Legitimising Radicalisation Policies in
the Netherlands
A Critical Frame Analysis of the use of radicalisation and
security in the discourse on radicalisation policies in the
Netherlands
University of Amsterdam
Master Programme: Political Science: Public Policy and Governance Research Project: European Security Politics
Supervisor: dr. Rocco Bellanova Second reader: dr. Floris F. Vermeulen Author: Sebastian Louis Marchesini Student number: 10624384
Word Count: 20.829
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ch. 1 Introduction ... 3
1.1 Introduction ... 3
1.2 Radicalisation ... 4
1.3 Radicalisation Policy and its Consequences ... 6
1.4 Research on Radicalisation Discourse ... 8
1.5 Conclusion ... 8
Ch.2 Theory ... 10
2.1 Introduction ... 10
2.2 Critical Security Studies ... 10
2.3 Governmentality ... 12
2.4 The Governmentality of Unease ... 15
2.5 Conclusion ... 17
Ch.3 Case Selection ... 19
3.1 Introduction ... 19
3.2 Amsterdam and Utrecht ... 19
3.2.1 Amsterdam department on radicalisation and polarisation ... 20
3.2.2 Utrecht municipality’s approach to radicalisation ... 22
3.3 NCTV ... 24
3.4 JSFP ... 25
3.5 Reflection and Conclusion ... 28
Ch.4 Method ... 29
4.1 Introduction ... 29
4.2 Critical Frame Analysis ... 29
4.3 CFA and the Governmentality of Unease ... 31
4.4 Conclusion ... 32
Ch.5 Analysis and Results ... 34
5.1 Introduction ... 34
5.2 Internal Security Fund Police ... 34
5.3 NCTV ... 39
5.3.1 NCTV - Diagnosis ... 39
5.3.2 NCTV – Prognosis ... 41
5.3.3 NCTV – The Governmentality of Unease ... 43
5.4 Municipalities of Amsterdam and Utrecht ... 47
5.4.2 Amsterdam – Prognosis ... 49
5.4.3 Amsterdam – The Governmentality of Unease ... 52
5.4.4 Utrecht – Diagnosis... 53
5.4.5 Utrecht – Prognosis ... 55
5.4.6 Utrecht – Governmentality of Unease ... 58
Ch.6 Conclusions, Reflection, and Recommendations ... 61
6.1 Introduction ... 61 6.2 Conclusions ... 61 6.3 Reflection ... 63 6.4 Recommendations ... 65 Literature ... 67 Appendix I ... 76
3 Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Radicalisation is a contested concept, not only in the academic literature, but also in policy discussions as well as the public opinion. It can be seen as a process that results in individuals performing acts of violence, a process through which an individual disengages from society, a process through which an individual embraces an ideology that is not considered normal, the entrenchment of political views, and many more. Causes of radicalisation are equally varied: psychological pathology, ideological or religious beliefs, a yearning for adventure, or a need for justification of other criminal behaviour. Even though the concept of radicalisation is heavily debated, the threats of it are very real, and therefore policy solutions are sought. However, how does this policy get constructed in absence of clear academic consensus?
Since “we do not discover a problem ‘out there’; we make a choice about how we want to formulate a problem” (Lindblom & Cohen 1979: 50), this thesis analyses the discourse that underlies the network of actors that produce policy solutions to radicalisation in the Netherlands. The research question that underlies this thesis is: how are conceptions of radicalisation used to justify radicalisation policies in the discourse employed in the network of actors that construct said policy? In order to understand radicalisation policies, an understanding of the discourse on which it is based is needed.
This thesis is divided in the following manner. This first chapter goes on to introduce the academic discussions on radicalisation as a concept, its related policies and their consequences and ends with the central puzzle to this thesis. The second chapter gives an overview of the literature that is used to build a theoretical framework which enables the analysis of the discourse that underlies radicalisation policy. In the third chapter, the cases that are chosen for this analysis are thoroughly introduced and their selection justified. These cases are the European Commission’s Internal Security Fund, the Dutch counter terror agency (the NCTV), and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Utrecht. The fourth chapter explains the chosen method for this thesis, the Critical Frame Analysis, and how it fits both the theory and the analysis. The fifth chapter presents the results found by applying the method to the selected cases and describes the discourse employed in the network that constructs radicalisation policy. The sixth and final chapter then gives the conclusions of that can be drawn based on the analysis and provides the
4 reader with a reflection on this thesis’ strengths and weaknesses, as well as ideas for further research. In short, the concept of radicalisation is kept vague in the discourse, which allows for extensive regulatory interventions in fields that are not traditionally related to security.
1.2 Radicalisation
Defining radicalisation is a controversial matter, so much so that is considered an essentially contested concept (Garver 1978: 168). This section explores several attempts at coming up with a definition. In her analysis of the state of the art of the study of radicalisation, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) presents radicalisation as the following:
“Here, a radical is understood as a person harboring a deep-felt desire for fundamental sociopolitical changes and radicalization is understood as a growing readiness to pursue and support far- reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798).
However, she specifically states that her focus, and therefore the used definition, is on violent radicalisation. In a largescale study to explain the process of deradicalization and disengagement of violent extremism, Demant, Slootman, Buijs and Tillie (2008) give a more generalized definition of radicalisation that contains the same conflict between the radical and society without it being too narrowly focused on violent radicalisation. They see radicalisation as “a process of delegitimization in which trust in the system decreases and persons increasingly withdraw into their own group because they no longer feel as part of society”1 (Demant et al. 2008: 4). The definition remains closely tied to the relationship
between an individual and society, making radicalisation a fundamentally political process (Demant et al. 2008: 9). However, Dalgaard-Nielsen refers to radicalisation as “a growing readiness”, making it a personal process. Demant et al. see it as a “process of delegitimization” which has a loss of trust in the system as a consequence. Here, radicalisation can thus be done by an individual who is not necessarily the radicalised individual. If someone delegitimizes the system (e.g. through propaganda) and a second individual else loses trust in society due to this delegitimization, is the second person
1 “We beschouwen radicalisering als een proces van delegitimatie, als een proces waarin het vertrouwen in het
systeem afneemt en men zich steeds verder terugtrekt in de eigen groep omdat men zich geen onderdeel meer voelt van de samenleving”
5 radicalised? The first? Or both? Problems like these fuel the continuing discussion on the definition of radicalisation.
