UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
Media representation and Youth Crime in El Salvador
Bachelor Thesis Human Geography
Johannes Chinchilla 10179690 18-6-2014
This research focusses on the ways in which Salvadoran media have traditionally reported about youth-crime. Attention is paid to the Salvadoran context, which seems to have been violent for over several decades. Possible consequences the media may have on the public interpretation of youth crime will be discussed, as the public interpretation of youth crime might contribute to possible solutions
Inhoud
Introduction ...2
Framework ...2
Research Methods ...8
Chapter Layout ...9
Chapter 1: The Salvadoran Context ... 10
Historical and Political Context ... 10
Precedents of Civil War ... 10
The Legacy of the Civil War ... 14
Socio-economic Context ... 15
Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion ... 16
Geography of inequalities ... 19
Chapter 2: Youth Crime ... 21
Crime in General and Social Conflict ... 21
Culture of Violence ... 24
Youth Crime in General and the Gang Phenomenon ... 25
Chapter 3: Salvadoran Media ... 29
Media and Democracy ... 29
Salvadoran Media: it’s just Business ... 30
Print Media and Online Newspapers ... 32
Legislation, Diversity and Ownership ... 33
Chapter 4: Media Discourse ... 35
Salvadoran Media Discourse ... 35
Discourse Analysis ... 40
Representation of reality ... 40
Stereotypes ... 41
Representativeness ... 44
The message ... 45
Chapter 5: Public Interpretation of Youth Crime ... 48
Creating the ‘Other’ ... 48
Construction of Discourse and Public Interpretation of Youth Crime ... 50
Consequences negative media-representation ... 52
Conclusion ... 54
Introduction
Although the amount of reported homicides decreased in 2013, El Salvador is still listed number four in the list of countries with the highest murder rates (Marroquín, 2014). In 2013 a total of 2,492 murders was registered, of which the majority of victims were males between 15 and 39 years old (Lohmuller, 2014). A common explanation for the high murder rate and the insecurity in the country is the presence of gangs or pandillas in Spanish. After the civil war, that lasted from 1980 until 1992, the problems associated with these gangs increased, or at least they were given more attention. Even now, 22 years after the civil war, not one day passes by without the media reporting something about these gangs. The majority of these media have showed to be influenced by politics and the private sector (Aguilar, 2006). Aguilar, for example, argues that although the gangs were perceived as a severe problem by society, it has not always been perceived as the biggest or most important problem for the people. However, when in October 2003 the right-wing government launched its new (aggressive) plan called ‘Mano Dura’ to fight the gangs, far more people indicated to perceive the gangs as the major national problem. Although the gang phenomenon is probably one of the most studied issues in Central America, there seems to be a gap in the literature –especially in English literature– about the way in which the media present information about these gangs. As not all homicides are related to gang violence, but most of them are related to violence from and among youngsters, the focus of this investigation will be on (the media coverage on) issues related to youth- violence and crime in general. The central research question of this investigation is as follows:
How is youth crime and violence currently being pictured in the Salvadoran media and in what way may this influence the public opinion about youth crime?
Framework
In order to answer the research question it is useful to revise the literature existing literature on the topic, as various interesting ideas and concepts can be used. Xavier Giró (2006) shows us that the media do almost to improve the situation in the country when it comes to youth violence and gangs. Instead, they often present a one-sided story that is often stigmatizing. Amparro Marroquín Parducci (2006) writes about a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the media are even aggravating the problems surrounding youth violence. The article explains how certain images of stereotypes and certain stigmas can contribute to a vicious circle of violence and the author recommends that the media alter their way of reporting certain facts, if they want to be part of the solution. Aguilar and 2
Carranza (2011) describe the emergence of youth-gangs and focuses especially on the (social) opportunities of these youngsters. They plead for a wider and more structural approach to integrate these often excluded actors into society. This article is useful to understand the underlying causes of youth crime and gang culture, both in the past as in the present. Martel (2006) queries the ‘official discourse’ on gangs. Although the author recognizes the presence of these gangs and the negative consequences of many of their deeds, she points out that the commotion around those gangs is often a form of propaganda, used to justify policy changes that are mainly benefiting the people that are involved in decision making processes. From the ideas and concepts provided by these and some additional articles, it is possible to extract the necessary guidance for the investigation. Hence, the conceptual model builds on the information collected from the existing literature.
Research Design
The research will basically exist out of three main topics, which will form the guidelines for this research. The three topics are divided in different chapters and will focus on:
• The most important causes behind youth crime and the main characteristics of youth crime
• The approach of the different Salvadoran media to cover youth crime
• The way in which the public interpretation and opinion about youth crime can be influenced by the media
The first part focusses on social structures and conditions that give way to the most important causes of youth crime (and violence). This is critical to understand, as these phenomena have been in the media attention for over a decade and are present in the everyday life of many. The second part will help create an understanding about the ways in which different media present information about youth crime and violence. Finally this paper will examine the way in which the media can possibly influence the public interpretation of youth crime. They may for example be contributing to a solution of the problems that are related to youth crime or they may be aggravating the situation. For this investigation a discourse analysis will be used (see Research Methods).
As the article from FLASCO (2007) shows, that the greater inequalities in society today have various causes. In the article processes such as democratization (political), liberalization (economic) and globalization as part of the process of modernization are mentioned as possible factor that contribute to growing inequalities. The authors also point out that the 3
military conflicts in Central America, that took place at the end of the last century, have marked the way in which political reforms have constructed new legal systems and institutions (socio-political), and have given way to new mechanics, behaviours, discourses and new struggles within the democratic system (FLASCO, 2007). In the conceptual framework, the concepts of historical context and social, political and economic context will be used to explain why social inequalities exist and are being reproduced (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Conceptual Model
As these concepts are considerably large, this investigation will not focus on those concepts. It will, however, be necessary to provide basic historical and contextual information of the Salvadoran, society in order to create a better understanding of the context in which the research is focused.
The third concept to be explained is the concept of social inequalities. In January 2012 Secretary-General Bank Ki-moon called on El Salvador to “address its socio-economic inequalities to consolidate its peace process” –that was initiated over 20 years ago (UN news centre, 2012). Socio-economic inequality is one aspect of social inequalities, however other inequalities such as inequalities in political power and the access to resources (such as health and education) are also important to keep in mind when we think of social inequality (Greig et al. 2007). Rodrígues et al. (2009) argue that social conflict can be a result of these inequalities, which often results in violent manifestations. Although they admit that the violence that is caused by youth gangs cannot be considered as a social conflict in itself, they argue that it is the manifestation of a social conflict that is inherent to society. The children, adolescents and youth are not violent by nature, but their violent acts are generally considered as a reaction to an environment that 'pushes' them in that direction (Rodrígues et al., 2009).
