EUROPEAN DOMESTIC POLITICS FELT ON “DEVELOPING” GROUND
The case of Development Coordination in Palestine
Word count: 16 713
Viktor Opsomer
Student number: 01505738
Basisvorm: wetenschappelijke verhandeling
Supervisor(s): Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie
A thesis submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in EU-Studies.
Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat.
Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.
This page is not available because it contains personal information.
Ghent University, Library, 2021.
pg. 2
EUROPEAN DOMESTIC POLITICS FELT ON “DEVELOPING” GROUND
The case of Development Coordination in Palestine
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines European coordination on development aid in Palestine. Recent research increasingly talks about illiberalism within the EU, but also in the external policies of the EU, especially when it comes to development aid. The critique on development policy is of course not new, nor is the observation that other interests are at stake. What is new however, is that a whole paradigm might be changing. As will be empirically discussed in this paper. The research question “In what way do domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground?” is posed in order to offer a more thorough insight into why states embark on development coordination. The intrinsic motivation of donor states to do so, define the paradigm they work in and how we in our turn look at international relations.
The data substantiating this thesis consists of interviews with 32 stakeholders conducted in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Hebron conducted during field research in June 2019. All the interviewed practitioners play a key role in shaping European development policy on the ground in Palestine. These are diplomats (both EU and European state representatives) and development practitioners (aid agencies and local NGOs).
Furthermore, media research is done in order to give an image of how political debate is conducted at a European headquarter level. By looking at different media coverage and parliamentary questions, a more complete image of how the HQ-field dynamic can best be described, will be offered.
Concluding, this thesis identifies three ways in which domestic politics impact development coordination projects on the ground. They differ from one another in the way that donor field diplomats and development workers take a more passive or active role in dealing with the headquarter level. All three ways have a very neorealist course of acting in international relations.
ABSTRACT: DUTCH VERSION
In deze thesis wordt Europese coördinatie van ontwikkelingshulp in Palestina onder de loep genomen. In recent onderzoek wordt steeds vaker gesproken over illiberalisme, niet alleen binnen de EU, maar ook in het buitenlands beleid van de EU, met name als het gaat om ontwikkelingshulp. De kritiek op ontwikkelingsbeleid is natuurlijk niet nieuw, net zomin als de constatering dat er andere belangen op het spel staan. Wat wel nieuw is, is de constatering dat het hier om een paradigmashift kan gaan. Zoals in dit document empirisch zal worden besproken. De onderzoeksvraag "Op welke manier beïnvloedt binnenlandse politiek ontwikkelingssamenwerking en ontwikkelingscoördinatie in het veld?" wordt gesteld om een dieper inzicht te bieden in waarom staten beginnen met ontwikkelingscoördinatie. De intrinsieke motivatie van donorlanden om dit te doen, zegt veel over het paradigma waarbinnen ze werken en hoe we naar internationale betrekkingen kijken.
De gegevens die deze thesis onderbouwen bestaan uit 32 interviews met belanghebbenden in Jeruzalem, Ramallah en Hebron, uitgevoerd tijdens veldonderzoek in juni 2019. Alle geïnterviewde
pg. 3 beoefenaars spelen een belangrijke rol in het vormgeven van het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid in Palestina. Dit zijn diplomaten (zowel EU als Europese staatsvertegenwoordigers) en ontwikkelingswerkers (hulporganisaties en lokale NGO's).
Verder zal er mediaonderzoek worden uitgevoerd om een beeld te geven van de manier waarop het politieke debat op het niveau van de Europese hoofdkantoren wordt gevoerd. Door te kijken naar verschillende media-aandacht en parlementaire vragen kan een completer beeld worden gegeven van hoe de dynamiek vanuit het hoofdkantoor het best kan worden beschreven.
Deze thesis identificeert als conclusie drie manieren waarop binnenlandse politiek de ontwikkelingscoördinatieprojecten in het veld beïnvloedt, ze verschillen van elkaar in de manier waarop donor diplomaten en ontwikkelingswerkers in het veld een meer passieve of actieve rol spelen in de omgang met het hoofdkwartierniveau. Alle drie de manieren hebben een zeer neorealistische koers in het voeren van internationale betrekkingen.
CONTENTS
Abstract 2
Abbreviations 4
1. Introduction 4
a) Illiberalism: the realization something is going wrong 5
b) Developmental Deadlock 6
2. Literature review 7
a) Neorealism in Development 7
b) European Development Policy in Palestine 11
3. Research 13
a) Mapping impact domestic politics on the ground 14
I. Political bargaining 14
II. Political hiding 17
III. Political pressure 21
b) Explaining impact domestic politics 25
4. Theoretical Reflections 27 5. Conclusions 29 Acknowledgements 30 References 31 Annexes 35
pg. 4
ABBREVIATIONS
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States AFD Agence Française de Développement
CSO Civil Society Organizations
DFID Department for International Development DoA Determinants of Aid
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists EEAS European Union External Action Service
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HQ Headquarter
JFA Joint Financing Arrangement
MDLF Municipal Development & Lending Fund MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO Non-Governmental Organization NSA Non-State Actor
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development oPt Occupied Palestinian territory
PSD Private Sector Development
INTRODUCTION
Even in development, a par excellence liberal intended approach and practice of international politics, neorealist motives are at the core of the existing policy. An argument that will be made in this thesis by looking at European coordination of development policy in Palestine. Originally the data used in this thesis has been collected for the goal to look at the successfulness of European coordination. These conclusions were made in a different article1.
