Radicalization on the local level : a research on preventive programs and their effectiveness in Amsterdam

(1)

1

Radicalization on the Local Level:

a Research on Preventive Programs and their

Effectiveness in Amsterdam

Master’s Thesis Political Science Specialization International Relations

July, 14th 2014

Supervisor: Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado Second reader: Dr. Julien Jeandesboz

By Jurrian Stoop Student ID: 6132839

(2)

2

Introduction

The events on 9/11 have set the thread of terrorism on national and international security agendas. Though jihadist terror was initially viewed as an external problem that arose in non-western societies, the attacks on Madrid (2004), the murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh (2004) and the attacks on the London underground (2005) showed different. In all these cases, the perpetrators were to a large extent born and raised in Western European countries. As a result, terms as ‘home-grown terrorism’ and radicalization quickly spread among academic and public debate. Since this wave of Islamic oriented terrorist attacks in Europe occurred, policies on monitoring, preventing and eradicating the threat of terrorism have been constantly revised and extended. But even until now, worldwide developments make it necessary to remain critical of current policy approaches.

The more recent public demonstrations and revolts in the Arab world, often

mentioned as the ‘Arab Spring’, for instance had an impact on Muslims worldwide and can produce new possible dangers for western societies (Dechesne & Meines, 2012). The

uprisings in Syria for example evolved into a complex, asymmetrical civil war that created a very unstable political climate. As a result, several young Muslims from Western European countries decided to participate in the Syrian conflict. At the moment, about 100 Dutch Muslims joined jihadist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and Jahbat al Nusra in their battle against the regime of Assad (Blokker & Pelgrim, 2014). These

developments made the Dutch government decide to increase the national ‘level of threat’ (dregingsniveau) on March 2013 towards 3, the second highest level, meaning there is a substantial chance for terrorist threats in the Netherland (NCTB, 2014)

The government of the municipality of Amsterdam, the city where Mohammed Bouyeri, murderer of Theo van Gogh grew up, has a counterterrorism and deradicalization policy that is mainly focused on preventing a person from radicalization. The ‘wide

approach’ that the government is promoting, involves a broad range of programs focused on youngsters that need specific attention since they are believed to be susceptible to

radicalization. Interestingly, the most recent revision of this local policy took place in 2012, when the national level of threat was still fixed at 2 (a ‘limited’ threat). Despite new changes and developments on local and national and international level, the government of

Amsterdam did not revise its approach yet.

In this research the current policy on radicalization from the government of Amsterdam will be studied. More specific, the focus will be on the implementation stage,

(4)

4 where the policy is translated into practice. Furthermore, the anticipation on current

developments, foremost the new phenomenon of ‘jihad travellers’ will be analysed. The central research question of this research is therefor:

How is the policy on radicalization and counterterrorism by the municipality of Amsterdam functioning in its implementation stage and how does it address current developments?

In support of the research the following sub questions are formulated:

 What factors shaped the current policy on radicalization?

 How is the policy on radicalization functioning in the implementation stage?

 How does the policy on radicalization address current developments?

In order to answer these sub questions, reports of the city council of Amsterdam on the policy of radicalization between 2005 en 2012 are analysed. Furthermore, interviews with Professor Ineke Roex – who is specialized in salafism and radicalization policy – and government official Mounir Dadi are conducted. In addition, three social workers from Spirit and Sciandri are interviewed about their experiences in the field. The thesis argues that the ‘broad

approach’ on radicalization by the government of Amsterdam is not effective in terms of addressing radicalization and should rather be considered as reintegration policy. Moreover, the policy renders insufficient to answer adequate to current developments such as the recruitment of jihadist fighters in Syria.

In the first chapter, the research frame will be presented. Definitions of radicalization will be discussed as well as theoretical views on radicalization. Second, the field of policy studies that focuses on implementation will be elaborated.Then, the methodology of this thesis will be discussed. In the second chapter the factors that shaped and established the policy on radicalization are analysed and discussed. The third chapter focuses on the stage where the policy is implemented whilst the fourth chapter is dedicated to the question whether recent developments are addressed. Finally, in the fifth chapter the results will be summarized and implications are discussed.

(5)

5

1. Research Frame

1.1 Definitions of radicalization

Interestingly, there is no general consensus on the meaning of the concept “radicalization”. The European commission for example uses a rigid definition of the term, describing it simply as “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to terrorism” (European Commission, 2006: 1). The Dutch secret service agency AIVD on the other hand, distinguishes no less than three components of radicalization. First they depict the development of views and activities aimed at far-reaching changes and overthrowing the social and/or political system whereby if necessary unlawful methods (including violence) will be used. The second component entails the increasing acceptance of far reaching personal consequences as a result of these views and activities and finally the AIVD

distinguishes the development of an overall uncompromising attitude of tendencies to engage in a confrontation with those who stand in their way (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). Thus, the AIVD views radicalization as a process more than a concept. According to the website of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTB) radicalization can be explained as a process of increasing willingness to use undemocratic means to impose political or religious beliefs on others.1 Sedgwick (2010) argues that the term is problematic because it is used in three different contexts: the foreign-policy context, the integration context and the security context. He suggests that a solution to this problem is to “abandon the attempt to use ‘radicalization’ as an absolute concept” (Sedgwick, 2010: 479). Despite this seemingly absence of an undisputed definition, some general patterns become visible when studying literature on radicalization. Most scholars for example, view radicalization as a pre-stage of terrorism and extremism. According to Veldhuis & Bakker (2007: 454), the concepts radicalization and terrorism are inseparable, since terrorism can be viewed as the most extreme form of radicalization. They point out that “not every radical is a terrorist, but every terrorist is a radical”. In addition, there seems to be a consensus on the perception of

radicalization as the counterpart of democracy. Slootman & Tillie (2006) for example, who published a report in association with the government of Amsterdam, argue that

radicalization in its most extreme form rejects democratic values and processes such as equality of all citizens , freedom of religion and speech and free elections. Next to that, radicalized individuals tent to present their own ideology as a universal one that should be imposed to the population, if necessary by force. This supports the theories of many scholars

(6)

6 who argue that the more groups become integrated into society; the heavier some individuals experience the remaining gap (Buijs e.a., 2006, 200-213; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). In order to cope with the growing danger of radicalization and terrorism, authorities searched for answers in the social sciences.

