita ... 25
5.2.2 Growth of GDP per capita ... 25
5.2.3 Primary Commodity Exports ... 26
5.3 Previous War ... 27
5.3.1 Grievances ... 27
5.3.2 Organizational structures... 29
6. The Effect of Foreign Intervention on Civil War ... 30
6.1 Former French Colony ... 30
6.1.1 Colonial heritage ... 31
6.1.2 French intervention is former French colonies and in Mali... 31
6.1.3 Goals and effects ... 32
6.2 Social Fractionalization ... 33
6.2.1 After intervention ... 33
6.2.2 Threats from a new angle ... 34
7. Conclusion ... 35
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, a global shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict has been observed by data sets like the Uppsala Conflict Data Plan (UCDP). The post-WWII conflict landscape is seen as dominated by internal forms of violence and ‘small
wars’ (Demmers, 2017). In the 21st century alone, approximately 30 countries have
experienced civil war (Sandler, 2016). Following, there has been a growing preoccupation with governing ‘internal’ conflict. Civil wars can be understood as a ‘glocal’ security threat. In today’s interdependent world, the international community has a stake in conflict prevention. Therefore, among academia there is a pressing need to develop a better framework to guide policy makers in preventing or resolving similar crises.
One of the core factors to gain understanding of in order to counter the prevalence of civil war is the motivations behind them. There is a debate within the academic community on the causes of intrastate conflicts. There exists a plethora of plausible competing explanations for civil wars, but there are two opposing schools on this question that prevail (Bara, 2014). On the one hand, there are scholars who perceive conflicts like these as a result of political and economic grievances as motivating people to rebel. On the other hand, there are scholars who see these conflicts as a product of a favorable opportunity structure which makes rebelling viable (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009).
One of the most influential theories among the second group of academics is Civil War Feasibility Theory/Hypothesis (Feasibility Theory) (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Nathan, 2005). Feasibility Theory comes down to the idea that “… where a rebellion is financially and militarily feasible it will occur” (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009). Collier and his colleagues based this theory on large-n quantitative studies. These studies identified several structural factors which are in correspondence with a
country’s risk of civil war.1 However, no clear causal explanatory mechanisms were
developed in the study. This received scholarly critique, arguing that the statistical relationships identified by Collier and his associates are not necessarily causal.
Therefore, qualitative case studies could refine Feasibility Theory, by revealing
how causal links proposed by Collier et al. have influenced the onset of actual civil
wars. This thesis addresses this academic niche by testing causal mechanisms drawn from Feasibility Theory in the context of the conflict in Mali. Recent developments in
Mali reinforce the importance of gaining larger understanding of international intervention on civil war. Feasibility Theory is not only influential among civil war scholars, but is also regarded as important among policy makers and political leaders (Ginty & Williams, 2009; Keen, 2012; Nathan, 2005). If this study were to reveal flaws or inconsistencies of the theory, it could affect conflict policy. The challenges in the Sahel require long-term solutions in order to prevent vulnerable states from collapsing (NRC, 2019).
Although this study is rather limited in scope, it could contribute to our understanding of civil wars, and more specifically to the development of Feasibility Theory. This information would be highly relevant for political leaders and stakeholders in their pursuit of a cease of hostilities and a lasting peace (NRC, 2019). Hopefully, it will also add to our understanding of development of future conflict, which would make preventive actions more successful in an earlier stage.
This research will take the conflict in Mali as a case, with the timeframe of 2012-2020. This is a highly complex conflict, which deserves further investigation. Furthermore, it has experience with foreign intervention and it has a long history of violent conflict.
Research question:
How does the viability of civil war change after foreign intervention?
Sub-questions:
- What is the place of Feasibility Theory in civil war literature?
- How can the causal links proposed by Feasibility Theory be converted into causal
mechanisms?
- How do these causal mechanisms influenced by international intervention contribute
to the prevalence of civil war in Mali?
The first chapter of this thesis is theoretical in nature and will provide an overview of Feasibility Theory in the wider context of civil war literature. The second chapter introduce the conflict in Mali which will be studied, it will also explain how and why it will be analyzed. The third chapter will offer a methodology through which the case of Mali will be analyzed and will also conceptualize the causal mechanisms. The fourth chapter will provide a concise historical overview of the conflict in Mali. It will also shed a light on other contributing factors to the situation. The fifth chapter is the first
analytical chapter and focuses on the initiation of the conflict. It is based on several causal mechanisms distilled from Feasibility Theory and how these factors have
contributed to the viability of civil war.2 The sixth chapter will discuss other factors
and assess how these were impacted by French intervention. The concluding chapter of this thesis will focus on its limitations, and offer policy implications as well as further research.
2. Theoretical Framework
This chapter will first place Feasibility Theory within the academic literature on civil war. It will also identify causal links that will be empirically tested in the analytical chapters.
2.1 Defining Feasibility Theory in the context of civil war literature
As mentioned before, over the past decades there has been a proliferation of ‘internal’ violent conflict which results in a preoccupation with governing this type of conflict (Demmers, 2017). The end of the Cold War meant a rise in possibilities for both direct political and military interventions in conflicted areas which resulted in military intervention and peacekeeping operations (Demmers, 2017). A rise in policy attention for intra-state violent conflicts intertwines with academic research.
Civil war can be seen as large-scale organized conflict on the part of a rebel army. It is the most prevalent form of violence and persists more than ten times longer than international wars. The prevention of civil war is seen as one of the most important priorities for international attention. Strategies on prevention should rest on analysis of what makes situations prone to civil war (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009).
There are two main approaches towards motivations behind civil war: greed and grievance. The debate between the two (greed vs. grievance) commenced when a group of political economists (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) proposed that civil wars are started by individuals who seek personal gain. It holds that objective social exclusion explains civil war. Thereby, it challenged the view of political scientists, who contrarily perceived political grievances as the main cause of civil wars.
