1
The power of the elderly
Ageing and regional security in East Asia
Stefan Bergsma Stal 157
9205 AK Drachten
Telephone number: 06-11101240 College card number: 1855018
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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE
I hereby declare that this thesis, “The power of the elderly: Ageing and regional security in East Asia“, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.
Name: Stefan Bergsma
Signature:
3 Table of contents
List of tables and figures: 4
1. Introduction: 5
2. On theory and methodology: 10
3. Ageing in East Asia: 22
4. National security versus social security: 32
5. Ageing and regional security: 53
6. Conclusion: 74
4 List of tables and figures
Tables
Table 2.1: Advantages and disadvantages of an ageing country (in relation to security) 20 Table 2.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a young country (in relation to security) 21
Table 3.1: Population statistics Japan (medium variant) 23
Table 3.2: Population statistics China (medium variant) 26
Table 3.3: Population statistics South Korea (medium variant) 29
Figures
Figure 4.1: Japan's social security expenditure (OECD) and military expenditure
(billion Yen) 33
Figure 4.2: Japan's social security expenditure and military expenditure (billion Yen) 34 Figure 4.3: Japan's social security expenditure and military expenditure
(as a percentage of GDP) 36
Figure 4.4: Japan's national defense budget (billion Yen) 37
Figure 4.5: China’s social security expenditure and military expenditure (billion Yuan) 40 Figure 4.6: China’s social security expenditure and military expenditure
(as a percentage of GDP) 41
Figure 4.7: China’s national defense budget (billion Yuan) 44
Figure 4.8: South Korea’s social security expenditure (OECD) and military
expenditure (billion Won) 47
Figure 4.9: South Korea’s social security expenditure and military expenditure
(as a percentage of GDP) 48
5 1. Introduction
Nowadays, there are several possible hot spots for military conflict in the world. East Asia is one of these regions. The three East Asian regional great powers1, China, Japan and South Korea2, have a troublesome history. Especially the Second World War, including the Japanese occupation of Korea and a large part of China, left deep scars in the collective memories of the Korean and Chinese peoples. Moreover, the war and in particular the U.S. peace treaty with Japan3 left the region with some unsettled territorial disputes. For instance, China and Japan quarrel about the sovereignty rights of the Senkaku/Diaoyu4 islands and South Korea and Japan both claim a group of small islands in the middle of the sea between South Korea and Japan. In Japan these islands are called Takeshima, while in South Korea the islands are known as Dokdo5. Furthermore, China and South Korea have territorial disputes about Socotra Rock6 and Baekdu Mountain7. The above mentioned shows that there are numerous
1 In this paper, a great power is a state which possess exceptional economic and military power. Military power
is an important part of a state’s power and this derives from the socio-economic ingredients of a nation. These include a state’s wealth and the size of a state’s population. I do not consider North-Korea to be a great power in East Asia. It has not the economic power nor the population to be considered a regional great power. These observations result in not using North-Korea in this paper.
(Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity (Oxford 2013), 78-80.).
2 South Korea is officially called the Republic of Korea (ROK). North Korea, officially called the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is the other country on the Korean Peninsula which claims to be the legitimate government of the whole peninsula. This paper will focus on South Korea.
3 This peace treaty from 1951/1952 is known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty and was the formal end of the
1941-1945 war between Japan and the Western Allies. Due to the fact that the U.S. determined the terms in this treaty, it is seen as a peace treaty solely designed by the U.S.. In addition, the Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty and the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Democratic People’s Republic Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) were not invited.
(United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty of Peace. 21 August 1952.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf.) (Accessed: May 25, 2015).
4
The islands are claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan and for that reason they are known by different names. In Japan they are called the Senkaku islands, in China they are known as the Diaoyu islands and in Taiwan they are called the Tiao Yu T’ai islands.
5
The English name for these islands is the Liancourt Rocks.
6 Socotra Rock is called Ieodo in Korean and Suyan Rock in Chinese. China, South Korea, North Korea and
Taiwan all claim that this reef falls under their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the last couple of years, there is much debate about this dispute due to the construction of a South Korean naval base on a close by island called Jeju.
(‘China’s next flashpoint?’, Steven Borowiec, March 22, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/chinas-next-flashpoint/1/.) (Accessed: May 23 and May 25, 2015).
7 Baekdu Mountain is situated at the border between North Korea and China. The Koreans call this area Gando
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disputes between the great powers of East Asia. These disputes have caused considerable tensions between the three countries in recent years. The rising level of tensions can escalate into a regional armed conflict one day.
The development and build-up of the military forces is, next to the debates between the three countries about territorial disputes, another important issue in East Asian relations. China’s military investments have been an important topic of discussion in the international community in recent years. China has become the second highest military spender behind the U.S.. The last couple of years there were defense spending increases of more than ten percent per year in China. For example in 2014, China’s defense spending rose 12,2% to 808.2 billion Yuan (about 132 billion Dollar) compared to the previous year.8 In 2015, China will boost its military spending by 10,1% to 886.9 billion Yuan (141.45 billion Dollar).9 Japan’s defense investments and developments also are in the news lately. In December 2013, the Abe administration adopted the first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) of Japan, changed the defense guidelines of 2010 with the new National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and raised Japan’s defense budget after a decade of cuts.10
This year, Japan announced its biggest defense budget ever, at 4.98 trillion Yen (42 billion Dollar).11 The third and last regional power of East Asia, South Korea, is increasing its defense budget as well. For this year, it is expected to rise by 4,9% from last year to 37.4 trillion Won (33.6 billion Dollar).12 Moreover, South Korea is planning to increase its defense spending by over 200 billion Dollar over the next five years.13 It seems that these military developments are part of the East Asian security dilemma. When one state enhances its own security by increasing its military capabilities, this decreases the security of the other states in East Asia. These threatened
(Sang Wook Daniel Han, ‘The Dispute over the legal status of Gando. A Reflection of Distorted Development of International Law in Northeast Asia’, Journal of the History of International Law Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), 211-228.)
8
‘China defense budget to increase 12.2% in 2014’, Xinhua, March 5, 2014.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014npcandcppcc/2014-03/05/content_17323159.htm. (Accessed: May 25, 2015).
