The threats we like – on positive reactions towards moral superiors

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The threats we like –

on positive reactions towards moral superiors

Nils-Lukas Udelhoven

ii UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN

DEPARTMENT OF MARKETING Master Thesis in Marketing

The threats we like

on positive reactions towards moral superiors

Author: Supervisor:

Nils-Lukas Udelhoven Dr. Jan Willem Bolderdijk

Korreweg 206a, 9715AM Groningen Faculty of Economics and Business

Netherlands j.w.bolderdijk@rug.nl

+4915168131300

n.udelhoven@student.rug.nl s3290921

Master thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for a MSc in Marketing.

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Abstract:

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Table of Content

Introduction ... 6

Theory ... 7

Social comparison ... 8

Threat to one´s self-concept: the construct of morality ... 9

Threat to one´s self-concept: self-involvement ... 10

Dealing with threats to self-concept ... 11

(Un)arming the moral do-gooder: with modesty ... 12

Method ... 15 Context ... 15 Procedure ... 16 Anticipated devaluation ... 18 Likability/Derogation ... 19 Manipulation check ... 19 Results ... 19 Anticipated Devaluation ... 20 Likability/Derogation ... 22 Mediation Analysis... 24 General Discussion ... 26

Coping with anticipated devaluation through moral do-gooder ... 28

Limitations and future research ... 29

Implications ... 31

References ... 33

List of Appendix schemes and tables ... 39

Appendix A: Questionnaire (exemplary, entailing moral justification-comment) ... 40

Appendix B: Amount of randomly allocated participants (collaborative experiment) ... 47

Appendix C: Amount of randomly allocated participants (focal experiment) ... 47

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List of Figures:

5. Anticipated devaluation through do-gooder Mary (mean distribution) 20

6. Anticipated devaluation through do-gooder Mary, by gender (mean distribution) 21

7. Likability of do-gooder Mary (mean distribution) 23

8. Likability of do-gooder Mary, by gender (mean distribution) 24

6 “While strong in reality, appear to be weak; while brave in reality, appear to be cowardly.” – Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Introduction

Moral do-gooder; we kind of admire them and we kind of hate them at the same time. True, hate is a harsh word. Nonetheless, it adequately describes how we often react to those, doing the right thing. For Cole and Morgan (2011), for example, the hostile media environment British vegans found themselves in inspired them to coin the term Vegaphobia. In another study, participants (228) were asked to relate traits to typical feminists and typical environmentalists (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny & Noyes, 2013). The most popularly stated traits? Feminists are typically “man-hater” (145) and environmentalists “tree-hugger” (151). While some of these findings might be good for a laugh over their absurdity – e.g. for more than half of the respondents it was obvious that the typical feminist is a lesbian (133) – mainly they should concern us. It is the goal of this study to reaffirm or expand previous research on the consequences of morally-motivated deviance and to suggest an approach, on how to reduce the likelihood of provoking negative reactions in the observers of such deviant acts.

After all, eco-systems all over the world benefit from the efforts made by groups like environmentalists, feminists, and vegans. This is especially the case considering the depletion of natural resources expanding full steam ahead (Costanza & Daly, 1992) and the commercial conduct in developing countries only slowly adapting to consumers´ increasing interest in the supply chain (e.g. Bhopal, 1984, see: Varma & Varma, 2005). Additionally, we should bear in mind that we all are affected by the resilience of our planet´s eco-systems. Thus, we should know better than to ridicule those acting morally-motivated, whilst possibly inducing costs upon themselves (Young, Hwang, McDonalds & Oates, 2010). However, us humans can be rather egocentric. So egocentric even that, in some, the first thing observing moral excellence triggers is the question “am I being judged?”. The following paragraphs will consult previous research to illustrate for what reasons and under what circumstances such negative reactions primarily occur. Only if we understand the roots of moral do-gooder derogation, we will be able to tackle its negative consequences properly. Like Cousteau, we will start at the surface (social comparison), dive deep (self-concept) and deeper even still (modesty-solution) into the psyche of humans.

7 shown to react in two broad directions: with inspiration or irritation (Bolderdijk, Brouwer & Cornelissen, 2017). Inspiration can lead observers to increased motivation towards and the imitation of pro-social behaviors (Lockwood & Kunda, 1999; Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Cramwinckel, van den Bos & van Dijk, 2015). As such, it is a desirable outcome as it gets more people involved and many hands make light work. Irritation, on the other hand, can have negative consequences like the derogation of the moral do-gooder (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Monin, Sawyer & Marquez, 2008; Collange, Fiske & Sanitioso, 2009). Now, obviously, the latter should be a thorn in every economist’s side. In the interest of greater investment in sustainable consumption we need to know how to avoid moral do-gooder derogation, so the “putting down of morally-motivated others” (Minson & Monin, 2012).

