Gun Cultures

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Gun Cultures

Security Provision out of Survival or Resulting From the

Provisions of the Social Contract?

By

Michelle G.M. de Rijck

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts International Relations and International Organisation – International Security

at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands

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List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1. The Causes of Gun Cultures page 17

Figures

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Abbreviations

AK-47 Avtomat Kalashnikova (Russian automatic assault rifle, better known as Kalashnikov)

ECOWAS Economic Community Of West African States IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms NRA National Rifle Association

ONS Office of National Security (Sierra Leone) SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLANSA Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms SLeNCSA Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SAS Small Arms Survey

SLP Sierra Leone Police

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Abstract

Various countries have been referred to as having a gun culture. However, the arguments that scholars use to support the suggestion that a certain state has a gun culture, are insufficient to structure our understanding of the phenomenon. Especially, the link between gun cultures and state structures, to explain the various ways gun cultures can be developed, is missing. The thesis fills this gap by confirming the hypothesis: A new theory will enable us to better understand gun cultures in general

and in the West African states Ghana and Sierra Leone in particular. The new theory and its model

explain how state formation leads to states with different social contracts. The social contract reveals the general opinion in a society, about the role of the state and the individual in security provision. In some states the government has the duty to provide protection for its citizens, while in other states this duty does not exist. This, in turn, shows whether the state’s monopoly on the use of force is centralized, decentralized or weak. Subsequently, gun ownership by civilians is possible, or not.

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1 Introduction

“The availability of small arms combined with the experience of protracted armed conflict resulted in the emergence of a gun-culture in certain African countries” (Schroeder and Lamb 2006, 72).

What is a gun culture? Is the enormous availability of weapons an important criterion to determine whether a country has a gun culture? Does the ownership of guns need to be legalized in a state’s constitution to be able to speak of a gun culture? What gun cultures do we know? Does the phenomenon exist only in the United States of America or also in some African countries? How can these different states all be referred to as having a gun culture? How is a gun culture being developed? Can the state’s monopoly on the use of force coexist with private gun ownership? How do people come to value guns as appropriate tools for security provision? Can a civil war result in a gun culture? These questions are central to this master thesis.

Literature on guns often focuses on the debate between pro-gun control and pro-gun rights, or on whether there is a causal link between the amount of guns in society and the level of crime and violence. However, no theory exists to explain the phenomenon of a gun culture. This thesis tries to fill this gap by stating the hypothesis: A new theory will enable us to better understand gun cultures in

general and in the West African states Ghana and Sierra Leone in particular. This hypothesis will be

tested in three chapters.

The sub-question of Chapter 2 is: Does the existing academic literature provide a profound

understanding of gun cultures in the world? In this chapter I will analyse what has been written about

gun cultures and hence what we know about the phenomenon. I will unravel the concept of ‘gun culture’ and search for a definition. The analysis of states that have been referred to as having a gun culture is interesting. I will take a critical look at what arguments various scholars provide to explain the existence of gun cultures in these particular countries. The arguments will be examined in light of the logic that they follow. The logic of appropriateness explains that guns are being perceived as appropriate tools in society, while the logic of consequences explains that guns become tools for survival as a result of economic or political problems.

In Chapter 3, I will examine how gun cultures are being developed and how this can be structured into a theory. The sub-question is: How do gun cultures relate to state structures and with this insight,

how can a new theory be created? First, I will investigate some of the classic theories about the

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opinion about the role of the gun in society, being linked to the role of the state in security provision. In some states the government has the duty to provide protection for its citizens while in other states this duty does not exist. This process will lead me towards the construction of a new theory on gun cultures with a model that structures the links between state formation, the social contract and the monopoly on the use of force.

The causal relationships in the model need to be correct, in order for the model to be relevant and strong. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I will test the model by applying it to the case studies of two West African countries. The sub-question is: Is the prevalence of guns in the West African states Ghana and

Sierra Leone compatible with the new theory on gun cultures? This will especially entail the

examination of which logic, the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness, can be used to elucidate how guns become owned by civilians in the states Ghana and Sierra Leone.

I choose Ghana because this state is referred to as having a gun culture and I want to know whether this is true and whether the new theory can explain why. It will also test the logic of appropriateness: are guns embedded in Ghana’s culture and in the social contract, which makes the ownership socially acceptable? I choose Sierra Leone because it has experienced a long-term civil war, involving a lot of guns. I want to know whether the civil war has led to a gun culture. This case study will test whether the logic of consequences can explain why citizens own guns in Sierra Leone: is it because there is no security provision and they need to survive in a hostile environment? This chapter is of prime importance to demonstrate the strength of the new theory on gun cultures.

My interest in guns comes from my problem solving perspective as a child: ‘to stop war and violence, why do we not just destroy all guns?’ After learning about the state, politics and international relations, this solution did not seem achievable anymore. My recent interest for International Security lead me to the subject ‘gun cultures’, which made me able to combine my interest for the gun and my interest for the role of the state in security provision. Hereby, this study differs from other approaches to gun ownership in that it does not focus on the crime or violence rate, but on the cultural reasons that influence people to value and demand guns. To put differently, this master thesis is thus not trying to answer whether or not guns make societies more violent, but to fill two important gaps: the conceptualization of the phenomenon and the role of the state in relation to gun cultures.

The subject ‘gun cultures’ fits the field of IR theory because it is linked to IR perspectives on society and state relations, including literature about failed states, humanitarian intervention and globalization processes. Furthermore, the discussions on private gun ownership appear on the political agenda and in public opinion frequently. It has recently been discussed in Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United States of America, as a result of mass shootings. The debates in various states can also influences each other. So, gun culture is a topic with a worldwide reach.

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2 Gun Culture; An Understudied Phenomenon

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine how the phenomenon of ‘gun culture’ is analysed in academic literature. The sub-question is: Does the existing academic literature provide a profound understanding of gun

cultures in the world? First, I will unravel the concept of ‘gun culture’ and search for definitions. I will

analyse the existing literature on gun cultures. I will especially focus on what states have been referred to as having gun cultures in academic literature and critically look at whether this literature gives extensive and satisfactory explanations for the existence of gun cultures. Lastly, the relevance of studying gun cultures from an IR point of view will be discussed.

