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Why do states support or oppose the norm of Responsibility to Protect and Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, based on the principles of this norm?
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Russian and US decision making on the Responsibility to Protect’s third pillar in the cases of Libya and Syria.
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Jonas Fritzler Student no. 10600051 June, 2014Master thesis Political Science, International Relations Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Sara Kendall
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Table of contents:
1. The emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect — State support and opposition 4 1.1 Relevance of the concept of R2P and the focus on Libya and Syria 4 1.2 Background: The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the international responses 6 1.3 Concept: Security Council tensions through the lens of compliance theory 7
1.4 Approach: Invoking interdisciplinary literature 9
2. Defining the norm: Evaluation of the legal and political status of the R2P 13 3. Literature Review: The academic debate on R2P and the crises in Libya and Syria 17 4. Theoretical framework: Merging approaches from International Relations and
International Law towards a compliance theory conception 22
4.1 Overview: International Relations theories and international law 25
4.2 Theories on compliance with international law 29
4.2.1 Character of international law 31
4.2.2 State perspectives on international law:
national interests and normativity 34
4.2.3. Practical examples for the application of compliance theories 38 4.2.4 Distilling relevant theories for the examination of state reasoning
for norm support 39
5. Content analysis: Comparison of decision making through the lens of
compliance theory criteria 42
5.1 Methodology: Selection of documents, and analysis outline 42
5.2 Analysis 48
5.2.1 R2P in practice: US and Russian positioning towards Resolution 1973
and the enactment of the NATO intervention in Libya 49
5.2.2 R2P reconsidered: The Syrian crisis and the international response 56 5.2.3 Findings of the analysis of the case studies in regard
of the compliance theory criteria 61
5.2.4 Evaluation and overarching analysis of broader policy tendencies in national policy outlooks: Reiterating or non-mentioning,
solidifying R2P or weakening its long term status? 64
6. Conclusion: Responsibility to Protect as a part of a bigger debate 72
List of Acronyms
Gulf Cooperation Council GCC
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICISS
International Law IL
International Relations IR
League of Arab States LAS
Middle East and Northern Africa MENA
National Security Strategy NSS
National Transitional Council (Libya) NTC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO
Presidential Study Directive PSD
Responsibility to Protect R2P
United Nations UN
United Nations General Assembly UNGA
United Nations Security Council UNSC
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1. The emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect — State support and opposition
This thesis engages with the question why states support or oppose norms in the interrelated context of international politics and the formation of international law. In this concern, the positions of the United States (US) and the Russian Federation (Russia) towards the emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and in particular humanitarian interventions in line with this principle, will be reviewed in the context of the recent crises in Libya and Syria. To answer the question, this work draws on literature from both the fields of International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL). More specifically, this thesis evaluates literature on compliance with international law, reviews in how far it is based on International Relations theories and distills relevant aspects from the different theoretical threads. The objective is to show how an interdisciplinary approach can enhance the debate on state reasonings invoked in favor of norm support or opposition towards the R2P principle. Next to this, the thesis strives to give additional insight into why states support R2P in order to analyze their position towards this concept.
It is necessary to introduce both both R2P as a complex norm as well as the political context of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis. It is furthermore needed to clarify the positions of the US and Russia in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on these matters. The next section problematizes these elements and gives an outlook on the interdisciplinary theoretical approach that is taken within this thesis.
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1.1 Relevance of the concept of R2P and the focus on Libya and Syria
In the last few years, some of the most pressing crises in world politics have been posed by intrastate violence. Especially the conflicts in Libya and Syria have confronted the international community with challenges for the application of international law based on international cooperation on United Nations (UN) level. In this context the emerging norm of R2P, and its third pillar , addressing humanitarian interventions as a last resort, has been a highly debated concept of 1 conflict resolution. The idea of R2P, first formulated by Deng and Cohen in the 1990’s (Bellamy 2008: 618f.) and then picked up by Kofi Annan in 1999 (UN General Assembly 1999), found great attention when it was defined as a comprehensive concept by the International Commission on
In his report “Implementing the responsibility to protect”, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon divides the
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principle of R2P, as it was adopted by the UN General Assembly in the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, into three pillars. Pillar one addresses the “protection responsibilities of the State”, pillar two highlights the importance of “international assistance and capacity building” in support of the first aspect, and pillar three prescribes a “timely and decisive response” to “a rapidly unfolding emergency situation”, which can involve actions under Chapter VII of the United nations and the thus the use of force as a last resort (UN General Assembly 2009: 22).
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and consists of a state’s responsibility to protect its civilians, the international community’s responsibility to support the state in this primary goal and to react, protecting the people of the regarded country, if necessary even by military means as a last resort (ICISS report 2001). Whilst the principle has been adjusted in parts (Bellamy 2008: 624; Mohamed 2012a: 224) , the R2P “was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 2 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006” (Bellamy 2008: 615; UN General Assembly, 2005: 30; UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006): 2) and later elaborated and defined further a Secretary-General report in 2009 (UN General Assembly 2009).
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Although there have been other cases in which the R2P has been implemented, this work examines the most recent two cases: the 2011 uprisings followed by internal armed conflicts in Libya and Syria. Both conflicts have raised question of the right balance for conflict resolution might be: a 3 tendency towards reservation or interference of the international community. States in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) represent contrasting views on how to enact international law. They defend principles of state sovereignty (UN Charter, Art. 2(1)) — a norm that involves “independence”, “equality” and “autonomy” of states (Henkin 1995: 100) — and non-intervention (UN Charter Art. 2(4),(7)) on the one, and the evolving norm of R2P, which has been part of “the initiative to redefine sovereignty as responsibility to the population” (Koskenniemi 2011: 63) on the other hand. Today, the international community — and the UNSC in particular — appears to be divided between different interpretations of international law, as there is an “uncertainty over the strength of the political commitment expressed for R2P” (Welsh and Banda 2010: 214).
As Saira Mohamed states, “what was adopted in the Outcome Document［…］makes clear that this was a
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drastically stripped-down version of the concept” (my emphasis) (Mohamed 2012a: 224). While there was
no big controversy about the first two pillars of the concept, the relevance of the third pillar was relativized decisively: “Instead of articulating any responsibility, the Outcome Document stated only that governments were ‘prepared' to use coercive measures ‘on a case-by-case basis.’ By the time the concept emerged from the United Nations, there was little responsibility left in the responsibility to protect.” (ibid.).