As the lack of opportunities can be both a result as a cause of social inequalities, it is placed in the same box of the conceptual model. It can, for example, be a result of social inequality when a young individual is not able to attend school or see a medical because of the socio-economic situation of its parents. As a result of a lack of schooling or poor health, the individual may struggle to find a well-paid job, resulting in a poor socio-economic situation for this individual (Vargas & Chavez, 2011)
Although stigmatization and social exclusion are not synonymous, they are often interlinked with each other. According to Kurzban & Leary (2001) certain individuals can be systematically excluded from particular sorts of social interactions as a result of stigmatization. This stigmatization may occur when they are a member of a certain group or because they possess a particular characteristic. Molina et al. (2009) argue that those who are socially excluded or ignored are often victims of social dynamics, structural conditions and the more powerful people in society. This may lead to a disruption of the social cohesion, which can lead to aggression, and personal and social violence.
As many have argued, youth crime can –to a large extend– be perceived as the outcome of the conditions described before (Rodríguez et al., 2009; Vargas & Chavez, 2011; FLASCO, 2007; Hernandez, 2014; Rude, 2014). However, it is necessary to determine what ‘youth’ is, in order to outline the scope in this investigation. In General, each country specifies the age-range of each of these groups. In El Salvador, those from 0 to 12 year-olds are considered ‘children’ and those from 13 to 18 year-olds as ‘adolescents’. In this case there is no age-range for the category of ‘youth’. However, in neighbouring country Honduras the juvenile period is defined as the period between the age of 18 and 30. In social sciences there is no consensus about the categorization of these different age groups, as the process of human development is influenced by many factors such as demographical, social, psychological and cultural factors that influence each individual in distinct ways. Some authors even reject the whole concept of 'youth' as it may result in ignorance of the heterogeneity of a certain group. So we can conclude that adolescence and youth cannot merely be interpreted as something influenced by biological processes, but also by psychological, social and cultural processes (Rodrígues et al., 2009). In this investigation a broad (and multiple) concept of youth will be used, following the different terminologies provided by the authors of the revised literature. When necessary, some further information on how these terms are constructed by other authors will be provided. In general terms, ‘youth crime’ refers to criminal acts committed by children, adolescents and youngsters. As violence can be seen as a certain form of crime, I will apply this term to the wider concept of crime.
The main focus of this investigation is on the approach of the ‘written media’ and their coverage of youth crime. Both printed and online newspaper articles, as existing literature on the topic will be used to find out what the general approach looks like. Both secondary literature as a discourse analysis of newspaper articles will be used to explain how different media have displayed topics related to youth crime. This discourse analysis will be focused on two printed newspapers; El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica, and on two online newspapers; El Faro and Voces.
The term media representation, in this case, has to do with the way in which media construct meaning about our world and how these ideas are represented. Is has to be noted though, that not all audiences will interpret the same message in the same way. Dyer (1977) suggest four possible factors to be considered when analysing representation:
• A selective re-representation of reality; in which (due to a lack of time and space in newspapers etc.) just a small part of the reality is being reported.
• A typical representation of reality: stereotypes can be used to represent certain groups of people in a particular way.
• Representativeness: Who is being heard?
• The meaning which media messages represent for audiences: How are the messages being interpreted? (Dyer, 1977 in Marris and Thornham, 1999)
In this investigation, the constructive approach, provided by Hall (1997) will be used in order to understand how the media can influence our perception of reality. In the constructive approach it is acknowledged that neither the individual user of language nor objects themselves can fix meaning in language. This approach helps us to separate the material world, where people and things exist, and the symbolic practices and processes; through which representation, meaning and language operate. In this theory the existence of the material world is not denied, but the acknowledgement is made that the social actors are those who make the world meaningful and make it possible to meaningfully communicate about that world to others. This process is on its turn influenced by conceptual systems of different cultures, the linguistic system and other representational systems that construct meaning (Hall, 1997).
The constructive approach may be most useful for the discourse analysis, when investigating to what extend the media provide; a selective re-representation of reality, a typical representation of reality and a representation from the perspective of a certain group. For example, if we wanted to find out if a selective re-representation of reality is given, it would be necessary to acknowledge that there may be a discrepancy between the (physical) reality and the story that is been told by the media (representation trough language). In case of the typical representation of reality, we may focus on the use of certain language by the author or speaker, in order to find out if these typical representations are accurate and righteous. It may also be helpful to look for underlying messages in media representation, in
order to answer questions such as: Whose viewpoint is being represented? Why is the story told (in a certain way)? What does the message project onto the audience?
Finally, as I believe that the media have the ability to affect the public opinion in a significant way, it will be useful to find out what kind of images are being broadcasted by these media and what the meaning of those messages represent for audiences (Hall, 1997). Due to limited time and resources, it was not possible to perform a large-scale investigation on the actual public opinion and the effects of certain media on it. I will try, however, to interpret this process by making use of existing literature and some in-depth interviews with key informants.
Research Methods
In this research, the central focus will be on the media coverage on youth crime and the possible influences of certain types of media coverage on the public opinion about youth. It can therefore be seen as an exploratory research, as the possible relationships between the different concepts is not certain. To conduct this investigation, existing data –such as journal articles– will be used to perform a secondary research. Newspaper articles can be used in various ways, there may be a focus on its quantitative nature; for example by counting the times a certain topic is given attention to in a certain newspaper. However, mostly qualitative methods will be used to try and interpret the messages that are being broadcasted by the media. For this part, I will make use of a discourse analysis of the two most read newspapers in El Salvador; El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica, as well as two online newspapers; El Faro and Voces. The newspapers will be revised in a systematic way by; counting the articles related to youth crime, paying attention to the language that is being used and by including an interpretive part for each newspaper. For reasons of convenience both El Diario de Hoy as La Prensa Gráfica will be revised on a daily basis for April 2014, while the online newspapers will be revised for both April and May 2014. There will also be made use of existing literature on the topic, and interviews with key informants in order to provide necessary background information and to facilitate the structuring of the research. The key informants have been selected on basis of their (work) experience with youth crime or the prevention of youth crime.
Chapter Layout
• Chapter 1: The Salvadoran Context. In this chapter attention will be given to the historical and political context as well as the socio-economic context. Special attention will be given to on the precedents and the aftermath of the civil war. To describe some of the most important aspects and struggles of the Salvadoran society, this chapter also focuses on the economic situation, the existing inequalities and poverty in El Salvador.
• Chapter 2: Youth Crime. In this chapter, an explanation of the high crime rates will be discussed and attention is given to youth crime and violence in particular.
• Chapter 3: Salvadoran Media. This chapter will focus on the way in which the Salvadoran media is structured, considering aspects such as ownership, orientation and the role of the media in a (well-functioning) democracy.