2.2 What Constitutes a Gun Culture?

Labelling something a ‘cultural’ aspect of society is difficult. It is one of the most discussed concepts in the academic world (Krause 1999) and multiple definitions exists. Culture can be about how people interact, what morals they value and the way they understand the world around them. It can be about a shared understanding and behaviour, or could include factors like language and identity. Culture is expressed in daily activities, rituals, symbols and traditions. Its features can change over time (Richards 1999) and an individual can be attracted to different cultures, rejecting elements of one and adjusting to others (Krause 1999). But how are cultural elements in a society linked to guns?

Let me first elaborate on definitions of guns. There are a lot of terms to describe guns. The terms ‘gun’, ‘firearm’ or ‘weapon’ are used interchangeably. More specific are the types: pistol, rifle, revolver or machine gun. These terms say something about the different shapes and ways they work: discharging a single shot at a time or shoot several times in a row. Even more particular are the names of guns, for example a very famous one: the Kalashnikov or AK-47 (Chivers 2010).

The United Nations (UN) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition -in short: the Firearms Protocol- was adopted in 2001 by the General Assembly in resolution 55/255 and entered into force on the 3rd of June 2005. To date, the Firearms Protocol constitutes the only global, legally-binding instrument that addresses the issue of small arms. Article 3 of the protocol defines the terms:

“Firearm” shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive”

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in Budapest 1956, Prague 1968 and Tiananmen Square 1989. Meanwhile the Kalashnikov assault rifle is an icon of the anti-establishment insurgents and therefore a symbol of revolutionary resistance. Nonetheless, others see this AK-47 as a symbol of criminal lawlessness (Cock 1997), and in the twenty-first century it became associated with terrorists (Chivers 2010). These examples indicate the influence of history on the development of the gun as a symbol in various societies.

There are different entry points for IR and Security Study Analysts to analyse the link between culture and guns. To make the step from a broad concept of culture to a more specific one on gun culture, I include the concept ‘security’, because I think guns are linked to security issues, either in the sense that they cause insecurity or provide security. I will take a look at the definition of ‘security culture’ made by Keith Krause, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development studies in Geneva, (1999, 15):

“Enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s society’s interests and values with respect to security are perceived, articulated and advanced”

According to Krause, linking the term ‘culture’ to security is necessary because “influences [on the

security of a state] cannot be reduced to crude material interests or rational calculations” (1999, 12).

It is not about the actual security one ‘has’ but about the security one ‘experiences’ or ‘feels’. What makes people feel insecure, and how do they think this should be solved? The orientation towards (in)security issues is formed by cultural influences: historical experiences of war, institutions, types of authority, ethnic threat perceptions, international standing, negotiating strategies or attitudes towards violence and dispute resolution (Krause 1999).

However, it is not possible to simply change the word ‘security’, in Krause’s definition of security culture, into ‘gun’. Security is not an object, while a gun is. Nonetheless, guns are also surrounded by ‘beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols’. Yet, referring back to Krause’s cultural influences, several countries have experienced wars, have the same kind of institutions (democracies), types of authority (presidents) or international standing (developed nations). Despite the similar cultural influences, the countries do not reflect the same beliefs, traditions, attitudes and rules regarding guns. So the question: what makes a country have a gun culture?, is still not answered sufficiently. I will ask three questions to find a satisfactory answer.

First, does the definition of ‘gun culture’ have to include the availability of weapons, the type of usage of weapons, the desire for weapons, the amount of weapons in the hands of civilians or the number of causalities? John R. Lott Jr. says in his book ‘More Guns, Less Crime’ (Lott Jr. 1998):

“American culture is a gun culture – not merely in the sense that 75 to 86 million people own a total of about 200 to 240 million guns, but in the broader sense that guns pervade our debates on crime and are constantly present in movies and the news. (...) We are obsessed with guns.” Lott Jr. seems to

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Second, is it a negative concept, meaning that gun ownership is viewed as illegitimate? Or is it a positive concept, meaning that private gun ownership is legitimate? On the one hand, for example in the United States, the gun culture has been proclaimed as being an important social right that is embedded in the constitution (Cukiers and Sheptycki 2012). This means that it is a positive concept, guns are legally owned by civilians. On the other hand, it is seen in for example the United Kingdom (UK), as something that has to be avoided in the form of urban youth- and gang- gun culture (Cukiers and Sheptycki 2012). This shows a negative association with the concept.

This diversion between positive and negative connotations in particular, leads to the theory on the logic of appropriateness. March and Olson (2004) explain that “The logic of appropriateness is a

perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, and legitimate. (…) To act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good.” Applied to the concept ‘gun culture’, this logic explains that it is a culture in which it

is collectively perceived and institutionalized that it is appropriate and reasonable to carry a gun. It is about the positive role the gun plays in a society.

Third, for a society to be labelled as having a gun culture, does gun ownership needs to be widespread? The scholars Cukier and Sheptycki (2012) use the term: ‘Pistolization’. This term is not intended to offer a way of understanding the availability and materiality of guns -in the above elaboration on culture it is stressed that issues of security cannot be reduced to material underpinnings- but to explain a process in which the pistol becomes a tool for solving problems in daily life. The carrying of a handgun is socially constructed, which puts in centre the purpose and meaning of guns, being security provision, hunting or protecting crops (Cukier and Sheptycki 2012).

