University of Amsterdam
Indigenous peoples’ socio-legal viewpoints
in the hybrid governance arrangement of the Amarakaeri
Communal Reserve, Peru
Iris Schuitemaker
Student number 10262059
Master thesis
24 July 2019
“
Without territory
we cannot live”
“When I was younger, about 12 or 14 years, I heard about the ACR [Amarakaeri Communal Reserve; IS]. I asked myself, and so did other younger people, and thought: for what is the ACR? Little by little I began to understand. First thing was that the ACR was our ancestors' land, so we should keep the territory for ourselves […]” (In 25)
On the cover you see an indigenous leader of one of the communities located around the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] Peru; photos by Mónica Suárez Galindo, 2017).
Iris Schuitemaker
E-mail: irisschuitemaker@hotmail.com Student number: 10262059
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. J.M. (Maarten) Bavinck
Professor of International Development Studies - Department of Human Geography, Planning and International Development Studies (GPIO), University of Amsterdam
Local supervisor
J. (Julia) Quaedvlieg, MSc
Second reader
Dr. F. (Fábio) de Castro
Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies - Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA), University of Amsterdam
This thesis was submitted on 24th of July 2019 in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Research Master in International Development Studies at the University of Amsterdam
I. Abstract
This study aims to gain a deeper insight into the hybrid governance arrangement of the Amarakaeri communal reserve (ACR) in Madre de Dios in Peru. The ACR is a protected area created in 2002 that includes indigenous peoples in governance. The ACR was promoted by these indigenous peoples as a means to gain territorial rights, as their territory is used for extractive activities. The theoretical perspectives of legal pluralism, critical institutionalism/bricolage and political ecology are combined to shine light on the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR. The main focus of this study is the socio-legal viewpoints of the indigenous peoples, and to what extent these viewpoints are promoted and incorporated in the governance practice of the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR. This is done because local resource users are increasingly participating in hybrid governance arrangements, such as protected areas. This study provides insights in hybrid governance arrangements involving indigenous peoples in order to come to more socially just governance arrangements. Six months of ethnographic fieldwork were conducted, including participant observations, informal and semi-structured interviews; the data was analyzed with a thematic narrative analysis.
The study found that the socio-legal viewpoints of the indigenous peoples center on the concept of territorial sovereignty. An elite group of indigenous people is able to promote these socio-legal viewpoints, as they are the ones that participate in the hybridgovernance arrangement. However, other more powerful actors – the central state, an oil company and nature conservation NGOs – are able to advance their interest into the hybrid governance arrangement, hereby minimizing the room to maneuver for indigenous people. Outcomes of the hybrid governance arrangement are that extractive activities continue on indigenous territories. At the same time, indigenous people are encouraged by the ACR’s governing actors (mostly NGOs) to use their territories in a “sustainable” way. This further fuels notions of unfairness stemming from different interacting legal systems in the hybrid governance arrangement. Hybrid governance arrangements are often seen as “the way forward” in governance, as they would create win-win situations and socioenvironmental benefits. This study suggests that this assumption can be questioned.
Keywords: legal pluralism, hybrid governance, nature conservation, indigenous peoples, political
Contents
I. Abstract ... 4
II. Acknowledgements ... 8
III. Figure and Tables ... 9
IV. Acronyms & abbreviations ... 10
1. Introduction ... 12
1.1 Problem statement ... 12
1.2 Objective and research question ... 13
1.3 Thesis setup ... 14
2. Theoretical framework ... 15
2.1 Introduction ... 15
2.2 Hybridity in natural resource governance ... 15
2.2.1 Rise of governance ... 15
2.2.2 Ostrom’s legacy ... 16
2.2.3 The bricolage perspective on governance ... 18
2.3 The legal pluralism perspective on governance ... 20
2.3.1 What is the extent of law? ... 20
2.3.2 Legal pluralism and governance in hybrid arrangements ... 21
2.3.3 Hybrid governance arrangements as forums ... 23
2.4 Power in critical institutionalism/bricolage & legal pluralism ... 24
2.4.1 Political ecology ... 25
2.5 Outcomes of hybrid governance arrangements ... 26
2.6 Research questions ... 28
3. Methodology ... 29
3.1 Introduction ... 29
3.2 Epistemology ... 29
3.3 Positionality ... 30
3.4 Qualitative data collection ... 31
3.4.1 Units of analysis ... 31
3.4.2 Data collection phase 1: Course participation ... 32
3.4.4 Data collection phase 3: Visiting indigenous communities ... 34
3.5 Qualitative data analysis ... 37
3.6 Ethical considerations ... 38
Chapter 4. The state and indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon ... 40
4.1 Introduction ... 40
4.3. The historical and legal context in the Peruvian Amazon ... 41
4.3.1. The rubber boom & haciendas ... 41
4.3.2. Colonization, indigenous organization & land titling ... 42
4.3.3. Communal reserves ... 43
4.3.4. Struggles for collective land rights ... 43
4.3.5. Decentralization? ... 45
4.3.6. Indigenous protests in Bagua ... 46
4.3.7. After Bagua ... 47
4.4 Conclusion ... 48
Chapter 5. The case of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve ... 49
5.1 Introduction ... 49
5.2 The need for territorial rights: Creation of the reserve ... 49
5.3 Characteristics of the ACR ... 50
5.3.1 Geography, biodiversity and resources ... 50
5.4 Overview of resource users ... 52
5.4.1 Indigenous peoples and their communities ... 53
5.4.2 Colonos ... 56
5.4.3 Extractivism and concessions ... 59
5.4.4 NGOs ... 61
5.5 Conclusion ... 65
Chapter 6. The hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR ... 66
6.1 Introduction ... 66
6.2 Governing actors ... 66
6.2.1 El Ejecutor de Contrato de Administración (ECA) ... 66
6.2.2 Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (SERNANP) ... 67
6.2.3 Co-governance allies filling the gap ... 68
6.3 Negotiating the zonification of the ACR ... 70
6.4 Communities’ governance and Planes de Vida ... 74
6.4.1 Indigenous communities’ governance ... 74
6.4.2 Planes de Vida ... 77
6.5 Creating elite groups? ... 81
6.6 Conclusion ... 84
Chapter 7. Indigenous peoples’ socio-legal viewpoints ... 86
7.1 Introduction ... 86
7.2 “It is our territory” ... 86
7.3 Keeping others out of the territory ... 88
7.4.1 Restricted resource use ... 91
7.4.2 Sustainable development projects ... 94
7.5 conclusion ... 96
Chapter 8. Conclusion ... 98
8.1 Introduction ... 98
8.2 Revisiting the research questions and theoretical framework ... 98
8.2.1. SQ1: Constitution of the hybrid governance arrangement ... 98
8.2.2 SQ2: Socio-legal viewpoints of indigenous peoples ... 100
8.2.3. SQ3: Reflection of socio-legal viewpoints in the hybrid governance arrangement ... 102
8.3 Limitations and recommendations ... 103
8.4 Back to the main research question ... 104
8.5 Moving towards socially just outcomes? ... 106
References ... 107
Appendix 1 – Topic list and key questions ... 119
Appendix 2 – List of interviewees ... 121
Appendix 3 – List of participants focus group discussion ... 122
Appendix 4 – All posters focus group discussion ... 123
Appendix 5 – Table of ethnic groups of the ACR ... 126
Appendix 6 – Definitions of the zonfication types in the ACR ... 127
II. Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Maarten Bavinck for his time, guidance and advise during the thesis writing process. Second, I would like to thank my local supervisor Julia Quaedvlieg for opening doors in Puerto Maldonado and for inviting me at to social events to make me feel more at home.
