ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITY AS AN INCENTIVE FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Cooperation in Transboundary Shared River Basins in the SADC
MASTER THESIS
MA International Relations and International Organisation – University of Groningen
Supervisor: Dr. C. K. Lamont
Student: Stefanie Kuiper BA
Student number: 1460579
TABLE OF CONTENT
TABLE OF CONTENT 1 – 2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 4
INTRODUCTION 5 – 10
I. Central Research Question 6
II. Methodology and Selection of Case Study 7
A. Methodology 7
B. Selection of the Case Study 7
III. Chapter Outline 9
Chapter 1: ANALYTIC OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE IN 11 – 23 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
I. The Relationship between Environmental Insecurity and Conflict 11
A. Homer-Dixon; Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity 12
B. Gleick; Fresh Water and Violent Conflict 15
C. Critics of Environmental Insecurity as Cause of Conflict 18
II. The Relationship between Environmental Insecurity and Cooperation 19
A. Wolf; the Basin-At-Risk Project and Water Cooperation. 20
B. Water as Incentive for Cooperation or Conflict; Wolf, Homer-Dixon and Gleick 22
III. Conclusion 23
Chapter 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 24 - 31
I. Similarities in Assumptions of Homer-Dixon, Gleick and Wolf 24
II. Definition and Measurement of the Core Concepts 26
A. Perception of Institutional Ability to Adapt 26
B. Perception of Change as Threat to Security 28
III. Combined Theoretical Framework 30
Chapter 3: THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IN TRANSBOUNDARY SHARED 32 - 38 RIVER BASINS IN THE SADC
I. Historical Background and Foundation of the SADC 32
II. Physical Dimension of Transboundary Shared River Basin Institutionalisation 33
A. Operational Institutionalisation in the SADC; the SADC – HYCOS project 34
III. Social Dimension of Transboundary Shared River Basin Institutionalisation 35
A. Legal-institutional Level of Transboundary Shared River Basins in the SADC 36
IV. Conclusion 38
Chapter 4: RATE OF CHANGE IN TRANSBOUNDARY SHARED RIVER BASINS 39 – 49
IN THE SADC
I. Geographic and Social-Demographic Features of the SADC 39
II. Physical Changes in Transboundary Shared River Basins 41
A. Water Quantity 42
B. Infrastructure 43
III. Social Changes in Transboundary Shared River Basins 45
A. Demographics 45
B. Quality of Accessible Water 47
IV. Conclusion 48
CONCLUSION 50 – 53
I. Research Objective and Theoretical Framework 50
II. Implementation of the Theoretical Framework to the Case Study 51
A. Perception of Institutional Ability to Adapt 51
B. Perception of Change as a Threat to Security 52
III. Concluding Statements 53
APPENDIX 1: Map of the Transboundary Shared River Basins in the SADC 54 APPENDIX 2: Socio – Geographical Data on the SADC Region 55 – 56
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BAR Basin At RiskCONSAS Constellation of Southern African States DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FLS Frontline States
HDI Human Development Index MDG Millennium Development Goals
RSAP-IWRM Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated Water Resources Development and Management
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADC – HYCOS Southern African Development Community – Hydrological Cycle Observation System SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
TFDD Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database TNRWR Total Natural Renewable Water Resources
TSRBI Transboundary Shared River Basin Institutionalisation
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme WHO World Health Organisation
WHYCOS World Hydrological Cycle Observation System ZACPLAN Zambezi River Basin Action Plan
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1 Some Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity 13
Figure 2 The Core Concepts of the Theoretical Framework; The Explanatory 25
Power of Environmental Security in Transboundary Shared River Basins
Figure 3 The Classical Temple of Sharing International Water Resources 26
Figure 4 Institutional Ability to Adapt in Transboundary Shared River Basins 27
Figure 5 Change as a Explanatory Concept in Environmental Security in 29
Transboundary Shared River Basins.
Figure 6 Theoretical Framework to Research the Explanatory Power of 30
Environmental Security in Transboundary Shared River Basins.
Figure 7 Population Growth in % in the SADC 45
Table 1 Classification Criteria for Conflict on Water 17
Table 2 River Basins its Riparian States and Specials Features in the SADC 40
Table 3 Water Quantity in the SADC region (10^9 m3/yr) 42
Table 4 Total Renewable Water Resources per Capita (m3/inhabitant/year) 46
Table 5 Quality of Accessible Water; % of Population with Access to Safe 48
INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world order has changed. Globalisation has accelerated, fuelling international relations and the discipline International Relations with re-evaluation of old concepts and new challenges. New research topics have become imperative, shifting the agenda of International Relations from state-centric, power-based theories towards a broad range of topics with potential research interest.
One of the outcomes of the new globalised world has been a renewed definition of security and security issues. The new world structure has brought fresh insights to Security Studies and has led to research that goes beyond the view of traditional Security Studies by looking at security in new sectors. Moreover, traditional security research has tended to focus on states, while new security issues go further than the state level towards regional or global level or focus upon the individual level.
The pioneers in the work of Security Studies after the Cold War are Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. They have defined the concept of securitarisation, in which the traditional material character of threats is secondary towards threat perception.1 Securitarisation does not focus on real or actual threats, but on the assumption of threat by an actor. Securitarisation presumes that the perception of the actor – whether it feels insecure or secure – defines the outcome of an event, not the factual security situation.2 In short; securitarisation defines security as a protection from perception of threats, whether real or alleged.
