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Appendix

Table 1 CAARs for shareholders of acquiring and target firms

Time interval CAAR %

(t-value) Panel A: Acquiring firms

[-1, +1] -0,1 %

(-0,1)

[-5, +5] 0,1%

(0,2)

[-18, + 1] -0,7 %

(-1,3) Panel B: Target firms

[-1, +1] 5,0 %***

(8,7)

[-5, +5] 6,6 %***

(8,2)

[-18, + 1] 10,7 %***

(11,7) Note: Calculations are based on equation 6 in section 3.2.

*** significant at the 1 % level Source: own calculations

Table 2 CAAR of acquiring companies in continental Europe and the U.K.

Event window Continental Europe (t- value)

U.K.

(t-value)

U.K. - Europe (t-value) Panel A: Acquiring firms

[-1, + 1] -0,6 % (-1,3)

0,2%

(0,1)

0,6% **

(2,4) [-5, + 5] -1,5%**

(-2,4)

2,5 %*

(1,8)

4,0 % ***

(9,5) [-18, +1] -3,1 %***

(-4,5)

1,9 % (1,1)

5,0 % ***

(10,3) Panel B: Target firms

[-1, + 1] 3,2 %***

(7,0)

3,1 %***

(5,7)

-0,1%

(-0,3) [-5, + 5] 4,6 %***

(7,3)

3,2 %***

(4,5)

-1,4%**

(-2,4) [-18, +1] 8,3%***

(11,3)

11,7 %***

(6,4)

3,4 %***

(5,1)

**, *** significant at the 5 % and 1 % level respectively

Source: own calculations

(2)

Table 3.1 CAARs in high, low and neutral valuation periods

Event Total High Low neutral High-Low High –neutral Low-neutral window (t-value)

Panel A: Acquiring firms [-1, +1] -0,0 %

(-0,3 )

-0,2 % (-0,3)

-0,4 % (-0,8)

0,9 % (1,6)

1,0 %***

(7,4)

-0,8 %***

(-5,5)

-1,8 %***

(-17,2) [-5, +5] -0,1 %

(-1,1)

-1,0 % (-1,0)

-0,4 % (-0,5)

2,1 %***

(2,9)

1,0 %***

(-5,3)

-2,3 %***

(-10,7)

-3,3 %***

(-22,1) [-18, + 1 -0,6 %

(-1,3)

-1,6 % (-1,3)

- 0,8 % (-1,0)

0,6 % (0,6)

2,1 %***

(-9,7)

-0,8 %***

(-3,2)

-2,9 %***

(17,0)

Events 152 34 80 38

Panel B: Target firms [-1, +1] 5,0 %***

(8,7)

2,1 %***

(3,3)

5,2 %***

(8,2)

7,2 %***

(4,0)

-3,1%***

(-23,2)

-5,1%***

(-15,9)

-2,0 %***

(-6,4) [-5, +5] 6,6 %***

(8,2)

3,4 %***

(3,9)

6,4 %***

(7,3)

9,7 %***

(3,9)

-3,0%***

(-16,2)

-6,3 %***

(-14,1)

-3,3 %***

(-7,7) [-18, + 1] 11,0 %***

(11,2)

12,3 %***

(11,4)

11,5 ***

(10,6)

9,0 %***

(2,9)

0,8 %***

(4,0)

3,3 %***

(6,5)

2,5 %**

(5,0)

Events 145 32 77 36

Average deal value

5,099 9,086 5,106 1,516 3,980 (0,25)

7,570**

(2,1)

3,590**

(2,1) Note: The average deal value is based on the total sample of the acquiring firms. As the table shows, the number of events in the sample of the target firms differs with two or three events per period. Therefore the deal value of the target firms differs also a bit. For the significance levels this has no consequences.

***, **, * significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10 % respectively Source: own calculations

Table 3.2 CAAR of acquiring companies in Europe and the U.S.

