Fearing inferiority
The importance of group-based competence
threat for the emergence of moral superiority
Eva van der Griend
In collaboration with Faiz Novascotia Saripudin
Master thesis Psychology, specialization S&O Institute of Psychology
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences – Leiden University Date: May 5th, 2018
Student number: s1642316
First examiner of the university: Dr. R. Pliskin
Abstract
The present research examined if, and to what extent, competence threat and group-affirmation are related to feelings of moral superiority. Previous research has shown that competence threat on the individual level can lead to feelings of moral superiority. Furthermore, there is a wide range of support for the assumption that intervention techniques aimed at affirming positive group values can reduce the need to feel morally superior towards another. Therefore, it was assumed that competence threat would lead to feelings of moral superiority and that group-affirmation would decrease the influence of competence threat on moral superiority. The study consisted of a 2 (Competence Threat vs. No Competence Threat) x 2 (Group-Affirmation vs. No Affirmation) design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions and were exposed to competence threat, group affirmation, a combination of both or neither. Subsequently, feelings of moral superiority were assessed. Results show that competence threat does not lead to an increased sense of moral superiority and that group-affirmation does not have a reducing effect on this relationship. Additional analyses pointed out that, regardless of their relatedness to moral superiority, neither ingroup identification nor political ideology could justify the absence of the assumed effects. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.
During the recent elections in the Netherlands, it has again become apparent that
progressive parties, such as GroenLinks, adopt an attitude of moral superiority over others (Blok, 2011). It seems that the party considers its position with regard to, for instance, the poorest in our society to be so self-evident that people with a contrary opinion will directly be classified as ‘wrong’ or even inferior to themselves (Opheffer, 2011). These moral superior attitudes or feelings may arise because Groenlinks perhaps experiences a certain degree of threat from the bigger, more conservative, parties such as the VVD, since they have been in government for quite some time.
Previous research by Jordan and Monin (2008) has already provided evidence for the assumption that competence threat on an individual level can lead to an increased sense of moral superiority. However, there is currently no empirical evidence for the relationship between competence threat and moral superiority on group level. It may also be important socially to discover what causes people to feel morally superior, since the aforementioned may have an impact on the persuasion of others in different domains, such as political campaigning,
marketing, legal arguments and more. The disclosure of the core antecedents of moral superiority might, thus, offer tools to implement such persuasion strategies more effectively.
In the current research we will investigate whether individuals will develop feelings of moral superiority after experiencing a sense of group-based competence threat. In an attempt to answer this question I will first review literature regarding social identity theory, competence threat and group-affirmation as potentially influential factors with regard to moral superiority.
Moral superiority
Moral superiority refers to the perception that one or one’s group is morally better than others or other groups (Täuber & Van Zomeren, 2012). A position of moral superiority can have
various beneficial effects for a group. It can, for instance, offer them a positive image and enforce respect from others (Iyer, Yetten & Haslam, 2012). Most people consider themselves to be just and moral. However, they also think that the average person is significantly less moral than they perceive themselves to be (Tappin & McKay, 2017). But what is the origin of this need to morally elevate oneself over others?
Several reasons can be distinguished for why groups, or rather group members, may assume a position of moral superiority. Firstly, one could take on a moral superior attitude to enhance one’s reputation or to legitimize one’s actions (Iyer et al., 2012). Companies could, for instance, participate in corporate social responsibility. This refers to actions and policies of societal benefit, to strengthen their moral image (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Secondly, one could take on a moral superior attitude due to a sense of threat (Jordan & Monin, 2008). More
specifically, feelings of moral superiority can arise when the norms and values of a particular outgroup are not in line with those of the ingroup. When the outgroup does not meet the so-called moral rules of the ingroup, these value differences are replaced by feelings of derogation and resentment. After all, groups have the need to preserve and secure their own values. Hence, threatening information regarding the ingroup’s identity can lead group members to take the moral high ground (Brewer, 1999; Jordan & Monin, 2008). However, to determine why groups may feel threatened by others or other groups I will first delve more deeply into Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Social Identity Theory
According to Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) Social Identity Theory, people derive a
substantive part of their identity from salient group-memberships. After all, the social context is considered the most important source of self-determination and subsequent behavior (Ellemers &
Haslam, 2012). The main aim of the theory is to understand and explain how people can come to adopt and behave in terms of social, rather than personal, identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers & Haslam, 2012). In one of Tajfel’s (1978) early experiments called ‘The minimal group paradigm’, it became clear that even when minimal groups are employed, ingroup favoritism can easily emerge. Hence, categorization on the basis of irrelevant criteria is enough for intergroup bias to occur (Tajfel, 1974, 1978).