This paper thus starts from a different perspective; looking back at the process of data collection, inductively there is a claim to make about theory of international politics. It goes beyond the successfulness of development coordination as such by discussing the practice on a paradigmatic level.
Starting from all the empirical data collected in Palestine, the retrospective research question arose ‘In what way do domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground?’ by reinterpreting the interviews, collecting extra data on a headquarter level and contextualising it in wider research on development and domestic politics, this paper will put forward the hypothesis that development policy has entered a paradigm of neorealism, states coordinate development projects amongst one another on the basis of power and national interests.
Methodologically, in gathering the data a pragmatic strategy was followed that departed from policy-relevant assessments and holds an inductive approach to science. Now, this thesis retrospectively
pg. 5 looks back at the data, realising that a discussion on theory of international relations is at stake. Thus, a new research question arose. The research starts from empirical data collection and wider research on development aid and domestic politics, but media research has also been done, the data is selected in the way it was identified as important by the interviewees on the field.
First, this thesis will discuss the context of the growing tendency to call Europe and European foreign policy “illiberal”, it will be emphasized that there is a wider realization that something is going wrong, however there is an existing disability to pinpoint what exactly is going wrong. Something this thesis will try to contribute to, putting forward that this context impacts development coordination on the ground in third countries, in this case: Palestine.
Illiberalism: the realization something is going wrong
Different approaches to development policies within Europe are increasingly being called ‘illiberal’, both pointing at specific member state practices such as the classic examples of Poland and Hungary (Szent-Iványi & Kugiel, in press; Kréko & Enyedi, 2018) but also pointing at the wider practice in important European states such as the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria (Wodak, 2019). Even at the EU level when talking about the trade-development nexus (Carbone & Orbie, 2014) or the security-development nexus (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013), an argument is made that this can be connected to the growing tendency of ‘illiberalism’ (Holden, in press).
The term ’illiberalism’ comes from ‘illiberal democracy’ as first coined by Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria, 1997), who - ironically for this thesis - talks already in the introduction about Palestine. In short, according to Zakaria, illiberal democracy is the lack of constitutional liberalism in a country that does have elections and claims to be a democracy. What is new in scholarly debates, is that the concept is now more often being used when talking about the EU (Holden, in press). The original concept did not apply to ‘the Occident’ because democracy in the West is supposed to be based on liberal philosophy and constitutional tradition (Zakaria, 1997). However, the term apparently does now also apply to the EU and other ‘Occidental countries’. This paper will argue that this debate about illiberalism, has confused things: it did so when it was first coined, and it does so again today. Zakaria wrote about illiberalism from a liberal perspective, he believed that liberalism brings just democracy, but democracy by itself cannot bring liberalism, in that case you will only get illiberalism. Something that James Madison, John Stuart Mill and Alexander Hamilton already warned about long ago. Ironically Zakaria argues that through development aid the US can “bolster constitutional liberalism in developing countries” (Zakaria, 1997, p. 40).
It is clear that Zakaria can be put in the international relations school of liberalism. By using this term ‘illiberalism’ today, one puts oneself directly in that line of thought. This paper argues that by using the term illiberalism, one cannot understand the true root of what is being called ‘illiberalism’. This point is being made here to make clear that multiple scholars and the broader development discussion realizes something is ‘going wrong’. We however need to make sure the debate is looking in the right direction. If the analysis is made that something is going wrong and the liberal paradigm is failing to explain what exactly is going wrong, one needs to take a step back and look at it outside of the usual frame. The hypothesis made here is that, what the term ‘illiberalism’ is trying to captivate, is actually the fundamental change of the underlying paradigm: neorealism in development practice. By looking at empirical data in this thesis, it will become clearer that the clash between liberalism and illiberalism is a false one, something more fundamental is going
pg. 6 wrong. Theoretically this has been made very clear by Hans Kundnani, the time of looking in a binary way at international relations and politics is over (Kundnani, 2019).
Interestingly more and more scholars have indeed experimented by looking at the changes in development policy and the overall external policy of the EU from a different paradigm, namely by problematizing a realist paradigm; describing the EU itself as something that used to be a normative power, but has become a geopolitical realist power block (Orbie, Bossuyt, De Ville, & Delputte, 2016). This paper will exactly add to this debate by using the case of development policy in Palestine based on the 32 stakeholder interviews gathered during field research in Palestine and the extra data collected on a headquarter level. In short, this paper will give an answer to the research question ‘In what way do domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground?’. The answer to this question will help the debate on theory of international politics further in an empirical way.