In Cusco I am very grateful to the staff of the San Blas Spanish School for helping me to upgrade my Spanish to an acceptable level. Special thanks to Chris Beirne from CREES for his feedback on my fieldwork plans. In Puerto Maldonado I would like to thank Tambopata Hostel for being my home and the staff for becoming my friends. Thanks for the many adventures, jungle trips and hikes in the weekends.
Special thanks to the staff of SERNANP and ECA, and all the people willing to talk to me about my research topic. Thank you for opening up your communities and lives for me. And, of course thanks for the countless bananas with rice, Inca Kola, masato and for playing volleyball during midday. Without your time and interesting stories none of this would be possible. Dakichi! And of course, many thanks Cassandra, Carla and Laura for assisting me during interviews.
Last, I would like to thank my partner Elmar Hanewald for travelling all the way to Peru, for the financial support that enabled me to concentrate on writing my thesis, for editing my work and for his love, care and patience.
III. Figure and Tables
Table 3.1: Number of days spent in each indigenous community 35 Table 3.2: Number of participants according to gender in different research phases 37
Figure 5.1: Location of the ACR and Manu National Park 51
Figure 5.2: Close up of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve 52 Figure 5.3: The territories of the Harakmbut groups before “contact” and the current ACR 53 Table 5.4: Population numbers of the indigenous communities around the ACR 55 Figure 5.5: A bird’s eye view on one of the communities in the ACR 56 Table 5.6: Numbers of colonos in the ACR and buffer zone 57
Figure 5.7: Small-scale gold mining in Huepetuhe 57
Figure 5.8: Extractivism, colonos and the planned road in the ACR 59
Table 5.9: The main mission of NGOs active in the ACR 62
Figure 6.1: Zonification of the ACR 2008-2012 72
Figure 6.2: Zonification of the ACR 2016-2020 74
IV. Acronyms & abbreviations
ACCA Asociación para la Conservación de la Cuenca Amazónica – Amazon Conservation Association
ACR Amarakaeri Communal Reserve
AIDESEP Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana – Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Jungle
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit – Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBC Community-Based Conservation
CBNRM Community-Based Natural Resource Management
COHARYIMA Consejo Harakmbut, Yine y Machiguenga – Harakmbut, Yine and Matsigenka Council
COICA Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica – Coordinator of the Indigenous organizations of the Amazon basin
COINBAMAD Consejo Indígena de la Zona Baja de Madre de Dios – Indigenous Council of the Lower zone of the Madre de Dios river
EBA Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (project of UNEP)
ECA Ejecutor de Contrato de Administración – The Executor of the Administration Contract
Expert In* Expert interview
F* Fieldnote (including informal interview material)
FENAMAD Federación Nativa del Río Madre de Dios y Afluentes – Native Federation of the River Madre de Dios and its Tributaries
FPIC Free prior and informed consent
FTA Free Trade Agreement
ILO International Labour Organization
INGEMMET Instituto Geológico Minero y Metalúrgico – Mining and Metallurgic Geology Institute of Peru
INRENA Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales – National Institute for Natural Resources
MINAM Ministerio del Ambiente – Ministry of Environment
MINEM Ministerio de Energía y Minas – Ministry of Energy and Mines MPA Marine protected area
NGO Non-Governmental Organization NTFP Non-timber forest product
PA Protected area
PDCPI Plan de desarrollo de capacidades para pueblos indígenas – Development of Capacities Plan for Indigenous Communities
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation SePeru Servicios Ecosistémicos Perú – Ecosystem Services Peru
SERNANP Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas – National Service of Natural Protected Areas of the State
SINANPE Sistema Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas – National System of Natural Protected Areas of the State
SPDA Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental – Peruvian Society for Environmental Law
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WWF World Wildlife Fund
1. Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
During the 1990s academic scholars identified a shift from government to governance, with multiple private, semi-public and public actors now recognized in the act of governing, whereas in the past this was seen mainly as the domain of the state (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009; Kooiman, 1993; Ansell & Torfing, 2016). Like in many domains, governance also shaped nature conservation, as multiple actors are now involved in protected area (PA) governance. Among these actors, local resource users and indigenous peoples are often targeted as partners. The reason being they already manage their natural resources, and therefore they would be best suited to conserve those resources (Dressler et al., 2010). The shift to governance also opened up the playing field to international organizations, NGOs and market players.
The interaction of these multiple actors in governance takes place in hybrid governance arrangements; new institutions that are created to enhance natural resource governance through co-governance. In hybrid governance arrangements local populations and multiple state and non-state actors govern together. It is said that hybrid governance arrangements can create win-win situations, as they can reduce poverty through sustainable livelihoods, have various environmental benefits, create better rules for resource access, and promote social justice by including marginalized populations in governance (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012).
The diverse set of involved actors in hybrid governance arrangements have a different notion of what is fair and refer to different socio-legal systems, which is called a situation of legal pluralism (Bavinck, 2005). The interactions of different actors in a situation of legal pluralism is a political one, as legal pluralism is embedded in power relations (De Theije et al., 2014). This raises questions on how hybrid governance arrangements are negotiated and structured, as they might work to benefit (the socio-legal systems of) some actors and disadvantage others (Cleaver et al., 2013).
One such hybrid governance arrangement is the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (ACR) in the Amazon region of Peru, a PA created in 2002 with the aim to benefit indigenous peoples and to protect nature. The ACR is co-governed by indigenous organizations, the state, and several nature conservation NGOs. This created a complex situation whereby the indigenous peoples
now have to deal with multiple governing actors who have different interests and notions of fairness, and who refer to different socio-legal systems (Bavinck, 2005).