9
‘China military budget ‘to rise 10%’, March 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-31706989. (Accessed: May 24 and May 25, 2015); ‘Confirmed: China’s Defense Budget Will Rise 10,1% in 2015’, Franz-Stefan Gady, March 5, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/confirmed-chinas-defense-budget-will-rise-10-1-in-2015/. (Accessed: May 24, 2015).
10
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, ‘Japan’s new approach to national security’, European Union Institute for Security
Studies 2 (2014), 1-4.
11 ‘Japan reveals record defense budget as tensions with China grow’, Justin McCurry, January 14, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/14/japan-reveals-record-defence-budget-as-tensions-with-china-grow. (Accessed: May 26, 2015).
12
‘S. Korea ups defense budget by 4.9 pct for next year’, December 3, 2014.
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141203000959. (Accessed: May 26, 2015).
13 ‘South Korea is planning a huge increase in defense spending’, Ankit Panda, April 22, 2015.
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states, in their case, will then increase their military capabilities to counterbalance this threat. This leads to security competition and more tensions between the regional powers of East Asia.14
Despite the military investments and the numerous tensions between the three nations, there has not been an armed conflict between the three East Asian powers since the end of the Korean War in 1953.15 A large part of this state of peace16 is ascribed to the involvement of the U.S. with this region. The U.S. are highly concerned with this region and they want to avoid that one state will dominate the region. Initially, this policy was aimed at containing the spread of communism, now it is primarily aimed at containing the rise of China.17 Furthermore, the U.S. has military alliances with South Korea and Japan wherein it guarantees Japan’s and South Korea’s security.18
In the last two decades, the absence of an armed conflict also is often ascribed to the growing economic interdependence between the three East Asian countries. A war between the countries of East Asia is presumed to be too costly for their economies and they gain more from trading than from fighting. Moreover, economic cooperation can enhance trust and confidence between the three nations.19 Nevertheless, there are still many tensions in the region that can lead to escalation. As mentioned above, there are several territorial disputes and historical grievances which can lead to rising nationalism and possible conflicts. Armed conflict is thus a possibility in this region.
A different, and often neglected way to look at East Asian security, is to focus on the ageing populations of the three East Asian regional powers. The three nations are ageing on an unprecedented scale. Seongho Sheen predicts that by 2030, Japan, South Korea and China will be too old for military rivalry. He concludes that the increases in social security spending
14
Dunne, Kurki and Smith, International Relations Theories, 77-80; ‘Solving the Northeast Security Dilemma’, Chen Jimin, May 10, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/solving-the-northeast-asia-security-dilemma/. (Accessed: May 26, 2015).
15
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. 27 May 2015.
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpregions.php?regionSelect=7-Eastern%20Asia. (Accessed: May 27, 2015).
16 This study uses the ‘negative peace’ definition. Consequently, peace in this study means the absence of war.
(Mikael Weissmann, The East Asian Peace. Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding (New York 2012), 39-43.)
17 Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), Azië in opmars: Strategische betekenis en gevolgen No. 86
(2013), 21-28.
18 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, ‘The U.S.-Japan Alliance’, Congressional Research Service
(2013), 1-2; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. relations with South Korea
(fact sheet), February 5, 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm. (Accessed: May 27 and May 28,
2015).
19 Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Khanna, ‘East Asia: Economic interdependence and regional security’, International
Affairs Vol. 73, No. 2 (1997), 219-234; Richard Katz, ‘Mutual assured production. Why trade will limit conflict
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due to ageing populations might limit the arms race between the three countries.20 Moreover, Mark Haas comes to the same conclusion in regard to global great power rivalry. He argues that rapidly ageing populations in the most powerful states in the international system will limit the rivalry between the U.S. and the other great powers.21 Although these inquiries are very interesting, this study is less interested in the future and more interested in the recent history. Therefore, this paper investigates the following question: to what extent has ageing contributed to peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War?
Although scholars have written about the importance of demographic factors to a state’s military and economic power, and about the consequences of ageing, there has been little to no literature on the connection between ageing populations and international security. There are some studies, but most of the time they focus on the future. This neglect is not difficult to explain, because only recently population growth and overpopulation have been surpassed by population ageing as the most important future demographic trend. Ten to twenty years ago there were concerns about considerable population growth in developing countries and there was only talk about ageing in the developed countries.22 This has changed in recent years as there came proof that not only the developed countries are ageing. Most of the developing countries also are ageing and they are ageing even faster than the developed countries do. Furthermore, ageing is taking place in every region in the world, it is a global phenomenon.23 Ageing is thus an important factor to pay attention to in international affairs.
This thesis investigates the relationship between ageing and security in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The timeframe, concerned with the post-Cold War era, has been chosen deliberately. There has not been any armed conflict, despite the high tensions, between the three East Asian regional powers in this period. Moreover, all three nations were ageing societies during this period24. East Asia is chosen because of the unprecedented fast ageing in this part of the world. Furthermore, East Asia has become a very important region in economic and political terms, while simultaneously it is an important subject in global affairs.
20 Seongho Sheen, ‘Northeast Asian’s Aging Population and Regional Security’, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 2
(2013), 292 and 317-18.
21 Mark L. Haas, ‘A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations’, International
Security Vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), 112-117.
22 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), The State of World Population 1999. 6 Billion: A Time for Choices
(New York 1999), 1-14; George Magnus, The Age of Ageing: How Demographics are Changing the Global
Economy and Our World (Singapore 2009), xvii.
23 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and HelpAge International, Ageing in the Twenty-First Century: A
Celebration and A Challenge (New York 2012), 12-33.
24 The United Nations defines a society as an ageing society when the elderly population (aged 65 and older)
exceeds 7% of the total population. A society is called aged or super-aged when the elderly make up at least 14% or 20% of the total population.
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The many territorial disputes and the divergent views on history have made this region a possible hotspot for conflict. While there are studies about ageing and studies about regional security in East Asia, there are no studies which combine these two variables.
10 2. On theory and methodology
Demographic change and demographic peace
This study is particularly influenced by the so-called ‘demographic peace thesis’. This thesis suggests that societies with rapidly growing populations and young age structures are most of the time poor, a burden for the environment and prone to civil violence, while those with slow or no population growth are more affluent and stable.25 As indicated in the remainder of this study, the three East Asian great powers have in the period after the Cold War become ageing societies (more than 7% of the population above 65 years of age), with a large number of elderly. The demographic peace thesis will be discussed in relation to the three countries, and it will be investigated if the increase of the number of elderly is a prerequisite for regional peace.