A possible solution to the problem seems intuitive, however, has been forgone in experimental research on moral do-gooder derogation: modesty. Characterized by being humble and the avoidance of attention-seeking (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides & Kumashiro, 2008), modesty has been proven to be a likable trait in people (Robinson, Johnson & Shields, 1995). A moral do-gooder, who is also modest, might still be accurately aware of their moral superiority. However, they do not boast their own self-worth based on it. On the contrary, they behave self-effacingly and enhance others. On that account, a moral and moreover modest do-gooder could possibly circumvent being disliked. This study will test the meaningfulness of modesty in this context. To that end, we will investigate to what extent the predicted greater derogation of a moral do-gooder, compared to a selfish do-do-gooder, can be eliminated or mitigated by behaving modestly. In order to construct this idea, we apply social comparison theory. Accordingly, the comparison with a moral superior can lead to a threatened self-concept of the observer. Based on this theory this paper argues that modesty first and foremost reduces the observers’ fear of devaluation and consequently the likelihood of negative reactions towards moral do-gooder. Inspiringly, previous research has been partially successful in mitigating anticipated devaluation, by means of making the moral do-gooder appear less judgmental (Howe & Monin, 2017). Through an experiment, testing the influence of a do-gooder’s justification and modesty on anticipated devaluation and likability, we hope to clear (some of) the fog, surrounding this important issue and to expand the moral do-gooder´s (scarce) portfolio of precautious measures.

Theory

8 suggesting that those on the inferior side of upward social comparison are subsequently less committed to their own ethical values. While these findings report stagnating progress, additionally, potential do-gooder engage in “undercover altruism” and hide their morally-motivated behavior (Bolderdijk & Cornelissen, 2017, p.1). This leads to an even further silencing of those, who should be heard. Finally, moral do-gooder are derogated and discredited. They are ridiculed (Cole & Morgan, 2011), stereotyped (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Bashir et al., 2013) and evaluated negatively with regards to personality traits (Monin et al., 2008; Minson & Monin, 2012; Bolderdijk et al., 2017). This derogation constitutes the focus of this study. To this end, we will first elaborate on social comparison theory and subsequently discuss two prerequisites leading to the negative consequences mentioned above.

Social comparison

9 appear threatening as a consequence of social comparison. As such, those two influential factors, namely the construct of morality itself and self-involvement, also provide important design parameters for the experiment.

Threat to one´s self-concept: the construct of morality

According to Alicke (2000), social comparison is the process that allows people to “establish, maintain, refine, or embellish their self-concept” (p. 271). This resonates with Festinger´s opinions and abilities as reflecting on those qualities, through social comparison, is essential for the capability to envision an idea of the self. Our self-concept consists of several domains, including our moral identity (Gecas, 1982; Steele, 1988) and, arguably, we like to think of ourselves as capable, virtuous and good (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Strongly embedded in “human values” (Rokeach, 1973), our moral self is developed from childhood on (Piaget, 1964; Killen & Smetana, 2005). It reasonably follows from its deep-cutting impact on the core of what makes us human that morality achieved universal characteristics (Turiel, 1983; Haidt, 2007). In other words, moral constructs apply to everybody and lay a level playing field for us all to compete and compare our performances. We can apply these characteristics of morality in the setting of morally-motivated consumption. By choosing on a moral basis the do-gooder implicitly condemns all other options as morally inferior (Monin et al., 2008). As observers cannot elude the grip of moral standards and their need for adequacy they compare their own with the observed performance. If their performance pales in comparison, they anticipate devaluation through the moral do-gooder (Monin, 2007; Minson & Monin, 2012; Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers & van de Bos, 2013; Howe & Monin, 2017). This anticipated moral devaluation resembles a threat to the observers’ self-concepts. The integrity of their moral identity is attacked in the light of the moral superiority of the do-gooder. It sounds plausible that observers anticipate that those, who judge certain products as immoral, could judge the buyers of such products similarly. In support of that notion, research has found morally-motivated deviance to facilitate moral do-gooder derogation, while selfishly-motivated deviance did not (Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Bolderdijk et al., 2017).

10 less moral consumption choices, e.g. in retail settings (Bearden, Netemeyer & Teel, 1989), c) the discomfort, resulting from perceived judgment in the moral domain (Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008; Cramwinckel et al., 2013) and d) the human need to uphold moral integrity and reduce discomfort (Festinger, 1962; Steele, 1988). It reasonably follows that the threat anticipated devaluation only occurs when the superiorly performing do-gooder is motivated by moral. We hypothesize that derogation-reactions to a moral do-gooder are rooted and mediated in this anticipation of moral devaluation (see Fig.1). In the present experiment we will demonstrate the threatening power of doing the right thing based on moral virtues. To that end, deviance based on self-interest will serve as a benchmark (or control) for what should not resemble a threat to observers (Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Bolderdijk et al., 2017).

Threat to one´s self-concept: self-involvement

The second antecedent to negative reactions to a moral do-gooder is self-involvement. Upward social comparison will only induce a threat in observers if they are involved in the matter at hand. In the case of self-involvement, the observer has been confronted with a similar or the same decision as the observed other and subsequently performed inferiorly. Exemplary, participants evaluated a moral rebel´s decision to disobey writing a racist essay more negatively if they before complied with the request (Monin et al, 2008). On the other hand, if participants solely observed the morally-motivated act they responded positively to the rebel. In agreement, Cramwinckel and colleagues (2013) show that participants reacted negatively to a confederate refusing to taste meat on moral grounds, only if they had tasted the sample themselves prior to the confrontation. As highlighted earlier, research in social comparison theory stresses the facilitating effect of similarity between the observer and the person of reference (Festinger, 1954; Monin, 2007). Facing two people with the same decision, e.g. accepting or refusing to taste meat, can help facilitating such similarities (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). Following previous research, the experimental design of this study will achieve self-involvement in participants through the tasting of a meat (-containing) sample and the subsequent confrontation with someone who refused to partake in the tasting (do-gooder).