Developmental Deadlock
This paper thus argues that the root of the problem that development policy encounters today cannot be captured within the liberal paradigm framework, as argued by using the term illiberalism. It is however not a surprise that scholars try to explain what development aid should be within a liberal paradigm, seen that it originally started as a liberal project.
The literature and standard readings of history locate the birth of international development practices back to the 1949 Truman’s inaugural addresses (Ziai, 2015; Komba, Kontinen, & Msoka, 2018), since then the goals, discourse and practice of development has changed drastically without abandoning the original philosophy or paradigm behind it. Aram Ziai describes in great detail how the trends in development discourse since the crisis of the 1980s – the emphasis on participation and ownership, sustainable development and free markets – are incompatible with the original rules and thus lead to serious contradictions (Ziai, 2015). This paper further argues that this ‘Neoliberal Turn’ in development practice was only the beginning of the growing contradictions within development policy, on its turn this sparked a ‘Neorealist Reaction’ to what development is. Hard economic interests, security questions and general national interests became increasingly important (Brown & Grävingholt, 2014). In this view, the neoliberal turn and the neorealist reaction strengthened and found an ally in one another, leading to the synthesis of a ‘developmental deadlock’ (visualization in Figure 1). A deadlock which will be illustrated in this paper by looking at all main European donors in Palestine talking about four different development coordination projects amongst these European states, via in-depth interviews it is possible to trace the motivations and interests back to why coordination amongst European donors on development aid is taking place. The aspect of coordination is important, a claim about political international theory can only be made when looking at the interaction between states. Something that takes place more extensively when states interact in different types of coordination.
pg. 7
Figure 1: inter-paradigm debate on Development
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Neorealism in Development
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the paradigms of Realpolitik have been used to try to understand what development aid is (Stokke, 2019). It should be emphasized that these paradigms look at development aid as being merely part of foreign policy of states. It is only when Waltz wrote his book theory of international politics in 1979 that a realist view became more complex in terms of looking at international actors (Waltz, 1979, 2010), seen as the birth of neorealism.
1979 is often looked at as a turning point in political history, not because Waltz finished his book, rather because it is the year the oil crisis kicked in, the “Volcker shock” took place and Margaret Thatcher got elected, more in general we can see that during the 70s European economies changed drastically (de Ville, 2018). The paradigm of looking at political economy completely changed. Also, in development policy a turning point was reached. The declaration of the first UN development decade in 1961 was put in place in order to promote international peace and security, law and order (Stokke, 2019), strengthening Truman’s idea on a multilateral level. However, by the end of the 70s things started to look more rough for ‘liberal’ development policy. Standing at the forefront of the 1980s, which has been called “the lost decade for development” in literature, characterized by stagflation, debt crises, and demands for structural adjustment as a condition for development aid (United Nations DESA, 2017, p 49-72; Carrasco, 1999; Stokke, 2019). A context in which both neoliberalism and neorealism arose from and, as will be put forward later on in this paper, both have made an irreconcilable impact on development policy that continues to threaten the very existence of the policy field up until today.
What does development assistance mean from a neorealist point of view? Looking at development from the paradigm put forward in theory of international politics by Waltz, using quotes from this founding document of neorealism, we can argue the following:
“Since justice cannot be objectively defined, the temptation of a powerful nation is to claim that the solution it seeks to impose is a just one. The perils of weakness are matched by the temptations of power.” (Waltz, 2010, p. 201)
pg. 8 This leaves us no other option than to look in a cynical way at the practice of development. The goals of development are only ‘just’ to the level powerful nations manage to put development forward as a solution. Development aid is a consequence of the peril of weakness. A peril exploited by more powerful nations, in their temptation to use the power they have in order to survive as a powerful state. To give a clear example: the historical rise in conditionality of development assistance, both in EU development policy (Holland, 2002; Del Biondo 2011) and as a global practice (Weeks, 2006), can be seen as a measure to legitimize the imposed developmental ‘solution’. The EU partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement is a perfect illustration of this, it tries to reflect an international consensus on development by enforcing conditionalities on development aid and financing towards countries in the Global South, a practice widely criticised (Zimelis, 2011; Santiso, 2003). However, on which basis or premisses is this criticised? To Waltz, states managing international relations while exercising power is a natural thing, why is it then a ‘surprise’ when states do this in the field of development policy? As argued before, the original intent of development policy according to Truman’s Inaugural Addresses and later enhanced through UN development policy, was seen as to create a safe haven from realpolitik and hard power in order to strive for the eradication of poverty. When looking at this as a liberal project of ‘common sense’ it sounds logical that when this dream dies on the vine, scholars would call this ‘illiberal’. However, both from a decolonial perspective and neorealist perspective, this never was a surprise: power structures are always at play.
“One cannot assume that the leaders of a nation superior in power will always define policies with wisdom, devise tactics with fine calculation, and apply force with forbearance.” (Waltz, 2010, p. 201)
On top of that, Waltz already made the disclaimer that it is not because someone is more powerful subsequently the entity is also the most rational or the embodiment of common sense. It seems that historically in development policy this imagined ‘embodiment of common sense’ has gone too far, as will be later in this paper illustrated with the case of aid in Palestine. For now, we look at the example of the “European Consensus on Development” which the EU frames as part of its response to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (2015), defining a shared vision amongst EU member states on development cooperation (European Commission, 2017).