• Chapter 4: Media Discourse. Based on existing literature and a discourse analysis, this chapter will reflect on existing media discourses en El Salvador.
• Chapter 5: Public Interpretation of Youth Crime. With the obtained information from the former chapters and some in-depth interviews, this chapter will explain in what way the media can influence the public interpretation of youth crime and what the possible consequences are.
Chapter 1: The Salvadoran Context Historical and Political Context
In March 2014 it was declared that the former guerrilla movement and current political party 'el Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional' (FMLN) won the presidential elections. Salvador Sánchez Cerén is the first former rebel commander that has been elected to the presidency of El Salvador. It is the second time after the civil war –and actually in all of Salvadoran history– that the country is governed by a left-wing party. Former president Mauricio Funes, who came to power in 2009 ended the two decades of right-wing rule, in which the ARENA party had ruled without interruption. The outcome of the elections (a victory of 50.11% to 49.39%) shows that the country is still heavily politically divided (Partlow, 2014). For some, the leftish victory is seen as a step to long-expected justice after a decade of war and two decades of right-wing oppression. For others, it is just a socialist threat to the prosperous classes, as redistribution of wealth and power are demanded by the people supporting the FMLN. Tensions are running high, and even 20 years after the war the country remains turbulent, especially in times of elections. The battle between left and right seems to be a never-ending one, and the scars left by the civil war are still clearly visible.
Precedents of Civil War
Being the smallest country of Central America, El Salvador had gone almost unnoticed by the international public prior to the civil war. In a bit more than one decade, the armed conflict had claimed the lives of over 75,000 citizens. It were the repugnant acts, such as the killing of the Archbishop Oscar Romero, the rape and murder of four U.S. churchwoman an the 1989 Jesuits Massacre, that draw more attention to the conflict (CJA, 2009). But what had caused the outbreak of a civil war and how could it have lasted for over more than a decade? The answers are multiple and complex, but to create a better understanding of the present political, social and economic struggles in El Salvador it is of the utmost importance to pay attention to these questions.
To explain the causes and precedents of the civil war, Mason (1999) points to the theory of the U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington, who argued that a revolution is most likely (if not inevitable) "to take place in a society where the conditions of land-ownership are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, unless government takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions." (Mason, 1999; p180).The expansion and commercialization of export agriculture, that took place in the second half of the 19th century, displaced many peasants from their land. Luxury commodities, such as cocoa, 10
indigo and coffee made up the largest part of the export products in the 19th century. After the independence (first from Spain, in 1821, and later from the Federal Republic of Central America in 1841), political control only shifted from the Spanish to the Salvadorian elite of European ancestry. These so called ‘fourteen families’ possessed virtually all of the fertile land and were able to exploit it by using cheap (indigenous) labour, while the country was being ruled by a long series of military dictatorships who favoured these families. Even though many peasants remained landless after the expansion and commercialization of export agriculture, it was uncommon for the aggrieved individuals to rise up in armed revolt. When they did, they were often crushed with great brutality (Mason, 1999; CJA, 2009).
The historian Héctor Lindo-Fuentes wrote that "to be Salvadoran, means knowing that something terrible happened in late January of 1932". This is probably the most remembered year of Salvadoran history, as an estimated 30,000 civilians were massacred. The reason behind the massacre was the oppression of a peasant revolt against the ruling dictatorship and the fourteen families, led by labour leader Agustin Farabundo Marti. In December 1931 vice president Maximiliano Hernández Martínez staged a coup with the help of a group of young officers and ousted former president Araujo. Within weeks after the coup, communist rebels were already plotting an insurrection against him, believing that a peasant rebellion was the right way to get attention for the problems the rural population had to deal with. On January 22 of 1932 the actual fight broke out and a rebel group, led by Martí, attacked government forces. These rebels existed for the greater part out of Pipil Indians1. Within a couple of days, the rebels had managed to take control over several towns and they were able to disrupt the supply lines to many places and thereby attacking the military garrison. Due to the possession of superior technology and training, the military was able to defeat the rebels easily (Mason, 1999).
Even though the rebels killed an estimated 100 people or less, the military responded with non-proportional force, and killed over 30,000 civilians. Most of the victims of the massacre where indigenous and although Martinez initially claimed to be responding to communist rebellion, the terms ‘indio2’ and ‘comunista’ soon became interchangeable. This led to the killing of thousands of innocent civilians –only because of their indigenous appearance– and the battle between classes became a racial one. In the years after the massacre, indigenous people were often afraid to express their ethnical background out of
1 The majority of the indigenous people in El Salvador belong to the Pipils or Cuzcatlecs. In 1998 it was
estimated that 10% of the Salvadoran population was from indigenous origin. (Salazar, 2003)
2 The Spanish term ‘indio’ is often used when referring in a disrespectful way to the indigenous people. 11
fear of further oppression. The incidents of January 1932 gave the message to the oppressed rural (indigenous) population that any form of rebellion would be punished heavily (CJA, 2009: Garrard-Brunett, 2004).
After the massacre, one military officer after the other followed as president of the country. The fourteen families controlled the economy, while the rural population kept living in poverty as agricultural labourers. Although rebellion was suppressed, discontentedness among the poor grew, as well as the demand for a fairer distribution of wealth and land. It has often been argued that the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the leftish parties coming to power in respectively 1959 and 1979, inspired the Salvadorans in their battle for more social equality (Marti, 2004; Winn, 1999). These incidents alone though, are not sufficient to explain the violence used by the opposition movements at the end of the eighteenth century.
As Mason argues, opposition movements rarely choose revolutionary violence as their initial strategy, instead they will use far less dangerous strategies of nonviolent collective action initially, in order to pressure the government to make the necessary changes to "alleviate the sources of popular grievances" (Mason, 1999; p181). Mason claims that it is the response of the state that will determine whether the initially nonviolent conflict will evolve in a violent one or not. This state response may either be reform or repression, or –as was the case in El Salvador– a mixture of those two. As the fear of communism was growing under the circumstances of the Cold War, the Salvadoran governments went to the extremes of both methods in order to maintain the status quo as long as possible. Simultaneously the state initiated one of the most extensive agrarian reforms in Latin American history, as it presided over one of the bloodiest waves of repression of the second half of the twentieth century. The land reform program was initiated to retard or even reverse the erosion of popular support for the regime. At the same time, the fourteen families needed a way of suppressing the mobilization of the poorer population, who were attracted to opposition movements that called for redistributive reforms. Therefore, the military was used to protect the elite against any movement that might threaten the economic hegemony of the agro-export elite (Mason, 1999).