1.2 Objective and research question
This research aims to understand the socio-legal system and the position within the governance arrangement of the indigenous peoples in the ACR, hereby providing insight in governance processes involving local resource users and marginalized groups, in order to come to more socially just environmental governance arrangements. The research question therefore is as follows:
How do indigenous peoples promote their socio-legal viewpoints in the hybrid governance arrangement of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve in Peru and to what extent are these viewpoints incorporated in governance practice?
Addressing these issues in hybrid governance arrangements, such as the ACR, is socially relevant as they aim at addressing issues related to social justice for local resource users and marginalized groups, such as indigenous peoples. On top of this, the ACR is located in the Amazon rainforest, and it also aims at meeting nature conservation goals. The Amazon rainforest is the largest tropical rainforest in the world, with global conservation significance. It is socially relevant to study how indigenous peoples promote and incorporated their socio-legal viewpoints in the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR, to see if hybrid governance arrangements can indeed enhance natural resource governance, create win-win situations, and promote social justice by including local populations in governance.
Studies on legal pluralism in the Latin American context are plentiful. However, they are mostly viewed theoretically in the dichotomy of customary law versus state law (Simon Thomas, 2013) and focus mostly on dispute settlement. Within the environmental governance literature, and especially on studies focusing on PAs, legal pluralism is often seen as an outcome of the creation of a PA. This is because conservation efforts are not introduced in a vacuum, since socio-legal systems are already in place (Chuenpagdee et al., 2013). Knowledge gaps exist on how the pluralism of rules and norms arises and how this should be dealt with (Bavinck & Gupta, 2014).
1.3 Thesis setup
In the following chapter I highlight the main theoretical perspectives used in this research: legal pluralism, critical institutionalism/bricolage and political ecology. Furthermore, these theoretical perspectives are linked together in a theoretical framework. Chapter 3 further explains the research design, methodology and methods chosen for this research. In chapter 4, I map the national policy context, with regards to policies affecting indigenous peoples in the Amazon region. This chapter also provides an analysis of the workings of the Peruvian state. In the first empirical chapter (5), I shortly describe the history and characteristics of the ACR and map the different resource users. The second empirical chapter (6), delves into the hybrid governance arrangements of the ACR in order to see how governance is practiced. In the last empirical chapter (7), I map the socio-legal viewpoints of the indigenous peoples and explore to what extent these viewpoints are incorporated in the hybrid governance arrangement, and with what outcomes. In chapter 8, I answer the research questions, reflect on the theory, make suggestions for further research, and contribute to the theoretical debate.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Introduction
In the following Section (2.2), I give a short historical overview of the rise of the concept of governance and how this process shaped natural resource governance and conservation efforts. Furthermore, I argue that natural resource governance increasingly takes place in new institutions or hybrid arrangements. In Section 2.3 I draw the theoretical framework, in which I combine institutional bricolage/critical institutionalism with a legal pluralism perspective and a political ecology outlook. In Section 2.4 I focus on the concept of power within these different theoretical perspectives. In Section 2.5 I review the current debates in natural resource governance, while focusing on the different outcomes and debates within these studies, and finally present my research questions (Section 2.6).
2.2 Hybridity in natural resource governance
2.2.1 Rise of governance
Since the 1990s there is a growing interest in the concept of governance, although the idea can be traced back further into history (Ansell & Torfing, 2016). The emerging interest in governance can be explained as a reaction to the growing complexity, diversity and dynamics of modern societies, in which the traditional roles of the state are problematized (Kooiman, 1993). Processes of globalization1 and environmental change resulted in growing complexity which can be seen in the lengthening of value chains of natural resources, the creation of a global competition on natural resources, overlapping jurisdictions, rights, and ownership, migratory flows and interactions between social groups, and increased changes in global climate patterns (Brondízio et al., 2009; Kooiman et al., 2008). As governments cannot govern these complexities, diversities and dynamics alone, acts of governing increasingly happen through interactions with multiple private, semi-public and public actors (Kooiman, 1993; Ansell & Torfing, 2016). Multiple non-state actors are now involved in governance, whereas in the past this was mainly the domain of the state (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009). Governance has the tradition to formulate problem solving and related solutions “neutrally” (Béné et al., 2009), such as the definition by Kooiman (2003), who defines governance as the whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. A
number of scholars argue that power relations should be of a more central concern in defining governance (Béné et al., 2009). As this study is concerned with governance of natural resources, governance is defined as “the process of formulating and contesting images and designs, and implementing procedures and practices that shape the access, control and use of natural resources among different actors”2
(De Castro et al., 2016, p. 6). This definition moves away from the tradition in governance to formulate problem solving and related solutions “neutrally” and gives room for contest among different actors (Béné et al., 2009).
2.2.2 Ostrom’s legacy
The shift from government to governance opened up the playing field in natural resource governance, which now include a diverse mix of actors, such as the state and decentralized state agencies, transnational and international organizations, NGOs, market players, and local or indigenous populations. Natural resource governance, including these multiple actors, is done through the creation of new institutions aimed to improve natural resource governance, such as PAs and conservation projects. These new institutions involve multiple interlinked scale levels, but are mostly played out on the local level when talking about governance arrangements which include local populations. New institutions are often seen as mechanisms to enhance governance at the local level, by adjusting property rights, avoiding depletion and degradation of natural resources, promoting sustainable livelihood options and advocating for robust management (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). Through the above practices local natural resource governance can be strengthened. As a consequence, community level institutions need to be redesigned, policies need to be reformed and capacity needs to be built (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). This line of thinking is called mainstream institutionalism, which in the field of natural resource governance, draws on the work of Ostrom (for example 1990, 2005). Ostrom (1990) explored the conditions under which self-governing institutions by resource users of common pool resources can be sustainable. She reacts on Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons”, which predicts common pool resources will be overexploited by rational and self-interested actors. According to Hardin, the solution is either privatization or making the commons a public good. Ostrom emphasized that collective action problems can be overcome by local communities under conditions of mutual trust and solidarity. Based on her analysis, she suggested design principles associated with sustainable natural resource governance (Ostrom, 1990). She states that better institutions for natural resource governance can be
crafted and developed by local communities and policy makers, until the optimal institution is created. Ostrom’s notion of crafting robust institutions entails building formalized institutions which mimic bureaucratic structures, instead of informal ones. Local traditions do provide the building blocks of natural resource governance, but need to be strengthened and formalized, as formalized institutions are seen as more robust, enduring and stronger than informal ones. (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012; Cleaver, 1999).