But where does this type of ingroup favoritism come from? Individuals seem to have a need to preserve or achieve positive intergroup distinctiveness, since this provides them with a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1982). They consider it important to preserve their group’s status since, according to the social identity theory, group-evaluation equals self-evaluation (Hogg, Abrahams, Otten & Hinkle, 2004). Rubin, Badea and Jetten (2013), conducted research
regarding low-status groups and the emergence of ingroup favoritism. The design of their study was based on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1978). Participants were assigned to either the ‘Red’ group or the ‘Green’ group and their status position was manipulated, at the start of the experiment, by providing the low-status group with fewer points than the high-status group. Subsequently, participants were asked to allocate points to both the ingroup and the outgroup. It was assumed that the allocation of points could, strategically, be used to compete with the high-status outgroup to achieve positive intergroup distinctiveness, which can be considered
‘competitive favoritism’. The other option proposed by the authors is compensation for the ingroup’s low-status to achieve intergroup fairness. This is referred to as ‘compensatory
favoritism’. Results confirm these hypotheses: Low-status groups show ingroup favoritism to be good or even better than the high-status outgroup (Rubin et al., 2013). This is particularly
relevant for the current research as it provides evidence for the proposition that when individuals experience group-based threat, they will feel the need to react in a compensatory manner.
In summary, research shows that salient group-memberships can provide people with a positive social identity. However, when people feel threatened by a high-status outgroup, they can show signs of ingroup favoritism. The question remains, however, what causes this threat to emerge?
Competence threat
Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1999) reviewed four different types of social identity threat one can experience, depending on the situational context: categorization threat, distinctiveness threat, threat to the value of social identity, and acceptance threat. The third type of threat is particularly relevant for the current study. Threat to the value of social identity refers to the fact that individuals will perceive threat when the value of their group is undermined. The results again suggest that when people who strongly identify with a group feel that their
competence is threatened, they will try to restore it either by outgroup derogation or defensive reactions.
Other research into the role of competence and morality within the evaluation of groups was conducted by Leach, Ellemers and Barreto (2007). Their results show that morality is more important for the evaluation of the ingroup than competence or sociability. The authors argue that a phenomenon called ‘social creativity’ can lead people to compensate for a lack of competence by feeling morally superior to the more competent outgroup.
According to Cohen and Sherman (2014) there are ways to reduce the aforementioned types of threat. The authors propose an intervention called self-affirmation. By giving individuals the opportunity to reflect on personally relevant values, psychological distress can be reduced
and people will be less likely to respond in a defensive way when confronted with threatening information. After all, people consider it important and are continuously motivated to preserve and restore their self-esteem (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, is this form of self-affirmation also applicable to groups? Ultimately, the current research aims to measure whether affirming the value of one’s group can reduce competence threat and can thereby subdue the need to adopt an attitude of moral superiority. In the next paragraph I will consider group-affirmation in relation to competence threat.
Group-affirmation
Group-affirmation theory presupposes that individuals have a continuous motivation to maintain a positive image of their group. This can, for example, be achieved by affirming important group values (Sherman, Kinias, Major & Kim, 2007). Research by Sherman et al. (2007) shows that group-affirmation can decrease defensiveness in response to social-identity threat. Also, their results demonstrate that high-identifiers, people who feel strongly connected to the group and its values, perceive more bias than low identifiers. This bias was reduced when given the opportunity towards group-affirmation.
Research by Derks, van Laar and Ellemers (2009) provides similar results. According to the authors group-affirmation is related to a person’s social identity since it reinforces the cognitive presence of the collective self. Therefore, reflecting on group values could possibly have a strengthening effect on the positive social identification. In a total of four experimental studies the authors showed that both self- and group-affirmation result in high well-being and performance motivation.
Other research into the role of threat and affirmation in relation to moral superiority was conducted by Jordan and Monin (2008). The authors hypothesized that self-threat leads to
attribution to the morality dimension, to elevate the attractiveness of one’s own behavior. The participants in the first experiment had to perform a boring task while observing another person quit this task. In the second experiment self-affirmation was taken into account, by asking the participants to write a personal essay about their own positive qualities. Results show that participants who witnessed another individual quit the boring task, responded by giving their own moral standing a boost. Self-affirmation caused this effect to disappear. Thus, when people are given the opportunity to feel good about themselves again, they appear to feel less threatened by the competence of others and do not develop an attitude of moral superiority (Jordan & Monin, 2008).
