Hizb ut-Tahrir
A global Islamist movement in different national contexts
L.R. Enthoven
Student number 5685613
Thesis European Studies: Identity and Integration First reader: Dhr. prof. dr. M. Kemper
Second reader: Dhr. dr. M.E. Spiering University of Amsterdam
Table of Contents
Introduction
1
1. General overview of Hizb ut-Tahrir
4
2. Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
14
3. A comparative analysis of the webpages
31
4. Conclusion
45
Attachments
47
Introduction
The topic of this thesis forms Hizb ut-Tahrir, a globally active Islamist movement that strives to establish a Caliphate and unite all Muslims. Despite the fact that the movement states that the manner in which it wants to achieve it aims are strictly non-violent, it is banned in most Arab and Asian countries in which it has a presence. The movement is very active in the West and especially in the United Kingdom. In this thesis I will compare the movement's branches in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in order to examine to what extend these national branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir and their strategies correspondent and where they not correspondent are formed by or adapted to the different national contexts. Furthermore based on this case study I will come to a statement on to which extend Hizb ut-Tahrir is a rigidly centralised organisation or more a movement a of loosely coordinated national branches.
In order to come to a thesis regarding the Dutch branch (Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands) and the English branch (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain) it is important to first give an understanding of Hizb Tahrir. Therefor I shall discuss the live of Al-Nabhani, the founder of the Hizb ut-Tahrir; the history of the movement; the ideology of the movement and the structure of the movement in the first chapter. Furthermore in this chapter I shall analyse if Hizb ut-Tahrir has to be considered non-violent. The second chapter forms an account of Hizb ut-Tahir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, in which I will discuss the number of members, the background of these members and how Hizb ut-Tahrir is confronted by policies of the English and Dutch authorities. Furthermore I shall give an interpretation and explanation of the similarities and differences encountered. The third chapter forms a comparative analysis of the online activities of the Dutch and the British branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the online media strategy of both branches. In this last chapter I will compare and analyse texts and articles that are on the respective websites of the Hizb Tahir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain.
For my research I relied on various earlier studies on Hizb ut-Tahrir on which I will now first give a small overview. I will not discuss all articles used for my paper but limit the overview to the articles I deem most useful and informative. Probably the most well known researcher on Hizb ut-Tahrir is Suha Taji-Farouki. She is affiliated to the University of Exeter where she has a post at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. Taji-Farouki's most important study on Hizb ut-Tahrir is A Fundamental Quest: Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Search
history, ideology and organizational structure of the trans-national Islamist party Hizb al-Tahrir.'1
Up to this day A fundamental quest remains the most thorough general survey on Hizb ut-Tahrir and therefor is a very useful source. However as it was published over 15 year ago it gives no insight on more recent developments.
A second researcher that has to be mentioned when discussing Hizb ut-Tahrir is Kirstine Sinclair. She is an assistant professor at the Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies and the Department of History of the Syddansk Universitet (University of Southern Denmark). Sinclair has written several research-articles on Hizb ut-Tahrir among which Islam
in Britain and Denmark. Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialized Agendas (2008) and The Calipate as Homeland. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain (2010). Both articles
discuss Hizb ut-Tahrir's activities in the United Kingdom and Denmark and focus on how Hizb ut-Tahrir members in both the United Kingdom identify themselves and what they consider as homeland: are they British/Danish and is the United Kingdom/Denmark their homeland or is it the hypothetical Caliphate?2
Besides the above named articles I have corresponded with Kirstine Sinclair by e-mail in February 2014 to ask her further questions regarding the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir.3
A further article that is of interest is The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Success in Britain and Uzbekistan and stalemate in Egypt and Turkey (2010) that was
published in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. The author of the article is Ihsan Yilmaz. Yilmaz is a professor at the Political Science and Public Administration of the Fatih University. Islamic Movements in general and Hizb ut-Tahrir in specific is part of his research interests.4
In the article Yilmaz describes and explains why Hizb ut-Tahrir thrives, as the title suggests, in Britain and Uzbekistan but is not able to create a solid base of support in Egypt and Turkey.
While there is ample research and media coverage of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the sources on the Dutch branch are far more limited. The main source on the Dutch branch forms the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). As I do not count the AIVD as an independent source, I have scrutinised the information provided by the service thoroughly. In order to gather further information on Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands and
1 Suha Taji-Farouki, 'Biography', http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/staff/taji-farouki/biography/, last
consulted on 14-04-2014.
2 General information on Kirstine Sinclair,
http://findresearcher.sdu.dk:8080/portal/en/persons/kirstine-sinclair(146c3251-eb5b-4861-b830-653ef824801a).html, last consulted on 14-04-2014.
3 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments. 4 General information on İhsan Yilmaz, http://iibf.fatih.edu.tr/?cv,9309&language=EN, last consulted on
to verify the information provided by the AIVD I have contacted various Dutch professors, who do research in the field of Islamism or political Islam. Most professors however replied that Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands really has to be considered as a fringe organisation, about which they knew very little, and that they could not further help me. One professor even stated that there are no Dutch experts on Hizb ut-Tahrir at all.
The only researcher who has given valuable feedback on my questions regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir is Martijn de Koning, an anthropologist at the Radboud University Nijmegen who does research into amongst others Islamism and who can be regarded as an authority in the field of Salafism and Islamic identity (in the Netherlands). I have interviewed Martijn de Koning at his offices at the Radboud University on February 25th 2014. The account of the interview is in Dutch and can be found in the attachments to this thesis.5
Finally I have interviewed Okay Pala a man of around forty years who has a Turkish background but fluently and eloquently speaks Dutch and has attended the Islamic University of Rotterdam. Okay Pala is the spokesman of the Dutch branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir and I assume its leader, as I shall discuss later. I met Okay Pala on March 18th 2014 at the central train station of Breda. As he apparently had no office or he did not want to reveal his address to me, the interview took place in the nearby Park Valkenberg.6
Similarly to the interview with Martijn de Koning the account of the interview is in Dutch and can be found in the attachments to this thesis.