Ostrom’s legacy created a body of work on the governance of the commons, which influenced international funders, environmental NGOs and practitioners. The commons perspective led up to two policy trends. First, the decentralization of the commons to lower government levels. Second, the decentralization of the commons to local resource users (called devolution) (Merino, 2016). In Latin America this resulted in decentralization of natural resources governance to lower bodies of government and local communities. Examples of this trend are the recognition of traditional user rights over indigenous territories, the creation of indigenous reserves, and the creation of co-governed PAs with local populations (Merino, 2016). The idea behind decentralization, besides efficiency, is that it would be more democratic, accountable, and closer to the end-user of natural resources (Larson & Ribot, 2004; Béné et al., 2009).
These two trends also shaped conservation efforts, as local natural resource management systems steadily evolved into a strategy to combine social justice with conservation goals (De Castro, 2014). This was not always the case, as PAs used to be exclusively the domain of the state3. The first PA, Yellowstone National Park, was established in the United States in 1872. This new PA model was soon copied by other states around the globe (Chape et al., 2008). Together with the creation of PAs, the idea of a human free “wilderness” was copied with it, as the management approach of Yellowstone Park was one of restricted access for local populations (Igoe, 2005; Dressler et al., 2010). This restrictive management approach became widely known as “fortress conservation” (Dressler et al., 2010). From the 1970s onwards fortress conservation was critiqued in the academic debate, as restricted access to natural resources was harming local livelihoods and well-being, with the consequence that conservation objectives would be undermined by local populations. As an answer to fortress conservation, local populations were increasingly involved as partners in PA governance. PA
3 Nevertheless, it has to be noted that conservation efforts have a long history that go back before the creation of
governance moved towards community-based conservation (CBC), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and later towards co-governance. In these participatory approaches conservation objectives are often combined with the creation of livelihood options and social justice (Dressler et al., 2010). The work of Ostrom (mostly 1990) has been influential in evaluating and promoting these co-governance arrangements, in which governance responsibilities are shared between lower hierarchical governing bodies of the state and local resource users (Béné et al., 2009; Ellen, 2003). For co-governance the idea of power-sharing and equity is combined with the view that local resource users would be best suited to conserve and manage their resources. Based on this idea indigenous populations are often targeted as partners in governance of natural resources, such as in conservation projects (Dressler et al., 2010). These approaches all built on the image that local and indigenous knowledge will contribute to conservation4 (Dressler et al., 2010). In the Latin American context, the notion of indigeneity is especially relevant because ethnic communities are often targeted in conservation arrangements, as according to these approaches they have special rights to resources and territory (De Castro, 2014). The inclusion of ethnic communities is often at the expense of other local resource user groups (De Castro, 2014).
The interplay of local populations and multiple state and non-state actors takes place in new institutions, which are set up in order to enhance natural resource governance, such as in conservation projects. This creates an interplay between local populations and institutions, which is said to help for a number of problems, including poverty alleviation through sustainable livelihoods, creating better rules for resource access in order to benefit all, mitigate powerlessness by including marginalized populations in governance, and numerous environmental benefits (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). Even more benefits arise when local populations participate in new institutions together with the state, because they can hold the state accountable and reduce state failure (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). In this research the Amarakaeri Communal reserve (ACR) in Peru, which is a PA with the aim to benefit local indigenous populations, will be treated as a new institution for natural resource governance.
2.2.3 The bricolage perspective on governance
The ACR will be treated as a new institution, this will not be done however by drawing on mainstream institutionalism, but instead on critical institutionalism. Where mainstream
4 These images on indigeneity are often critiqued as they are romantic, static, and one-dimensional (Dressler et
institutionalism is mostly based on the work of Ostrom (1990; 2005), in this research critical institutionalism is based on the work of Cleaver (1999; 2000; 2001; et al., 2013; De Koning & Cleaver 2012). Critical institutionalism explores the way institutions mediate relations between natural resources, people and society (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). Cleaver argues we should move away from the idea that institutions can be consciously crafted, and rather see them as outcomes of both conscious and unconscious acts of people whom are also bound by their constraints (Cleaver, 2000). According to Cleaver, the reality of how institutions are shaped is far more complex, ad hoc, fluid and (path) dependent on social and historical context than the over-simplistic notion of “crafting” shows (Cleaver, 1999). Cleaver does not give a definition of the term institutions, which she also calls hybrid arrangements, but instead claims what they are not, by critiquing the work of Ostrom (1990; 2005). In this study the term hybrid governance arrangement is used, instead of the term (new) institution, as a focus on hybridity in governance is central to this research.
Central to Cleavers work is the concept of bricolage, a mechanism to explain why hybrid governance arrangements are the way they are. According to De Koning and Cleaver, bricolage is “the creative piecing together of different arrangements, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships to produce new or adapted institutions” (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012, p. 277). The term bricolage derives from the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss who describes a bricoleur as a French handyman, who improvises and uses all his tools to complete a task (Lévi-Strauss, 1966). Cleaver argues that hybrid governance arrangements are formed ad hoc by “bricoleurs”, people who draw on existing social, cultural, and symbolic ideas by including existing rules, meanings and local decision-making processes. Hybrid governance arrangements are also mostly based on prior needs and wishes. In this way, hybrid governance arrangements are embedded in society and are historically shaped. Cleaver focusses on the social embeddedness of hybrid governance arrangements which function on interconnected multiple levels, in which interactions are both fuzzy and messy (Cleaver, 2001).
Cleaver (2001), uses the concept of bricolage to analyze hybrid governance arrangements. According to Cleaver, “a bricolage perspective helps us to see how governance schemes are both negotiated and structured, working to benefit some and disadvantage others” (Cleaver et al., 2013, p. 2). Bricolage is based on a critical perspective that questions if hybrid governance arrangements really increase the ‘room for maneuver’ for non-state actors or if it creates
winners and losers instead (Cleaver et al., 2013). By incorporating power relations into the bricolage perspectives, Cleaver critiques the way communities are treated in Ostrom’s mainstream institutionalism (1990; 2005), as power dynamics in communities and between stakeholders are often overlooked in this approach (Cleaver et al., 2013; Ribot et al., 2006). It can also be read as a more general critique on the tradition in governance to formulate problem solving and related solutions without giving much attention to power relations (Béné et al., 2009).