The Present research
Previous research shows that threat to an individual’s competence can lead to feelings of moral superiority, and that these feelings can be diminished by the possibility of self-affirmation (Jordan & Monin, 2008; Leach et al., 2007). Moreover, group-affirmation can decrease
defensiveness in response to social identity threat, reduce intergroup bias, and increase both well-being and performance motivation (Sherman et al., 2007; Derks et al., 2009). However, to date there is no empirical evidence for the influence of group-affirmation on feelings of moral superiority, as a reaction to perceived competence threat.
Therefore, the current study will focus on moral superiority as a result of group-based competence threat, taking group-affirmation into consideration as a possible moderator.
The following research questions will be guiding us throughout our study: ‘’To what extent does
based competence threat encourage a feeling of moral superiority? And will group-affirmation reduce this effect?’’
We assume that participants who will experience a sense of group-based competence threat will develop feelings of moral superiority, whereas participants who do not experience a sense of group-based competence threat will not develop these feelings (Hypothesis 1). In addition, we assume that group-affirmation will decrease the influence of competence threat on the emergence of moral superiority. We expect that participants who get the opportunity toward group-affirmation, will not develop feelings of moral superiority as a result of competence threat, as against participants who do not get the opportunity toward group-affirmation (Hypothesis 2). The current research aims to test the hypotheses by subjecting participants to a survey study in which an ingroup and an outgroup will be created. Subsequently, competence threat and group-affirmation will be manipulated after which feelings of moral superiority towards the outgroup will be measured.
Method Participants and design
In the current study we used a sample from the Faculty of Social Sciences (FSW) at Leiden University. Participants were recruited via word of mouth advertising and through SONA, a platform designed for Leiden University students which offers them the opportunity to obtain course credit or to receive a monetary compensation for participating in scientific
research. After completion participants were rewarded with either 1 course credit or 3.50 euro. We ran a power analysis which suggested that a sample of 147 participants would be sufficient. Our full sample contained 155 participants. The sample consisted of 32 males and 123 females. Ages ranged from 17 to 42 (M = 21.12, SD = 3.36). The research consisted of a 2 (Competence Threat vs. No Competence Threat) x 2 (Group-Affirmation vs. No Affirmation) between-groups design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions above.
There were four a priori criteria on the basis of which participants could be excluded from our sample. First, one participant was excluded because she indicated not to be an FSW student. Also, three participants were excluded because they failed more than two of the comprehension checks. Moreover, two participants were excluded because they did not answer all items of the Competence Sociability and Morality Questionnaire. Finally, two participants seemed to somewhat understand the main purpose of the current research. However, we decided not to exclude the last mentioned participants from our sample, but to treat them with caution. After the exclusion of the aforementioned participants, our final sample consisted of 149
participants. The sample consisted of 30 males and 119 females. Ages ranged from 17 to 42 (M = 21.13, SD = 3.41). Hypotheses were tested on the basis of this sample (N = 149).
Materials
Group-affirmation essay. The participants in the group affirmation conditions were
given the opportunity to write an essay about a positive experience with regard to the Faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University. Participants in the no affirmation condition were given a filler task. They were asked to write down the courses they completed followed by the courses they are planning to take. This part of our study is based on the design of Jordan and Monin (2008) and Sherman et al. (2007).
Competence threat manipulation. The participants read one of two manipulation texts,
depending on the experimental condition they were assigned to. These texts described
similarities and differences between the Faculties of Social Sciences at Leiden University and the University of Amsterdam (UvA), such as course diversity, the number of weekly contact hours and whether the university offers courses in both Dutch and English. In the competence threat conditions, participants were able to read that the GPA of UvA students was higher than that of
Leiden University students, whereas participants in the no competence threat conditions were able to read that the faculties had equal GPAs. Additionally, all participants were informed that at the UvA less accurate use is made of plagiarism checks such as Turnitin. The purpose of the statement regarding plagiarism checks was to give participants in the competence threat condition a possible reason to develop a sense of moral superiority over UvA students. For the full manipulation texts, see Appendix B.
Moral convictions. Participants’ moral convictions regarding plagiarism were examined
with a three item measure. Participants were, for instance, asked: ‘’To what extent is your
position on plagiarism prevention a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?’’.
Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), higher scores indicated that plagiarism prevention is considered to be important on a moral level (α = .84).