R2P has also recently been invoked in Côte d’Ivoire (2011) after the outbreak of violence following the
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presidential elections in November 2010 (UN Security Council 2011, resolution 1975). But this work will focus on Libya and Syria, as both states and their populations were facing a similar situation of violence outbreak in the context of the 2011 uprisings in the MENA region. The two conflicts have therefore posed comparable challenges to the international community. The crises in Libya and Syria are significant cases for the debate on the R2P, as in both these situations a functioning government was in place. The no-fly zone in Libya was enacted against the Gaddafi regime, which was still in place. Similarly, a Syrian intervention — or at least measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter — were debated by the UNSC member states against the Assad government, which was defined as sovereign by the Russian government (UN Security Council 2011d: 4). The US put forwards arguments in line with the principle of R2P, which was formulated in 2005 (UN General Assembly 2005: 30; UN Security Council 2012b: 5). In this sense the discussion on the
involved conflicting norms of R2P on the one and the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty on the other hand play a major role here.
1.2 Background: The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the international responses
In the Libyan crisis, following the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, the UNSC decided to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011)). Based on the Responsibility to Protect’s third pillar (UN General Assembly 2009: 22), the responsibility to react if a government fails to protect its civilians, the decision to intervene by military means was adopted by UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) and enacted by NATO (Thakur 2013: 69f.). Since that moment, the norm of Responsibility to Protect is part of a heated debate on the international response to the ongoing conflict in Syria. NATO was accused of having acted “disproportionate” as well as outside of its mandate by the Russian representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin (UN Security Council 2011b: 9), and in the academic debate it was raised that NATO had “ignored the restrictions against targeting Gaddafi directly in a transparent effort at regime change” (Thakur 2001: 70). On the other side, the Security Council’s reaction on the crisis was picked up “as a pivotal sign of the norm’s growing acceptance as a guide to international action” (Dunne 2011).
In the case of Syria, there is a gridlock situation in the UNSC. Especially due to the antagonistic standpoints of the United States, representing a problem-solving approach of interference in line with R2P’s third pillar, and Russia as its main opposer of a strong UNSC resolution, pleading for state sovereignty and against external interference, and holding up the need for a diplomatic conflict resolution (MacFarquhar and Shadid 2012; UN Security Council 2012e: 3). Next to other reasonings for their skeptical view towards a strong UNSC resolution addressing Syria, “Russia and China raised directly their reservations concerning the manner in which Resolution 1973, dealing with Libya, had been interpreted expansively” (Zifcak 2012: 18). So, while the Libyan intervention had been described as a milestone for the evolving norm of R2P by some commentators, due to the manner of enactment by NATO, it was also invoked as an evidence, proving the point for non-interference in the case of Syria. Similarly, the Iraq war is assumed to have „raised the bar higher“ for humanitarian interventions (Ignatieff 2013b). Libya might have been an exception, as there was a broad support, leading to a Chinese and Russian abstention rather than a veto, in the UNSC (ibid.). But following the Russian and Chinese reasoning for a reservation of the Security Council in the case of Syria, the intervention in Libya has also expanded the gap between the opposing powers in the UN Security Council, especially as the enactment of the NATO intervention interpreted the mandate, given by UNSC Resolution 1973, in a very broad and extensive way (Gladstone 2012).
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While violence in Libya has led to a quick response of the UNSC, Syria seems to put the international community in a dead end situation. In July 2011 the Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, highlighted the threatening situation in Syria and set it into the context of the principle of R2P: “The Government of Syria is reminded of its responsibility to protect its population, as all heads of State and government pledged to do in the 2005 Summit Outcome Document. They agreed to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement.” (Deng and Luck 2011b). Three years later, even after more than 140 000 Syrians have died in the conflict (Rayman 2014) and millions of refugees are displaced within Syria and in its neighbouring countries (UNICEF 2014: 1) the UNSC member states have not been able to find a consensus on far-reaching sanctions. Since 2011 there is a 4 stalemate situation: “Russia and China, embittered by Security Council actions last year［2011］ that led to Western military intervention in Libya and the downfall of its longtime leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, are intent on avoiding a repeat in Syria. They have consistently objected to any resolutions concerning Syria that would impose sanctions or criticize Mr. Assad ［…］.” (Gladstone 2012). Due to the repeated use of the Chinese and Russian veto it seems unlikely that R2P’s third pillar — the responsibility to react — will be invoked in the Syrian case. Thus, it seems to be that no compromise will be reached for a strong UNSC resolution which would be coherent with the initial idea of the third pillar of R2P: protecting civilians, even by enactment of “coercive action against a state to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm” (Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 99). 5
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1.3 Concept: Security Council tensions through the lens of compliance theory
Right now, the international community — in particular the UNSC as the responsible UN organ — faces a dilemma, as it has to stand on the sidelines of the conflict in Syria and is unable to react with measures that could stop the escalation of the conflict. One has to bear in mind that this thesis does
Since 2011 the UNSC has adopted the resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2059 (2012), 2118 (2013),
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and 2139 (2013). These resolutions address the precarious humanitarian situation, the responsibility to protect the Syrian population, and the alarming and startlingly rising death tolls in the country (see mentioned resolutions). But at the same time all these resolutions have failed to determine significant measures that could halt the persistent civil war by using multilateral coercion or military means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The stalemate situation in the UNSC becomes clear facing the fact that between 2011 and 2014 the Russian
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Federation and China have vetoed four UNSC resolution drafts addressing the situation in Syria (Dag Hammerskjöld Library 2014). The frustration about the veto use of Russia and China among the other member states (especially the United States) gets outlined by MacFarquhar and Shadid (2012).
not strive to identify an appropriate approach on the conflict resolution in Syria. Rather than discussing what reaction on the crises would have been the most effective, this work poses the question why states support the norm of R2P. This research is carried out by means of looking into the case studies of the two conflicts of Libya and Syria, and moreover the UNSC response to these crises. Due to the importance of the UNSC and its main opposing powers Russia and the United States, the decisions made by these two states in particular will be examined here. They do not 6 only seem to be important because of their vote in the UNSC, especially the power to use a veto, but also because UN-actions linked to chapter VII are highly dependent on Russia and the US, among other reasons as there is a lack of military capabilities of other UNSC members (Ikenberry 7 2009: 79).
