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Ex-post evaluation of competition policy

enforcement in energy markets: the E.ON

abuse of dominance case

by Tomaso Duso

Discussant: Anneke François (ACM)

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Summary

• Alleged abuse of dominance E.ON by withholding capacity • Commitment E.ON: divesture of 5.000 MW (2009-2010) • Ex-post evaluation: effect of divesture on wholesale prices • Difference in Difference approach

• Counter factual: prices during peak / off-peak hours

• Basic model for estimating prices: demand & supply drivers • Results: strong and statistically significant convergence effects

in short and long run

• Robustness check: placebo regression France and Spain

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Alleged abuse of dominance

Theoretical starting point for ex-post assessment:

“The divestiture of generation capacity should lead to an increase in competition […] which should lead to an increase in energy supply […], which implies an outward shift of the supply

schedule. Subsequently, wholesale prices should decrease c.p.” • In this case: divestment leads to less market power of E.ON,

which should reduce its possibility and incentive to withhold production capacity → outward shift of supply curve!

 However: alleged abuse.

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Difference in Difference approach

• DiD assesses convergence of wholesale prices during peak and off-peak hours over time → assumes all other factors have same effect on development peak and off-peak prices • Peak and off-peak prices as counter factual, because:

“a shift to a lower capacity schedule if capacity is withdrawn […] would have much larger effects during peak time”.

• Is it possible that the convergence should (partially) be explained by the steeper slope of the supply curve during peak hours compared to off-peak hours?

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Alternative approach?

• DiD tries to identify if prices during peak and off-peak hours (before - after divesture) have coverged and attributes the cause of this effect to the divesture.

Possible alternative approach?

• Try to identify relationship between divesture and energy

supply by comparing supply curves before and after divesture. • Assess if the alleged withheld capacity (before divesture) is

part of the supply curve after the divesture.

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