5 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 6 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.
1.
General overview of Hizb ut-Tahrir
This chapter gives a detailed background of Hizb ut-Tahrir. As stated in the introduction this is necessary in order to better understand the two more analytical chapters that follow. The most important source about the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir is the earlier mentioned A
Fundamental Quest: Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (1996) written
by Suha Taji-Farouki. Almost all later articles that discuss the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir refer to A Fundamental Quest. The first paragraph will elaborate on the life of Al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the establishment of the movement. In the second paragraph I will give a short survey on the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the method in which the movement wants to implement its ideology. Finally the last paragraph of this chapter will elaborate on the structure of the movement.
1.1 Al-Nabhani and the founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Taqi al-Dun Al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, was born in 1909 in Northern Palestine, 'into a family distinguished by its tradition of scholarship in the Islamic sciences'.7 Through his family he became acquainted with Islamic jurisprudence and local politics. He further increased his knowledge of Islam and Islamic law when he attended al-Azhar University in 1928. Al-Azhar, which is located at Cairo, is the best renowned centre for Islamic learning.
After graduating from al-Azhar, al-Nabhani returned to Palestine, that in 1920 had become a British mandate. He became a teacher in Haifa but developed an aspiration for a career at the Islamic law courts. Thanks to the contacts he made during his study at al-Azhar he was appointed as a clerk at an Islamic court in 1938. In the years following he rose through the ranks and became a judge of the Islamic Court of Jerusalem in 1948 and thereupon at the Palestine Court of Appeals. During his years in Jerusalem, al-Nabhani became increasingly politically active. This was driven by his resentment over the British administration over Palestine and the policy of King Abdallah. Besides the situation in Palestine al-Nabhani had a larger quarrel with what he understood as the corruption and decline of the Muslim world in total. In his eyes this was caused by the non-Islamic way in which the Muslims lived.8
7 Suha Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest. Hizb al-Tahrir and the search for the Islamic Caliphate, London:
1996, 1.
The founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir by al-Nabhani must further be understood in the light of the decolonisation of the Middle East, the foundation of Israel and the subsequent Arab– Israeli War. Additionally the newly formed Arab states were internally weak as their leaders had little legitimacy. This was partly due to the fact that they were chosen by the French and the British, and in the eyes of the population continued to serve the causes of these former colonisers. Additionally the Arab states had 'weak state structures, a lack of industrialisation, large scale peasantry, and impoverished societies with artificial identities.'9
This period brought forward the secular Arab nationalism of the Ba'ath movement. This Arab nationalist movement called for the unification of the Arab world and had a socialist anti-imperialist program, which was to bring a common identity, economical success and a renewed Arab heyday. Al-Nabhani initially was involved with the Ba'ath movement and even had part of a failed coup plot by the Jordanian Ba'ath Party to replace King Abdallah in 1948-1949. Al-Nabhani however became dismayed as Ba'ath in essence was a secular movement and he deemed that Islam should be at the centre of the ideological and political system. Furthermore Ba'ath did not bring the prosperity promised. Instead the movement brought new repressive and corrupt regimes to the Arab world and further economical stagnation.10
Disillusioned with Arab nationalism and the Ba'ath movement, al-Nabhani pursued the establishment of an Islamic political party with as goal 'Arab unification based on Islam as opposed to the secular ideology of pan-Arabism'.11
In November 1952, together with two acquaintances he applied to the provincial governor of Amman for permission to establish the political party Hizb ut-Tahrir in Jordan. The application was rejected however, as in the view of the regime the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir was incompatible with the country's constitution and 'a potential cause of civil strife'.12
Consequently al-Nabhani and his associates informed the governor of Jeruzalem of the group's intention to form an association in the West Bank. This move displeased the Jordanian regime, as it was not able to block the group from registering as an association. The reaction of the regime that followed was harsh: al-Nabhani and his fellow founding members were imprisoned for a short term on the charge of bypassing the law and the movement was
9 Frank Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir. A threat behind a legal facade?, Monterey: 2006, 13.
10 Frank Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir. 13-14; Malik Mufti, Sovereign creations. Pan-Arabism and political order in
Syria and Iraq, New York: 1996, 47-49 and 110-129
11 Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, Profile: Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK, 2010, 143. 12 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 6-7.
banned from holding speeches in Mosques and distributing leaflets. Due to these severe measures the movement leadership relocated to Lebanon.13
In the late 1950s and early 1960 Hizb ut-Tahrir successfully expanded its activities in the neighbouring countries. Al-Nabhani travelled around in the Middle East and new branches were set up in Syria and Iraq. In Jordan and the West Bank, despite the repressive measures taken against it, the movement was able to hold study circles, expand its cadres and win popular support. The apparent success led Hizb ut-Tahrir to optimistically strive for it goals more aggressively in the second half of the 1960s. As the movement had obtained wide support, at least in Jordan, the leadership ought the time right to achieve its final goal of installing the Caliphate there. The foreseen means of achieving this goal was the staging of a coup and in the late 1960s and early 1970s Hizb ut-Tahrir is said to have had a leading role in various unsuccessful coups in Jordan and later Iraq.14 Following this series of unsuccessful coups Hizb ut-Tahrir 'went into a phase of stagnation in the Middle East'.15
In 1977 al-Nabhani passed away. He was succeeded by 'Abd al Qadim Zallum as supreme leader or Amir of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Qadim Zallum was born in 1924 Palestine and like Al-Nabhani he followed part of his education at al-Azhar. Under the leadership of Qadim Zallum the movement in 1979 sent various delegations to the Islamic Republic of Iran to advise Ayatollah Khomeini how 'to apply Islam in its entirety'.16
As Hizb ut-Tahrir its goal is to establish a Khilafa in which Sunni and Shia are to co-exist the attempt to come to an understanding with Shia Iran is less surprisingly than it may appear. However despite the overtures Khomeini passed over their advice and as a consequence Hizb ut-Tahrir became disenchanted with him and the Iranian regime.17
The decades that followed have formed a stalemate in the movement's progression in the Middle East. In general it can be said that Hizb ut-Tahrir since its founding in the early 1950's has neither been able to develop a broad and solid enough support base in the Middle East nor has the movement been able to fulfil its ideal of establishing the Caliphate, this despite the wide popularity the movement enjoyed in Jordan. Where the movement progress stalemated in the Middle East it did successfully spread its message to a nearly global extent.