11 In conclusion, self-involvement constitutes a second influence factor to do-gooder derogation. Self-concept threats as the result of upward social comparison are only elicited, when derived from the moral justification of the do-gooder and self-involvement of the observer. If one´s behavior is not different from and implicitly (or explicitly) questioned by the moral do-gooder, then an observer should not feel threatened through anticipated devaluation and derogation fails to occur. In the present experiment both, moral inferiority as well as self-involvement of the observer, will be achieved by requesting participants to taste a meat sample (Minson & Monin, 2012; Cramwinckel et al., 2013) (see Context in the Method section).

Dealing with threats to self-concept

In those cases, in which both of the above-mentioned conditions are met the majority of people reacts defensively (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008; Minson & Monin, 2012; Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Zane et al., 2016; Bolderdijk et al., 2017). This characterization as “defensive” is accurate, as we recall that the derogation of the other is an attempt to protect the self-concept from anticipated devaluation. As a means to this end, devaluating or discrediting the source of the threat is a theoretically sound cathartic exercise (Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Bolderdijk et al., 2017). One approach to deal with a threatened self-concept is affirming observers of their self-integrity, by reminding them of values most important to them (Crocker, Niiya & Mischkowski, 2008). The self-affirmation theory was developed by Claude Steele (1988) and is based on the assumption that humans strive to uphold their self-integrity. This mechanism works so efficiently that even affirming domains, different from the one threatened, proofs sufficient in dealing with self-concept threats (Steele, 1988; Aronson, Blanton & Cooper, 1995).

12 understanding of the functioning of modesty this study predicts to uncover. It seems reasonable to assume that self-affirmation reduces the need to derogate, mainly, yet, not merely, by influencing the observer’s inner processes. This resonates with Monin’s categorization of “moral inferiority” and “moral confusion” as “focused on the self”, while “anticipated moral reproach […] focuses on the other” (2007, p.58). Affirming observers of moral excellence of their goodness influences their self-perception. In comparison, the means deployed by this study aim to influence the anticipated devaluation, in other words, the other-, or threat-perception. Thus far, the author has submitted that social comparison can elicit a threat to the self-concept of self-involved observers if the observed behavior is superior, different from their own, and morally-motivated. This will be demonstrated, by capturing the evaluation of the do-gooder in conditions with the justification either based on self-interested or moral virtues. We predict that the observers’ anticipation of devaluation is underlying the moral do-gooder derogation. Testing, how convincingly anticipated devaluation mediates derogation, will expand the discussion on the sources of moral do-gooder derogation. Equipped with the knowledge of these causations, this study proposes to influence the observer’s threat-perception through modesty in order to reduce the threat at its source. When obtaining participants’ responses on anticipated devaluation and likability, the modest justification-manipulation will constitute the third condition that will be compared with the above mentioned.

(Un)arming the moral do-gooder: with modesty

13 of modesty ought to be taken into account. They represent the manifestation of modesty in interpersonal interaction. Chen and colleagues (2009) devised three such behavioral factors of modesty, namely self-effacement, other-enhancement, and avoidance of attention-seeking. Those factors were composed based on behaviors, that were most popularly related to the term modesty by participants. Therefore, they were a source of inspiration and guidance for the manipulation of the present experiment.

In order to understand how modesty could affect anticipated devaluation and derogation we examine the two behavioral aspects of modesty, manipulated in this study, more closely. Those are self-effacement and avoidance of attention-seeking. Participants in the present experiment were confronted with the comment and picture of a virtual do-gooder. In this one-way confrontation the two modesty-components chosen promised to be the most appropriate and feasible with regards to their manipulation. The previous sections have established that self-involved observers of moral superiority expect to become the target of moral devaluation through the do-gooder. Modesty could eliminate or, at least, reduce this threat. Self-effacement is characterized through “not [praising] one’s own strengths” or even denying them as well as avoiding “inconvenience to others” (Chen, Bond, Chan, Tang & Buchtel, 2009, p. 617). This paper argues that being perceived in this way is difficult for observers to combine with the anticipation of devaluation and harsh judgment. The avoidance of attention-seeking is to the greatest extent self-explanatory. However, it also entails the avoidance of others’ acknowledgment of one’s own superiority (Chen et al., 2009, p. 617). Again, successfully conveyed this impression should counter-act the anticipation of devaluation. As such, proposing modesty as a remedy for moral do-gooder derogation, is a novel research question. In its support, however, modest participants in experimental research seem to appear more honest, authentic, and likable to others; more so than self-enhancing or self-deprecating participants (Robinson et al., 1995). This tendency to viewing modesty as a positive and likable trait is even present in children from the age of eight and upwards (Banerjee, 2000).

14 effect, by adding a modesty-component to the moral justification of the moral do-gooder. Subsequently, the effects of the self-interested justification for deviant behavior (not threatening), moral justification (threatening) and (moral-)modest justification (hypothetically not threatening), can be compared with regards to their influence on anticipated devaluation and likability of the do-gooder.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model. Likability of the do-gooder mediated via anticipated devaluation. The moral justification of deviant behavior (e.g. sustainable consumption) leads to derogation (dislike) unless the do-gooder is modest.

