1. Introduction
In the examination of small firms and their strategic behaviour, the development of strategic alliances comes forth as an increasingly popular and successful strategy (Dodourova, 2009; Hagedoorn, 2002; Street & Cameron, 2007). ‘Strategic alliance’ is a broad term capturing many
1 Joshua Huisman
Student number: S2207605
E-mail: j.huisman.11@student.rug.nl Phone number: +31634347966
Corresponding address: Gasthuisstraat 45, 8331 JN Steenwijk
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Small Firms and Strategic Alliance Success – The Case of
Sleeptrade and the Physios
J. Huisman
1Info
Abstract
Date: 30/11/2016
Number of words: 15.442 Supervisor: E.P.M Croonen Master Thesis BA
This study contributes to the academic literature by studying factors of strategic alliance success for small firms instead of large firms. Based on the case study of Sleeptrade, a Dutch franchisor in the bed industry, four success factors are expected to be at the basis of strategic alliance success: 1) alliance competence, 2) idiosyncratic resources, 3) cooperation, and 4) legitimacy. They lead to strategic alliance success in terms of financial performance and satisfaction by offering either one or both alliance partners a competitive advantage. Following a resource-based perspective, these success factors are classified as alliance resources and are this way integrated in one model. In a context of small firms, owner-motivation was expected to influence the four alliance resources (or success factors): the more an owner-manager would strive for entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager), the more likely the owner-manager was to exploit alliance resources. The more an owner-manager would strive for lifestyle goals (craftsman manager), the less likely the owner-manager was to exploit alliance resources. In this case study, there was too little variance on owner-motivation to elaborate on this proposition. Future research may focus on this premise.
Keywords:
Strategic Alliances, Small Firms, Success Factors, Resource-based
forms of inter-firm cooperation that go beyond mere market transactions (Nooteboom, 1999). However, strategic alliances are not always successful in practice, that is, they do not always result in satisfaction of alliance partners and/or financial performance (Day, 1995; Galaskiewicz & Colman, 2006; Guttiérez et al., 2012; Harrigan, 1988). This can be due to factors of failure like mistrust, misunderstanding and power imbalance (Berger et al., 2004; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005). In overcoming factors of failure, knowledge of success factors can help ensure success for strategic alliances (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). This is important for managers of small firms2, because failure of strategic alliances might be devastating. Strategic alliance failure relates to business failure of small firms, which is in turn linked to great personal losses (Watson, 2007). This strikes the managerial interest of this topic.
Unfortunately, the current academic literature lacks knowledge of strategic alliance success for small firms (Barroso-Méndez et al., 2015; Street & Cameron, 2007). This far, these models are all based upon empirical data gathered among large firms (Doroudova, 2009). This means a model for strategic alliance success in a context of small firms is still missing in the academic literature. The lack of such a model is remarkable. First, because small (and medium) firms are the backbone of the European economy since they represent 99% of all the businesses in Europe. This information was adopted from Europa.eu on June 16th, 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/). Second, small firms have completely different characteristics and goals than large firms. Whereas large firms operate to maximize shareholder value, small firms operate in the owner-manager’s interest. Small firms are often more vulnerable for strategic alliance failure, because they do not possess an alliance portfolio and are more dependent on a strategic alliance (Street & Cameron, 2007). Bridge et al. say about this:
“Small firms are not just smaller versions of large firms, … and just as it is wrong to assume that small firms behave like large firms, it is also very wrong to assume that all small firms will behave identically.” (Bridge et al., 2012, p. 263)
Thus, not only are small firms different from large firms, but the group of small firms is also diverse itself. This may be due to different owner-motivations. Owner-managers may differ in motivation by striving for more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager) or lifestyle goals (lifestyle manager), as I will argue in the theoretical framework of this study. In conclusion,
there is a need for a model of strategic alliance success in a small firm context. Because the academic literature lacks such a model this far, in this study I make an attempt to build such a model. This way an academic gap will be filled and managers of small firms may take advantage of a comprehensive and applicable model that supports the improvement of strategic alliance success for small firms.
The model proposed in this research is partially based upon the model of Wittmann et al. (2009). In the current academic literature, factors of strategic alliance success for small firms are usually studied separately and from different theoretical perspective. Only a very little number of models for strategic alliance success combines (some) theoretical perspectives (Barroso-Méndez et al., 2015; Hoffman & Schlosser, 2001; Kogut, 1988). The model of Wittmann et al. (2009) is one of the few models that combines different theoretical perspectives (Barroso-Méndez et al., 2015). Therefore, the Wittmann model is chosen as starting point for the theoretical framework of this study.
The success factors that Wittmann et al. propose are alliance competences, idiosyncratic resources and cooperation. I will explain how these success factors, all classified as alliance resources, come forth through different theoretical perspectives in the theoretical framework of this study. Whereas Wittmann et al. (2009) describe their proposed success factors in an intuitively appealing manner, they sometimes lack consistency and accuracy in their arguments. I try to systematically link the success factors to a competitive advantage, that in turn leads to a superior financial performance and satisfaction, to provide for a sound model. Note, that both the Wittmann model and the model in this study, are constructed from a commercial point of view. This means, that the purpose of the strategic alliance is to generate profits (Barroso-Méndez et al., 2015).
network of entrepreneurs with dyadic relationships which are considered as ‘embedded units’ (cf. Yin, 1994). In section 4, the case of Sleeptrade BV will be discussed more extensively. In this section, I will also introduce two phases of conducting the research. Phase 1 contains a quantitative approach that is used to explore patterns in the overall data and select strategic alliance for the second phase. Phase 2 contains a qualitative approach with in-depth interviews to elaborate on the theoretical framework. In section 5, I address the results of Phase 1. In section 6, I address the results of Phase 2. This study ends with a discussion in section 7 in which I discuss conclusions, limitations and directions for future research.
2. Theoretical background
As described earlier, there are different theoretical perspectives in the academic literature that explain strategic alliances and strategic alliance success. These theoretical perspectives will be outlined in this theoretical framework, because each one brings forward a set of factors for strategic alliance success. As I will argue, there is only one theoretical perspective that integrates other perspectives in one model: that is the resource-based perspective (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Hunt, 2002; Lambe et al., 2002; Wittmann et al., 2009). Not only is the resource-based perspective important for integrative purposes, it is also useful for the model in this study because it seems to fit small firms very well by being intuitively appealing and practically attractive (Rangone, 1999). Because the resource-based perspective is key in this study, a brief explanation is needed. From the resource-based perspective, a firm is seen as a set of resources. Resources include all assets, capabilities, processes, information, knowledge, attributes, etc. controlled by a firm (Barney, 1991). Resources are ought to bring the firm a competitive advantage. Resources bring the firm a competitive advantage if they are: 1) inimitable, 2) non-substitutable, 3) immobile, and/or 4) not easy to surpass by innovation (Hunt, 2000; Wittmann et al., 2009). If resources meet these criteria, the resource contributes unique value to the performance of a firm that cannot be obtained by competitors. This means the firm has an advantage over its competitors which offers a firm superior profit (Barney, 1991; 1996; Hoffmann & Schlosser, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).