Western Europe has proven to be a haven for Hizb ut-Tahrir, as for many other Islamist groups. Where the movement has to deal with strong repression in large parts of the
13 Ibidem, 7.
14 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 26-28. 15 Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 15.
16 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 31. 17 Ibidem.
Middle East, South- and Central- Asia and Russia, it can spread its message relatively undisturbed in countries as the United Kingdom, Poland, Denmark and The Netherlands. Germany forms an exception; the movement is prohibited to organize public activities there since 2003, 'on charges of spreading antisemitic propaganda following the publication of a leaflet the previous year'18
, on which in Germany penalties remain rigorous.19
1.2. Ideology
As stated before the main goal of Hizb ut-Tahrir is resuming the Islamic way of live by establishing a Caliphate. In order to achieve this the Western influences, that according to al-Nabhani have corrupted the minds of the Muslims and made them mentally sluggish, have to be challenged and suppressed. In essence Hizb ut-Tahrir calls for an ideological struggle. This struggle is between Islam on the one side, which al-Nabhani deems the superior system, and imperialistic democratic capitalism on the other. The movement has a variety of books and reports in which it elaborates on its ideology. At the core are the texts written by al-Nabhani himself, but since his passing away his direct successors and other members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have propagated additional texts. Based on several of the texts that are available on the various websites of Hizb ut-Tahrir I will give an overview of the movements ideology.
According to one of the new texts of Hizb ut-Tahrir, of which the author is not named, the Muslim lands (states with a Muslims majority) are in quarrel and stagnating. In order to turn this around the movement argues that a Khilafah (caliphate), comprising all the Muslim lands has to be established. This caliphate should be ruled by Sharia-law under a Khalifa (caliph). What is remarkable and where Hizb ut-Tahrir differentiates form many other fundamentalist movements is that according to Hizb ut-Tahrir sources the movement envisions a Caliphate in which no distinction is made between Sunni and Shia.20
This however does not count for for example Alawis, as Hizb ut-Tahrir does not deem Alawis to be Muslims (this is of special interest in the light of the civil war in Syria and that Al-Sad is a Alawi).21
18Ian Cobain, 'Islamist group challenges Berlin's five-year ban in European court',
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/24/islam.religion, last consulted on 04-05-2014.
19 Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 170; Houriya Ahmed en Hannah Stuart, 'Profile: Hizb ut-Tahrir in
the UK', Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 143-172, there 147.
20 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for change, London: 1999, 4-6. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, The
Islamic State, London: Al-Khilafah Publications 1998, 136–137.
21 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.
In Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Evaluating the threat posed by a radical Islamic group
that remains nonviolent (2006) E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley confirm that Hizb ut-Tahrir
officially does not differentiate between Sunni and Shia yet in spite of this Hizb ut-Tahrir is nearly exclusively a Sunni movement.22
Regarding this matter I asked both Martijn de Koning and Okay Pala, the spokesperson and I presume the leader of Hizb ut Tahrir Netherlands, how the current tension between Sunni and Shia should be understood. According to Martijn de Koning Hizb ut-Tahrir in practice is exclusively a Sunni movement. He however underlines that in contrast to other radical movements that are exclusively Sunni Hizb ut-Tahrir does not spread anti-Shia propaganda.23
According to Okay Pala the current tension between Sunni and Shia is mostly a representation by the West and Western media with as goal to undermine the establishment of the Khilafa and the unification of all Muslims.24
Hizb ut-Tahrir regards the current leaders of the Muslim lands as mere puppets of The United States and the "West", which have an imperialist program to suppress Islam. The underlying reason for this, according to the movement, is that the West fears Islam because it knows that Islam is a superior system and ideology and it will therefor prevail in the end. In its texts Hizb ut-Tahrir states that all the Muslim lands have Kufr (disbelief) systems, even though some laws are based on Islam. This is because the security in the Muslim lands is not maintained by the Aman (security) of Islam. So even though they are Muslim lands and their inhabitants are Muslims they are Dar ul-Kufr (land of disbelief) instead of Dar ul-Islam (land of Islam).25
The movement sees Islam as the only correct religion and ideology. It therefore considers other religions 'like Judaism, Christianity' and other ideologies like 'Communism, Socialism and Capitalism' as Kufr religions and Kufr ideologies'.26
Democracy is seen as Kufr as well because democracy is ruling of the people by the people, there where according to Hizb ut-Tahrir ruling should be by the mandate of Allah.27
Besides the fact that Hizb ut-Tahir considers democracy to be Kufr it also argues that democracy has no actual reality because in reality it is a small 'group of influential people' who are actually ruling in the West.28
22 Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, 'Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Evaluating the threat posed by a
radical Islamic group that remains nonviolent.', Terrorism and political violence, 2 (2006), 317-318.
23 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments 24 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.
25 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The methodology, 5-6. 26 Ibidem, 30.