15 moral-justification, compared to selfish-justification (Hypothesis 2a) and, again, mitigated by modesty (Hypothesis 2b). The power of the modesty-manipulation on likability will be judged relative to the results obtained with moral-manipulation – similar to the analysis of anticipated devaluation. Lastly, we suggest the existence of a mediation effect. We hypothesize that anticipated devaluation is at the root of observers’ need to derogate, mediating the downstream effects of the do-gooder’s justification on likability (Hypothesis 3).

Method

The experiment was conducted in cooperation with three fellow students, also conducting research at the University of Groningen. Collectively, four studies, investigating the moral do-gooder derogation, have been conducted. For the purpose of achieving a high sample size we decided to combine our experiments to one, sharing not only the laboratory facility and participants-pool but also the questionnaire (see Appendix: A, for the whole questionnaire). From November 27th _{until December 12}th _{2018 a total of 315 participants answered the}

questionnaire as part of the collective experiment named “Movie and Taste Perception”. The participation was compensated with either 8 euros or study credits (in the first week), and 4 euros during the remaining days (due to decoupling from another study). The author’s home university, the University of Groningen, provided ethical approval for this study.

Context

16 Subsequently, the probability of observers perceiving implicit judgment was high. Therefore, both earlier-mentioned prerequisites for moral do-gooder derogation were provided, should participants have tasted the sample. After eating meat observers were confronted with a fictitious refuser (do-gooder), justifying their choice to forgo the tasting based on either self-interest or moral. In a third condition the moral justification was expanded by a modesty-component. Omnivores (still) constitute the majority of citizens in the Netherlands. Hence, accumulating a sufficient number of self-involved participants, complying with the request to taste the sample (91%) did not pose a problem. In the present experiment more than ninety percent of the participants performed morally inferior and were self-involved, thus, potentially prone to engage in moral do-gooder derogation.

Procedure

Firstly, participants were welcomed in the Virtual Reality lab of the University of Groningen by at least two of the collaborating researchers, conducting the experiment. The theatre in which the experiment took place facilitated a large screen and seats for 19 participants. While one of the researchers instructed the participants, the other operated the screen, lights, and sound in the theatre. The theatre-setting was essential for the manipulation of a fellow researcher (influence of awe on moral do-gooder derogation). Lastly, a proportion of participants was randomly allocated to a second condition that is also not part of the focal study (influence of imperfection on moral do-gooder derogation). The complete allocation of participants over all conditions can be found in the appendix (see Appendix: B). Prior to starting the study, participants were asked to read and sign a form of informed consent.

In a first step the participants were briefed about the ingredients of the sample, assuring that everybody willingly consumed meat. Hereafter, the researchers informed the participants that they were free to forgo the tasting. Subsequent to tasting or refusing the sample, the first two pages of the questionnaire were answered. The questions captured if the participant tasted the sample, reasons as to why they refused (if they did), what their impressions of the sample were, and what dietary preference they had (4 items). The aim of this part of the questionnaire was not only to achieve the self-involvement of participants but also to make their own (omnivore) consumption behavior salient in their minds. Additionally, this tasting laid the foundation for the moral justification of the do-gooder.

17 short videos was shown (cotton field = control, grand nature = awe, both shorter than three minutes). Afterwards, the last step of the experiment was initiated. Participants answered the remaining items of the questionnaire, which started with the confrontation of participants with the do-gooder and meat-refuser “Mary”. Depending on the manipulation, Mary embodied either a selfish, moral or modest do-gooder. She was introduced, using a depiction1 _{and a comment.}

The latter portrayed the justification-manipulation, which was adapted for each condition (see Fig.2 – Fig.4). In the selfish condition the comment stated that Mary refused to taste the pork chips since they contained meat. She elaborated that this decision was driven by a dislike for the “taste and structure of meat” (Fig.2).

Figure 2. Selfish condition. Mary’s comment, communicating a selfish justification for her deviant behavior.

In the moral condition Mary, again, refused to taste the sample because it contained meat. However, in this second condition the justification was rooted in moral concerns (Fig.3). Mary argued that the production of meat is “[putting] a strain on the environment” and is “bad for animal welfare”. As we devised above, these arguments establish Mary as morally-motivated and morally-superior.

1_{The depiction shows a friend of one of the collaborating researchers. She gave her consent to the usage of her depiction in}

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Figure 3. Moral condition. Mary’s comment, communicating a moral justification for her deviant behavior.

In the last, the modest condition, the moral comment was copied and extended by a short comment, representing behavioral traits of modesty (Fig. 4). In addition to being morally-motivated, Mary stated that she tried to be “humble”. Lastly, she communicated that she did not “like to talk much about [her moral motivation and dietary preferences]”.

Figure 4. Modest condition. Mary’s comment, communicating a moral justification for her deviant behavior and, additionally, behavioral traits of modesty.

Anticipated devaluation

19 scale (1 = extremely immoral, 7 = extremely moral). Composed over their mean these items provided a reliable scale (α = .72, M = 4.02, SD = .89). The scale was reverse-coded with higher scores indicating a higher level of anticipated devaluation, simplifying the subsequent interpretation of results.