1.2 Processes and models for radicalization

A widespread academic assumption is that radicalization is the pre-stage of terrorist violence (Abels, 2007; (de Graaff, de Poot & Kleemans, 2009). About 25 years ago terrorism experts estimated that it would take five to seven years for a radicalization process to evolve into terrorism. Nowadays, the duration of such a process is considered to be much shorter (de Graaff, de Poot & Kleemans, 2009). Mohammed Bouyeri for example, who was member of the so called Hofstad Network (Hofstadgroep) got radicalized during living room gatherings with his fellow believers. Together they developed a dangerous mind-set and attitude towards the Western society, simply in the middle of this society, without anyone noticing it. Here the term ‘home-grown terrorism’ comes into play: terrorism that evolves domestically but is influenced and shaped by foreign and/or transnational developments and thus differs from purely domestic terrorism (de Graaff, de Poot & Kleemans, 2009).

In addition, most theorists suggest that radicalization proceeds through different stages. Several models are designed to explain how radicalization evolves. Wiktorowitcz (2005) for instance, conducted an ethnographic case study on members of the Al-Muhajiroun movement in the U.K., a transnational Islamist organization that advocates a worldwide Islamic revolution and created a model of radicalization. The group he examined is notorious because of its official goal of “using military coups to restore an Islamic state wherever Muslims live, including Britain” (Wiktorowitcz, 2005: 7). In his theoretical model,

Wiktorowitcz outlines four processes in his model that could lead a person to radicalization: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment and socialization. The first stage of ‘cognitive opening’ often results from a personal crisis, which can be incited by several personal factors, such as job loss or experiences with discrimination or victimization. Such a crisis can also be further stimulated by members of an extremist group. In the second stage of ‘religious seeking’, a person’s receptiveness is directed towards the Islamic religion. This religious seeking makes it likely for a person to adapt worldviews that are promoted by extremist groups. This worldview is further debated and explored in the third stage of ‘frame alignment’, wherein the individual regards the worldview to fit in his own personal

(7)

7 paradigm(s). In the last stage of ‘socialization’ a person officially joins an extremist group and adopts their ideology and group identity. These are continuously enforced by interactions with other group members. Simultaneously, the individual abandons mainstream society. Interactions with the group are most effective face-to-face, but according to Wiktorowitcz socialization can also occur over the internet, via chat rooms or forums for instance (Wiktorowitcz, 2005).

Silber & Bhatt (2007) also created a four-stage model of radicalization, on behalf of The Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD). Of course it must be taken into account that their model was applied to home-grown terrorist cases in North America, but nevertheless their insights can be useful for other relevant areas. ‘Pre-radicalization’ in the first stage refers to the isolated world of an individual prior to the radicalization process. Silber and Bhatt distinguish several common traits that characterize those that are receptive for this initial stage of radicalization: they are likely to be “young, male Muslims from middle class backgrounds and male-dominated societies. They are often educated, second or third generation immigrants, or recent converts, and are not likely to have a criminal history”. (Silber & Bhatt, 2007: 24). Once an individual meets these characteristics, the second stage of ‘self-identification’ possibly begins. In correspondence with Wiktorowitcz’ model, a personal crisis occurs. During this crisis, the individual gets disappointed and loses faith in mainstream society and turns to Islam in order to manage his crisis. During this religious exploration the individual gets inevitably exposed to certain radical ideologies of the Islam, like the jihadist-salafist ideology that is easy to find on the internet or in several media reports on Western interference in Muslim countries. In the third stage of ‘indoctrination’ the individual embraces the jihadist worldview and mentally justifies violence against all un-Islamic entities. This religiosity is politicized and many world events are interpreted as if the West is fighting a war against the Islam. As a consequence, the individual’s self-serving goals are shifting towards non-personal goals aimed at protecting or avenging Muslims. At this point, the individual engages in private (‘living room’) meetings with radical agenda points. In the final stage of ‘jihadization’, individuals identify themselves as ‘holy warriors’ and become committed to violent Islam. They might gain para-military knowledge in training camps in Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. Alternatively, they might participate in jihadi training activities at home. At the extreme, a terrorist attack is planned during private meetings where practical matters such as possible targets, the required materials, date and time are discussed and roles are divided (Silber & Bhatt). These two models by Wiktorowitcz and Silber and Bhatt are typical examples of

(8)

8 pyramid-shaped constructions where in every new stage the amount of radicalized reduces until finally a relatively small group remains that is willing to use violence. On the bottom of these models one can identify a representation of a population that feels discriminated or excluded and is trying to achieve social justice and is looking for a clear cultural or social identity. By doing this, they reject certain elements of the society they live in.

Slootman and Tilly (2006) support these models and argue that only a minor group of individuals pass through all stages of radicalization and eventually are willing to use

violence. In their research for the government of Amsterdam they state that an orthodox religion does not necessarily lead to political distrust (and thus possible radicalization), but they can be considered as the minimum conditions for radicalization. Thus, Slootman and Tilly argue that preventive policy actions should be aimed at these beliefs. The combination of the two conditions increases chances of radicalization: an orthodox religion combined with a dichotomous world view (strong feelings of ‘us’ and ‘them’) and the idea that Islam in the West is being threated is a common cause for radicalization (Slootman & Tilly, 2006).

However, some scholars criticize the earlier mentioned models of radicalization and emphasize the influence of general group processes. Meertens (2005) for example, argues that ordinary, general group processes also occur in extraordinary groups, such as terrorist sects. According to him, the attacks of 9/11 are the result of normal, predictable processes, such as leadership, power, obedience and social pressure – processes that take place in any social group. De Jong (2007), who conducted a field research among Moroccan youngster in the Amsterdam neighbourhood Slotervaart also contends that an explanation for their deviant and radicalist behaviour can be found by looking at general processes of group dynamics instead of specific cultural aspects. According to him, the young Muslims he interviewed are extra susceptible for radicalization because of the way their shared street culture evolves within the context of a relatively poor neighbourhood that happens to be inhabited by a dominant group of Muslims. De Jong argues that deviant behaviour and radical ideas can be understand by using general theoretical explanations combined with an understanding of the circumstances of the neighbourhood the youngsters grow up in.

(9)

9 1.3 Theoretical views on policy implementation: bottom-up and top-down Before discussing the classic bottom-up versus top-down debate this section elaborates the theoretical view of Barret (2004) on implementation. According to her, implementation should be considered as an essential part of the policy process rather than an administrative follow-on step. She views implementation as a “policy action dialectic” that involves bargaining and negotiating between actors that seek to turn the policy into effect (the

policymakers) and those whom practical action depends on (the executers or implementers). Furthermore, Barret argues that the policy process by which policy is negotiated and

modified during the formulation continues in the actions of the actors who are involved. Here, she means that the implementers will act in order to “protect or pursue their own values and interests” (Barret, 2004: 251). Hence, Barret regards policy both as a formulation of the intention by those willing to control or change behaviour, and as a mediated output that emerges from the implementation stage. Furthermore, Barret lacks recognition for the complexity, time and resources that are involved in creating the organizational capacity in order to achieve effective change. Finally, she identifies an enduring tension between the expectations of managerial control of the implementation process and the experienced reality of organizational micro-politics in the policy-action relationship that is characterized by negotiations between semi-autonomous agents with often competing interests and conflicting

values.