27 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The campaign to surpress Islam, London: 1995, 16; Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, Democracy is a
system of Kufr. It is forbidden to adopt, implement or call for it, 2nd edition London: 1995, 1-7
An essential point regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology is whether it has to be regarded as violent or non-violent. The movement currently is not banned in most of Europe because it is regarded non-violent. However the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir prescribes the establishment of a caliphate ruled by sharia law. According to Taji-Farouki Hizb ut-Tahrir therefor in the final phase intends to overthrow the governments of the Muslim states either by civil disobedience, a procession to the seat of government or a military coup executed by 'forces that have agreed to hand over power to the movement.'29
So in the final phase Hizb ut-Tahrir approves violence in order to establish the Khilafa. The movement states however that even though it approves violence in this stage it is not the movement itself that will take a violent action.
After achieving the establishment of the Khilafa the assumption regarding the non-violent ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir becomes even more ambiguous. According to the movement apostates of Islam and persons practicing homosexuality should be killed based on sharia-law. Additionally the established caliphal state has to be considered expansionist on a global scale as according to Hizb ut-Tahrir:
'[a]ll the countries of the world, in the East or the West are considered Dar al-Kufr and potentially Dar al-Harb (land of war), and the relationship with them is a part of the foreign policy, and this relationship is defined by the demands of jihad and the interest of Muslims and the Khilafah State according to the divine law'.30
Where according to Hizb ut-Tahrir treaties with non-Muslim states are allowed by Islam, an important condition is that these treaties always last a predetermined and limited period according to the demands of Jihad. No such treaties or even cease-fires can be entered into with Israel, because Israel occupies Muslim lands. The caliphate is therefor to wage war against Israel because according to the movement's ideology, Islam 'makes it imperative upon all Muslims to engage her (Israel) in war and exterminate such a state and free the Muslim lands from her'.31 However once again Hizb ut-Tahrir states that it will not act violent itself. The monopoly of violence will lay with the caliphate. However after the establishment of the caliphate, the role of Hizb ut-Tahrir will be to ensure that the caliph will rule by the Sharia or more accurate by Hizb ut-Tahrir its interpretation of the Sharia. So where the monopoly of
29 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 104. 30 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 38. 31 Ibidem, 38.
violence lays at the caliphate, the caliph is to act violent according to the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir or to be removed by the movement, as he does not rule by divine law.
What may seem remarkable is that Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology does not exclude other political parties after the caliphate is established; the foreseen caliphate is not to be a single-party state. However according to Hizb ut-Tahrir: 'Islam prohibits the existence of non-Islamic political parties and blocs that are founded on a basis that contradicts Islam, and it allows the existence of parties and blocs within the boundaries of Islam.'32
So where in theory other parties are allowed, in practice only parties with a program non-divergent to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology are allowed to exist in the caliphate.
In conclusion it can be stated that the movement currently does not act violently, yet it does call up for violence. If Hizb ut-Tahrir will achieve its object of establishing a caliphate, this will change. Even though the movement states that it remains non-violent, this is difficult to belief. To start the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir calls up for violence by inciting for war with the West and Israel and the killing of for example apostates and homosexuals. That Hizb ut-Tahrir points out that it is not the movement but the caliphal state that that is to commit the acts of violence I consider merely as a false distinction, especially as if the ruler will not commit the violence Hizb ut-Tahrir is propagating, the movement will remove him from office as he does not rule by the movement's interpretation of the Sharia.
1.3 Party structure
Recent works on Hizb ut-Tahrir that deal with the internal structure of the movement are for the main part based on research done by Taji-Farouki for A fundamental quest. This book however was published in 1996 and the sources Taji-Farouki based her research on are for the large part even (considerably) older. Furthermore what is known about the party structure at a local level is mainly based on how the movement is structured in the Middle East, an area where the movement has to deal with repressive regimes, this in contrast to the relative freedom it has in the West.
As said what we know about the structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir is based mainly on findings by Taji-Farouki. According to Taji-Farouki the movement is rigidly organised. She states that the organization is to a large part modelled to the mass nationalist parties 'that had emerged in the Arab East from the 1930s' and similarly has a pyramidal structure.33
The centralised leadership committee forms the top it instructs and appoints the lower provincial
32 Taqiuddin an-‐Nabhani, Concepts of Hizb-‐ut-‐Tahrir, 1953, 65. 33 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 114.
committees. Subordinate to these provincial committees are the local committees, which on their turn are appointed and instructed by the provincial committees. The unit of the province in general corresponds with individual nation states. Next to the local committees are the study-circles, which are not administrative organs as the committees, but rather a party activity. The communication between the various committees is arranged vertically, instructions are given top down and regular reports by the lower committees are transferred upward. Between the committees on the same level there are no direct links.34
The Amir heads the general centralised leadership. Al-Nabhani himself was the first Amir and as stated before he was succeeded by 'Abd al Qadim Zallum. 'Abd al Qadim Zallum laid down his position in 2003, only a few weeks before he died. He was on his turn succeeded by Ata Abu Rashta, a civil engineer, who previously was the spokesman of the Jordan branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir.35
Hizb ut-Tahrir makes various requirements before a person qualifies for membership. A first requirement is that a person should be at least 15 years old. Furthermore the movement only accepts Muslims, who are not part of an organisation that is in contradiction to Hizb ut-Tahrir's interpretation of Islam. Furthermore certain mental 'fitness' is required. Aspiring members start as novices and membership is only obtained after they convey the party ideology as if their own (own deviating opinions are allowed, but are to be kept to oneself). This period of transformation may require several years of indoctrination.36
After a novice is regarded fit to become a member he/she is to be swear the following party oath before a local committee leader:
'I swear by God Almighty to be loyal to Islam and to defend it, to embrace Hizb al-Tahrir's opinions and constitutions, to have confidence in its leadership, and to implement its resolutions even if they are contrary to my own opinion, as long as I remain a member. In all this I place my trust in God.'37
Membership is not reserved to men only; women are allowed to join Hizb ut-Tahrir as well. However there are some conditions to women members. For example the women are not to attend the same study-circles as the men but have separate study-circles. Additionally the
34 Ibidem, 114-115; Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 39
35 Zeyno Baran, 'Fighting the war of ideas', Foreign Affairs, 6 (2005), 71. 36 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 132-133.