Ironically, at the same time this consensus also confirms the lack of a clear and coherent EU vision on development, leaving a paradigmatic uncertainty that makes Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget resources prone to be captured by non-development agendas (e.g. trade and migration interests) (Orbie, in press). It is not self-evident that because the EU is trying to search for more coherence and consensus, leveraging its development policy competences, that it at the same time strives for a more righteous solution, a more just world.
To already illustrate this with a quote of one of the interviewees who is in a senior role as local donor development worker in Palestine: “Member states and development agencies are also for the EU a political instrument, the EU also wants to be visible, not just a ‘facilitator’. Of course, I want them in a facilitating role, but they also have their own dynamic. They also want to use us, they also want visibility. We are an instrument for their political strategy. They see us as consultancy. They want to have their own visibility and raison d’être and protect it of course”
pg. 9 (interview 10). As Waltz makes clear in the aforementioned quote, there hides a danger in the illusion of the embodiment of common sense, one should not confuse power with wisdom.
“Fourth, great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake. For them management becomes both worthwhile and possible.” (Waltz 2010, p. 195) [...] “Again, the parallel with market theory is exact. Both firms and states are like units. Through all of their variations in form, firms share certain qualities: They are self-regarding units that, within governmentally imposed limits, decide for themselves how to cope with their environment and just how to work for their ends. Variation of structure is introduced, not through differences in the character and function of units, but only through distinctions made among them according to their capabilities.” (Waltz, 2010, p. 98)
It is striking how often Waltz uses ‘managerial’ and ‘market’ language, he often makes the comparison with market theory to describe how he thinks states behave. We can look at this as a clear example of trying to depoliticize foreign policy. Both neoliberalism and neorealism arose from the same time frame: the late 1970s and 1980s. The latter is a reaction to the first, but on vital points both paradigms are very compatible: the description of how units behave in a structured market environment.
Why is this important to development policy? We can see that looking at how politics works from a managerial/market-oriented scope had a large impact on development policy, especially within the EU. The focus of the EU on creating ‘resilience’ in the neighbourhood and on the African continent is a striking example of this, the discourse and jargon used comes from a very managerial angle. Foreign policy initiatives aimed on increasing ‘resilience’ are the materialization of the ‘principled pragmatism’ the EU prides itself on and which has gradually colonized foreign policy discourse of the EU (Wagner & Anholt, 2016; Juncos, 2016). How it focuses on building free-market economies, accountability and responsibilisation of the local partners, without devolving power (Juncos, 2016) adds up to the trade-development nexus. It is simply put, depoliticizing foreign policy, making it look like pure technical decisions on which all knowledge and capabilities come from the EU. We can see that more realist scholars are very satisfied with the recent turn the European Commission took in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, words like ‘principled pragmatism’, ‘Realpolitik with European characteristics’ and the enhanced position of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) are music to realist ears (Biscop, 2016).
All the aforementioned paradigmatic threats to what development policy at the core is, makes it all the more important to look at how development cooperation takes place on the field, in third countries. This paper will focus on the case of Palestine. Publications on EU-Palestine relations usually take wider foreign policy perspectives (Bicchi, 2014; Bicchi, 2018; Bicchi and Voltolini, 2017; Martins, 2015; Persson, 2017; Voltolini and Bicchi, 2015; Tocci, 2005) and barely focus explicitly on European development aid (except Wildeman, 2018; Le More, 2005).2 It is interesting to know, in the light of this research, that when specifically looking at European coordination practices on the ground, similar research has found that states pursuing their national goals is still a major constraining factor for development policy and the proper coordination of aid, as is shown in research from Carbone in Africa (Carbone, 2016). It legitimizes the focus this thesis puts on domestic politics impacting development initiatives on the ground, building further on this research it is relevant to test the idea in the context of Palestine.
pg. 10 Making the contrast clear between hard domestic interests on the one hand and the liberal intended approach on the other hand, within the EU and European development policy, has a wider research tradition which goes under the name of ‘Determinants of Aid’ (DoA) research (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet et al., 1989; Hess 1989; Lebovic 1988; Stokke, 2019). The DoA research does show that motives for aid go beyond liberal ‘international humanism’, and instead depend very much on foreign policy interests, determinants thus variate from state to state. This research tradition legitimizes the focus this thesis puts on domestic politics impacting development cooperation and coordination on the ground, the whole DoA research is based on the premisses that domestic politics interests are the enabling or constraining factor in embarking on development policy, and determine in what way states shape development policy.
To a certain extent, this thesis can be put in line with this research tradition. What is different however is that this thesis has a prominent focus on the paradigmatic level. Coming down from a neorealist perspective, the thesis looks into what strategies headquarters use to impact development coordination on the ground. Opposed to focusing on specific individual and material national interests donor per donor, like what the DoA research tends to do.
