• No results found

Thoughts on "Ex post analysis of two mobile operator mergers in Austria"

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Thoughts on "Ex post analysis of two mobile operator mergers in Austria""

Copied!
9
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Thoughts on "Ex post analysis of two

mobile operator mergers in Austria"

(2)

The big picture

• Consolidation in (and between) fixed telecoms and mobile

telecoms markets

• natural monopolies…

• … in the form of tight oligopolies that are getting even tighter

• How to understand the nature of competition in these

markets?

• What are the implications for competition policy /

(3)

Schwarz's contribution (1)

• Empirical evaluation of effects on retail prices of two recent

mergers in Austria

• Several methodological hurdles had to be crossed

‣ measuring price changes over time: different baskets

(4)

Schwarz's contribution (2)

• T-Mobile/tele.ring (2006)

‣ 5 to 4 merger

‣ result: asymmetric market shares + remaining maverick ‣ effective remedies

‣ decrease in prices

• H3G/Orange (2013)

‣ 4 to 3 merger

(5)

Nevertheless

• Consumer welfare depends on:

‣ price

‣ quality (download speeds)

• What happened to unit prices?

‣ Average revenue/Mb decreased during 2012-2014, at comparable rate

as elsewhere in Europe (Frontier Economics, 2015)

• Impact of H3G/Orange merger on consumer welfare was

(6)

Nature of competition (1)

• Price competition with horizontally differentiated goods

‣ partial model, providing a partial view at best

‣ telecommunications services are essentially homogeneous → price

discrimination + opaque prices

• Large economies of scale / infrastructure investments

‣ do operators pass fixed cost savings on to consumers? ‣ scope for network sharing agreements

In mobile markets, mergers increase prices and levels of

(7)

Nature of competition (2)

• High rate of technological change

‣ 3G, 4G, 5G

‣ quality and speed, mobile services, F2M convergence, OTT ‣ changing nature of demand and usage patterns

• Competition is dynamic

‣ consumers will benefit more from stimulating dynamic efficiency than from protecting static efficiency

• Notion of Schumpeterian competition difficult to apply

because of spectrum rights (entry barriers)

(8)

• Regulators have been pondering about "3" versus "4",

(9)

Reconciling dynamic competition with risk of too little retail competition:

1. "4" may be safe bet

2. economies of scale → network sharing?

3. voluntary MVNO access — backed by threat of access obligations

4. homogeneity: scrutinize differentiation strategies that make prices opaque (brand differentiation is ok though)

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

Cadogan lijkt te zijn gericht op het noordwesten, maar misschien meer naar het Westen doordat de Franse troepen, ook al kwamen zij vanuit het noorden, konden

If channeling would have taken place, patients within the smaller geographical market would have been channeled to hospitals outside the smaller geographical market and the market

While the lag number of reviews and overall rating introduced issues in the survival model it should not here as the modelling of post-adoption usage does not incorporate

[r]

• Alleged abuse of dominance E.ON by withholding capacity • Commitment E.ON: divesture of 5.000 MW (2009-2010) • Ex-post evaluation: effect of divesture on wholesale prices

Example for placebo tests in the synthetic control group approach: Basket ‘low’ in the T-Mobile/tele.ring case.. Results for the

The initial low level of financial inclusion, enabling expansion of mobile money through leapfrogging existing deficient formal banking services, is the mechanism behind

sitions with a firm-age of at least 5 years a country has in a year to the total number of international M&A deals excluding minority and institutional acquisitions of firms of