women study-circles are to be 'supervised by either their husbands, relatives who they cannot marry or by other women'.38
The study-circles form the fundamental unit of party organisation and consist of a small number of party members and new recruits. The purpose of the study-circle is the intensive study of the party ideology under the supervision of a knowledgeable and veteran member. The circles are rather loosely defined. For example a party member can attend several circles and supervise the one and be a student in the other. Besides the role of supervisor there are generally no other functions. Membership of a study-circle is crucial for members and novices. The supervisors are expected to hold the study-circles regularly and to strive for discipline from the circle members. Members and novices that are repeatedly late or whose attendance is irregular are warned and can eventually be removed from the party. 39
During the study-circles, which are held weekly, the party ideology is studied.40 The party ideology for the main parts exists of texts by al-Nabhani. The supervisor selects further material he deems appropriate for the level of the circle. The procedures during a study-circle are regulated by strict instructions. The supervisor reads aloud a short section. The meaning of this passage is discussed and the supervisor answers questions that arise. The aim of the study-circles is to indoctrinate the circle members with predefined ideas, rather than actual open discussion and the development of independent thought. The atmosphere during the study-circles is serious; 'There is no joking or chatting'. Being supervisor is deemed a grave responsibility and the mentality and competence of an individual must be evident. The supervisors are required to rigorously study the party programme and Islamic literature. Furthermore they are expected to be informed of current political events.41
Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir cautions against selecting persons on educational level or social status, most recruits are relatively well educated. This is because according to Hizb ut-Tahrir understanding its ideology requires a good an active mind. Supervisors in general only invite people who respond positively to the party's message to the study-circle. The emphasis on caution by the central leadership is linked to the situation of repression the Hizb ut-Tahrir encounters in the Middle East. This repression can partly be understood by the coups in which the movement is said to have participated. It appears that in Europe where the Hizb ut-Tahrir is under less or no scrutiny by the authorities, its policies are more open. In the UK for
38 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 11. 39 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 125. 40 Ibidem, 125-‐128.
example individuals are admitted to study-circles on request.42 What further underlies the assumption that the European branches are more open is the large meetings and demonstrations that the movement organizes in the UK and other Western European countries. During these large meetings members of various study-circles meet, this is contradictory to the strict cell-structure the movement adopts in the Middle East.
1.4 Conclusion
Based on my research on the history, the ideology and the party structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir I came to some key arguments. To start the presumed non-violent character of the movement has to be considered as a facade; Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology is violent and even the statement that the movement is currently is non-violent is debatable based on her virulent expressions. As stated above if the movement is ever to rise to power in the Middle East and to establish a caliphate, this caliphate will be violent both internally and externally. I further want to argue that Hizb ut-Tahrir can be seen as an avant-gardist movement. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir regard themselves as an elite. The movement exist of small cells that are to influence the mass. A final argument I want to make is regarding the party structure. As stated the movement has a pyramidal structure. The supreme leader or Amir together with the centralised leadership committee forms the top. Underneath it there are various lower committees. Based on this structure a rigid and centralised organisation could be expected. To what extent this is the case I will give answer based on the following chapters that form a case study into the Dutch and the English branch.
2.
Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
This chapter discusses several aspects of the English and the Dutch branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The first two paragraphs give a general overview of respectively the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Dutch branch. In these paragraphs I will give an account on the number of members, the background of these members and on how Hizb ut-Tahrir is confronted by policies of the English and Dutch authorities. The following part of the chapter forms a comparative analysis. In this part I will first overview the similarities and differences between the Dutch and the English branch. Subsequently, and this is the essence of the chapter, I shall give an interpretation and explanation of these similarities and differences.
2.1 Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom
The English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in the early 80s. The initial success of the movement was rather limited and so was its outreach. This changed in 1986 when Omar Bakri Muhammad, who was expelled from Saudi Arabia, joined the English branch and became its local Amir. Under Bakri's inspired leadership Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain became more active and its number of members increased. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain transformed from a waning movement to one of the largest Islamist organization in Britain.
Under Bakri's leadership however the English branch adopted rather extremist views. The most striking example hereof was made during the height of the First Gulf War (1990-1991), which was a reaction to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Bakri fiercely opposed the intervention that was led by the United States and backed by among others the United Kingdom. Because of this English support in the Gulf War, he is said to have uttered a death threat against than Prime Minister John Mayor in February of 1991. In an interview of the
Daily Star Bakri was cited:
'Major is a legitimate target. If anyone gets the opportunity to assassinate him, I don't think they should save it. He is the head of a state which has declared war against Islam and our God says fight those who fight you. It is our Islamic duty and we will celebrate his death. I pray to God for someone to kill him.'43
Following the statement, several Members of Parliament demanded Bakri's arrest for
incitement to murder. Bakri, who has been arrested several times, was indeed shortly detained on this occasion but after 48 hours he was released without being charged. There are two accounts on why no charge was brought against Bakri. The first account states that this was because of an intervention by moderate Muslim leaders, who thought that imprisoning Bakri would only further lead to further radicalization of the Muslim youth.44
According to the second statement however Bakri was released because during the interrogations he claimed that he was cited wrongly.45
In 1996 Bakri and the central leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir came to a conflict and Bakri left the movement and continued with an own organization Al-Muhajiroun. The exact circumstances of Bakri departure from Hizb ut-Tahrir are not clear, as also on this topic there are divergent reports. Bakri himself stated in an interview in 2004 that he 'resigned on 16 January 1996 in response to a violation of Islamic rules by the worldwide Amir [being: Ata Abu Rashta] of Hizb-ut-Tahrir.'46
In the same interview Bakri elaborates on the reasons for him leaving by stating that:
'The real dispute was over the methodology to establish the Khilafah, they did not like me attacking man-made laws here in the UK, and they did not like the fact that I was condemning the policy of John Major and the English government.'47
Whereas according to Bakri he left the Hizb ut-Tahrir, other sources state that he was expelled. In a press release of August 9th 2005 Hizb ut-Tahrir states that Bakri 'was expelled from the party in 1996 and has had no relationship whatsoever with the party for over 9 years.48
Various (former) Hizb ut-Tahrir members corroborate this statement. In an interview with Kirstine Sinclair of 2003 the Amir of the British branch Jalaluddin Patel and the branch its spokesperson Imran Waheed 'hinted that it was Bakri’s infamous demand that the English Queen should convert to Islam that decided the matter.'49
Furthermore in the interview I had with Okay Pala, the spokesperson of the Dutch branch, he also stated that Bakri was expelled