Because of the strong tension between the major powers both in the UNSC itself as well as in respect of their positions vis-à-vis the UNSC, this work intends to gain further understanding of why this is the case. Put differently, it asks why states support the evolving international norm of Responsibility to Protect, or oppose it. According to Finnemore and Sikkink the impact of norms can be examined by looking into how norms and state behavior are interrelated and whether norms pose an independent moral “oughtness” and prompt “justifications for action” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). The question thus is how the regarded states position themselves towards the evolving norm of R2P and its values. Do they directly oppose the principle in their arguments or do they help establishing a new norm by reiterating it, taking the position of a “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898)?
This work engages with literature on compliance with international law. Because of the current status of R2P as an "emerging norm” that is both legal and political (Stahn 2007: 108), it is difficult to ‘measure’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891f.). Thus compliance with the norm is hard to evaluate and it is impossible to exactly assess in how far states comply. A strict research question, only addressing state compliance with the international norm of R2P would not do justice to the complexity of such a normative model and its impact on international politics. Therefore, this thesis
The key role of the two major powers as the counterparts in the UNSC becomes visualized when looking
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into the Kosovo conflict, and the linked debate on a humanitarian intervention. In this case Russia and the US were also the ones whose positions were clashing the most regarding the prominent and heated debate on the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Wheeler 2000: 275).
This could also be seen in the case of the no-fly zone in Libya, which was highly dependent on the US air
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force. As Walt highlighted before the intervention, “In practical terms, any strategically meaningful military intervention in Libya would depend almost entirely on U.S. forces and logistics” (Walt 2011). In line with this assessment, the US only passed the military command for the Libyan no-fly zone to NATO after more than a week, as the US President confirmed in his speech on Libya on March 28, 2011: “Our most effective alliance, NATO, has taken command of the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no-fly zone” (Obama 2011a).
strives to compare the state positioning towards the norm of R2P — whether supportive or opposing — and in particular its most controversial third pillar.
A look into the Russian and US decisions can help to get a deeper understanding of the involved political tensions between the two powers, and the question why no breakthrough has been achieved yet as to a collaborative UNSC response to the Syrian crisis. For this purpose, it is important to compare the statements and speeches delivered by representatives of the permanent UNSC member states, Russia and the US.
As Jaye Ellis writes, “the international regime, does not exist in a neutral, apolitical space between states” (Ellis 2002: 279). Therefore, institutions like the UNSC cannot be seen as one united actor but rather as a platform for cooperation in which compromises remain tobe achieved. “International legal discourse takes place in various ways and settings, but it is most intense in international organizations. When the relevant law is UN Charter articles on peace and security, the Security Council is the central arena.” (Johnstone 2003: 452). The UNSC is a “political body” that acts within the “limitations of the Charter” and is also the institution which “Either through a rational application of lessons learned or the inertial impact of precedent” can “reinforce inchoate norms” (ibid.: 452f.). In the discourse between the UNSC member states, international norms such as the R2P are not only aiming for approval, but especially for support, “regardless of narrow national interests”, heading towards a more universal application of the norm (Mohamed 2012b: 321). This means that the re-crafting of state sovereignty through R2P (and particularly its third pillar) intended to create a clear notion of humanitarian interventions that is supported by states, even if this is not in line with their strategic interest. While acknowledging that there is no support without reservations for the norm of R2P, this work focuses on what kind of reasoning leads to support or opposition. Therefore it is helpful to look into the arguments carried out by Russia and the United States through the lens of a theoretical framework of criteria for measurement of the different interests and reasonings. For this objective the existing literature on compliance with international norms and law that draws on International Relations theory as well as on a International Law school of thought will be invoked here.
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1.4 Approach: Invoking interdisciplinary literature
The interdisciplinary approach can help to give an understanding of the complex causalities of international politics and international law. As Koh puts it “International Law now comprises a complex blend of customary, positive, declarative, and ‘soft’ law” (Koh 1997: 2630f.), while state politics influence the emergence of new law through treaties and practice (Henkin 1995: 33).
Especially due to the central role of states in the making of non-treaty law or customary law it is not sufficient to only look into International Relations theories and political aspects. As customary law gets “developed by custom, by general, repeated practice and acceptance”, legal views on the issue of norm emergence concerning the R2P have to be discussed here (ibid.). By deciding to support certain norms, states develop their own policy engaging with the tense relation between treaty law, moral values, and strategic interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). Through their policy, states can influence the emergence of peremptory norms (jus cogens), that can develop an own influence on treaty law (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53). Even though the norm of R2P does not have such an impact, is not binding and “has no direct means of enforcement” (Mohamed 2012a: 226), it includes moral claims and can help solving conflicts between existing norms and rules or put forward certain interpretations of such. Norms can support a purpose, strengthening certain values and stand between moral claims and legal claims. So, an interdisciplinary approach is needed here, as the application of international norms like R2P incorporates political decision making but also the acceptance and the support of different rules and norms in international law. Guzman claims that “Without an understanding of the connection between international law and state actions, scholars cannot hope to provide useful policy advice with respect to international law” (Guzman 2002: 1826). Moreover, Anne-Marie Slaughter states three main reasons why an interdisciplinary approach can enrich international legal theory. The first one is defined as a problem solving way “to diagnose or reframe a variety of international problems and to formulate policy solutions” and strives to give policy recommendations (Slaughter et al. 1998: 374). The second way aims to “Analyze Particular International Legal Institutions” and helps to “sharpen our understanding of the function of particular institutional arrangements” such as treaties and international organizations (ibid.: 375f.). And as Slaughter puts it, the “third approach uses IR to critique and reconceptualize particular rules, institutions or international law as a whole” (ibid.: 377). Within this work, all these aspects play a certain role, as it strives for a further understanding of the political and legal reasonings for norm support or opposition. By looking into the political bargaining in the international law forming institution of the UN Security Council it aims for a better understanding of this institution.