1990). Through strategic alliances, firms can benefit from access to new technologies, new markets, wider range of products/services, economies of scale, knowledge, risk sharing and skills (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell, 1990). These are all examples of resources a firm may obtain from strategic alliances. If alliance partners integrate resources, a synergistic effect may occur that leads to more value than the sum of the separate resources (Das & Teng, 2000). The resources that a firm can obtain from strategic alliances are called alliance
resources. “An alliance resource consists of any tangible or intangible entity available to the
parties that enables the alliance to produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some market segment(s)” (Wittmann et al., 2009, p. 11). This means an alliance resource can either be valuable to both alliance partners or only one. From the resource-based perspective, alliance resources lead to superior profits if they offer the firm a competitive advantage. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and forms the central premise of this theoretical framework. Therefore, we will now take a closer look at this relationship.
3. Theoretical framework
3.1 Strategic alliance success
From its definition, alliance resources bring the firm an advantage in performance through effectiveness and/or efficiency (Hunt & Morgan, 1995; Hunt, 2000; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995). An efficiency advantage appears when resources of a firm or strategic alliance bring the same or relative similar value to customers at lower costs than competitors. An effectiveness advantage appears when the resources of a firm or strategic alliance bring more value to customers at the same or relative similar costs level as competitors. If the alliance resource meets the four criteria of being 1) inimitable, 2) non-substitutable, 3) immobile, and/or 4) not easy to surpass by innovation, then it offers the firm a competitive advantage. An effectiveness and/or efficiency advantage results in firms being more profitable than competitors because competitors cannot obtain these advantages in their performance (Barney, 1991; Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, & Fahy, 1993; Day & Wensley, 1988; Wittmann et al, 2009).
one could measure to what extent these goals are achieved and determine the degree of strategic alliance success. Because goals can differ among strategic alliances, it is important to consider whether a definition of strategic alliance success fits the purposes of a strategic alliance.
As to this study, the definition of strategic alliance success should fit the purposes of the theoretical framework. Because the theoretical framework is developed from a commercial point of view, financial performance is a proper objective indicator for measuring strategic alliance success (Wittmann et al., 2009). Financial performance means there are financial benefits for either one or both alliance partners strictly due to the strategic alliance. However, the single use of financial performance suggests that if pre-determined financial goals are not met, the strategic alliance is unsuccessful. This is not necessarily the case. If both parties are satisfied with the strategic alliance, then we can state that the outcome of the strategic alliance is somehow beneficial or put differently, successful. This might be because implicit goals are unconsciously achieved. Implicit goals may emerge due to new insights or learning over time within the strategic alliance. Goal achievement and satisfaction seem to be strongly related to each other (e.g. Locke et al., 1970), and Narus and Anderson (1990) found effectiveness to be linked to satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction can be interpreted as a certain level of strategic alliance success too. In conclusion, both financial performance and satisfaction seem to be proper indicators of strategic alliance success for this study. Combined they offer a more complete indication of strategic alliance success.
This leads to the first proposition:
P1: Alliance resources that are inimitable, non-substitutable, immobile, and not
easy to surpass offer a firm a competitive advantage, which in turn leads to strategic alliance success in terms of financial performance and satisfaction for either one or both alliance partners.
In conclusion, strategic alliance success can be achieved from alliance resources. This is explained in two steps. 1) By definition, an alliance resource should contribute to effectiveness and/or efficiency for one or both alliance partners. Otherwise, the resource is not qualified as alliance resource. 2) An alliance resource that meets the four criteria of being inimitable, non-substitutable, immobile, and not easy to surpass, offers one or both alliance partners a competitive advantage. As argued before, a competitive advantage leads to strategic alliance success.
3.2 Alliance competences
Alliance competences are the first success factor that Wittmann et al. (2009) propose. It follows from the competence perspective, which is an extension of the resource-based perspective (Lado et al., 1992; Newbert, 2008). According to the competence perspective, it is not just resources, but competences that are key to success (Lado et al., 1992; Sanchez, Heene, & Thomas, 1996). This is because competences make it possible to exploit resources. As to strategic alliances, a firm needs the competences to identify and integrate resources of the alliance partner to achieve success (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007). For this matter, Lambe et al. identify three facets of competences that contribute to strategic alliance success: experience-based knowledge, manager development capability, and partner identification propensity (2002). Following this, an alliance competence is defined as an ability for finding, developing and managing a strategic alliance (Lambe et al., 2002).
For integrative purposes, following a resource-based perspective, an alliance competence can be classified as a ‘higher order resource’ (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Hunt, 2000; Lambe et al., 2002; Wittmann et al., 2009). Higher order resources are socially complex, interconnected resource combinations of tangible and intangible resources (Wittmann et al., 2009). Because alliance competences are socially complex and formed by interconnected resources, it fits this definition. By classifying an alliance competence as resource, it can be integrated in the theoretical framework. However, to be relevant to the theoretical framework, alliance competences should offer a firm a competitive advantage.
An alliance competence does offer firms a competitive advantage, because alliance competences are tacit, contain unique knowledge which is firm-specific, and are developed by experience during a time-consuming process (Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2006; Wittmann et al., 2009). This makes it hard for competitors to obtain the same advantages. Therefore, it offers a competitive advantage to firms in a strategic alliance for which the strategic alliance may achieve success (see Figure 2). This brings us to the second proposition:
P2: Alliance competences offer a firm a competitive advantage.
3.3 Idiosyncratic resources
Idiosyncratic resources are the second success factor that Wittmann et al. (2009) propose. Idiosyncratic resources are those that are newly created within a strategic alliance. Idiosyncratic resources are unique to the strategic alliance, and may be developed during the lifetime of a strategic alliance or emerge through a combination of both firm’s resources. As for idiosyncratic resources that develop, relation-specific investments are needed. As for combining both firm’s resources, it is important to note that not every resource of the alliance partner is useful to the strategic alliance. Some resources may be overlapping and some may be nonoverlapping (Das & Teng, 2000). This leads to the following classification: resources that are overlapping and not useful are called surplus, resources that are overlapping and useful are called
supplementary, resources that are nonoverlapping and not useful are called wasteful, and
resources that are nonoverlapping and useful are called complementary. It is the complementary resources that may form idiosyncratic resources if they are combined in the right way. These are not alliance resources. That is when resources are idiosyncratic.