The three item measure was part of a longer questionnaire containing 13 questions in total. Participants’ moral convictions regarding course diversity and the availability of Dutch and English courses were, respectively, measured with a one item measure (‘’To what extent is your
position on having diverse courses a moral stance?’) and a three item measure. Regarding the
three item measure participants were, for instance, asked: ‘’To what extent is your position on the
availability of Dutch and English courses a reflection of your core moral beliefs and
convictions?’’. Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much),
higher scores indicated that the availability of Dutch and English courses is considered to be important on a moral level (α = .81).
Furthermore, three single items measured how important participants considered the fact that a university offers diverse courses, employs plagiarism checks and offers courses in both Dutch and English. For instance, participants were asked: ‘’How important is it that a University
tries to prevent plagiarism?’’. Lastly, three single items measured the extent to which
participants consider their position regarding plagiarism prevention, course diversity and the availability of courses in both Dutch and English, to be personally important. Participants were, for instance, asked: ‘’To what extent is your position on having courses taught in Dutch and
English personally important to you?’’. Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), higher scores indicated that the items were considered more personally
important. The moral conviction questionnaire was based on the design of Skitka and Morgan (2014). For a detailed overview of the questionnaire, see appendix C.
Identification. Feelings of identification with the ingroup (Faculty of Social Sciences at
Leiden University) were measured by four identification items. Participants were, for example, asked: ‘’To what extent are you glad to be categorized as a member of the faculty of Social
Sciences at Leiden University?’’. Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7
= very much), higher scores indicated a stronger identification (α = .88). The identification questionnaire was based on the design of Leach et al. (2007). For a detailed overview of the identification questionnaire, see Appendix D.
Competence, Sociability and Morality. A Competence, Sociability and Morality (CSM)
-questionnaire was used to measure our main dependent variable: the difference in morality ratings between the ingroup and the outgroup. Participants were asked to rate both faculties by indicating their answers to a set of seven questions on a 7-point scale, on the dimensions of competence (ingroup: r = .70, outgroup: r = .84), sociability (ingroup: α = .87, outgroup: α = .89), and morality (ingroup: r = .46, outgroup r = .66). For example, participants were asked:
‘’How moral do you think students at Leiden University are, in general?’’ (1 = very immoral, 7 = very moral). To calculate our main dependent variable, a scale was made of the morality and
trustworthiness items for both groups, after which the outgroup scale was subtracted from the ingroup scale creating a new variable called ‘’moral superiority’’. This part of the questionnaire was based on the method of Leach et al. (2007). For a detailed overview of the questionnaire, see Appendix E.
Cooperation and likeability. The final questionnaire consisted of six items that
assessed to what extent the participants liked the outgroup (Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Amsterdam) and how likely they were to cooperate with them. Participants were, for example, asked: ‘’ To what extent would you be willing to have joint organizations and clubs
between the two universities?’’. Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7
= very much), higher scores indicated a stronger willingness toward cooperation and more likeability (α = .82). The questionnaire was compiled by the authors as part of the current
research. For a detailed overview the Cooperation and Likeability questionnaire, see Appendix F.
Procedure
In the current research, participants were exposed to competence threat, group affirmation, a combination of both or neither. Participants were randomly assigned to the
experimental conditions as follows: no group-affirmation and no competence threat (n = 44), no group-affirmation and competence threat (n = 40), group-affirmation and no competence threat (n = 31) and group-affirmation and competence threat (n = 34).
Participants completed the questionnaire either in a laboratory setting or elsewhere by using a link provided to them via Leiden University’s research platform. All participants were asked to give their consent. Participants in the laboratory were then led to a cubicle where they were given the instruction to complete a survey regarding their feelings and attitudes towards the Faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University. Firstly, participants were given the
group-affirmation assignment or the filler task. Secondly, all participants read one of two manipulation texts, containing either threatening or neutral information regarding both faculties’ GPA.
Thirdly, participants were presented a set of 13 questions concerning their moral convictions regarding course diversity, plagiarism and having courses taught in both Dutch and English. Fourthly, participants were asked to fill out the Competence Sociability and Morality (CSM)-questionnaire with regard to the ingroup. Also, they were asked to indicate the level of identification with the ingroup. Fifthly, participants were asked to complete the CSM-questionnaire with regard to the outgroup (Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Amsterdam). Sixthly, likeability and willingness to cooperate with the outgroup were measured with a six item questionnaire. Finally, participants were asked to answer some comprehension checks and provide demographic information such as age, sex, ideology and residence. All participants were debriefed and paid in accordance with their participation.