2.3 The legal pluralism perspective on governance
Multiple state and non-state actors and local populations are now involved in governance through hybrid governance arrangements, these multiple actors all have different norms, values and interests. On top of this, multiple actors also gained law-making abilities, as the production of law now opened up to a wide range of public and private organizations in hybrid governance arrangements (Von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Turner, 2019). One theoretical outlook that can shine a light on this issue is legal pluralism. Legal pluralism acknowledges that law is not exclusively connected to the state and a plurality of legal orders exists (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009). Legal pluralism can be defined as the situation whereby different, formal and informal (parts of) legal systems are applied to identical situations and come into contact (Vanderlinden 1972; Von Benda-Beckmann, F., 2002; Bavinck, 2018).
2.3.1 What is the extent of law?
The main debate around the concept of legal pluralism is centered around the extent of the term “law”. Where some, mostly legal scholars, argue that law is always connected to the state, others, mainly legal pluralists, argue that normative structures of other political or social entities can be legitimate. Legal pluralism thus leaves room to explore the term “law” as an analytical concept. In other words, what can be considered as law? Santos states that if the concept of law would know no limits, it is both everywhere and nowhere (Santos, 1985). So, where does legal pluralism end? What is law, and where is it? (Santos, 1987). The use of law as an analytical concept therefore always requires clarification of the kind of legal phenomena to which one refers (Von Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2006). In this study, law will be defined as a normative order enforced by a staff of people in which a set of rules structure human conduct (Bavinck, 2005). Instead of the term normative order, I will use the term socio-legal system, or short legal system, throughout this study for reasons of
consistency. The Von Benda-Beckmanns define socio-legal system as “a body of legal rules and regulations conceived of as a totality and represented as a bounded symbolic universe by social actors [...]” (Von Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2006, p. 18).
The Von Benda-Beckmanns state that law manifests itself in three ways. The first is through ‘general law’, general rules and principles, which express how things are and why they are the way they are. In the second way, law manifests itself through ideological claims, ideological representations, or normative conceptions (Von Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2006). These normative conceptions express how things must, should or may be. Socio-legal systems are thus imbedded in normative ideas and ideologies in societies. Therefore, law can be seen as bodies of norms and values, or legal ways of seeing the world (Von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Turner, 2019). The Von Benda-Beckmanns (2006) also state that these ideologies are not necessarily institutionalized, and can differ from the actual legal structure of institutions. In the third way, law becomes manifested in ‘concrete law’, also called practice of law, where legal conceptions are practiced on a concrete case. In this way, law becomes inscribed in society, persons (for example by obtaining the legal status ‘indigenous’) and in material and immaterial objects by giving such an object a specific legal status (for example a PA), and in organizations such as communities, states, and institutions (Von Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2006).
2.3.2 Legal pluralism and governance in hybrid arrangements
Now that I roughly answered the question of what is meant by law, I will focus on the second question of Santos (1987), namely “where is it?”. This study acknowledges the legitimacy of multiple and co-existing legal systems, including international, transnational and state law, as well as project law5 and customary law made and enforced by different actors. That these multiple actors can now shape law, can be seen as a consequence of the shift from government to governance (Bavinck & Gupta, 2014). Multiple actors can include for example local populations, state and multiple state agencies, NGOs, international and transnational organizations, and indigenous organizations, all with law making ability in the same space. In a governance context, these multiple actors interact with different norms, values and legal ways of seeing the world. This resulted in new legal landscapes in which customary laws, national laws and policies are mixed with project laws from NGOs and international
5 With project law is meant rules and regulations derived from development projects when interacting with local
organizations (Santos, 1995; Randeria, 2003). All these governing actors gained legislative powers in the new legal landscape, in which a plurality of legal systems exists, which adds to the legal complexity in governance arrangements (Von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Turner, 2019). Therefore, governance arrangements can be seen as hybrid arrangements, in which multiple legal systems come together. In these hybrid governance arrangements, multiple actors each try to spread their legal viewpoints, which often contradict with the legal viewpoints of the other involved actors (Von Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2006). Hybrid governance arrangements are thus spaces where the domains of governance and legal pluralism come together.
Research on legal pluralism expanded to include situations of governance, as public and private organizations now conduct normative activities, such as the production of law. Governance is seen as a complementary tool to legal pluralism, and Von Benda-Beckmann and Turner even state governance and legal pluralism have “a symbiotic relationship” (2019, p. 260). This relationship can flourish because legal pluralism has always sought to analyze hybrid legal spaces within one geographical area, and its framework proved adaptive to include hybrid legal spaces, with multiple overlapping normative orders, in the global or multiscalar arena (Berman, 2014). In the global arena state law can be viewed as a “bottleneck for global flows of transnational law in attempts to link above-the-state and below-the- state legal pluralisms” (Von Benda-Beckmann & Turner, 2019, p. 265).
Law plays an important role in governance, as authorities involved in governance use rules to manage natural resources. When studying governance under a situation of legal pluralism, it comes as no surprise that both law and governance are fractured domains as they are tangled up in hybrid governance arrangements (Zips and Weilenmann 2011; Bavinck; 2018). The inclusion of multiple stakeholders with multiple interests and socio-legal systems raises questions about the way hybrid governance arrangements are negotiated and structured. While a bricolage perspective helps to see how governance schemes are both negotiated and structured (Cleaver et al., 2013), a legal pluralism perspective accentuates the underlying socio-legal systems within hybrid governance arrangements. A legal pluralism perspective allows for a closer look at multiple legal systems and the ways they co-exist.
2.3.3 Hybrid governance arrangements as forums
As a plurality of legal systems exists, this raises the question on how to theorize about legal pluralism in hybrid governance arrangements, where multiple actors interact. One theoretical perspective that I will use for this purpose is “forum shopping”, in which actors “shop” between different legal systems by making rational choices based on their political interests (Von Benda-Beckmann, K., 1981). Von Benda-Beckmann describes the process of forum shopping as follows, “disputants have a choice between different institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will be, however vague or ill-founded their expectations may be” (1981, p. 117). Von Benda-Beckmann also acknowledges that making a rational choice among forums is only possible to an extent, because scaling-up a dispute is often bound to certain restrictions, as it can be “expensive, time-consuming and hazardous” (1981, p. 142). Von Benda-Beckmann uses the concept of forum to point out that a variety of institutions can deal with disputes. These institutions derive their legitimacy from different legal systems, so each institution or forum has its own body of normative rules which people can shop amongst in the hope to get the best possible outcome (Von Benda-Beckmann, K., 1981). Besides forum shopping another force is at work, as institutions can acquire and manipulate disputes according to their own political interest, which is called “shopping forums” (Von Benda-Beckmann, K., 1981). Von Benda-Beckmann acknowledges that institutions, and their individual functionaries, can select disputes for political advantage, or fend them off if they threaten to work in their disadvantage. In other words, institutions “shop for disputes as disputants shop for forums” (Von Benda-Beckmann, K., 1981, p. 117).