Idiosyncratic resources can produce a synergistic effect for which more value is created than simply the sum of single resources that firms obtain (Das & Teng, 2000; Jap, 1999). This means, if more value is created by idiosyncratic resources than by a firm’s resources individually, an effectiveness advantage is achieved. An efficiency advantage is achieved, because idiosyncratic resource need relation-specific investments. Relation-specific investments are costly since they are sunk and ‘unredeployable assets’ (Palmatier et al., 2007). Therefore, idiosyncratic resources show the intent of the alliance partner, and reduce the chances of opportunism and switching to new partners. This way, monitoring and safeguarding costs become lower which makes strategic alliances more efficient in their operations (Palmatier et al., 2007). Finally, idiosyncratic resources show the willingness to maintain the relationship (Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001; Palmatier et al., 2007). In conclusion, idiosyncratic resources offer both effectiveness and efficiency advantages for which they can be classified as alliance resources.
Importantly, idiosyncratic resources are proposed to lead to a competitive advantage for the firm (see Figure 2). This is because idiosyncratic resources have little or no value outside the partnership and are hard to imitate, immobile and non-substitutable (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Hunt, 2001; Wilson, 1995). This brings us to the following proposition:
3.4 Cooperation and relational factors
Cooperation is the third success factor that Wittmann et al. (2009) propose. Cooperation is the voluntary coordination of actions that benefits individual and mutual goals (Smith & Barclay, 1999; Wittmann et al., 2009). By definition, superior levels of cooperation are associated with higher levels of strategic alliance success. After all, strategic alliance success is determined upon the achievement of goals whereas cooperation benefits the achievement of goals (Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995). If goals can be achieved in a superior way, efficiency and/or effectiveness increase. The degree of cooperation depends on three relational factors: communication, trust and commitment (Anderson & Narus, 1998; Crespin-Mazet & Ghauri, 2007; Leonidou, Barnes, & Talias, 2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wittmann et al., 2009). As I will explain, all these relational factors benefit goal achievement by improving efficiency and/or effectiveness.
The first relational factor is communication. This is defined as the sharing of formal and informal information between alliance partners (Wittmann et al., 2009). Mohr and Spekman (1994) argue that being knowledgeable, which occurs through communication, allows alliance partners to complete tasks more efficiently. Wittmann et al. (2009) argue that communication is a mechanism for aligning expectations and conflict resolution. This would increase the efficiency by reducing monitoring costs and prevent the strategic alliance from destructive conflicts. They also state that communication is a mechanism for developing value creating strategies. If strategic alliances achieve superior value, strategic alliances perceive an increased effectiveness. In conclusion, communication offers strategic alliances both superior efficiency and superior effectiveness.
The second relational factor is trust. Trust is the confidence a firm has in its alliance partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Trust contributes to efficiency, because it functions as a reducing heuristic for uncertainty and ambiguity (Heide & John, 1992). Heuristics lower monitoring and safeguarding costs. This means that trust makes strategic alliances more efficient. From a commitment-trust perspective, it is argued that trust leads to higher levels of cooperation, because trust facilitates a positive learning effect (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Lancastre & Lages, 2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). A learning effect means the same value can be crated at lower costs. Therefore, trust increases efficiency of a strategic alliance. In conclusion, trust offers superior efficiency to strategic alliances.
1984; Lancastre & Lages, 2006). Reducing opportunism is important because of the destructive character of opportunism. If this is reduced, commitment makes strategic alliances more efficient.
In conclusion, communication, trust and commitment increase the likelihood of positive acting of alliance partners and function as heuristic which decreases the costs of monitoring, safeguarding and destructive action in a strategic alliance (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Hibbard et al., 2001; Palmatier et al., 2007). Altogether, they structure the exchange in strategic alliances. In general, cooperation makes the strategic alliance more efficient, because it functions as a smoothening mechanism for the operation of the strategic alliance which makes it possible for alliance partners to operate more efficiently (Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Due to its social complexity, cooperation can be classified as higher order resource for which it fits in this theoretical framework. Moreover, the superior efficiency and effectiveness offer a competitive advantage. This is because communication, trust and commitment develop over time, once established they are hard to imitate. Therefore, they contribute to cooperation giving the strategic alliance a competitive advantage. In addition, it takes time to develop during a strategic alliance (Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995). Due to its development over time, cooperation is hard to imitate (Hunt, 2000; Madhok & Tallman, 2000; Palmatier et al., 2007).
P4: Cooperation, that emerges with higher levels of communication, commitment
and trust, leads to a competitive advantage.
3.5 Legitimacy
The success factors alliance competence, idiosyncratic resources and cooperation are all suggested by Wittmann et al. (2009). Although their model includes several theoretical perspectives, it does not recognize the fact that firms are socially embedded (Nooteboom, 1994). Social embeddedness means that firms are influenced by social contexts. So far, all success factors apply within the strategic alliance and do not refer to factors outside the alliance. Therefore, I suggest an expansion of the model.
2007). This is the process of legitimation. Legitimacy is the generalized perception that justifies a firm’s action by validation and recognition (Dacin et al., 2007; Suchmann, 1995). For institutionalists, successful firms are those that gain legitimacy of stakeholders. Firms can do so by conforming to social pressures (Oliver, 1997). Firms that gain legitimacy, receive technical benefits such as access to resources, skills and markets. Firms that lack legitimacy suffer from a lack of access to resources, skills, and markets (Dacin et al., 2007).
An important question now is: how does legitimacy fit in the model of this study? The answer is quite simple. Legitimacy can be classified as a higher order resource (Oliver, 1997; Rao & Ruekert, 1999). Due to its social complexity legitimacy is rare, difficult to imitate, and difficult to trade (immobile) (Amit & Schoenmaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Rao, 1994). This means legitimacy is eminently able to provide for a competitive advantage which ultimately leads to success. This way it fits the resource-based perspective. The remaining question is how legitimacy relates to strategic alliances.
Strategic alliances may increase legitimacy (Dacin et al., 2007; Oliver, 1997). According to Dacin et al. (2007), legitimacy may provide firms with access to technology, resources and markets. Strategic alliances may increase this legitimacy. Strategic alliances may do so through reputation and status, because reputation and status spread signals that influence the social justification process (Dacin et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2008). Positive reputation signals and status symbols create a positive generalized perception for which a firm or strategic alliance may gain legitimacy that makes the firm or strategic alliance ultimately more successful (Rao et al., 2008).
superior value or if they reduce costs while producing the same value. They may offer both efficiency and effectiveness advantages. The third possibility means that the strategic alliance as a whole gains legitimacy. For example, in this situation alliance partners may benefit from first-mover advantages with their strategic alliance (Dacin et al., 2007). A first-mover advantage implies superior value creation for which an effectiveness advantage can be achieved. The first two possibilities increase efficiency whereas the third possibility directly increases alliance performance. So, it is argued that legitimacy for strategic alliances in three different forms increases strategic alliance success through reputation and status.