Within this work the decision making of the UNSC — conducted through a very small number of states — and the consequences of the political influence possessed by the permanent member states of the UNSC will be reviewed. This thesis builds upon the assumption that the permanent member states have a strong influence and play an important role in the policy formulation of the UNSC. Therefore, the work focuses on the positions of two major veto powers in the Security Council, the
US and Russia. An analysis of state reasonings for decision making regarding the R2P can be relevant for future cases of R2P debates in the Security Council and can help finding a consensus, by giving a further understanding of interests and involved values. In order to increase knowledge of state decisions it is important to define a set of influencing factors that can be used for a content analysis. Therefore, this thesis draws on literature on compliance with international law which can help to give an insight into norm support of R2P. A relevant set of criteria from this theoretical approach will be applied to the decision making of Russia and the US respectively, in the case studies of Libya and Syria. For this analysis policy documents from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the UNSC, and also other official statements will be analyzed.
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In the debate on compliance with international law, especially authors like Abbott, Slaughter, Keohane and Moravcsik, but also Kreps and Arend have a comprehensive approach as to why states support international law. These authors’ positions get discussed in the theoretical chapter. This thesis aims at distilling what aspects of the discussed theories can be of particular use as a set of criteria for a comparison of the decision making of the US and Russia in the case studies regarded here. As will be showed in the following chapter, the debate on Libya, Syria, and state-reasoning in favor of or against support of the R2P has instigated a scholarly debate. The contrasting views vary from a realist standpoint, focusing on strategic aspects, to liberal ideas, emphasizing on the meaning of institutions, or constructivist thoughts highlighting the meaning of social interaction. This thesis is based on the idea that state support of international norms cannot only be explained based on a single theoretical thread. In the regarded cases there are not only explanations building upon realism and strategic game theory approaches that play a role, but also different strands of liberal and constructivist views that motivate norm adherence or opposition. Especially literature on compliance with international law can help to give a deeper understanding of how Russia and the United States were motivated in their decision making. One can examine this by evaluating how they defend the idea of humanitarian interventions under the umbrella of the R2P and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and conversely the existing international law, that highlights the principles of non-intervention (Art. 2 (4) UN Charter; Art. 2 (7) UN Charter), and state sovereignty (Art. 2 (1) UN Charter): “R2P sits at the intersection of three different legal regimes: sovereign equality; the use of force and non-intervention” (Welsh and Banda 2010: 215).
Whilst trying to shed some light onto the debate on support of the norm of R2P it is important to note that “given the messy reality of international relations［…］we can never really know why
states follow rules of international law” (Kreps and Arend 2006: 331). That being said, International Relations theory “must seek to make some kind of evaluation — even if it is a contingent, imperfect one — of why states act as they do” (ibid.). Thus, while the aim of this work is to give a further insight into state’s positioning towards the Responsibility to Protects’ third pillar of humanitarian interventions, it cannot claim to uphold the principle of completeness. Nevertheless the contribution of this thesis lies especially in the interdisciplinary perspective — involving IR and IL, and engaging with diverse theoretical threads — which increases the understanding of a debate that appears to be gridlocked by its clear dividing lines and helps to avoid a too narrow approach.
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Before addressing the cases of Libya and Syria as well as the involved interests of Russia and the US, the following chapter gives a definition of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm and highlights the political and the legal aspects that it incorporates. This definition constitutes the basis for the following chapters, as it is helpful to have a clear definition of the norm which lies at the heart of the issue at stake.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the academic debate on the question why states have supported the application of R2P’s third pillar in the case of Libya in 2011, while the Syrian crisis has proven to be unresolvable due to the lack of consensus in the UNSC. This is necessary not only as a basic insight into the main arguments that are put forward in the debate of IR and IL scholars, but also to underline the tensions and the shortcomings of the predominant engagement with the concept of R2P. The gap between the opposing views on R2P, a very controversial issue of international politics, tries to get overcome within this work by choosing an interdisciplinary approach, building on different IR theory threads.
Chapter 4 consists of a theoretical framework for the analysis of policy documents. It discusses different IR theories and their positioning towards international law, legalist approaches to a theory on compliance with international law as well as practical examples that serve as a complementary concept next to the discussed theories.
Chapter 5 starts with a discussion of the methodology used for the study of policy document, to then analyze official statements and speeches by heads of states and government representatives of the US and Russia addressing the crises in Libya and Syria. During this analysis the categories defined in the theoretical chapter will be used as guiding principle. Finally, the findings get set into the context of the theoretical criteria of compliance theory and then get evaluated in the context of more long term policy plans of Russia and the US to give a broader outlook.
2. Defining the norm: Evaluation of the legal and political status of the R2P
Explaining the evolving norm of Responsibility to Protect cannot be done in a clear cut definition. It has been agreed upon the principle at the World Summit in 2005 (UN General Assembly 2005: 30), and its content is not to be confused with the outcome document of the ICISS, called “Responsibility to Protect” (ICISS 2001). The R2P builds upon existing customary international 8 law such as the “obligation to prevent and punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity” (UN General Assembly 2009: 5). States do not have a legal obligation to adhere to the principle and there is “no legal enforcement” (Mohamed 2012a: 226), the complex concept as such is not part of customary international law but rather consists of a recommendation and prescribes the international community to act in certain situations. “R2P seeks to motivate states to intervene even when they do not have particular national interests driving them to do so” (Mohamed 2012a: 226). But the status quo of the principle of R2P is different (ibid.). As it is put by Albright and Williamson from a US perspective, the “R2P is not a straitjacket but a platform on which U.S. leaders can join with partners in progressing toward a set of widely shared goals” (Albright and Williamson 2013: 21).