44 Ibidem.
45'Report on Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed', http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/bmms/sampleissue_Jan2001.asp, last
consulted on 02-04-2014; R. Israeli, Islamikaze. Manifestations of Islamic Martyrdom, London: 2003, 194.
46 Mahan Abedin, 'Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed',
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=290, last consulted on 02-04-2014.
47 Ibidem.
48 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 'Omar Bakri was not the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir',
http://www.hizb.org.uk/press-releases/omar-bakri-was-not-the-founder-of-hizb-ut-tahrir, last consulted on 02-04-2014.
49 Kirstine Sinclair, 'The Caliphate as Homeland. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain', 2010, 183. available on
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/0/D/1/%7B0D1B4B59-9755-44EB-887E-90595D8D461D%7DKirstine%20Sinclair%20ph%20d%20afhandling.pdf.
from Hizb ut-Tahrir, adding to this that a vain man as Bakri would not admit that he was expelled.50
Number of Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain
Hizb ut-Tahrir does not give an account of its number of members. Sinclair endorses this by stating that '[n]o branch will ever provide general membership information or numbers.'51
This makes it difficult to make a statement on how many members the movement has in the UK. Several researchers came with diverging accounts, which will form a starting point for my account.
Sinclair stated in 2008 that the movement had between 500-1.000 members in Britain and had held gatherings which attracted over 10.000 people.52
Problematic about this first estimation of Sinclair is that she does not give any explanation how she comes to it. In her PhD dissertation of 2010 Sinclair comes with another estimation, which 'is based on conversations with former members.' She estimates that the movement then had approximately 1.000-1.500 members in Britain.53
This increase can be explained in several ways: either Hizb ut-Tahrir has increased its number of members, or Sinclair came to new insights that led to a more accurate estimation.
In their article The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood (2007), Robert S. Leiken and Steve Brooke state that a former Hizb ut-Tahrir member they had interviewed stated that the movement 'dominates the English scene' and that he estimated that the movement had around 8.500 members in the UK.54
However Leiken and Brooke do not give an evaluation on this statement by the former Hizb ut-Tahrir member they interviewed, so it is not clear if they mark this as an accurate estimation.
Except for the above named researchers, several journalists have made estimations on the support base of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain. One of these estimations was given in several newspapers after a renewed bid by the English government to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in the aftermath of the murder of the English soldier Lee Rigby by a radical Muslim of May 22th,
50 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments. 51 Ibidem, 124.
52 Kirstine Sinclair, 'Islam in Britain and Denmark. Deterritorialized identity and reterritorialized agendas',
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1 (2008), 47.
53 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 77 and 185.
2013. According to this estimation the movement is 'believed to have several thousand members in Britain.'55
Contrary to the researchers above, who do not mention any decline in members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain in their papers, a spokesperson of the anti-radicalism think tank Quilliam Foundation stated in an interview with The Guardian, of July 2011, that in the past few years Hizb ut-Tahrir is strongly in decline and its influence is on the wane.56
This statement however should be viewed with the background of the Quilliam Foundation in mind.
The Quilliam Foundation was founded in 2008, by Maajid Nawaz, Rashad Zaman Ali and Ed Husain, all former Hizb ut-Tahrir members. The latter is the writer of the bestseller
The Islamist. Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left. (2007).
In the novel, which is autobiographic, Husain describes how he became a radical Muslim and joined Hizb ut-Tahrir and later left Hizb ut-Tahrir and became a practitioner of Sufism. Many of the other foundation's staff members and researchers have also been members of radical Islamist groups. The foundation states about itself that its aim is:
'to generate creative, informed and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.'57
The foundation is somewhat controversial, mostly because of a confidential briefing paper it composed for the English Office for Security and Counter Terrorism that was leaked. This briefing paper titled Preventing Terrorism - Where Next for Britain (2010), was controversial as it contained a blacklist of organizations and persons the Quilliam foundation alleged to be extremist sympathizers.58
55 Alan Travis, 'Theresa May considers 'second-tier' banning orders',
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/jul/16/theresa-may-second-tier-banning-order, published on July 16th 2013, last consulted on 02-04-2014; Nigel Morris, ' Government in fresh bid to outlaw hardline Islamists',
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/government-in-fresh-bid-to-outlaw-hardline-islamists-8706589.html, last consulted on 02-04-2014.
56 Shiv Malik, 'Watchdog recommends Tory U-turn on banning Hizb ut-Tahrir',
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir-ban, last consulted on 02-04-2014.
57 Quilliam Foundation, 'About us', http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 58 Vikram Dodd, 'List sent to terror chief aligns peaceful Muslim groups with terrorist
ideology',http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/04/quilliam-foundation-list-alleged-extremism, last consulted on 02-04-2014; Duncan Gardham,'Mainstream Islamic organisations 'share al-Qaeda ideology', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/7928377/Mainstream-Islamic-organisations-share-al-Qaeda-ideology.html, last consulted on 02-04-2014.