Faced with the task of defining radicalisation, some authors look to respected institutions for their definitions. Such is the case with Veldhuis and Bakker’s research into the causal factors of radicalisation, in which the authors use the European Commission’s definition of radicalisation. This definition holds that radicalisation is “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (Veldhuis & Bakker 2007: 450). The authors combine this with the definition of terrorism that holds that “terrorists are simply the members of societies who are the most optimistic about the usefulness of violence for achieving goals that many, and often most, support” (Veldhuis & Bakker 2007: 450). Even in this bare-bones definition of radicalisation, it still contains a reference to an individual’s referred vision of society and his potential willingness to use violence to achieve this.
Perhaps because of the definitional problems of radicalisation, there has equally been no consensus over the causes of radicalisation. This segment offers a concise state of the art of the research into the causes of radicalisation. The logic being, that if one understands how radicalisation works, one can devise methods to either prevent radicalisation from happening or by reversing the process, effectively deradicalizing individuals.
Following her meta-analysis of studies on radicalisation, Dalgaard-Nielsen offers a perspective that holds that there is no central cause of radicalisation. There is no socioeconomic profile that can be used to find radicalised individual (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 810). Additionally, the direct social context of a radicalised individual is presented as a possible key factor in radicalisation processes (ibid.). Due to the lack of clear predictive factors for radicalisation, Dalgaard-Nielsen postulates that the makers of policies that are aimed at preventing radicalisation should adopt a case-by-case approach (ibid.).
In a review of the state of the art of literature on the psychological aspects of terrorism and radicalisation, Jeff Victoroff (2005) heavily criticises the existing literature. Finding that “virtually none of them [psychological theories on terrorism and radicalisation] has been tested in a systematic way” (Victoroff 2005: 33). The author then goes on to tentatively conclude that, based on the evidence that has been found, there is no clear psychological profile of terrorists, and therefore, attempting to predict an individual’s radicalisation towards terrorism based on psychological characteristics is futile (Victoroff: 2005: 34). This claim has
6 been further solidified by Horgan (2008: 93), finding that “Profiling the individual and his or her presumed associated qualities has no future in serious analyses of either the terrorist or the pathways to radicalization in which he or she engages”.
In conclusion, both radicalisation and its causes are difficult to pin down. The literature presents radicalisation as a break-down of the relationship between an individual and society, however, the causes of this breakdown are unclear.
1.3 Radicalisation Policy and its Consequences
However vague the definitions might be, the consequences of violent acts by radicalised individuals is very clear. The attacks on the Twin Towers in New York by violent jihadi radicals in 2001 are an horrific example of the potential threat posed by radicalised individuals. Three years later in Amsterdam, the filmmaker Theo van Gogh was assassinated by an individual that most consider an Islamic extremist (Vermeulen 2014: 286; Demant et al. 2008: 4). These two events provided clear pressures to step up Dutch counterterrorism efforts. Since 2004, both at the national and the municipal level, policies were put in place with two main goals: preventing radicalisation on the one hand and increasing non-judiciary repression (e.g. fiscal regulations targeted at radical groups) on the other (Demant et al. 2008: 83). Since the causes of radicalisation are broad, vague and focussed on individual processes, these sorts of policies can be wide-ranging in scope, target and intended goals. Under the general banner of ‘increasing the resistance to radicalisation’, many types of policy can be legitimized. For example, in Amsterdam, radicalisation is seen as being partly caused by social isolation. Therefore, the municipality’s department on radicalisation and polarisation (ARPA) has organized a football tournament for isolated Muslim boys (ARPA 2017a: 18). In both Amsterdam and Utrecht, schoolteachers are being selected for training in detection of radicalisation amongst their students (Gemeente Utrecht 2015: 18; ARPA 2017a: 22).
Observed from a distance, it seems counterintuitive that municipal governments should organise football tournaments for young boys in order to stop extremists from committing horrors like the Paris attacks. Of course, the defence goes, this is necessary to prevent these kids from radicalising into full blown violent extremists. To stop radicalisation, rather far-reaching measures have been established. Alarmingly, a large ongoing study on the effectiveness on counter-radicalisation policies preliminarily concludes that there “is a need for reliable evaluation of counter-radicalisation and deradicalization policies and
7 programmes”. Stating that this has, so far, been lacking (DARE 2018: 2). This suggests that radicalisation is a problem which is not yet fully understood, and which policy solutions cannot be adequately evaluated. This situation is understandable, governments were posed with the new threat of radical Islamic violence and were quick to attempt to contain it with policy. It has become problematic, however, since researchers have found several ways in which these policies negatively affect the citizens that are targeted by it. The following section gives an overview of the potentially detrimental effects of radicalisation policies.
Focussing on the U.K.’s ‘PREVENT’ strategy, Paul Thomas (2012: 94), has found that large segments of the British Muslim community feel as if they are targeted by their government, countering broader policy objectives of unity and integration. This feeling of being a ‘suspect community’ can then foster further disengagement of citizens and prevent integration (Thomas 2012: 94-95). This conclusion is supported by a larger analysis of the literature by Amy Jane Gielen, stating that “community engagement programmes have led to the singling out of Muslim communities, stigmatisation, polarisation, and “suspect communities.”” (2017: 11). Going further, Ragazzi (2017) defends that deradicalization policies have a more insidious effect on Muslim communities. Instead of resulting in assimilation or alienation of Muslim communities, as the proponents or opponents of counter-radicalisation policies based on community engagement defend, Ragazzi introduces the idea that these policies have resulted in Muslim communities policing themselves (2017: 725). Referred to as ‘policed multiculturalism’, Ragazzi approaches counter-radicalisation policies as a form of ‘government through community’, in which conventional policies of the multicultural welfare state blend together with policing (2017: 732). Branding parts of the community as either ‘trusted’, ‘victims’ or ‘risky’, counter-radicalisation policies have created a situation in which ‘trusted’ Muslim voices are heard whilst dissenting voices are deemed either the victims of propaganda or dangerous radicals (Ragazzi 2017: 737-738). By doing this, the government can effectively decide which version of the Islamic faith they deem desirable, simultaneously creating stimuli for the Muslim community to police itself and censor dissenting voices. Radicalisation policy can have great consequences to the communities it targets by identifying them as a risk, yet radicalisation is a concept that cannot be conclusively defined. This begs the question of how the definition of radicalisation is constructed.