After the development of this approach, both sides progressed over 10-15 years. Following, there have been multiple attempts to bridge his divide (i.e. Zartman,
Hoeffler, Bara). However, over the last years, multiple authors have tried to confirm supremacy of either the greed or grievance side of the debate. But over the years, the debate has moved from motivations of rebels to the importance of structural opportunities and motives that are important for explaining the prevalence of civil wars (Cederman et al., 2013)
Among the academics who support the grievance-side of the debate, the Horizontal Inequalities (HI) Theory is currently seen as the most prominent (Cederman et al. 2013, Keen, 2012). Contrasting to previous theories, which were mainly based on case studies, HI Theory is supported by extensive quantitative research. In short, HI entails “… inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural statues between culturally defined groups (Steward 2008, pp. 3).
Among advocates of the ‘greed’ school of thought, and thus on the other side of the debate, the most prominent theory is Feasibility Theory, developed by Collier et. al (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). The authors posed themselves against the grievance school which prevailed in civil war studies at the time. They increasingly called into question the importance of motivation and argued that the circumstances which generate a rebellion might be distinctive in the mere financial and military feasibility of rebellion (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner, 2006). According to these scholars, political grievances do not spark civil war, unless favorable conditions create economic incentives to start a rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). Feasibility Theory was developed in 1998, and the first version’s foundation was that civil wars only occur if the rebels are convinced that the economic benefits of starting conflict weigh more than the costs. Thus, a measurement of cost and benefits The ‘feasibility hypothesis’ they formed was: ‘…there where a rebellion is feasible it will occur’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998 pp. 565)
Later, they tweaked their theory, acknowledging that both economic opportunities and grievances can play a role in the motivation of rebels (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). Then, they argued that rebel motivation is in fact irrelevant and that civil war only occurs where the construction of a militant organization is economically and militarily ‘viable’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2011). This is the theory they stuck to and which transformed the ‘greed thesis’ into ‘Feasibility Theory’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). So, where traditional political analysis focused on finding a certain ‘root cause’ of civil war often connected to some sort of historical grievance, modern economic theory tends to focus on the feasibility of rebellion as well as its motivation.
The basis of Feasibility Theory is quantitative methodology. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) have constructed two econometric models for predicting the outbreak of civil war, which are founded on several factors that had been theorized to make a country prone to civil war. One of the models is based on factors connected to grievances, while the other contains factors related to opportunities. They estimated which factors correlate with their dependent viable: the risk of civil war during a five-year period. Eventually, after an amount of statistical tests, a set of independent variables remained statistically significant. These ended up being interpreted as having causal links with the risk of civil war.
After its development, Feasibility Theory has been updated many times as a response to received constructive criticisms over the years (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Collier et al., 2006; Collier et al., 2009). An example is Sambanis (2004), who criticized the proxies and the methodology of Feasibility Theory. He furthermore stressed the importance of combining the quantitative research by Collier and Hoeffler with (comparative) case studies. As a response to this, Collier and Sambanis (2005) published a book: “Understanding Civil War”. Here, they applied a mixed methods approach by selecting academics who applied Feasibility Theory to a set of case studies of civil wars. The methodology among these cases differed greatly, although they were meant to use the same theoretical framework and use process tracing as method. These studies were conducted to be theory-building opposed to theory testing. The case studies were analyzed with an outdated set of risk factors (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001), which have adapted since (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2006; Collier et al., 2009). Although the book contributed to the debate by combining qualitative and quantitative research, it did not suffice in conveying the idea that the correlations that Collier et al. identified could be seen as causal links.
It seems that this is a recurrent problem in the field, as there are little scholars who pursued analysis of causal mechanisms connecting to risk factors identified by quantitative studies. As Lyall (2014) noticed, only 12 studies of 448 articled on civil war from 1995-2012 in leading political science journals employed process tracing methodology. Large-n quantitative studies reveal correlations, not causation. Therefore, qualitative studies using process tracing are needed to determine whether a correlation is in fact a causal link.
In 2009, the most updated version of Feasibility Theory was published. Again, academics have critically questioned parts of this theory, like its validity (Keen, 2012; Cederman et al. 2013, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Holmqvist, 2012). Most of the critique concerned the interpretations of the correlations that the authors of Feasibility
Theory had identified. Nathan (2005), for example, claimed that “conclusions they [Collier et al.] draw from their statistical analysis are speculative” (p. 6). Holmqvist (2012) argued that “the results [of Collier et al.] may lend themselves to various alternative interpretations” (p.11). Keen (2012) argued that “his [Collier’s] interpretation of rebel behavior is certainly an oversimplification” (p. 770). There are more scholars (Bensted, 2011; Cederman et al., 2013, Bennet & Miguel, 2010) who have offered similar critique.
Concluding, to be able to make inferences about causal links as opposed to correlations, it is important to provide Feasibility Theory with evidence from qualitative case-studies which are focused on theory testing. This means that, before testing, these interpretations need to be made into causal mechanisms. Before offering these causal mechanisms, the causal links formed by Collier et al. (2009) require a concise introduction.
2.2 The Causal Links Proposed by Feasibility Theory
Nine independent variables were posed by Collier et al. (2009) in their latest study of civil war. These were found to be indicative of a country’s risk of civil war. So, the in- or decrease of the independent variable is connected to the value of the dependent variable (risk of civil war). Not every independent variable will be tested in this thesis, but it is important to give insight in all variables in order to legitimize the choice of tested independent variables.
1. GDP per capita. Feasibility Theory argues that the recruitment of rebels is easier
in a relatively poor country, as when society is impoverished, they have lower opportunity costs. Furthermore, following the argument of state capacity, poor countries have less control over its territory and are therefore less capable of countering a rebellion militarily.
2. Growth of GDP per capita. A slow economic growth increases the risk, as there
are less employment opportunities. Therefore, the opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement decreases which makes it easier for rebel leaders to find new recruits.
3. Primary commodity exports (PCE) (the percentage of country’s exports are
primary commodities). Collier et al. (2009) argue that natural resources (oil, gold) can be used to finance a rebellion. When a country has a high amount of natural resources, rebels can use them to fund their activities. Furthermore and
corresponding to the grievance thesis, the government would be not as reliant on the collection of taxes which makes it less accountable. This, in turn, produces grounds for grievances
4. Previous war (the amount of years passed since the previous civil war). This
variable is connected to legacy effects, respectively psychological or material. The first concerns past grievances between two communities that stood opposite of each other in earlier conflict. The second, material legacy, concerns weapons, but also organizational structures of former militant groups. These types of legacy tend to expire over time, so the longer ago a previous war has taken place, the less likely it becomes for hostilities to be renewed.