One of the ‘new’ sectors of research in Security Studies is the environment. The research in Environmental Security revolves around the hypothesis that environmental problems can pose a threat to security among and within states and societies. Within Environmental Security, water plays an eminent role. Hydro politics – the politics of water – is important in security issues since water is shared, unequally divided and scarce. Moreover, water is irreplaceable, essential, and cannot be substituted. The importance of water in (environmental) security issue is characterised by its multiple and complex role in, for example human survival and economic development.3 The eminence of water for the international agenda has been proven by the international water conference in Dublin and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or the so-called Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.4
1
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London, 1998)
2 Ibidem 3
Khagram, Clark, and Firas Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security to Sustainable Security and Development”, Journal of Human Development, 4, 2 (July 2003) 289 - 290
4
The multifaceted characters of water can also lead to diffuse and unstructured research. This thesis will narrow down the research of environmental security to transboundary shared river basins. Environmental security is seen as the absence of environmental threats to security. Environmental insecurity explains the opposite; the presence of an environmental threat to security. The role of transboundary shared river basins in environmental insecurity is been given special attention since the beginning of the new agenda in Security Studies. Researchers like Homer-Dixon and Gleick researched this topic since the early 1990s.5 The position and the stream of the river basin offers advantages to an upstream riparian, which can unilaterally use the shared river basin, thereby affecting other downstream riparian states.6 The situation of the upstream riparian is solely based on its geographical location. Rivers always flow downhill towards one point. Therefore, the downstream riparian is unable to reverse the dependency upon the upstream riparian. Since security in this field is depending on geography rather than economic and/or military power, a unique opportunity for cooperation may occur. Considering that transboundary shared river basins provide a unique research agenda because both sovereign international, and transnational dimensions of state relations overlap, this thesis will concentrate on environmental insecurity in transboundary shared river basins.
I. Central Research Question
The objective of this research is to examine environmental insecurity as an incentive for regional integration. To reduce complexity, the thesis will focus upon transboundary shared river basins as the level of research and the state as the central actor. The research method used to structure and examine the research question will be based on a single-case study, namely transboundary shared river basins in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The research question to study this is: to what extent can environmental insecurity, in the form of transboundary shared river basins,
explain regional cooperation in the Southern African Development Community?
A number of hypotheses are defined in order to answer this question. The core hypothesis assumes that the incentive for cooperation in the SADC in the context of the perceived ‘optimal
response’ of member states to environmental insecurity is influenced by the perception of the institutional ability to adapt and the perception of change as a threat to security. Chapter one of this
thesis will explain the academic relevance of this hypothesis in researching environmental insecurity in transboundary shared river basins. Chapter 2 will explore the theoretical framework of this thesis, and chapters 3 and 4 will treat two hypotheses which are deducted from this main hypothesis; these hypotheses are;
5
The literature discussion in chapter one will give a thorough overview of this.
- The perception of institutional ability to adapt in transboundary shared river basins in the SADC give rise to an incentive for cooperation as the perceived optimal response to environmental insecurity.
- Environmental changes in the transboundary shared river basins in the SADC pose a threat to environmental security and give rise to an incentive for conflict as the perceived optimal response to this situation.
II. Methodology and Selection of the Case Study
A. Methodology
The case study method applied to this research will be a single-case counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual analysis facilitates the possibility to research cause and effect between interventions and outcomes. The analysis combines knowledge in particular cases with strong theories about the consequences of particular values to a variable to produce credible accounts of what should have been true if one variable in a case had assumed a particular value.7 Where mainstream theorists predict the outcome of conflict as a credible account (after assuming particular values of variables), this thesis case study is based on the prediction of regional cooperation as a credible account.
Counterfactual analysis uses “nomothetic and idiographic case study counterfactuals”.8 Nomothetic studies tend to generalise and to contain quantitative research, whilst ideographic studies tend to specify unique and subjective phenomena in qualitative research. This approach is of value for International Relations since the subjects of research are unique individual cases. However, they do have general characteristics or behave according to general rules or laws.9 Both the ideographic (unique individuals), and the nomothetic perspective (behaviour according to general laws), are important in case study research in International Relations. Theoretical approaches of Homer-Dixon and Gleick concerning environmental insecurity and conflict are used as ideographic theories and the Basin at Risk project of Wolf represents the nomothetic perspective in environmental insecurity in this thesis. Chapter one will elaborate on the methodology used throughout this thesis.
B. Selection of the Case Study
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was founded on August 17th 1992 with the Windhoek Declaration in Windhoek, Namibia. The SADC provides an interesting case study due to its
7 Sprinz, Wolinksky-Nahmias, Models, Numbers & Cases, Methods for Studying International Relations,
(Michigan, 2004) 25; Tetlock, Belkin, Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical,
methodological and psychological perspectives (Princeton, 1996) 6, 8-10 8
Sprinz, Models, Numbers and Cases, 25
complexity in economic and political history and development, and the environmental and geographic concerns within the region. SADC’s aspirations are sustainable and equitable economic growth, socio-economic development through cooperation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and security.10 Currently, the SADC has 15 member states; Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), Zambia and Zimbabwe.11 As the SADC was founded in 1992, the data analysis in this thesis will focus on the period 1992 – 2010.
The economic and political history and development of Southern Africa are characterised by colonialism and economic underdevelopment. The most historical analysis of conflict and development within the region started with the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.12 The discovery of Southern Africa by European colonialist resulted in several political and territorial problems. The first inheritance of colonisation is the territorial map of Southern Africa. The territorial borders of states within the continent have been based on a political process in which the European conquerors drew the map of Africa. In this scramble, territorial boundaries were set based on political games between the European powers. The tactics of keeping river basins within state territory were not taken into account during this process. After the Second World War, many (African) colonies gained independence. In this independence process, the doctrine of uti possidetis channelled the process of setting the territorial boundaries. This doctrine gives (African) states the obligation to respect the principle of the “intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonisation”.13 Since the territorial boundaries drawn by the colonial rules cannot be changed, the location and stream of a river can lead to problematic situations.14
Second, the most economically developed states within the region – Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe – are reaching the limits to their available water resources.15 Water is integrated with economic development which implies that water scarcity can jeopardise the future
10
http://www.sadc.int/english/about-sadc/ accessed on February 24, 2012
11 Appendix 1 contains a map of the SADC region. 12
Ngoma, Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa; An Analysis of Regional Security in the
Southern African Development Community, (2005, Zambia) 3
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/ProspectsForASecurity05/Contents.htm Accessed on April 23, 2012.
