Het Hof van Justitie
uitspraak doende op de door het Sozialgericht Nümberg bij beschikking van 16 januari 1995 gestelde vragen, verklaart voor recht: De arti-kelen 77, lid 2, sub b-i, en 78, lid 2, sub b-i, van de verordening (EEG) nr. 1408/71 van de Raad van 14 juni 1971 betreffende de toepas-sing van de sociale zekerheidsregelingen op werknemers en zelfstandigen, alsmede op hun gezinsleden, die zich binnen de Gemeenschap verplaatsen, zoals gewijzigd en bijgewerkt bij verordening (EEG) nr. 2001/83 van de Raad van 2 juni 1983,moeten aldus worden uitge-legd, dat het bevoegde orgaan van een Lid-Staat niet gehouden is, aan pensioen- of rente-trekkers of aan wezen die in een andere Lid-Staat wonen, aanvullende gezinsbijslagen toe te kennen ingeval het bedrag van de door de woonstaat uitgekeerde gezinsbijslagen lager is dan dat van de in de wettelijke regeling van de eerste Lid-Staat voorziene bijslagen, wanneer het recht op pensioen of rente, of het recht van de wees, niet uitsluitend uit hoofde van in deze staat vervulde verzekeringstijdvakken is verkre-gen.
NOOT
In bovenstaande uitspraak werd het Hof ge-vraagd zich uit te spreken over de artikelen 77-79 van Verordening 1408171 welke zien op het recht op bijslagen voor kinderen van pensioen-of rentetrekkers en wezen. Deze bijslagen wor-den in beginsel volgens de wettelijke bepalingen van een Lid-Staat toegekend. Indien pensioe-nen verschuldigd zijn volgens de toeuelijke re-gelingen van meerdere Lid-Staten, dan worden de bijslagen in beginsel toegekend volgens de regeling van de zooonstaai. Volgens de letter van de verordening zou dit echter tot een ver-lies van bijslagen kunnen leiden indien de bij-slagen in de woonstaat lager zijn dan de bijsla-gen die voorheen in een andere Lid-Staat zijn verkregen. Een dergelijke verlies zou de uitoe-fening van het recht op vrij verkeer kunnen be-lemmeren en het Hof had daarom al in eerdere arresten bepaald dat de verplaatsing naar een Lid-Staat met lagere bijslagen niet mag leiden tot een verlies van bijslagen verkregen op grond van nationaal recht. De Lid-Staat met de ho-gere bijslagen is verplicht, het verschil tussen de bijslagen aan te vullen. In de hierboven opge-nomen zaak was de vraag of dit "recht op aanvulling" ook bestaat indien pensioentrek-kers of wezen hun recht enkel verkrijgen door
middel van de in de verordening opgenomen regels inzake de samentelling van tijdvakken van verzekering of wonen. In casu betrof het Spaanse en Italiaanse onderdanen die Duitse pensioenen ontvingen. Zij hadden voor een re-latief korte periode in Duitsland gewerkt en voldeden in beginsel niet aan de minimumoer-zekeringsperiodes in Duitsland. Zij waren ech-ter toch gerechtigd tot een pensioen door middel van de in de verordening opgenomen regelingen betreffende de samentelling van tijdookken. Anders dan de Advocaat Generaal Fennelly, komt het Hof tot de conclusie dat in dergelijke gevallen geen recht op aanvullende bijslagen bestaat. Immers, zo stelt het Hof, in een derge-lijk situatie verliezen de betrokkenen niet de bijslagen die zij enkel aan de wettelijke regeling van een andere Lid-Staat ontlenen. De uit-spraak lijkt Lid-Staten met relatief hoge kin-derbijslagen te beschermen, daar zij niet ver-plicht zijn pensioen- of rentetrekkers die slechts relatief kort op hun grondgebied hebben ge-werkt, en dus ook relatief kort aan de financie-ring van die bijslagen hebben bijgedragen, een recht op aanvulling te geven.
A.P. van der Mei (docent sociaal recht Uni-versiteit Maastricht)
83
EHRM 16 september 1996, nr. 39/2995/545/ 63'
(Mrs Ryssdal {President}, Gölcüklü, Mat-scher, Macdonald, Russo, Foighel, Pekka-nen, Loizou, Jungwiert}
Onderscheid o.g. v. nationaliteit;
objec-tieve en redelijke rechtvaardiging.
Emergency assistance is in Oostenrijk gekoppeld aan de betaling van premies aan het werkloosheidsfonds. Het recht op deze uitkering is een financieel recht in de zin van art. 1 Eerste Protocol. Het daarin neergelegde eigendomsrecht is in het geding en art. 14 kan worden inge-roepen. De weigering van een nooduitke-ring, gegrond op de nationaliteit van Gaygusuz is niet gebaseerd op een objec-tieve en redelijke rechtvaardiging.