Following Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s so-called “norm life cycle” the initiation of the ICISS report in 2001 and its publishing could be regarded as part of the norm’s stage of “emergence”, in which “ideational commitment of norm entrepreneurs” leads to the emergence of a new concept (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898). At this point R2P was not a genuinely new concept but rather the redefinition of existing aspects of international law. Nevertheless, 2001 marks a change of language in the debate on humanitarian interventions, and the ICISS report has led to a clear definition of the concept. While R2P was lacking in precision as well as in acceptance at this stage, it was put forward by “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898) aiming for a strong influence of this new principle. From a realist perspective such a norm plays a minor role unless it suits national interests, while it is also acknowledged that normative aspects “limit states’ exercise of power” as a balance of moral values and power politics has to be found (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). Thus, from a constructivist perspective, due to its formulation in the World Summit Outcome Document 2005 (UN General Assembly 2005: 30) R2P already appears to be a new reference magnitude with a potentially strong influence.
The second step in the norm life cycle is described as “norm cascade” (ibid.: 896), leading to a “legitimacy” and “reputation” of the regarded concept, which includes a broad acceptance (ibid.:
See footnote 2.
898). Building upon norm compliance theory, a strong normative standing, based on a capable legitimacy of the involved values leads to a broad support (Chayes and Chayes 1995: 4; Kreps and Arend 2006: 348f.). In the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document the UN member states unanimously agreed upon the following definition of the 3rd pillar of R2P: “we are prepared to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis［…］” if peaceful approaches have been exhausted (UN General Assembly 2005). Although not binding to the states agreeing on R2P in the General Assembly, the norm and its values have gained prominence and impact through this procedure.
After having a clearly defined norm that a number of states have agreed upon, the next step in the life cycle of a norm is defined by “internalization” leading to a general conformity (Finnemore and Sikkink: 896f.). The problem of the R2P lies in the fact that there is no general “obligation” (Abbott et al. 2000: 402; Kreps and Arend 2006: 353) for states, but rather the need of UN Security Council authorization for action which is highly depending on the decisions of the member states, especially the permanent members whose strong support often is needed for enactment (Ikenberry 2009: 79). While it poses only few obstacles to agree on a general obligation of states to protect their citizens, especially the third pillar of R2P which collides with the principle of equal state sovereignty defined in the UN Charter Article 2 (1) and non-intervention (Art. 2 (4),(7) UN Charter) remains a controversially discussed issue (Bellamy 2008: 616). While all UN member states have agreed upon the need to react, there is disagreement on which situation can be seen as qualified for such measures. So, the R2P’s principle of humanitarian interventions as a last resort leaves the question how the UNSC member states can conduct an objective decision making on humanitarian interventions following the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, in which cases it decides to intervene and when it does not, and in how far the UN General Assembly’s decision has an effect on the UNSC’s policy. Apparently the norm as such lacks in precision, which also has a strong influence on compliance with international law (Chayes and Chayes 1995: 10).
At this point R2P can be seen as a norm, strengthening argumentation in support of a humanitarian interventions, and also as an aspect that leads to the need for justification of non-support (Finnemore and Sikkink: 892). In a constructivist effort norms can be regarded as continuously renegotiated principles that can lead to “new patterns of politics”, as non-conform action with norms leads to disapproval (ibid. 891f.). But as R2P is a rather complex norm which is constituted by different other norms and treaties of international law and furthermore opposes some legalized
principles it cannot yet be described as a broadly internalized principle. A norm in the stage of “internalization” is assumed to have reached the status of general conformity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898). This is difficult to measure, especially when examining the third pillar that collides with UN Charter norms in several instances. Therefore, R2P is being shaped through politics as reinterpretations of international law. The no-fly zone in Libya for example had an impact on state perspectives on an intervention in Syria, as it was highly disputed. The debate on 9 R2P is an expression of the tension between humanitarian interventions as an expression of a prioritization of humanitarian law and a collective defense of humanity on the one side (Stahn 2007: 100), and the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty on the other. Those contrasting principles of international law play an important role here because they get invoked by states justifying their positions towards the R2P enactment in Libya and Syria. As Finnemore and Sikkink define it, norms make a difference in politics as they change the “standards of appropriateness” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888) and lead to the need of justification of non-support of the norm (ibid.: 892).
One can discuss in how far R2P has a legal status, or if it is more of a political norm (Stahn 2007: 108). Some describe the concept of R2P as a “political rhetoric”, others call it an “emerging legal norm” (ibid.), which is “dynamic” and “has and will continue to develop” (Rosenberg 2009: 470). Its relatively quick acceptance through the UNGA in 2005 and the UNSC in 2006 has given the principle a fairly strong legitimacy, but due to differing framings of the R2P’s enactment in Libya it is unclear whether it will be developed further as having a strong legal status. At this point it seems unlikely that such a broad normative principle, lacking in precision and involving the use of military force (an integral part of state sovereignty), will become a custom of states. States are likely to reserve themselves certain sovereignties. In particular because “No law exists in a vacuum, much less law on such a complex and contested issue as intervention” (Cronogue 2012: 126), which includes the use of national military assets. How political the enforcement of international law through the UNSC is becomes visible in statements on the intervention in Libya. On the one side, Vladimir Putin stated that UNSC Resolution 1973 was “defective and flawed” and “resembles medieval calls for crusades”(Bryanski 2011), on the other side Obama has supported the notion of a no-fly zone based on humanitarian needs in his justification of the NATO mission in Libya (Obama 2011a).
This impact of state interpretations of law in and outside the UN Security Council on future state decisions
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gets revealed notably in a statement made by the Russian representative to the United Nations, Vitaly
Churkin: “The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience” (Churkin 4 Oct 2011: 4).
Within this work both the effect on political rhetoric as well as on the emergence of the legal status of the concept, will be taken into account as they both lead to different layers of state interests, whether they are of a strategic or more of a normative nature. States have a strong influence on the emergence of new customary law, creating precedents and supporting certain principles: “Multilateral law-making is a complex of political actions and layers of negotiations. States are subject to persuasion, to the influence of group commitments and the claims of solidarity with other states of like mind and common interest. The politics of international law shape emerging law, whether by custom or treaty.” (Henkin 1995: 40f.) Hence, states can either decide to support a more universal acceptance of a principle through their practice or they can keep such principles as a tool for justification while using them selectively. Speaking in the context of Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s theoretical approach states can either lead a norm further from the status of “norm cascade” towards “internalization”, or use it as a tool of argumentation while it is situated in the status of “norm cascade” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895).