5. Former French African colony. A security guarantee from an outside regime for
the government can strengthen it and thereby reduce the incentives for insurgency. France is the only nation to actually provide a security guarantee to some of its previous colonies in the period between 1965-1999.
6. Social fractionalization (refers to the ethnical and religious diversity of the
country). Countries that are more heterogeneous ethnically and religiously are more prone to an outbreak of civil war. Collier et al. (2009) have not yet found an explanation for this causal relationship.
7. Proportion of young men. The relatively more young men a country has, the more
likely a country is to an outbreak of civil war as they are the primary recruits. The larger the pool of potential recruits, the smaller the cost of an insurrection. 8. Population (the amount of people in a country). Denser populated countries are
more prone to the risk of an outbreak of civil war than countries which are more sparsely populated. This effect, however, is rather small. Collier et al. (2009) interpret this correlation as evidence that there are economies of scale in prevention of organized crime.
9. Geography (proxied by an indicator that measures the amount of mountainous
area in a country). As mountains provide shelter to rebel groups, they are interpreted as a risk factor. Therefore, they increase the military viability of the insurgency (Collier et al., 2009, pp 7-11).
The method this research is applying, TTPT, requires an analysis of large amounts of data. This makes analysis of all these factors beyond the scope of this thesis. As most of the independent variables have distinct relations to the dependent variable, they can be analyzed one at a time. This research will select the variables that are most feasible for this thesis. To begin, the interpretation of the perceived causal relationship of Collier et al. has to be detailed enough to make in possible to conceptualize it into a
testable causal mechanism. It also has to be feasible to test this relationship in the context of the conflict in Mali. Furthermore, it would be best if a variable has an unexpected outcome. While conducting the research, it being an iterative process, the most suitable variables will be chosen.
This thesis has rescheduled these factors for the sake of its research. The first analytical chapter of this thesis, the fifth chapter, will focus on the initiation of the conflict. It will first discuss demography and geography (Proportion of young men, population,
geography). Then economic incentives (GDP per capita, Growth of GDP per capita, Primary commodity exports). It will conclude by discussing Previous Wars. The sixth chapter will
focus on Former French Colony and Social Fractionalization. This divide was chosen as the last two factors that are being discussed are extremely complicated in the Mali case, and therefore deserve a deeper analysis.
3. Methodology
This chapter will present the methodology which will be applied throughout this research. First, it will explain the choice of a qualitative in-depth single case study research design. Then, theory testing process tracing (TTPT) method will be highlighted. Then, the causal relationships which are identified theoretical framework need to be re-conceptualized in causal mechanisms drawn from Feasibility Theory. It will also discuss case selection, data collection, operationalization and limitations of the research.
3.1 Research Design
In the previous chapter, it became clear that one of the problems of Feasibility Theory is rooted in its methodology. Until now, the qualitative or mixed methods studies conducted by Collier et al. and others have shown that there are certain factors that have a correlation with the risk of civil war a country runs. However, it has not been proven that these associations should be interpreted as causal links. That is why qualitative approach has been chosen for this thesis, as it can be applied to refine the understanding of associations brought to us by large-n quantitative studies.
This research aims to find out whether and how Collier’s causal links have contributed to the onset of a civil war. This means that the thesis is limited to within-case inferences, as opposed to cross-within-case inferences. The first can be defined as “causal
inferences made, based on observed empirical material, about the presence or absence of the parts and whole of a causal mechanism in a particular case” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 182). On the other hand, cross-case inferences can be described as deductions made about a causal effect that suit the whole population of a certain phenomenon. As the objective of this case is to dive into particular causal mechanisms, an in-depth single-case study research design is applied as it enables strong within—case inferences.
3.2 Method – Theory Testing Process Tracing
As Lyall argues (2014, p. 186): “Process tracing is an invaluable tool in the civil war scholar’s toolkit … for it provides the ability to move beyond statistical association [correlation] towards causal inference about why (and how) outcomes are produced in civil war settings”. To answer the central research question, TTPT method was chosen. This method was specifically designed for testing existing causal mechanisms (Beach & Pederson, 2013). Furthermore, it dives deeper into the context (scope conditions) under which the mechanism enables to transmission of causal forces from X to Y (Lyall, 2014). The methodology applied in this thesis is built on the guidelines in “Process-Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). It has been described as “the first book-length study of process-tracing methodology” (Ylikoski, 2015, p. 634). In the book, causal mechanisms link a cause (X) and an outcome (Y) through an interlocking system of necessary but insufficient parts. Each part is comprised of an entity (n) engaged in an activity transmitting causal energy (→). The complete mechanism can be portrayed as: X [(n1→)*(n2→)] Y (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Important to note, is that causal mechanisms are dependent on the context in which they occur. Fallety & Lynch (2009) describe context as the setting in which a set of initial conditions produce an outcome through operation of a causal mechanism. Beach & Pederson (2013, p. 181) have used this definition in order to define the scope conditions as “the context under which a particular mechanism is theorized as able to be activated”.
TTPT can be employed when a causal mechanism linking X and Y is present in a population of cases covered by a certain theory. It is applied in order to evaluate whether empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the presumed causal mechanism has been present and if it has functioned as it is expected to. As Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 11) argue, this method allows to go beyond the study of statistical association by “opening up the black box of causality to study more directly the causal
mechanisms whereby X contributed to producing Y”. This is what makes this method ideal for testing causal mechanisms inferred from Feasibility Theory.
3.3 Case Selection
The civil war in Mali was selected for analysis, because it fits the criteria of a TTPT case studies. Beach & Pedersen (2013) argue that, when conducting a TTPT case study, “The researcher selects a single case where both X [independent variable] and Y [dependent variable] are present, and the context allows the mechanisms to operate (p. 11)”. What makes Mali an interesting case is that although several international interventions have taken place, civil war remains a perpetual problem. This makes it interesting to research to what extent inferred causal mechanisms actually change to the viability of the outbreak of civil war, when measuring against the fluctuating level of violence over the past years. The research will be limited to the situation in Mali between 2012-2019.