Looking back at the definition by Krause on the ‘security culture’: “Enduring and widely shared

beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols…advanced” (see previous page), it is noteworthy to look

further into the terms ‘enduring’ and ‘widely shared’. A gun culture in relation to youth or drug gangs can be perceived as negative in the broader society, but gun ownership among the group members is perceived as appropriate. Hence, the perception of ‘needing to own a gun’ does not need to be ‘widely shared’ among all people in society. Even in America, where gun ownership is perceived to be a social right, not every civilian agrees with the right to bear arms. Guns are embedded in identities of diverse social groupings (Cock 1997, 71). A gun culture therefore does not need to apply to an entire country. “Broad references to ‘gun culture’ may have little meaning, given that different social groups often

relate to firearms in distinct ways, with significant variations appearing along gender, class, age, and ‘ethnic’ lines. In this sense, ‘national gun cultures’ represent gross oversimplifications” (SAS 2005,

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Regarding the term ‘enduring’, it has to be underlined that public perceptions can change over time. For example, due to mass shootings. The Small Arms Survey of 2005 (206) clearly states that:

“Social attitudes to guns may change over time, so that it is not possible to speak of a stable permissive (or restrictive) gun culture. Like other cultural features, ‘gun culture’ is not a given, but the product of social and political interaction. As such, it may constantly evolve and be renegotiated by members of a given community.” So, attitudes to guns are enduring, but to a certain extent. The

Small Arms Survey (SAS 2005, 205) gives the following definition for the concept of gun culture:

“a set of values, norms – both social and legal – and meanings that render the presence of firearms and their possession by private individuals acceptable and legitimate”

I doubt the inclusion of ‘legal’ in this definition. Some countries do not have permissive laws on gun ownership, as will become clear from part 2.4, while the presence of firearms and the ownership by private individuals appears generally accepted. Can a gun culture be explained by the number of gun owners, even though it is not officially permitted by law to own a gun? To answer this question, the logic of expected consequences can be applied. This is about a rational calculation based on interests and preferences (Goldmann 2005). Linked to guns, the ownership can be caused by a persons’ rational calculation of his or her security. A person then sees it as necessary to own a gun even though this is not legal. This also brings up the question: who is responsible for security provision, the state or the individual? Cultural norms again determine who takes up this task and thereby determine the role of the gun.

To sum up the answers to the three questions, the definition for gun culture should take into account that guns need to have a place in the public debate and need to be perceived as having a positive role in society, by a segment of society. Taking all these views together, I formulate the following definition:

“A gun culture is made up of culturally and socially constructed beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that influence the way in which guns are perceived by a social group as appropriate tools to protect oneself in everyday life”

In this way I thus believe that gun cultures can be explained through the logic of appropriateness. However, the logic of consequences seems to hold some explanatory power as well. A gun can be seen as an appropriate tool, even if this is caused by necessity, i.e. as a consequence of insecurity. Whether or not this latter argument is true I will elaborated on into more detail in chapter 3 and 4. I will now look at the explanations found in the existing literature on the causes of gun culture and look at whether or not the two logics can be found in the argumentation of various scholars.

2.3 Literature review; explaining Gun Cultures

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culture create violence or does violence create a gun culture? This then results in the debate about gun control (Lott Jr. 1998; Squires 2000; Fleshman 2001; Cukier and Sidel 2006). It is an interesting dilemma but it is too broad to answer within the scope of this thesis. Instead of looking at gun use and gun violence in a society, I find it more important to investigate what causes the weapons to take such a prominent place. The causes of gun cultures, as found in the literature, will be outlined in three groups: cultural, political and economic causes. In part 2.2 it is explained that culture creates the value for guns and the general acceptance of gun ownership. Gun culture can thereby be linked to the logic of appropriateness. However, the political and economic factors that will be analysed in this part will make a statement for linking gun cultures to the logic of consequences.

2.3.1 Cultural Causes

Societal factors like individual character, social relationships, family influence or group pressure can cause a demand for guns (Stohl and Grillot 2009). Moreover, guns can become embedded in everyday cultural activities: films, TV, books, songs, sports (war games such as paintball) and toys (fake guns or video games). These media influences and activities cause guns, war, weaponry and military force to be normalized and glorified. However, most often mentioned in academic literature, are cultural causes gun cultures: history, gender and ethnicity.

Historically, guns can be a part of society, especially from the supply side. According to Michael Fleshman (2001), writer for the United Nations’ Africa Renewal Magazine, guns in South Africa stayed in the hands of ordinary people after the militarization during the apartheid. In other countries, guns survived demilitarization after a war of independence, a civil war or the Cold War involvement. Guns in this way can become symbols of freedom. As indicated before, the AK-47 is a symbol of decolonisation and liberation. The Mozambican national flag even has a picture of the rifle in its emblem (Fleshman 2001).

Jacklyn Cock (1997), professor in sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, mentions that the supply and demand for guns is socially organized. The way guns are conceptualized and presented reveals what values and habits prevail in a society. According to her, an important explanation for the role of guns can be found in gender constructs. In many western and non western cultures, guns are linked to masculinity. The traditional role of the man is to provide security. This image has been formed by popular characters of cowboys, warriors and soldiers possessing values as honour, strength and courage (Cock 1997).

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owners, but they are not as numerous (Lott Jr. 1998). Nevertheless, women in South Africa are trying to purchase guns. This is part of the feminist emancipating movement of women who want to be equal to man. Women also carry guns more often to protect themselves against rape and domestic violence. In South Africa the protection of women by males has decreased and even turned into male violence against women (Cock 1997). This fact actually damages the masculinity argument for gun cultures.

Another cultural cause of gun culture, according to Cock (1997), is ethnicity. Identities divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’, thereby determining exclusion or inclusion. Having a gun can mean inclusion in a certain group, which is for example required for belonging to a drug gang or militant group. Nene Mburu (in Springwood 2006) explains that certain African leaders have tried to play off various rural ethnic communities against each other by providing guns. More scholars argue that gun violence relates to fears of insecurity grounded in racial and ethnic identities (Cock 1997). I, however, find this argument not particularly strong, as it should not lead to a conclusion that certain ethnic groups are more violent or more easily accept the usage of guns. The same goes for religions: are more Christian or Islamic nations gun cultures? This would require a cross sectional analysis of various states and religions and their acceptance of guns.

Gun cultures have thus been explained as resulting from cultural factors like: social activities, a historic symbols, role expectations related to masculinity or collective ideas about ethnic divisions. According to the logic of appropriateness, these cultural causes make guns to be perceived as appropriate to own. Yet, on their own, these arguments do not explain gun cultures. I will now turn to the political causes that I have found in the literature.