On February 3, 1997 Oscar Arnulfo Romero Galdámez (Monseñor Romero) was appointed Archbishop of San Salvador (fundacionmonseñor). The ruling elite was content with him being appointed, as he was seen as a quiet man who did not feel much for the revolutionary thoughts of his compatriots. They would soon be proven wrong. Just about a month after the appointment of Monseñor Romero, a great friend and colleague of him (Rutilio Grande) was assassinated. The death of his friend had a great impact on Moseñor
Romero, who refused to attend any political events3 until the death of his friend would have been profoundly investigated. Subsequently, Monseñor Romero committed his services to justice and reconciliation in the country. He opened an office for the protection of human rights and opened the doors of the church to peasant refugees who were fleeing the countryside in fear of persecution. As his empathy for the suffering population grew, his requests for justice became louder and stronger. On March 23, 1980 he made an urgent call to the Salvadoran army to stop the violence against their own people. He explained that the law of God says not to kill and that no soldier had to obey orders that counteract the law of God –referring to the orders to kill nonviolent revolutionary rebels and innocent people (Mason, 1999).
The day after this appeal Moseñor Romero was murdered by ‘death squads’, most likely ordered by Roberto d'Aubuisson; a rightist leader and formal national guard officer who later founded the far-right political party ARENA4 (Severo, 1992). On the day of his funeral, snipers attacked the crowd, killed 42 people and left over a 200 wounded. It was after the assassination of Monseñor Romero that the sporadic political violence, that had dominated the eighteenth century, evolved into a full-scale civil war. In September of that same year, the FMLN was formed out of the five major leftist revolutionary organizations. A guerrilla army was formed to oppose the right-wing paramilitary forces and government. According to Mason, the use of coercive machinery of the state to repress opposition challenges and sympathizers was one of the main causes of the outbreak of the civil war. He argues that "revolutionary organizations do not spring out of nowhere. They arise instead from nonviolent opposition organizations that have become the targets of state-sanctioned repressive violence." (Mason, 1999; 186).
3 Referring to political events associated with the current government of that time, as Monseñor Romero
suspected the involvement of or even culpability of the government forces regarding the death of Rutilio Grande.
4 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or Nationalist Republican Alliance, founded in on 30 september 1981 by
Roberto D'Aubuisson and Mercedes Gloria Salguero Gross.
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The Legacy of the Civil War
By the end of 1989 both the rebels and the state concluded that neither one could defeat the other in battle. In this year, the FMLN undertook what they called the ‘final offensive’, as they had called several other operations before. Also this time the offensive did not lead to a victory but it proved that the rebels' combating capacity was still sufficient to preclude military defeat. It also convinced the rebels that it would be necessary to pursue an alternative to military victory. Also the U.S. government5 came to the conclusion that it had become very difficult to keep supporting the Salvadoran military after several acts of terror like the assassination of the Jesuits6. As it became clear to all three parties that a continuation of the conflict no longer offered any possible solutions, a settlement seemed to be the only possible option for the different parties. It took until 1992 before the peace accords were signed (Mason, 1999).
The peace agreement forced the FMLN to convert into a (demilitarized) political party. At the same time the internal security forces were replaced by a new national police force. The UN played an important role as mediator and neutral third party in the peace negotiations. However, soon after the peace accords their authority began to decline. Mason argues that after the peace accords, public attention and press scrutiny subsided, resulting in the loss of leverage of international public opinion. This leverage was necessary for the UN in order to compel the parties to comply with the signed agreements. The UN faced major difficulty in compelling the Salvadoran government to comply with the agreements. One of the problems was that several army officers, whose abuses of human rights were egregious, remained in their position. As the FMLN was demilitarized, they too had lost leverage to compel compliance. The ARENA party controlled the majority of the legislature and the presidency and were therefore able to water down investigations that could tarnish their reputation. The United Nations Truth Commission investigated 22,000 denunciations of human rights violations during the war and found that 5 percent were committed by the 5 After the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and in the 'heat' of the Cold War, the United States were
prepared to take serious measures in order to avoid further expansion of socialist or communist powers. When Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, he was determined to fight communism in the region and took a belligerent attitude. The problem, however, was that military intervention in the region could turn out in a total disaster if public opinion were to turn against it –as had happened in Vietnam. Therefore, Reagan decided to make use of a new strategy called 'low intensity warfare', which existed out of logistic, military, economic and political aid, without sending battalions of soldiers, to avoid further expansion of socialist and communist influences (Marti Puig). During the 1980s, the Salvadoran government received a total of over $4 billion. It is often argued that the civil war would have ended much earlier in a victory of the FMLN without the support for the government from the United States (Bourgois).
6 On 11 November 1989, six Jesuits, a cook and her daughter were murdered near the UCA (Universidad
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas) by death squads, associated with the government forces, but the killings were supposed to look as though committed by the guerrilla.
14
FMLN, compared to 85 percent by the army and 10 percent by army-linked death squads (Bourgois, 2001). After the war the ARENA party stayed in power for as long as two decades.
If one is to understand the current socio-political situation of El Salvador, one must have an idea of the struggles of the past. Bell (2013) argues that:
"The biggest flaw of the Peace Accords was its failure to comprehend the difficulty in removing corruption from the government. The war may have ended, but the instating of proper justice systems, dismissal of military/treasury police, and installation of reintegration programs were all never fully completed due to the remaining corruption in the Salvadorian government." (Bell, 2013; p36)
Besides the high unemployment and security concerns, the biggest challenge for this new government may be to reduce the polarization in the country, that even 22 years after the war seems to be everyday reality and seems to be one of the underlying reasons of many struggles in the country (Allison, 2012).
Socio-economic Context
According to Juan Héctor Vidal, the ex-director of the ANEP7, the primary goal of the new government should be to "establish a national agreement in order to make the economy grow." With a growth percentage of 1.9%, the Salvadoran economy had one of the lowest growth rates of all Latin American countries (LAC) last year (see graph 1). What may be even more alarming is the external debt, which accounts for almost 60% of the country’s GDP. On top of that, the state has an estimated debt of $20,000 million with the private pension administrators (Lezcano, 2014; eluniversal.com, 2014). According to the same analyst, El Salvador is not coming along with the rest of Central America, as the dollarization in 2001 'let down the anchor' to an already slow growing economy. The remittances, that made up 16.6% of the GDP in 2013, have also lost their growth rhythm. These remittances are sent by Salvadorans living abroad, mostly in the United States, and they have become more important for the Salvadoran economy over the last decades after the civil war. The export rate, which grew with 16% and 18% in respectively 2010 and 2011, stagnated in 2012 and grew with a modest 2.8% in 2013. Besides the slowly growing economy, El Salvador has to deal with severe poverty, that has been declining over the last five years, but is still affecting a large part of the population (World Bank, 2014; Bunse & González, 2006).