Elmore (1997) distinguishes two approaches in the analysis of policy implementation: forward mapping and backward mapping. This is in line with an overall split in the field of implementation in the two major schools of top-down and bottom-up. Forward mapping entails the traditional strategy of policymakers: it simply begins on the top of this process, when a clear statement of the intentions of the policymaker(s) is presented. It then proceeds through numerous increasing stages of what is expected of implementers at each level. At the bottom the policymaker(s) formulates as precise as possible what a desirable outcome would be in terms of the originally formulated intention. Elmore heavily criticizes the assumption implied in forwards mapping that “policymakers control the organizational, political and technological processes that affect implementation” (Elmore, 1997: 603). He calls the notion that policymakers exercise a certain form of direct influence on policy implementation “the noble lie”.

Backward mapping on the other hand shares with forward mapping the idea that policymakers have an interest in affecting the implementation and the outcomes of political

(10)

10 decisions, but the logic of backward mapping opposes in all respects forward mapping. First, it questions the assumption that policymakers exercise determinant control over the

implementation process. The approach also criticizes the top-down idea that “explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities and well-defined outcomes” will increase the probability that the implementation of policies will be successful (Elmore, 1997: 604). In fact, backward mapping begins not at the top, but at the bottom stage of the

implementation process where administrative actions intersect with private choices. The process of developing the policy starts with a statement about the expected behaviour that results from the policy on the lowest level, instead of a general statement of intent. Then it presumes to stating an objective, which is first formulated as a set of organizational

operations and secondly as possible effects or outcomes that result from these operations. After formulating the target of the policy, the analysis ‘backs up’ through each level of the policy process, asking two questions at each stage: ‘What is the ability of this unit to affect the behaviour that is the target of this policy?’ and ‘What resources does this unit require in order to have that effect?’ (Elmore, 1997). In the final stage of backward mapping the policymaker outlines a policy that complies those resources at the organizational units that are likely to have the biggest effects.

Moreover, Elmore points out another problem with respect to the effectiveness of policy. He argues that simply practicing or exercising the policy the way it is formulated by the administration leaves no room for personal skills of actors on the lowest ‘street-levels’, where “public servants touches the public” (Elmore, 1997: 609). Besides, he suggests that officials on the bottom-level should be free at some point to asses specific, unique situations and apply an appropriate approach that could depart from the prescribed policy. According to Elmore, the best way to solve these problems is to pursue a backward mapping strategy since this strategy begins with mapping concrete behaviour and focusses on the ‘delivery-mechanism’ for affecting this behaviour. In other words, it puts the direct executioners of the policy in a situation where they can use their skills and pragmatic judgment to address the problems that the policy focusses on in practice. Thus, the point of connection between the problem and the closest point of contact is the most critical stage, which determines whether a policy is successful.

Sabatier (1980) agrees with the bottom-up approach presented by Elmore for certain reasons. First, he argues that the identification of problems in the field and contacting persons who could execute policies in the first stages embodies an explicit and replicable

(11)

11 perceived problems instead of a governmental program. This makes it easier to set up a variety of governmental programs, private organizations and market forces that could play a role in solving those problems. Third, Sabatier argues that because the bottom-up approach focuses on strategies that are pursued by a wide range of actors, they are better able to deal with unforeseen changes or strategic interactions than ‘top-downers’ who tend to focus more on program proponents, while neglecting other actors.

1.4 Path dependency in policy studies

The theoretical idea of path dependency can be related to policy studies since it offers an understanding of the development of social and political processes. According to Kay (2005: 553) a process is path independent if “initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction; in other words the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point”. Thus, path dependence implies that the progress or development of a certain course (for example the creation and evolution of a policy) can be predicted by choices that are made in earlier stages. As a result of this, path dependency can be viewed as process that constrains choices in the future. According to Ostrom (1999) however, path dependency should not be

considered as a theoretical model of framework, but rather as an ‘organizing concept’ that can be used to label a certain temporal process. He views this as a form of explanation, to understand why choices are made and what influences these choices.

Within the discipline of policy studies path dependency is often associated with notions of historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999; Hay, 2002). This approach embraces the idea that “individuals act within institutional arrangements, the present structure and functioning of which are understood only partially when not embedded in ahistorical perspective” (Kay, 2005: 555). Thus, individuals and groups act in an

environment that is constrained by the form of institutions, like norms, procedures, conventions and organizational structures. At the policy level, this means that during the creation of a public policy important rules are constituted that shape conditions and a context for future steps.

Moreover, Kay (2005) views path dependency as an appealing concept for understanding the development of public policies since it offers a label for the common observations and prevailing intuition that that policies once constituted are often extremely difficult to reform or change. Furthermore, path dependency provides a theoretical

(12)

12 argues that the concept in this sense can provide an “important caution against a too easy conclusion of the inevitability, ‘naturalness’, or functionality of observed outcomes”. Another advantage of the use of path dependency in policy studies according to Hall (1993) is that ‘time’ is no longer perceived as a dependent but rather as an independent variable in the explanation of change.

However, Pierson (1993: 598) challenges the idea of path dependency in public policy, since “Policy is about choice; the choice of reasons for (in)action, the choice of policy instruments, the choice of how to respond to the consequences of policy outputs”. He argues that if a policy is shaped by institutions that internalize habits and routines, whether they are respected or not, the policy still expresses a “general set of objectives or a desired state of affairs” (Pierson, 1993: 599). Another common critic on path dependency is expressed by Raadschelders (1998) who states that the concept cannot be used to explain current or future phenomena, since it does not provide consistent mechanisms necessary to recognize causal patterns. Path dependency simply fails to pinpoint mechanisms that elicit social change. 1.5 Methodology

In this section, insight in methodological choices and data collection will be provided as well as information about the research objects. In order to answer the main question in this thesis, two methods are being used that are part of a qualitative research design. First, a content analysis of official government documents regarding the policy on radicalization has been done. Second, semi-structured interviews with several key figures are conducted in order to understand the true meaning of radicalization policy in the implementation stage.