8 1.4 Research on Radicalisation Discourse
Research into the discourse on radicalisation and its effect has only recently started off. A study on the United Kingdom’s ‘PREVENT’ strategy on radicalisation has found that British government bases its strategies on a problematic view on radicalisation. It found that the government uses the conception of ‘psychological vulnerability’ to radicalisation as a primary explanation for radicalisation and uses this to legitimise pre-emptive interventionist legislation that affects the lives of young British Muslims (Coppock & McGovern 2014). Similar studies of the PREVENT strategy show that conceptions of radicalisation and its solution are used to legitimise increased government of British Muslim communities, which can have negative effects (Heath-Kelly 2012; O’Donell 2015; Powell 2016). There has been little research in other countries, of which Denmark is a notable exception (Kühle & Lindekilde 2012). A large critical discourse analysis of the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network analyses radicalisation-preventing measures in the educational field by sampling from several countries, including the Netherlands (Mattson et al. 2016: 260). However, it narrowly focusses on the educational field, making it a limited measure of the discourse in the Dutch context.
The studies on the possibly negative consequences of radicalisation discourse in policy networks beg the expansion of analytical targets. Instead of focussing on the UK’s PREVENT strategy, or on specific fields such as education, this thesis sets out to study the discourse on radicalisation that is employed at differing levels of Dutch government. Both municipal and national entities of government are analysed, as will be detailed in the following chapters, as well as an international EU-level entity.
1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, radicalisation is a complex problem of which many aspects are not yet fully understood. The need for policies to prevent radicalisation to violent extremism is clear. However, current policies can have detrimental effects on the communities they target. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the reasoning behind radicalisation policies are scrutinized. Studies on this topic already find that the discourse on radicalisation can be problematically constructed and have negative consequences on the targeted communities.
9 Following the studies presented in the previous section, the next chapter offers an overview of the academic literature on critical security studies to develop a theoretical lens through which the construction of radicalisation can be analysed. Before continuing, however, the following disclaimer is necessary to explain how radicalisation is viewed in the rest of this thesis. This research is not meant to evaluate which policies are or aren’t appropriate or effective. Nor is it an undertaking to come to a final definition of radicalisation. Instead, this thesis studies the puzzle of how an ill-understood, often vaguely defined concept as radicalisation is used to justify policies that can have detrimental effects on a marginalized group in Dutch society.
10 Ch. 2 THEORY
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the relevant theory is introduced and explained. For clarity’s sake, the following chapter has been divided in three main section. The first section gives an overview of critical security studies and its now seminal notion of securitization. The second section present the notion of governmentality as originally conceived by Michel Foucault. In the third section, a new view on security is presented which can be interpreted as a governmentality approach to security studies. This approach is adapted to be used as a framework in this thesis in order to analyse the construction of radicalisation policy.
2.2 Critical Security Studies
Critical security studies perceive security as a social construct. One of the dominant concepts within this literature is that of securitisation. In its most classical sense, securitisation is presented as an intersubjective process in which a securitizing actor attempts to break free from previously agreed upon interactor relations by claiming a specific object is being threatened by another actor or force (Buzan et al. 1998: 26-30). More specifically, a securitising actor attempts to claim that a certain referent object, often the state or the nation, is confronted with an existential threat which can only be defeated by granting the securitizing actor special, and often extra-legal, status. Wæver put it most clearly:
“Security is the speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. The issue is securitized – becomes a security issue, a part of what is ‘security’– if the relevant audience accepts this claim and thus grants to the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind” (Wæver 2000: 251).
This claim of an existential threat, referred to as a speech act, is one of the central functions of this classic perspective on securitisation theory, often referred to as the Copenhagen School (Christou et al. 2010: 347). If the speech act is accepted by the audience, the securitising actor is able to activate emergency rules, which go beyond the ‘normal’ political rules (ibid.).
11 In contrast to traditional assumptions that security is intrinsically good, securitisation theory describes security as neutral: more security can be viewed positively or negatively, depending on the context (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 83). On the topic of immigration, for instance, many have argued that more securitisation has had the negative consequence of limiting the political possibilities needed to solve the problem (Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2006). This stance entails a concern with the way critical security studies tend to apply the term security to a growing variety of issues (social, environmental, political etc.) without challenging security’s military meaning (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 83). However, the theory’s analytical focus on the state level and those in power has resulted in many authors to argue it still is part of the critical security studies (Eriksson 1999; Wyn Jones 1999: 111-112; Wæver 1995: 57).
The Copenhagen School is not the only school of thought concerned with securitisation. Three main criticisms have been levied against the Copenhagen School, which have either developed the theory on securitisation further or have resulted in offshoots. After presenting the three criticisms below, the section will continue with one of these offshoots, often called insecuritisation theory (Christou et al. 2010: 347).
Firstly, it is too narrowly focussed on the deliberate speech act of traditional powerful actors (Christou et al. 2010: 347). Without denying the importance of such speech acts, Cristou et al. (2010: 347) go further and state that “it is also in the realm of ‘normal’ or regular speech that important information can be gleaned by the analyst.”. In other words, the Copenhagen School has too great a focus on events, ignoring continual processes and practices that can result in securitisation.
Secondly, the Copenhagen School is accused of having an outdated view on security as being divided as internal and external, referring to the police and military respectively (Christou et al. 2010: 347). Instead, the critics present the idea that the lines between these two classical dimensions of security have “merged into […] a new field of security where the traditional internal/external divide no longer exists” (ibid.). This new “field of security” facilitates the interaction between internal and external security actors. A good example of this is how modern military forces claim responsibility of border surveillance to protect the country against ‘infiltrating enemies’ (Bigo 2000: 322).
The third criticism centres around the key role of extraordinary measures in the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitization. By using the call for extraordinary
12 measures as a key concept, this criticism goes, the Copenhagen School foregoes the ability to detect securitisation that occurs through institutionalisation. In his analysis of European border regulations and the security role played by FRONTEX, Andrew Neal (2009) claims that the EU can securitize without calling for extraordinary measures. Instead, actors can call for the expansion or altered use of already existing structures (Neal 2009: 345). The effect is still the same, a subject is deemed a security risk and then becomes the object of a more intense form of governing. However, it is presented as the continuation of ‘normal’ politics. As Neal put it: “The new and controversial quickly become ‘normal’” (2009: 346).