This brings us to the fifth propositions:
P5: Legitimacy leads to a competitive advantage.
3.6 How is this model different for small firms than for large firms?
The remaining question now is: How is this model different for small firms than for large firms? For alliance competences and idiosyncratic resources, Wittmann et al. (2009) argue that top management support has a positive effect on alliance competences, because top management teams are expected to be more committed to strategic alliances and have the experience that facilitates competences (2009). However, top management teams are typically in charge of large firms, whereas small firms are usually managed by the owner, so called owner-managers. Managers of large firms are usually motivated by the goal to maximize shareholder value. However, owner-managers can have many different motivations for running their small firm (Brush & Chaganti, 1999). (Nooteboom, 1994; Storey & Greene, 2010). Different motivations may lead to different outcomes, so instead of focusing on a top management team as the Wittmann model does, the model for small firms in this study focuses on the owner-manager.
For this matter, owner-managers can be distinguished in two entrepreneurial types:
craftsmen and opportunists (Lorraine & Dussault, 1987; Smith, 1967; Smith & Miner, 1983;
As a consequence, craftsmen are unlikely to join strategic alliances whereas opportunists actually are (Woo et al., 1991). Therefore, craftsmen are expected to have less alliance experience than opportunists. Following the argument of Wittmann et al. (2009), it is expected that craftsmen develop less alliance competences. In addition, craftsmen have goals that do not align with alliance goals. Following the definition of success in this study, strategic alliances strive for financial performance. Financial gains are not something craftsmen strive for. The incongruence of individual and alliance goals causes less commitment for which alliance competences will be less developed (Wittmann et al., 2009). This brings us to the following proposition:
P6a: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
are more likely to possess and develop alliance competences.
For idiosyncratic resources, craftsmen managers are expected to be less likely to make relation specific investments than opportunist managers due to investment risks that are involved (Palmatier et al., 2007; Woo et al., 1991). In addition, they are expected not to invest in their firm more than needed since they use their earned money for their own living (Woo et al., 1991). This brings us to the following proposition:
P6b: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
are more likely to develop idiosyncratic resources.
Communication served as a mechanism for developing strategies. According to the entrepreneurial typologies, it is the opportunist that develops and implements strategies. Therefore, opportunist managers are more likely to communicate well. Trust increases the willingness to cooperate, but according to the entrepreneurial typology this willingness is higher for opportunists than for craftsmen. This means the effect of trust on cooperation is weaker for a craftsman. Finally, commitment should balance goals. As we have already seen, there is incongruence between the goals of a craftsman and a strategic alliance. Therefore, the following propositions are expected:
P6c: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
P6d: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
are more likely to trust each other.
P6e: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
are more likely to be committed.
As I have argued, craftsmen do not develop alliance competences as opportunist managers do (Woo et al., 1991). This means craftsmen are not able to exploit the resources of alliance partners. With this argument in mind, craftsmen are less likely to exploit legitimacy as a resource from an alliance partner than opportunist managers are.
P6f: Owner-managers with more entrepreneurial goals (opportunist manager),
are more likely to exploit legitimacy.
4. Methodology
4.1 Unit of analysis
The theoretical framework of this study, is elaborated on with a case study. The case of Sleeptrade BV, from now on to be called Sleeptrade, was selected for this study. Sleeptrade is franchisor of a retail formula in the bed industry. The researcher has connections with the CEO of Sleeptrade, because the researcher’s father is one of the founders of Sleeptrade. This connection made it possible to gain unique access to the network of Sleeptrade.
in its market. However, Sleeptrade and its formula Beddenspecialist.nl has been growing over the past four years ever since its establishment.
Two years ago, a platform called SlaapFysio (literally translated: SleepPhysio) was developed by Sleeptrade. Ever since its establishment, the platform provides for a body of principles on improving people’s sleeping situations. It is created to connect Beddenspecialist retailers with physios. Per Beddenspecialist retailer it was possible to engage in more than one strategic alliance. Sleeptrade has hired a physiotherapist who specializes in sleeping behaviour and sleeping positions. The physiotherapist has become a key player in the development of the platform by connecting several Beddenspecialist retailers with local physios. This way, strategic alliances between Beddenspecialist retailers and physios have emerged. The aim of the strategic alliances is to help patients to improve their sleeping situations. This can be done by integrating the SlaapID service in the physio’s treatment. Physical complaints should be relieved by improving a patients’ sleeping situation, eventually with products of the attached Beddenspecialist retailer. This means the physio should lead the patients to the Beddenspecialist retailer. Physios are financially rewarded if their leads end up with sales at Beddenspecialist stores.
The case of Sleeptrade seems particularly appropriate for the purposes of this study, since a mixture of craftsmen and opportunists can be expected. This is because physios are
expected to be focused at exercising their profession rather than focused on profit maximizing. The Beddenspecialist retailers are expected to possess a more ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ for which they would be focused on profit maximizing. This makes it possible to elaborate on the propositions of the framework. To be clear, both Beddenspecialist retailers and physios participated in this research.
In conclusion, this case study is concerned with a company called Sleeptrade. This company owns a retail formula that is exploited by independent entrepreneurs through a franchise system. Sleeptrade developed a platform called SlaapFysio. Via this platform, each Beddenspecialist retailer (physio) is connected to a local physio (see Figure 3). This means several strategic alliances exist within this network of Dutch entrepreneurs (within dotted lines in Figure 3). Each strategic alliance is considered an embedded unit. The strategic alliances are the unit of analysis in this study. All information in this paragraph was based upon confidential documents of Sleeptrade about the setup of platform SlaapFysio and exploring talks with the CEO of Sleeptrade.
4.2 Research phase 1
This research was divided in two phases (see Figure 4): a quantitative and qualitative one. By using both approaches it was possible to provide for a stronger substantiation of constructs and propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is because quantitative data makes it possible to compare constructs (Jick, 1997), whereas qualitative data collection makes it possible to explore and elaborate on the theoretical propositions (Yin, 1994). The method of research phase 1 will now be explained. The method of research phase 2 follows in section 4.3.
4.2.1 Phase 1: A quantitative approach
group of Beddenspecialist retailers. An additional advantage of the quantitative data collection was that future research may benefit from the provision of the quantitative scales.