•
•
[EVRM art. 6 lid 1, 8, 14 en 50; Eerste Pro-tocol EVRM art. 1]
Gaygusuz, tegen Oostenrijk. As to the law
I. Alleged violation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Ar-tiele 1 of Protocol no, 1
33. Mr Caygusuz complained of the Austrian authorities' refusal to gram him emergency as-sistance on the ground that he did not have Austrian nationality, which was one ofthe con-ditions laid down in section 33(2) (a) of the 1977 Unemployment Insurance Act (see para-graph 20 above) for entitlement to an allow-ance of that type. He claimed to be a victim of discrimination based on national origin, con-trary to Artiele 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1. which provide: Artiele 14 of the Convention "The enioyment ofthe rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured with-out discrimination on any ground such as (..) nationalf..) origin(..)"
Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1
"Every naturalor legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment ofhis possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the condi-tions provided for by law and by the general principles of intemationallaw.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deerns necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
34. The Commission and the Turkish Govem-ment agreed with this arguGovem-ment, whereas the Austrian Govemment rejected it.
35. The Court must first rule on the applicabi-lity of these two Articles taken in conjunction. A. Applicability of Artiele 14 of the Conven-tion taken in conjuncConven-tion with Artiele 1 of Pro-tocol No. 1
36. According to the Court's established case-law, Artiele 14 of the Convention comple-ments the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. Ithas no inde-pendent existence since it has effect solely in relation to 'the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms' safeguarded by those provisions. AI-though the application of Artiele 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous - there can be
no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of them (see, among other authorities, the Karl-heinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment of 18 july 1994, Series A no. 291-B, p. 32 §22). 37. The applicant and the Turkish Govem-ment argued that Artiele 14 ofthe Convention was applicable in conjunction with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1. They referred to the reasoning of the Commission, which found that the award of emergency assistance was linked to the payment of contributions to the unemploy-ment insurance fund.
38. The Austrian Govemment, however, sub-mitted that emergency assistance did not come within the scope of Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1. Entitlement thereto did not result automati-cally from the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance fund.
lt
was an emergency payment granted by the State to people in need. Consequently, Artiele 14 of the Convention was not applicable either. 39. The Court notes that at the material time emergency assistance was granted to persons who had exhausted their entitlement to unern-ployment benefit and satisfied the other statu-tory conditions laid down in section 33 of the 1977 Unemployment Insurance Act (see para-graph 20 above). Entitlement to this social benefit is therefore linked to the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance fund, which is a precondition for the payment of unemployment benefit (see paragraph 21 above). It follows that there is no entitlement to emergency assistance where such contribu-tions have not been made.40. In the instant case it has not been argued that the applicant did not satisfy that condi-tion: the refusal to grant him emergency assis-tance was based exclusively on the finding that he did not have Austrian nationality and did not fall into any of the categories exempted from that conditon (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above).
41. The Court considers that the right to emer-gency assistance - in so far as provided for in the applicable legislation - is a pecuniary right for the purposes of Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1. That provision is therefore applicable without it being necessary to rely solely on the link be-tween entitlement to emergency assistance and the obliga ti on to pay 'taxes or other contribu-tions'. Accordingly, as the applicant was de-nied emergency assistance on a ground of dis-tinction covered by Artiele 14, namely his nationality, that provision is also applicable (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutan-dis, the Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 october
1987, Series A no. 126, p. 18, §40, and the Darby v. Sweden judgment of 23 october 1990, Series A no. 187, p. 12, §30).
B. Compliance with Artiele 14 of the Conven-tion taken in conjuncConven-tion with Artiele 1 of Pro-tocol No.!.
42. According to the Court's case-law, a diffe-rence of treatment is discriminatory, for the purposes of Artiele 14, if it "has no objective and reasonable justification", that is if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is not a "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised". Moreover the Con-tracting States enjoy a certain margin of appre-ciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations jus-tify a different treatment. However, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention. 43. The applicant maintained that the diffe-rence in treatment between Austrians and non-Austrians under section 33(2)(a) of the 1977 Unemployment Insurance Act as regard entitlement to emergency assistance was not based on any objective and reasonable justifi-cation. He had paid contributions to the un-employment insurance fund on the same basis as Austrian employees.
44. The Turkish Government and the Com-mission agreed in substance with the appli-cant's argument.
45. The Austrian Government submitted that the statutory provision in question was not dis-criminatory. They argued that the difference in treatment was based on the idea that the State has special responsibility for its own nationals and must take care of them and provide for their essential needs. Moreover, sections 33 and 34 of the Unemployment Insurance Act laid down certain exceptions to the nationality conditon. Lastly, at the material time, Austria was not bound by any contractual obligation to grant emergency assistance to Turkish natio-nals.