2.3.2 Political Causes

A distinction can be made between a government that actively or passively influences the role of guns in society. Cock (1997) states that a government can actively support the import or manufacturing of weapons, thereby showing that the government values arms as important assets. In the same line, it can excessively arm the state’s security forces. However, the active role of the government in arming its security forces does not need to lead to gun ownership by civilians. What makes guns embedded in society through a political process, is on the one hand, when a governments establishes a law that renders gun ownership legal. These laws are essential in understanding the legal basis of a gun culture. When gun ownership is legalized, this can demonstrate the general acceptance of guns as a necessary tool in the life of citizens. The other way around, a law can also demonstrate a negative value attached to guns, namely by prohibiting them. Either way, the government will create these laws because there is demand for gun control or gun rights from society. Culture thus influences and shapes these laws according to the logic of appropriateness.

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The demand for weapons in this sense results from the will to demonstrate power, the interest to acquire territory or resources, or the desire for or against independence or secession. These desires are often achieved by war or violence. Experiences of war and crime and the role of the gun in achieving the above mentioned political goals shape the attitudes towards guns. As explained before, guns can become symbols of heroism, revolution, freedom or basic security provision. If a country has been at war for a long time, guns become part of everyday life. Springwood (2006) thus uses the logic of appropriateness to explain that a gun culture results from historical events that shape the public perception of guns.

I turn now to the influence of a passive government on the role of guns in society. A state can be passive and do nothing to prevent or control imports and manufacturing. This can demonstrate an indifference to arms regulations. Besides that, by providing no or a weak control of arm stocks and by paying security officials very poorly, weapons can fall in wrong hands or end up in the illegal circuit (Cock 1997). The passive role can result in more arms circulating in the country. However, I want to highlight that this does not imply that citizens will own guns. Namely, when citizens do not feel threatened by this flow of weapons, or when they feel protected against negative consequences of the presence of arms, personal gun ownership is not necessary. The logic of appropriateness then explains that guns are not perceived as threatening or important in the security provision.

On the contrary, if a state is unstable the perception of guns can be totally different. Instability breeds insecurity, which in turn creates the desire to be protected, which can be done by weapons. But why is this option chosen? The choice for weapons to solve insecurity might be established as a result from the weak state role in providing security. Fleshman (2001, 3) elaborates on the link between guns and the state and argues that a passive or weak authority can result in gun ownership by civilians: “In

areas where state security is weak or absent, possession of a gun can be a matter of survival, either to seize food and other vital resources or as protection from attack”. Jukka Savolainen, criminology

professor at the University of Nebraska (2000, 1022) explains this in a slightly different way:

“Imbalance of institutions generates value orientations that emphasize efficiency norms at the expense of moral considerations: the mood of society becomes more predatory”. Philippa Garson, reporter and

former journalist at the Guardian adds: “In case of lawlessness, a high level of violence and insecurity

[due to state weakness] having a gun is more useful than political accountability.” (1992, 58).

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the monopoly on force and authority. Individuals take up their own responsibility for personal security and arm themselves (Squires 2000). Hereby, Squires also uses a logic of consequences.

It appears that the scholars, in the literature outlined above, do not agree on the explanations for the role of guns in society. Some take a logic of appropriateness, like Cock (1997) and Springwood (2006), while others use the logic of consequences: Fleshman (2001), Savolainen (2000), Garson (1992) and Squires (2000). I will now turn to evaluate the economic causes to see whether or not this disagreement is to be found regarding those factors as well.

2.3.3 Economic Causes

This part explores the arguments stated in academic literature that guns can gain a prominent place in societies due to economic factors. According to historian Michael A. Bellesiles (2000) gun ownership became part of the American society due to the industrial revolution which made mass production of guns possible. This gun manufacturing can be of great economic importance in a country as a booming business which creates jobs and trade. This is a logic of consequences approach: if gun manufacturing is a large business, a country can become a gun culture. However, part 2.4 will show that not all manufacturing countries or gun importing countries are gun cultures.

Another economic cause of gun ownership that can be explained by the logic of consequences is the private security industry. When the police or the state apparatus cannot stabilize disputes in society, private security guards replace national and international police and armies. The increase in private armed guards is a sign of people losing their confidence in the capacity of the state to protect them (Garson 1992; Cock 1997). However, the logic of appropriateness can also be raised regarding this armed business. How appropriate are private security companies? Do they have a legitimate role? Are they accepted in society? There is a lot of academic research on the issue of private security, and I will return to it briefly in the next chapter when I analyse the work of Anna Leander (2002, 2009).

Tom C. McCaskie (2008), who is a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, argues that in times of economic hardship gun ownership can be established. This is due to inequality or unemployment. If certain people have no jobs, income, food or future prospects, the gun can be used in a desperate quest for money or justice. This argument is based on the logic of consequences. The most important weak point in this argumentation for economic causes of gun cultures is that inequality, economic hardship and the arms industry are present in so many countries. This then cannot explain why a particular country, having these problems, turns into a gun culture while another country, experiencing the same problems, will not develop into a gun culture.

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of guns. Economic factors, in turn, basically are linked to the logic of consequences. Inequality, economic hardship or unemployment can turn guns into tools to safeguard one’s interest. This logic remains contested because it is not strong enough to explain differences in countries’ gun cultures while they have the same economic problems. Table 1 provides an overview of the causes of gun cultures and their underlying logic of appropriateness or consequences. In the next part, I will give an overview of various countries that have been referred to as having gun cultures. This will structure my argument further that the existing literature does not provide a clear understanding of the phenomenon of gun culture.

Table 1: The Causes of Gun Cultures

Cultural Causes Political Causes Economic Causes Logic of Appropriateness  History  Gender  Ethnicity  Identity  Gansterism  Education  Symbols  Recreation / Sport / Social activities  Laws  Constitution  Security provision  Private security sector Logic of Consequences  War / Crime / Violence  Power plays on secession, independence or resources  Weak state institutions  Survival  Gun manufacturing  Arms trade  Industrial revolution  Economic hardship  Inequality  Unemployment  Private security sector

2.4 What Gun Cultures Do We Know?

In this part, I will look at the worldwide presence of guns and their role in different countries. For a complete overview I should include a cross-country study. This is not possible within the scope of this thesis. However, I will take a look at various countries that have been referred as having a gun culture. It seems like the concept is used as if its contains are clear. The vast differences between the countries show that the concept is not sufficiently analysed to understand to what cases it can be applicable. In other words, the literature is insufficient in explaining the variations in gun cultures.