One could view the design of this research as a case study, since it concerns an in depth study of a specific topic (the policy on radicalization by the government of Amsterdam) on a specific time. Though this remains a large field, the focus will be on the implementation stage and – even more specific – on the ways that two selected organizations are executing this policy in the present. This choice has been made in order to make this broad field of research more researchable and gain more in depth information rather than describing the broad lines of this local policy. It allows the researcher to get in contact with relevant actors on the field and analyse the operationalization at this field level. Of course, this is also due to practical limitations such as time and accessibility that force the researcher to work on a small scale.

According to Yin (2010) a case study is especially useful in social sciences, since any situation in the social (‘real’) world has its own specific context and background and

(13)

13 therefore can only be studied by taking that context into account. A research topic such as the implementation of policy is carried out directly by social objects (i.e. people) and thus

demands a qualitative approach in order to understand the motivations and experiences of these objects without generalizing possible findings but rather analysing them in their specific situation. According to Bryman (2008) a case study will not answer a question

completely, but it can provide some indications and elicit the need for further elaboration on a subject.

A common critic on a case study design regards the ability of generalization: according to Flyvbjerg (2006: 224) the view that “one cannot generalize on the basis of a single case study is usually considered to be devastating to the case study as a scientific method”. However, he argues that a case study in many ways offers more realistic and reliable responses to social questions than purely statistical surveys. Even though it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies, they can offer useful insights that contribute to a bigger understanding of a topic.

The municipal policy

Thus, main aspect of this thesis is the policy on radicalization by the government of Amsterdam. Interestingly, an independent evaluation of this policy never took place and moreover, little is known about the direct operationalization and execution of this policy (Roex, 2014) which gives this research relevance. The policy is a culmination of reports, action plans and threat assessments conducted by the national secret service agency (AIVD), and the government itself between 2004 and 2012.2 Since there exists no comprehensive, encompassing outline of the policy this research is focused on these smaller policy pieces that can be found on the internet, accessible for anyone.

The first official policy note on radicalization emerged in 2004 and is called Wij Amsterdammers. It was a response to the murder of Theo van Gogh and initiated a wave of publications regarding radicalization in Amsterdam. The major guidelines of this report remained a solid foundation for the policy up until now (Dadi, 2014; Gemeente Amsterdam, 2012) and thus Wij Amsterdammers will serve as an important unit of analysis in this

research. In addition, despite the many government publications on radicalization, the most recent document stems from 2012. 3 This is an interesting fact, since new developments that

2_{For more info, see}

http://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/veiligheid/openbare-orde/kennisbank/radicalisering/beleidsdocumenten/

3_{See Heroriëntatie Radicaliserings- en Polarisatiebeleid at}

(14)

14 could influence the threat of radicalization have occurred, like the Dutch jihad travellers in Syria for example. Thus, the relatively outdated revision of the policy urges a critical analysis.

In order to get a clearer view and understanding of the text, a local government official who is responsible for and personally contributed to the establishment of the policy is interviewed. The city government stated it was willing to cooperate with this single

interview. Furthermore, it was not possible to get access to other relevant documents next to the public pieces on the internet. Thus, the analysis is to a large extent based on publically accessible documents.

Spirit & Sciandri

Part of the ‘broad approach’ to radicalization that the city council of Amsterdam is

promoting, are several societal organizations that in fact execute and implement the policy. The municipality is using ‘key figures’ who work close with vulnerable youngsters in order to reach their goal of preventing individuals from radicalization (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2012). Since this research focuses on the implementation stage, workers of two organizations will be interviewed. Spirit Jeugd & Opvoedhulp(‘Youth & Pedagogic Help) is an

organization with a wide range of programs that offers help to parents who experience problems raising their children. The program associated with deradicalization is

called Resocialisatie & Begeleiding (Rehabilitation & Accompaniment). This is aimed at youngsters between 12 and 18 years old who deal with multiple problems who often have been involved with police. During the program youngsters learn several skills that increase their self-reliance and motivation and offers them a better perspective in society. Objective is to rehabilitate these youngsters in their family, school and neighbourhood but above all to ensure a permanent change of their deviant behaviour.4

Another organization that is included in the broad approach on radicalization is Stichting Sciandri. This is a foundation that engages in sport activities, sport stimulation programs and sport events at the neighbourhood level. Sciandri focuses on youngsters in relatively deprived city districts. Objective is to learn participants how to work together, how to cope with losing, respecting the opponent, material and environment as well as educating and helping the young participants with school or finding a job.5 Thus, Spirit and Sciandri are social organizations that help youngsters with several problems in different ways.

4_{For more info, see www.spirit.nl/professionals/resocialisatie-en-begeleiding/} 5_{For more info, see www.sciandri.nl/}

(15)

15 Interestingly, no word is spoken about radicalization on their websites or program brochures. The interviews with workers from both organizations therefore offer insights in the way they experience the fact that they are implementing the radicalization policy.

Data collection

Hence, data is collected by analysing government documents regarding the policy of

radicalization and, to a large extent, by conducting five interviews with relevant key figures. The documents have been analysed using insights from qualitative content

analysis. According to Berg and Lune (2012: 349), a content analysis is “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings”. Thus, a content analysis can be a useful tool to understand the explicit and implicit meaning of a text. Bryman (2008: 327) refers to a qualitative content analysis as “an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of meanings of and in the texts”. This implies that the

researcher plays an essential role in a qualitative analysis of texts. Since the policy documents on radicalization compass several hundred pages and the time for this research is limited, chosen is to not code all the text but rather track down the meaning, possible contradictions and practical implications of the text.

Respondents of the semi-structured interviews have been chosen by using a purposeful selection strategy, i.e. they are selected because of their personal experience or knowledge with respect to the topic (Bryman, 2008). However, not all participants are chosen by free selection, since Spirit, Sciandri and the city council insisted that they selected the interviewees. Furthermore, the content and the goal of the interviews had to be clear, even though the interviews were semi-structured and not entirely fixed.

As a result, Ali Bouaouzan and Rachid Amrani from Sciandri are interviewed, as well as Mohamed Sharif from Spirit. All three men are from Moroccan decent and were raised and still live in Amsterdam. Government official Mounir Dadi, also from Moroccan decent, is a senior staff member from the municipality of Amsterdam. He is responsible for the contact point for radicalization and engaged in the radicalization policy.6_Fifth

interviewee is Ineke Roex, a Dutch professor in salafism and radicalization at the University of Amsterdam. She conducted a research on the Salafi movement in the Netherlands and is currently engaged in a research on Islamic activism in Western Europe. All interviews were

6_{For the contact point for radicalization, see:}

(16)

16 conducted face to face and fully recorded. Next to that, side notes were taken.