Likability/Derogation

To capture the degree of derogation the author utilized fourteen 7-point bipolar scales to measure the likability of the fictitious other (cf. Monin et al., 2008). Mary was evaluated within the following parameters: stupid – intelligent, weak – strong, insecure – confident, passive – active, cruel – kind, awful – nice, cold – warm, dishonest – honest, unfair – fair, unpleasant – pleasant, dependent – independent, stingy – generous, immature – mature and low self-esteem – high self-esteem. Hence, higher scores indicate a greater likability of Mary, while lower scores indicate the derogation of the do-gooder. Combined and averaged over their mean the items form a reliable scale (α =.88, M = 4.89, SD = .83).

Manipulation check

Lastly, a manipulation check was included in the questionnaire. This last variable captured if the participants have read the questions attentively and perceived the manipulated elements of the comment. They were asked to recall as to why Mary refused to taste the sample. The options were: “[…] because [she] believes it's immoral” (moral condition), “[…] because [she] believes its immoral. However, [she] initially struggled with not eating meat” (imperfect condition), “[…] because [she] believes its immoral. However, [she] does not like to talk much about it” (modest condition), “[…] because [she] does not like the taste of meat” (selfish condition) and “I forgot […]”.

Results

20 17 and 34. On average they were aged 21.55 (SD = 2.61), male (53%) and Dutch (48%), albeit the various nationalities involved (27). To test the hypothesized predictions participants evaluated the do-gooder Mary with regards to their fear of her devaluation and their liking of her. The tasting of a meat-containing sample provided not only ground for participant’s self-involvement but also for Mary’s moral justification and superiority. The participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions, which only varied in the composition of Mary’s justification for deviant behavior (Fig.2-4). The results obtained in each condition were employed in the analysis of variance and subsequently compared. Lastly, a mediation analysis investigated the validity of anticipated devaluation as the source of defensive reactions like derogation.

Anticipated Devaluation

To investigate differences in the level of anticipated devaluation for each condition, a one-way ANOVA was performed, employing Mary’s justification as the independent, anticipated devaluation as the dependent variable. We used an alpha level of α = .05 for all statistical tests this variable was administered to. In the different conditions (Fig.5) groups were confronted with either a selfish, moral or modest justification (or do-gooder).

21 As predicted in the theory section we found a significant difference in anticipated devaluation between groups, based on the manipulation of Mary’s justification (F (2, 212) = 4.32, p = .014). On average participants only marginally feared devaluation through Mary (M = 4.02, SD = .89). The selfish do-gooder did not represent a threat to observers (M = 3.81, SD = .76). In contrast, the do-gooder portraying moral justification (M = 4.19, SD = .93) led observers to anticipate devaluation significantly more (MDifference = .39, t(171) = 2.97, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .45). This

is in line with hypothesis (1a), predicting that self-concept threats are only associated with morally-motivated deviance not, however, selfishly-motivated deviance. Adding the modesty-component to Mary’s moral justification resulted in a perceptible reduction of anticipated devaluation. However, its effect was not strong enough to eliminate anticipated devaluation (M = 4.07, SD = .95). Moreover, the modesty-manipulation has not been sufficient in establishing a significant difference between the moral and the modest justification (MDifference = -.12, t(129)

= -.694, p = -.489), rejecting hypothesis (1b). The findings contrast the prediction that the fear of moral devaluation can be significantly mitigated by modesty. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of the manipulation on participants’ responses. Albeit the visible effect we cannot attest modesty a strong or even moderate power in affecting anticipated devaluation. Additionally, figure 6 reveals distinct differences when grouping the results by gender of the participants.

22 To test for the influence of participant’s gender we performed an ANCOVA, including gender as a covariate. There was a persisting significant effect of justification on anticipated devaluation, after controlling for the effect of participant’s gender (F (2, 211) = 4.27, p = .015). We can infer that the responses we have obtained from participants are no predisposition of their gender. As we focus on male participants we find a significant difference between groups (F (2, 110) = 3.24, p = .043). The fear of devaluation was significantly smaller in confrontation with the selfish do-gooder (M = 3.85, SD = .76) than it was with the moral do-gooder (M = 4.30, SD = .99; MDifference = .44, t(89) = 2.43, p = .017, Cohen’s d = .51, see Fig.6). Adding the

modesty-component was essential without effect. To male participants Mary’s modest justification (M = 4.30, SD = 1.08) appeared to be just as threatening as her moral justification. The significant main effect of the manipulation fails to manifest when investigating the responses of female participants (F (2, 98) = 2.12, p = .125). Compared to their average male counterpart (M = 4.11, SD = .94) the average female participant did not fear Mary’s judgment (M = 3.90, SD = .81). Yet, in accordance with previous results, the moral do-gooder yielded greater anticipated devaluation (M = 4.08, SD = .86) compared to the selfish do-gooder (M = 3.75, SD = .77). However, in contrast to male participants, adding the modesty-component made the moral do-gooder appear considerably less threatening to female respondents (M = 3.77, SD = .71). For female participants, adding modesty to morality almost entirely reversed the uptick in anticipated devaluation that was recorded, comparing the moral and selfish condition. These findings suggest that while male participants on average anticipated relatively greater devaluation through Mary, female participants were more susceptible to explicit denial of judgment through modesty.

Likability/Derogation

23 7, the modest Mary was liked more than the selfish Mary and less than the moral Mary (M = 4.93, SD = .91).

Figure 7. Likability of do-gooder Mary. Higher scores indicate greater liking of Mary. Lower scores indicate derogation. The y-scale starts at 2.