The demographic peace thesis derives from the demographic transition theory. The demographic transition occurs when a nation shifts from high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low fertility. This will lead to development and modernization. Eventually, these factors lead to stability and peace. Moreover, low mortality and low fertility lead to the ageing of the population. In countries which have completed the demographic transition, there are smaller proportions of children and larger proportions of older people (aged 60 and older) in the population.26 Most of these countries with mature age structures27 are full democracies.28
In the literature, there are debates about the usefulness of the demographic peace thesis. For example, Neil Howe and Richard Jackson disagree with the statement that nations which have completed or nearly completed the demographic transition are politically and socially more stable than nations which have not. They argue that the demographic transition is different in every country and that it is not certain that for example China and Russia will
25 Douglas A. Sylva and Susan Yoshihara, Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power Politics
(Washington 2012), 8.
26 All the advantages and disadvantages of ageing countries and young countries mentioned in this first section
are summed up in table 2.1 and table 2.2 at the end of this section.
27 A country has a mature age structure when 55% of the population is above age 30. These countries have
generally been the most stable, democratic and highly developed. 80% of the countries with mature age structures in the period 1970-1999 have been full democracies.
(Elizabeth Leahy, The shape of things to come. Why age structure matters to a safer, more equitable world (Washington 2007), 10.)
28
United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Ageing
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follow the same peaceful path as Japan or as most of the aged European countries did. Furthermore, they state that the transition process from a traditional to a modern society can be accompanied by social, cultural and economic turmoil. They conclude that the demographic peace thesis focuses too narrowly on state failure and too little on neo-authoritarian state success as a global threat.29 Jack Goldstone argues in this respect that demographic factors are only a part of the complex causal forces behind violent conflicts. He is of the opinion that economic development and regime type are the most important elements influencing the risks of conflict.30
Although Goldstone argues that other forces are also important in explaining violent conflict, he points out that demographic change is a vital part of this explanation. Other scholars, for example Elizabeth Leahy, Marcel Leroy and Richard P. Cincotta, agree with him.31 In this respect, much demographic change and security literature is about population pressure and (male) youth bulge. A general assumption in International Relations theories is that there will be poverty, famine, epidemics and aggressiveness due to strong population pressure.32 This population pressure is the consequence of rapid population growth. Eventually, the argument is that population pressure causes overpopulation, which will be an incentive for conquering territory and thus war.33 With regard to population pressure, the (male) youth is the most important part of the population. Many scholars argue that countries’ age structures matter for their security. Elizabeth Leahy concludes that very young and youthful age structures (ages 0 to 29 years) are the most likely to undermine countries’ development and security. During the 1990s, countries with a very young age structure were three times more likely to experience civil conflict34 than countries with a mature age structure. Moreover, between 1970 and 1990, 80% of all civil conflict occurred in countries in which 60% or more of the population was 30 years or younger.35 Richard P. Cincotta draws
29 Neil Howe and Richard Jackson, ‘Global Ageing and the Crisis of the 2020s’, CSIS (2011), 20-25. 30 Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict’,
Journal of International Affairs Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), 12.
31
Leahy, The shape of things to come., 20; Marcel Leroy, Population and World Politics. The interrelationships
between demographic factors and international relations (Leiden 1978), 53-95; Richard P. Cincotta, Robert
Engelman and Daniele Anastasion, The security demographic. Population and civil conflict after the Cold War (Washington 2003), 31.
32 Marcel Leroy, Population and World Politics., 55-57. 33
Ibidem.
34 Although the research of Elizabeth Leahy is about civil conflict, it still is useful in this study. Civil conflict can
easily turn into interstate conflict. Especially in today’s globalized world, where many countries are intertwined with each other, a civil conflict can spill over to other countries, and can have regional and global implications.
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the same conclusion. According to Cincotta, a youth bulge36 can be an asset for developed countries if the youth is educated and trained, while for developing countries it can be a social and political challenge due to limited economic opportunities. This can lead to frustration and conflict.37 China, Japan and South Korea lack such a (male) youth bulge. This study examines if the absence of a youth bulge is important for security in East Asia and if it was one of the reasons for East Asia’s stability in the period after the Cold War.
A country with a considerable number of elderly (aged 60 and older) is thus seen as more stable and peaceful as a country with a considerable number of youth. There are several explanations for this phenomenon in the literature. Some scholars argue that there are changes in the social mood of graying countries. These countries are expected to be more conservative and risk-averse.38 Paul H. Irving adds to this that older people have more experience and that they approach problems differently than younger people. He concludes that older people are better in conflict resolution than younger people, because they appreciate multiple perceptions, are willing to compromise and recognize the limits of knowledge.39 Moreover, as a consequence of ageing, smaller family size may make the public less willing to send its scarce youth to war. In the past, this was different due to the fact that if a son died in battle it could bring some solace when other brothers survived. Nowadays, due to small families, parents are unwilling (as they traditionally have been) to risk their only child in war.40 Peter G. Peterson summarizes these findings accurately: ‘An aging society may mean less innovation, less risk-taking, and more-conservative values. But it also may mean a wiser culture that is more protective of its assets, including its young people.’41 The three East Asian nations are also ageing rapidly and already are ageing societies. Arguments describing that ageing societies are more peaceful and stable will be investigated in relation to China, Japan and South Korea. It will help the study answer the question if ageing is an important variable in explaining the regional East Asian peace after the Cold War. Besides smaller families and changes in social mood, there are also other matters why ageing countries are
36 A youth bulge is a side effect of past population growth. A state has a youth bulge when it has a large
proportion of young people. When more than 40% of all adults are young people (aged 15-29), one defines this as a youth bulge.
(Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion, The security demographic., 42-43.)
37 Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion, The security demographic., 42-49.
38 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, ‘The graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st
Century (Mayor Findings of the Report)’ CSIS (2008), 4.
39
Paul H. Irving, The Upside of Ageing: How Long Life is Changing the World of Health, Work, Innovation,
Policy, and Purpose (New Jersey 2014), 12-14.