The above criticisms of securitisation theory render it inadequate for the analysis of the construction of radicalisation policies. Firstly, radicalisation is a problem that has long been identified and presented as a problem that requires a solution. As such, the chance that radicalisation policy is constructed outside the use of speech acts seems most likely, making securitisation theory less useful due to its focus on speech acts. Secondly, radicalisation policies are often related to both internal as external forms of security (e.g. the leaving and returning foreign fighters), making securitisation theory’s less useful since it adheres to a more traditional external-internal distinction. Thirdly, the role of institutions (e.g. the NCTV) in radicalisation policy makes it highly likely that the policy is made through the altered use of already existing structures, instead of extraordinary measures. This further undermines securitisation theory’s usefulness as a framework to analyse the construction of radicalisation policy.
The following sections describes the result of combining the above literature with that on governmentality, resulting in the concept of governmentality of unease. This concept is then mobilised to fit the study on the construction of radicalisation policies presented in this thesis. Before continuing on the governmentality of unease, an explanation of governmentality as a concept is needed. The following section introduces the term, tracing it back to whom introduced it, Michel Foucault. After this step, the chapter introduces the key notion of the governmentality of unease in section 2.3.
2.3 Governmentality
Governmentality is introduced by Michel Foucault in a seminal series of lectures near the end of his life (Walters 2012: 1). Due to the lack of clear theoretical work published by Foucault explaining governmentality, this part of the thesis is primarily based on work by William
13 Walters’ work on governmentality (2012), where he analyses Foucault’s thoughts on governmentality and proposes some guidance on how to use this conceptual “tool-box”. Not only does Walters provide Foucault’s views on governmentality, he also explains several theoretical developments which can be seen as “governmentality studies” (Walters 2012: 2). This section starts with a description of Foucault’s vision on governmentality, followed by explaining approaches to research in line with the concept. Before ending the section, some theoretical implications of the theory of governmentality are discussed before reflecting on its role in this thesis.
Confusingly, Foucault originally used the term in three different ways. In the first and broadest way, Foucault presents governmentality as a:
“framework for analysis that begins with the observation that governance is a very widespread phenomenon, in no way confined to the sphere of the state, but something that goes on whenever individuals and groups seek to shape their own conduct or the conduct of others” (Walters 2012: 11).
Foucault’s second use of the term refers to the “governance of and by states [italics in original]” (Walters 2012: 12). In research of this governance, Foucault sets aside the idea that states are a collection of institutions. Instead, he sees the state as the result of arts, practices and techniques combining in various ways and times (Walters 2012: 12). In this sense, governmentality studies the conditions that need to be met for a modern state to exist.
The third use of governmentality by Foucault is more specific and refers to one grouping of arts, practices and techniques for running a state (Walters 2012: 12). Basically, Foucault uses governmentality in this sense to refer to a specific constellation of practices and techniques that results in something resembling to a modern liberal mode of governance (ibid.).
In any case, the concept of governmentality invites us to see states or governments not as a static structure of institutions. Instead, governance is to be seen as the result of a fluid, ever changing constellation of different mechanics, practices, arts, techniques, and material conditions. Governmentality is not a cohesive political theory. Rather, it offers us novel ways of conceptualising and analysing the day-to-day workings of government (Walters 2012: 45). Here, government is not meant in the classical sense of the institution, instead it refers to any entity that steers the behaviour of peoples (e.g. the market, private companies etc). Foucault has stated multiple times that his work is like a toolbox of which the reader can pick, choose,
14 and alter whatever they deem useful (ibid.). The following section presents the key tools that a governmentality approach offers us, and how they can be used in social or political research.
Generally, research on governmentality starts with controversies; moments in which the status quo is being questioned, Walters notes for example “public concern over ‘arranged marriages’ or ‘radicalisation’ amongst ‘immigrant communities’” (Walters 2012: 57). In these sorts of controversies, source material is generated. Actors produce reports and studies, ask for the creation of task forces and commissions, ask for expert opinions etcetera. This source material can then be analysed. Certain questions are then asked of the documents that are produced:
“What kinds of political subjects are being described or assumed in these documents? Are they imagined as 'rational actors' or something else? Are they 'communities' with inclinations towards cooperation or perhaps 'classes' immersed in struggle? Within what kinds of moral and epistemic frames are the problems of government being imagined?” (Walters 2012: 58)
This list of questions is by no means exhaustive. They are presented here to illustrate that studies of governance do not attempt to ascertain what the optimal path of government should be. Instead, researchers are after the specificity of governance (Walters 2012: 58). Governmentality studies study the specific form of the network of practices and techniques that underly the current form of government. In other words, governmentality studies do not ask what the best policy in any given field might be, instead it asks what the current context is in which the policy is made.
This description of governmentality shows great overlap with the concept of governance (Walters 2012: 64). Both studies attempt to ascertain the how of governance by analysing practices and networks instead of institutions (Lemke 2011: 53-54). Additionally, neither school of thought view the use of power as a top-down process (ibid.; Walters 2012: 65). There are, however, several important differences between studies of governance and studies of governmentality. The following paragraph presents three key differences between studies of governance and that of governmentality.
Firstly, governance theory assumes that the current governance is the successor to a time in which the nation-state did hold all the power and used it in a top-down fashion (Walters 2012: 65). Secondly, it assumes that all major problems can be solved through
15 discussion and cooperation amongst all the relevant actors. By doing so, governance theory assumes an ideologically liberal perspective which cannot account for the existence or creation of non-liberal modes of government (Walters 2012: 66). This ideological bent is also present in the third difference between governance and governmentality. Governance theory posits the existence of a “golden age of the nation-state” (Walters 2012: 67) in which all problems were fixed by the state and nation-states were the sole form of governance. In contrast, governmentality removes this ideological focus on liberal governance and moves to a more objective understanding of governance networks.
In sum, governmentality studies offer novel ways to analyse practices, arts and techniques that constitute governance. Obviously, this runs counter to securitisation theory’s notion of a speech act being a powerful force in the creation of security policies. Although certainly a form of practice, the focus on speech acts ignores the wide gulf of other practices that are performed. Additionally, focusing on the speech act, and therefore the dominant actor in the policy network, ignores the practices which lie beyond the sovereign state’s institutions yet still effect the construction of governance. Adopting a governmentality approach, this thesis gains the capability to analyse actors which lie beyond the traditional spectrum of political representatives and institutional security actors. Instead, the approach allows us to analyse the more mundane practices that result in the construction of policies on radicalisation. Additionally, where securitisation theory is mostly occupied with specific speeches, the governmentality approach’s use of policy documents and other texts allows this thesis to pick from a larger range of sources to analyse the construction of radicalisation policy. The following section continues with this critique on securitization theory and presents an approach to security that incorporates governmentality.