Looking at European foreign policy from a realist perspective while criticizing both the paradigm and European policy is not uncommon (Reichwein, 2015; Orbie et al., 2016), but it is however unique to look specifically at European development policy from a realist perspective while criticizing both. In general, adding this to the lack of research on European development aid in Palestine makes this thesis all the more relevant.
To summarise, DoA looks at material determinants for aid, this varies from state to state. This thesis gives the same amount of value to domestic politics impacting the principles of development but wants to know how exactly domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground rather than why. It is an attempt to schematize the strategies headquarters use and look at how neorealist these international relations are in the context of Palestine.
In the EADI book on international development assistance written by Olav Stokke, interestingly it is argued that the paradigm of neorealism cannot be overlooked when judging development policy. It is argued that neorealism was the first ‘realpolitik paradigm’ that had a major impact on how development policy is defined and looked at. To put it simply: if originally development policy was an argument against realist scholars, who failed and could not explain the overall liberal motives behind it; development policy under a neorealist paradigm became an argument for the dominant existence of ‘realpolitik’, it was for the first time captured by more realist scholars.
“It follows that aid policy may be examined within the analytical frameworks of foreign policy and international relations. The realist paradigm that dominated analyses of politics among nation states for years during the post-WWII era brought power and power relations to the fore: governments seek to increase their influence and promote their vested national interests, particularly their security and economic interests. [...] Over the years, the paradigm has been developed from Morgenthau’s classic core—via, inter alia, the neorealism of Waltz (Waltz 1959, 1979) and Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Keohane 1984)—remaining central in the study of international relations.
Within this paradigm, development assistance becomes an instrument to further the national interests of the aid-providing state (with a normative string attached—this should be its mission). This would especially apply when foreign aid/development assistance is
pg. 11 channelled bilaterally, but arguably also when channelled multilaterally—through intergovernmental bodies and domestic and international non-governmental organizations or institutions. [...] From the outset, development assistance became an instrument in the international interplay of the emerging superpowers in the post-WWII bipolar world system. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, Western governments quite openly stated that the promotion of democracy and an open market economy, and containment of communism in the South were prime arguments for development assistance. [...] From this perspective, foreign aid—including development assistance—may best be analysed within the paradigms of realpolitik.” (Stokke, 2019, p. 10)
It is clear that the realist paradigm has an impact on development policy, and it is important to take a closer look at this, understanding how this comes down in the field is vital in order to understand the full consequences of what development policy can bring about. In this case, we look at the context of Palestine.
European Development Policy in Palestine
For the first time the EU succeeded in 2017 to create a “European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine” (European Union, 2017), this document captures the framework of how European development coordination should take place, it aims for “working better together”. This Joint Strategy for 2017-2020 takes into account that during the programmed cycle Palestine will remain under Israeli occupation, because of this, European countries find it a priority to protect the viability of the two-state solution, it is to them a common priority (European Union, 2017). The document does not in any way talk about recognizing a Palestinian State, while in literature there was hope that the Swedish recognition of the Palestinian State in 2014 would have a “Snowball Effect” across Europe (Persson, 2015), it is not an inherent strategy of European donor countries so far.
European development policy in Palestine has a major focus on Civil Society Organizations (CSO), Private Sector Development (PSD) and various organizations of the United Nations (European Union, 2017), they form a large part of the ‘development partners’. This is also the case for all analysed European development projects in this thesis, as will be explained later. These Non-State Actors (NSA) are not only involved in policy implementation in Palestine but are themselves part of the 'EU external policy-making process' by providing input through advocacy and lobbying (Voltolini, 2012). This practice is often considered a danger to the principle of ownership, in this context, ownership is defined as the good practice of policy makers in developing countries who can determine their own policy about their country and this policy is also respected by donors, who help to further propagate the policy (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012). Although the ‘EU external policy-making process’ is supported by the ‘local perspective’, meaning CSOs and the European Parliament, which is referred to as the "power of the local" (Gordon & Pardo, 2014), the problem here is that these CSOs often originate from European civil society (OECD, 2018), so often this does not meet the criticism about ownership.
In the article by Ibrahim and Beaudet it is also argued that for true ownership to take place, the donor countries must stop serving as metaphorical band-aids or fire extinguishers, in that regard, Israel, and not donors, should be obliged to compensate for the destruction of infrastructure and other developmental projects (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012).
pg. 12 On top of that, the universal “fits all” approach by which the EU spend their resources on “good governance” through a web of actors can cause Palestinian authorities to lose ownership of their development process (Taghdisi Rad, 2015) and even sponsor Palestinian authoritarianism (Tartir, 2018). Multilateral donors can replace country-specific policies with vague universal values and objectives, which can again sustain a conflict itself, aid donors can be very stubborn in holding onto these “pre-determined normative values” (Wildeman & Tartir, 2014). This has created a certain path-dependency when it comes to European discourse towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the European jargon being used has stayed the same for a very long period of time, it is something that comes with the huge amount of actors and aid towards Palestine, the conflict has always been high on the agenda in EU external policy (Persson, 2018).