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of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and can be used by governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. The research note number 9 (SAS 2011) shows statistics on the numbers of firearms owned by civilians. I have included some of the figures in the appendices. Appendix 1 shows that civilians, including gangs, private security companies and non-state armed groups, together own 650 million firearms. This is compared to the 226 million guns owned by law enforcement and armed forces. In appendix 2, the top ten countries with the most firearms (total) in civilian hands is portrayed. Leading countries are the USA, India and China. Appendix 3 lists the countries regarding the amount of firearms per 100 residents (average). Here, the top three countries is different: USA, Yemen and Switzerland. Interestingly, China and India are on place 102 and 110 respectively.1 Most Asian countries are to be found at the bottom of the list, indicating low rates of gun ownership amongst civilians.

To further complicate the comparison, statistics on importing and exporting countries show that, although Africa is often believed to be a main destination for SALW, the continent only received 25 million dollars’ worth of arms in 2005 (Stohl and Grillot 2009). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2012, also confirmed by Grimmett 2010), indicates, by contrast, that between 2007 and 2011, India, South Korea, Pakistan and China imported the most arms (Appendix 4A). The biggest exporting countries were the USA, Russia, Germany and France (Appendix 4B). As mentioned before, these numbers about the availability of guns alone do not explain whether or not there is a gun culture in a country. I will therefore go into more detail by looking at some states being referred to as having a gun culture.

When searching the internet and university libraries for information about gun cultures, the main subject of inquiry to pop up is the United States of America (USA). It thereby promises to be the clearest example of a gun culture. According to Cukier and Sheptycki (2012), the term ‘gun culture’ was invented by the American historian Richard Hofstader in the 1960s. Contrary to general thought, the origins do not lay in the Second Amendment to the constitution of the USA, which was written in 1789. It states that; “A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right

of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Bellesiles (2000) wrote a book about the

debatable origins of the gun culture in the USA. Around the time of the drawing of the Bill of Rights, not many Americans owned guns. This changed around 1850 when Samuel Colt invented mass manufacturing for high quality guns. He combined this with a grand marketing and promotion strategy. This can be linked back to the explanations in part 2.3.3 about economic causes of gun cultures. It seems like the gun culture then is not as culturally embedded as most American would like to think.

1_{A total of 178 countries has been analysed. Complete figure to be found online: SAS 2007 chapter 2 annex 4.}

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Yet, Cukier and Sidel (2006) argue that there are also cultural factors that have shaped the gun culture in the USA. America has inherited the European hunting ethos, target shooting and gun collecting. Moreover, since the National Rifle Association actively promoted the gun and linked it to the second amendment, it has become embedded in everyday life (Cukier and Sheptycki 2012; Suter 2009). But the phenomenon of gun culture cannot solely be defined or measured against the prime example of the USA, as its case simply does not fit other cases.

Switzerland for example, has a very different and unique system. Every adult male is legally required to participate in the national defence, to possess a gun and to follow civil services or army training (BBC news 27-09-2001). The reasons for gun ownership are deeply embedded in the culture and the education, with the rationale to defend the country, instead of providing protection against fellow -criminal- citizens. In other words, the Swiss gun culture is based upon national security while the gun culture in the USA is based upon personal security. Compared to these two examples of gun cultures, other countries in the western hemisphere show that the right to bear arms is not widespread, although the economic standard, type of political system or history is similar to and interlinked with the USA or Switzerland.

Due to a high rate of gun violence, the UK has often been assumed to have a gun culture (Lott Jr. 1998; Squires 2000). However, the UK holds rank 88 on the SAS list (appendix 3). The use of the term gun culture in this case can actually demonstrate the illegitimacy of the use of guns and the fear for firearms. Squires (2000) explains that the UK has a culture in which the carrying of weapons by civilians is contrary to the collective and paternalist notions of public order. Guns are equated with violence and hence gun ownership is not generally accepted. Another example of a country that treats gun culture as something that needs to be avoided is Canada. The general opinion among Canadians is that one does not need to own a gun for protection. Yet, Canada has relatively high rates of gun ownership (Cukier and Sheptycki 2012). It has place 13 on the SAS list (Appendix 3). Nonetheless the law does not allow civilians to carry guns. They only may possess firearms for recreational and sport purposes. The same goes for Australia, rating 42 on the SAS list (2007). A lot of guns are used for recreational purposes or for hunting animals. Yet there are strict laws regulating guns and there is an influential gun-control debate (Cukier and Sidel 2006).

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common in the tribal society. However, these cultural practices of conflict resolution only work when the traditional means of controlling armed violence are also upheld. There is said to be a gradual erosion of the customary norms controlling the use of guns. Conflict is more and more resolved by the gun. The gun culture in Yemen is very different from the USA or Switzerland.

Brazil gives a good example of how the global pro-gun lobby can influence gun ownership and the perception of guns by civilians (Cukier and Sheptycki 2012). On 23 October 2005, 64 per cent of the Brazilians voted against a referendum to ban firearms. This means that the population feels that private ownership of firearms is necessary for security (Stohl and Grillot 2009). Voters against the ban on firearms gave the argument that it will not stop criminals from buying weapons illegally while it will be depriving ordinary citizens of the means to defend themselves (BBC news 02-07-2004). Pro-gun groups have successfully tied weapon possession to the status of masculinity and honour. Owning a gun can also be a requirement for belonging to a certain -drugs- gang (Cukiers and Sheptycki 2012). A social group on itself can have a gun culture. The drug gangs in the city slums are problematic. Despite the political campaigns by the government to reduce the number of privately owned guns (BBC news 23-08-2008) the results of the referendum show that people desire guns and gangs show the customary behavior of gun use.