2.4 The Governmentality of Unease
Combining the previous criticisms of securitisation theory and governmentality, insecuritisation theory has been proposed (Christou et al. 2010: 347; Huysmans 2014: 29-30). The following section describes insecuritisation theory and a dominant outcome of this new perspective on security: the governmentality of unease. This new approach to governmentality, originally put forward by Bigo (2002), offers new ways to study security policy which are useful in this thesis’s goal to understand how radicalisation policies are constructed.
16 A key argument in insecuritisation theory holds that “notions of insecurity, uncertainty, risk and precaution are organising various modes of government and are arranging social and political relations in increasingly diffuse ways through fear, anxiety and unease” (Huysmans 2014: 30). Instead of singling out an issue as being a threat and therefore in need of extraordinary measure, insecuritisation theory states that issues are permanently subjected to securitisation in a diffuse manner, based on the mobilisation of unease. In other words, insecuritisation theory states that security policy is legitimised through a permanent process in which borders and identities are identified as sources of insecurity (Christou et al. 2010: 347).
Proponents of insecuritisation theory argue that the classical divide between internal (police) and external (military) security has deteriorated, giving way to a ‘field of security’ (Christou et al. 2010: 347; Bigo 2000; Bigo 2002: 73). Experts in the field of security, both internal and external, can freely interact within this field (Christou et al. 2010: 347). this has led to a new form of governmentality, one that is concerned with the control of populations, instead of territory (Huysmans 2006: 98). In this field of security, professionals “struggle to establish a hierarchy of dangers that legitimizes their struggle for resources” (Bigo 2002: 73). This struggle has resulted in what Bigo (2002: 85) names the “field of unease management” and later the “governmentality of unease” (Bigo 2013: 121).
Presented like this, it seems that the governmentality of unease assumes the existence of a security elite which deliberately influences policies in all different levels of governance. However, proponents of the governmentality of unease do not subscribe to this view. The practices of modern governments are so complex that one can no longer plausibly expect a sovereign actor to actively securitise, especially on the EU level (Neal 2009: 351). According to Bigo (2013: 121): “it is certainly not an elite, a group of the “powerful” imposing their agenda. It is the field that imposed itself on all the actors in the fields, including the dominant ones” (Bigo 2013: 121). As such, the process of securitizing identities and borders to govern populations has been emancipated from sovereign state authorities and is now being performed by a complex network of private and public actors which all follow their own interests; security has left the field of traditional politics (Bigo 2013: 121). In leaving the field of traditional politics, security has become harder to properly analyse. Therefore, Bigo (2002) argues that research into this discourse on security “is possible only through a detailed
17 analysis of the positions of authority of those who promote a threat definition in each bu-reaucracy, whether public or private” (Bigo 2002: 85), instead of relying on speech acts. Here, Bigo clearly exhibits Foucauldian views on governmentality and the related method of analysis.
In sum, the governmentality of unease offers researchers an approach that analyses discourses in order to ascertain how security policy is constructed. This approach acknowledges that modern security policies are the result of a discourse which is constructed in a network that consists of many different actors, both private and public. Any research into the construction of security policy should therefore analyse the discourse present in the network and this means going beyond the speech acts performed by the legislative authorities.
2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the developments in the literature from securitisation to insecuritisation theory offer new key ways to understand how radicalisation policies are constructed. Firstly, instead of reverting to key speeches by the political leaders of the security apparatus, research into the discourse surrounding security policy should analyse documents from different actors or institutions in the network. Secondly, the research should focus on the informal speech patterns, practices and techniques that are used by the different actors in this network. In doing so, the researcher should study the ways in which the actors are describing or questioning the status quo, instead of what the best way forward could be. Thirdly, research on the ‘field of security’ that is responsible for the governmentality of unease cannot be limited to the national context. The international nature of the field of security demands an international perspective. Since the European Union is seen as a prime example of how governance has become far too complex to be understood through simple speech acts (Neal 2009: 351), influences from the European level must be taken into account to understand the Dutch situation.
By adopting the governmentality of unease approach, the research question can be phrased as the following: How does the network of entities that make radicalisation policies use discourse to legitimise said policy by constructing identities and borders as insecurities? Among these entities are all the relevant parties in constructing radicalisation policy, not only the political authorities. This means that private and public bodies at any level (local, national
18 or international) are potential targets of analysis. In keeping with the governmentality of unease, policy documents and other texts are proper material to analyse a discourse that legitimises the escalation of governing of specific segments of the population. This framework enables this thesis to study a wide range of actors and documents in order to analyse a discourse which underlies the construction of radicalisation policy.
Instead of formulating a strong hypothesis that is to be tested, I will follow Walters’ (2012: 58) advice and focus on questioning the status quo in order to show the specificity of governance in the realm of radicalisation policy. Before presenting the research design developed for this thesis, the following chapter explains and defends the cases that have been selected for analysis.
19 Ch. 3. CASE SELECTION
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the entities and sources that are analysed in this thesis. In total, four entities are selected: the municipality of Amsterdam’s department on radicalisation and polarization (Aanpak Radicalisering en Polarisation Amsterdam; ARPA), the Utrecht municipality’s approach to radicalisation, the Dutch agency on counter-terror and security (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid; NCTV), and a European Union’s Funding institution (The Internal Security Fund – Police; ISFP). These four entities differ from each other in several distinct ways that are explained below. From these four entities, documents that either describe current policy (in the case of the municipalities and the NCTV), desired policy (in all cases), and documents that attempt to convince external entities to adopt their policy advice (in the case of the NCTV and arguably the ISFP) are selected. Due to the ISFP’s year of creation being 2014, combined with the lack of publicly accessible documents from both municipalities previously to 2014, the time frame that is analysed in this thesis is from 2014 to 2018.
The goal of this thesis is to find out how the concept of radicalisation is used and presented in security discourse to legitimize policies that affect the personal lives of targeted citizen groups. The first section of this chapter presents the Amsterdam and Utrecht entities. Moving up from the bottom level, the next section deals with the national level by explaining the selection of the NCTV. In the final section, the European level entity is selected: the ISFP. The final section reflects on the choice of entities.