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3. Literature Review: The academic debate on the R2P and the crises in Libya and Syria
This chapter seeks to outline the different positions in the academic debate on humanitarian interventions in Libya and Syria in order to give an oversight of the different standpoints and how they can be subsumed under certain theoretical frameworks. This part of the thesis aims at showing tensions that are predominant in the debate and provide distinctions between the different theoretical presumptions that they build upon. It provides a literature review while locating the different approaches within the field of International Relations theories. This review is not only meant to function as an oversight of the different positions taken by scholars engaging with Libya, Syria, and the third pillar of the R2P, but also to show predominant shortcomings in the debate. While the regarded issue — humanitarian interventions in the framework of R2P — has been highly debated over the last few years, many scholars have a rather narrow view on the topic, only examining them through one theoretical approach, and taking a strong position supporting one side by either strongly arguing that the Libyan no-fly zone was legitimate and has to be the concept of choice for a solution of the Syrian conflict, or not. Similarly, the Syrian debate on a strong UNSC reaction to the crisis — and to the use of chemical weapons in August 2013 in particular — faces antagonistic standpoints. Obama’s red line concerning chemical weapons use in Syria, which is based on claims of humanitarian principles as well as the internationally accepted principle of non-use of chemical weapons (Obama 2013b), is accnon-used to give rebels an incentive to “push the Assad government to cross that line” (Dunne 2013). Next to this, Russian President Putin emphasized the damage that could be done to the United Nations by unilateral action of the US and a coalition of the willing (Putin 2013). This concern about unilateral actions is an initial problem of the R2P concept: the “confusion about the relationship between R2P and non-consensual military intervention” (Bellamy 2008: 616).
While the current debate appears to be biased in this sense, siding either with a strong understanding of R2P or vice versa with a wide scope of state sovereignty, scholars as well as major UNSC powers are divided. This work therefore builds upon an interdisciplinary approach, not only incorporating different fields of study but also various theoretical paths from International Law that also draw on International Relations theories. By making use of such an interdisciplinary approach, this work is an attempt to overcome the ideational abyss that divides the current debate.
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While the two cases discussed within this thesis appear to have started in a similar way (that is, in the context of the 2011 uprising in the MENA region) there are some differences that might have
triggered the response in Libya, and in contrast the inability of the UNSC to act decisively in Syria. In the case of Libya, a substantive amount has been written about why the UNSC was able to react so quick and based on a far-reaching mandate, that applied the R2P’s third pillar and acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by military means (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973). Bellamy and Williams highlight the “gatekeeper” role of regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) to have sparked the quick response of the international community in Libya (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 839). In contrast to the case of Syria, this consensus of regional organizations supporting a collaborative UN reaction can be seen as a game changer (ibid.: 841), especially as relevant regional actors are explicitly mentioned in the 2005 Outcome document of the UNGA (UN General Assembly 2005: 31). Next to the emphasis on regional organizations, the role of strategic interests — strongly linked to the question of domestic support — has been mentioned in the debate.
Looking into strategic state interests (rooted in realist thought) there is no striking interest for states in humanitarian interventions if it is not for the purpose of strategic balancing or other integral state interests related to the concerned state. “Realists are skeptical of the idea that universal moral principles exist and, therefore, warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to adhere to some indeterminate notion of ethical conduct“ (Dunne and Schmidt 2011: 86). Following this thought, there is no direct state interest in intervening in Libya or Syria. This risk therefore can only be taken if it is based on a UNSC resolution and gets broad support. Realists point out the danger if such an intervention is opposed by one of the major powers in world politics, as in the case of Syria. In contrast to this strict realist notion of state interests, Barack Obama defended the need of a no-fly zone by highlighting the US “interests" as well as “values” supporting the Libyan claim of human freedom (Obama 2011a). Parallel to such a statement, Vladimir Putin’s claim that Russia is defending principles, not interests (Putin 2013) points at the central role of a discussion of the role of interests. The different ideas of state interests — whether normative or strategic — will be discussed at a later point in this work.
Addressing different aspects that influence state decision making Zifcak characterizes three aspects: “strategy”, “principle” and “politics”. He defines “strategy” as a realist thinking on the interests of UNSC members and the risks of an involvement in a conflict (Zifcak 2012: 31). As such, addressing the criteria of “strategy”, Russian export interests in Syria are mentioned, but also the high risk of a major conflict in the unstable MENA region (ibid.: 31ff.; MacFaquhar 2011). What Zifcak calls “principle” involves the tension between R2P on the one side, and state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention on the other side (ibid.: 28). When it comes to the question of
strong UNSC responses to the Syrian conflict the principles of state-sovereignty and non-intervention are both supported by Russia and China (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 843). The category of what is subsumed under “politics” is an aspect that is closely linked to strategic thought. It revolves around the questions if there is domestic support in the country of crisis and what the domestic situation within the state of concern is (Zifcak 2012: 26). In respect of the domestic situation, one major difference between the two conflicts is that in 2011 Libya had a united opposition, called the National Transitional Council (NTC), that supported an intervention (Fadel and Sly 2011), while Syria is divided into different ethnic groups and seems likely to fall into a sectarian war scenario (Izady 2014; Fisher 2013).
Following the enactment of UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya, which was brought into action in a broader interpretation of the mandate and included bombing of Gaddafi’s military facilities (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 845), there has been a lot of critique towards western states using mandates of humanitarian interventions for conducting a regime change (ibid.: 847). Recently a gridlock situation in the UN Security Council could be observed. Besides, both scholars and political representatives were divided between a general skepticism towards further use of the norm of R2P on the one side, and authors like Thakur and Ignatieff , defending the principle, on the 10 other side.