Originally the ideas of “forum shopping” and “shopping forums” were applied on the topic of local disputes, where legislative forums are linked to states and state agencies, customary laws, and religious laws, among others (Von Benda- Beckmann, K., 1981; Biezeveld, 2004; Simon Thomas, 2013). However, today law production is done by a wide range of public and private organizations (Von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Turner, 2019). All these governing actors in the new legal landscape gained legislative powers, creating ample options for “forum shopping” and “shopping forums” (Von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Turner, 2019). The importance for hybrid governance arrangements is the acknowledgement they can be seen as forums with legal systems (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981), as the nation-state is no longer the only legislative forum in the global arena (Von Benda-Beckmann & Turner, 2019). Not only can people and governing organizations shop among the different forums, they can decide in which forum they want to get involved and participate in governance through forums. I would
like to argue that hybrid governance arrangements act in similar ways as forums. Hybrid governance arrangements are often shopped for in the hope they will bring a certain advantage to the one who is shopping and participating in the forum. Next to treating the ACR as a hybrid governance arrangement which is formed through bricolage, it can also be treated as a forum at the same time.
2.4 Power in critical institutionalism/bricolage & legal pluralism
The inclusion of multiple actors with multiple interests and socio-legal systems in hybrid governance arrangements raises questions about the way power is held and exercised. It also raises the question of how the concept of power should be defined and used. From a legal pluralism perspective, a plurality of laws can create room for maneuver through forum shopping. However, it tends to work in the favor of stronger parties, who have the power to decide “which forum and which set of rules are to govern a particular situation” (Benda-Beckman et al., 2009, p. 12). In other words, some socio-legal systems are prioritized over others, by powerful actors who are able to shape policies (Bavinck et al., 2014b). So, the situation of legal pluralism could either weaken or strengthen inequalities, but gravitates to the latter (Von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009). This is even more so for postcolonial societies, such as Peru, in which (post)colonial law was imposed on people with existing law system(s) (Bavinck, 2005). The focus on power and inequalities in a situation of legal pluralism does not mean that a legal pluralism perspective engages with normative judgements. Zips and Weilenmann (2011) argue that a legal pluralism perspective is not able to determine that one legal system should be preferred over the other.
Like legal pluralism, a critical institutionalism/bricolage perspective also looks at the room for maneuver of actors in hybrid governance arrangements. Different from a legal pluralism perspective, critical institutionalism/bricolage acknowledges that governance arrangements can create winners and losers, instead of increasing the ‘room for maneuver’ for non-state actors (Cleaver et al., 2013). Critical institutionalism/bricolage does this by looking at how governance arrangements are negotiated and structured through bricolage (Cleaver et al., 2013). Critical institutionalism has a large overlap with a political ecology perspective, and Cleaver and de Koning even classify some political ecologists as critical institutionalists (2015).
Political ecology, however, places different accents in the understanding of power in governance arrangements, as the emphasis is more on social justice and understanding unequal governance outcomes. Combining Critical institutionalism with a political ecology outlook does right to the two levels of winners and losers in governance arrangements. Level one is about the way hybrid governance arrangements are negotiated and structured, which creates winners and losers. Level two is about the outcomes of hybrid governance arrangements, which creates winners and losers. The first level can be explained by a critical institutionalism/bricolage perspective, the second level is best understood while using a political ecology outlook. Therefore, in this research, legal pluralism, critical institutionalism/bricolage and political ecology will be combined.
2.4.1 Political ecology
Political ecology is a broad critical stance of research studying the interactions between people and the environment. The roots of political ecology lie both in ecology and in social science, and it theoretically draws on ideas of political economy and post-structuralism. Robbins describes political ecology as a ‘community of practice’ which “addresses the condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations of power. Political ecology, moreover, explores these social and environmental changes with an understanding that there are better, less coercive, less exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing things” (Robbins, 2012, p. 20). While the broad field of political ecology has produced a diverse body of literature, a joint concern for social justice is shared. Political ecology is based on the broad Marxist tradition to understand marginality as a structure in society, and developed some tools for the understanding of marginality. Studies focusing on issues of social justice are typically interested in the historical processes, legal and institutional infrastructures, and discourses creating unjust outcomes in social/environmental systems (Robbins, 2012). Political ecologists studying natural resource governance often emphasize that unequal power relations in hybrid governance arrangements lead to unequal outcomes (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015; Boelens, 2009; Ribot & Larson, 2005).
Power has been conceptualized in a number of ways. A focus on pluralism in hybrid governance arrangements, however, suggests attention should be given to the interactions and relations among multiple actors with different socio-legal systems. Power should be thought of as relational in a situation of legal pluralism, as power is unequally distributed among actors. Weber defined power as “as the capacity of some actors to affect the practices and
ideas of others” (as cited in Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 155-156). On top of this definition, the following definition of power by the political ecologist Paulson and co-writers (2003) is used: “A social relation built on the asymmetrical distribution of resources and risks […] locate(d) […] in the interactions among, and the processes that constitute, people, places, and resources” (p. 205).