46. The Court notes in the first pi ace that Mr Gaygusuz was legally resident in Austria and worked there at certain times (see paragraph 10 above), paying contributions to the unem-ployment insurance fund in the same capacity and on the same basis as Austrian nationals. 47. It ob serves that the authorities' refusal to grant him emergency assistance was based ex-clusively on the fact that he did not have Aus-trian nationality as required by section 33(2) (a) of the 1977 Unemployment
Insu-rance Act (see paragraph 20 above).
48. In addition, it has not been argued that the applicant failed to satisfy the other statutory conditions for the award of the social benefit in question. Het was accordingly in a like situa-tion to Austrian nasitua-tionals as re gard his entitle-ment thereto.
49. Admittedly, sections 33 and 34 of the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act (see paragraph 20 above) lay down certain exceptions to the nationality condition, but the applicant did not fall into any of the relevant categories.
50. The Court therefore finds the arguments put forward by the Austrian Government in-persuasive. It considers, like the Commision, that the difference in treatment between Aus-trians and non-AusAus-trians as regards entitle-ment to emergency assistance, of which Mr Gaygusuz was a victim, is not based on any "objective and reasonable justification". 51. Even though, at the material time, Austria was not bound by reciprocal agreements with Turkey, it undertook, when ratifying the Con-vention, to secure "to everyone within [its] ju-risdiction" the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention.
52. There has accordingly been a breach of Ar-tiele 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunc-tion with Artikcle 1 of ProtocolNo.T.
11.
Alleged violation of Artic1e
6 §1of
the Convention
53. Mr Gaygusuz further complained that he had not had access to a tribunal with full juris-diction and that he had not had a fair hearing. He relied on Artiele 6 §1 of the Convention, which provides: "In the determination of his civil rights or obligations (... ) everyone is enti-tled to a fair (... ) hearing by [a] (... ) tribunal
(...)
"
54. The Austrian Government and the Com-mis ion rejected this argument. The Turkish Government made no observation on the question.
55. The Court, having concluded that there has been a breach of Artiele 14 of the Conven-tion, taken in conjunction with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1, does not consider it necessary to examine the case under Artiele 6 §1.
111.
Alleged violation ofArtic1e 8 ofthe
Convention
56. Mr Gaygusuz also complained of interfe-rence with his family life, contrary to Artiele 8 of the Convention, which provides:
•
•
2. There sha1l be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is ne-cessary in a democratie society in the interests ofnational security, public safety or the econo-mie we1l-being of the country, for the preven-tion of disorder or crime, for the proteepreven-tion of health or morals, or for the proteetion of the rights and freedoms of others."
57. Having re gard to the conc1usion set out in paragraph 52 above, the Court considers, like the Commission, that no separate issue arises under Artic1e 8 of the Convention.
IV.
Application of Article 50 of the
Convention
58. Under Artic1e 50 of the Convention, "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure ta-ken by alegal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partia1ly in conflict with the obligations arising from the (... ) Convention, and if the intemal law of the said Party a1lows only partial repara-tion to be made for the consequences of this decision of measure, the decision of the Court sha1l, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
A. Pecuniary damage
59. For pecuniary damage Mr Gaygusuz c1ai-med 800.000 Austrian schillings (ATS), corre-sponding to the amount of emergency as-sistance he had been deprived of from 1987 to 1993.
60. The Turkish Govemement argued that the applicant should be paid the whole sum c1ai-med, as it was precisely the Austrian authori-ties' refusal to grant him emergency assistance which had caused him to leave the country. 61. The Austrian Govemement submitted that this compensation c1aim was based on nothing more than a hypothesis. As the applicant had left Austria in 1987, it was impossible to know whether he would have been unemployed du-ring the relevant period and whether he would have satisfied the other conditions for the award of the social benefit in question.
62. The Delegate of the Commission conside-red that the applicant had suffeconside-red pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found and left assessment of the amount to the Court's discretion.
63. The Court notes that the applicant applied for emergency assistance on 6 july 1987 and left Austria in September 1987 (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). Without wishingtospeculate about the applicant's situation after that date, the Court must neverthe1ess take into account the fact that his departure from Austria was
due to the non-payment of emergency as-sistance, which would have amounted to ATS 235 per day. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, it awards him the sum of ATS 200.000.