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Criticism towards the R2P describes the enactment of the norm in a cynical way as a “responsibility to regime change” and opposes the idea of what gets described as “cosmopolitan acts of sovereignty, recognized by ‘the international community’ or not, kill in the name of humanity — from air, soil, or sea” (Çubukçu 2013: 43f.). Occasionally, the idea of humanitarian intervention even gets set into the context of colonization (ibid.). Next to this, a selectiveness in the choice for humanitarian interventions found itself under strong critique after the NATO enactment of the no-fly zone. It was argued that coherence and consistency were lacking, “unless measured from an exclusively geopolitical standpoint” (Falk 2011). From this point of view the intervention could not be seen as an “effort to protect Libyan civilians” but “rather as an unauthorized attempt to turn the tide of the conflict in favor of the insurrectionary campaign by destroying as many of the military assets possessed by Libya’s armed forces as possible, clearing the path for a rebel advance” (ibid.). Thus, some authors criticize the norm heavily, claiming that “the R2P calls for coercive pressure only against states, either in the form of military action or ‘sustained diplomatic, economic, and
Both Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur are authors of the 2001 ICISS report on Responsibility to
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legal pressure’” (Kuperman 2011: 128). According to Kuperman the idea of humanitarian interventions failed “to deter or prevent” in crises like Bosnia and Kosovo (ibid.). This debate draws attention on some major problems of UN Security Council actions under chapter VII addressing humanitarian reasons are: who gets deterred in what situations, what side of a conflict gets supported, and what is going to happen afterwards?
In strong opposition to critical voices, Thakur writes about the success of R2P in Libya: “NATO took almost a full decade to intervene with air power in Kosovo in 1999; in Libya, it took just one month to mobilize a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians”. He then concludes by describing the outcome as “a triumph for R2P” (Thakur 2013: 69). Michael Ignatieff takes this claim even a step further, and writes in favor of unilateral R2P engagements as a last resort if the UNSC is not able to react (Ignatieff 2013a). Following his idea, the UN and its ideals get weakened anyway: either because the international community is not able to act within its principle of R2P or because western states intervene in the conflict without a UN-mandate and curtail the meaning of the UN and the principle of state sovereignty (Ignatieff 2013a). But according to Ignatieff there 11 should be a priority on the protection of civilians (Ignatieff 2013b).
One of the dilemmas regarding the implementation of the R2P is the “‘political strategy’ criticism” that is given by the small group of decision making countries in the UNSC (Cronogue 2012: 126). As UNSC decision making consists of a small number of states and there are only five permanent members, the interests of those states play a decisive role when it comes to the Responsibility to Protect.
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As discussed in this chapter there is a vivid debate on the two cases that are examined within this thesis, and on the norm of R2P as a justification for humanitarian interventions. The objective for this work is not only to discuss scholarly views that are mostly tending towards certain interpretations that are either skeptical or optimistic as to the functioning of the R2P and the principle of humanitarian interventions, but rather to look into the main opposing standpoints in the Security Council, the ones of Russia and the United States. The question is in how far they support either the R2P and the principle of humanitarian interventions or support a strong interpretation of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. And more importantly, why they do so. Not Especially the moral reasoning of Ignatieff’s argument is striking here: “When the Security Council blocks
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action and states get away with gassing their own people or killing them en masse, the rule of law suffers and the authority of the Security Council is diminished.［…］States that act to defend civilians in the absence of Security Council approval have political, if not legal grounds to argue that they are, in fact, defending international law.” (Ignatieff 2013a).
only in recent crises but especially in the case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the positions of Russia and the US were antagonistic. The use of force in the enactment of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was described as a necessity “to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe” on the side of the US, and highlighted as a violation of the principle of non-intervention on the Russian side (Wheeler 200: 277; UN Charter, Art. 2 (4); UN Charter, Art. 2 (7)).
In order to examine these different positions, the next chapter strives to define a theoretical framework for the clarification of the norm of R2P and the analysis of policy documents. An interdisciplinary framework of theories from International Law and International Relations scholarship can help define the status of the norm R2P, which shall be explained in more detail. A complementary concept of three different threads will be introduced. At first, a basis will be set by an engagement with International Relations theories and their view on international law. This helps elaborating the next step, a discussion of literature on compliance with international law. The third section discusses practical approaches towards norm compliance.
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4. Theoretical framework: Merging approaches from International Relations and International Law towards a compliance theory conception
This work contrasts and juxtaposes state decisions and reasoning of the United States and Russia in the cases of Libya and Syria following the 2011 uprisings in the MENA region. It aims at uncovering reasons for state support or opposition towards the norm of R2P. This chapter therefore provides a theoretical framework in order to carry out such a comparison, and strives to define a set of criteria that can be used in content analysis of official documents expressing state policy of both Russia and the US. For this purpose, this chapter engages in an evaluation of existing literature on compliance with international law, distilling factors that can be relevant for the case of norm support. The theories taken up here originate both in IR as well as IL theories.
The first part of this chapter discusses the connection between IR theories and compliance with international law, as well as the different threads concerning ideas of compliance theory. This chapter starts with an overview of IR theories and their perspective on international law, as IR theories are invoked by the different compliance theory approaches. The second part consists of a discussion of existing literature on compliance with international law. As there are some relevant applications of compliance theory that can help cultivate a deeper understanding of norm support, practical examples are considered in the third section. However, this chapter will start with a short introduction that gives an overview of the invoked authors and their theories. This serves as a basis for the subsequent categorization of different elements from theoretical frameworks.
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This section gives attention to theoretical approaches that address adherence and compliance with international law, which is of major importance for the evaluation of support of the R2P. Furthermore, it evaluates a set of aspects that can help to enhance an understanding of the discourse on state decision making in the case studies discussed here. Heading towards the selection of the most relevant criteria, the leading question is: how can theories on compliance with international law get applied to the case of support of an emerging norm, the Responsibility to Protect? And moreover, how can they enhance the debate on the R2P principle? While aiming to distill main theoretical approaches, one has to be aware of the difficulties of a comparison of norm support and a clear evaluation of conformity with international law. As Kreps and Arend emphasize, there is “no perfect method for determining why a state adheres to a particular international legal regime” (Kreps and Arend 2006: 351). In the case of norms, adherence is even more difficult to evaluate. But on the other side a compliance theoretical approach by political scientists can “offer a
window into the motives of decision makers” (ibid.) and the understanding of the decision making processes of major UNSC powers can help find solutions for future gridlock situations.