7 National Association of the Private Enterprise (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada)
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Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion
The socio-economic inequality is often mentioned as one of the most urgent problems of El Salvador. The UN Secretary-General Bank Ki-moon reminded the Salvadoran government in 2012 that it needed to address these inequalities in order to consolidate the peace processes –that were initiated over 20 years ago (Allison, 2012; UN news centre, 2012). In order to get a clear view on these socio-economic inequalities, it is necessary to clarify some important concepts that are related to the issue, such as; poverty, inequality and social exclusion. After explaining these concepts and the way they interact with each other, it may be useful to pay some attention to the geographical dimension of these concepts.
Inequality and poverty may initially appear as words with a common sense meaning, but when explored more deeply, their complexity emerges. Inequality can for example include differences in income levels and wealth, but in a wider perspective it can also include differences in access to health, educational levels, life expectancy, and power relations. Greig et al. (2007) distinguish different types of poverty, including absolute, relative, objective and subjective poverty (Chinchilla, 2013). According to Greig et al. the concept of inequality may often be more useful:
“if the focus […] moves to the concept of poverty, researchers tend to turn to the lack of resources and gaps in service delivery, rather than the unequal social relations that mediate the allocation of resources and the delivery of services.” (Greig et al., 2007; p15).
16 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Graph 1: GDP per capita in us$ in El Salvador
and LAC, 2004-2012
LAC El Salvador
In some cases, however, it may be more convenient to use the concept of poverty, in order to give a clear image of the severity of the problem. If we take a look, for example, at a graphic showing the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line8 of El Salvador, we see a decline of that percentage over the last years. Between 2011 and 2012 alone, it dropped from 40.6% to 34.5% (See graph 2). This number alone may not be enough to explain the difficulties the country faces with its socio-economic inequalities, but it does show us that a fairly large part of the population is still living in poverty. An often used method to measure the income (in)equality is the use of the GINI index9. In El Salvador this was last calculated in 2009 and it amounted to 48.33. The GINI ranking puts El Salvador on the 30th place (of countries with the highest level of inequality), out of the 153 countries that were measured over the last years, meaning the country has a relatively uneven distribution of income (UNDP, 2013).
8 US$ 2.94 per capita per day in urban areas and $1.91 in rural areas (Povertytools, 2011)
9 Index measure of the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption expenditure) among
individuals within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, 2014)
17 30% 32% 34% 36% 38% 40% 42% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: World Bank (edited by author)
Graph 2: Percentage of Population Below National Poverty Line El Salvador
The UNDP offers even more indices that may help to clarify some aspects of the social inequalities in El Salvador. One of them is the well-known HDI index, this index measures the long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development. These dimensions include a long and healthy life, a decent standard of living and the access to knowledge. When this score was last calculated for El Salvador in 2012, the HDI value was 0.680. This places El Salvador in the ‘medium human development’ category and at the 107th place of the 187 measured countries and territories. Between 1980 and 2012 life expectancy at birth increased with 15.8 years, while the average years of schooling also increased with 4.5 years (UNDP, 2013).
The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita increased by approximately 38% during the same period. However, when the HDI index is adjusted for inequality, it becomes clear that, although the country has made some progress, there is still a need for special attention to certain vulnerable groups. The HDI, discounted for inequality, falls from 0.680 to 0.499, a loss of 26.6 percent. Another type of inequality which may not be as relevant to this research, but is often mentioned, is gender inequality. For the Gender Inequality Index the country has a value of 0.441, ranking it 82 out of the 148 measured countries. Unfortunately the Multidimensional Poverty Index, introduced in 2010 by the Human Development Report, has not been calculated for El Salvador, due to a lack of relevant data (UNDP, 2013). According to Bunse and González (2006) poverty and inequality do not only have repercussions on the marginalized groups, but on the society as a whole. They point out that in most Central American countries a 10% of the population possesses 40% of the wealth, and that in El Salvador this percentage is even growing. They argue that poverty and inequality are likely to form serious political and economic risks; they cultivate public discontent, contribute to high levels of criminality and insecurity and explain a big part of the rise of political populism (Bunse and González, 2006; 67). Furthermore, the public discontent about the high levels of poverty, the increasing inequality, the failing governments and the corruption can provoke instable politics and have major repercussions for the democracies of those regions (Bunse and González, 2006; 67). They show that 65% of the Central American population does not believe that every person has the same opportunity to overcome poverty and that 19% of them point out poverty to be the major reason to be discriminated.
The high levels of poverty and inequality are often accompanied with widespread violence. Urban violence and organized crime have increased in El Salvador, as well as in Guatemala and Honduras since the 1990s. This is noticeable in the high murder rates of these countries, especially Honduras and El Salvador, as shown before. As a consequence, 18
the public discontent grows even further, because of a lack of security in these countries. However, as Bunse and González point out, the effects are not merely social or political; the insecurity, crime and corruption are important factors that contribute to the decline of sales (7% in El Salvador). Also foreign investment is being held back by these factors, leading to a growing informal economy. The World Bank showed that this may lead to a vicious circle of poverty as for every 10% increase of poverty, economic growth is reduced by 1%. So the high levels of poverty cause less economic growth, while at the same time the slow growth of the economy implies increased poverty. In Central America, the informal market is exceeding the formal market, leading to severe consequences for economic growth and human development. One of the main problems that Bunse and González see is the lack of human capital and an inadequate educational system (Bunse and González, 2006, Portillo, 2014)
Geography of inequalities
The demographical changes that took place over the last decades have changed the Salvadoran society into a predominantly urban society. The cities are fragmented and unequal, and currently almost two million people are living in half a million homes that are characterized by their precarious living circumstances. Today, more than half of the poor population of El Salvador lives in cities. The 2010 Mapa de pobreza urbana y exclusión social (Urban Poverty and Social Exclusion Map) shows agglomerates of dwellings that lack in proper construction materials or in access to basics services. According to the report, these precarious settlements in urban areas (PSUA) form the most important centres with a concentration of people that live in conditions of poverty and social exclusion (Briones et al., 2010). The Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (MASS) presents the major concentration of PSUAs. However, the most precarious settlements are found in areas more remote from the metropolitan area. The biggest lack of infrastructure seems to be the access to adequate sanitary facilities, which affect 58% of the PSUAs. The report is principally concerned with social exclusion, which it describes as;
“the process of accumulation and combination of individual, economic, social, cultural and political factors that situate people in places of disadvantage. This process corresponds to situations in which people or residences are incapacitated to practice basic consuming norms (either material or symbolic) as a consequence of improper insertion in the labour market. [..] This process of exclusion is reproduced generation after generation.” (Briones et al., 2010; 13)
Even though social exclusion is not just an exclusive characteristic of the PSUAs, 70% of these settlements report a certain degree of social exclusion, in comparison with 37% of other types of settlements. The report points out that access to education, health, work and diversion are in a large way determined by the place of dwelling. Not surprisingly, youngsters form one of the most vulnerable sectors. From those between 18 and 24 years of age living in PSUAs, seventy-five percent lacks the minimal accreditation to continue higher education. The principal idea of the report is to explain that the main problem the urban poor face is not the lack of income, but rather the limitations in the access to different resources. One of the limitations is the effective insertion in the labour market, but this is not seen as the root of the problem. It has to be noted that the PSUAs are not homogeneous and that not all the poor live in these areas, nor that everyone living in these areas has an income inferior to the national poverty line; however the PSUAs do present the highest proportions of precarious dwellings in the urban areas (Briones et al., 2010).