There have been other scholars investigating the Mali case. Sabrow (2017) has looked at Mali through a peace operations perspective, which is more focused on the international but with the perception of the local. De Bruijn et al. (2015) have sought to find the source of conflict in the spread of information flows. However, these authors have not looked into the feasibility of civil war over time as a qualitative case study. Collier et al. have conducted quantitative research on civil war, but qualitative studies are needed to offer more insight in the why layer of conflict. As mentioned earlier, in the book “Understanding Civil War”, mixed methods with regard to Feasibility Theory were applied (Collier & Sambanis, 2005). This also happened in the case of Mali, but with a different methodology than this thesis. Furthermore, over the past years the conflict has deepened and broadened in ways that deserve an academic assessment. The fact that the conflict in Mali has been well documented makes for it to be a suitable case.
3.4 Data collection
In this thesis, source selection is theory driven, as is often the case in process tracing. Beach and Peterson (2013, p. 132) explain: “we select sources based on the type of evidence that is best suited to enable us to engage in a critical theory test”. Common problems to this method of data collection concern limited internal validity and confirmation bias. To counter this, triangulation of different sources was applied. For example, with regard to the brief history of the conflict in the Sahel, historical accounts by different historians are triangulated in order to come to an essence. Observations
were also made by combining different types of sources, like academic articles, historical scholarship and official institutional documents (i.e. UN documents).
Media reports will also form an important source of data within this research. In order to distill solid data, information from different sources has been triangulated in order to counter the problems of internal validity as well as confirmation bias that are inherent to this method of data collection.
In order to get a grasp on major political developments, this study will also take UN Reports on MINUSMA into account as well as reports of the UN’s Security Council. Other official documents like reports of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) will be consulted, as these give insight in food production. Assessments of the security status made by the Crisis Group and reports from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism will be used.
3.5 Limitations
There are several limitations to take into account with regard to the research design applied in this study. The first limitation concerns the external validity of the research which is relatively low, which is inherent to the method applied. Beach and Pederson (2013, pp. 3) argue that, in a single case study applying TTPT “… no claims can be made, about whether the mechanism was only cause of the outcome”. This is because by itself, a sole TTPT case study cannot conclude if the causal mechanism is necessary for the transmission of causal forces between the X and Y (Beach& Pedersen, 2013). Taking these limitations into consideration, this particular thesis will be limited to making (within-case) inferences about the causal mechanisms that affected the conflict in Mali. Nevertheless, TTPT single case study-results, when put in a broader research design, can be used to make cross-case inferences (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 153-156). Thus, although the results of this research project would not be sufficient to make generalizations about civil wars at large, results would become generalizable in a wider research project.
A second limitation, or challenge, to this research can be found in data collection, which is inherently difficult in post-conflict environments (Lyall, 2014, p. 204). A highly valuable source of data for this research would be interviews with (ex-)combatants and other relevant stakeholders. However, this is made impossible by the extreme violent conditions. To overcome this hurdle, information was combined from i.e. international court records, documents of the Mali government, the UN and NGOs as well as books and academic articles on the subject. Thus, observations were collected from a wide and rich spectrum of sources.
A third and last limitation is related to the internal validity of the research, which might be affected by subjective biases. In general, a certain level of subjectivity is inherent to qualitative methods in general and process tracing in particular (Bennett, 2014, p. 281). These biases can influence a variety of factors, like the assignment of probabilities, the determination of uniqueness and certainty of empirical tests, the evaluation of empirical observations, and the drawing of conclusions. In order to diminish the looming threat of subjective biases, the researcher will aim to rationalize each choice made, to structure the decision-making process and to refrain from cherry-picking of convenient observations. Therefore I would argue that despite the aforementioned intrinsic limitations, the internal validity of this research is high.
4. Case: The 2012-2013 Mali Crisis
Between January and April 2012, Mali experienced the fourth Tuareg rebellion in its postcolonial history, which involved an Islamist takeover of all the northern cities as well as an improvised military coup. These disruptive events were seen as unexpected by international actors, who deemed Mali to be a ‘poster child for democracy in Africa’ (Clingendael, 2015). The 2012 coup van be perceived as a symptom of several interrelated crises (Lotze, 2015, p. 4). For example, Lotze (2015) argues that the recent crises stem from: long-standing structural conditions including weak state institutions, ineffective governance, fragile social cohesion, deep-seated resentment in the north of the country towards the south, climate change and economic shocks. Before entering into analysis, this chapter will focus on these political and security issues leading up to the 2012 crisis. The chapter is meant to provide an introduction, not an exhausting account of these issues. First, the chapter will provide general information. Relevant issues like previous wars and grievances will be touched upon briefly, as they will be discussed to a greater extent in the analytical chapters.
Fig 1. Political map of Mali based on UN Map No. 4231 Rev. 3, United Nations, March 2013.
The geographic division between north and south in Mali can best be understood as a porous boundary between climates. In the north, the climate can best be described as a desert, while the south is subtropical in nature. They are divided by the Sahelian belt. This division is followed by two broad patterns of populations. Most of Mali’s people (90%) live in the South, where the largest group is the Bambara. They have ruled southern Mali for the larger part of the past century and have dominated Mali’s government and military. In the north, the regions are Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The first two are located at the Niger River bend, which is an ethnically diverse region. Here, there are numerous farming and fishing communities, which are semi-nomadic ethnic groups, most prominently the Songhais and Peuls. More to the north, and deeper into the desert, there are only few cities, Kidal being one of them. In both areas, Tuareg and Arabs reside. Tuareg presence extends north and east towards Algeria, Niger and Libya (Pezard & Shurkin, 2015).