13
Uti possidetis is a general principle in International Law which suggest that “[t]he essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of security respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved.” International Court of Justice Reports, 1986, In: Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge, 2008) 524-528; Moreover, the Organisation of African Unity adopted a resolution in 1964, stating that “colonial frontiers existing as at the date of independence constitute a tangible reality and that all members states pledged themselves to respect such borders.” In: Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge, 2008) 526
14
Savenije, Van der Zaag, “Conceptual framework for the management of shared river basins; with special reference to the SADC and EU”, Water Policy, 2 (2002) 12
15
Turton, “An introduction to the hydropolitical dynamics of the Orange River Basin.” In: Nakayama,
economic growth of these states, and therefore, the region as a whole. This water scarcity situation could lead to the securitisation of water resources as it threatens the economic growth. To avoid this security trap, the SADC region has developed several de-securitisation processes. The establishment of the SADC as a regional integrative institution can be seen as a beginning of this process.16
III. Chapter Outline
The first chapter will concentrate on the analysis of the explanatory power of Environmental Security theories. The analysis from the literature is split into two topics, conflict and cooperation in relation to environmental insecurity. This distinction is based on the assumption that Security Studies contain both peace and war studies. As such, security research is relevant to conflict and cooperation.
The first part of the literature analysis will focus on the relation between environmental scarcity and conflict. One of the main theorists who link scarcity and conflict is Homer-Dixon in his book ‘Environment, scarcity and conflict’. Another important researcher in this first chapter is Gleick and his research on water as an incentive and a tool for violent conflict. Questions raised in this part are whether environment is a matter of national security and whether environmental scarcity can be used as a source for security research. The second part of the first chapter concentrates on security and cooperation. Because of the geographic nature of transboundary shared river basins, traditional security rules do not apply. Economically and militarily strong states do not always have the power to control all actions within the river basins. Sovereignty of states declines when it comes to transboundary shared river basins. In this part, Aaron Wolf’s project ‘Basins at Risk’ will be used. He examined all water events which occurred over the past five decades and analysed this data to come to a better understanding of water as an incentive for cooperation.
The second chapter contains a combined model for further research. The key concepts of the relevant literature will form the base of this theoretical model. Moreover, the hypothesis principle of this thesis will be further explored. The theoretical framework will analyse both parts of security studies in relation to environmental scarcity and transboundary shared river basins. The theoretical framework designed in the chapter 2 is the structure for further research in chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the institutional capacity in transboundary shared river basins in the SADC. The chapter gives a short overview of the historical background and the foundation of the SADC. Furthermore, it will analyse the institutional ability to adapt in the SADC. The physical and social dimension of transboundary shared river basin institutionalisation is central in this second part of the chapter. The SADC – Hydrological Cycle Observation System (SADC-HYCOS) is central to the physical dimension of institutionalisation, whereas the political and legal-institutional situation of the SADC is essential in the social dimension of transboundary shared river basin institutionalisation.
CHAPTER 1
ANALYTIC OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY STUDIES
Environmental changes and natural resource scarcity can lead to social disorder, economic decline and forced migration, which in turn may lead to instability, violence, or even armed conflict.17 The stage for environmental conflict or cooperation between states is set – in a sense – by geography. Dealing with transboundary environmental issues generates a decline in traditional state power and makes states vulnerable to a threat since they are less able to act independent. 18 The sovereignty of states, and the ability to control the outcome of actions influencing the environment, is weakened. The alteration of the balance of power among states does not automatically indicate a larger risk of conflict. Environmental issues can also create unique opportunities for cooperation and integration, as states can see cooperation as a solution to concur with new threats to their national power.
This chapter provides in a thorough analysis from the literature and academic discussion of the topic of environmental (in)security in general, and that of transboundary shared river basins specifically. This chapter discusses the explanatory power of environmental (in)security in context of conflict and cooperation. The first part of the chapter will focus on environmental insecurity and conflict. The second part of the analysis for this chapter concentrates on cooperation as an outcome of transboundary shared river basin management. The research question central in this chapter is: To
what extent can exciting literature in Environmental Security Studies explain either regional cooperation or conflict?
I. The Relationship between Environmental Insecurity and Conflict
Traditionally, security studies address concerns from a military and economic perspective, focusing on threats to the national state territory, its sovereignty and state borders.19 Critical or non-traditional security studies have introduced new perspectives on threats to national security,
17 Daoudy, McCaffrey, Ojendal, and Turton, “Trans-boundary Water Co-operation as a Tool for Conflict
Prevention and Broader Benefit Sharing” Global Development Studies No 4, 26
http://www.egdi.gov.se/word/Transboundery%20water.pdf accessed on November 16, 2011. Other scholars
who agree with this line of thought are Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, 1999); Gleick, Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources (New York, 1993); Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs, 67, 3 (1991) 431 – 451
18
This logic is core to Neo Realism. Kenneth Waltz and his book Theory of International Politics (1979) explain that state act in an anarchic system Since there is no central authority, states have to rely on self-help in order to survive. The security dilemma explained by neo-realism claims that states cannot trust another and therefore should keep as much sovereignty as possible. State strive to relative gain in which it is important that cooperation will only appear when an actor thinks it will gain more than the other. This process will result in a ‘balance of power’ which shapes the international anarchical system. Transboundary environmental issues lie beyond the relative power of a state, since states are less able to rule over nature. For example, a state cannot alter the flow of a river and therefore are dependent on upstream actors.
broadening the traditional military, economic security agenda to other security threats which, for example, can be linked with the environment.20 Environmental security is predominantly linked to the relation between the threat of violent conflict and environmental scarcity.