B. Non-Pecuniary damage
64. The Turkish Govemment argued that the applicant should be paid a substantial sum for non-pecuniary damage.
65. As the applicant submitted no c1aim to that effect, the Court, like the Commission and the Austrian Govemment, considers it unneces-sary to rule on the question.
C. Costs and expenses
66. The applicant also c1aimed ATS 123.415,40 for costs and expenses, made up of ATS 31.818,67 in the Austrian courts and ATS 91.596,73 before the Convention institutions. 67. The Turkish Govemment argued that the applicant should be reimbursed in fu1l for the costs and expenses he had incurred.
68. The Austrian Govemment submitted that only the costs and expenses relating to the ap-plication to the Constitutional Court were re-levant. For those incurred before the Conven-tion instituConven-tions, they considered the sum of ATS 80.000 appropriate.
69. The Delegate of the Commission made no observation on this point.
70. Making an assessment on an equitable ba-sis in the light of the information in its posses-sion and its own case-law on the question, the Court awards Mr Gaygusuz ATS 100.000. D. Default interest
71. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest appli-cable in Austria at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 4% per annum.
For these reasons, the court
1. Holds unanimously that Artic1e 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Artic1e 1 of Protocol No. 1, is applicable in the case; 2. Holds unanimously that there has been a breach of Artic1e 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Artic1e 1 of Protocol No. 1; 3. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to consider the cease under Artic1e 6§1 of the Convention;
4. Holds unanimously that no seperate issue arises under Artic1e 8 of the Convention; 5. Holds by eight votes to one that the respon-dent State is to pay the applicant, within three moths, 200.000 (two hundred thousand) Au-strian schillings for pecuniary damage;
6. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, 100.000 (one hundred thousand)
strian shillings in respect of costs and expenses; 7. Hold unanimously that simpIe interest at an annual rate of 4% shall be payable from the ex-piry of the above-mentioned three months un-til settlement;
8. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
84
EHRM 21 februari 1997, nr. 108/1995/614/ 702 Van Raalte t. Nederland
(mr Ryssdal, President, Russo, Valticos, Mrs Palm, Foighel, Baka, Makarczyk, Jung-wiert, Van Dijk)
Gelijke behandeling; objectieve rechtvaar-diging; eigendomsrecht.
De Nederlandse Algemene Kinderbijslag-wet maakte tot en met 1988 onderscheid tussen mannen en vrouwen ouder dan 45 jaar: die groep vrouwen was vrijgesteld van het betalen van premie ingevolge die wet. De betaling daarvan wordt bestreken door artikel 1, Eerste Protocol EVRM. Het eigendomsrecht kan niet in de weg staan aan nationale wetgeving die erop gericht is "to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions".
Very weigthy reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could re-gard
a
difference in treatment based exclusivelyon the ground of sex as com-patible with the Convention. Irrespective of whether the desire to spare the feel-ings of childless women ofa
certain age can be regarded as a legitimate aim, such an objective cannot providea
justification for the gender-based difference of treat-ment in the present case. Schending van artikel 14jo. artikel 1,Eerste Protocol EVRM[EVRM art. 14 en 50; Eerste Protocol EVRM art. 1]
As to the law
I. Alleged violation of artic1e 14 of the convention taken togetherwith artic1e 1 of protocol No. 1
32. The applicant claimed that the levying of contributions under the General Child Bene-fits Act (see paragraph 21 above) from him, an
unmarried childless man over 45 years of age, constituted discrimination on the ground of gender prohibited by Artiele 14 of the Conven-tion taken together with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1, given the fact that at the time of the events complained of no similar contributions we re exacted from unmarried childless women ofthat age (see paragraph 21 and 23 above). Artiele 14 of the Convention and Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1 provide as follows:
Artiele 14 of the Convention
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured with-out discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, asso-ciation with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
Artiele 1of Protocol No. 1.
"Every naturalor legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment ofhis possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the condi-tions provided for by law and by the generaI principles of internationallaw.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way imp air the right of a State10enforce
such laws as it deerns necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general intererest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission agreed with the applicant that such violation had taken place. The Gov-ernment contested this.
A. Whether Artiele 14 ofthe Convention is applicable
33. As the Court has consistently held, Artiele 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. Ithas no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the en-joyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguar-ded by those provisions. Although the applica-tion of Artiele 14 does not presuppose a breach of thos provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be no room for its ap-plication unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, the Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment of 18 Iuly 1994, Series A no. 291-B, p. 32, § 22).
•
•
other contributions" and therefore came with-in the ambit of Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Government did not contest this.
35. The Court sees no reason to hold other-wise, and accordingly finds that Artiele 14 is applicable.
B.