3.2 Amsterdam and Utrecht
The choice of a municipal actor flows from the desire to analyse how a discourse on radicalisation can influence the personal lives of citizens. Since radicalisation is closely related to (national) security, it is to be expected that the municipality is a big player in the network that produces policies on it. It is less likely that most radicalisation policies for a given region are produced by a private actor. The focus on radicalisation departments or approaches instead of directly the mayor is based on the governmentality theory’s notion that researchers should look beyond the evident figureheads of authoritative institutions. The department on radicalisation presents an interesting combination of governmental regulatory
20 power and a distance to the traditional focal point of securitisation research. The following section begins with presenting the Amsterdam case and its relevant documents, followed by that of Utrecht.
3.2.1 Amsterdam department on radicalisation and polarisation
The selection of Amsterdam as one of the entities to be analysed is based on two primary characteristics of the municipality’s department on radicalisation and polarisation (hereafter: ARPA). These characteristics are its size and recent controversies and reorganisations within the department.
Firstly, it is the largest city of the Netherlands with more than 850.000 inhabitants. Simply put, the municipality of Amsterdam has influence over the greatest number of citizens of all municipalities, making their policies most relevant to analyse. Additionally, between 2004 and 2010, the Amsterdam approach to radicalisation was considered an example to other municipalities, both national and international (UU & LEI 2018: 5). These characteristics of size and exemplary status translate to a department on radicalisation that has great influence over the way discourses and policies on radicalisation are constructed. The greater the influence, the greater the importance of scrutiny, hence the selection of the ARPA.
The second characteristic of the Amsterdam department on radicalisation and polarisation that makes it relevant for analysis is that it is currently under a contentious reorganisation. The reorganization of the department was prompted by a controversy in June 2017 in which several high-ranking officials were fired, the mayor was accused of ‘purging’ the department of Muslim servants, and a proposed plan to run a covert propaganda campaign to prevent Muslim youths from radicalising was uncovered (Koops 2017; Wiegman 2017; Parool 2017a; Parool 2017b; Kouwenhoven & Blokker 2017; Sterkenburg 2017). Since this thesis is not aimed at determining the truth of the controversy, its details will not be presented here. Instead, to follow the tradition of governmentality researchers, the existence of a controversy shows that the ARPA’s “established ways of conducting affairs are called into question” (Walters 2012: 57). This results in the generation of relevant documents, aiding in the selection of data sources for analysis (ibid.). Additionally, the fact that the ARPA went from an exemplary position in 2010 to one mired in controversy in 2017 begs the question of what went wrong. Of course, since this thesis is not set up to determine what ‘good’ radicalisation
21 policy is, this question cannot be answered here. However, it is relevant to study how the ARPA’s discourse in the years of its decline as an exemplary entity relates to the other entities’ discourse on radicalisation. Whether their discourse in these years was or was not compatible with that of the other entities can say something about the possible influence of the discourse on radicalisation used by the other entities.
From the Amsterdam department on radicalisation and polarisation, the following material is selected for analysis. Ideally, interviews would be among the analysed material. Due to geographical proximity, I have attempted to interview civil servants from within the Amsterdam department. However, possibly due to the reorganisations or the ARPA’s nature as (partially) a security agency, I have not been able to get the interviews needed for this thesis. I have, however, had two informal interviews with civil servants within ARPA. One phone call on the 5th of March and an onsite talk with two civil servants on the 21st that same month. Both informal talks spanned approximately 1 hour and were part of the exploratory phase of this thesis. I mention these informal talks because they offered insight into the ARPA and have helped me make a selection of sources and entities that is explained in more detail further in this chapter.
Alleviating the need for interviews, Walters (2012: 57) states that policy documents and reports are also valid sources of analysis under the governmentality approach. This is further supported by previous research (Bigo 2002; Bigo 2013). Therefore, ARPA’s discourse on radicalisation is analysed on the basis of its 2016 yearly report, a document explaining the ARPA’s approach to online radicalisation (2017), and a policy letter written by the late mayor Eberhard van der Laan on the topic of ‘Amsterdam’s DNA’ (2017). The first two documents are clearly policy documents that are produced by the ARPA, making them useful for analysis (Walters 2012: 57). The third document, a letter by Eberhard van der Laan, requires more explanation, since it is not directly produced by the ARPA. It is included based on the following three reasons. Firstly, the letter is strongly related to the Amsterdam approach to radicalisation and polarisation. The letter presents the results of a project of which the ARPA was a part and which had as its goal to combat radicalisation and polarisation in Amsterdam. Secondly, Eberhard van der Laan has been accused of meddling extensively within the ARPA (Sterkenburg 2017). Thirdly, and most importantly, the letter features prominently on the ARPA page on the municipal website as explaining the department’s approach to online radicalisation (Amsterdam.nl 2018). The document is thus written by someone that has been identified as having influence within the department, on a
22 subject related directly to the department and it is being presented as part of the department’s documents. An overview of the selected documents is given in table 2.1
Table 2.1: ARPA documents
Type, name & date Stated function
Yearly report
“Jaarrapportage Aanpak Radicalisering en Polarisatie 2016”
2017 (?)
Provide a report of ARPA’s yearly activities of 2016 as well as its planned activities for the future.
Policy document
“Online aanpak Radicalisering en Polarisatie” 2017 (?)
Explain ARPA’s approach to combat radicalisation and polarisation online.
Policy letter by Van der Laan “Amsterdams DNA”
14-02-2017
Report on a project meant to combat radicalisation and polarisation.
3.2.2 Utrecht municipality’s approach to radicalisation
Three characteristics of the Utrecht municipality’s approach to radicalisation have resulted in its selection for analysis. The first of these is its size compared to Amsterdam. The second characteristic of the case is the lack of a controversy as seen at Amsterdam. The third characteristic is the relationship between the two cities.
Firstly, its size, with 340.000+ inhabitants, the city of Utrecht is less than half the size of Amsterdam. The smaller size could mean that certain factors that influence discourse might be present which aren’t noticeable in the Amsterdam case, or vice versa. It also means that the nature of day-to-day activities in the city is of a different scale. This difference in societal context could result in different views on the problem of radicalisation. Not meant as a form of variable control, this difference between the municipalities simply broadens the analysis of the municipal level of discourse. Moreover, Amsterdam is relevant due to it having influence over the largest number of citizens, Utrecht is relevant as an example of smaller municipalities that might not get regularly scrutinized.