40 Peter G. Peterson, ‘The Shape of Things to Come: Global Ageing in the Twenty-first Century’, Journal of
International Affairs Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), 205.
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presumed to be peaceful. The economic and military matters of an ageing society are other important matters in relation to international security. These will be discussed at the end of this first section.
Gender and security
If one talks about youth bulge and security, the composition of the youth is an often cited matter. Christian G. Mesquida and Neil I. Wiener state that the abundance of young males is the most reliable factor in explaining the causes of conflict or war. War is often between young men and most of the time about material resources. There is an evolutionary part in their argument. Young, unmarried men want resources to attract women. These women want men with resources and this can lead to competition between men. Furthermore, young men have less to lose and more to win in comparison to older men (because normally, older men have more resources). According to Mesquida and Wiener, this can lead to risk taking and war. They conclude that changes in the relative numbers of young in societies men contribute significantly to the occurrence and severity of violent conflict.42 In addition, Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer investigated the relationship between high sex-ratio societies43 and security in Asia. Due to the preference of male children in China and India, there is a surplus of young men in these countries. For example in China, there is a surplus of around 20 million males. Calculations predict that this will rise to around 30 million in 2020. These men are the so-called ‘losers’ in society and are from the low socioeconomic class. Because of this, and due to the fierce competition for scarce marriage partners, they seek their satisfaction through violence and criminality. Hudson and Den Boer give three historical examples (two in China) were these ‘bare branches’ contributed to social conflict. Governments created offensive foreign policies to disperse these branches because they threatened the domestic stability. Their main conclusion is, similarly to Mesquida and Wiener, that a surplus of young men is dangerous for intra and international stability.44 It is interesting for this study to see that China has a surplus of men, while South Korea and Japan have not. Yet, despite China’s surplus of men, it has not resulted in conflict after the Cold War. The role of this surplus of men will be dealt with in relation to regional security.
42
Christian G. Mesquida and Neil I. Wiener, ‘Male Age Composition and Severity of Conflicts’, Politics and the
Life Sciences Vol. 18, No. 2 (1999), 181-189.
43 High sex-ratio societies are societies with significantly more men than women. 44
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International security and international affairs are often about men and less about women. This has changed in the last two decades. There are several studies (mainly in the U.S.) about women and international security/conflict, and most of the time these studies are about attitude differences between men and women in regard to international conflict. It is often argued that women are more caring and nurturing because of motherhood. This leads to other attitudes towards war and peace.45 Furthermore, in Lisa Togeby’s study about gender differences in foreign policy attitudes in Denmark of the 1980s, she found a gender gap46 in foreign policy attitudes. She concluded that women in Denmark were more peaceful, more afraid of violence and more caring and compassionate towards people in need outside their own country than men in Denmark. According to her, this was less due to the caring characteristic of women, but more owed to the left-wing political orientation of women.47 Mary Caprioli and Mark A. Boyer also state that women are more peaceful and less likely to support the use of violence. Their main conclusion in their research about the relationship between gender, violence and international crisis is that if there is a high level of gender equality in a society, this leads to more compromise in foreign policy and decreases the severity of violence in crises.48 On the other hand, Francis Fukuyama looks at the difference between men and women in world politics through a biological lens. According to Fukuyama, (young) men, due to hormones, are the aggressive part of society. Women are capable of channeling this male violence if there were more women in international politics. Women can achieve this by constraining aggressive male impulses through norms, laws and agreements. In addition, Fukuyama argues that this is possible in the near future due to the ageing of the population and with it the emergence of elderly women as one of the most important voting blocs. They can vote for female leaders who are less supportive of war and defense spending, and thus can channel male aggressiveness.49 Not all scholars agree with this gender gap in attitudes towards conflict, war and international security. Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner are of the opinion that gender is not an important factor in attitudes about international conflict.
45 David Fite, Marc Genest and Clyde Wilcox, ‘Gender Differences in Foreign Policy Attitudes. A Longitudinal
Analysis’, American Politics Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 4 (1990), 495-496.
46 The differences between men and women.
47 Lise Togeby, ‘The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes’, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 31, No. 4 (1994),
375, 388-390.
48 Mary Caprioli and Mark A. Boyer, ‘Gender, Violence, and International Crisis’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution Vol. 45, No. 4 (2001), 503, 509, 515-516.
49
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They conclude in their research about attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict that women are not less militaristic or more orientated towards diplomacy and compromise than men.50
Although gender is important in relation to international security, it will not be one of the main elements in this study. Gender will be used in the next section where the focus is on the ageing process of East Asia. Moreover, as mentioned above, gender will be discussed in section 5 when the study describes the regional security situation and the (lack of a) surplus of men in East Asia.
Power and capabilities
The size of a state’s population has always been important in international security. This is also the case in this study. One of the most dominant theories of International Relations, realism, asserts that an increase in population can lead to an increase in power.51 A country with a large population can, for instance, assemble a large army. Moreover, large populations have a large labour force which can increase economic growth. This economic growth increases a state’s wealth with which the state can acquire more military capabilities.52
In addition, Marcel Leroy agrees that absolute population size has positive consequences for the power position of states. He concludes that large populations have a greater domestic market and thus stimulate the creation of a variety of industries. This makes them less dependent on foreign nations and trade.53 Population growth and large populations are thus important factors regarding a state’s power. Ageing states have low or declining population growth and this can affect their amount of power in the international system. Shrinking youth cohorts in ageing societies result in less personnel for the army. This leads to smaller armies and less ability to fight conventional wars.54 Moreover, very talented individuals who can be technical experts in the army are considered valuable for an army. The digitalization of warfare requires technical experts and it is argued that the greater a country’s population, the greater the availability of technical expertise (of course good educational opportunities are also
50 Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner, ‘Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Exploring
Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East’, World Politics Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), 273.
51 Dunne, International Relations Theories., 78. 52
Ronald R. Krebs and Jack S. Levy, ‘Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict’ in: Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell, Demography and National Security (New York 2001), 64-76.