Within Mali’s population, groups are divided as well. For example, Tuareg are organized into different confederations. These are then divided by caste and clan in both horizontal and vertical hierarchies. Every confederation is built up from different clusters of noble clans. Each noble clan is in turn associated with clusters of subordinate clans. At the top is an elected chief, the amenokal. The dominant Tuareg
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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
M A L I
Map No. 4231 Rev. 4 Feb 2020 M A U R I T A N I A A L G E R I A N I G E R Western Sahara 0 150 300 km 0 100 200 mi BURKINA FASO GHANA GUINEA SENEGAL UNITED NATIONS Geospatial GA MBIA GUINEA-BISSAU NI GERIA TOGO BENIN Assamakka Sélibaby Sénégal G ambia Bakoy B aoul é Nige r Bago é Volta Noi re Niger Nig er ! ^ o ! ^ National capital Administrative capital Town, village International boundary Administrative boundary Railway Main road o Airport Bani
confederation for the past century has been the Kel Adagh confederation. Within the Kel Adag, the dominant noble clans are Ifoghas. Kel Adagh’s prominence stems from French alliances during the colonization to counter the Iwellemedan confederation, the more powerful competitor of Kel Adagh (Pezard & Shurkin, 2015). The relation between French colonialism and the Mali crisis of 2012-2013 will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 6.
4.1 Grievances
The crisis in 2012 can be seen as the outcome of grievances of a colonial legacy. Looking from a historical point of view, the grievances of Malian Tuareg and other Malian communities date to the colonial period. The colonial policy separated populations, which created grievances related to access to land and resources in an environmentally challenging area, feelings or marginalization and exclusions, and competition over trafficking and smuggling (Bergamaschi, 2014).
After French colonialization, armed resistance has been palpable from the 1890s into present-day northern Mali. These took the form of Tuareg-led revolts, which were partly triggered by periods of drought. These challenged colonial authority in the region, in present-day Mali and Niger in the 1910s. Working towards independence in the 1950s, many Tuareg felt disappointed not to acquire own territory. This, despite the efforts of France’s Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (French: Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes, OCRS), which goal was to create a territorial region. It was created in 1957 and lasted only until 1963 (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013). These grievances were also present in earlier Tuareg-led uprisings. Many of the fighters in 2012 had experience in fighting in the Malian army in 1990 and 2006, or hadfathers who had fought in 1963 (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013, ) Chapter 5 will provide more insight on grievances, past wars and how they connect to the 2012 crisis in Mali in chapter 5.
4.2 Dialogue and decentralization
Historically, with regard to governance, Mali has used both dialogue and decentralization as components of democracy. Mali’s history of decentralization dates back to ancient empires that have governed the territory since the ninth century. These precolonial empires have the reputation of being local institutional autonomy, which is an inherent part of decentralization. Therefore, many Malians see decentralization as an exceptionally Malian approach to democracy instead of a new, imported
phenomenon. Regardless of the state’s commitment to decentralization, the population is becoming increasingly disillusioned with it (Wing, 2013, p.3).
Apart from the conflict between the state and its northern subjects, there was also internal weakness within the state. For example, corruption under President Amadou Toumani Touré played an important role in a decline of faith in the state. This also fed other problems like the growth in drug trafficking, in which even state officials took part. Retraction of the Malian army from the northern regions encouraged smuggling (Lotze, 2015, p.4).
4.3 Religious matters
Mali is a secular state. However, over the past two decades, religion has taken an increasingly important role in the public sphere. Mali has been tolerant towards its religious terrain, which is being undermined by fundamentalist Islamic militants. Leading up to the crisis, the presence of AQIM and MUJAO heightened counterterrorism efforts in the region (Wing, 2013, p.3). An expert in political Islam, The process of Islamization of the ancient Tuareg regionalist projects has led the MNLA to invest in alliances with Ansar-Dine, elements of AQIM and MUJAO (Bergamaschi, 2014, 339).
4.4 Relationship between government and people
When President at the time, Amadou Toumani Touré (hereafter ATT), was elected in 2002, he was seen as a hero by most Malians. Up to the time of the 2012 coupe d’état, Mali was seen as one as Africa’s stronger democracies, and the Freedom House designated the country as free (Freedom House, 2012). This also meant that the country was treated as a donor darling by the international community. Still, the country was one of the poorest of the world, but had relatively stable, although weakened, governance structures (Bergamaschi, 2014, p.360). ATT’s fall was the start of the breakdown of the Malian state. This revealed that, despite being seen as a democratic success, there were problems eroding its foundation (Wing, 2013, p.2). By 2013, the Freedom House changed Mali’s destination to not free. This makes Mali one of the most extreme drops in the Freedom House’s indexing history (Freedom House, 2013). Over the past years, the gap between the needs of the majority of the Malians and the political class widened. Public frustration with the political elite grew, as state corruption increased. This fueled the general sense that the government was not accountable to the people. Another reason for this widening gap can be found in the failed decentralization and unmet promises from local governances across the country
(Wing, 2013, p.3). Decentralization was designed in order to strengthen the accountability of the state towards the people. However, instead of following its purpose, it became another opportunity for corruption to manifest itself (Wing, 2013,p.3).
Frustration among Malians grew by the widening gap between them and the political elite leading up to the March 2012 coup. In January that year, the Malian army was defeated in Aguelhoc. It proved counter effective to gaining more credibility that the government responded evasive to questions about how many soldiers had been killed, and what would be done to reinforce the army. This led to protests in Bamako and Kato in February. Dissatisfaction with the government combined with other structural problems fed the widespread support for the coup among Malians. Thousands turned to the streets to protest against foreign intervention, as the political elite was seen as profiting from donor support obtained through Mali’s privileged status as a democracy. The political elite was seen by the majority of Malians as corrupt and impartial towards the instability and criminality in the north (Wing, 2013, p.5).
4.5 Other external factors
The country attracted outside actors in the form of aid, tourism and preaching, some of whom spread militant forms of Islam. For example, the Algerian militant faction that became Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). When the end of the Algerian civil war became close in the early 2000s, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (French acronym: GSPC) moved southward into the Sahara and the Sahel, while kidnapping and raiding from Mauritania to Chad. They traded in cigarettes, weapons, people, and drugs which provided a lucrative business in kidnapping for ransom (Lotze, 2015, p.4).