The choice for an online survey was justified by the fact that this was the most cost-efficient way of collecting data (especially in terms of time). This way, I could reach the entire range of respondents at once and I had administrative advantages because online data could be easily transferred to the output files needed. The respondents were all working people so usually their age would vary between 18 and 65. Based on this, I expected them to be able to make use of a computer, and/or mobile device. Of course, surveys in general have some disadvantages too. One of them being the validity of answers. Respondents might not understand questions the way they are intended to. Also, a respondent may not feel comfortable answering certain questions or a respondent may feel bored. With the use of in-depth interviews in phase 2, these problems do not exist. Therefore, a combination of approaches and data was very fruitful. 4.2.2 Phase 1: Data collection
The online survey was configured via Qualtrics. Via e-mail (mail addresses were made available by Sleeptrade) each respondent was invited to participate in this study. In the invitation, I introduced myself and I stressed the importance and their benefit of participating. The latter being the opportunity to influence and shape the strategic alliance. Every Beddenspecialist retailer and physio received a unique link and by entering a password they gained access to the online survey. It was possible to fill in the survey online on desktop as well as on mobile phone and tablet. First, the respondent was asked to fill in his or her name and the name of one alliance partner so that the alliance partners could be linked afterwards for dyadic purposes. The survey started with a few background questions, followed by the scales for each variable. The respondent could easily select the scores by a simple click. Every variable was introduced to the respondent with a definition and/or short explanation before they answered each question. This was done to get a mutual understanding of concepts. This increases the validity of results, because this way you ensure that you measure what you want to measure. At the end of each scale (presented on one internet page), I provided unlimited open space in which
Figure 4. Research phases.
each respondent could write anything he or she wanted. This way, I could get a deeper understanding of the strategic alliance and the respondent was given the feeling that it was possible to spill every information he or she wanted to. A pilot survey was taken by the researcher himself, his father, the CEO of Sleeptrade, the physiotherapist of Sleeptrade and the supervisor of this Thesis. Based on the experiences during the pilot, some questions were reformulated into easier questions. The data was collected during a period of 5 weeks. During those 5 weeks, a total of three reminders were sent to every respondent that did not took the survey yet. The average time the respondents spent on taking the survey was about 15 hours. This average time was skewed because a few respondents did not take the survey at once, but spread their answering process over more than one day (a maximum of 5 days and 4 hours). 4.2.3 Phase 1: Measurements
The variables financial performance, competitive advantage, alliance competence, idiosyncratic resource, cooperation, communication, trust and commitment are all based upon the model of Wittmann et al. (2009). Except for legitimacy and satisfaction, all variables were based upon validated, reflective scales. Legitimacy was the success factor I added in the theoretical framework, just as I added satisfaction as an extra indicator for strategic alliance success. For legitimacy, I was not able to find accurate measurements. Therefore, I developed a scale myself. It consisted of 10 items. It showed very good internal validity (α=.822). Like for all scales in this study, respondents made their ratings on a 5-point scale with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 being ‘strongly agree’. Only for satisfaction, I added one rating item on a 10-point scale with 1 being ‘maximally dissatisfied’ and 10 being maximally satisfied’. As for all variables, these statistics are showed in Table 1 (see Appendix A for all survey questions).
Concept Set of values Rating Items Reliability Questions Financial performance (Lambe et al., 2002) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 10 α=910 16.2-16.12 Satisfaction (own item) Maximally dissatisfied – maximally satisfied (1-10) 1 - 17.2 Competitive Advantage (Jap, 1999) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 8 α=.896 12.2-12.9 Alliance competence (Lambe et al., 2002) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 3 α=.609 5.2-5.4 Idiosyncratic Resources (Lambe et al., 2002) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 5 α=.715 6.2-6.6 Cooperation (Cannon & Perreault, 1999) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 7 α=.810 11.2-11.8 Legitimacy (own scale) Strongly disagree – strongly agree (1-5) 10 α=.822 14.2-14.11 Owner Motivation (Walker & Brown, 2004)
Strongly disagree – strongly agree
(1-5) 11 α=.660 13.2-13.12
Commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994)
Strongly disagree – strongly agree
(1-5) 8 α=.709 8.2-8.9
Trust
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994)
Strongly disagree – strongly agree
(1-5) 8 α=.905 9.2-9.9
Communication (Morgan & Hunt, 1994)
Strongly disagree – strongly agree
(1-5) 6 α=.895 10.2-10.7
is more important than making money”.
All scales were adjusted for dyadic purposes. For example, the question “Together we
generated a lot of profit with this strategic alliance” was split into “I generated a lot of profit with this strategic alliance” and “The alliance partner generated a lot of profit with this strategic alliance partner”. This was done for every question possible in the online survey.
The internal validity of idiosyncratic resources and commitment was good (α≥.7). The internal validity of legitimacy and cooperation was very good (α≥.8) and financial performance, competitive advantage, trust and communication were even considered excellent (α≥.9). The internal validity of two scales was below .7. This was the case for alliance competence (α=.609) and owner motivation (α=.660). Although some researchers argue that a scale between .6 and .7 can be reliable, a score below .7 is questionable (Nunnally, 1978). Because this study does not include statistical analyses, I calculated the scales anyway. However, future research might want to look for other scales to measure alliance competence and owner motivation.
Based on the internal validity analyses, no items were deleted from the scales. For a few variables, the Cronbach’s Alpha would increase with .01 or at maximum .02. However, deletion would hurt the consistency of the scales. For most items, the questions were asked twofold (in a dyadic way). That means that the respondent had to answer an item of the scale for itself, but also for its alliance partner. For example, the original item “In the strategic alliance high levels
of integrity are achieved” was divided into two items about the integrity of the respondent self
and its partner. The harm of deletion would have been bigger than the benefit.
Finally, two comments must be made. First, for measuring competitive advantage, a scale for positional advantage by Jap (1999) was used. A positional advantage is based upon a competitive advantage (Jap, 1999). The difference is that a competitive advantage is more general and a positional advantage is focused on market position. The scale of positional advantage fits the purposes of competitive advantage in this study, because it includes items of efficiency which is important in this theoretical framework. Second, when it comes to financial performance, it is noteworthy to tell that respondents were not asked for ‘hard numbers’ of profits. This is because it is hard to exactly determine what profits can be strictly appointed to the strategic alliance and the contribution of each success factor. In addition, asking for exact profits might cause resistance because of the sensitivity of this information. Therefore, the reflective scale of Lambe et al. (2002) was used with questions like “The strategic alliance
made it possible to achieve higher profits compared to competitors for me/the alliance partner”.
4.2.4 Phase 1: Analysis
After collecting the data, I was first able to describe the final sample. I calculated several descriptive statistics. This provided me with demographical information (like age, duration of the alliance etcetera) and the possibility to compare variables. Per variable, mean, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation were calculated. First, the descriptive statistics were studied overall. Second, these statistics were studied within group, which means among physios and Beddenspecialist retailers separately. I looked for differences and patterns that would become clear from these statistics. Finally, the results on the satisfaction variable were used to select the embedded units for the interview. The satisfaction variable was chosen because this was an indicator of success that would both fit an opportunist manager and a craftsman manager. The financial performance indicator is expected to be more relevant for the opportunist manager than to the craftsman manager. The strategic alliance with the highest and the lowest average satisfaction scores were selected. In addition, the strategic alliance with the greatest difference in satisfaction was selected.