A. Homer-Dixon; Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity
Several authors have debated about the link between environment and conflict.21 Homer-Dixon is one of the key researchers within the field of environmental (in)security and conflict. His research is concentrated on the correlation between violent conflict and the exhaustion of renewable resources. Homer-Dixon puts emphasis renewable environmental resources, i.e. fish, water, fertile soils and forests. Moreover, he concentrates on the role of scarcity in environmental security. He identifies three sources of environmental scarcity; (i) environmental change, (ii) demand- and supply-induced scarcity, and (iii) unequal social distribution of resources.22 Environmental change refers to an man-made decline in the quality or quantity of a renewable resource that occurs at a higher rate than it is renewed by nature.23 Demand induced scarcity can be the result of population growth or increased consumption per capita. Reduction of supply can be related to the erosion of agricultural land or the lack of fresh water due to drought.24 Unequal social distribution of resources implies a social structural problem. Resources are in control of a comparatively small number of people while the main population has no adequate access to resources.
When environmental scarcity occurs, Homer-Dixon argues that two possible outcomes are possible; resource capture of those with the possibilities to do so, and ecological marginalisation of those who do not have the means. Resource capture is a process in which “resource depletion and population growth cause dissimilar resource access.”25 Elite groups within society change the allocation of natural resources into their favour, which condemns the remaining population to scarcity. Ecological marginalisation appears when unequal access and population growth cause resource degradation and exhaustion. Demand-induced scarcity produces supply-induced scarcity. Unequal distribution causes inability to access resources, forcing the growing population to migrate to regions that are ecologically fragile and extremely vulnerable to degradation.26 Environmental scarcity in this sense is not dependent on absolute supply and access to a resource, but “it is the
20 S
pector, and Wolf, “Negotiating security: New goals, changed process”, International Negotiation, 5, 3 (2000) 410
21
Examples are Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict; Options and Actions (Washington, 2003); Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, 1999);Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security: A
New Framework for Analysis (London, 1998); 22
Homer-Dixon, “Environment, Scarcities and Violent Conflict, Evidence from Cases”, International Security, 19, 1 (1994) 8
23
Ibidem, 4
24
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, 1999) 280
25
Homer-Dixon, “Environment, Scarcities and Violent Conflict”, 10 – 16
resource supply relative to, first demand of the resource, and second, the social distribution on the resource.”27
Homer-Dixon concluded that it is predominantly the state as the social institution that has the most to fear from environmental scarcity, since it is likely to weaken the capacity and legitimacy of the state. To avoid the chances of conflict as a result of environmental scarcity, states should adopt a strategy that reverses environmental scarcity. Homer-Dixon suggests a national and an international solution for this. On a national level, states should rearrange their social structures to avoid social deprivation and unequal distribution of resources. Internationally, states should specialise in an abundant commodity and exchange this with the scarce commodity on the international market.28 This argument explains Homer-Dixon’s conviction that the relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict is most likely to occur in the developing world. Poor states are less able to adapt to social and industrial changes. This makes them vulnerable to environmental scarcity problems. The SADC member states are so-called developing states. Following Homer-Dixon’s line of reasoning, it is likely that environmental scarcity leads to conflict in these states.
Figure 1 illustrates the combined model Homer-Dixon has developed to explain the relation between environmental scarcity and conflict. The model demonstrates the three main sources of environmental scarcity, which can lead to destabilised states and to (violent) conflict in the long run.
Figure 1: Some Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity.29
27 Homer-Dixon, and Deligiannis, “Environmental Scarcities and Civil Violence”, 309-325, In: Brauch et al, Facing Global Environmental Change. Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts (Berlin, 2009) 317
28
Homer-Dixon, “Environment, Scarcities and Violent Conflict”, 17
Homer-Dixon identified three relations between environmental scarcity and conflict. His first hypothesis implies that resource scarcity is a direct cause of violent conflict. Simple-scarcity conflict can be explained by the security dilemma. The security dilemma assumes that states act rationally and calculate their situation in a zero-sum environment in which the availabilities of natural resources are set.30 Neo-realism argues that the anarchical structure of the international system
makes survival, self-help and relative gain the most important concern of states. By ensuring or increasing their power, states can take measures, which can be seen as a threat by other states.31 The renewable resource most likely to provoke interstate violent conflict is water. Water is a basic need for both private and public survival. Scarcity of this resource can immediately threaten individual and national security.32 Fresh water and rivers appear as an economic commodity essential to economic development, as well as a political product ensuring or threatening (inter-) national human security. Given that rivers often have been international shared basins, they are a concern for interstate security. Rivers flow to the lowest point, which makes the downstream riparian dependent upon the actions of the upstream riparian. Conflicts are most likely to occur when a downstream riparian is highly dependable on river water and is stronger than the upstream riparian. In this case, there is a threat for the downstream riparian that the upstream partner will use water as a means of coercion.33
The other two links between conflict and environmental scarcity defined by Homer-Dixon have an indirect relation to violent conflict. Population movements may cause a ‘group-identity’ conflict, since large movements of people may change the social balance within an area. It can alter the distribution of natural resources like land, water, wood and other basic needs necessary to human survival. When a larger group must share the same natural resources, economic deprivation can occur. This may lead to deprivation conflicts. Another reason for economic deprivation can be a decrease in supply or an increase in demand. An area suffering from serious drought or failed harvest has to deal with supply decreases, leaving people in despair and enlarging the possibilities for violent conflict.34
Homer-Dixon concludes by pointing out that environmental scarcity has been hardly ever a sufficient cause of violent conflict. Moreover, he claims that empirical examination shows that violence deriving from environmental scarcity is more frequently internal rather than interstate in kind. However, conflict generated from environmental scarcity can have severe indirect effects on
30
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 137-141
31 Dinar, “Water, Security, Conflict and Cooperation”, SAIS Review, 22, 2, (Summer- Fall 2002) 240-241 32
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 139 – 140
33
Homer-Dixon, “Environment, Scarcities and Violent Conflict”, 18-31;Gleick, “Water and Conflict, Fresh Water Resources and International Security”, International Security, 18 , 1 (Summer 1993) 93
the international community. The global world intertwines national states on economics, politics and other areas giving a new impulse to previously insignificant areas of interest for policymakers. Crises in developing states often have implications for other states. Interstate violence can affect external trade, create large refugee flows and produce humanitarian disasters, which call upon military or financial help of other states. Moreover, internal violence can have a negative effect on neighbouring countries which destabilise the region. Although the environment is not an independent cause of violent conflict, it should not be neglected in research regarding the causes of aggressive conflict.