The focus on PSUAs in urban areas may cause one to overlook the problem of rural poverty. In 2010, for example, 1,114,460.1 was the estimated number or rural poor, while 46.5 percent of the population was living below the rural poverty line (World Bank, 2014). A reason for the focus on urban areas may be the growing population in these areas, as a result of urbanization. Another factor may be the increasing inequalities in cities, which are more visible in the cities than in rural areas. The metropolitan area of San Salvador, and the cities of La Libertad and San Miguel are characterized by luxurious malls, restaurants and pompous buildings, often not so far away from marginalized settlements. In the 2005 mean GDP per capita map it is clearly visible that
higher incomes are characteristic to the regions mentioned before (see map 1). Tardanico (2008) argues that although the ongoing urbanization has caused an increase of population and an increase of the share in the national economy in the metropolis, severe deficits in basic infrastructure have marked the area. He also addresses that due to these and other factors, we should be aware of possible class polarization and fragmentation, along with changing urban-spatial mixes of class, gender, and generation.
Chapter 2: Youth Crime
After considering historical, political, social and economic factors it becomes clear that El Salvador is a country with a tumultuous history that has left its marks on society. To understand the phenomenon, the perceptions and the evolution of youth crime, it seems impossible to neglect these factors. This chapter will clarify the importance of the problems associated with youth crime and seek an explanation for these problems.
Crime in General and Social Conflict
In her book El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty, and the Transition to Democracy Ellen Moodie (2010) examines stories of Salvadoran citizens, their visions on society and how many urban Salvadorans regard the present ‘peace’ as 'worse than the war'. According to Moodie, this last sentence could often be heard in the immediate years after the war. But even now, over two decades after the peace accords, the intensifying insecurity has turned into an often discussed topic that has seeped into public discourse, and has gotten great attention from the mass media. The author writes that she came to El Salvador in 1993 to learn about peace, but instead encountered something completely different.
"It wasn't war, either. It was something else, something somehow more sinister, less knowable. This mystery, this unpredictable new mode of danger, only amplified anxiety. The most visible reason for this sentiment was the rising crime rate." (Moodie, 2010; p2)
If we look at the official statistics of the national police force (Policía Nacional Civil, or PNC), we see that robbery and theft are the most committed crimes (see graph 3). However, physical abuse and homicide immediately follow with staggering numbers. What are the reasons behind these high crime rates? And who are the ones committing these crimes? These simple questions have multiple and complex answers, but one aspect of the Salvadoran society that is often given priority is the gap between rich and poor.
Rodriguez et al. (2009) argue that the social relationships between different actors naturally causes conflict. This conflict may sometimes tried to be solved pacifically, in which case a peaceful situation can be maintained. The term 'conflict' refers to a situation in which at least two or more actors do not agree on a specific topic or may have different interests. One of the most accepted sociological theories is that from Ralf Dahrendorf, who suggest that conflict is inherent to social dynamics and is the driver behind social change. The origins of conflict may be various; class war, inequalities in power relationships, battles for resources, ideological disputes or honour and prestige. In the case of youth crime
(specifically violence) Rodriguez et al. argue that it cannot be considered as a social conflict in itself, but as a manifestation of a profound social conflict that concerns or should concern a society. Children are not born violently; their acts often reflect certain particularities of their environment. In many cases, youth violence is an expression of discontent an unsatisfied children, adolescents and youth.
As the uneven distribution of wealth was one of the most importance factors for the civil war, many claim that the unsatisfactory peace process left the country with scars that are not yet healed (Guitiérrez, 2014). Bunse and González (2006) for example, argue that poverty and inequality stir up public discontent and contribute to high levels of crime and insecurity. They also note that these high levels of crime and public discontent are accompanied by high levels of violence. It seems simple; a large group of poor people has to deal with a rich upper class who can afford luxuries they cannot afford. As the discontent of these poor people grows, it eventually results in crime. However, we should be careful to merely adopt these assumptions.
22 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Graph 3: Crime Statistics from January - July,
El Salvador
2012 2013
Vargas and Chaves (2011) for example, argue that poverty and crime do not hold a causal relationship. Instead, they see phenomena as manifestations of the same process of vulnerability, by increasingly removing a large part of the population from exercising their rights and opportunities. In their analysis they seek to demystify the stigmatization of those who are socially excluded, as the criminalization of poverty has justified the cultural acceptance of the idea that crime is originated directly and exclusively by poverty. As a consequence, the association between the poor and criminal acts is being reinforced, disregarding the role of the state, which is often not able to provide efficiently in basic needs of those poor. Vargas and Chaves argue that the ‘social’ and ‘structural’ violence (ideological, political and economic systems) established sociocultural regimes, characterized by inequality and exclusion. This type of violence alludes to the exercise of oppressive inequality, socially legitimized, which is harmful to society and promotes the establishment of a vicious circle of violence. According to the authors, social stratification can therefore be seen as a mechanism to maintain social order, where one group dominates over the other by using (symbolic) violence. Poverty should therefore rather be seen as a social vulnerability factor that increases the risks of a certain group to find themselves in a situation in which crime may serve as a survival mechanism. Instead of attributing crime to poverty, they conceptualize it as a socio-historical phenomenon, resulting from an exclusive development model (Vargas & Chaves, 2011).
Following this holistic approach, we may assume that not only the individual that commits the crime is responsible for his acts, but also the exclusive nature of society. According to Vargas and Chavez the social vulnerability of certain groups is being reinforced by poverty and may lead to a process of stigmatization by the state and the media. By stimulating prejudices and stereotypes, the general image occurs that the crime problem is a problem of poverty, instead of the outcome of structural problems of society. This way, ideas that make society believe that; being young, belonging to a certain social group and live in a certain area is equivalent to being dangerous, is being reinforced. These assumptions may lead to a negative self-image of the marginalized groups and may lead to further social exclusion and segregation. This social exclusion and segregation can have an aggravating effect on the economic situation of the marginalized groups, as they are not part of the regular society. One way of survival may then be to turn to crime. Although the original article from Vargas and Chavez focuses on the Cost Rican society, their understandings of the emergence of crime may be helpful to understand crime as a situation that is stimulated by individual, social, economic, historical and political tendencies (Vargas & Chaves, 2011; Giró, 2006; Rodgers, 2009).