Secondly, the municipality of Utrecht is not currently under reorganization, nor is it mired in a controversy. This stability results in clear and regular documentation of policy. The lack of a controversy means that a questioning of “established ways of conducting
23 affairs” (Walters 2012: 57) probably is not present in the documents. However, it could mean that the Utrecht discourse on radicalisation policy is more explicitly presented. Though Walters states that a controversy leads to the generation of documents relevant for analysis due to differing actors discussing which action is necessary to end the controversy (Walters 2012: 57-58), it could also be argued that a controversy leads to officials being mindful of how they present their ideas.
Finally, the third characteristic of the Utrecht case that is relevant to its selection is the fact that there exists a strong relation of influence between the two municipalities. After the 2017 controversy surrounding the Amsterdam department, a task force was called in to assess and advice a reorganisation of ARPA (UU & LEI 2018: 3). This task force was organised by the University of Utrecht and contained terror experts normally engaged in the Utrecht approach to radicalisation. The primary researcher, prof. dr. Beatrice de Graaf, is member of the advisory board of the Utrecht approach to radicalisation (UU.nl 2018; AT5 2018). This could point to Utrecht’s radicalisation approach to be considered effective and that of Amsterdam to be considered ineffective. This implies that the discourse on which the approaches and policies are based differs between the two municipalities, with that of Amsterdam being deemed insufficient or otherwise ‘defective’. This increases Utrecht’s relevance to the analysis of the discourse over that of other cities that might also have the previous two characteristics (e.g. Den Haag or Eindhoven).
Three documents of the Utrecht approach to radicalisation are selected. Two of these documents are the actionplan to prevent and counter radicalisation, one being published in 2015 and the other in 2017. The third document is a letter from mr. A. Pehlivan to give a summary of developments and plans of the Utrecht approach to radicalisation. This letter is sent to one of two commissions of the Utrecht city council: the commission on Humans and Society (Utrecht.nl 2018b). The two actionplans are found on the municipality’s website on their approach to radicalisation (Utrecht.nl 2018a). There are many more documents on the website, however, most are reports that were produced by external organisations. This does not outright eliminate these reports from selection since the governmentality of unease emphasises these sorts of non-government members of the policy network. However, the set scope of this thesis results in their exclusion. The letter by Pehlivan was not present on the website but since it was sent to all participants of a meeting on the 2015 actionplan, it was retrieved from one of their websites (stichtingasha.nl). Since it is part of the Utrecht approach
24 to radicalisation, and the municipality has little other publications on their website, it is included. An overview of the selected documents is given in table 2.2
Table 2.2: Utrecht documents
Type, name, author & date Stated function Actionplan
“Actieplan Utrecht zijn we samen” Gemeente Utrecht
09-07-2015
Explain the 2015 Utrecht approach to radicalisation and polarisation.
Letter to the commission on Humans and Society.
“Utrecht zijn we Samen: stand van zaken preventie en aanpak radicalisering”
A. Pehlivan 02-07-2015
Give summary and explanation of the 2015 actionplan to the commission.
Actionplan
“Utrecht zijn we samen: De Utrechtse aanpak van polarisatie en radicalisering” E. Steenvoorden
December 2017
Explain the 2017 Utrecht approach to radicalisation and polarisation.
3.3 NCTV
For the national level, the National Agency on Counter Terror and Security has been selected (henceforth the NCTV, its Dutch acronym). It is not a national political player, such as the prime minister, nor is it a salient security actor, such as the ministry of security and justice. Instead it is a rather unpolitical agency that both executes counter-terror and radicalisation policy as well as advises government on counter-terror and -radicalisation policies (NCTV.nl 2018b). Additionally, in the Netherlands, municipalities are relatively autonomous in deciding their (de)radicalization policies with the national NCTV acting as more of an advisor (Van der Laan & Van Gils 2015: 14; Gemeente Utrecht 2015; 29). This means that the NCTV is probably more embedded in the practical reality of radicalisation discourse and policy than the (prime)-minister. Additionally, its clear role as advisor in radicalisation policy
25 means that the NCTV might be responsible for the language used in the discourse at the lower levels. It is also the only agency of its size at the national level which focusses primarily on terrorism and (by extension) radicalisation (NCTV.nl 2018b).
The NCTV publishes 3 threat assessments a year in which they explain the current threats emanating from terrorism and radicalisation that face the Netherlands, including a risk assessment (NCTV.nl 2018a). Accompanying these assessments are letters written by the minister of Security and Justice, providing summary and context for the House of Representatives. I have decided to use these letters instead of the threat assessments because of two characteristics. Firstly, these letters are presented as originating from the NCTV. They are published through the NCTV and presented to the House as being from the NCTV. The second characteristic is that these letters not only give a summary of the threat assessment, they also provide clear policy advice to the House of Representatives. In this manner, these letters represent a move by an unpolitical agency to influence policy which can impact Dutch citizen’s in the name of security. Additionally, it is thinkable that most politicians and other players in the network firstly read this letter before, if at all, reading the actual assessment. In total, ten threat assessment letters have been selected, starting in 2014 and ending in 2018. Since all the threat assessment letters have the same goal, that is to provide summary and advice to the House of Representative, a table would be excessive. A list of the letters, together with their date of publication, is included in the Analysis chapter.
3.4 JSFP
On the international level, many actors and organisations exist that could be selected for analysis. From these, the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police is selected. The choice is based on three major points. The first is its characteristic as a non-political entity that presents a discourse on radicalisation. The second point is that its discourse is made salient by the large amount of funding that are awarded by the Internal Security Fund – Police (henceforth: ISFP). The third point is that it was mentioned by one of the civil servants in the informal talks of the 21st of March as explained in the section on the municipality of Amsterdam. The following paragraphs explain the details of the ISFP and provide further explanation of the three reasons for selection.
The Internal Security Fund was created by the European Commission (more specifically, its Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs) in 2014 for a six-year
26 period and contained 3.8 billion euros at inception. The ISF is divided in two instruments: Borders and Visa, and Police (EC 2018c). The Police instrument, ISFP, is set up to fight crime (including terrorism) and manage risks (ibid.). The ISFP operates in the following manner. It publishes Calls for Proposals which outline a problem and connects it to a financial funding package. Organisations can then apply for this funding by sending in a proposal to solve the problem outlined in the Call for Proposals. If a proposal is deemed acceptable by the ISFP, funding is awarded (EC 2018b). The process is open to local and national governments, agencies, universities, and private institutions.