B. Gleick; Fresh Water and Violent Conflict
The new security study agenda has given precedence to the environment as a topic of discussion. The previous section is a first step in this process, in which Homer-Dixon tried to identify a link between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. Although he directs some of his research towards water and transboundary shared river basins, the main focus of his research is still on renewable resources in general. Since this thesis tries to study the link between transboundary shared river basin management and security, the theoretical studies of Homer-Dixon need to be complemented by the work of Peter Gleick.
Gleick devoted his research to the link between freshwater and violent conflict. He claims that water can both be an objective for (interstate) violent conflict and/or an instrument of war. Threats to security are related to water stress, a notion of an emerging threat to national resources, and the unequal distribution of water. Gleick emphasises that insecurity is an outcome of environmental scarcity that reduces the quality of human life. He states that “[w]here water is scarce; competition for limited supplies can lead nations to see access to water as a matter of national security.”35 To understand this statement, it is important to realise the concept of threat perception. Threats are not always actual and real, but can also occur when an state assumes it is in danger. The perception that environmental problems – such as access to rivers or water scarcity –are threats to national security drives the securitarisation dynamics.36 Security explained in this way can be defined as the absence of threats, whether real or perceived. This process is defined as ‘securitarisation’ by Buzan and others.37
Gleick agrees with critiques on Environmental Security theories that the environment is not a singular source of conflict.38 He claims that there is no single cause for interstate conflicts. It is
35
Gleick, “Water and Conflict, Fresh Water Resources and International Security”, International Security, 18 , 1 , (Summer 1993) 79
36 Turton, “Hydropolitics: The concept and its limitations”, In: Turton, and Henwood, Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, (Pretoria 2003) 13–19
37
Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs, 67, 3 (1991) 431 – 451; Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, Security, A New Framework For Analysis (London, 1998)
difficult to distillate the many entangled causes of conflict; however, Gleick is assured that water plays an increasing role in disputes. This does not lead to the conclusion that all water scarcity leads to violent conflict, most will lead to negotiations and non-violent resolutions.39 States are often not concerned about the enforcement of an optimal distribution of water, but they seek to achieve security arrangements. However, Gleick generally disagrees with the critique that water has no independent influence on violent conflict. According to him, violent conflicts are likely to occur on regional level and in developing countries where water is both more critical to survival and less easily replaced.40
Gleick classified some criteria for conflict over water and defined some case studies to verify these criteria. First, he acknowledged that states are willing and able to start a violent conflict to control the water resources. States have started military actions to expand their boundaries to get effective control over the resource. The last violent conflict with water as a military goal, according to Gleick, was the war between Angola and South Africa in 1998. Angolan forces attacked the Calueque dam via air and land with the goal of damaging the power and water supply.41 Second, water resources can be used as a military or political tool. Especially when a state experiences growth and development, water can be a source of economic or political strength. Water is an important resource for both agricultural and industrial development. Gleick defines some characteristics, which determine to what extent water can be considered of strategic significance. These are (i) the degree of scarcity; (ii) the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one region or state; (iii) the relative power to the basin states; and (iv) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources.
Water resource systems can also be used both as offensive and defensive instruments of war. Both state and non-state actors use water and water resource systems as targets or tools of violence. In the past ten years, the use of water as a target for terrorist attacks has grown exponentially. Gleick claims that the use of water as a military objective of warfare is a historical measure which has been used for centuries and is still an actual topic as has been proven in Israel – Palestine (2009) and Iraq – US (2003).
Development disputes are the last form of conflict defined by Peter Gleick. Development disputes are a consequence of water resource problems. Although water is a renewable natural resource, it is difficult to redistribute economically and there are no substitutes for water. Development disputes, and violent conflicts have both social and economic roots. Socially, the lack of fresh water can result in human suffering and water-related health burdens. Lack of safe drinking
39 Ibidem, 80 40
Ibidem, 83
41
water and poor sanitation can produce waterborne diseases and tensions between groups due to inequitable distribution. Economically, lack of fresh water can impact industrial growth and agricultural development. Water can provide hydroelectric power, and good irrigation can make the agrarian sector more profitable.
Table 1. Classification Criteria for Conflict on Water.42
The economic, political and social value of water increases the competition for limited water supplies, and many states depend on water sources that are partly under the control over other nations. Global climate changes, industrial and population growth put stress on the demand on water in the coming decades. Although Gleick admits that water-related disputes are more likely to create political confrontations and negotiations than violent conflict, he appeals towards academic and
42
Daoudy, et al., “Trans-boundary Water Co-operation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention”
http://www.egdi.gov.se/word/Transboundery%20water.pdf accessed on November 21, 2011 18 – 19
BASE OF CONFLICT ACTORS SUGGESTED CRITERIA
Water as a military goal
Water supplies or access to water are at the root of the tensions.
State and non-state actors
A changed outcome in physical or effective control of the resource following the end of the conflict
Water as a military Tool
Water resources or water systems themselves are used by a nation or State as a weapon during a military action.
State actors The use of flooding, moats, poisoning.
Water as a Political Tool
Water resources or water systems themselves are used by a nation, State, or non-state actor for a political goal.
State and non-state actors
Coercion – the use of an advantageous hydraulic (or security) position to advance interest in non-water domains
Water as terrorism
Water resources, or water systems, are either targets or tools of violence or coercion by non-state actors.
Non-state actors
Water as a Military Target
Water resource systems are targets of military actions by nations or States
State actors The deliberate destruction of wells, reservoirs, treatment or distribution facilities
Development disputes
Water resources or systems are a major sources of contention and dispute in the context of economic and social development
State and non-state actors
military scholars to do more thorough research into the relation between violent conflict and water to develop tools for preventing those conflicts.43
C. Critics of Environmental Insecurity as a Cause of Conflict
The field of Environmental Security is an emerging field of research in which strong theoretical and empirical bases need to be explored to cumulate and integrate knowledge. Compared with, for example, the relationship between power distribution and violent conflict, environmental (in)security is still in its infancy. Following this logic, the first critical note on the aim for Environmental Security as a cause of conflict is explained by (neo) realism or traditionalism.