4.3 Research phase 2
4.3.1 Phase 2: A qualitative approach
During the second phase, I collected data with a qualitative approach making use of in-depth interviews. The aim of the in-depth interviews was to elaborate on the propositions of the theoretical framework. In addition, with in-depth interviews I could add questions in Sleeptrade’s interest. For example, Sleeptrade was interested in how they could rearrange the strategic alliance to make it more successful. This way both academic and practical interests could be satisfied. In addition to the in-depth interviews, I studied the available documentation about the SlaapFysio platform. This documentation contained the official contract Sleeptrade used and the informal (confidential) business plan that was developed internally. This way, both primary and secondary data were used. The use of primary and secondary data is called triangulation (Patton, 1987). I did so, to get a full understanding of the strategic alliances. 4.3.2 Phase 2: Data collection
Theoretical framework Set of values Questions Strategic Alliance Success Description of strategic alliance success… Total (4)
… in general … relation-specific … positive factors … negative factors 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 Competitive Advantage Description of competitive advantage Total (2)
Proposition 1
… in the strategic alliance
… in relation to strategic alliance success
1.2 1.3 Alliance competence Description of alliance competences… Total (6)
Proposition 2
Proposition 6a
…currently … necessary
… in relation to strategic alliance success … and its determinants
… and its development … and owner-motivation 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.14 Idiosyncratic Resources Description of idiosyncratic resources… Total (6)
Proposition 3
Proposition 6b
…currently … necessary
… in relation to strategic alliance success … and its determinants
… and its development … and owner-motivation 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20
Cooperation Description of cooperation… Total (5)
Proposition 4
…currently … necessary
… in relation to strategic alliance success … and its determinants
… and its development
1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.25
Communication Description of communication… Total (3)
Proposition 5 Proposition 6c … in general … and cooperation … and owner-motivation 1.26 1.27 1.32
Trust Description of trust… Total (3)
Proposition 5 Proposition 6d … in general … and cooperation … and owner-motivation 1.28 1.29 1.33
Theoretical framework Set of values Questions
Commitment Description of commitment… Total (3)
Proposition 5 Proposition 6e … in general … and cooperation … and owner-motivation 1.30 1.31 1.34
Legitimacy Description of legitimacy… Total (7)
Proposition 6f
…currently … necessary
… in relation to strategic alliance success … and its determinants
… and its reputation … and development … and owner-motivation 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.41 Owner-motivation Description of owner-motivation…
… in general
… opportunist manager or lifestyle manager
1.12 1.13
Table 2b. [2/2] From concept to question (Emans, 2004).
the set of values and attached questions are presented. All prepared questions can be seen in
Appendix B. A semi-structured interview allowed me to ask open questions and elaborate on
responses of the interviewee. For this purpose, I conducted the interviews myself. Open questions were useful to gain unexpected information and to make sure that interviewees were not influenced by the interviewer.
In general, the physios and Beddenspecialist retailers were asked for what they expected, experienced and wanted in the future when it comes to the strategic alliance. More specific, the qualitative interview was split up in three parts. At first, the respondent was asked how he or she would describe the strategic alliance to someone not familiar with the strategic alliance. This way, I made the respondent think of the basics of the strategic alliance, and with a simple question like this, the respondent could get a comfortable feeling. This is called a ‘free reaction strategy’. Meanwhile, the answers provided me with more background information of the specific strategic alliance. In the first part, I also asked about the start-up, and I asked for personal and strategic goals both at the beginning and now during the strategic alliance. The second part included all questions from the interview scheme. The third part existed of a ‘wrap-up’ with questions specific for Sleeptrade, like, “What changes would you make if you were in
Sleeptrade?”. I also created probes in this part in order to remind me of anything that I might
have forgotten in the first two parts.
A total of 8 in-depth interviews was held of which 2 were pilots. The pilot was held with the researcher’s father and its attached physio (known to the researcher). Based on the pilot, a few questions were formulated differently, because a few questions appeared to be unclear. The researcher noticed this because the respondents asked a few times what was actually meant. Further, 3 Beddenspecialist retailers and 3 physios were interviewed. More interviews were not possible due to the time restriction for this Thesis. The respondents were interviewed in their own store or practice and one at the respondent’s home. This way they felt comfortable which encourages the respondent to give honest and complete answers. The interviews were recorded by iPhone and the researcher took notes on his laptop during the interviews.
4.3.4 Phase 2: Analysis
After collecting the qualitative data, the analysis was done by comparing the practical insights from the field with the already existing literature. This is called pattern matching (Yin, 1994). I tried to expound similarities and differences between practice and existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although it is not possible to test proposition using in-depth interviews, they do offer practical insights that confirm the propositions or not. Via this process, it is also possible to develop new propositions from the field.
5. Results phase 1
5.1 Final sample
other 2 are ‘loose’, because they could not be connected to a physio since their physios did not take the online survey.
The survey is distributed among 48 physios, 46 official physios and 2 unofficial ones. The unofficial physios have no contractual agreement anymore or no contractual agreement yet. The online survey was distributed to them, because Sleeptrade included their mail addresses by accident. These takes are considered non-response. There are 7 physios that only recently joined platform SlaapFysio. Their strategic alliances did exist no longer than 4 months when the online survey was taken. For this, they are expected to possess too little experience and information for participating in this study. Their takes are not included in this study. As a consequence, from 48 physios a total of 39 physios was appropriate for this study. Of 39 appropriate physios (potential sample), 25 have started the online survey and 22 of them have completed the online survey. All survey finishers are included in the sample. This means, the final sample of physios exists of 22 respondents of which 7 can be matched to a Beddenspecialist retailer and 15 were considered ‘loose’.