Results Competence threat and moral superiority
We first conducted our main analysis. A two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was carried out with competence threat and group-affirmation as the independent variables and moral superiority as the dependent variable. This allowed us to test if participants who experienced a sense of group-based competence threat developed feelings of moral superiority (Hypothesis 1) and whether group-affirmation decreases the influence of competence threat on the emergence of moral superiority (Hypothesis 2). Moral superiority was calculated on the basis of two items from the CSM-questionnaire. The raw scores for these items are presented in Table 1.
Table 1.
Raw scores of the scales for the morality and trustworthiness items, of both ingroup and outgroup, prior to subtraction.
Results of the ANOVA did not show a significant main effect of competence threat on moral superiority, F (1,145) = 1.27, p = .262, ηp2 = .009. However, the descriptive difference in
means is in accordance with the hypothesis. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
The impact of group affirmation. To test whether group-affirmation reduces the need to
feel morally superior, we investigated the interactive effect of group-affirmation and competence threat on moral superiority. First, results of the ANOVA did not show a significant main effect of group-affirmation on feelings of moral superiority, F (1,145) = 1.67, p = .199, ηp2 = .011.
However, the descriptive difference in means is in accordance with the hypothesis. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
Furthermore, the interactive effect of group-affirmation and competence threat is not significant, F (1,145) = 0.87, p = .353, ηp2 = .006. The means and standard deviations for the
interaction are presented in Table 2. Regardless of the insignificance of the results, the means do indicate that amongst participants who faced competence threat and were not asked to engage in
CSM – items Ingroup M (SD) Outgroup M (SD)
Morality 5.06 (0.89) 4.81 (0.82)
Trustworthiness 4.98 (0.96) 4.56 (0.85)
Morality and Trustworthiness Scale
group-affirmation there is a bigger difference in morality ratings between ingroup and outgroup present (e.g. moral superiority).
Table 2.
Means and standard deviations of moral superiority between ingroup and outgroup as a function of both competence threat and group-affirmation.
Nevertheless, the current results do not match our hypotheses. Competence threat and group-affirmation do not seem to have an interactive effect on the need to morally elevate one’s own group over a threatening outgroup.
Competence threat and moral convictions
Since the results described above suggested that there was no influence of competence threat and group-affirmation on moral superiority, we tested whether competence threat and group-affirmation had an interactive effect on participants’ moral convictions regarding
plagiarism. A two-way ANOVA was conducted with competence threat and group-affirmation as the independent variables and a scale of the three moral conviction questions regarding
plagiarism as the dependent variable. Results of the ANOVA did not show a significant effect of competence threat on moral convictions regarding plagiarism, F (1,145) = 0.06, p = .813, ηp2 <
Experimental condition
Competence threat M (SD) No competence threat M (SD) Total M (SD)
Group affirmation 0.27 (0.12) 0.24 (0.13) 0.25 (0.09)
No affirmation 0.53 (0.11) 0.28 (0.11) 0.41 (0.08)
.001. Moreover, the effect of group-affirmation on moral convictions regarding plagiarism was not significant, F (1,145) = 0.17, p = .685, ηp2 = .001. Finally, the interactive effect of
competence threat and group-affirmation on moral convictions was not significant, F (1,145) = 0.46, p = .500, ηp2 = .003. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.
Since the effect of competence threat on moral convictions towards plagiarism turned out to be insignificant further analyses, regarding the effect of the competence threat on participants’ moral convictions towards course diversity and the availability of Dutch and English courses, were not carried out.
Table 3.
Means and standard deviations of the moral conviction scale as a function of both group-affirmation and competence threat.
Moral convictions and moral superiority
Furthermore, in order to examine how participants’ moral convictions regarding plagiarism relate to feelings of moral superiority towards an outgroup, a correlational analysis was carried out. After all, according to Stets and Carter (2011), a higher moral identity, which can be derived from participants’ moral convictions, relates to the inclination to adopt a moral Experimental
condition
Competence threat M (SD) No competence threat M (SD) Total M (SD)
Group affirmation 5.33 (0.21) 5.15 (0.22) 5.24 (0.15)
No affirmation 5.12 (0.19) 5.21 (0.18) 5.16 (0.13)
superior attitude toward others. A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the aforementioned variables. Results indicate that moral convictions and moral superiority do not significantly relate to each other, r = .054, n = 149, p = .510. The correlations are presented in Table 4.
Table 4.
Correlations between measures.