Most importantly, the analysis revealed a lack of statistical significance for the aforementioned group differences (F (2, 212) = 1.84, p = .162), rejecting hypothesis (2a & 2b). While a perceptible difference can be found between the selfish and moral condition (MDifference = .24,

t(171) = 1.93, p = .0552_{), the differential effect between moral and modest justification was}

close to zero (MDifference = -.06, t(129) = -.42, p = .676). We can conclude that the likability of

Mary does not differ strongly across conditions. Moreover, we could draw conclusions from the weak impact of modesty. However, the defensive reactions we aimed to mitigate in the modest condition failed to occur and thus, the role of modesty remains inconclusive after the ANOVA analysis. Grouping by gender reveals how the responses of female and male varied over conditions (Fig.8). On average, both, male participants (M = 4.77, SD = .79), as well as female participants (M = 5.02, SD = .85) rather liked than derogated Mary. However, Mary’s likability did not differ significantly across conditions (male: F (2, 110) = 1.19, p = .308; female: F (2, 98) = .49, p = .613). Despite the absence of a main effect of the manipulation on likability and in order to solidify the findings above, an analysis of covariance was performed. The lack

24 of statistical significance of justification on likability was validated after controlling for the gender of participants (F (2, 211) = 1,80, p = .167).

Figure 8. Likability of do-gooder Mary, grouped by gender. Higher scores indicate greater liking of Mary. Lower scores indicate derogation. The y-scale starts at 2.

Mediation Analysis

As the findings of the previous section suggest, there is no effect of Mary’s justification on her likability. The differences across groups are small and statistically insignificant. Thus, the relationship that was predicted to be mediated was not detected. However, in order to enrich the unexpected findings obtained thus far, we tested for the proposed mediation effect nonetheless. This study employed model 4 (bias-corrected, 1000 bootstrap samples) of the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). The likability of Mary was chosen as the dependent variable, anticipated devaluation as the mediator and the type of justification as the independent variable. As we recall the latter variable is multi-categorical (selfish vs. moral vs. modest). In order to test the effects of these different conditions the model 4 was adjusted to apply the indicator coding (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). The result of this coding process (see Appendix: D) were the two dummy variables D1Moral and D2Modest. As participants in the selfish condition

25 mediation analysis. Not taking the prior findings into account, we expected a significant effect of anticipated devaluation, mediating the relationship between justification and likability. For confidence intervals we chose a confidence level of 95%.

Figure 9. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard error in parentheses and 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * indicates statistical significance at an alpha level of α = .05. The a-path represents the effect of the independent variable on the mediator, the b-path represents the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable, the c-path represents the total effect, and the c’-path represents the direct effect.

26 mediator (c-path), was insignificant (F (2, 212) = 1.84, p = .16, R2 _{= .02). Historically popular,}

Baron and Kenny state that a condition for mediation is the significance of this total effect between independent and dependent variable (1986). However, more recent research (MacKinnon, Lockwood & Williams, 2004; Hayes, 2013) promotes the use of bootstrapping and the investigation of the confidence intervals. Should those confidence intervals of the indirect effect include zero, then we can assume that the total effect (c) and the direct effect (c’) are not different from each other. Subsequently, we could reject the hypothesis that there is an indirect effect of mediation. As shown in the mediation results in figure 9 the indirect effect did not contain zero in the in the moral condition (95% CI [-.25, -.04]). Therefore, we can assume a statistically significant mediation effect. In contrast, for the modest condition the same requirements did not hold true (95% CI [-.22, .01]). Compiling these findings, we can conclude that the effect of Mary’s moral justification on the evaluation of her likability was mediated by the extent, to which participants anticipated devaluation. This is in line with hypothesis (3). Further support for this interpretation derives from the weak yet significant negative correlation between the two variables (r(213) = -.28, p < .001). However, due to the missing main effect of justification on likability reported in the previous section, as well as to the lack of insignificance of the direct effect (c’) found in this section, we can merely assume partial mediation. Lastly, the author reiterates that those findings only concern the moral justification.

General Discussion

Bolderdijk and colleagues (2017) have presented evidence for the irritant effects, resulting from moral excellence. Precisely, it was demonstrated that the moral justification of deviance yielded more negative evaluations from observers than the selfish justification did. In unison, Cramwinckel and colleagues (2015) show similar effects of motivation for meat-refusers. Concluding their research, Bolderdijk and colleagues (2017) posed the challenge to further investigate if moral do-gooder are beyond redemption or if, for example, communicating a non-judgmental mindset could reduce observers’ need to derogate.

27 however, resulted in a perceptible drop in participant’s fear of devaluation. Female participants were considerably more susceptible to modesty than male participants – the role of modesty will be addressed at the end of this section. Altogether, these findings on anticipated devaluation confirm previous research on the reactions of self-involved participants to moral superiors (Monin et al., 2008; Howe & Monin, 2017).

Surprisingly, these effects of justification have not been reflected in derogation, or likability for that matter. We predicted that levels of anticipated devaluation would be closely tied to the extent participants derogated moral superiors. On the contrary, the do-gooder was liked in every condition (Fig.7), slightly more by female compared to male participants (Fig.8). Most notably, the do-gooder was liked the most when justifying her actions based on moral motivation. How participants reacted to the moral do-gooder was inverted to what the author predicted. Not only do these findings oppose previous research on the reactions to moral superiors. They also raise to question to what extent reactions to self-concept threats are bound to be of negative valence. While the do-gooder in the present experiment did appear threatening, it was not enough to make her the target of derogation. The findings of the mediation analysis add to this supposition. The likability of the moral do-gooder was partially mediated through anticipated devaluation, (in part) confirming that higher anticipated devaluation leads to decreased likability (Fig.9). However, we can only draw incomplete conclusions with regards to anticipated devaluation’s validity as the integral influence on likability (or derogation). Based on our findings we must assume that more factors, other than anticipated devaluation influence the likability of the moral do-gooder.