Domestic and regional turbulence grew, as Mali entered the 2010s. Apart from long-term trends like increasing periods of drought and the growing proliferation of AQIM in the Sahara and the Sahel, other developments played part in the destabilization of politics in North and West Africa. In the north, the “Arab Spring” began in 2011 in Tunisia (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013, p.3). Qaddafi supported the Tuareg cause and recruited Tuareg to his armed forces. After Qaddafi’s regime fell, most of these Tuareg returned home to northern Mali. They found a disappointing state of governance and development, and united into the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) (Lotze, 2018). The Arab Spring reignited rebellions in the north of Mali, led by Tuareg groups. Among the armed forces, there was a widespread belief that not enough attention was being paid to the defeat of this rebellion (Lotze, 2018).
While resulting protest movements left regimes in Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania intact, they plunged Libya into civil war. Qaddhafi’s fight for freedom led to refugees, fighters, and weapons travelling out of Libya. There is debate on how this circulation of men and arms could explain the Mali 2012 rebellion. However, consensus has been reached on the idea that the chaos in Libya was not all too helpful in achieving stability in Mali. The MNLA, which was created in 2012, profited from the influx of fighters and weapons (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).
The collapse of Colonel Qaddhafi in Libya proved to be a catalyzer for mercenaries to return to Mali. They joined smuggling activities and insurgent groups in Libya, which made them well-equipped and well-trained. In Mali, this led to intensification of violence, which led to the downfall of the army in the north by late 2011. Moreover, if the coup in 2012 was directly connected to military demand about the army’s complicated situation in the north, it was mainly unprepared and its conspirators improved significantly (Bergamaschi, 2014, p.350). At the end of 2011, several northern towns called for independence by demonstrating. The following January, a rebellion eliminated the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) out of key locations in the north (Lotze, 2014, p.4)
In 2012, Mali was looking towards a new election and a new presidency. By, among others, the MNLA, this could have been seen as an opportunity to make their demands heard. Combined, these factors allowed a Tuareg uprising at a moment of domestic uncertainty and regional turbulence. (Thurston & Lebovich, 2015, p.5) The way the previous wars are related to the 2012-2013 crisis will be discussed in the next chapter. In Mali, democracy was at risk. The lack of dialogue within the country, the rise of “consensus politics”, and some political elites’ increasing corruption and impunity made the political system even more delicate. The following chapters will respectively explore the Malian situation following the factors proposed by Feasibility Theory. First, factors presented by Collier’s Feasibility Theory that have contributed to the initiation of civil war will be discussed. Second, this thesis will focus on the factors Former French colony and Social fractionalization.
5. Initiation of the 2012-2013 conflict
This chapter will dive deeper into the story behind the conflict in Mali, based on causal mechanisms distilled from Feasibility Theory. By discussing how several factors can
be seen as a breeding ground for conflict, it will set the stage for the next chapter. This chapter will be structured as follows. First, causal mechanisms that relate to demography and geography will be discussed, i.e.: proportion of young men; population; and geography. Second, causal mechanisms related to the economical field (GDP per capita; growth of GDP per capita; and primary commodity exports) will be handled. Third, this chapter will discuss how previous war in the near past contributes to both grievances and organizational structures and how these have contributed to the proliferation of civil war. It is important to acknowledge that, in reality, each of the factors are not as clearly separated from each other as proposed in the theory. As will become clear in the following, some factors are intertwined with each other.
5.1 Demography and geography 5.1.1 Proportion of young men
As proposed in Paul Collier’s Feasibility Theory (2009) a high percentage of young men links to the viability of civil war as follows. It leads to a larger pool of potential recruits, which makes the cost of an insurrection is smaller. Moreover, more primary recruits can enhance the possibility of outbreak of civil war.
In order to establish a sustainable peace, youths are critical. In Mali, more than two-thirds of its population of 18 million are under the age of 24. Youths are thus quintessential to the achievement of lasting peace. This group, however, faces many difficulties. For example, the literacy rates among youths lie between 39-56%, as many do not have access to proper education. This leads to a lack of expertise to find employment. Among youths in Mali, the livelihood expectations are high and not congruent with reality (Mercy Corps 2017, p.6).
From a research the Mercy Corps conducted in 2017, there are several key factors as to why youths unite themselves with violent extremist groups. Firstly, there is ample support from the community to armed groups. The Arab community shares the same Arab-Islamic values as the group, which are centered against the government
who is unable to meet the expectations of the people. The government often
fails communities in providing security, healthcare, education and access to water (Mercy Corps, 2017, p. 15). Armed groups jump into this vacuum, and often offer protection to specific communities. Furthermore, government and security authorities often impose injustices to cities and communities. By joining a violent extremist organization, these events are likely to occur less (Mercy Corps, 2017, p. 13).
Within the communities, decision-making lies at the top. The community views affiliation with armed groups as a responsible act of supporting the community. As
disobeying orders from above is met with social repercussions, obliging to this wish (affiliation with an armed group) is seen as a responsible act of supporting their community. This makes participation in violence an opportunity for young people to gain recognition and a sense of duty (Mercy Corps, 2017, p. 13).
Another important motivation for youths, apart from motivations at the community level, is the pursuit of long-term economic stability and increased status. For them, affiliation with an armed group is a means to achieve conscription in the military, which offers them a long-term stability at a government position (Mercy Corps, 2017, p.19)
5.1.2 Population
Feasibility Theory (Collier et al., 2009) proposes that the more dense a country is populated, the more prone it will be to an outbreak of civil war compared to countries which are more sparsely populated. The authors, however, recognize that this effect is rather small in the case of Mali.
The idea that population density can have a positive effect on the success of, comes from the logic of collective action. For example, population density can enhance already existing tensions and enhance the ability of a certain group to organize itself. In the case of Mali, the crises took place in the most sparsely populated parts of Africa, with a population density of on average 1.2 people per square kilometer, and even less in north Mali (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 283). This implies that the proposed causal mechanism does not stand up for the case of Mali.