The government becomes so overwhelmed by aid projects that the business of government becomes dominated by the need to satisfy donors, replacing the need to satisfy citizens (Collier, 1999, p. 530). In the article by Taghdisi Rad (2015), it is even argued that:
“At the macro-level, political interests, strategic alliances, and quest for diplomatic survival dictates the general direction of donor assistance. These political agendas manifest themselves in the ideological and economic frameworks and activities adopted or supported by donors at the micro, project level. Such policies and projects in the oPt have not only undermined Palestinian development prospects and territorial integrity but have normalised the occupation and reduced the urgency for a political settlement to the conflict.” (Taghdisi Rad, 2015, p. 14-15)
It should be emphasized that this is a very important citation, it clarifies a very neorealist approach to development policy, it is the ‘climax’ this literature review worked towards. As figure 2 shows, all literature fields that this thesis wants to combine, come together in this citation: European development policy, Palestinian context and neorealism. It is a citation that this thesis will try to dig deeper into when looking at local development projects on an empirical level to clarify how exactly domestic policies impact development policy and coordination on the ground.
pg. 13 Of course, it would not be fair to only put scrutiny on European development policy in Palestine. In this literature review it should also be emphasized literature often concludes that the EU also shows good intentions when it comes to the objectives set by the Palestinian Authority. The EU Joint Strategy report also supports and is built upon the 'Palestinian National Policy Agenda 2017 - 2022' prepared by the Palestinian State (State of Palestine, 2016; European Union, 2018). In literature, when we talk for example about the crucial issue of the border problem between Israel and Palestine, the European long-term discourse and the actions are fairly constant and straightforward in defending the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution (Bicchi & Voltolini , 2017). The presence of a large community of European practitioners and European diplomats in the field, mainly in Jerusalem and Ramallah, also means that European institutions have a direct line in resistance against the occupation which also legitimizes the Palestinian authorities (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016). There are even arguments that it is legitimate to say that the EU can be proud of supporting Palestinian democratization and developing good governance in the region (Tocci, 2005).
Also, in the aforementioned document, the European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine, there is certainly an awareness that innovative approaches and development tools will not be enough to redefine the two-state solution and rebuild trust between the EU and Palestine (European Union, 2017). It is made clear that only "a credible, realistic and courageous political solution" can end the occupation and give European development practitioners the space to support the two-state solution and a livable environment for all Palestinians (European Union, 2017). There is clearly an ever-growing European impatience towards Israeli policies towards the conflict and the peace process (Martins, 2015).
3. RESEARCH
The data substantiating this thesis consists of 32 in-depth interviews conducted from all major European donors in Palestine, including diplomats and development workers on the field from the representations of Belgium, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were interviewed. The decision was made to focus during these interviews on four main coordination projects that bond these donors. As argued before, a claim about political international theory can only be made when looking at the interaction between states, in development this takes place most extensively through different levels of coordination practices. In particular we looked at coordination projects that were identified as most relevant or important by the interviewees themselves; namely (a) the Joint Financing Arrangement, a pooled fund in the education sector, (b) Transfer Agreements to the EU for social infrastructure in Area C, (c) a pooled fund managed by the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) in the agricultural sector, and (d) a Secretariat channelling funds to support Human Rights Civil Society Organizations. In the remainder of this thesis, these four cases will respectively be referred to as the JFA, Area C, FAO, and Secretariat case studies.3 It is not the intent of this thesis to technically analyse these coordination projects, this has already been done in a technical report (Ghent University et al., 2017). The key focus lies on how the European donors behave, how they impact development cooperation and coordination, they are the units of study.
pg. 14 As will be noticed further on, a lot of issues surrounding the coordination projects are very politicized and mediatized at the headquarter level (e.g. through parliamentary questions, media backlash, lobby activism), it was therefore necessary in the light of this research and in order to capture a full picture of how domestic politics impacts ‘developing’ ground to also carry out media research on a headquarter level. The data collected for the media research stem from the interviews, the issues or cases were identified by the interviewees, the conducted media research looks deeper into this. This research is done in order to find an answer to the question: ‘in what way do domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground?’
Mapping impact domestic politics on the ground
Via the inductive approach taken during the in-depth interviews, three methods of impact via domestic politics can be schematized. These are the three main ways into how domestic politics impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground, they will constitute the basis for explanations in the next section. First, there is the way of political bargaining. Second there is the way of political hiding, and third, there is the way of political pressure. These three ways have in common that all three of them rely on domestic insistences, they are not a natural dynamic on the field initiated by local diplomats and development workers, but rather induced by state power. This is in line with the literature review a neorealist reading, it will be further substantiated through the explanation of the research.
I. Political Bargaining
The development coordination initiatives looked at in this study are designed and implemented on a field-level.4 Thus, the bargaining between European donors on the setup of these initiatives happens within a local dynamic. It is normal that these local representations follow certain directives and orders that come from their respective headquarters, as they are accountable towards their democratic elected governments. What is however more of a problem is that the way of bargaining on the local level is contrary to the five principles put forward in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness5, a reference point when it comes to international aid. Ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and accountability are all at stake because of reasons of political bargaining on a local level.