53 Leroy, Population and World Politics., 21-52. 54
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needed).55 In relation to technical experts, some scholars state that the better-paying private sector lures away the brightest that the military needs to command and operate a high-tech modern military.56 Realism also addresses the possibility of conflict between countries with different population growth rates. A larger or fast growing state may be more comfortable with war and war casualties due to a huge pool of manpower. On the other hand, a state with a small or declining population may be interested in striking preemptively to stop the larger state from changing the status quo in its favor.57 In East Asia we can possibly see this situation develop between South Korea and/or Japan towards China. In this case, Japan/South Korea may be anxious about the rise of China. These realistic assumptions in this section are important for this study. It leads to questions about the capacity of ageing states in East Asia to meet their security requirements. China is an exception, because it had, and still has, a large pool of eligible people for its army after the Cold War. Nevertheless, the size of a state’s demography is important for a state’s power and thus for the state’s ability to fight wars. Therefore, demography also can possibly be important for peace.
Although a lot of scholars agree with each other that demography is one important variable for a state´s power and international security, they also agree that it is not the only one or the most important one.58 This study agrees with this point of view. For instance, nowadays war is different than in the past. There are no large battles with large armies anymore. Besides manpower, an army can be very effective if it has high-tech weapons (or nuclear weapons). It is argued that in the last two decades there is a shift from manpower-intensive forces to capital-manpower-intensive forces.59 In addition, investments in human capital such as high level of training and experience, has become important in armies worldwide.60 For operating these advanced weapons, a high level of education is needed. Moreover, economic capabilities and thus money are required for a large and/or advanced army. These economic capabilities are difficult to produce in ageing societies because ageing can lead to a smaller labour force which can slowdown economic growth. Rising pension and healthcare costs are other matters which can influence a state’s capabilities in the international system. This will be dealt with in the last part of this section.
55 Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz and Julie E. Taylor, ‘Global Demographic Change and Its Implications for
Military Power’, RAND (2011), 89-95; Magnus, The Age of Ageing, 272.
56 Sylva and Yoshihara, Population Decline, 143. 57
Idem, 140-143.
58 Krebs and Levy, ‘Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict’, 64-69; Libicki, Shatz and
Taylor, ‘Global Demographic Change’, 2-3.
59
Nichiporuk, ‘The Security Dynamics’, 27-28.
17
Social spending versus military spending
Another important matter for this thesis is the effect of ageing populations on a state’s economy and in particular on the relationship between social and military spending. This is the case because it is argued that ageing societies have a negative impact on a state’s economy.61 Ageing societies have shrinking workforces because more people enter retirement than enter the labour market. This can slowdown a country’s economic growth and thus its gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, it is assumed that elderly are less willing to invest than younger people. This can have negative consequences for entrepreneurship and technological progress, and thus productivity.62
Ageing societies also lead to changes in the ratios between older and younger people in the population. There is a growing number of elderly and a declining number of working-age people in working-ageing societies. This increases the social burden of supporting the older part of the population. There is, so to say, a high old-age dependency in ageing countries. This means an increasing amount of government spending on pensions and medical costs. In most of the countries, current workers have to pay for the pensions of the retired elderly. These pay-as-you-go pension systems are not financially sustainable in ageing countries due to the increase in the number of elderly who are supported by fewer and fewer workers. The medical costs of an ageing country will rise because older people need more medical care than younger ones. Furthermore, the rapid rise of the old-old (aged 80/85 and over) means even more medical costs. All these factors contribute to pressures on a government’s budget. The governments need more money for the elderly and this has to come from some other parts of their budget. A logical consequence of higher demands for social services expenditure is the transferring of resources from other areas of the government’s budget (for example defense expenditure) or the abandoning of new major spending initiatives.63 It is not likely that ageing countries will utilize other ways, such as increased taxation, deficit spending and reductions in old age benefits, to pay for the expenditures required by ageing populations. These matters lead to much domestic opposition and negative economic consequences. Therefore, cuts in other government spending areas is the most probable option. Important for this study, these possible cuts in defense expenditure can make it more difficult for ageing societies to defend
61
Haas, ‘A Geriatric Peace?’, 117-119.
62 Richard Jackson, The Global Retirement Crisis: The Threat to World Stability and What to Do About It
(Washington 2002), 69-70; Peterson, ‘The Shape of Things to Come’, 202-203.
63
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themselves or to contribute to the defense of others. For some countries this can mean that they cannot meet their security commitments.64 Moreover, due to less available defense personnel in ageing societies, these societies often have invested much money in advanced new military systems. According to some, these ageing nations cannot continue to pay for these advanced systems due to demands for social expenditure on elderly. The argument is that these nations then will decrease their defense budget or seek for multinational cooperation to maintain their military capabilities.65 In this study, the article by Seongho Sheen about Northeast Asia’s ageing populations and regional security, is very important in this respect. This article asserts that increasing social security spending will lead to decreasing defense spending in East Asia.
In regard to the relationship between social and defense spending, the electoral clout of the elderly is important. In ageing societies, the number of elderly voters increases. Moreover, a graying of the median voter occurs in ageing societies. In some reports, there is clear evidence that an increase in the median age of the population, positively and significantly affects the retirement spending as a share of GDP. One of these reports, analyzing 30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-countries in the period 1980-2005, concludes that an increase in the age of the median voter of one year is associated with an increase of 0.25 percentage points in retirement spending relative to GDP.66 Therefore, the elderly can be a big voting power. Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse, in their research about the relationship of ageing on both the program size and the benefit generosity of public pension in 18 OECD countries, conclude that there is a positive relation between population ageing and the overall size of pension programs.67 The ‘elderly power’ is thus something a government has to take into account. Especially so, because voter participation rates generally rise with age and elderly are historically the most active voting group.68 A report about ageing in Great Britain states in this respect that in the past the state of a nation was defined by the youth, but this can change in the near future due to the increase in the elderly population.69 It is assumed that the elderly voting power and the increase of the elderly population will result in more government spending on social services and less on the
64 Libicki, Shatz and Taylor, ‘Global Demographic Change’, 79-81, 85. 65 Nichiporuk, ‘The Security Dynamics’, 28.
66 David Hollanders and Ferry Koster, ‘The graying of the median voter: Ageing and the politics of the welfare
state in OECD countries’, AIAS Working Paper 10-98 (2010), 7-10.