Arguments before the Court 1. The applicant36. In the applicant's submission, differences in treatment based on sex were already unac-ceptable when section 25 of the General Child Benefits Acts was enacted in 1962. The wor-ding of Artiele 14 of the Convention showed that such had been the prevailing view as early as 1950.
Moreover, legal and social developments sho-wed a elear trend towards equality between men and women. The applicant drew atten-tion to,inter alia,the Court's Abdulaziz, Caba-les and Balkandali v. the U nited Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985 (Series A no. 94), which stated explicitly that "the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Eu-rope" and that "very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference in trea-tment on the ground of sex could be conside-red compatible with the Convention" (loc. cit., p. 38,§78).
The Netherlands legislature had in fact recog-nised the unacceptable nature of the distinc-tion in quesdistinc-tion by enacting, in 1988, legisla-tion abolishing it.
In any case, statistics showed that very few men aged 45 or over fathered children; on the other hand, women aged over 45 were still able to have children and in many cases did so, thus invalidating the justification of any distinction based on the theoretical possiblity of procrea-ting. Lastly, the right to elaim benefits under the General Child Benefits Act was in no way related to the payment of contributions. 2. The Government
37. The Governement denied that there had been a difference in treatment between per-sons in similar situations. Women aged 45 or over differed fundamentally from men of the same age in that for biological reasons they were much less likely to be able to have child-ren. To the extent that it had to be assumed that there had been a difference in treatment between persons in similar situations, the bio-logical difference referred to constituted in it-self sufficient objective and any reasonable jus-tification. In addiotion, when the rule in
question had been enacted it had been justified by the social attitudes prevailing at the time: it was assumed that women who had no child-ren, and who in all probability never would, suffered thereby and it was considered wrong to impose on such women the additional emo-tional burden of having to pay contributions under a child benefit scheme. Admittedly, the exemption in question had been abolished with effect from 1 january 1989, essentially in response to a change in social attitudes to-wards unmarried childless women.Itwas, how-ever, inevitable that sociallegislation should to some extent lag behind developments in so-ciety and allowances had to be made. More ge-nerally, the Government referred to the wide margin of appreciation which in their view Ar-tiele 1 of Protocol No. 1 allowed the State in "enforcing such laws as it deerns necessary ... to secure the payment of taxes or other contri-butions or penalties" .
3. The Commission
38. The Commission was of the opinion that there had been a difference in treatment based on gender and that this difference was not jus-tified.
Moreover, it considered that the social attitu-des relied on by the Government had been overtaken by developments well before 1985. Itreferred,inter alia,to the Court's finding of a violation of Artiele 14 taken together with Ar-tiele 4§3 (d) in its above-mentioned Karlheinz Schmidt iudgment, the fmancial contribution in that case having been imposed in 1982.
C.
The Court's assessment1. Applicable principles
39. For the purposes of Artiele 14 a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no ob-jective and reasonable justification, that is if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationschip of proportiona-lity between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. Moreover the Contrac-ting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differen-ces in otherwise similar situations justify a dif-ferent treatment (see, among other authorities, the above-mentioned Karlheinz Schmidt judg-ment, pp. 32-33, § 24).
However, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based exelusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Con-vention (see, among other authorities, the above-mentioned Karlheinz Schmidt
ment, ibid.).
2. Whether there has been a dijference in treatment between persons in similar situations
40. At the time of the events complained of contributions under the General Child Bene-fits Act were levied from unmarried childless men aged 45 or over but not from unmarried childless women of the same age (see para-graphs 21 and 23 above). This undoubtedly constitues a "difference in treatment" between persons in similar situations, based on gender. The factual difference between the two catego-ries relied on by the Government, namely their respective biological possibilities to precreate, does not lead the Court to a different conclu-sion. Itis precisely this distinction which is at the he art of the question whether the diffe-rence in treatment complained of can be justi-fied.
3. Whether there is objective and reasonable justi-fication
41. The Court notes that the General Child Benefits Act set up a social-security scheme to which, in principle, the entire adult population was subject, both as contributors and as poten-tial beneficiaries. A key feature of this scheme was that the obligation to pay contributions did not depend on any potential entitlement to benefits that the individual might have (see pa-ragraph 21 above). Accordingly the exemption in the present case ran counter to the under-lying character of the scheme.
42. \Vhile Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation under the Convention as regards the introduetion of exemptions to such contributory obligations, Artiele 14 re-quires that any such measure, in principle, ap-plies even-handedly to both men and women unless compelling reasons have been adduced to justify a difference in treatment.