Political bargaining is defined here as bargaining on the ground that does not directly go about development policy and content, but rather bargaining dominated by political interests. This is a broad and vague definition of course, one which will become clearer by looking at some examples from the interviews.
4 As opposed to headquarter level forms of development coordination such as the much criticized Joint Programming initiatives by the EU (Furness and Volmer, 2013; Carbone, 2016)
5 Organised around 5 principles: “1. OWNERSHIP Developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 2. ALIGNMENT Donor countries and organisations bring their support in line with these strategies and use local systems. 3. HARMONISATION Donor countries and organisations coordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication. 4. MANAGING FOR RESULTS Developing countries and donors focus on producing – and measuring – results. 5. MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY Donors and developing countries are accountable for development results. [...] More than over 100 countries agreed to it.” (OECD, n.d.).
pg. 15 “Countries with a separate aid agency look very differently at dossiers and projects. We do not want to micromanage, we put a lot of things in the hands of our partner, this is important considering the principles of ownership and alignment. We have a different vision on what development policy is, I can work better together with countries who have the same structure.” (interview 1)
The critique delivered here by a European donor is directly addressed to donor countries that work with a separate aid agency in their representations, examples of aid agencies are GIZ (German), AFD (French) and Enabel (Belgian). However, the critique was also returned, development workers working for an aid agency argued that by not having some kind of separation everything is seen too political. “It is not a political programme, it is aid.” (interview 5), even blaming countries -who do have a unified development structure within the political representation- that partly because of their very close ties to the political section the Secretariat coordination project ended. It was too much politicized.
This is a good example of domestic politics impacting the field via the way of ‘political bargaining’. Because of institutional features of different European states, meetings on the field to setup and implement a certain development coordination project turn into political bargaining. A diplomat in the political representation tries to legitimize their own nationally determined way of working and relates this to a different vision and more respect for the principles put forward in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. On the other side there is a European development worker connecting the failure of a local coordination project to how politically other representations look at development.
They both do not directly talk about how development policy should look like, but rather focus on how they are domestically organized. The structures of power.
As argued before, to a certain extent it is natural that local European staff follow orders coming from their democratic elected governments. In development policy things get more complicated of course, because the actual policy impact fully takes place within a third country. This is important to be considered, because the literature review earlier showed that development aid has the ability to have a devastating impact on the economy and state structure of the country receiving aid, in this case the state of Palestine. A key feature of the way domestic politics impact development coordination on the ground via political bargaining is that it surpasses the input of this third country. It completely undermines the democratic principles of ownership and alignment. Moreover, this research observes that the lack of democratic principles causes a more general lack of accountability on a headquarter level.
A very clear example of this lack of accountability can be found in the case of Belgium leaving the JFA coordination project (see political pressure section bellow). When the headquarter level was contacted for an interview, one of the direct stakeholders who made the decision to withdraw Belgium was open for an interview, but when questions were raised on the specific decision-making process on the JFA, it was made very clear that no further comments could be made.
Most of the stakeholders who took part in the decision-making process on the JFA in 2018 are now in a different position - which was also the case for the contacted stakeholder - democratically it is hard to enforce transparency from people who have already moved on. This is also a problem recognized and observed on a field level during this research: people change constantly. Whereas the decisions, like withdrawing Belgium from the JFA, will have a developmental impact for years
pg. 16 to come. In such a context, with a lack of accountability, political bargaining is stimulated rather than kept in check.
“We have too much power.” (interview 27)
This was cited by a European donor to denounce the culture of micromanagement in coordination projects. When European donors come together to decide on things like precisely which school to support and what name a school can have, it was argued that donors have too much power. Coordination projects should move closer to budget support6 (interview 27). The denunciation of the culture of micromanagement was echoed by a lot of European donors (interview 4;6;14;15;27;32), however no European donors admitted to having contributed to this culture. A possible explanation for this might be that the interests of the different donors are so distinct from one another that they see others interests as micromanagement. Adding to the culture of political bargaining. Very illustrative to this situation, interviewees emphasized:
“The micromanagement takes place because of abuse of power, we have much flexibility with very limited accountability towards others. What is important? Nobody tells you or asks.” (interview 6)
“We tried to find a new mechanism [for the Secretariat], it did not work out. Interests and motives are just too divergent. Some want to work via the UN, others do not. Some have certain clauses on terrorism, others do not. Some want core funding, others do not.” (interview 3)
“The JFA is a bit micromanaged. There needs to be a system where investments can be prioritized. There has always been an issue to align, which causes the problem of micromanagement and on its turn causes problems with the Palestinian ministry.” (interview 32)
When considering this culture of micromanagement that comes with political bargaining, what is then the incentive to still participate in development coordination on a field level? A very often heard argument coming from the donors was that they are “stronger together” (interview 9;11;14;15;20;31), build on the logic that there is more leverage if you stand with a large donor group, if you talk with one voice to the ‘partner’ and if the possible agreement depends thus on a larger financial scale. All these mentioned arguments are of course based on political strategy, it enforces political bargaining in which the ‘partner’ country or implementing partner is envisioned as an opponent and needs to be faced in the strongest possible battle position, a very neorealist way of looking at state cooperation and relations on a field level.