Semi-structured interviews are a valuable method in this research since its framework allows for open, conversational two-way communication without losing focus on the topic. The majority of the questions were created during the interview, which allows both the interviewer and the respondent to elaborate on details or discuss relevant issues rather than following a rigid interview guide. Another reason for the use of semi-structured interviews as main method in this research is the probability of gaining more information through different perspectives next to analysing official documents.

(17)

17

2 Analyzing the Amsterdam policy on radicalization

Introduction

The policy on radicalization in Amsterdam in its current state, often referred to as the Brede Aanpak (‘Broad Approach’), can be understood as some kind of cumulative process. By building up knowledge and expertise throughout the years, the policy has been constantly changed and renewed. However, the first report on radicalization after the murder of Theo van Gogh, called Wij Amsterdammers, still serves as solid foundation for the current policy. Thus, this report will be central to the analysis in this section. In order to get a critical view on the establishment of the policy, the road to the ‘Broad Approach’ will first be examined. Furthermore, as has been elaborated earlier in the theoretical section, the academic field of policy studies encompasses to a large extent the discussion between a top-down and bottom-up approach of policymaking. While a top-down design is one where a decision maker or executive on top of the process determines the direction or course of the policy, a bottom-up design departs from grassroots – a large chain of people who are active in the practical setting the policy is aiming at (Barett, 2004). As both approaches have their own positive and

negative aspects, the framework of the policy on radicalization will be analysed in this

chapter. In order to identify the political and theoretical components this policy consists of, it will be helpful to use insights from top-down and bottom-up theories, as well as the

experiences of government official Mounir Dadi, and visions of Professor Ineke Roex, specialized in salafism and radicalism (policies).

2.1 Analyzing the road to the ‘broad approach’

The council of Amsterdam is actively promoting a policy on radicalization that seeks to limit and eradicate “problems caused by radicalization and polarization” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2012: 7). Ever since the assassination of Theo van Gogh, these policies have been changed and renewed for many times. Between 2005 and 2012 at least 17 reports on radicalization have been published on behalf of the Government of Amsterdam7. When analysing these government documents and reports, a certain course of development becomes visible. In 2004, shortly after the murder of Van Gogh, the aim of policy makers and advisors was to gain more insight into the dangers of radicalization within Amsterdam and to get a better understanding of what this danger means to the security of its citizens (Gemeente

7

http://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/veiligheid/openbare-orde/kennisbank/radicalisering/beleidsdocumenten/;

(18)

18 Amsterdam, 2004). Thus, monitoring terrorist threats and individuals who may pose a direct danger to society as well as ‘eradicating radicalization’ was the biggest concern for the city council (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004). In a report called Wij Amsterdammers the factual findings were briefly:

- Terrorism is present in the Netherlands and Amsterdam - Relatively little is known about processes of radicalization

- Relatively little is known about radical/extremist interpretations of the Islam - There are persons in Amsterdam who have certain ideas, motives and willingness to engage in violent acts

- An approach that includes only police and the ministry of justice is not sufficient: the city council has a clear role to fulfil.

Hence, it comes clear that the findings in one of the first official reports on radicalization in Amsterdam have an explorative character and are focused on mapping the presence and danger of radicalization in Amsterdam.

Furthermore, in 2006 a second report was published, called Wij Amsterdammers II. As a result of the first report, factors that could influence or cause radicalization are described more into detail. In order to diagnose the actual problems, the researchers used a conflict model designed by professor Staub (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006). According to Mounir Dadi, a government official responsible for the radicalization policy and contact point for radicalization, this decision was made in order to get a more detailed and comprehensive overview of the situation in Amsterdam:

“After the first Wij Amsterdammers it became clear that our knowledge about this topic was highly insufficient. Of course, the city council was aware of tensions in society among different groups. But to be honest, we did not consider radicalization to be a real potential danger up until 2005.”8

Thus, even though government officials already had notions of polarization in the Amsterdam society, the murder of Van Gogh elicited awareness for a new, unknown danger. The policy is shifting from monitoring and recognizing radicalization, towards offering vulnerable individuals and groups a perspective for a better position in society.

According to Dadi, the approach has improved in many ways in 2007. This can be attributed to a large extent to the growing academic field of research on radicalization. Dadi

8_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “Na de verschijning van ‘Wij}

Amsterdammers’ werd duidelijk dat onze kennis over dit onderwerp ontoereikend was. Natuurlijk waren we op de hoogte van spanningen in de samenleving tussen verschillende groepen. Maar om eerlijk te zijn, radicalisering werd tot 2005 nooit gezien als echt gevaar” (original citation).

(19)

19 points out: “Especially the Instituut voor Migratie en Etnische Studies (IMES), associated to the University of Amsterdam, conducted a research on processes of radicalization which provided us new perspectives on radicalization in our city”.9_{The research Dadi refers to is}

called Amsterdam tegen radicalisering (‘Amsterdam against radicalization’). Next to a more clear definition of radicalization and a comprehensive view on the beliefs and ideology that characterizes radicalizing individuals, the research identifies new possible causes for

radicalization. Interestingly, according to the researchers, the risk of radicalization increases when an orthodox interpretation of the Islam is combined with the perception that politics and society treat Muslims in an unjust way and the Islam is therefore being threatened (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). Thus, the combination of a religious and political dimension could result in a process of radicalization according to the report. However, Ineke Roex (2014), professor at the University of Amsterdam and specialized in salafism and radicalization, warns for a too simplified approach of the connection between an orthodox religion and radicalization or terrorism. She points out that “Since a few decades people tend to confuse an orthodox or salafist religion for an extremist/jihadist ideology”.10 According to Roex, being an orthodox Muslim can be in no conceivable way linked to terrorist activities or tendencies towards radicalization. In addition, Roex argues that so called salafi’s embrace more western democratic values than most people think: “Most salafi’s accept the democratic legal order for pragmatic reasons. They are aware of the rights they have in the Netherlands, unlike most Arab countries. Their logic is that you have to accept the laws of the country you live in, as long as you are able to fulfil your religious duties”11. This contradicts the starting point of the 2007 policy, where it is stated that “even though orthodoxy does not always lead to

radicalism (..) all radicals are orthodox” (Slootman & Tillie, 2006: 4). Here the report initiated by the city council leaves no doubt that an orthodox religion in all cases is involved in the process of radicalization. This assumption could provoke reactions from the Islamic community, where a salafist interpretation of Islam is on one hand considered as a dogmatic and rigid version of Islam, but at the same time respected and honoured in western societies

9_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “Vooral het onderzoek}

gedaan door IMES leverde nieuwe inzichten over radicalisering in Amsterdam” (original citation).