Culture of Violence
In El Salvador, one specific form of crime has been studied more than any other; violence. Although the words ‘crime’ and ‘violence’ differ in their meaning, academic research tends to focus almost exclusively on violence as the most important or most present form of crime in the case of El Salvador. Although this research has a slightly wider approach to crime, it seems unavoidable to give prior attention to violence. Not so much because of the fact that other studies do so as well, but because it is what makes the Salvadoran case more or less unique. It has to be mentioned, though, that Honduras and Guatemala are two other cases with staggering numbers of crime related to violence. Many authors mention a 'culture of violence' as a characteristic feature of those three northern Central American countries with histories of civil war, dictatorships and authority regimes (Savenije, 2009).
“In the case of El Salvador, a sketch of the argument could be that: the high levels of violence are products of a large history of violent acts that facilitated a culture of violence, formed by systems of norms, values and attitudes, that legitimize, approve and stimulate its use. Besides increasing the quantity of fire arms in the country, the civil war intensified this culture by suggesting that the best or only way to solve conflicts is by means of violence. Furthermore, the unstable institutions, that are responsible for application of the law and the justice administration, permitted –especially after the war– an elevated level of impunity and therefore consolidated violent acts in time of peace.” (Cruz, 2003; 1161, 1164 in Savenije, 2009)
Moodie (2012) explains how criminalized individuals and practices of violence are being interpreted in a post-war environment. She argues that the democratic transition led to a new coding of violence. While during the war, most people assumed that just about all the violence came forth out of an ideological conflict and could be considered as political violence. After the war, violence was often assumed to be 'common', with the primary goal of material gain. Ridriguez et al. (2009) argue that the Central American countries all have a history of violence: the colonial times, the establishment of the nation-state and, more recently, the armed conflicts. These periods are characterized by intense conflicts over power, resources, control, inequality, discrimination and ideologies. This context has an accumulated negative effect on youth, especially on those who are marginalized and socially excluded. Now, if we combine the idea of crime –which in the case of El Salvador is just about always linked to violence, whether in reality or subjectivity– to youth, there is one phenomenon that may be the most studied topic in El Salvador; youth gangs. Two gangs;
Homicides with youth victims, El Salvador
Month 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total January 247 228 193 196 864 February 174 178 163 206 721 March 212 166 190 120 688 April 194 191 176 80 641 May 223 188 208 79 698 June 216 174 176 83 649 July 170 142 202 81 595 August 187 184 207 74 652 September 229 90 192 82 593 October 236 166 175 83 660 November 184 148 190 84 606 December 172 147 182 72 501 Total 2444 2002 2254 1168 7868Source: INJUVE, 2013 (edited by author)
the MS13 (Mara Salvatrucha) and the 18th Street (Barrio 18) have captivated the minds of the Salvadoran society and many scholars around the world.
Youth Crime in General and the Gang Phenomenon
It is necessary to keep in mind that youth are not only involved in crime as offenders, but that they are often “victimized by crime” (Rude, 2014). The table shows how the number of youth homicide victims dropped dramatically in March 2012. On March 9 of that year, the MS13 and the 18th Street came to a truce, which implied no more killing of rival gang-members and law enforcement officers. After the truce, the murder rates dropped from 14 a day to 5. Now, two years after the truce, many people argue that the truce is ‘dead’, as the murder rates have gone up to 10 a day again. However, Rude (2014) points out, that the truce has had enormous effects on violence in general in the country. Not only the prisons for gang-members (segregated from ‘regular’ prisons) are much more quiet, but also other prisons, free from gang-members, are much more peaceful (Rude, 2014).
To get an overview of the involvement of youth in crime, we can make use of the homicide statistics from January and February 2013. During this period, 351 homicides were registered, of which 195 (56%) were committed by youth. Within this group, 98% were males and 2% females. The number of youth victims of homicide dropped from 206 in February 2012 to 86 in the same month in 2013, which is a decline of 54% –as a consequence of the truce. Another type of crime that may be committed by youngsters may not be considered a crime in any other country. According to Rude (2014) a lot of people are imprisoned because of traffic accidents, or as the national police force (PCN) calls it 'culpable homicide by traffic accident'. Between January and February 2013, 35% of these 'homicides' were caused by youngsters. According to the Salvadoran Institute for Development of Woman (ISDEMU), 1107 youngsters were victims of sexual offences in the first trimester of 2012, of which basically all were woman. 80% of them had suffered from domestic violence, 14% from sexual aggression, 4% from child abuse and 4% from workplace harassment. Of the 279 denunciations of sexual crimes between January and February 2013, 68% of the victims were between the age of 15 and 16. With regard to the theme of violence, we can use the homicide statistics in order to further elaborate on this topic. In El Salvador, no other type of violence has been registered and researched as much as homicides (INJUVE, 2013). As mentioned before, a large part of the homicides in January and February could be ascribed to youngsters (56%). The statistics from January until December of 2012 show an even higher share of youth in the total number of homicides, as 67% of the registered homicides could be ascribed to youngsters between 15 and 29 years of age. One could argue that this is logical, as the age category used here has fairly wide range. However, the majority of homicides that can be ascribed to youngsters, is committed by 18 to 20 year-olds (see graph 4). A common explanation for the high homicide rate amongst youngsters is the involvement in gangs. These gangs, with an estimated number between 28,000 and 60,000 in El Salvador alone, are characteristic to the northern triangle of Central America (Santos, 2013). With involvement in extortion, robbery, violations, drug and arm trafficking, these gangs have built up a reputation of being extremely violent and dangerous. As said before, this gang phenomenon has been broadly studied, thus it is not necessary to profoundly elaborate the topic. Nevertheless, it is necessary to give a general overview of the causes of involvement in gangs and the way they operate in order to understand why these gangs are so widely discussed and why they have predominantly been present in discourses about crime and violence.
Youth gangs are not an exclusive phenomenon to Central America, they have existed in countries as Ireland, the United States, Brasil and Colombia. However, the Northern triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) has gotten major attention over the last two decades because of the emergence and rapid growth of youth gangs. There is no single exact definition of youth gangs; some describe them as devious or anti-social groups that commit crimes, while others consider them to be groups of individuals that live in poverty and are marginalized and that find the gangs to be a social group that offers them an alternative identity to elevate their self-esteem (Rodríguez et al., 2009; 9).