43. In the present case the Court is not persua-ded that such reasons exist. In this context it must be borne in mind that just as women over 45 may give birth to children (see paragraph 17 above), there are on the other hand men of 45 or younger who may be unable to procreate. The Court further observes that an unmarried childless woman aged 45 or over may well be-come eligible for benefits under the act in question; she may, for example, marry a man who already has children from a previous mar-riage. In addition, the argument that to levy contributions under a child benefits scheme from unmarried childless women would im-pose an unfair emotional burden on them might equally well apply to unmarried
child-less men or to childchild-less couples.
44. Accordingly, irrespective of whether the desire to spare the feelings of childless women of a certain age can be regarded as a legitimate aim, such an objective cannot provide a justifi-cation for the gender-based difference oftreat-ment in the present case.
4. Conclusion
45. There has been a violation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken together with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II.
Application of Artiele 50 of the
convention
46. Artiele 50 of the Convention provides as follows:
"Ifthe Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by alegal authority or any other autho-rity of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations ari-sing from the ... Convention, and if the inter-nallaw of the said Party allows only partial re-paration to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfac-tion to the injured party. "
The applicant claimed damages as well as reimbursement of costs and expenses.
A. Damages
47. The applicant asked the Court 10 award
him compensation for pecuniary damage in the amount of the contributions which he had paid under the General Child Benefits Act in 1985 through 1988. These totalled NLG 1.959. He also asked the Court10 award him
interest over these sums at the sta tu tory rate. He also claimed NLG 4.740 for non-pecuniary damage. He stated that it had been "very pain-ful" for him as an unmarried childless man to have to pay contributions under the General
Child Care Benefits Act.
48. The Govemment stated that had there not been the difference in treatment complained of, men and women would have been equally liable to pay contributions under the General Child Benefits Act, so that the applicant would have had to pay them in any case. The applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage was in their view incompatible with the applicant's argument that such feelings, if suf-fered by women, could not justify extending the exemption only to them.
re-•
•
cover the contributions paid under domestic law and also considered that the applicant was entitled to some compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
50. The Court notes that the finding of a vio-lation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken together with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not entitle the applicant to retrospective exemption from contributions under the scheme in question. Accordingly the applicant's claim for pecuniary damage has not been substantiated.
As regards the applicant's claim for non-pecuniaray damage, the Court considers that the present judgment constitutes in itself suffi-cient just satisfaction.
B. Costs and expenses
51. The applicant asked the Court to award him NLG 7.836,75 for costs and expenses in-curred in the domestic proceedings, NLG 6.768 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Commission and NLG 8.666,25 for costs and expenses incurred be-fore the Court. The Govemment did not com-ment. The Delegate of the Commission consi-dered that the applicant was entitled to the sums sought.
52. The Court has no reason to doubt that these costs and expenses were actually incur-red. It also accepts that they were necessarily incurred by the applicant in rus attempts to prevent the violation found and later to obtain redress therefor. Finally, it finds them reasona-ble as to quanturn. The applicant's claims un-der this head, which total NLG 23.271 are the-refore accepted in their entirety.
C. Default interest
53. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest appli-cable in the Netherlands at the date of adop-tion of the present iudgement is 5% per an-num.
For these reasons, the Court
1. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken together with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1; 2. Dismisses by eight votes to one the applicant's claims for pecuniary damage; 3. Holds unanimously that the present iudg-ment constitutes sufficient iust satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustai-ned;
4. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant, within three months, NLG 23.271 (twenty-three thousand
two hundred and seventy-one Netherlands guilders) in respect of costs and expenses, and that simple interest at an annual rate of 5% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement. Partly dissenting opinion ofjudge Foighel
I am in complete agreement with the majority of the Court as regards its finding of a violation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken together with Artiele 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this case. However I am in dis agreement with the view of the maiority that the applicant's claim for pe-cuniary damage should be disrnissed. The Court has found the applicantto be the victim of discrimination as regards the requirement that he make contributionstothe Child Bene-fits scheme. Since this is damage which he has sustained as a result of the violation of Artiele 14 of the Convention taken together with Arti-cle 1 of Protocol No. 1 he should, as a matter of faimess, be entitled under Artiele 50 of the Convention to reeover the contributions that he had made to the scheme. I note, moreover, that this was the view taken by the Court in its Karlheinz Schmidt judgment of 18 july 1994 (Series A no. 291-B, p. 34,§33).