10_{Professor of salafism and radicalization policy at the University of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “Sinds}

een aantal decennia zijn mensen geneigd een orthodox of salafistische geloofsbeleving te verwarren voor een extremistische of jihadistische ideologie” (original citation).

11_{Professor of salafism and radicalization policy at the University of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “De}

meeste salafi’s accepteren de democratische rechtsorde uit pragmatische overweging. Ze zijn zich vaak bewust van de rechten die ze in Nederland hebben, in tegenstelling tot de meeste Arabische landen. Hun redenering is dat je de wetten van het land waarin je leeft moet accepteren, zolang je in staat bent aan je belangrijkste religieuze plichten te voldoen” (original citation).

(20)

20 (Eikelenboom, 2004).

In 2009 the policy renewed again, focusing more on far right radicalism,

discrimination, problematic neighbourhoods, possible effects of the economic crisis and unemployment. Thus, the approach became even broader. According to Roex, the decision to focus more on far right radicalism is a political decision. She argues:

“Right radicalism can hardly be considered as a problem in Amsterdam. The city council proclaimed more emphasis on other types of radicalism to keep the people, especially the Muslim community satisfied. The government claims that their radicalization programs aim to address all types of radicalization, though Islamic radicalization is by far their biggest challenge”12.

This seems a legitimate argument: though the 2009 evaluation report promotes bigger emphasis on far right radicalism, only three of the approximately sixty notifications the radicalization contact point received were related to far right radicalization (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). The ‘Broad Approach’ also emerges out of the more general focus on discrimination. In order to eradicate the breeding ground for radicalization, the report states that it is necessary to reduce discrimination and social contradictions. Although this idea is supported by different theories on radicalization (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Silber & Bhatt, 2007), it is also where the approach might become too broad: by focusing on literally any individual with their programs the anti-radicalization policy is shifting more and more towards a re-integration policy.

Finally, in 2012 a new kind of evaluation took place. Here, previous mentioned dangers that could lead to radicalization such as the economic crisis and unemployment are not discussed one time. This shows how inconstant and impulsive the policy on radicalization in Amsterdam is. After all, the economic crisis is still present and unemployment rates

continue to rise. Dadi admits:

“after seven very productive and valuable years of research and policy on radicalization we are still discovering new aspects that are related to radicalization (..) a few years ago, our researchers described the economic crisis as ‘point of attention’, since in different countries people blamed the state and the business sector for the crisis.

12_{Professor of salafism and radicalization policy at the University of Amsterdam, interviewed by author:}

Rechts-radicalisme kan amper worden gezien als een probleem in Amsterdam. De gemeente benadrukt dat het beleid is gericht op alle vormen van radicalisering, vooral om de moslimgemeenschap tevreden te houden. Islamitisch radicalisme is veruit hun grootste uitdaging” (original citation).

(21)

21

In some cases, this unrest was accompanied by violence. This threat was serious enough to pay attention to in our radicalization policy, since we do not want to leave out any potential factor”13.

This eagerness to track down any potential cause for radicalization underlines the broad approach that characterizes the policy. Though it remains unknown whether factors such as economic crises play a role in processes of radicalization among Muslims in Amsterdam, the city council is trying to include any thinkable factor into its policy. According to

Wiktorowitcz (2005) and De Graaff et al. (2009) radicalization is a process that can evolve in a very short period of time, often initiated by a personal crisis incited by several personal factors, for example job loss. However, they also content that it is extremely difficult to address such personal factors. Therefore, they recommend a specific approach aimed at tracking down the individuals that are already displaying deviant or delinquent behaviour, instead of focusing on numerous indirect factors the government has little to no influence on, such as economic crises (Wiktorowitcz, 2005). Moreover, in the 2012 ‘reorientation’ of the radicalization policy, signals of ‘jihad travellers’ are discussed. Despite the fact that the report calls for extra attention for the Syrian, Egyptian and Somalian community, about 100 to 150 Dutch Muslims are active in several wars in the Middle East (NCTB, 2014).

According to Roex, this is one of the failed tasks of the government: “It was a well-known fact that since 2011 an increasing amount of young Muslims travelled to countries in the Middle East to participate in jihadi-oriented wars. Even though the national and municipal governments were aware of this, they failed to anticipate. I consider that a missed chance”14. Again, this indicates that the ‘broad approach’ is not fully addressing the problems it should address: deradicalizing vulnerable individuals. This leads to the preliminary conclusion that increasing knowledge and information from several reports resulted into an approach aimed at eradicating breeding grounds for radicalization without addressing the hard core of individuals who embody the biggest challenge and threat for the city council.

13_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “Na zeven bijzonder}

productieve en waardevolle jaren onderzoek ontdekken we nog steeds nieuwe aspecten van radicalisering (..) een aantal jaar geleden werd de economische crisis als aandachtspunt genoemd, aangezien mensen in verschillende landen de staat en zakenwereld verantwoordelijk hielden voor de crisis. In enkele gevallen ging dit gepaard met geweld. Voor ons was deze dreiging serieus genoeg om aandacht te krijgen in het

radicaliseringsbeleid, aangezien we geen enkele potentiële factor over het hoofd willen zien”.

14_{Professor of salafism and radicalization policy at the University of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “Het}

was algemeen bekend dat sinds 2011 een toenemend aantal Nederlandse moslims naar landen in het Midden Oosten afreisden om mee te vechten met jihadistische strijdgroepen” (original citation).

(22)

22 2.2 The broad approach: top-down or bottom-up?

Furthermore, in order to get a better understanding of the policy on radicalization, top-down and bottom-up approaches can offer helpful insights. Wij Amsterdammers is one of the first reports that focusses specifically on the danger of radicalization and terrorism in Amsterdam. Results of this research were translated into a new anti-radicalization policy that was aimed at reducing radicalism in Amsterdam. To a large extent, this policy process can be viewed as a top-down method, since the major guidelines of the policy are derived from

recommendations in an earlier publication: Van Dawa to Jihad by the AIVD, the Dutch secret service (2004). Next to that the authors of the report state that interventions and

strategies are based on existing academic literature. Strategies that are suggested can be found in the recommendations of Wij Amsterdammers. Since it remains unclear how the AIVD collected its information and most of the recommendations and strategies in Wij

Amsterdammers are presented as major solutions, it is hard to believe that the government used a bottom-up approach and consulted relevant people active in the field about their needs. Dadi argues:

“We used the databank of the AIVD to set up a first foundation specifically focused on radicalization in Amsterdam. Radicalization was – especially at that time – a relative new phenomenon that required immediate action after the murder of Van Gogh. Therefore, we consulted the AIVD for the right strategies15”.