67
Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse, ‘Are Ageing OECD Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy? Evidence from 18 Democracies, 1980-2002’, Journal of Public Policy 29, 1 (2009), 1-6.
68 Jackson, The Global Retirement Crisis, 73. 69
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military. This means that it will be difficult for ageing countries to invest in their military capabilities. For elderly, social security is seen as more important than military security. As a result, decreasing military budgets are not seen as a problem in the eyes of the elderly. Their focus is much more on their own social security benefits.70 In this study, it will be investigated if the increase in the elder population in China, Japan and South Korea have resulted in more social security spending and less defense spending. In these three countries, the number of elderly has increased rapidly after the Cold War. These elderly have become a large voting group in these countries, and this study examines if this has consequences for the regional security situation in East Asia.
Methodology
This study uses the case study framework to answer the research question. The case, which is investigated in this study, is the relation between ageing and security in East Asia. East Asia is chosen deliberately due to the fact that it has not seen an armed conflict between the region’s three most important countries since 1953. These three countries are China, Japan and South Korea, and these are discussed separately in each section. The absence of war between these three nations has surprised many because as the introduction shows, there are many territorial disputes, tensions and historical grievances. This has resulted in nationalism and several incidents which make the region a possible hotspot for conflict. Furthermore, ageing, the most important variable in this study, is taking place on an unprecedented scale in these three states, especially since the 1990s.
The case study method is chosen because it is related to the historical method. This study focuses on the period after the Cold War and hopes to find an answer to the research question by analyzing this period. By using the East Asian case study, this study tries to generalize on the question: to what extant has ageing contributed to peace in East Asia after the Cold War. Furthermore, it is maybe possible to generalize beyond this case. Namely, East Asia is not the only region in the world which is ageing. Almost every country is ageing and this study can maybe shine light on other regions in relation to the relationship between ageing and security.
This study uses a mix of methods to investigate the relationship between ageing and security in East Asia. Literature research is one of the most important ones among these.
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Moreover, the study engages in text and statistical analyses from several different sources. Information from several ministries of China, Japan and South Korea are used. For instance, statistics about social and military expenditure are thoroughly investigated in this study. These data are also derived from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) statistics. In addition, statistics about the populations of the three countries from the latest U.N. numbers and papers are used. The analysis of (social) statistics is thus an important part of this paper. Furthermore, the study makes use of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are for instance treaties and government documents. The secondary sources used in this study are from different disciplines and about different subjects. One of the most important discipline for this study is demography. Sources about demography and ageing have provided an overview of the consequences and extent of ageing in the three East Asian states. Furthermore, sources about international and East Asian security helped explain the regional security environment in East Asia. Sources about politics and relations between the three East Asian nations were also important in this respect.
Table 2.1: Advantages
and disadvantages advantages disadvantages of an ageing country
(in relation to security)
Ageing country The most stable and peaceful countries in the world:
- For the most part full democracies - Reduced influence of youthful character
traits on foreign policy
- Reduced amount of money for war due to high cost of the elderly
Negative impact on a country’s economy:
- High pension and healthcare costs
- Shrinking workforce
- Low rate of economic growth - High old-age dependency Different social mood:
- Smaller family size, less willing to risk its scarce youth in war
- More risk-averse and peaceful - Better in conflict resolution
Due to high costs in other government areas, less money for defense
expenditure. Difficult to meet its security commitments
Reduced resource scarcity, so limited chance of conflict
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More women in society:
- Less aggressive, more peaceful - Less supportive for war/use of force
Diminished power position in the international system (see above mentioned disadvantages)
Table 2.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a young country (in relation to security)
advantages disadvantages
Young country A large number of young people. This can be an asset for developed countries if they are educated and technically trained
A large number of young people. This can be a social challenge for developing countries due to limited economic opportunities
Demographic bonus:
- Large and increasing workforce - Large pool of manpower for the army - High rate of economic growth - More entrepreneurship - Low dependency rate
Population pressure: - Resource scarcity
- Poverty, famine, epidemics and aggressiveness - Environmental degradation Prone to instability, violence and state failure
Increased power position in the international system (see above mentioned advantages)
Comprise for a large part out of young men:
- Aggressive part of the population (hormones) - Take risks for resources - Unable to marry (gangs,
22 3. Ageing in East Asia
Ageing is taking place globally, in both developing and developed countries. However, it is not taking place at the same pace. Some countries are ageing faster than others. Moreover, some countries are at the beginning of becoming an aged society, while others already are (mostly Western countries). A declining fertility and a decreasing old-age mortality results into ageing. This leads to a reduction in the proportion of children and an increase in the proportion of elderly. Moreover, life expectancy at birth has increased significantly globally. The numbers are impressive. From 1990 to 2013, the global share of older people increased from 9,2% to 11,7%. This share will grow in the future.71 In the last 10 years, the number of people aged 60 and above has grown with 178 million.72 In addition, the older people themselves are ageing. The old-old group (aged 80/85 and over) have been increasing faster than the older people as a whole. This global ageing trend has major social and economic consequences for countries. For instance, in some countries a large part of the elderly is living in poverty and the old-age support ratios73 are declining. In addition, as people live longer, they have got more chance to suffer from multiple diseases or disabilities. Besides social and economic consequences, this study will argue that ageing has political and military consequences. In the remainder of this section, an overview of the causes and extent of population ageing in East Asia will be discussed. Japan, China and South Korea are discussed in three separate parts.
Japan
Japan is known as the world’s most aged society. Ageing has a long history in Japan and the reasons for ageing are, similarly to other ageing societies, a declining fertility rate and a rising life expectancy. Japan is often seen as the frontrunner in the global graying process because it tops the global list of categories on ageing, fertility decline and population decline made by the United Nations. For example, Japan is currently the only country in the world with more
71 United Nations, World Population Ageing 2013, 3-15. 72
UNFPA and HelpAge, Ageing in the Twenty-First Century, 20.
73 The old-age support ratio measures how many people there are of working age (20-60/64), relative to the
number of older people/retired people (60/65+).