However, another link between population and outbreak of violent conflict can be found. As Benjaminsen (2008) argues, there lies a connection between population growth and scarcity as one of the root causes of violent conflicts in poor countries (p. 819). He argues that population pressure can increase the demand for, for example, fuelwood and increased degradation of vegetation and livestock. Mali has experienced a growth of roughly 3% each year for the past two decades, with a high fertility rate (of six children per woman in 2017 (World Bank, 2020). This leads to a building pressure on population and resources. With more people relying on sources of water, land and pastures, conflict is more prone to break out. The next header, geography, will offer a deeper understanding into how this takes form in the case of Mali.
5.1.3 Geography
Feasibility Theory (Collier et al., 2009) proposes that there is a connection between geography and violent conflict. For example, mountains can provide shelter to rebel groups, which is why they are interpreted as a risk factor. Therefore, they increase the military viability of the insurgency (Collier et al., 2009).
Mali’s geography consists from forest cover for 9 percent. These is a mechanism to be found between forest cover, as it could prevent access for the government to rebel bases, which could make it more difficult for the army to be victorious. The same goes for the vast desert areas in Mali, which pose their own problems. Although highly speculative, this thesis would suggest that Mali’s topographical features (forest cover, desert areas) might have facilitated a violent extremist groups, thereby reducing the possibility of a military success (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 283). However, no large amount of proof has been found in order to substantiate this proposition.
Looking at geography from a slightly more political point of view, Bamako’s political and economic policies have turned Mali’s north into a region characterized by insecurity and an infrastructure that is not adequate in providing enablement of a functioning economy. At the same time, the south, being more fertile, had a better economy as it could rely on agriculture (Clingendael, 2015, p. 25). The political center of Mali is based in the sourth, and the political geography makes the north is inaccessible from Bamako, by a lack of infrastructure, which makes the region distant (Collier, 2005). The limited economic opportunities through political oppression and geographical disadvantage have encouraged northern Malians to rely on something else than natural in order to create livelihood. Since the 1980s, a criminal economy came up in the north, making the region a hub for trafficking of illicit goods (Clingendael, 2015, p. 27).
Bächler (1998) labels the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali as a resource conflict, as an outcome of environmental degradation. Weighty problems are caused by a combination of population pressures, inadequate land use, and weak ecology. These led to soil erosion, desertification and scarcity of fresh water. Benjaminsen (2008) labels this explanation ‘demographic and environmental stress’ (DES). Extrapolating this, the geographical relative disadvantage of the north with regard to the south could have encouraged people to engage with violent extremist groups.
5.2 Economic incentives 5.2.1 GDP per capita
Feasibility Theory argues that the recruitment of rebels is easier in a relatively poor country, as when society is impoverished, they have lower opportunity costs. Furthermore, following the argument of state capacity, poor countries have less control over its territory and are therefore less capable of countering a rebellion militarily (Collier 2009).
5.2.2 Growth of GDP per capita
A slow economic growth increases the risk, as there are less employment opportunities. Therefore, the opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement decreases which makes it easier for rebel leaders to find new recruits (Collier 2009).
With regard to economic growth, Mali’s GDP has grown over the past decades, at an average rate of 5.8% between 1995-2005 and 4.9% between 2007 and 2010. At the time of the crisis in 2012, the growth dropped to a negative rate at -1.2% (European Parliament, 2014). However, from 2012 until 2019, the GDP returned to growing at an average rate of 5.2% (World Bank, 2020)
Although Mali’s GDP seems to be on the rise, the growth of the GDP per capita remains low. In order to understand why that is, it is important to place the growth of Mali’s GDP in its context. First, one has to take into consideration the high population growth which leads to low growth in per capita GDP. Second, the economic growth Mali is experiencing does not create more jobs in the formal sector. This has led to a rise in unemployment, which contribute to a larger public discontent and unrest (European Parliament, 2014). Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that most economic activity is concentrated in southern areas that are not affected by the security crisis (IMF, 2020).
Practically, the weak economy in the north has pushed nomadic populations like the Tuareg over Mali’s borders. This can be seen as a form of economic refuge, who were in the pursuit of better economic opportunities in countries neighboring to Mali, which can be linked back to the crisis. For example in Libya, Malian refugees joined Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion and participated in wars there. Here, these Tuareg refugees received military training which they brought back to Mali after repatriation. These combatants formed a large part of the northern Mali rebels (Clingendael, 2015).
5.2.3 Primary Commodity Exports
Collier et al. (2009) argue that natural resources (oil, gold) can be used to finance a rebellion. When a country has a high amount of natural resources, rebels can use them to fund their activities. Furthermore and corresponding to the grievance thesis, the government would be not as reliant on the collection of taxes which makes it less accountable. This, in turn, produces grounds for grievances (Collier 2009). There are several causal mechanisms with regard to primary commodity dependence that can put a country at risk. For example, it increases inequality, it produces an economic structure with a low intensity of internal trade and produces an economy which is vulnerable to trade shocks (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p.266).
Mali’s main export is gold, complying over 90,3% of total exports in 2018 at 2,59 billion dollars (OEC, 2020). Prior to the conflict, in 2012, it comprised only 60,8% of total exports, at 1,86 billion dollars. Another important commodity is cotton, in 2012 worth 404 million dollars and 93 million dollars in 2018. Other export products are fertilizers, oil, and iron (Trading Economics 2019).
Since 2016, armed groups have been seizing gold mines in regions in Mali where the state is weak or absent. Gold mines can offer armed group both as a source of funding as well as new possibilities for recruitment (International Crisis Group, 2019). With regard to the distribution of other natural resources, armed groups have become actively involved in the regulation of these, in order to create more local legitimacy for their rule (Clingendael, 2018, p.1). This is all relates mainly to the central Mopti region in Mali. However, since 2015, radical, armed groups from the ungoverned north have moved to the region. Here, they began participating in the regulation of natural resources. Furthermore, these group took an active role in the mediation of local conflicts. The ultimate goal was to increase local legitimacy. But: many central Malians reject “both the imposition of new, conservative religious rules and the violent governance” (Clingendael, 2018, p. 3)
Poor resource management over the years has impacted the livelihoods of communities in central and northern Mali malignantly. Intercommunal struggles over resources can be a breeding ground for conflict (Clingendael, 2018). These communal conflicts, in turn, provide favorable circumstances for radical, armed groups to proliferate. Moreover, the more intercommunal conflicts there are, the more likely it would be for more radical, armed groups to proliferate. More on intercommunal tensions will be discussed in the next chapter.