Event window Europe

(t- value)

United States (t-value)

U.S. - Europe (z-score) Panel A: Acquiring firms

[-1, + 1] -0,6 % (-0,5)

0,3 % (0,5)

0,9% ***

(5,6)

[-5, + 5] -1,1%

(-0,6)

1,2 % (1,3)

2,3 % ***

(13,2)

[-20, +5] -2,5 %

(-1,2)

0,8 % (0,8)

3,3 % ***

(19,5) Panel B: Target firms

[-1, + 1] 3,2 %***

(7,7)

7,9 %***

(5,8)

4,7 %***

(24,8)

[-5, + 5] 4,9 %***

(8,4)

9,1 %***

(4,9)

4,2 %***

(16,1)

[-20, +5] 8,8%***

(12,9)

14,3 %***

(6,6)

5,5 %***

(18,3)

Average deal value 5.796 3.869

*** significant at the 1 % level

Source: own calculations

(3)

Table 3.3 CAAR cash, stock and mixed payments

Cash Stock Mixed Cash-Stock Cash-mixed Stock-mixed

(t-value) (z-score)

Panel A:

Acquiring firms [-1, +1] 0,8 %

(1,9)

-0,1%

(-0,1)

-2,2%***

(-3,0)

0,9 % (2,4)

3,0%***

(21,4)

2,1 %***

(5,5) [-5, +5] 0,8 %

(1,2)

-3,1%

(-1,6)

-1,4%

(-1,4)

3,9 %***

(7,6)

2,2 %***

(10,9)

1,7 %***

(3,2) [-20, + 5] -0,9 %

(-1,2)

-1,2 % (-0,5)

-1,9 % (-1,6)

0,3 % (0,6)

0,9 %***

(4,9)

0,7 % (1,2)

Events 90 15 30

Panel B: Target firms [-1, +1] 4,8 %***

(5,5)

14,0 %***

(8,8)

2,9 % ***

(3,4)

-9,2%***

(-21,8)

1,9%***

(9,8)

11,1 %***

(25,0) [-5, +5] 7,0 %***

(5,7)

14,5 %***

(6,6)

3,4 % ***

(2,9)

-7,5%***

(-12,8)

3,6 %***

(13,8)

11,1 %***

(18,1) [-20, + 5] 10,0 %***

(6,6)

14,3 %***

(5,3)

13,4% ***

(9,1)

-4,3%***

(-6,5)

-3,4%***

(-13,2)

0,9 % (0,7)

Events 84 15 30

*** Significant at the 1 % Source: own calculations

Table 3.4 Deal type returns of target companies 100 %

acquisition (t- value)

Minor acquisition (t-value)

100 % - Minor (t-value) Panel B: Acquiring firms

[-1, +1] -0,1 % (-0,1)

-0,0 % (-0,1)

-0,1 % (-0,7)

[-5, +5] 0,1 %

(0,0)

0,3 % (0,4)

-0,2 % (-0,2) [-20, +5] 0,8 %

(0,1)

-1,8 %**

(-2,3)

2,6 % (0,4) Panel B: Target firms

[-1, +1] 6,6 %***

(8,4)

1,8 %**

(2,5)

4,8 %***

(36,3) [-5, +5] 7,2 %***

(6,6)

5,3 %***

(5,3)

1,9 %***

(9,9) [-20, +5] 9,3 %***

(7,0)

14,6 %***

(11,8)

- 5,3 %***

(-24,6)

*, ** Significant at the 1 % and 5 % level respectively

Source: own calculations

(4)

Table 4 Significant determinants of short-term wealth effects for acquiring and target firms Acquring firms

Panel A

CAAR [-1, +1] (%) CAAR [-5, +5] (%) CAAR [-18, +1] (%) Value driver Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Deal value(bln

€)

-0,026 -2.88*** -0,034 -2,39** -0,058 -2,78***

Target MTBR 0,042 3,42***

Low valuation -1,58 -1,87* -3,23 -1,77*

Observations 106 109 107

R

2

11,8 % 4,5 % 7,6 %

Adjusted R

2

9,1 % 2,0 % 5,9 %

F-statistic 4,55*** 1,72 4,30**

Target firms Panel B

CAAR [-1, +1] (%) CAAR [-5, +5] (%) CAAR [-18, +1] (%) Value driver Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Deal value(mln

€)

-0,023 -3,58*** -0,037 -1,68*

Stock payment 5,97 1,84* 4,86 1,42

Target MTBR -0,19 -3,30***

Observations 97 98 97

R

2

18,6 % 1,4 % 1,7 %

Adjusted R

2

15,1 % 0,7 % 1,0 %

F-statistic 5,26*** 1,93 2,34

Note: The number of observations includes not the whole sample at the acquiring and target firms, because of the data availability problem of the target MTBR. The number of observations differs between the three event windows of the acquirer because outliers caused a normality problem and are therefore deleted from the sample.

These outliers were more than for times the standard deviation and less than three percent of the total sample.

***, **, * significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10 % respectively

Source: own calculations

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