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than 30% of its population aged 60 and over.74 This was not always the case and it is interesting to look at the demographic path of Japan towards an ageing society. It shows that there can be big demographic changes in a short period of time. In 1945, Japan was younger than China, the U.S. and Western Europe. Its median age of 22.3 years in 1945 was younger than those of China, the U.S. and Western Europe.75 Nowadays, Japan is not the
Table 3.1: Population statistics Japan (medium variant)
1950 1990 2000 2010 2050
Total population (thousands) 82119 122249 125715 127353 108329 Population aged 60 and over (thousands) 6344 21269 29272 39085 46209 Population aged 60 and over (%) 7,7 17,4 23,3 30,7 42,7
Population aged 80 and over (thousands) 362 2872 4666 8086 16903
Population aged 80 and over (%) 0,4 2,3 3,7 6,3 15,6
Population change per year (thousands) 1238 447 253 -107 -606
Population growth rate (%) 1,45 0,36 0,20 -0,08 -0,55
Median age (years) 22.3 37.4 41.3 44.9 53.4
Working age population aged 15-59 (thousands) 46775 78591 78058 71347 48547 Old-age dependency ratio (age 60+/age 15-59) 8 17 25 36 72 Fertility rate (children per woman) 3.0 1.48 1.30 1.41 1.74 Life expectancy (both sexes, in years) 62.17 79.45 81.83 83.50 89.02 Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 Population sex ratio (males per 100 females) 96.0 96.2 95.7 95.0 93.7 Total female population (thousands) 41933 62306 64224 65318 55920 Total male population (thousands) 40267 59943 61490 62035 52409 (United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects:
The 2012 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.)
youngest anymore. Its median age is around 46.1 years (2014) and higher than every other country in the world.76 The ageing and high median age of Japan are mainly the result of a declining fertility rate. This results in relatively few births. A population needs a fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace itself and thus to maintain its population size.77 After the Second World War, as table 3.1 demonstrates, Japan only briefly was above this replacement rate. In the 1960s, Japan’s fertility rate went below the replacement rate where it still is today. Japan, as indicated in table 3.1, had a low fertility rate of 1.41 children per woman in 2010. This low fertility rate, one of the lowest in the world, has resulted in population decline in the
74 United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population
Prospects: The 2012 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 21, 2015).
75 Magnus, The Age of Ageing, 95.
76 CIA, The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html.
(Accessed: June 18-20, 2015).
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last three years. This means that more people died than were born. In 2014, the population fell by 268.000, while in 2013 the population shrunk by 244.000.78 It is argued that the Japanese population could drop to below 90 million by 205079, with over 40% being elderly, if this trend continues.80 As a consequence, as indicated in table 3.1, the working age population of Japan declined from 78,5 million in 1990 to 71,3 million in 2010. Table 3.1 shows that this trend will continue in the future. This trend can be resolved by letting immigrants into the country, but just as in Europe, immigration is a controversial issue in Japan. Japan has traditionally been an ethnically homogenous country with only 2% of the population being foreigners. It is estimated that as many as 650.000 immigrants per year are needed, if the fertility rate does not rise, to stop the shrinking of the population.81 The fact that the Japanese population have been ethnically homogenous traditionally will make it difficult to allow a large number of foreigners into the country. A large number of new immigrants will change Japan dramatically and many Japanese will probably not be ready for this.
The other important part of ageing is longevity. This also is the case in Japan where table 3.1 shows that life expectancy has grown from 62.2 years in 1950-1955 to 83.5 years in 2010-2015. This high life expectancy, one of the highest in the world, is mainly the result of high economic growth, advances in public health and medicine, and general improvements in the standard of living.82 As a result, more people survive to older ages. Especially in the case of Japan, this has resulted in a rapid growth of the old-old (aged 80/85 and over). The old-old in Japan, as indicated in table 3.1, have increased from 362.000 (or 0,4% of the total population) to more than 8.086.000 (or 6,4% of the total population) in sixty years. This part of the Japanese elderly will grow strongly in the future.83
The long lifespan and the low birthrate have resulted in the ageing of Japan. Japan’s process of ageing was very different in comparison to other ageing countries, it was much faster. While it took Western Europe on average 67 years to change from an ageing society
78
‘Japan’s Demographic Crisis: Any Way out?’, Ankit Panda, March 26, 2014.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/japans-demographic-crisis-any-way-out/. (Accessed: June 20, 2015); ‘Japan’s birth rate problem is way worse than anyone imagined’, Ana Swanson, January 6, 2015.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/japans-birth-rate-problem-is-way-worse-than-anyone-imagined/. (Accessed: June 21, 2015).
79 This is even lower than the UN statistics depicted in table 3.1.
80 ‘Japan desperate to tackle its ticking demographic time bomb’, David McNeill, March 22, 2014.
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/japan-desperate-to-tackle-its-ticking-demographic-time-bomb-1.1734316. (Accessed June 21, 2015).
81
Ibidem.
82 David R. Phillips, Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Policies and Future Trends (London 2000),
116-117; Suzanne Kunkel, Frank J. Whittington and Erdman B. Palmore, The International Handbook on Aging:
Current Research and Developments (Santa Barbara 2009), 321-329.
25
(more than 7% of the population above 65 years) to an aged society (more than 14% of the population above 65 years), Japan accomplished this in 24 years. In 1970 it became an ageing society, and it was an aged society in 1994. Furthermore, Japan became the first super-aged society in 2005 when more than 20% of the population comprised of elderly aged 65 and above. Thus, it took Japan 35 years in total to transform from an ageing society to a super-aged society. On the contrary, it took (for example Germany), and will take, Western Europe on average 110 years to accomplish this transformation.84
The future of Japan’s demographics are not looking bright. If there is no more immigration or a higher birthrate, which is likely, Japan depopulates. Furthermore, the median age increases significantly. Japan will have more and more elderly and less and less younger people to support them. Nowadays, there are already more people aged 60 and over (around 33%) than children aged 0-14 (around 13%).85 This gap only increases in the future. Especially in rural areas, the proportion of elderly will dominate the view. The old-age dependency ratio, as demonstrated in table 3.1, will grow even further. This already has and will have considerable social, economic and political consequences. In addition, it has consequences for Japan’s national security. This will be dealt with in the remainder of this study.