28 moral inferiors differently according to their gender. Lastly, the author argues that the drop in anticipated devaluation due to modesty should not be disregarded based on the absence of derogation. It should instead be interpreted as an indication for the potential to reduce of self-concept threats. The influence of the do-gooder’s selfish or moral justification is well-documented (Monin, 2007; Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Bolderdijk et al., 2017). We additionally submit that measures of self-presentation like modesty merit further investigation within the context of moral do-gooder derogation. Lastly, it is noteworthy that the sample size in the modest condition (42) amounted to circa half of those sample sizes gathered in the selfish (84) and moral condition (89). This allocation developed due to collaboration with other researchers and might have influenced the power of the ANOVAs conducted.

Merging these findings discussed above, the author proposes that besides the fear of devaluation more factors play a role in determining our reactions to moral superiors. There are threats we seem to like. In spite of self-involvement and an anticipation of devaluation observers can deal with their moral inferiority without lashing out towards superiors. In the following section we will investigate how participants in the present experiment might have maintained their self-worth, before resorting to the need to derogate.

Coping with anticipated devaluation through moral do-gooder

29 moral do-gooder positively in order to create distance between themselves and those, who would presumably evaluate her negatively (other meat-eaters).

The second suggestion of this study derives from the consideration of the potential sources of derogation and their susceptibility to the immediate environment of the observer. Research on moral do-gooder derogation suggests that there are possible sources of derogation, alternative to externally anticipated devaluation (O’Connor & Monin, 2016). One that the author wants to highlight is the notion that moral superiors remind us of our own shortcomings and flaws with regards to the moral domain (Cramwinckel et al., 2013; Bolderdijk et al., 2017). In this case, measures capturing, for example, observers’ self-regard would have certainly had greater explanatory power. In the context of the present study the evidently existing anticipated devaluation was possibly not translated into an offset in self-regard and thus failed to manifest in derogation. Once again, we recall the specifics of the experimental design, precisely, the group setting, in which participants conducted the experiment. Observers might still have formed the impression, that Mary would stereotypically (Bashir et al., 2013) look down on them. However, with the social norm on their side they would simply not care enough to question their own morality based on their meat consumption. Being able to reconfirm one’s actions through seeing others perform similarly, could have reduced participants’ need to derogate in reply to the anticipated devaluation.

Limitations and future research

30 then the modesty-component. Potentially, when the denial of judgment was perceived, the damage done to the participants’ self-concepts was already too great to be reversed. This notion could be tested, by varying the immediacy of the self-concept threat (within the confrontation) relative to when participants perceive the modest self-presentation (e.g. firstly introducing the do-gooder and managing their self-presentation, e.g. modesty, secondly eliciting self-concept threat through justification, and vice versa). Lastly, the different effect of modesty on female and male participants could be explained by gender-specific effects of modesty. Women not only have a favorable perception of other’s modest behavior but also engage in it more often than men do (Brown, Uebelacker & Heatherington, 1998). In the organizational context research additionally found that moderate levels of modesty are only favored over high levels of modesty when attributed to men instead of women (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion & Cialdini, 1996). Therefore, future research could alter gender and level of modesty in order to control for these potential influences.

Secondly, not only with regards to modesty, the way the do-gooder was presented to participants ought to be taken into account, when interpreting the present results. We confronted observers with a fictitious do-gooder, keeping gender, age, ethnicity and other perceptible characteristics constant. Arguably, Mary looks friendly in the picture. Moreover, men and women are influenced differently by in- and out-group biases, which can be manifested in how they evaluate others (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). To be able to rule out that the do-gooder was merely not derogated because she looked friendly in the first place or was female, future research ought to vary characteristics of the confrontation. Such precautions in future experimental design would certainly allow for greater validation of the obtained results. Exemplary, a study similar to this one, could test for the influence of changing demographics of the do-gooder in combination with different levels of modesty.

31 similarly bring to light findings, suggesting the possibility of positive reactions to moral threats, especially in collectivistic societies.

Implications

The most notable implications of this study stem from the fact that it gives rise to more questions than it might answer. However, we believe that it does so in a manner that also provides clear directions for researchers, aiming to expand on or recreate the present findings. Firstly, even when eliciting the fear of devaluation moral do-gooder can be liked. As mentioned in the introduction of the study context, the inspiration through others, leading with good example, is a desirable outcome for societies as a whole. Up until now, we assumed that inspiration is mostly limited to circumstances, which do not implicate the observer. As issues like the emission of hazardous gases through large-scale meat-consumption and automobiles, however, implicate the greatest proportion of people in most societies, promoting the greater cause seemed to be a traitorous endeavor. The present findings show that even though observers indicated feelings of implication through fearing the do-gooder’s devaluation, they refrained from derogation. Is the fear of external devaluation possibly not the source of derogation? Or more interestingly and in unison with our findings, under what circumstances can the influence of anticipated devaluation on likability be negated? How can we robustly recreate the finding of positive reactions towards moral superiors of the present study? And lastly, how should the models we employ, investigating moral do-gooder derogation, be expanded by the consideration of interactions between the potential sources of derogation? These are only some of the questions that, based on our findings, could have potential merit for future investigation. We have reason to belief that potential influences on the likability of moral do-gooder are not mutually-exclusive and that a more comprehensive set of observed variables (e.g. self-regard and group identity) could bring to light valuable and actionable insights. Especially considering the benefits of inspiring others’ pro-social behavior over irritating them, consumer psychologists, marketers and brand manager, as well as NGO’s should drive forward the recreation of the present findings.