NOOT
1. Deze twee uitspraken van het EHRM zijn van groot belang voor de toepassing van het EVRM in het sociale zekerheidsrecht (zie ook JB 1997120 en 64~ met noot Hennga), Het EHRM is in de eerste uitspraak teruggekomen op eerdere uitspraken inzake de reiksoijdte van art. 1~ EersteProtocol, dat handelt over het ei-gendomsrecht. Dit werd eerst geacht slechts be-trekking te hebben op sociale zekerheidsrechten voor zover er sprake was van de verwerving van een aandeel in een fonds waarvan de grootte van moment tot moment bepaalbaar was en waarbij de premies niet vooral dienden om uitkeringen van anderen op dat tijdstip mo-gelijk te maken (X v. Nederland, Yearbook XIV (1971)~p. 224~ X. v. Nederland~ Year-book XVI (1973)~p. 274 en EeRM 10 juli
1985~ RSV 19901171). Dat zou in Nederland met name van belang zijn vooropbouzostelsels, derhalve alleen voor de aanvullende pensioe-nen en ambtelijke regelingen.
2. In USZ 1997183 gaat het om het recht op Oostenrijkse 'emergency assistance '. Dit lijkt opvallend veel op een Nederlandse bijstands-uitkering. Het EHRM acht het thans vol-doende reden om de emergency assistance onder het eigendomsrecht tebrengen, dat de uitkering
is verleend in vervolg op een werkloosheidsver-zekeringsuitkering, waarvoor een premie is be-taald. De betaling van premies aan een werk-loosheidsoerzekeringsfonds vormt een voor-waarde voor de betaling van een uitkering (ov. 39). Dit roept uiteraard de vraag op of ook de Nederlandse bijstandsuitkering onder het ei-gendomsrecht van het Eerste Protocol zou kun-nen vallen. Immers, ook bij ons gaat aan de bijstandsuitkering veelal een WW-uitkering vooraf De WW kent ook een eigen fonds dat gevoed wordt door premies. Werknemers en werkgevers zijn beide verplicht daaraan pre-mies te betalen, maar de uitkering is niet af-hankelijk van de vraag of er daadwerkelijk premie is betaald, uitsluitend van de vraag of
men aan de inhoudelijke voorwaarden voldoet. Dat geldt al helemaal voor een daarop vol-gende bijstandsuitkering. Die constructie is ge-kozen ter bescherming van de werknemer. In-geval zijn werkgever ten onrechte geen premies betaalt en op het loon inhoudt, met name bij zwart uierh, is deze toch niet onverzekerd. Die uitspraak maakt niet duidelijk of ook in dit ge-val het feit dat premiebetaling verplicht is, vol-doende reden vormt om de uitkering onder art. 1 Eerste Protocol te brengen. Met name over-weging 41~ tweede volzin zou aldus kunnen worden gelezen, dat het enkele ontbreken van een band tussen premiebetaling en uitkerings-recht niet doorslaggevend is. Derhalve is het zeer wel mogelijk dat alle sociale zekerheidsuit-keringen die in de vorm van juridisch bindende aanspraken zijn geformuleerd, onder het Eerste Protocol kunnen worden gebracht. Daarmee zou een einde komen aan de rechtspraak van de CRvB~ waarin werd uitgemaakt dat bij-voorbeeld een AA W-uitkering niet onder het Eerste Protocol viel (CRvB 1 november 1983, RSV 1984/147-150).
3. Het belang van de toepasselijkheid van het Eerste Protocol is mede dat de toepassing van het discriminatieverbod van art. 14 EVRM aan de orde komt. Anders dan bij art. 26 IVBPR is dit discriminatieverbod immers ge-koppeld aan de andere rechten van het Ver-drag. Als gevolg van het bezien van uitke-nngsrechten als eigendomsrecht in de zin van het Eerste Protocol wordt het mogelijk om dis-criminatie in de sociale zekerheid behalve op basis van Richtlijn 79/7/EEG of art. 26 IVBPR ook op basis van art. 14 EVRM aan te vechten. Dit is ten minste om drie redenen van belang. In de eerste plaats omdat het EHRM soms andere criteria hanteert bij de toepassing van het discriminatieuerbod. De tweede reden is dat het EVRM een eigen rechtsgang heeft. Men is niet afhankelijk van
deCRvB~ die hetzij een prejudiciële vraag aan het EG-Hof moet stellen en deze daarna dan weer moet vertalen in de nationale context, hetzij het IVBPR moet interpreteren. Wie het niet eens is met een uitspraak van de CRvB kan dan nog de Straatburgse rechtsgang vol-gen. Het derde belang is dat de werking in de tijd niet is beperkt. De EG-regeling heeft pas directe werking vanaf eind 1984. De directe werking van art. 26 IVBPR is hieraan door de CRvB gekoppeld. Het EHRM heeft een derge-hjk verband met het EG-recht althans tot dus-ver nooit gelegd.