To explain the emergence of these gangs, some argue that it is a consequence of social exclusion and 'structural violence' (Vrigil, 2002 in Rodríguez et al., 2009; Vargas and Chaves, 2006). This structural violence –inherent to society– creates reactive violence, either criminal or political, from those who are being excluded. The conditions of misery, frustration and desperation are a potential reason for the emergence of conflict, violent acts and crimes (Briceño-Leon & Zubillaga, 2002 in Rodríguez et al., 2009). The socio-ecological approach suggests that the gangs are a product of disruption of urban areas. In some cases, the gangs may serve as a replacement of social institution, such as the family. Cultural theories see the gangs as a subculture that arises amongst the urban poor. From an economic perspective, the gangs can be considered as informal 'enterprises' linked to drug trafficking and organized crime. Finally, psychological explanations may consider the integration of youth in gangs as a process of maturation and the formation of one’s identity (Rodríguez et al., 2009). 27 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Age
Graph 4: Youngsters accused of homicide, El Salvador 2012
Youngsters accused of homicide
Clearly, the ideas about gangs are various and the approach used to understand the phenomenon of gangs influences the conceptualization of gangs. All of the approaches contribute in a certain form, but differently, to the understanding of the gang phenomenon. It may thus be helpful to consider a multidisciplinary approach, which takes all of the earlier mentioned approaches into account.
The MS13 originated in Los Angeles shortly after the armed conflicts from the '70s and '80s. As a form of survival amongst a violent gang culture, already present in Los Angeles, Salvadorans started their own gangs to rival the already existing African-American and Mexican ones. Some argue that the extremely violent nature of the MS13 is caused by the initial form in which it appeared; as minorities such as Salvadorans were outnumbered by far by other gangs, they had to be extremely violent in order to survive. The 18th Street already existed before the MS13 and consisted mostly of Mexican immigrants. From 1996 and on, the federal government of the United States decided to fight the gang violence and culture by executing mass deportations of youngsters involved with these gangs. Once deported, these youngsters found themselves in an unfamiliar environment; Central America was in a process of reconstruction after the political violence and was marked by poverty, unemployment and a weak institutional framework (Rodríguez et al., 2009).
It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 gang members are currently present in the Central American region. The gangs operate in the form of small 'cells' or 'cliques' that operate within certain territories or communities. The size and organizations of these groups varies in each place. With regard to the activities of the gangs, they are known for their involvement in acts of crime and violence such as extortions, robberies, assassinations, drug- trafficking and consuming. There are also assumptions and rumours that the MS13 and the 18th Street are involved in international and organized crime at the US border (USAID 2006 in Rodríguez et al., 2009; Hernández, 2014). However, because of a lack of proper investigation and juridical persecution, there is no certainty about these assumptions. According to Rodríguez et al., 2009, the criminal and violent acts from the gangs are being exacerbated by sensationalistic newspapers and other media that stimulate the perception of insecurity amongst the people. The following parts will elaborate further on this topic.
Chapter 3: Salvadoran Media
The media play an important role in a democratic society, and in the ideal situation they would present a truthful image of reality to its citizens. Some refer to the media, especially to printed media, as the Fourth Estate or Fourth Power; an institution or a societal or political force with no officially recognized influences (Schultz, 1998, Christancho et al., 2013). As suggested in the former chapter, the media are suspected of exacerbating events that involve violence, gangs or (usually) both. This chapter will serve to create a better understanding of the nature existing media in El Salvador.
Media and Democracy
There are several characteristic that define a democracy; the constitutional state, the division of powers, popular sovereignty expressed in universal suffrage, political pluralism, general public liberties, and the guarantees of human rights in general (Samour, 1994 in Ayala, 1994). In the case of El Salvador, the peace agreements from 1992 opened an important phase for democratic transition. Four general objectives were proposed by the opposing parties; 1) ending the armed conflict through political practices, 2) guarantee the unconditional respect for human rights, 3) stimulate the process of democratisation and 4) reunify the Salvadoran society.
The Peace Accords from Chapultepec authorized the FMLN to establish media and the necessary infrastructure. This was not necessary for the other party (the established government) side, since it already controlled virtually all media. Ayala (1994) argues that during the peace negotiations, no single reform to support the political agreements was suggested that referred to the democratization of communication. Although several forms of control (censorship) were prohibited, the civil rights to express and communicate freely were still absent. The Salvadoran Political Constitution also refers to the liberty of expression and states that:
“Every person may freely express and disseminate his thoughts provided they do not subvert the public order nor injure the moral, honour or private lives of others. The exercise of this right shall not be subject to previous examination, censorship or bond; but those who infringe on the laws [while] making use of this right, shall respond for the offense they commit.” (confinder.com, 2003; p3) Even though this type of agreement has the ability to favour the process of democratization –as anyone may express his or her thoughts disregarding ideologies, interests or social class– it also carries with it the inherent danger to be interpreted only formally (abstract),
without being put into practice. Ayala warns us that the rights declared in universal declarations and national constitutions may often be mostly abstract by nature and may pave the way for a misinterpretation of reality –if there is no strict post-examination. The risk, then, is the possibility that what is seen as a universal right may be converted into a privilege for some; only those who are able to effectively broadcast their message. In order to consolidate the process of democratization, there should be democratization of the word; free flow of information, equality of opportunities, the possibility of public participation and unrestricted access to channels and spaces (Ayala, 1994).
Ayala argues that during the civil war, the human rights related to communication and expression were violated and became prohibited rights for the majority of the population, Those who cultivated opposing ideas to the official discourse, risked being eliminated as if they were an armed enemy on the battle field. Even though the armed conflict ended, the social divide remained present in Salvadoran society as a source of new conflicts.
What has changed over the past two decades? Are the media contributing to the well-functioning democracy? This questions implies the thought that the media should try to contribute to the well-functioning of democracy; a thought that I, amongst others, agree with (Ayala, 2014, com 2013blz nr). Even though the article of Ayala was written twenty years ago, other scholars have recently made similar claims. He referred to the situation at that time as a 'structural censorship' being present; where the majority of the mass communication media belong to a small economic elite, related to political power.
Salvadoran Media: it’s just Business
In this research, special attention will be given to the printed and online media. However, in order to get an idea of the main characteristics and the most influential companies it is necessary to pay some attention to radio and television as well. The organisation of both radio and television communication in El Salvador was been and still is being marked by oligopolies. Hence, very few names and companies appear as owners of different media or associates of those media. In the radio spectrum, there are no limits to the quantity of frequencies that one group may own, which results in a saturated and exploited radio spectrum that is controlled by very few companies.
The first Salvadorian radio stations emerged in the first half of the last century and, even though they were privately owned, were under constant supervision of the state. In 1949 the Salvadoran Association of Radiobroadcasters (ASDER) was founded, and governed by Ferando Alvayero Sosa among others. The collaboration between the state and privet business allowed the private sector to exploit virtually all frequencies within a couple of 30