Traditionalists concentrate on military power, national security and the survival of the state. Although environmental scarcity can lead to war and may kill people and reduce human well-being, traditionalists argue that this not necessarily leads to a threat to the survival of the state. Dinar explains that “[i]f all the forces that threaten life, property and well-being are considered as threats to national security, the term itself will be drained of any meaning.”44 In a traditionalist view, national security and survival of the state are main drivers for action. Relations between states are driven by insecurity and uncertainties regarding future direct leaders to focus on short-term security needs. According to one of the most influential theorists in neo realism, Kenneth Waltz, high politics always dominates low politics, as it is the essential issue to states’ survival, even when security evolves with the existence of real or perceived threats. Following this line of reasoning, environmental security is not relevant as long as it does not threaten state survival.
With the end of the Cold War and the new globalised world, realism and traditionalism became less able to explain the events occurring in the international world. Nontraditionalism gained momentum, questioning the traditional concept of security.45 Scholars started realising that environmental change and resource scarcity can lead to economic decline, social disorder and political uncertainty, which may in turn lead to violence, instability or even armed conflict.46 Nontraditionalists claim that diverse factors play a role in security matters, making the hierarchy between topics of interest irrelevant.
Homer-Dixon’s work and the broader non-traditionalist literature on environmental (in)security have been critiqued by a number of researchers, most importantly Gleditsch and Levy. Gleditsch identifies nine major shortcomings in the conduct of environmental security by Homer-Dixon and Gleick. According to Gleditsch, the definition of ‘environmental conflict’ is unclear, and
43 Gleick, “Water and Conflict”, 110-112 44
Dinar, “Water, Security, Conflict and Cooperation”, 234
45
Buzan, et al. Security, A New Framework For Analysis (London, 1998) ; Buzan, ‘Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World’, in: Söderbaum, Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism, (New York, 2003) 140-160
46
economic and political factors are neglected.47 Levy's elaborates on Gleditsch’ argument, claiming that economic rather than environmental scarcity influences the risk of violent conflict. Environmental scarcity is not a source of violent conflict, but a consequence of conflict can be environmental scarcity. Renewable resources represent a certain value worth fighting over, especially for elites in developing countries. As Levy put it: “Developing country elites fight over renewable resources for the same reason that Willy Sutton robbed banks – that’s where the money is.”48 In a ‘direct’ correspondence between Homer-Dixon and Levy, it becomes clear that most of the discussion is set on disputes over the definition of what can be defined as a considerable threat to security and conflict.
II. The Relationship between Environmental Insecurity and Cooperation
One issue often neglected in the traditional school of security studies is that, in addition to the study of war as a part of security, one must also consider the study of peace. As such, research in security studies should both concern conflict and cooperation. The relation between environment and security is valid as long as it affects, both logically and empirically, conflict and cooperation. Environmental (in)security and hydropolitics should be considered part of the security field to the extent that water issues affect the likelihood of violence or peace. 49
Whilst the Environmental Security approach in the beginning of the 1990s focused on the environment as an incentive for conflict, the debate has moved on and begins to emphasise options for cooperation as a result of environmental scarcity. The most important contribution in this shift from conflict towards cooperation and environmental insecurity is the result of research and data collection, which resulted in a database at the Oregon University led by Aaron Wolf. This database discloses that there have been very few violent conflicts over water in history. The research shows that even states sharing ‘basins at risk’ are more prone to cooperate in order to find solutions for disputes than to use violence. Moreover, the research concluded that there is no single indicator that can explain either conflict or cooperation in water affairs.50 Indicators that showed a significant correlation between water and conflict – high population density, low capita GDP, unfriendly international relations – explained only a small percentage of the variation in the data.51 This provides an incentive for further research in the relationship between environmental (in)security, water and cooperation.
47
Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and The Environment: A Critique of the Literature”, Journal of Peace Research, 35, 3 (London, 1998) 380-387
48 Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issues?”, International Security 20, 2 (1995) 45 49
Dinar, “Water, Security, Conflict and Cooperation”, 234
50
Wolf, Stahl, and Macomber, “Conflict and Cooperation within International River Basins: The Importance of Institutional Capacity”, Water Resources Update 125 (2003) 31 - 40
A. Wolf; the Basins-At-Risk Project and Water Cooperation
Wolf’s research concentrates on issues relating transboundary water resources to political conflict and cooperation. He combines environmental science with dispute resolution theory. With his colleagues at the Oregon State University, Wolf developed the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) in which water-related treaties, background material and case-studies of freshwater conflict resolution are collected. During this database study, Wolf discovered that there is no significant empirical evidence supporting the alleged link between environment and armed or violent conflict. To cover the gap between other research on environmental insecurity and his observed findings, he started the so-called ‘Basins At Risk’ (BAR) project. Wolf does not ignore the possibility that water can be an incentive for conflict, but he claims that cooperation occurs more often.52 With the BAR project, Wolf and his colleagues researched freshwater resources and international conflict by providing a quantitative, global-scale exploration of the relationship between freshwater resources and conflict.
The BAR project used the TFDD to examine the biophysical, geopolitical and socioeconomic setting of each historical event of water conflict and cooperation to identify indicators with a potential for water disputes. The project tried to identify international river basins with the greatest potential for conflict of interest in near future by examining the correlation between each event in its historical and geographical setting. The BAR project is based upon the hypothesis that “[t]he
likelihood and intensity of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basins exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb that change.”53 The BAR project has three objectives, and three corresponding methods result in these objectives. First, the project wants to” identify historical
indicators of international freshwater conflict and cooperation.” The BAR Water Event Database has
been created to accomplish this goal. The BAR Water Event Database gathers all reported events in international freshwater resources from 1948 – 1999. Incidents that did not meet the criteria are e.g. use of water as a weapon, victim, or target of warfare, and issues internal to a country.54 Here, the research of Wolf differs with the theoretical work of Gleick who included water as a weapon of conflict.