Furthermore in the paper the Quilliam Foundation criticized the 'Prevent' Strategy. This program of the then sitting Labour government entailed reaching out to non-violent though radical Islamic groups in order to prevent terrorism. The Quilliam Foundation disagreed with this strategy as '[t]he ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics.'59
Looking on the statement by The Quilliam Foundation it should be kept in mind that it is an anti-radical think-tank and has repeatedly stated its aim is to counteract groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir. The statement on the decline of Hizb ut-Tahrir could therefor be seen as boosting its own success-story. However after contacting Ms. Sinclair by e-mail and interviewing Martijn de Koning on the statement by the Quillian Foundation, it appears that the statement is valid at least to a certain extent.60
Sinclair stated that she agrees with the Quilliam foundation that the influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom in specific and in Europe in general is in decline. She argues there are various reasons why Hizb ut-Tahrir is struggling. She first mentions the stricter legislation throughout Europe. Furthermore she stated that 'The Arab Spring' has proved difficult for Hizb ut-Tahrir to explain. How is the movement 'to maintain that what the Arab populations really want is a Caliphate', when in Syria various Muslim branches are fighting each other in a brutal civil war and in Egypt the support for the Muslim Brotherhood has waned and the military dictatorship appears to be stronger than before.61
The second argument however is in a retrospective view as when in 2011 the report by the Quilliam foundation was published the Muslim Brotherhood was still flourishing in Egypt and the insurgence in Syria had not yet become a cruel sectarian civil war.
During my interview with Martijn de Koning he stated that he partly agrees. He argues that Hizb ut-Tahrir has lost some influence since its heydays in the 90s. However he underlined that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain still has a strong core of members and remains very active at various universities in the UK. He further stated that Hizb ut-Tahrir has been surpassed in its outreach by Salafi movements, adding to this that the competition between the various radical Islamic movements in the UK is much stronger than in the Netherlands.62
Concluding it can be said that it has proven to be very difficult to give anything more than a rough estimate on the number of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain as the accounts strongly
59 Quilliam Foundation, Preventing Terrorism. Where Next for Britain, London 2010, 56.
60 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments;
Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments.
61 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments. 62 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments.
diverge. However as Sinclair her estimation is (partly) based on interviews with former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and her research is the most thorough and relatively recent, I expect her estimation to be the most adequate and therefor assume the number of members to be around 1500. We should keep in mind however that besides the actual members there is a significant group of people supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir but who have not obtained member status yet. The overall outreach of the English branch therefor exceeds the number of members.
Background and status of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain
In most research literature and media articles on Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain a fairly common view emerges on the general origin and background of its members. Even though in broad lines the views of the various researchers correspond with each other some dissimilarities are to be distinguished.
In A Fundamental Quest Taji-Farouki states that the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was established in the early 1980s, 'when a handful of experienced activists came to live and work in the country, having been forced to leave various parts of the Arab world as the result of their activities.' She further argues that where Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain initially was mainly focused on Arabs, temporarily living in the United Kingdom: 'for example students and visiting professionals.'63
The movement at that time tried to recruit activists that after returning to their home country could disseminate the party's propaganda.64
During the 80s recruitment of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain gradually shifted to other nationalities such as Turks, Somalis and Pakistanis.65
On the reason of this shift Taji-Farouki does not elaborate, but she does state that the newfound recruitment pool existed mainly out of 'second-generation English-born Muslims whose immigrant parents had settled permanently in Britain.'66
Recapitulating briefly it appears that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain expanded its recruitment from solely temporarily staying Arabs to English born Muslims from a variety of backgrounds.
A second shift in the recruitment policy can be distinguished in the 90s as the youth of Britain's large South Asian community proved to be an increasingly fertile breeding ground for the movement's ideology. Since then the majority of the Hizb ut-Tahrir followers in the United Kingdom are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. This further change of its
63 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 171. 64 Ibidem.
65 Ibidem. 66 Ibidem.
recruitment pool proved to be successful as Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain expanded further in the late 80s and early 90s.
Similarly to Taji-Farouki in 1996, Kirstine Sinclair in 2008 and 2010 argued that the majority of Hizb ut-Tahrir's English branch are from South Asian, mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, origin. She explains this statement by pointing out that the majority of the Muslims in the United Kingdom are of South Asian decent. The background for this forms the colonial history of the United Kingdom, which has led to various major influxes of immigrants from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.67
As stated in the previous chapter membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not confined to men, as women can be members of Hizb ut-Tahrir as well. Only Sinclair discusses the woman groups of the UK branch to a certain extent in The Caliphate as Homeland: Hizb ut-Tahrir in
Denmark and Britain (2010). What becomes clear is that the English branch of the movement
has women's section and even a women's media representative.68
Robert S. Leiken and Steve Brooke in 2007 also corroborated that in the United Kingdom Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters are mainly young Southeast Asian Muslims. Interesting about Leikens and Brook's article is that it compares the backing of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain with that of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom. Leiken and Brooke state that '[t]he contest between MAB [Muslim Association of Britain, the largest Brotherhood-linked organization in the United Kingdom] and HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir] roughly follows ethnic and generational lines: young Muslims of Pakistani descent are heavily represented in HT, whereas the older and fewer Muslims of Arab descent join MAB.'69
The article further states a full step further than the radical but 'formally non-violent" Hizb ut-Tahrir are the various Jihadi groups who according to the a assessment of the English internal security chief's numbers '[s]ome 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1,600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas.'70
However as became clear after interviewing Martijn de Koning, Leiken and Brooke leave out the group that has taken over the dominance in the scene of radical Islam in the UK: the Salafi movement. Presumably Leiken and Brooke left out the Salafi movement as contrary to Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood it is not a clearly distinct and strict organization but more a puritanical tendency within Sunni Islam of
67 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 7 and 190. 68 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 57.