Note: *p < .05 (2-tailed), p** < .01 (2-tailed)
Exploratory analyses
Identification. Because the results do not match the predefined hypotheses, additional
analyses were performed to determine if other factors may have affected the relationship
between competence threat and moral superiority. Since a correlational analysis pointed out that identification was positively related to both feelings of moral superiority, r = .182, n = 149, p = .026, and moral convictions, r = .271, n = 149, p = .001, an ANCOVA was conducted with competence threat and group-affirmation as the independent variables, moral superiority as the dependent variable, and identification as the covariate. After all, when social identification with the ingroup is low, people may have a lesser need to protect this identity by acting in a
Moral superiority Moral convictions Identification Political ideology
Moral superiority - .054 .182* -.192*
Moral convictions - .271** .004
Identification - -.007
compensatory manner in the form of morally elevating their group over a threatening outgroup (Hogg et al., 2004; Rubin et al., 2014).
Results of the ANCOVA did not show a significant main effect of competence threat on moral superiority, F (1,144) = 1.51, p = .221, ηp2 = .010. Moreover, no significant main effect of
group-affirmation on moral superiority was found, F (1,144) = 1.26, p = .263, ηp2 = .009. Finally,
the interaction of competence threat and group-affirmation on moral superiority was not significant, F (1,144) = 0.91, p = .342, ηp2 = .006.Thus, the degree of identification with the
ingroup cannot account for the absence of a significant interaction of competence threat and group-affirmation on moral superiority.
Political Ideology. The correlational analysis pointed out that political ideology was
negatively related to moral superiority, r = -.192, n = 149, p = .019. This indicates that a more conservative or right-wing political orientation relates to lower scores of moral superiority. Moreover, according to opinion pieces (Blok, 2011; Opheffer, 2011), the maintenance of certain political convictions can influence feelings of morality superiority. Hence, we investigated whether participants’ political ideologies could partially account for the insignificance of the current results. To this end, a second ANCOVA was conducted with competence threat and group-affirmation as the independent variables, moral superiority as the dependent variable, and a scale of the political ideology questions as the covariate. Results of the ANCOVA did not show a significant main effect of competence threat on moral superiority, F (1,144) = 0.90, p = .346, ηp2 = .006. Moreover, no significant main effect of group-affirmation on moral superiority was
found, F (1,144) = 0.86, p = .356, ηp2 = .006. Finally, the interaction of competence threat and
The political ideologies of the students in our sample do not seem to have influenced the absence of a significant interaction of competence threat and group affirmation on moral superiority.
Discussion
In the current study we investigated the effect of competence threat on feelings of moral superiority. In addition, we examined whether, and to what extent, affirming important group values, prior to this threat, affects the aforementioned relationship. A survey study was conducted in which competence threat and group-affirmation were manipulated. Participants were first given the opportunity towards group-affirmation or were given a filler task, after which they read a text consisting of threatening or neutral information regarding their ingroup and a similar outgroup. Subsequently, we measured feelings of moral superiority by asking participants to rate both the ingroup and the outgroup on the morality dimension. It was assumed that competence threat would lead to an increased sense of moral superiority (Hypothesis 1) and that group-affirmation would reduce the need to feel morally superior over a threatening
outgroup (Hypothesis 2). The results indicated that the participants who experienced competence threat did not show an increased sense of moral superiority with respect to the outgroup. In addition, the presumed interaction with group affirmation, that is to say: participants who were given the opportunity to reflect on positive group values, was insignificant. Hence, the results that Jordan and Monin (2008) found, regarding the effect of competence threat and group-affirmation on moral superiority on the individual level, did not occur at the group level.
Limitations and future directions
The current study has a number of mentionable limitations. The manipulation texts used in the current study were compiled by the authors and have not been used in previous research, nor were they subject to a pre-test. The texts may have contained too little threatening
information, as a result of which the effect of competence threat on feelings of moral superiority remained absent. If we had been able to conclude this at an earlier stage of the research process, the texts could have been adjusted accordingly. Also, some of the participants completed the questionnaire in another, for us unfamiliar, environment. Possibly these participants were distracted or unfocused, which caused the manipulation to not have the expected effect. According to a recent study by Thorton, Faires, Robbins and Rollins (2014) the mere presence of, for instance, a cell phone may decrease students’ attention, especially for tasks that appeal to cognitive skills, and affects their task-performance. This limitation could, therefore, have been avoided if all participants had completed the questionnaire a controlled laboratory setting. Moreover, the comprehension checks indicated that some participants no longer knew which of the faculties had a higher GPA and whether plagiarism checks were employed at the faculties in question, which may have reduced the threat the participants experienced. This might not have been the case if the competence threat manipulation occurred at a later stage of the research. Lastly, little is yet known about the relationship between competence threat, group-affirmation and moral superiority on the group level. If we would have had access to a wider range of empirical evidence for the aforementioned relationship, this would possibly have enabled us to set up a stronger theoretical framework and a better design.