South Africa holds rank 50 of 178 in number of civilian firearms (SAS 2007). Despite the high amount of civilian gun owners, laws on the possession of firearms are strict (Cock 1997). This appearing contradiction is caused by the numbers of illegal, non-registered guns. These guns are smuggled across the borders between South Africa and former civil war countries (Fleshman 2001). The demand for arms is historically created by the apartheid regime and more recently by the problematic violent society (Stohl and Grillot 2009). Garson (1992) gives various arguments for the gun culture in South Africa. She mentions social groups in relation to economic factors and the weak state. Various youth defense units seek to express their frustration and cynicism about the future. With no jobs, education or security provision, the majority of black youth comes to glorify the guns. They want guns to protect their families. The only place these young people feel safe is in a mob. The private defense units blur the distinction between legitimate defense mechanisms like the police or the army (Garson 1992).

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for Security Studies in South Africa, which showed that 60 per cent of the respondents expressed their willingness to carry a gun for self-defense (Fleshman 2001). This reflects the general acceptance of guns in South Africa.

All these cases offer only a snapshot of civilian gun ownership in the world. The choice to include these countries has been influenced by the available literature. For examples, certain cases with a high rank like Finland, Serbia and Cyprus (SAS 2007) are not included because of the limited literature I could find. It could, however, be interesting to include these cases in a follow up research. The countries that have been taken into account, are chosen especially for their explanatory value. I choose countries that are high on the list of civilian gun owner countries: USA, Swiss, Yemen. But I also brought to the analysis countries like Brazil and South Africa, that do not have a particular high rank, but still are referred to as having a gun culture by scholars (Cukier and Sheptycki 2012; Cock 1997; Fleshman 2001; Garson 1992). Moreover, South Africa is the only significant producer and exporter in Sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil is the only major producer and exporter in Latin America. These cases provide information related to the arguments made in part 2.3.3 on the link between economic manufacturing and gun cultures.

The concept of gun culture is applied to various states, that is why I wondered how Yemen or South Africa can be referred to as having gun cultures, when totally different countries like the USA or Switzerland have a gun culture as well. Together, these examples have structured my argument that totally different countries can have gun cultures, while the manifestation of the phenomenon and its development find their origin in different factors. It is not my intention to argue that the term gun culture is applicable to only one case with a limited, specific set of factors e.g. as pertaining to the USA. On the contrary, I think there is no gun culture format, that fits all cases. All cases have context specific factors that explain the role of guns in society. In part 2.5, I will explain what the implications of the lack of theory on gun cultures are for the IR field of study and why I think it is relevant to study gun cultures from an IR perspective.

2.5 Relevance of Studying Gun Cultures in IR

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central factor in contemporary culture and politics. However, the role of the gun “in post-modern

social fragmentation has not yet received the kind of sustained theoretical attention given to organized collective violence in the context of state formation” (Squires 2000, 26).

IR theories, especially linked to the field of international security, have an interest in firearms. Topics that are frequently examined are guerrilla warfare, terrorism, uprisings, political conflict. However, guns are not only relevant for war strategies but also linked to economics, shown by market for guns and international arms trade. Even more, what makes the role of guns interesting for studying in the field of IR can be highlighted by three features: the cross national aspect of guns, the influence of state formation on the role of guns in society, and the private security sector.

First of all, guns and gun cultures have cross-national causes and impacts. Keith Suter, Foreign Affairs editor, confirms in his article ‘Global Gun Culture’ (2009), that gun cultures are not only national, but need to be placed into a global frame. Linked to this argument is the example of the UN that tries to negotiate international sets of rules regarding guns by holding conferences. The recently discussed Arms Trade Treaty was organized by the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (New York Times 27-07-2012). Despite the fact that states argue that arms fall under domestic regulation, supply and demand of weapons come from international trade, relations, interests and laws. SALW have flooded the world in recent decades and have had different impacts on societies.

Besides governments, lobby groups and other key institutions that promote gun ownership have also a global reach. David Morton, a freelance reporter in South America, describes in his article

‘gunning for the world’ (2006), that national pro-gun right associations have an influence on each

other. Especially the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the USA influences gun lobbies in other countries like Australia, the UK and Brazil. Morton (2006) writes the following about the Brazilian gun ownership debate: “The idea that owning a gun is a human right as dear as, say, the freedom to

protest, might not exist [in Brazil] if not for the National Rifle Association, which has shaped, tested and honed the message.” The gun-rights lobby thus operates worldwide. Nevertheless, confronting the

pro-gun rights activists, the pro-gun control associations are aligned worldwide as well. Under leadership of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) more than 500 gun control organizations are represented (Morton 2006). Gun cultures all over the world thus influence each other, in demand as well as in supply. So, the value for IR is the trans-national aspect of guns.

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Thirdly, the private security sector is the main field in which guns and security perceptions are discussed in IR nowadays. This is also linked to how the state’s monopoly on the use of force is formed and upheld. Moreover, the growth in the private security sector informs us that the provision of security is changing. In some states, guns will become more and more part of ordinary people’s lives. A broad understanding of why this happens helps IR scholars and policy makers anticipate new developments.

To conclude, guns have always been part of IR: nuclear weapons, the Cold War arms race and non-state armed groups have all been studied thoroughly. International industry, trade, politics and conflicts are influenced by, and themselves influence, the role of guns. Why then not explore the various ways the role of guns has developed in various countries? To quote Cukiers and Sheptycki (2012, 15): “There are many layers of gun culture to be unpacked”.

2.6 Conclusion

The leading question in this chapter was; Does the existing academic literature provide a profound

understanding of gun cultures in the world? Finding a definition was difficult. However, after a

thorough examination I argued that a gun culture is: “made up of culturally and socially

constructed beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that influence the way in which guns are perceived by a social group as appropriate tools to protect oneself in everyday life”. There is no

vast body of literature that explains how a gun culture comes into being. Different scholars use different logics to explain why they think a certain country can be referred to as having a gun culture. What I find missing in the literature is the role of the state in the formation of a gun culture. I want to structure the ideas about gun cultures, being plural, and the various ways they can come into existence.

Particularly, what I want to do in the next chapter is to figure out which way of thinking, the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequences, can explain the place a gun gets in a society, especially when linked to the role of the state in security provision. They both seem to be valuable in explaining the existence of gun cultures. The following chapters of my thesis will show whether or not this is correct.