2.5 Outcomes of hybrid governance arrangements
I started this chapter with the argument that governments cannot govern complexities, diversities and dynamics alone and multiple non-state actors now need to be involved in governance (Kooiman, 1993; Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009; Ansell & Torfing, 2016). While one could argue that in governance the state changed its traditional roles and became less powerful, at the same time it could be argued it is still a very important actor that should not be underestimated. As Simon Thomas (2013) puts it, “one of the key role players within the interplay of legal pluralism and the dynamic of power relationships is the state” (2013, p. 41). A research by Randeria (2003) questions the weakening role of the state within hybrid governance arrangements. Randeria studies cases of natural resource governance in India and argues that instead of speaking of weakening states we should speak of ‘cunning’ states, “which capitalize on their perceived weakness in order to render themselves unaccountable both to their citizens and to international institutions” (Randeria, 2003, p. 306). She argues that a situation of legal pluralism could be an advantage for the protection of rights of vulnerable citizens, as states could use this available legal space to protect the interests of their marginalized population, if only states have the political will to act. However, her research suggests that states use the legal space for facilitating and shaping neoliberal globalization policies. What happens is global extractive companies get access to natural resources at the expense of local resource users, while the state holds itself unaccountable (Randeria, 2003). A study in Brazil from De Castro (2014), with the telling title “Ethnic territories in Brazil: social inclusion or political trap?” also critiques the role of the state. De Castro argues that participatory governance arrangements involving ethnic communities stand in stark contrast with large-scale extractivism policies impacting their territories and the surrounding region. While ethnic communities are “granted the undesirable role of guardians of the global commons” (p. 71), this is used to legitimize large-scale extractivism policies promoted by the state. According to Ribot and Peluso, in situations of legal pluralism the state often remains the absolute mediator and power holder (Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
On the other hand, the central state might have lost some powers on the national level due to processes of decentralization (Randeria, 2003; Béné et al., 2009). Multiple studies have indicated that decentralization in natural resource governance have unequal outcomes because of a limited institutional capacity of the state and high power imbalances (Larson & Ribot, 2004; Larson & Soto, 2008; Araujo et al., 2017). In one of these studies Araujo and co-writers argue that a limited institutional capacity of the state leads to an incomplete implementation of participatory initiatives. Elite groups, mainly NGOs, used this participatory co-governance arrangement to adjust it to their interests. By doing this, NGOs take up the role of the state and try to initiate highly needed projects. However, these projects are of course in line with their nature conservation agendas (Araujo et al., 2017). This study exemplifies that other actors are sometimes able to use the room for maneuver to advance their interests through the selection of an accurate forum to claim their rights (Von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
A number of studies argue that the room for maneuver is also unequally divided among actors, and local resource users are often at a disadvantage (Béné et al., 2009; Chuenpagdee at al., 2013). One of these studies is about co-governance on inland fisheries in sub-Sahara Africa (Béné et al., 2009). This study found that in most cases co-governance failed to improve the overall quality of governance. Instead, the distribution of power was altered, at the disadvantage of local resource users, and to the advantage of a variety of actors who were able to promote and advance their interests and agendas (Béné et al., 2009). Another study indicating that local resource users are at a disadvantage is written by Chuenpagdee and co-writers (2013), who study the pitfalls of PA governance. This research describes a case in Mexico where local fishermen were involved from the start in creating a marine protected area (MPA). However, more powerful stakeholders (mostly scientists) took control over the governance process and the input of local fisherman was minimized. According to Chuenpagdee and co-writers the reasons for conflicts in the MPA lie in different legal systems of the involved actors, and the power imbalances to define problems and solutions accordingly in the governance process.
Studies focusing on hybrid governance arrangements are plentiful. However, the studied governance arrangements all have different structures, outcomes, winners and losers. The above studies suggest that hybrid governance arrangements are indeed prone to work for the
disadvantage of some, mostly local resource users, while working as an advantage for others. This raises the question of how these governance arrangements are structured and negotiated among actors with different socio-legal systems. Studies point out that local resource users often are at a disadvantage when negotiating among more powerful or ‘cunning’ states and other actors. That is why a focus on local resource users, in the case of the ACR indigenous peoples, is central to this study.
2.6 Research questions
The main question of this research is:
How do indigenous peoples promote their socio-legal viewpoints in the hybrid governance arrangement of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve in Peru and to what extent are these viewpoints incorporated in governance practice?
Three sub-questions will be used in order to answer the main question:
1) How is the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR constituted?
2) What are the socio-legal viewpoints of indigenous peoples on the governance of their territories?
3) How are the socio-legal viewpoints of indigenous peoples reflected in the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR?
3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I clarify that critical theory underpins this research (Section 3.2), and explore my position in the ‘web of reality’ (Section 3.3). In Section 3.4. I explain the choices made during data collection. This section is structured according to the chronology of fieldwork, in which three phases can be distinguished: 1) an introductory, qualitative data collection phase consisting of the participation in a month-long course; 2) a qualitative data collection effort on the institutional level in Puerto Maldonado; and 3) a qualitative data collection in five indigenous communities. In this section I also clarify the choices made concerning sampling and units of analysis. In Section 3.5 I explain the choice for analyzing the data with a thematic analysis and reflect on the process of making themes. The chapter ends with a reflection on ethical issues (Section 3.6).
3.2 Epistemology
Lincoln et al., (2011) identify five research paradigms, these include positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, interpretivism and a participatory paradigm, each of which have an own ontological and epistemological stance. Of these five paradigms critical theory underlies this research. In critical theory, power plays a key role and in its ontological position it recognizes human nature operates in a world that is based on power struggles. Epistemologically, research is driven by the study of these power struggles and the knowledge produced should change the existing oppressive structures through empowerment and social transformation (Merriam, 1991). Critical theory differs from positivism and post-positivism paradigms in so far that most inquiries made under these banners exclude action and transformation from the researchers’ domain, as action can be out of line with the aim for objectivity (Lincoln et al., 2011). On a more epistemic level critical theory differs from positivism and post-positivism in the way reality is viewed. Positivism acknowledges the existence of an objective reality which can be studied and post-positivism acknowledges an objective reality which can never be fully understood (Lincoln et al., 2011). In critical theory, objectivity is of a lesser concern, instead a normative view on reality prevails. This differs from the subjective epistemologies of interpretivism and participatory paradigms, in which multiple realities exist or where reality is co-created by participants. Critical theory connects to critical institutionalism and political ecology based on the shared concern for social justice,
transformation and change. It does not seem a conceptual stretch to argue that the idea of social justice, which underlies both critical institutionalism and political ecology, is rooted in the same normative epistemology and ontology as critical theory.
For a master thesis, empowerment and social transformation might be a too ambitious endeavor. Instead, the focus within the paradigm of critical theory for this research lays more in the study of power struggles and the (theoretical) focus on social justice. At the same time, I acknowledge that reality is shaped through these power struggles and that social justice, through social transformation, for marginalized and vulnerable groups should be included in the researchers’ domain. It is appealing to think that for this research a different paradigm should have been chosen, one that does not have an appetite for social transformation, as this is unfeasible to achieve in a master thesis. However, I do not have the flexibility to freely switch paradigms as they underlie my basic beliefs about reality, ways of knowing and research conduct.
The paradigm of critical theory does not necessarily prescribe which methods to use, although it is suggested a participatory approach best fits with the idea of empowerment and social transformation (Lincoln et al., 2011). I did not opt for a participatory methods approach because this is a very demanding process and the goals of empowerment and social transformation were unachievable for this short research project. Instead, a mix of qualitative methods, mostly rooted in ethnography, are used. The essence of this research is to map the socio-legal viewpoints of indigenous peoples and to gain insight in the way these viewpoints are included in the hybrid governance arrangement of the ACR. According to Hammersley the most important feature of ethnography is “its commitment of seeking to understand the perspectives of others” (Hammersley, 1992, p.45). By opting for ethnographic methods, I seek to understand the socio-legal viewpoints of the indigenous peoples in the ACR.