32 others. There are several possible explanations as to why coping with self-concept threats in group settings could be facilitated (e.g. social norm on their side, or “cut-off” from omnivore-group after failure) in comparison to individual settings. From a conceptual perspective this requires a revision of the processes, following from upward social comparison, accounting for potential influences of group settings. An interesting research question could be, for example, if group settings initially mitigate the moral do-gooder derogation, or if the group merely represents a safety net for those who perceive great self-concept threats.

33

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39

List of Appendix schemes and tables:

Scheme/table Page

1. Appendix A: Questionnaire, exemplary entailing moral justification-comment 40 2. Appendix B: Amount of randomly allocated participants (collaborative

experiment) 47

40

Appendix A: Questionnaire (exemplary, entailing moral

justification-comment)

Movie and Taste Perceptions

The following survey has five sections; completing the survey takes approximately 10-15 minutes. Please read the questions carefully and answer in English!

Section 1

Did you taste the chips? o Yes

o No

If you refused to taste the chips, please indicate why and continue with Section 2:

--- In three words, please explain what the chips tasted like

--- --- ---

In three words, please explain what kind of thoughts appear when eating the chips --- --- ---

Section 2

How often do you eat meat? o Every day

o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month

o Occasionally throughout the year o Never

How often do you eat fruits and vegetables? o Every day

o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month

o Occasionally throughout the year o Never

How often do you eat chips? o Every day

41 o Occasionally throughout the year

o Never

Do you have any special dietary preferences? o Lactose free o Gluten free o Vegetarian o Vegan o None o Other, namely: __________________

This is the end of section two. Please raise your hand when you are done and wait for further instructions.

42

Section 3

Suppose another fellow participant in this study named Mary (see picture left) refused to eat the chips you tasted at the start of the study. She explained her reasoning with the following comment:

"I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I care about behaving

in a moral way as a consumer and therefore refuse to eat any meat.

Producing meat puts a strain on the environment, and is bad for animal welfare."

Mary

How would you describe Mary?

Stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong Insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active Cruel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kind Awful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nice Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Warm Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Independent Stingy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Generous Immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mature

43

"I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I care about behaving

in a moral way as a consumer and therefore refuse to eat any meat.

Producing meat puts a strain on the environment, and is bad for animal welfare."

If Mary saw what I normally eat, she would think I am:

Extremely immoral

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely moral

Please indicate the likelihood that you, like Mary, would become a vegetarian:

Extremely unlikely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely

Most vegetarians think that most non-vegetarians are:

Extremely immoral

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely moral

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree I would like Mary as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I would like to have Mary as a

colleague

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I respect Mary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Mary would like me as a colleague 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mary would like me as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

44

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

Totally not applicable

Totally applicable

I feel happy with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel dissatisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel self-critical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel angry with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel disgusted with myself

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel annoyed with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I feel disappointed with myself

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Please remember watching the movie and imagine yourself as strongly as possible to being back in the theatre, seeing the movie for the first time.

While watching the movie, to what extent did you experience feelings of…

45

While watching the movie, to what extent did you feel…

Not at all Very much Connected to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Awe-inspired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bored 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fearful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Spiritual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Very much I admire people who

own expensive homes, cars and clothes

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I like a lot of luxury in my life

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I’d be happier if I’d be able to afford more things 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ______________________________________________________________________________ Delicious taste is an important consideration for me when purchasing food

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Can you remember why Mary refused to taste the chips?

Please do NOT look at the previous pages to look for the answer. It’s ok if you forgot. It’s important that you answer honestly.

o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral.

o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she initially struggled with not eating meat.

o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she does not like to talk about it.

46

Section 4

Please indicate the likelihood that you would sign the petition shown above

Extremely unlikely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely

Section 5

How old are you? --- What is your gender?

o Male o Female o Other

What is your nationality? --- What is your SONA ID? ---

47

Appendix B: Amount of randomly allocated participants (collaborative

experiment)

Condition

Condition _condition Selfish Moral condition _condition Modest Imperfect _condition

No awe

(control) 50 50 30 29

Awe 48 49 29 30

Table 1. Amount of randomly allocated participants, over all conditions, of the (collaborative) experiment (n = 315). “Awe” and “imperfection” were not captured in the focal experiment.

Appendix C: Amount of randomly allocated participants (focal experiment)

Condition Selfish condition Moral condition Modest condition

84 89 42

Table 2. Amount of randomly allocated participants, over all conditions, of the (focal) experiment (n = 215).

Appendix D: Indicator coding process (categorical independent variable)

Condition Dummy

variable

Selfish Moral Modest

D1 (Moral) 0 1 0

D2 (Modest) 0 0 1