Thus, the policy has been set at a high level in the political process and is subsequently communicated to lower levels of executioners in the field. This strategy is equivalent to Elmore’s concept of forward mapping, which holds the idea that a clear statement of a small group of policymakers is formulated at the top, in this case the secret service agency and the city council of Amsterdam. After the policy statement passes different stages of the

hierarchical chain it is eventually executed by the workers in the field (Elmore, 1997). What happens in the case of the policy on radicalization is that three main guide lines are

formulated: fighting terrorism in addition to actions by police and ministry of justice; preventing radicalization by counteracting exclusion and discrimination; and preventing polarization and mobilizing positive forces (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005). In fact, these guide lines remain quite abstract and nonconcrete. Barett (2004) argues that vague and

15_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “We maakten gebruik van de}

databank van de AIVD om een eerste basis te leggen voor de aanpak van radicalisering. Zeker in die tijd was radicalisering een relatief nieuw verschijnsel, dat directe actie vereiste naar aanleiding van de moord op Van Gogh. Daarom hebben we de AIVD geraadpleegd” (original citation).

(23)

23 unclear goals characterize a top-down approach: objectives that are set by actors on top of the political process, who are hardly aware of the situation in the field, are most of the time difficult to achieve in practice.

Furthermore, recommendations in the report are formulated by an advisory board on top of the political chain (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005). Recommendations such as the publishing of a manifest that “includes the basic elements of the constitution in simple words” are not driven by agents in the field but invented by people in the office. Elmore (1997) criticizes such a strategy, by stating that the effectiveness remains unclear and moreover, a manifest of empty phrases can by no means be considered as an useful

instrument for executioners in the field, let alone address the actual problem. Other examples of vague, abstract suggestions are “the stimulation and promotion of discussion about several relevant topics among youngsters “and “creating a we/us sentiment”16. Roex (2014) qualifies them as completely useless:

“Especially at the beginning terms such as radicalization and salafism were to a large extent politicized by the elite. This led to a huge wave of publications and conferences on these topics, which were at least interesting, but not really helpful. While the situation demanded a clear, practical, unambiguous game plan, politics took over”17

However, next to this top-down centred view of the policy, once could distinguish some more bottom-up elements the report on radicalization. First, The city council is keen to stress that Wij Amsterdammers is ‘work in progress’ and that initiatives from society will, if possible, be included in the strategies (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004). Yet, valuable initiatives against radicalization from society are rare according to Slootman & Tillie (2006), so the policy remains largely a matter of top-down strategies. A second bottom-up element can be found in the statement that information indicating processes of radicalization is already collected in an earlier stage during regular work activities by many of the municipal services. Dadi explains:

“In fact, we already had an unofficial databank full of valuable information about radicalization in our

16_{See Actieplan “Wij Amsterdammers” at http:/www.amsterdam.nl/publish/actieplan/wijamsterdammers.pdf} 17_{Professor of salafism and radicalization policy at the University of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: Zeker}

in het begin werden termen als ‘radicalisering’ en ‘salafisme’ tot in den treure gepolitiseerd door de elite. Dit leidde tot een golf van publicaties en congressen over deze onderwerpen. Op zich heel interessant, maar niet heel nuttig. Terwijl de situatie een duidelijk, praktisch actieplan vereiste nam de politiek het over” (original citation)

(24)

24

municipality. However, most of the information was not recognized or labelled as such. Many services had acquired useful information about radicalization, without knowing that. So we started scanning this data in order to get a better overview of the situation in the streets”18

Thus, one could consider this tactic as a certain bottom-up tactic: workers in the field, who are affiliated with the municipality and are in direct contact with the actors the policy is aiming at, are reporting experiences which are directly used by policymakers. Even though this information was initially not acquired in order to gain knowledge about radicalization, it can still be seen as direct information at the grassroots-level and thus a bottom-up approach. According to Elmore (1997), a more moderate version of bottom-up entails the tactic of using information directly retrieved in the field by professionals and officials without any

previously stated order to do so. In other words, knowledge is collected by scanning through reports and documents of fieldworkers whose working activities are related to the main topic, in this case radicalization. Hence, next to use of academic literature and data from secret services some information directly from the field is included in the policy on radicalization.

Another indication of a bottom-up strategy are the several researches conducted by the Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek (‘Office for Research and Statistics’). In one research in 2012 for example, tensions among communities were examined in order to gain insights into the presence, backgrounds and risk factors of polarization and radicalization. The

participants, residents of Amsterdam, stated that tensions in the neighbourhood are caused by nuisance of youngsters and dirt on the streets, instead of differences in religious background for example. This led to more police patrols and campaigns calling to keep the streets clean (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014). While this is a good example of recognizing and addressing a problem at grassroots level, it can be questioned whether such a strategy really attributes to eradicating polarization and radicalization. Roex argues:

“The Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek is the proudly promoted research department of the municipality that stores a large range of data. Even though I consider clean streets and more police patrol as a nice way to keep neighbourhoods liveable, I doubt that these initiatives have a significant effect on themes as radicalization and polarization (..) intentions of monitoring problems at the street level are visible, but they are not contributing”19

18_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: In principe beschikten we,}

zonder het te weten, al over een grote hoeveelheid kennis over radicalisering dankzij onze collega’s bij verschillende gemeente diensten. Echter werd deze informatie nog niet als dusdanig gezien. Daarom zijn we begonnen deze informatie door te spitten en een overzicht gaan maken” (original citation).

19_{Het Bureau van Onderzoek en Statistiek is het paradepaardje van de gemeente dat onderzoeken verzorgd}

naar elk denkbaar onderwerp. Hoewel schone straten en meer politie mij een mooi streven lijken om een leefbare buurt te creëren, betwijfel ik of deze initiatieven een significant effect hebben op thema’s als

(25)

25 This, again, indicates that the broad approach seems to depart or even alienate from the official goal of the government: eradicating radicalization. Despite the numerous actions taken by the government, varying from education programs, to so called ‘street coaches’, to neighbourhood barbecues set up to create more social cohesion, the critical question remains whether this truly addresses the real problem. Is seems as if the government of Amsterdam is using a bottom-up approach only to address general issues that contribute to a better and more liveable environment. When it comes to the major guidelines, the essence of the policy on radicalization, a top-down approach expressed by recommendations derived from

bureaucratic bodies such as the secret service and academic research becomes visible.