China
When one thinks about China, ageing is probably never an issue people link to China. China is known as the country with an enormous population and a never ending pool of (young) workers. Although it is true that China has an enormous population of 1.4 billion people86 (largest population in the world), the population is rapidly ageing (especially in rural areas). Nowadays, China’s proportion of elderly is growing faster than anywhere else in the world.
Similarly to Japan, ageing in China is due to mortality decline, longevity and fertility decline. However, the reason for China’s declining fertility rate is different due to the fact that it has less been a natural cause as it was in other countries. China’s family planning and in particular its one-child policy is causing China’s rapid ageing and declining birthrate. The one-child per couple policy was decreed in 1979 to stabilize the rapid population growth and
84
Sheen, ‘Northeast Asian’s Aging Population’, 296-298; Jason L. Powell, ‘The Power of Global Aging’,
Ageing International Vol. 35, No. 1 (2010), 7.
85 UN, World Population Prospects, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 22, 2015). 86
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to make an end to food and water shortages. China’s Communist Party imagined that this policy would improve individual prosperity.87 According to table 3.2, this policy had its effect. The fertility rate declined significantly from 3.01 in 1975-1980 to 1.66 in 2010-2015. This resulted in fewer births, a decreasing number of young people and a slowdown in population growth from 1,59% at the start of the one-child policy to 0,61% nowadays.88
Table 3.2: Population statistics China (medium variant)
1950 1990 2000 2010 2050
Total population (thousands) 543776 1165429 1280429 1359821 1384977 Population aged 60 and over (thousands) 40741 100759 128222 168938 454360 Population aged 60 and over (%) 7,5 8,6 10,0 12,4 32,8
Population aged 80 and over (thousands) 1528 9669 13484 19980 90425
Population aged 80 and over (%) 0,3 0,8 1,1 1,5 6,5 Population change per year (thousands) 11444 14420 7550 8353 -5822 Population growth rate (%) 2,00 1,20 0,58 0,61 -0,42
Median age (years) 23.7 24.8 29.6 34.6 46.3
Working age population aged 15-59 (thousands) 316551 723206 824473 944177 726429
Old age dependency ratio (age 60+/age 15-59) 7 9 10 11 39 Fertility rate (children per woman) 6.11 2.05 1.55 1.66 1.81 Life expectancy (both sexes, in years) 44.6 70.0 73.4 75.2 79.9
Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) 1.07 1.12 1.16 1.16 1.09
Population sex ratio (males per 100 females) 107.5 106.6 106.8 107.4 107.0 Total female population (thousands) 262001 564115 619061 655638 669197 Total male population (thousands) 281755 601314 661368 704183 715780
(United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.)
Besides these consequences, the one-child policy resulted in a relatively high sex ratio. This means that Chinese couples preferred baby boys instead of baby girls. As indicated in table 3.2, already in 1950 there was a preference for baby boys. Since then, the population sex ratio has been around 107, while the global average is 10489, which implies that there are 107 males per 100 women. Moreover, the sex ratio at birth has increased significantly from 1.07 in the period 1950-1980 to 1.1690 in the period 2010-2015. This means 116 baby boys for every 100 baby girls. What stands out is that the sex ratio at birth was stable before the one-child policy and increased rapidly after the implementation of this policy. The sex selection in China has resulted in a considerable gender imbalance. In 2015, there were more than 51 million more Chinese men than women. Furthermore, if one focuses on the youth group (aged
87 Sylva and Yoshihara, Population Decline, 159-160; ‘What is China’s one-child policy?’, Malcolm Moore,
October 30, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11197594/What-is-Chinas-one-child-policy.html. (Accessed: June 22, 2015).
88
UN, World Population Prospects, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 22, 2015).
89 Magnus, The Age of Ageing, 169.
90 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer assert that China’s sex ratio at birth could be as high as 1.31 in some
regions or provinces.
27
15-34) in China, there are around 20 million more young males than young women.91 As described in section 2, many of these males will be unable to find a bride. This can lead to social problems and possibly violent conflicts. The next sections of this study will deal with this Chinese problem.
Next to a declining fertility rate, China’s life expectancy increased significantly since the 1950s. Economic growth, and improved nutrition, healthcare and sanitation led to an increase in life expectancy from 44.6 years in 1950-1955 to 75.2 years in 2010-2015.92 Moreover, as indicated in table 3.2, the Chinese median age rose from 23.7 years in 1950 to more than 34.7 years today. Especially the last 20-25 years, the median age grew rapidly. In 1990 the median age was 24.8 and was thus not very different from the one in 1950 (23.7). Since then, the median age increased rapidly from 24.8 to around 36.0 in 2015.93 This is a remarkable growth in such a short period of time. China turned into an ageing country in 2001 and will be an aged country in 2026. This shows that the population is rapidly ageing in the last two decades. It will take China only 25 years to change in an aged country with 14% of the population aged 65 and above. Western Europe, in contrast to China, achieved this on average in 67 years. Moreover, China will change in a super-aged society 10 years after becoming an aged society.94 China is not only ageing fast, it is ageing at a much earlier stage, in contrast to other ageing states, of economic and social development. It is said that China will become the first nation to grow old before becoming rich (an advanced industrial state).95 In the near future, China will continue to age rapidly. Nowadays, due to the huge population, China already has the largest number of people aged 60 and over, and people 80 and over. Table 3.2 demonstrates that there are more than 160 million elderly over age 60 and more than 19 million over age 80 in China. This will only increase in the future. In addition, the proportion of elderly grows due to the coming of age of the people born during the Chinese baby boom periods in the 1950s and 1960s.96 China’s government has acknowledged the problems of ageing, but the speed and scope of the ageing process has surprised them. For
91 UN, World Population Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 22, 2015); Hudson
and Den Boer, ‘A Surplus of Men’, 11-12.
92 UN, World Population Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 22, 2015); Richard
Jackson, Keisuke Nakashima and Neil Howe, ‘China’s Long March to Retirement Reform: The Graying of the Middle Kingdom Revisited’, CSIS (2009), 8-9.
93 UN, World Population Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. (Accessed: June 22, 2015). 94
Sheen, ‘Northeast Asian’s Aging Population’, 296-298.
95 ‘China: Growing old before it can grow rich?’, Mukul Devichand, May 17, 2012.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-18091107. (Accessed: June 23, 2015); Haas, ‘A Geriatric Peace?’, 130.