The second goal of the BAR project was “to use these indicators to create a framework to
identify and evaluate international river basins at potential risk for future freshwater conflict." The
information gathered in the BAR Water Event Database is linked with a Geographic Information System (GIS) data set. This data set gives the researcher the opportunity to analyse the events and to
52
Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, “International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk”, Water Policy, 5 (2003) 31-62
53
Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, “Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators for Basins at Risk”, Journal of the American Water Resources Association, (October 2003) 1110
explain why a certain event occurred.55 The third purpose to the project was “to enhance
understanding of the driving forces that may cause water to become a focus of conflict or cooperation."
The BAR project found some interesting results subverting many of the factors traditionally considered relevant indicators of international water conflict. Neither scarcity, climate change, water stress, dams, nor dependence on freshwater resources for economic or personal use showed a significant association with conflict over water. According to earlier research in environmental insecurity, water is associated with conflict. The presumption in this research was that events causing conflict would outnumber the number of incidents of cooperation over international water resources. The empirical and statistical evidence showed, however, that the opposite is true. The number of incidents of cooperation outnumbered those of conflict with a ratio larger than two-to-one.56
Another interesting result from the BAR project is that three issues – water quantity and quality, and infrastructure– dominate the events.57 However, none of the factors used in the quantitative database research could explain more than a small percentage of the variation in the data. The most relevant indicator of conflict and cooperation appears to be rapid or extreme changes in physical or institutional settings within a basin and the presence of institutional mechanisms that moderate uncertainty. Conflicting events occurred significantly more between the two states whilst, in contrast, cooperative events often involved multiple states. This could indicate that regionalism, and institutionalism could play an interesting role here. States that already have belligerent or friendly relations with each other are prone to have the same hostility or a friendly approach over water issues, when dealing with each other. Within a regional setting, this seemed not to be the case. From a regional perspective, states have friendlier relations over water issues than they do overall. In terms of Neo-Functionalism, one of the leading theoretical approaches in Regional Integration Theory, cooperation in low politics (i.e. technical issues such as water) will lead to a ‘spill over’ effect in high politics.58 Cooperation regarding water could therefore lead to larger regional integration in the long run according to Neo-Functionalism.
55 Yoffe and Larson, “Basins at Risk: Water Event Database Methodology”,
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/basins_at_risk/bar/BAR_chapter2.pdf accessed on January 4, 2012, 23
56 Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano, “Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators
and Findings of the Basin at Risk Project” 63 – 120 In: Basins at Risk: Conflict and Cooperation over
International Freshwater Resources (Oregon, 2002) 60-120
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/basins_at_risk/bar/BAR_chapter4.pdf Accessed on January 5, 2012
57
Ibidem
58
Daoudy, et al., “Trans-boundary Water Co-operation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention”
In other words, the BAR project led to the conclusion that there is no significant evidence that water scarcity leads to an increased chance of conflict, but to more cooperation instead. Institutions and institutional infrastructure are important matters within water security since they have the power to absorb the uncertainty that theorists associate with a tendency towards conflict. International freshwater treaties deserve special attention to see in what matter it provides an institutional system and opportunity for flexibility to face changes.
B. Water as Incentive for Cooperation or Conflict; Wolf, Homer-Dixon and Gleick
Wolf's major critique on Gleick and others is that their studies are too ideographic and concern only a small number of interactions. Wolf’s approach is a nomothetic, full-scale data research in which he researches all interactions between states in which water is important. By focusing on all interactions, Wolf discovered that water was barely an incentive for conflict over the past five decades and that the database constructed does not represent the norm, but only incidents. Gleick argues that conflicts are not necessarily triggered by competition over water resources, but water resources can be a source for other triggers of conflict, like social instability, ethnic clashes, and low-intensive international conflict or border disputes.59 Wolf’s research only focuses on events that are directly linked to water, therefore he pays no attention to contextual factors that only come out through small number or single case studies.
Another important factor in research is the level of analysis. Homer-Dixon and Gleick research environment as an incentive for conflict from a national and state level perspective, whereas Wolf focuses on the regional or basin level. In Homer-Dixon’s conclusion, he points out that environmental scarcity has hardly been a sufficient cause of international conflict. In his empirical research, he found that conflict is merely internal rather than international. However, internal conflict can have severe indirect effects on the international community, such as migration flows or social instability. Following this line of reasoning, Homer-Dixon concludes that the environment has a negative effect and can be a trigger for destabilising the region. Wolf’s conclusion that water is not an independent cause of violent conflict is correct, but it does not paint the complete picture according to both Homer-Dixon and Gleick.
The following step in this thesis is to integrate both frameworks into one viable set of assumptions, which can be used for the case study.
III. Conclusion
This chapter has explained the multiple function of water as both an incentive for conflict and cooperation. The chapter has given a thorough overview of the literature and research in environmental (in)security. Different views and perspectives are explained by using the academic research of Homer-Dixon, Gleick and Wolf in order to answer the research question central in this chapter. This research question is: To what extent can existing literature in environmental (in)security
explain either regional cooperation or conflict? Homer-Dixon and Gleick have developed a framework
in which they examine the relation between environment, water and conflict and looked at the sources and consequences of environmental scarcity. Wolf’s study has researched the relation between water and cooperation, using a nomological theoretical framework for analysis.60 These theoretical approaches form the base of a combined theoretical framework developed and explained in the next chapter.
60
Sprinz, Wolinksky-Nahmias, Models, Numbers & Cases, Methods for Studying International Relations, (Michigan, 2004) 25; Tetlock, Belkin, Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical,
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The first part of chapter 1 has examined the alleged relationship between environmental (in)security and (violent) conflict using the theories of Homer-Dixon and Gleick. The second part of the discussion in chapter 1 concentrated on the relationship between environmental insecurity and cooperation, based on the research of Wolf. This chapter elaborates on this last point and discusses the similarities between these researchers to come to a testable theoretical framework and falsifiable hypotheses to answer the research question formulated in the introduction of this thesis.