5.3 Previous War
This variable is connected to legacy effects, respectively psychological or material. The first concerns past grievances between two communities that stood opposite of each other in earlier conflict. The second, material legacy, concerns weapons, but also organizational structures of former militant groups. (Collier 2009).
In order to understand why it has been difficult to implement durable peace in Mali, the 2012 crisis needs to be put in a historical perspective. As mentioned earlier, the 2012 crisis was not a self-contained event. This particular crisis has had several predecessors. According to Collier & Sambanis (2005), previous wars can provide a breeding ground for the viability of civil war. This subsection will focus on how previous wars could have provided Mali with grievances and organizational structures that have had influence the viability of civil war in 2012.
5.3.1 Grievances
The abovementioned factors of FT coincide with this plausible explanation of motivations. The greed-side of the debate relates to combatants’ motivation in armed conflicts lies in the desire to create a better situation for themselves. From this perspective, joining an armed group can be seen as more profitable than not joining. However, it is important to take into account that there are multiple factors at play. For example, grievances can be used to legitimize participation with rebel groups. Grievances mostly are built on issues of identity (ethnicity, religion, social class etc.) (Collier, 2000). For the past century, Mali’s history is characterized by several rebellions. This brings about a long list of grievances. Throughout the next paragraph, this thesis will highlight economic and political grievances which seem to be recurring and apparently have had influence on the 2012 crisis.
One of the most important grievances in northern Mali is related to the colonial period, which will be discussed in depth in the following chapter. However, it is important to understand how this colonial period can be perceived as a grievance. The drawing of national boundaries by colonizers led to, for example, the interference of caravan routes. Later, decolonization brought about an economic effect as there were differing conceptions of property between nomadic and sedentary communities. The legal apparatus established by the Malian state allowed it to claim unregistered land, thereby privileging sedentary communities (Collier & Sambanis, 2005).
The First Tuareg Rebellion, which took place after Mali’s independence in 1960s, was a reaction to Mali’s government in Bamako who applied antagonistic economic policies to subordinate Tuareg and other nomadic populations. This first rebellion was answered by the state with brutal force (Pezard & Shurkin, 2015). For example, the poisoning of wells and killing over 1000 Tuareg (Collier & Sambanis, 20xx). This led to grievances, and the establishment of the postcolonial relation between the Malian state and the north in a hostile manner, and laid grounds for grievances to entangle themselves in the way northern populations looked at Bamako’s government throughout the following years (Pezard & Shurkin, 2015).
Prior experiences have provided many Tuareg who rebelled during the 1990 rebellion with ample grievances, as many had parents who were killed during the first rebellions of themselves had fled abroad after the retaliation of the north (Collier & Sambanis, 201xx). In the decades after the first rebellions, the southern provinces of Mali received a preferential treatment from the government, which can be seen as a grievance in itself. This, as the earlier discussed droughts that impacted the northern region, led to many Tuareg moving to Libya where they supported Qaddafi’s army which had a radicalizing influence. During the Third Tuareg Rebellion, between 2006-2009, where the recurring goal of the rebels was to achieve more autonomy for the northern regions and a more proper distribution of natural resources (Pezard & Shurkin, 2015).
The different rebellions (the first three, as well as the 2012 crisis), are very repetitive in nature. This is also visible in the different Peace Accords signed since the end of Mali’s independence. All of the accords come back to a couple of points, as listed by Pezard and Shurkin (2015, p.7):
- “The recognition of the north’s special status
- The provision of a greater voice and role for the people of the north through decentralization
- Better treatment by Bamako and its armed forces, who are required to lessen their presence and role
- The promotion of economic development in the north
- The integration of some rebel combatants into Mali’s security forces and administration”
This implies that there was a continuation of grievances throughout the rebellions. However, it is too blunt to say that nothing has changed over the years. As the previous paragraphs have shown, there are more factors at play than grievances only. Tuareg
irredentism finds its roots in the colonial policy of “separating populations and that policy’s legacy, grievances related to access to land and resources in an environmentally challenging area, feelings of marginalization and exclusions, and fierce competition over trafficking and smuggling” (Bergamaschi, 439).
5.3.2 Organizational structures
In January 2012, the attack on the Malian military barracks just outside of Menaka marked the start of the fourth Tuareg rebellion. Unlike former attacks, the rebels appeared to have prepared themselves better and seemed organized in a proper way. Furthermore, they brought along ample supplies and weapons (Clingendael, 2015). Although Mali had experiences previous rebellions, it was different in the sense that it was unexpected that it would lead to a coup d’état, the downfall of the Malian army and its democratic institutions and the capture of northern Mali by Tuareg (LeCocq et. al, 2013)., This subsection will investigate whether this organization had its roots in previous wars, which could have provided organizational structures to be built upon. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was created in 2011 in Libya. It was created out of existing Tuareg opposition movements who returned to Mali in 2011 after the Libyan revolution had ended (ICCT, 2013). They had assembled all the different rebel groups who were divided and weakened by political conflicts. The result was the MNLA, a representation of the most important northern communities of Mali (Clingendael, 2015).
Many Tuareg fled Mali for the pursuit of a better livelihood in Libya after the third rebellion. After Qaddafi’s fall in 2011, many Malians returned to Mali. Here, the prospective leader of the MNLA united former Libyan soldiers with Tuareg separatists who had opposed Mali earlier in 2006 (LeCocq et al., 2013). Throughout the first three rebellions, the Kel Adagh Tuareg clan were the ones who took up arms against the government. During the second Tuareg Rebellion, this group was again the one who took initiative and leadership. However, a more pan-Tuareg approach was implemented. They created the Mouvement Populaire pour la liberation de l’Azawad (MPLA), which was a representation of the Tuareg community at large. These structures are very similar to the the ones of the MNLA. After the return of manby Malians from Libya, most fighters organized themselves along existing military organizations, following factional logics of Tuareg class and clan. (ethnic (LeCocq et al., 2013).