5.2 Demographics
At first, the online survey offers insights in some demographical statistics. The final sample exists of 7 dyadic embedded units (14 respondents), 2 ‘loose’ Beddenspecialist retailers, and 15 ‘loose’ physios (N=31). The average duration of the strategic alliances is, according to the respondents, 18 months and 21 days (data collection was in August, 2016). However, in not one matched case, the alliance partners have filled in the same duration. Clearly, the alliance partners are not aware of when their strategic alliance officially has begun. According to secondary data, the average duration of the 39 strategic alliances (which means excluding the strategic alliances from April or later) is 24 months. The Beddenspecialist retailers are all men. Of the total sample, 80.6% is man and 19.4% woman. All women in the sample are physio and
Total Appropriate Survey starters Survey finishers Final sample Embedded units Loose Beddenspecialist retailers 24 21 15 12 9 7 2 Total Appropriate Survey starters Survey finishers Final sample Embedded units Loose Physios 48 39 25 22 22 7 15
from all physios they form a 27.3% proportion. We can conclude that men form a majority in the sample. The average personal age of the total sample was 49 years with a minimum age of 28 years and a maximum age of 62 years. The average personal age among the Beddenspecialist retailers is 53 years and the average personal age among the physios is 48 years. This does not seem like a big difference. On average, the physio group is slightly younger, although this is mostly due to two ‘outliers’ with an age of 28 and 31 years. The average store of the Beddenspecialist retailer exists for 70 years, with a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of 117 years. The average practice of physios exists for 48 years, with a minimum of 28 years and a maximum of 60 years. This may be interpreted as that all strategic alliance partners, both Beddenspecialist retailers and physios, are established parties in their markets. Due to anonymity issues, above standing demographical statistics are not linked to cases.
5.3 Descriptive statistics
Second, the online survey offers insights in several variables I measured. For all variables, descriptive statistics are calculated. The mean, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation for all variables can be seen in Table 4. In comparing the statistics, the indicators of success are the first to notice. The indicators involve financial performance and satisfaction. Financial performance has a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 3.1 (scale 1-5), whereas satisfaction has a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 9 (scale 1-10). Financial performance is centred at the lower side of the scale, whereas satisfaction shows quite a normal distribution. The average of financial performance is with 2.38 on the lower side of its scale, whereas the average of satisfaction is with 5.73 on the higher side of its scale. The scores on financial performance are relatively lower than the scores on satisfaction. This might suggest that financial performance is not as important in these strategic alliances as satisfaction. From the theoretical framework, satisfaction is linked to (implicit) goal achievement. Therefore, it might be that other goals than financial ones are more important to the strategic alliances of platform SlaapFysio.
Based on previous reasoning, there might exist differences in goals. Therefore, it is interesting to take a closer look at owner-motivation. Owner-motivation showed an overall average score of 2.61. That would mean non-financial motives (lower score) are slightly more important than financial motives (higher score). The Beddenspecialist scored on average 2.83, whereas the physio scored on average 2.52. On forehand, differences were expected between the physios and Beddenspecialist retailers. I expected the physios to be running their businesses as a craftsman (lower score) and the Beddenspecialist retailers to be running their business as an opportunist. Following this expectation, the Beddenspecialist retailers score on average slightly higher. The difference is not very big though. In addition, the overall minimum was 1.73 and the overall maximum was 3.27 with a standard deviation of .36, so there is a small variation on this variable. If there is only little variation in owner-motivation, it might become
Fin an cial p er for m an ce S atisfa ction Com p etit ive ad van tage Alli an ce com p ete n ce Id iosyn cr atic re sou rc es Cooper ation L egitimac y Own er -m otivat ion Com m u n icat ion T ru st Com m itm en t Overall Mean 2.38 5.73 3.27 3.48 2.95 3.71 2.53 2.61 3.06 4.09 3.25 SD .59 1.84 .32 .7 .55 .47 .49 .36 .69 .37 .42 Minimum 1 3 2.25 2 1.8 2.86 1.3 1.73 2 3.25 1.8 Maximum 3.1 9 3.75 4.67 4 5 3.4 3.27 4.33 5 4 N 30 30 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 30 30 Retailer Mean 2.73 4.75 3.25 3.37 3 3.48 2.67 2.83 2.9 4.2 3.33 SD .47 2.19 .27 .65 .6 .43 .47 .31 .69 .42 .37 Minimum 1.8 3 2.75 2 1.8 2.86 1.9 2.36 2 3.88 2.75 Maximum 3.1 9 3.5 4 3.6 4 3.4 3.27 4 4 4 N 8 8 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 8 8 Physio Mean 2.25 6.09 3.27 3.53 2.94 3.79 2.47 2.52 3.11 4.05 3.22 SD .58 1.6 .34 .72 .54 .47 .5 .34 .71 .35 .44 Minimum 1 3 2.63 2 2.2 3.14 1.3 1.73 2 3.25 2.63 Maximum 3 9 3.75 4.67 4 5 3.2 3.27 4.33 5 4 N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
hard to discover how different owner-motivations influence factors of strategic alliance success with this sample.
Legitimacy was the lowest scoring success factor with an average of 2.53. The Beddenspecialist retailer, with mean 2.67, scored slightly higher than the physio with a mean of 2.47, but again the differences between retailer and physio were small. The minimum and maximum were 1.3 and 3.4 respectively. The standard deviation was .49 which means the average overall score gives quite a good impression of the sample score on this variable. The average is beneath the middle of the scale. It seems that Beddenspecialist retailers and physios gain only little legitimacy from the strategic alliance.
Trust scored the highest average of all variables. The overall average was 4.1 with a standard deviation of .37 which means the mean score is quite a good impression of the scores in the sample. The Beddenspecialist retailers rate a 4.2 on average, whereas the physios rate a 4.05 on average. There was a maximum score of 5 given (among the physios), whereas the minimum score was 3.25 which is above the middle of the scale. One can conclude from this, that high levels of trust are achieved within the strategic alliances.
Finally, it is important to look at the competitive advantage. The achievement of a competitive advantage is key to strategic alliances according to the theoretical framework. The scores are on the higher side of the scale. Overall, a 3.27 was rated for the strategic advantage over their competitors that strategic alliance partners gain from the strategic alliance. Among Beddenspecialist retailers a 3.25 was given and among physios a 3.27. The overall minimum was 2.25 which is a score already close to the middle of the scale. Thus, on average, the competitive advantage scores high. This could mean that the strategic alliance partners all experience, potential or actual, strategic benefits from the strategic alliance.