In addition to the prior limitations in the design of our study, there are some other, theoretically motivated, alternative explanations for the absence of the hypothesized effects. First of all, it may be important to bear in mind that the way in which affirmation techniques are applied has an influence on the functioning of these interventions. Multiple studies conducted by Sherman et al. (2009) pointed out that an increased level of awareness negatively influences affirmation processes and significantly reduces their effectiveness. It is therefore possible that
the participants in our sample were too aware of the affirmation process as a result of which the expected effect, a decrease in feelings of moral superiority, did not emerge.
Moreover, there is an important distinction between self-threat and group-threat. Self-threat can be considered practically inevitable, whereas group-Self-threat can be reduced or even overcome by distancing oneself from this group and its values. This assumption is supported by research of Wout, Danso, Jackson and Spencer (2008). The authors state that group threat has a lesser impact on task-performance than self-threat. The difference appears to be especially large for low-identifiers, since they are clearly affected in their task performance by self-threat but not by group-threat. In the context of the current research, this may be explained by the fact that identification was positively related to feelings of moral superiority. Hence, when a group does not cover a large part of the social identity, threats on group level have a much lesser impact than individual threats, and the need to morally elevate oneself over others decreases. After all, the strength of the identification increases the severity of the social identity threat (Spears, Doosje & Ellemers, 1997). The Faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University may, thus, not be
considered an important part of the social identity of the students in our sample.
Finally, it is important to mention that political ideology relates to feelings of moral superiority. As mentioned in the introduction, some progressive parties seem to adopt an attitude of moral superiority, perhaps as a result of experienced competence threat (Blok, 2011; Opheffer, 2011). On the same note, research by Emler, Renwick and Malone (1983) shows that students who consider themselves to be left-wing show much higher scores on moral reasoning than students who consider themselves to be moderate or right-wing. Exploratory analyses in our research made clear that political ideologies cannot account for the absence of the hypothesized effects, but are themselves related to moral superiority: The more progressive or left-wing people
consider themselves to be, the stronger the feelings of moral superiority with regard to an outgroup.
Nonetheless, the current results have opened a door to a still-to-be-explored field of research. The recommendation for future studies is, therefore, to investigate the relationship between group-based competence threat and moral superiority, in which identification levels are taken into account and in which the manipulation of competence threat is applied to an ingroup that is considered to be a more salient part of the social identity of the participants in question. Also, it is recommended to make use of more subtle hints or priming techniques to strengthen the group value of the participants in question, since the explicit application of affirmation
interventions can have negative effects (Sherman et al., 2009). Moreover, it may be important to take participants’ political preferences into account, due to their significant relation to moral superiority. Finally, it is desirable to carry out a pre-test, prior to the research, to check whether the competence threat manipulation produces the desired effect.
Implications
Our study can be considered beneficial to the existing literature because it shows that the effect of competence threat on feelings of moral superiority manifests itself differently on the group level than on the individual level. As previously stated, individuals seem to only feel threatened in their group identity when it covers a large part of their social identity (Spears et al., 1997). Perhaps this provides us with an explanation for why progressive politicians, such as Klaver of Groenlinks, do express themselves morally superior to other groups. After all, one could argue that being the leader of a political party covers a substantially larger part of his social identity than being a student at the Faculty of Social Sciences does for the current sample.
Acknowledging these differences in dealing with moral superiority on individual and group level is a challenge for the field of intergroup relations. In practice, the persuasion of others in different domains must therefore be regarded as a context dependent strategy. One should first ascertain how important the group membership is for the subject’s social identity before one can determine the consequences of certain intergroup biases, such as competence threat.
Concluding remarks
When someone questions their own competence as a result of threat, brought about by a more competent other, this will encourage this person to compensate for this threat by morally elevating himself over the other (Jordan and Monin, 2008). However, when competence threat is experienced on a group level, the extent to which someone identifies with this group appears to be essential for the impact of the threatening information (Branscombe et al., 2011; Spears et al., 1997; Wout et al., 2008). Hence, if the threatened group is not considered an important part of one’s social identity, it seems easier to detach oneself from this group, since this provides protection from the negative experience of competence threat. This is in line with findings from the current study: Our results show that the interacting effect of competence threat and group- affirmation on moral superiority does not occur when competence threat is experienced at group level. In other words: Are people fearing inferiority? This may well be the case, but based on the current results it seems more likely that feelings of moral superiority are replaced by a
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Appendix A: Research costs
We have included 168 participants in our study. The study took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Participants received either 1 SONA credit or 3.50 euros. The study consisted of one questionnaire. The budget for the current research was 400 euros, therefore we were not able to provide all the participants with the monetary compensation of 3.50 euros, since 151 participants equals 525 euros. However, we expected that a good amount of participants would participate in our study for SONA credit. We ended up paying 76 participants. The remaining 92 participants have participated in our study for course credit.