69Leiken, Robert S and Steve Brooke, The moderate Muslim Brotherhood, 120. 70 Ibidem.
loosely cooperating individuals and groups. Even though a part of the salafi movement exists of Jihadi groups, the majority of this radical group is non-violent.71
Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the Hizb ut-Tahrir members in the United Kingdom are from South-Asian descent, Hizb ut-Tahrir also attracts members of other origins. An interesting case form converts to Islam. According to Sinclair Hizb ut-Tahrir 'has a special interest in converts.' She came to this conclusion through interviews she has had with former members who are converts. The background of this special interest in coverts is because Hizb ut-Tahrir-ideology states:
'that people born in Muslim families are expected not to take residence in the West permanently, hence individuals of Western and non-Muslim origin are the only Muslims expected to stay in the West permanently and therefore of special interest to the party’s spreading of the message in non-Muslim countries.'72
The argument by Sinclair that Hizb ut-Tahrir expects Muslim families not to remain in the West I presume is mainly because Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that they can not live in a Islamic way in the West. Therefor when the caliphate is established they are to move to Caliphate as there they can live by Islamic rules, as Muslims according to Hizb ut-Tahrir should. Why the converts are to remain in the West spreading the Islamic message under non-Islamic conditions remains unclear, but I assume that the convert are to remain in the West to further spread Islam.
While the scholars on Hizb ut-Tahrir appear to be unanimous about the general origin of Hizb ut-Tahrir-members in the United Kingdom, they in majority also agree on the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir-recruits. A first interesting aspect of the recruits of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain forms the fact that the movement since long mostly recruits university students.
According to Taji-Farouki Hizb ut-Tahrir is very active at universities and 'the movement has achieved a substantial infiltration of university Islamic societies.'73 According to her this is caused partly due to the feeling of alienation of the young Muslims of Asian origin. The younger generation distances itself 'from the strong ethnic base which
71 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 72 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland 74-75.
characterises the mosque context associated with their parents'74 and are therefor especially susceptible to Hizb ut-Tahrir's interpretation of Islam, which calls for a unified Ummah. Taji-Farouki underlines Hizb ut-Tahrir 'message strikes a chord with the alienation from English society which many young Muslims feel, especially those from areas where racism is growing'.75
Another scholar that discusses the background of English Hizb ut-Tahrir members is Ihsan Yilmaz. In his article The varied performance of Hizb Tahrir he argues that Hizb ut-Tahrir only recruits among the well educated. Yilmaz elaborates on this statement by pointing out that the movement has altered its target group variable times. About this he states:
'HT went someway down recruiting the disenchanted from the streets but has now reverted to recruiting in the universities. HT is not a populist movement like the Brotherhood or other Islamist movements; it is elitist.'76
Besides underlining that Hizb ut-Tahrir mainly targets students, Yilmaz brings forward several other points of interest regarding the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir members. To start he underlines that Hizb ut-Tahrir recruitment efforts benefit from the overall discrimination of Muslims in the UK and most of the rest of Europe. According to Yilmaz Hizb ut-Tahrir is known to target the frustrated youth of second an third generation Muslims who feel discriminated.
A further point that attracts the Southeast Asian youth to Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is the search for identity by the Muslim youth. They feel little for the traditional Islam that their parents avow. Furthermore they have little faith in the alim preaching in local mosques, as these alim are often from the rural areas of Pakistan and have little knowledge of the problems the Muslims youth encounters in modern Britain.
So regarding the background of members of the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir two general statements can be made. First that Hizb ut-Tahrir mostly recruits at universities and consequently that most of the English members are highly educated and second that they to a certain extent feel discriminated and isolated. I would argue that the reason why Hizb ut-Tahrir mostly recruits on universities is caused by the avant-gardist tendency of the movement as the Hizb ut-Tahrir sees itself as an intellectual vanguard. It may appear
74 Ibidem. 75 Ibidem.
76 Ihsan Yilmaz, 'The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Success in Britain and Uzbekistan and stalemate in
contradictory that highly educated Muslims feel discriminated and isolated, as they are successful. However the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir nearly exclusively focuses on young highly educated Muslims and these highly educated Muslims do encounter discrimination, for example on the jobs market, and to a certain extent do feel isolated, explains why the members of the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir are in general highly educated.
Stance of the English Authorities versus Hizb ut-Tahrir
The United Kingdom and especially greater London area are of great importance to Hizb ut-Tahrir. This is as stated in the introduction partly caused by the fact that the party, due to the openness in United Kingdom, has considerable freedom in its actions. This is in contrast to most states in the Middle East where the party has gone underground as it is forbidden, and its members are rounded up and prosecuted. Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir is able to thrive in the United Kingdom it is controversial to say the least. The English branch has come under scrutiny of the authorities various times and there have been several attempts to ban the movement. Some of these instances (for example after the above discussed presumed death threat against Prime Minister John Mayor) stem to when Omar Bakri Muhammad held the leadership of the branch between 1986 and 1996. After Bakri's departure the English branch appears to have somewhat moderated its stances, but the movement remains disputed.77
One of the first times Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared in bad light was around 1993. This was mainly due to its virulent anti-Semitist statements during its campaign against the signing of the accord between Israel en the Palestine Liberation Organization in September of that year. The movement issued leaflets and posters with inflammatory headings such as 'Peace with Israel - A crime against Islam', and called up for a jihad against Jews in Palestine. Due to these and other outbursts the Union of Jewish Students accused Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain of anti-Semitism. Besides anti-Semitic expression the party uttered virulent against homosexuals and Hindus. For example in 1993 in a publication in al-Khilafa, a periodical issued by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, Hindus were called 'untamed savages' and homosexuals were demanded death.78 As a result the National Union of Students called for a ban by the government. However the Home Office responded by stating that it was aware of Hizb ut-Tahrir, but that there was no basis to ban it.79
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9-11 Hizb ut-Tahrir and many other Islamist
77 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 82; Suha Taji-Farouki, 'Islamists and the threat of Jihad. Hizb al‐Tahrir
and al‐Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews', Middle Eastern Studies, (2000) 30-31.
78 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 173. 79 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest,175-177.