By addressing the question in how far states act in support of international legal regimes, Kreps and Arend compare the adherences to different treaties in international law. Similar to this approach, official documents such as statements and speeches will be reviewed in the analysis conducted in this thesis as well. Such primary documents can give an insight into the motivations and reasons of states which are highlighted by state decision makers and/or representatives (ibid.: 352). Such statements can be used as indicators to help understand motivations. However, at the same time they do not give a comprehensive picture of what is at stake for each state (ibid.). Therefore it helps to have (1) a complementary framework of theoretical approaches that can give explanations of state decisions and official statements from different perspectives, rather than a single-theory approach, and (2) take comparable practical examples like the support of the Rome Statute and the debate on the ICC into account (Simmons and Danner 2010). In order to make use of different approaches from various theoretical backgrounds, this thesis discusses IL and IR theory as well as practical approaches to state compliance with international law. Especially Simmons and Danner’s engagement with credible commitment to the Rome Statute and the ICC can help form a set of relevant criteria for the case of decision making concerning the Responsibility to Protect (Simmons and Danner 2010). Other useful practical applications are given by Moravcsik’s account of human rights cooperation and the question under which conditions states decide to agree upon reciprocally binding human rights norms (Moravcsik 2000). Morrow furthermore provides a practical case study on the functioning of international law during wartimes. He poses the question under which conditions states support reciprocally binding international treaties (Morrow 2002). These applications can also help to compare the support of R2P and the involved interests with other norms and their support. In this way, it is possible to draw on the conclusions that were made in these cases and use such a practical application of theories as a complementary framework. Next to IR and IL theories, both these aspects can help testing the findings of the analysis.
The theoretical approaches discussed in this section come from different schools of thought: International Relations and International Law. The discussed topic needs to be addressed through an interdisciplinary approach, as the question of compliance concerns both disciplines, because decisions are made through an evaluation of legal and political aspects (Koh 1997: 2600). The views discussed in this chapter engage with international rules and norms in strongly differing ways. The authors base their assumptions on different IR theories, especially realist, liberal, and constructivist theoretical concepts, as well as legalist premises, borrowed from IL theory.
While compliance literature can help to explain state decision making in relation to international law, it is also criticised as it cannot provide a full picture of factors influencing this process. Howse and Teitel state that such a “focus obfuscates the character of international legal normativity, tending to ignore the centrality of interpretation to the generation of legal meaning, as well as the horizontal relation between diverse norms and regimes (‘fragmentation’)” (Howse and Teitel 2010: 128). To avoid such a limited approach, this thesis does not only discuss the justification of one approach towards compliance theory, but aims at distilling relevant aspects from multiple theoretical threads of different theories of IR and IL.
The theoretical focus on compliance with international law is based on the challenge posed “by realists and some but not all positivists” and their skepticism towards enforcement of international law (ibid.). Building upon the critique of an oversimplifying theory on norm compliance, Chayes and Chayes state that “this rational-actor conception of compliance may be useful for theory or model building, but no calculus can supply rigor, nonautological support for the proposition that states observe treaty obligations — or any particular treaty obligation — only when it is in their interest to do so” (Chayes and Chayes 1995: 3). So, one has to keep in mind that compliance theory is not able to give sure answers, but only builds upon indicators that support certain claims of state decision making. It also cannot be seen as an “on-off phenomenon”, as states can support law to different extents, involving multi-layered reasons (ibid.: 18). Furthermore, while looking into literature on compliance with international law one has to bear in mind that this is only literature that is especially focused on the compliance with international treaty law, which is less difficult to evaluate by its character. In contrary to treaty law the Responsibility to Protect is an evolving norm or an “emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect” (United Nations 2004: 66).
Because compliance literature mostly engages with international treaty law it does not carry the analysis far to simply ask if states act in conformity, as in the case of the R2P norm criteria are defined too broad, and R2P is not a binding law, but an evolving norm. As explained before, the status of norms is difficult to measure, as it has a continuously changing character (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891f.). This counts for R2P as well, as the norm is currently evolving. Therefore, the question is one of how states interpret existing norms and lead to a broader acceptance or a stronger disregard with the concept through their verbal positioning as well as their actions. Do they, for instance, help pushing a principle towards a stronger legal status by taking on the role of a “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898)? Hence, not only the R2P and its third pillar, but also the concept of humanitarian intervention has to be examined in the analysis, as well as
involved international norms like the norm of non-intervention and state sovereignty and their support have to be evaluated. According to Finnemore and Sikkink the existence of a strong norm can be qualified by acts of justification of non-support of the norm (ibid.). This aspect also has to be taken into account for a document analysis. The examination of the justification put process can either lead to the finding that a norm is already a universally accepted principle or a rather unclear concept that is not universally invoked by different states but underscored by other interests.
Compliance literature uncovers reasons for the adherence to international law “by asserting that there is a range of considerations including reputational effects and long term self-interest that lead to compliance with international law, regardless of the absence of authoritative interpretation and enforcement in most instances” (Howse and Teitel 2010: 128). Just as other theoretical approaches engaging with international politics, the strengths and weaknesses of compliance theory are based on the fact that it simplifies and narrows down in order to be able to conclude with policy advice, or to at least provide helpful insights. It focuses on certain aspects that can help explain state behavior, and leaves out other aspects. Along these lines, especially in the sense of Slaughter’s view on compliance theory giving policy advices (Slaughter et al. 1998: 374), the interdisciplinary approach taken here is a positivist problem-solving approach, that also is consistent with what Joseph Nye describes as an important part of academic work: “From a normative perspective［…］academics, as citizens, have an obligation to help to improve policy ideas when they can” (Nye 2008: 597).
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4.1 Overview: International Relations theories and international law
When dealing with norms and rules in international law and state compliance, there are different IR theories that play an important role. They do not only have a distinct focus regarding the influencing factors of international politics respectively, but they also assume different state priority settings that lead to decision making related to international rules and norms. This discussion of IR theories and their relation to international law is of special importance for the research in question, because the theories discussed here — realism, liberalism, and constructivism — get invoked by the different threads of compliance theory that will be discussed in subchapter 4.2. Additionally, the theories pose clear positions towards international law, and picture the main opposing views and lines of thought towards norms in a triangular relation with international politics and international law. In that sense, this sub-chapter provides a theoretical basis for the discussion of the theories on compliance with international law.