I. Similarities in Assumptions of Homer-Dixon, Gleick and Wolf
In order to come to a quantifiable structure and confirmable hypotheses, the thesis defines the most important similarities and assumptions of the three theoretical frameworks explained in chapter 1. To start, the definition of the research subject must be clarified. In this thesis, environmental (in)security is defined as the absence of protection of [environmental] threats – whether real or assumed. Moreover, when the environment appears as a threat, environmental insecurity occurs. The outcome of an event does not depend solely on objective threats, but can also rely on the perception of a state. In other words, when a state believes it is threatened, it acts on grounds of this assumption, whether the assumption is correct or not. The state will act to what it perceives as the ‘optimal response’ to this threat; the outcome of this action can be either conflict or cooperation.
The next step in defining the theoretical framework is to question what influences the perception of states to perceive an event as an environmental threat to security. Homer-Dixon assumes that developing states – member states of the SADC can be defined as such61 – are more prone to conflict, since they are less able to adapt to changes. This is in line with the argumentation of Wolf, who assumes that the inability to adapt to changes leads to conflict. Both researchers add a certain value to the linkage between the ability to adapt to changes and the outcome of an event. Moreover, both researchers give importance to the institutional level of, and between, the actors. Homer-Dixon gives special interest to the internal situation within the state – whether the state is developed or not – whilst Wolf also gives credit to interstate relations i.e. is there a (legally binding) agreement between the states. In short, both theorist agree that the rate of change and the level of institutionalisation are important in how states perceive as the optimal response to environmental threat.
To measure the perceived ‘optimal response’ to threats, the concept must be separated into two parts. First, the concept of change must be explained and separated into measurable and
61
definable concepts. An important feature of change is that it can occur on a short term and is a rapid phenomenon. The explanatory power of change as an influence over the outcome of an event can be determined when the rate of change is defined. The next step in this separation is to measure the level of institutionalisation. The influence that a change has on the outcome of an event depends on the ability of states to adapt to this. Institutionalisation is a time consuming process and it takes a long term to develop a stable institutional level. A high level of institutional adaption indicates that states are able to absorb a high rate of change. The institutional level of ability to adapt is therefore also important for this research.
Figure 2 shows the core concepts of the theoretical framework. To summarise; state act on a situation of environmental threat; the action of the state is influenced by its perception the environmental threat; the outcome of the event can be either cooperation or conflict. The perception of the state, or ‘the circumstance influences the outcome of an event’ is influenced by the
level of institutionalisation between states and the rate of change. To conclude; the outcome of an
environmental event that can pose a threat on security depends on the institutional ability to adapt to change.
Figure 2: The Core Concepts of the Theoretical Framework; The Explanatory Power of Threats to Environmental Security in Transboundary Shared River Basins
The hypothesis derived from this model and central to this thesis is: the incentive for cooperation in
II. Definition and Measurement of the Core Concepts
In order to come to a verifiable theoretical model, it is necessary to give more information about and definitions of the concepts Institutionalisation and Change.
A. Perception of Institutional Ability to Adapt
Transboundary shared river basins are vital for riparian states sharing them. However, these states may take opposing positions over the use of shared rivers. This utilisation of a river can be pursued through either conflictive or cooperative means.62 In this line of reasoning, the of institutionalisation is an important factor to define the outcome of an environmental situation. Moreover, the perceived
institutional ability to adapt the general context of the relations between riparians will be decisive
for the nature of the interaction.
The institutional ability to adapt to a situation is dependable on the level of
institutionalisation.63 Institutionalisation literally means “[to] establish (something, typically a practice or activity) as a convention or norm in an organisation or culture.”64 This thesis measures the institutional level to adapt in transboundary shared river basins by using a diverted model of the “Classical Temple of Sharing International Water Courses” defined by van der Zaag and Savenije. 65
Figure 3: The Classical Temple of Sharing International Water Resources 66
In this figure, illustrated in figure 3, the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRW) is the fundament; symbolising the desirability of a fully integrated management of water resources. Upon this foundation, three pillars support the roof which is named the sharing of international water resources. The central pillar represents the operational part of integration, the political pillar represents an enabling environment, and the institutional pillar is responsible for laws and institutions.
62
Brochmann, Hensel, “Peaceful Management of International River Claims”, International Negotiations 14 (2009) 397
63
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/popups/itemDefn.html?id=4192 accessed on March 16, 2012
64 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, (Oxford, 2000) 65
Savenije, van der Zaag, The Management of Shared River Basins, Experiences from SADC and EU, Focus on Development 8, (Delft, 1998) 37
66
This figure, together with the calculation of the level of institutionalisation is the fundament of a two-step model towards measuring the rate of institutionalisation in transboundary shared river basins. First, an overview of physical and social institutions concerned with transboundary shared river basins must be given. After this is dealt with, it is necessary to measure the extent to which member states have adopted this process and act within the framework and institutions created in the region. The schematic overview of institutionalisation in transboundary shared river basins in figure 4 will be used to achieve this goal.
Figure 4 illustrates the factors important in measuring institutionalisation in transboundary shared river basins. The figure is abstracted from the “classical temple” defined by van der Zaag and Savenije. One major adjustment to the figure is the division of a physical and a social dimension of institutionalisation. However, van der Zaag and Savenije make a distinction in their research as well. They link the physical dimension of transboundary shared river basin institutionalisation (TSRBI) with the technical or operational pillar in the ‘temple’. The social dimension of TSRBI – or as van der Zaag and Savenije call it the ‘non-physical dimension’ – can be measured by looking at the legal-institutional pillar.
Figure 4: Institutional Ability to Adapt in Transboundary Shared River Basins
The physical dimension of institutionalisation refers to the assumption that chances for cooperation are higher when a certain level of institutionalisation already exists.This statement follows from an academic debate – mostly in Liberal Institutionalism and Negotiation Theories – that inadequate or ambiguous information is seen as an obstacle for cooperation.67 A certain level of institutionalisation
67