Item Cost
Appendix B: Manipulation texts Competence threat
Social Sciences in The Netherlands: Facts and Figures
Social Sciences is a popular field of study. Hence, many universities offer undergraduate Social Sciences programs. In addition to Leiden University, a large Social Sciences faculty is also present at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). The psychology program at both Leiden
University and UvA is the most popular program among social science programs with sociology and political science as the second and third most popular programs, respectively. Both
universities offer about 15 contact hours a week, have around 4 or 5 teachers per course, and have similar courses offered for each program. Both universities offer courses in English and in Dutch. Additionally, both universities employ online plagiarism checks such as Turnitin, but fewer lecturers at UvA (compared to Leiden) actively use it in their teaching. The biggest difference between the institutions, however, relates’ to students’ Grade Point Average (GPA), with UvA students faring better. UvA students have an average GPA of 7.4, whereas Leiden University students have an average GPA of 7.0. This in turn increases the attractiveness of UvA students in the job market and drives up the university’s ranking compared to Leiden University.
By Kees van den Broek Nov. 24, 2017 www.studiekeuze123.nl
No competence threat
Social Sciences in The Netherlands: Facts and Figures
Social Sciences is a popular field of study. Hence, many universities offer undergraduate Social Sciences programs. In addition to Leiden University, a large Social Sciences faculty is also present at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). The psychology program at both Leiden
University and UvA is the most popular program among social science programs with sociology and political science as the second and third most popular programs, respectively. Both
universities offer about 15 contact hours a week, have around 4 or 5 teachers per course, and have similar courses offered for each program. Both universities offer courses in English and in Dutch. Additionally, both universities employ online plagiarism checks such as Turnitin, but fewer lecturers at UvA (compared to Leiden) actively use it in their teaching. Finally, students at the Social Sciences faculties in the two universities have similar academic success, with the Grade Point Averages (GPAs) of students virtually identical: 7.4 across departments.
By Kees van den Broek Nov. 24, 2017 www.studiekeuze123.nl
Appendix C: Moral Convictions Questionnaire
The following thirteen items were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
How important is it that a university offers diverse courses? How important is it that a university tries to prevent plagiarism?
How important is it that a university in The Netherlands have courses taught in Dutch and English?
To what extent is your position on plagiarism prevention a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?
To what extent is your position on the availability of Dutch and English courses a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?
To what extent is your position on plagiarism prevention connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?
To what extent is your position on the availability of Dutch and English courses connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?
To what extent is your position on having diverse courses personally important to you? To what extent is your position on having courses taught in Dutch and English personally important to you?
To what extent is your position on plagiarism prevention personally important to you? To what extent is your position on plagiarism prevention a moral stance?
To what extent is your position on having courses taught in Dutch and English a moral stance? To what extent is your position on having diverse courses a moral stance?
Appendix D: Competence Sociability and Morality Questionnaire
How moral do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very immoral, 7 = very moral)
How likeable do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very unlikeable, 7 = very likeable)
How intelligent do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very unintelligent, 7 = very intelligent)
How warm do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = not at all, 7 = very warm)
How friendly do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very unfriendly, 7 = very friendly)
How trustworthy do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very untrustworthy, 7 = very trustworthy)
How competent do you think students at Leiden University are, in general? (1 = very incompetent, 7 = very competent)
Appendix E: Identification Questionnaire
The following four items were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
To what extent do you identify with the faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University? To what extent are you glad to be categorized as a member of the faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University?
To what extent do you feel strong ties with the faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University? To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden University?
Appendix F: Cooperation and Likeability Questionnaire
The following six items were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
To what extent would you be willing to have joint courses between the two universities? To what extent would you be willing to have joint social activities (gatherings, events, etc.) between the two universities?
To what extent would you be willing to have joint organizations and clubs between the two universities?
To what extent would you be willing to have joint volunteer opportunities between the two universities?
To what extent would you consider enrolling in a more advanced academic programme (Masters/PhD) at the University of Amsterdam?
To what extent would you consider enrolling in a more advanced academic programme (Masters/PhD) at Leiden University?