Conclusion

When analysing the course the government of Amsterdam is following in its policy on radicalization, it becomes clear that the first findings, shortly after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, are primarily explorative: knowledge about radicalization is not present thus information is derived from the secret service and academic research. This is a first indication of a top-down approach. Although more information is collected throughout the years, some aspects of the policy remain vague or debatable, such as the assumed link between salafism and radicalization or the proclaimed shift towards other (barely-existing) forms of

radicalization next to Islamic radicalization. Next to that, the policy seems inconsequent in certain ways: some potential factors of radicalization that are mentioned in one report are completely ignored in the next. Examples are the economic crisis or problematic

neighbourhoods. Also, the danger of jihad travellers is underestimated by officials: while the city council received early notifications about this issue, several youngsters are fighting wars in Islamic states at the moment. As we shall see, this could lead to new impulses for

radicalization. Moreover, when looking at the theoretical aspects of the policy, a top-down character seems to prevail. The main objectives of the policy are set by actors on top of the political process, the city council. Secondly, the guidelines are too general and unpractical to be really effective in the field. There is little to no input from the grassroots-level, which could affect the success of the policy. A few bottom-up elements can be identified in the information that is directly acquired by fieldworkers, though this remains a very moderate form of bottom-up politics. In sum, the broad approach on radicalization is largely shaped by

radicalisering en polarisatie (..) intenties om problemen op street level in kaart te brengen zijn zichtbaar, maar dragen nog niet bij aan een oplossing.

(26)

26 top-down politics and entails a wide range of practical actions, while the real danger of

radicalization remains unaddressed.

3 Implementation stage of the broad approach

Hence, the main aim of the policy on radicalization is connecting citizens of Amsterdam and enhancing trust among different community groups in order to eradicate radicalization (De Gruijter, van Middelkoop & Pels, 2008). This policy can be considered as preventive, since it is aimed at a broad public and the different programs are set up in order to decrease

discrimination and social contradictions and eventually eliminate the breeding ground for radicalization. In this section, the implementation stage will be analysed by using the experiences from so called ‘key figures’ Ali Baddaou, Rachid Amrani and Hicham Sharif, who work for Sciandri and Spirit, societal organizations involved in the policy. Next to that, the possible gap between these experiences in the field and the expectations of the city council will be analysed.

3.1 From the office to the field: radicalization policy on the grassroots level Since it became clear that most of the policy is created by a top-down approach, it is

interesting to look at the grassroots level how the policy is functioning. The government has decided to work with ‘key figures’, actors in the field that are in close connection to the individuals the policy aims at. These key figures include street coaches, societal workers, sport trainers and teachers (De Gruijter, van Middelkoop & Pels, 2008). Stichting Sciandri (‘the Sciandri Foundation’) conducts social community work in a sportive environment and offers sport stimulation programs20. Ali Baddaou and Rachid Amrani both work for Sciandri and explain their work activities: “next to guiding and teaching them a sport we also try to reach youngsters in an educational way where schools and government fail21_{”. This is the}

main method of the several programs the government has set up: reaching youngsters via role models, figures from the same environment who fulfil an exemplary role. Though Baddaou feels like the young participants in his class respect him and look up to him, the effectiveness of the program remains unclear to him. He states that it is very difficult to check whether the goal of behavioral change is met, since youngsters experience so many different stimuli that constitutes their behaviour. Furthermore, the goals of the government policy and Sciandri

20_{http://www.sciandri.com/}

21_{Youth worker at Stichting Sciandri, interviewed by author: “Naast dat we jongeren begeleiden tijdens het}

sporten en leren hoe ze moeten sporten proberen we ze ook op een pedagogische manier te bereiken, waarin scholen en de overheid vaak falen” (original citation).

(27)

27 differ in a certain sense, which could lead to divergent and unexpected outcomes.

According to Dadi, the city council decided to include Sciandri in their policy because of its capability to get in contact with problematic and vulnerable youngsters: “we want organizations like Sciandri to create trust between workers and youngsters in order to identify signals of radicalization and, if necessary, intervene when a case demands action”22_{. This}

implies that youth workers from Sciandri are familiar and experienced with recognizing signals of radicalization and that tracking down radicalization is one of the main tasks of the organization. However, according to their website, Sciandri views itself as a facilitator of sport activities that seeks to learn participants to be a team player and how to cope with losing. Next to that, they want to offer youngsters in problematic neighborhoods some kindof healthy recreation23. Amrani argues: “as far as I know, we are seeking to educate and support children in their daily lives by engaging them in sport activities. Radicalization is not directly our concern. We know how to deal with problematic individuals to a certain extent, but I am not sure how to link this to radicalization”24_{. When asked, Baddaou also denies that he is}

executing the radicalization policy through his youth work: “radicalization is a serious threat that I think is best managed by police or the ministry of justice. Of course, we play a role in educating children and youth, but our focus is not on identifying radicalization among our participants”25_{. Thus, while government official Dadi claims that organizations such as}

Sciandri are executioners of the policy in the field, the organization and its employees are unaware of this.

This policy bias can be explained as a discrepancy between policy makers and

executioners: according to McLaughlin (1987) individual beliefs and incentives are central to responses at the local level. While the city council may invest in trainings and workshops for the implementers, McLaughlin argues “will or the attitudes, motivation and beliefs that underlie an implementer’s response to a policy’s goals or strategies, is less amenable to policy intervention” (McLaughlin, 1987: 172). Since Baddaou and Amrani refuse to view

22_{Senior staff member of the Government of Amsterdam, interviewed by author: “We willen dat organisaties}

als Sciandri het vertrouwen creëren tussen jeugdwerkers en jongeren om signalen van radicalisering vroegtijdig op te vangen en indien nodig in te grijpen” (original citation).

23_{http://www.sciandri.com/}

24_{Youth worker at Stichting Sciandri, interviewed by author: “Voor zover ik weet proberen wij kinderen iets te}

leren en ondersteunen met problemen aan de hand van sport. Radicalisering is niet onze zaak. We weten hoe we om moeten gaan met probleemjongeren maar ik weet niet of je dit kan linken aan radicalisering.” (original citation).

25_{Youth worker at Stichting Sciandri, interviewed by author: “Radicalisering is een serieuze dreiging die wordt}

opgepakt door politie en justitie. Natuurlijk spelen wij een lerende rol voor jongeren, maar onze focus ligt niet op het herkennen van radicalisering onder onze deelnemers.” (original citation).

Radicalization on the local level : a research on preventive programs and their effectiveness in Amsterdam