4. In USZ 1997/84 ging het om de premiebe-taling voor de AKW. Volgens de tot 1989 gel-dende regeling waren ongehuwde vrouwen bo-ven de 45 niet tot premiebetaling verplicht. De heer Van Raalte vocht het feit aan dat hij als ongehuwde man wel tot premiebetaling ver-plicht was. In casu komt de kwestie van het Eerste Protocol niet expliciet aan de orde, maar blijkt dit impliciet te worden erkend, nu het EHRM eveneens tot de conclusie komt dat in relatie hiermee een beroep kan worden gedaan op art. 14 EVRM.
•
•
historische uitspraken, waarmee het EVRM ook ten aanzien van het sociale zekerheids-recht weer een belangrijke rol kan gaan spelen op het gebied van bestrijding van discrimina-tie.
GHvV
Diversen
85
CRvB 25 februari 1997,96/2356 ABW (mrs Van den Hurk, Van der Kolk-Severijns en Olde Kalter)
Bezwaar; heroverweging.
Bij het primair besluit van 12januari 1994, dat betrekking heeft op de aan-vraag van 29 november 1993
om
een RWW-uitkering vanaf die datum, is in primo beoordeeld het al dan niet zijn van werkloze werknemer en het eventuele ontstaan van het recht op RWW-uitkering in de periode van 29 november 1993 tot en met 12januari 1994. In het algemeen zal een besluit op een aanvraag alshier-voor bedoeld naar zijn aard zien op de toestand tot en met de datum waarop het besluit is genomen. Gelet op de aard en de strekking van dit primaire besluit was ook voor de heroverweging van dat be-sluit op grondslag van het bezwaar het zojuist genoemde beoordelingstijdvak van belang. Artikel 7: 11,eerste lid, van de Awb verplichtte appellant dan ook niet
om
in de heroverweging wijzigingen in de omstandigheden van betrokkene te betrekken, die niet gerelateerd kunnen worden aan het tijdvak waarop het pri-maire besluit ziet.[Awb art. 7:111
Het College van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Amsterdam, appellant,
en
A.A., wonende te A., gedaagde.
I.
Ontstaan en loop van het geding
Appellant heeft op in het beroepschrift aange-voerde gronden hoger beroep ingesteld tegende uitspraak van de Arrondissementsrecht-bank te Amsterdam van 27 december 1995, nummer R\VW 94/6267/21, waarnaar hierbij wordt verwezen.
Bij uitspraak van 25 april 1996, nummer 96/ 2365 ABW-W, heeft 's Raads president de werking van de uitspraak van de rechtbank ge-schorst totdat op het hoger beroep in de bo-demprocedure zal zijn beslist.
Namens gedaagde heeft mr E.G. van Heus-den, advocaat te Amsterdam, een verweer-schrift ingediend.
Het geding is behandeld ter zitting van 14 ja-nuari 1997, waar appellant zich heeft doen ver-tegenwoordigen door drs V.M. Pavelková, werkzaam bij de gemeente Amsterdam en waar voor gedaagde is verschenen mr Van Heusden, voornoemd.
Il.
Motivering
Met ingang van 1 januari 1996 is de Algemene Bijstandswet (ABW) ingetrokken en zijn de Al-gemene bijstandswet en de Invoeringswet her-inrichting Algemene Bijstandswet in werking getreden. Het in dit geding aan de orde zijnde geschil wordt beoordeeld aan de hand van de ABW en de daarop berustende bepalingen, zo-als die luidden ten tijde zo-als hier van belang. Uit de beschikbare gegevens blijkt, voor zover hier van belang, het volgende.
Gedaagde was sedert 1979 als marktkoopman in kleding geregistreerd bij de Kamer van Koophandel en tevens in het bezit van een marktplaatsvergunning. Hij ontving sedert 13 december 1983 een uitkering ingevolge de Rijksgroepsregeling werkloze werknemers (RWW), welke uitkering bij besluit van appel-lant van 22 juni 1993 ingaande 1 juni 1993 is beëindigd op de grond dat gedaagde werk-zaamheden als zelfstandige verrichtte en daar-door geacht werd te beschikken over de mid-delen om in de noodzakelijke kosten van het bestaan te voorzien.
Bij besluit van 12 november 1993 is een aan-vraag van gedaagde van 21 juli 1993 om bij-stand op grond van het Bijbij-standsbesluit zelf-standigen afgewezen.
Het tegen dit besluit ingediende bezwaar-schrift is door appellant ongegrond verklaard bij besluit van 4 maart 1994. Tegen dit laatste besluit is geen rechtsmiddel aangewend. Op 29 november 1993 heeft gedaagde een aanvraag ingediend om uitkering ingevolge de R\VW.
Bij besluit van 12 januari 1994 is deze aan-vraag afgewezen op de grond dat gedaagde niet als werkloze werknemer in de zin van artikel 1 van de R\VW kan worden aangemerkt.