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3 Towards a Theory

3.1 Introduction

Political theory often includes a classification of states. Basically, states share a number of similarities. They have a territory, a population, a government and they poses constitutional independence which means they are recognized under international law as valid members of the international society of sovereign states (Sørensen 2001). But historically states have had different paths of development, which has led to different political and social structures. Governments have made diverse policy choices on the same topic, for example gun ownership.

As seen in the previous chapter, hardly any scholar goes into the questions: Why do countries differ in their rules regarding guns? Why is it legal to own guns in one state, while another state prohibits this? Is it because the state is losing its monopoly on the use of force, or do some states deliberately give up this right? Is it because the population demands this? What is the role of guns in the social contract? Can a gun culture be explained because privately owned guns have always been part of the security provision, or because, due to a lack of security provision by the state, people purchase guns to survive in a dangerous environment? What is sought in this chapter is not a typology or classification of statehood, but rather an understanding of how gun ownership is linked to the construct of the state, the monopoly on the use of force and the social contract. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to find out; How do gun cultures relate to state structures and with this insight, how can

a new theory be created?

I will first investigate some of the classic theories about the process of state formation, including the work of Charles Tilly (1985), Martin van Creveld (1999) and Anna Leander (2002b). This will help in the understanding of the process of the monopolization of the use of force by the state. Secondly, I will analyse how state formation causes differences in states concerning the role of guns in the social contract and the role of the state in security provision. This process will lead me towards the construction of a new theory on gun cultures. The logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness will be used to explain the model.

3.2 State Formation and the Monopoly on the Use of Force

The concepts ‘state’ and ‘government’ are often used interchangeable. The distinction lays in that the ‘state’ is the organizational format, in which a ‘government’ “makes peace, wages war, enacts laws,

exercises justice, raises revenue and looks after the internal security on behalf of society as a whole”

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conceptualization, in most literature this monopoly is attributed to the ‘state’. This is because the government is only one part of the state apparatus, the government makes decisions about the monopoly, but the military and the police enforce it. So, I will use the term ‘state’ more often.

A general theory on European state formation is well developed by Charles Tilly in his article

War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (1985). According to him, war making led to state

making. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the expansion of military power caused the replacement of private armies by standing armies. Royals like Richelieu in France and The Tudors in England demilitarized great lords, condemned the carrying of lethal weapons and repressed private armies (Tilly 1985, 174). This created the monopoly of the state on the use of violence and force. The monopoly on military power and the maintenance of standing armies required money, which could be extracted from a commercializing middle class. The taxation resulted in the development of centralized systems of government, demanded accountability by the leaders and all together created the state apparatus (Sørensen 2001).

Complementary, Martin van Creveld explained in his book The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) the changes that this centralization process brought about. The state apparatus became to control civil society, define borders and organize recruitment and training for armed forces. What also changed was the reason for warfare, which switched from personal gain to impersonal security of the state. This was for example shown by the rules concerning prisoners of war. Prisoners were no longer treated as the private property of the captor but formed a new legal category. They had the right to be protected. Also soldiers were no longer seen as criminals working for one man’s profit, but were simply performing their duty in the name of their state. Moreover, the distinction between soldiers and civilians was made by the introduction of army uniforms. Soldering became a profession. The maintenance of public order, before exercised by lighters, night-watchmen, guards or prison wardens, became centralized into the police force, governed by the municipal leaders (Van Creveld 1999).

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Nowadays, various armed groups are still in place, fighting each other, financing themselves by looting civilians or by engaging in illegal activities. As a result, there is no creation of strong institutions, no centralization of power and no monopoly on the use of force. The institutions that are created are weak and corrupt. Since money comes from external donors, the government is not accountable towards the people, but towards the international community. People do not feel attached to their leaders and the leaders do not show where the money is invested. This leads to a lack of representation and accountability (Leander 2002b). Some post-colonial rulers developed a state apparatus based on rewards. Supporters of the state leader offered their loyalty and in return received privileges, which created a patron-client relationship. Such a system is no base for security for the overall population as it lacks order, justice, and produces no public or collective goods (Sørensen 2001).

Other states that missed the crucial phases of Tilly’s state formation, ensured their power by military leadership and repression. This, however, does not mean that this regime has no monopoly on the use of force. Repressive regimes can hold this monopoly. Nevertheless, the intention is different. The monopoly is used to protect the regime instead of the population. When the regime is repressive it can even, instead of providing security for the population, form a threat to internal security in itself. The rules in this society are upheld by coercion, instead of by identity or reward based politics.

It seems noble of the government to provide protection for the population. But Tilly (1985) argued that state formation by raising taxes is actually a criminal activity in order to expand power. The more people buy protection from the state, the more influence the state has. The government sells protection whether the people want it or not. Moreover, the state undoes all the competition in the security market. This makes me wonder whether each particular way of state formation is forced upon society by the state, whether it is created by the population or whether this is something that is a natural development? Moreover, do people find it appropriate for the state to have the monopoly on the use of force? Thomas Hobbes (1985) is one of the political philosophers who gave an answer to this question.

3.3 The Social Contract

3.3.1 Hobbes’ Leviathan

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value their own survival and wellbeing more highly than that of others. Therefore, when there is no authority to rule over the people, a war of all against all will be the result. To avoid this, the people hand over all power to an absolute ruler or government, who will decide on what is permitted, make laws, provide security and maintain peace (Hobbes 1985, Morris 1999). The basis of this line of thought is to be found in Hobbes’ second principle (1985, 190):

“That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”

This seems to means that the security provision is totally depending upon the Leviathan (Sørensen 2001; Van Creveld 1999) and that the people should thus lay down their right to all things, including weapons. This is paradoxical, because why would the people trust the Leviathan in providing protection? What if the rulers are self-interested or repressive? Is even the worst government preferable to the absence of government? Hobbes replied that the Leviathan would honour the terms of the social contract which prescribes the duty of establishing safety, welfare, order and justice for its citizens (Sørensen 2001). The state’s monopoly on the use of force is the raison d’être of the sovereign. The Leviathan’s has its own ‘gun culture’: a culture in which it is seen as natural that the state has guns.