The first point underlying the ISFP’s inclusion in this thesis has to do with its institutional location. Just as the NCTV, it is not a political player, nor is it a policy maker. Yet, because it falls under the European Commission, a heavy international player, it is reasonable to assume that its discourse on topics carries weight.
The second point serves as a solidification of the previous. The fund contains 3.8 billion euros, making it a large financier of security programs in the Member States. Since multiple kinds of actors can apply for these funds, it can be seen as an extra source of funding for agencies which already exist. For example, though Amsterdam nor Utrecht has yet received funding, Dutch national police has received funding, as well as the University of Tilburg (EC 2018d). It is to be expected that such a large source of funding can have influence over other entities that are engaged in the making of policies on security, such as radicalisation.
The final point that underlies the selection of the ISFP is based on the informal talk with an Amsterdam civil servant on the 21st of March. In it, the official said that if there were to be an actor that influences the discourse in the radicalisation circles, it is the ISFP. The civil servant considered it possible that actors in the radicalisation policy network alter their language to become compatible with the outstanding Calls for Proposals in order to increase chance of funding. This piece of information that underlined the ISFP as target for analysis. The fact that no academic analysis could be found of the ISFP’s influence of radicalisation discourse, even though a professional in the field mentioned it, further solidified its position as this thesis’s target for analysis.
From the ISFP, the Calls for Proposals (henceforth: Calls) are analysed in this thesis. Ignoring the ones that are in no way related to radicalisation, four Calls remain. Three are expressly focussed on the prevention of radicalisation whilst the fourth is more focussed on
27 the financial aspects of counter-terror policy. One has a fund of 2.5 million euros, two have a fund of 3 million and one has a total fund of 6 million euros. The fund connected to these Calls is not relevant for the analysis; it is included to provide context on the amount of funding the ISFP makes available. The following table (3.3) gives a detailed overview of all four documents.
Table 3.3: ISFP's Calls for Proposals
Name, date & budget Stated function
“Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism”
18-11-2014 Budget: 3.000.000
Calls for institutions and organisations to propose programmes to prevent radicalisation.
“ISF Call for proposals for alternative and counter narrative campaigns supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism – Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP)”
04-10-2017 Budget: 6.000.000
Calls for institutions and organisations to propose programmes which focus on the creation of counter narrative campaigns in the media in order to prevent radicalisation by radical propaganda.
“Counter-Terrorism financing” 05-12-2017
Budget: 2.500.000
Calls for institutions and organisations to propose programmes which aim to attack the financial side of terrorist organisations.
“Call for proposals for projects on preventing and countering violent radicalisation”
30-01-2018 Budget: 3.000.000
Calls for institutions and organisations to propose programmes to prevent and counter radicalisation.
28 3.5 Reflection and Conclusion
Before continuing with the methodology of this thesis, a short reflection on the selected cases is required. The selected entities vary in nature from each other. The ISFP is an international funding scheme, ARPA is a specific department of the municipality of Amsterdam, the Utrecht approach to radicalisation is presented as part of the entire municipality, and the NCTV is a national agency tasked with the gathering of information on radicalisation, providing policy advice, as well as executing security policies. The governmentality of unease approach’s emphasis on analysing different sorts of actors is therefore achieved in the selection of entities presented in this chapter. Even though the entities differ in nature, each uses the term radicalisation to justify either their own policy or the policy they would like to see implemented. Therefore, they are all part of a network of practices and techniques that results in increased government of specific groups in society. According to the governmentality of unease approach, this sort of analysis has the highest chance of identifying the discourse that is used to legitimise security policies.
The lack of a larger pool of documents does pose an obstacle to this thesis. The lack of interviews, as well as the limited time scale due to the ISFP’s age does call into question several capabilities of this thesis. Firstly, the thesis is not able to establish a clear causal relationship or mechanism. This research is not able to uncover which entity is producing the discourse and which ones are simply adopting it. Secondly, the thesis cannot establish a timescale. Therefore, it cannot present the development of the discourse through time. Related to these two obstacles, the thesis is not capable to state whether the discourse among these entities originates within one or more of these entities or whether they are adopting a discourse that lies outside this thesis’ selection.
The governmentality approach’s emphasis on the specificity of governance does not require a timeline, nor does it require the researcher to find the originator of the discourse (Walters 2012: 56-57). Instead, governmentality research is used to give an adequate description of the discourse of governance, focusing on how participants of the network use language to legitimise specific policies and practices (Walters 2012: 58). As such, the above limitations are not considered obstacles for this thesis’ specific research. The following chapter explains the methodology that allows for an analysis of the selected documents in accordance with the governmentality of unease.
29 Ch. 4 METHOD
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the methodology that is employed to study the discourse that underlies the construction of radicalisation policies. This chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the core of the chosen method, the Critical Frame Analysis. The second section defends the method’s compatibility with this thesis and relates it to the literature on governmentality. The final section concludes the chapter and provides a summary of the method before moving on to chapter 5.
4.2 Critical Frame Analysis
In short, the Critical Frame Analysis (henceforth: CFA), as originally propagated by Verloo and Lombardo (2007), adopts a critical approach in the analysis of source texts. The goal of this critical approach is to analyse the frames and prejudices that are, in part, subconsciously reproduced (Verloo & Lombardo 2007: 32). To be able to do this, Verloo and Lombardo (2007: 35) have developed a list of guiding questions that help the researcher to analyse a text document whilst being mindful of what the text’s producer might include subconsciously. The CFA is explained in greater detail below.
The key concept within this method is that of a “policy frame”. Generally, a frame refers to the interpretational scheme through which an individual gives meaning to reality (Goffmann 1974). More specifically, a policy frame is defined as an “organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included” (Verloo 2005: 20). Policy frames can be created through discourse and through practices (Giddens 1984). This means that actors can actively mobilise frames to influence the discussion surrounding policy in an intended way and they can mobilise such frames based on their practical reality without being aware they are doing so (Verloo & Lombardo 2007: 32). Adopting a critical attitude can help researchers identify frames and biases that are not specifically mentioned by the source text, yet are present in the practices of the text’s author (ibid.). This is the goal of critical frame analysis. To help in this process, Verloo and Lombardo (2007: 35) present a set of “sensitizing questions” to be used as a tool to help the researcher analyse different aspects of a policy frame. The questions are divided in a category that focusses on diagnosis, and one