Fin an cial p er for m an ce S atisfa ction Com p etit ive ad van tage Alli an ce com p ete n ce Id iosyn cr atic re sou rc es Cooper ation L egitimac y Own er -m otivat ion Com m u n icat ion T ru st Com m itm en t Case 1 Retailer 3 3 3.5 4 3.6 4 3.2 2.36 3 4 4 Physio 2 6 2.75 3.67 3.4 3.29 2.3 2.55 2 3.88 2.75 Difference 1 3 .75 .33 .2 .71 .9 .19 1 .12 1.25 Case 2 Retailer 2.9 - 3.38 3.67 2.4 3.14 3.4 3.09 3.5 4.5 3.13 Physio 2.4 7 3.63 4.33 4 5 2.8 1.73 4.33 4.38 3.75 Difference .5 - .3 .66 1.6 1.86 .6 .36 .83 .12 .62 Case 3 Retailer 3 4 3 3.33 2.8 2.86 2.2 3.18 2 3.88 3.13 Physio 2.6 6 3.25 3.67 2.4 3.14 2.4 2.64 2.5 4 3 Difference .4 2 .25 .34 .4 .28 .2 .46 .5 .12 .13 Case 4 Retailer 1.8 7 3.25 3.67 3.4 4 2.4 2.64 4 4 3.25 Physio 3 8 3.75 4 3.2 4 2.7 2.73 4 5 3.5 Difference 1.2 1 .5 .33 .2 0 .3 .9 0 1 .25 Case 5 Retailer 3 4 3.38 3.67 2.8 3.14 2.7 3.27 2 5 3.38 Physio 2 7 3.5 3.33 2.4 3.71 2.2 3 3.67 4 2.88 Difference 1 3 .12 .34 .4 .57 .5 .27 1.67 1 .5 Case 6 Retailer 2.2 3 3 2 3.4 4 2.6 2.91 3.17 3.88 2.75 Physio 3 6 3.75 4.67 3.4 4.86 3.2 2.09 2.67 4.63 3.63 Difference .8 3 .75 2.67 0 .86 .6 .82 .5 .75 .92 Case 7 Retailer 2.8 5 3.5 3.33 3.4 3.43 2.9 2.55 3.33 3.88 3.38 Physio 2.9 9 3.5 3.67 3 4 2.9 2.36 4 4 4 Difference .1 4 0 .34 .4 .57 0 .14 .67 .12 .62
advantage except for case 4 that has a relatively low score on financial performance and a relatively high score on satisfaction. Overall, no clear pattern can be discovered from the quantitative data.
6. Results phase 2
The in-depth interviews are important to elaborate on the propositions of the theoretical framework. Although it is not possible to empirically test each proposition using in-depth interviews, they do offer practical insights that may or may not support each proposition. Per proposition, the practical insights from the in-depth interviews are now discussed. The central premise in this study is that if alliance resources are inimitable, non-substitutable, immobile, and not easy to surpass, they offer a firm a competitive advantage. This is argued for each alliance resource in the theoretical framework and will be address per proposition. However, the first proposition is that a competitive advantage leads to strategic alliance success in terms of financial performance and satisfaction for either one or both alliance partners.
P1: Alliance resources that are inimitable, non-substitutable, immobile, and not
easy to surpass offer a firm a competitive advantage, which in turn leads to strategic alliance success in terms of financial performance and satisfaction for either one or both alliance partners.
At first, when asked an open question for the strategic alliance goals and strategic alliance success according to the respondent, the answer is in every case that the patient/customer should benefit from the strategic alliance. This can be classified as customer value. The Beddenspecialist retailers add that patients with physical complaints need to be referred to their stores for supporting products, so called leads. Eventually, this should lead to an increase of
Strategic alliance success (/goals)
Number of
mentions Success factors
Number of mentions
Customer value 8 Resources (SlaapID) 4
Leads (sales) 4 Communication 6
Trust 4
Commitment (labour intensity) 3 Competences (use of SlaapID) 2 Competitive advantage * 7
sales. In one case, the leads and sales are named first by a Beddenspecialist retailer. Among the physios, the leads were neither named as a strategic alliance goal or strategic alliance success. Among three of the four physios, leads are named as a mean to help the patient. When asking for it, it does not feel like a goal or success for the physios. In conclusion, creating customer value and leads are mentioned as the purpose of the strategic alliance with creating customer value as most important one.
After clarifying what strategic alliance success is defined like in this study, I asked with an open question, what is important to achieve strategic alliance success according to the respondents. In other words, what are factors of success and failure? Many factors are named, but not once a competitive advantage. Among the factors are (see Table 6) the SlaapID sensor (resource), communication, trust, and the knowledge of Sleeptrade. Bad communication was named as a factor of failure. Other mentioned factors of failure were not knowing how to use the SlaapID sensor (competence), and labour intensity: time and effort were frequently named as factors of failure (commitment).
After the open question, I explicitly asked for a competitive advantage as success factor. Both physios and Beddenspecialist retailers do perceive the strategic alliance to have a (sometimes very) positive impact on their competitive advantage. However, for one of the eight respondents, it does not seem to matter. This physio states that there is a deep focus on the village. This particular physio is the physio everyone in the village goes to. If it turns out that patients have troubles with their sleeping behaviour, then the possibilities offered by the strategic alliance happen to be a coincidence. People with sleeping troubles do not expect the physio to help them with their sleeping situation, for which the strategic alliance does not make a difference for the practice compared to competitors. People will visit the practice anyway. There was one implicit confirmation of the proposition: “If it influences success, I don’t know.
But it [the strategic alliance] offers an opening to customers and patients.” This statement does
describe a competitive advantage offered by the strategic alliance, namely market access that competitors do not possess, but it does not confirm explicitly the relation between a competitive advantage and success. All other respondents answered explicitly yes. In four of eight interviews, the explanation was access to markets. The strategic alliance may increase customer (or patient) leads in both directions. Furthermore, opposed to “the best” products and services that everyone claims to have, SlaapID and SlaapFysio are distinctive from competitors according to the respondents, thus offers the firm(s) a competitive advantage.
first proposition, there seems to be support for a competitive advantage leading to strategic alliance success. This is due to the offering to market access, the leads (and sales), and the competitive advantage it offers. There is only one explicit exception that argues against the proposition. The seven other cases provide for support of the proposition: a competitive advantage leads to alliance success.
P2: Alliance competences offer a firm a competitive advantage.
The second proposition is that alliance competences lead to a competitive advantage. A great majority of the respondents states that competences are very important to a competitive advantage. Only one of the respondents cannot think of any competences. Other respondents name structuring as a competence, although this competence is not developed enough yet. One physio names the strategic alliance as the only way to distinct the practice from lots of competitors. “My market share increases; supply and demand. I am the only one offering this,
so I offer a strong feature to the market [patient].” In this particular part of the interview, the
respondent talks about its competences, thus, it should be interpreted as an exploitation competence. Furthermore, the use of knowledge is named. There is knowledge available, but not everyone knows how to use it, according to two Beddenspecialist retailers. In addition, physios must develop the competence of working with the SlaapID sensor. They sometimes do not know how to use the sensor for which it is not optimally exploited. This can be classified as an exploitation competence again. Social capabilities are named as important to the strategic alliance. The terms “bonding” and “knowledge of people” come forth as important to make the strategic alliance a success. Table 7 gives an overview of the alliance competences. Finally, one respondent stated that alliance competences should
lead to a competitive advantage if they are facilitated by availability of the alliance partner, priority and enthusiasm.
Alliance competences Number of confirmations
Exploitation competence
- Use of resources (SlaapID) 4
- Use of knowledge 2
- Access to markets 1
Structuring 4
Social capabilities 2