David Murley (1998) argues that the surrendering of the right to defend oneself is incompatible with the social contract theory. He says that Hobbes would never allow an individual to surrender his or her right to self-defence. In the social contract people surrender rights, but they do not surrender the right to protect oneself. Elke Krahmann (2009) adds that the social contract presented by Hobbes does prohibit the private use of violence but does not prohibit the right to self-defence. The state’s or Leviathan’s monopoly on the use of force is thus only intended for purposes other than immediate self-defence.

The statement by Murley - that the social contract is incompatible with monopolizing the right to self-defence in the hands of the state - implies that the social contract is something fixed and that there is only one form of social contract. I, however, want to argue that there are multiple forms and that the social contract is something imaginary. This has also been mentioned by Christopher Morris (1999), who collected critical essays on Hobbes theory. He argues that the state of nature and the social contract are hypothetical. This means that they do not explain exactly how societies came to be, or what rules a society has decided upon. Rather, it triggers people in a society to critically evaluate whether or not their social structure is the best way to organize society (Morris 1999; Squires 2000). It also makes people think about who is responsible for their security and consider whether or not they agree on the rules that are in place. For example, rules on who may own or carry guns. These rules have been developed by social processes, are influenced by culture and can change over time.

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example, a state can choose to protect only its own citizens or also provide security for visitors and asylum seekers. This is of course a question of international law. But the reason to touch upon this aspect, is that citizenship reveals something about the kind of protection provided by whom and for whom. Leander (2009) mentions that Hobbes did include the factor of citizenship, which is the basis for the right to claim specific protection. Does citizenship imply the right to be protected? Kenneth Waltz claims that “citizens of states need not defend themselves” (Waltz 1979, 104; cited in Leander 2009, 5). It is interesting how the ‘civilian right to be protected’ or the ‘duty of the state to protect’ are articulated and performed in various societies. In the next part I will discuss if the right to bear guns can coexist with the monopoly on the use of force.

3.3.2 The Right to Bear Guns and the Monopoly on the Use of Force

The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the USA (see page 19) can be interpreted in various ways. Some scholars argue that the founders intended to prevent government tyranny (Murley 1998; Scarry 1991). The culture of self-reliance and self-protection, embedded in English law, was adopted by the colonies in the Americas. However, the English government, which ruled over these colonies, tried to disarm the population. Therefore, the English government and the concentration of military power were perceived by the colonists as repressive, dangerous and a threat to freedom (Horwitz and Anderson 2008). After independence, the Second Amendment limited governmental force against the civilians and decentralized this power by giving civilians the right to bear arms (Scarry 1991). This decentralization is important and goes together with another interpretation of the Second Amendment.

The second interpretation is that the American state is not obligated to ensure that private interests are not harmed by others (Murley 1998). The underlying idea is that the people should not be dependent on protection by the state. If the individual would have no right to self-protection and the state has the duty to provide for security, yet fails to do so, the individual can get harmed. Hence, in the United States of America the basic thought is that the individual has the right to provide for its own security, as the state cannot be trusted with this sacred duty. This is the reason for decentralizing the monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, civilians may own and carry weapons (Murley 1998).

Against this, Wimmer (2003, 13) argues that arming the population creates a deficit in statehood:

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people the right to own guns does not imply that the state loses its monopoly on the legitimate2 use of force.

To explain this, the state’s monopoly is unlikely to be absolute. There are always actors like mafia, criminals or drugs gangs who claim a certain use of force. The monopoly thus does not mean that the state is the only actor to use force, rather it is the only lawful actor. The monopoly even does not need to be absolute, as long as the government is strong enough to enforce its laws. Similarly, a government does not need to disarm all civilians or prohibit self-defence. It is not an either-or case. If gun ownership is seen as appropriate and acceptable and it poses no threat to the governments existence nor to the security of the population, the question then, ‘can the monopoly on the use of force coexist with the right to bear arms?’ is thus to be answered positively.

But are there cases in which the monopoly gets severely damaged or the state loses its monopoly? Max Weber (cited in Horwitz and Anderson 2008, 504), like Wimmer, argues that the monopoly is most fundamental to the state in order to maintain law and order: “A compulsory political association

with continuous organization ... will be called a ‘state’ if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” The argument here is that when the state loses its monopoly on the use of force, it ceases

to be a state, because then it would be just like any other type of organization.

Sometimes a government still is seen as the legal and rightful executer of force, although its monopoly is eroding due to war or state weakness. The private security sector, for example, can take over the role of security provision (Leander 2001). Yet, Krahmann (2009, 9) argues that in this case, the government sometimes is still able to control or check the security provision. In some places the state no longer has the full monopoly on the use of force, but: “…it is sufficient if the state retains the

monopoly on the legal control of the [private security] actors who wield armed force to protect others”. When the role of the private forces is seen as appropriate, this is part of the social contract.

The monopoly on the use of force is in this case decentralized. However, there are also cases in which the state is no longer seen as the rightful possessor of the monopoly on the use of force. A state can lose its monopoly, for example, when it breaks international legally binding rules or turns against its population (Leander 2002a).

Of interest for IR debates is that the absence of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force might have implications for humanitarian intervention, i.e. whether or not the international community has the responsibility to intervene when the state itself fails to protect, or endangers the security of its population. I take one step back and ask: is having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force equal to having the responsibility to protect the citizens? As shown by the interpretation of the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the USA, it is sometimes not seen as the duty of the state to protect

2

Gun Cultures

Gun Cultures

Security Provision out of Survival or Resulting From the

Provisions of the Social Contract?

By

Michelle G.M. de Rijck

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

Abstract

1 Introduction

2 Gun Culture; An Understudied Phenomenon

2.1 Introduction

2.2 What Constitutes a Gun Culture?

2.3 Literature review; explaining Gun Cultures

2.3.1 Cultural Causes

2.3.2 Political Causes

2.3.3 Economic Causes

2.4 What Gun Cultures Do We Know?

2.5 Relevance of Studying Gun Cultures in IR

2.6 Conclusion

3 Towards a Theory

3.1 Introduction

3.2 State Formation and the Monopoly on the Use of Force

3.3 The Social Contract

3.3.1 Hobbes’ Leviathan

3.3.2 The Right to Bear Guns and the Monopoly on the Use of Force