3.3 Positionality
As a researcher I cannot be separated from the social context and the power relations I study. This demands research self-consciousness and awareness of the context in which the researcher is working. In this light it is important to state my own position and be conscious about my biases. As a researcher I do not live in a vacuum; I have values, interests, an educational background and more, all shaping the research. I have a background in
environmental studies, human geography and international development studies. Theoretical ideas for this research stem from these educational backgrounds, which can be perceived as a bias. On the other hand, these theories are a useful tool, and without them, undertaking research is a daunting task. One of the biases is that I consider myself to be a conservationist, I am in favor of conservation projects. However, the way in which conservation programs are designed and negotiated differ strongly. I think they should not be imposed on people living near such an area, and that free prior and informed consent (FPIC) and social justice should play a key role. Another bias is that I am white and from a rich European country. I was often perceived as a rich tourist instead of a researcher, and being white most likely opened doors and gave me other privileges. Bernard (2006) states that the gender of the researcher has consequences in the field. It influences how others perceive me and to whom and where I get access. I had the feeling that being perceived as a (white young) female helped me to get access to the male dominated governance scene of the ACR. At the same time, being perceived as a female in a masculine environment also meant I was often not taken seriously as a researcher and sometimes degraded to the status of a mere object, in few occasions this resulted in harassment and even sexual assault. I probably have many more biases, both known and unknown to me, that can clarify my position in the ‘web of reality’. All my biases shape this research, they influence the way I think, act and produce knowledge and they influence the way participants perceive me and respond to me.
3.4 Qualitative data collection
3.4.1 Units of analysis
Individuals and organizations were the units of analysis. Individuals are the unit of analysis when interviewing indigenous people from the communities. I have decided to focus on individuals rather than households because perspectives, viewpoints and experiences can differ within the household. In this research the terms ‘indigenous communities’ or ‘indigenous peoples’ are frequently used. This is because I acknowledge conflicts occur between groups and categories of people (Bavinck et al., 2014a). However, these groups and categories must further be unpacked. Bigger categories cannot be taken for granted without studying its parts, as power relations play a role between individuals within these bigger units. It is necessary to recognize multiple dimensions of diversity within ‘indigenous communities’, ‘indigenous peoples’ and also within a household.
Organizations, such as NGOs and government agencies, are seen as units of analysis because they are a unit with a legal system that can exercise governance. Bavinck and Kooiman argue that “reductionist approaches, which focus on specific actors or interactions, fail because they lack a larger (system) picture. But holistic approaches, in which the system as a whole is the unit of analysis, are also fruitless. Combinations need to be made” (2013, p. 14). By studying both individuals and organizations, and at the same time acknowledge that conflicts occur between groups and categories of people, I will be able to gain knowledge on indigenous socio-legal viewpoints and on the larger governance picture.
3.4.2 Data collection phase 1: Course participation
The initial research proposal was based on governance processes in Manu National Park, a national park next to the ACR (see figure 5.1). When arriving in Peru, I soon found out I could not get access to this national park. I was not able to find a gatekeeper or anyone to vouch for my presence in the communities located in Manu National Park. As I was looking for opportunities, my local supervisor arranged I could participate in a month-long course named Plan de desarrollo de capacidades para pueblos indígenas (PDCPI) in Puerto Maldonado. The course is set up to empower the ten indigenous communities living around the ACR. This opportunity made me realize I should switch research location, as I now had access to the course, to indigenous people living in the around the ACR and possibly in a later stage also to the indigenous communities. This course was the start of the qualitative data collection period, that took place from September 2016 until February 2017. The PDCPI course was set up by ACR governing actors ECA (Ejecutor de Contrato de Administración) and SERNANP (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas), and the NGOs ACCA (Asociación para la Conservación de la Cuenca Amazónica) and CARE (Cooperative for
Assistance and Relief Everywhere). Eighteen indigenous participants had been selected for
this course. The selection of the participants was done by the communities. Each community was able to select a maximum of three participants for the program. The selection by the communities resulted in a bias, as only four women participated in the course, and most participants were young men.
The course took place in a conference center just outside Puerto Maldonado. Each day the course started with a lecture of an expert, followed by a discussion. The lectures helped to create baseline information about the ACR and indigenous peoples’ viewpoints. Afterwards, group assignments and workshops took place, mostly involving role plays and making
posters. During the course I participated in these group assignments and workshops. When working together on assignments and during the breaks, I talked to the other participants of the course, always with a pen and notebook in my hand in case something interesting was being said. I also collected course material and talked to the experts. At the end of the day I typed out the conversations, participant observations, initial ideas and reflections in a fieldnote.
At the end of the course I conducted a focus group discussion with a group of 16 participants, of which three female participants, on the topic conflicts and challenges in their communities (see table 3.2). Focus groups are an adequate tool to explore a topic in depth (Bryman, 2012). These topics were interesting to explore because it could shed a light on the on-ground realities, struggles and experiences of indigenous peoples in the communities. The focus group was moderated by my local supervisor, as at the time my Spanish was inadequate for this purpose. My role was taking notes and keeping an eye on the process. The focus group started with a discussion on the topic of conflicts, then the group was divided per community and posters were made visualizing conflicts (see appendix 4), then each group presented their posters and explained what they had visualized. The notes were then worked out into a fieldnote by me and my local supervisor.
The fieldnotes made during the course and the focus group discussion informed the research design of this study, as the original proposal on Manu National Park was not fully applicable to the new research area. Manu National Park is mostly governed by biologists who use a restrictive management approach (fortress conservation), where the ACR has a co-governance approach. This meant the original proposal on Manu National Park had to be adjusted to the new research context and to the co-governance approach. During the conversations over lunch I got the impression that decades of marginalization for these indigenous peoples did not end when the reserve was set up in 2002. Instead the struggle for their rights and territories continued under the co-governance of the reserve, in which power dynamics play a key role. Therefore, my research interests were adjusted to finding ways to understand the position of the indigenous peoples in the hybrid governance arrangement, their viewpoints on governance and to what extent these viewpoints are included in governance. For this reason, the second phase of fieldwork was done on the institutional level, in order to see how the reserve was governed. The third phase of fieldwork focused on the indigenous communities, to understand the position of the indigenous peoples and their socio-legal viewpoints.