6 “Budget support is a method of financing a partner country's budget through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the partner government's national treasury. The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary procedures” See OECD/DAC, 2006, “Harmonizing donor practices for effective aid delivery”, volume 2.
pg. 17 “The success is in the design; they can design a much broader project than they would be able to do alone, they do the whole value chain. Together we are better in negotiating: we stand stronger together towards the FAO, we are stronger together.” (interview 9)
“Separately it [the project] would not have the same impact, if I would say something alone to the Palestinian minister, he would not take it in good faith.” (interview 14)
In order to be complete, the earlier mentioned quote in the literature review that was used as a short illustration, is already a clear example of the way of political bargaining:
“Member states and development agencies are also for the EU a political instrument, the EU also wants to be visible, not just a ‘facilitator’. Of course, I want them in a facilitating role, but they also have their own dynamic. They also want to use us, they also want visibility. We are an instrument for their political strategy. They see us as consultancy. They want to have their own visibility and raison d’être and protect it of course” (interview 10) This quote talks about very different aspects, motives why the EU is interested in development coordination. It shows that the EU leveraging its development cooperation competences via facilitating coordination on the ground is not a neutral strive for effectiveness and efficiency. Other local donors perceive it as a well-aimed strategy for political gains.
In the context of a ‘developing’ country, local donors have the urge to find the strongest bargaining position, vis-a-vis the donor receiving country but also towards other development ‘partners’. Local staff is looking at state power and opportunity in a very neorealist way. There is nothing liberal about using development partners as a means to legitimize one’s own political structure, it would be easier to argue that development is a liberal practice if development was purely and merely a goal in itself. From the conducted interviews it is easy to conclude that this is not the case today. Constantly seeking for the best possible bargaining position, using coordination projects as a means to do so, and not as a goal is something that cuts both ways. It might become a vehicle that headquarters use to push through their own interests opposed to interests of local staff, this will become clearer in the next two sections.
To summarise this section, there is a large flexibility and freedom to steer things within development coordination on a field level in some areas, it gives a lot of power to European donors. In these areas political bargaining is very common, it is a way of domestic politics to have an impact on development cooperation on the ground. What makes this way unique is the active role of European diplomats and development workers on the ground, it is through their acting that this way is activated, and domestic politics play an important role in field cooperation and coordination.
II. Political hiding
The second way for domestic politics to impact development cooperation and coordination on the ground shows itself through the way of political hiding. In this way local European representatives and development workers on the ground try to keep their heads low and hide themselves by using the headquarter level as an excuse or reason why European development cooperation and coordination is not successful or is impacted on the ground.
pg. 18 During an interview with a high representative of the Municipal Development & Lending Fund (MDLF) - the local implementing partner under the Area C coordination project - it was made clear that:
“On the EU; we need to have a player, not only a payer. EU needs to become a player. We need to have a strong voice.” (interview 29)
It is not surprising that in the current context, European states who have a political strong voice on Palestine are hard to find, even more so on the level of the EU, as made clear in the literature review. There is however a local demand. A more unexpected reason for the lack of strong European stances goes together with the overall lack of hard political orders and strategies coming from the headquarters. The word “transition” (interview 8;9;14;30;31) was a word often used during interviews with European donors and is very illustrative for the current situation of political hiding and damaging for the “liberal image” of development policy. When in transition, hard decisions cannot be made, European representatives are “stand-by” for the new political positions (Interview 8;9). A strong voice cannot be formulated. The interviewees argued that these periods of transition both had to do with electoral transitions in times of elections and more administrative decisions waiting to be made on a headquarter level. Examples cited by the interviewees at the time were the Danish and Belgian elections - which in Belgium was even more complicated because of the long period of failure to form a new government - the awaited strategy reports for the Netherlands and Switzerland which were overdue, the prolonged post-election time on a EU level with the delayed start of the Commission Von Der Leyen, the discussions about the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 which will bring new headquarter orders and of course the adaptation to the new EU-Parliament with all its underlying structures. And last but not least, mentioned very frequently as a reason for the so called “transition”: Brexit (interview 8;9;10;11;24), however this “Brexit transition” was remarkably downplayed by the local Department for International Development (DFID) representative from the UK, “It has surprised me that Brexit did not hit us harder yet. We are still engaged in the most important groups in the EU. We had no instructions to withdraw.” (interview 26). To other European donors it was however clear that because of Brexit the continuation of the contribution of the UK to the Area C project was highly uncertain.
Using the argument of political transitions at the headquarter level to explain the disability to communicate clearly or follow up on certain projects on the ground is an interesting thing, seen that Europe as a whole will always be in some country or some part in a stage of “transition”. If we already just look at the two vital EU member states of France and Germany: Germany is going towards federal elections in 2021 and France towards presidential elections in 2022. Following the logic of “transition” this would mean that for the next two years already two vital European aid donors in Palestine would be in “stand-by” mode.
On top of that, is it not quite cynical that development projects in a third country are imperilled by democratic or administrative changes in “developed” countries? For example: if Brexit creates a standstill or even deterioration of coordination projects amongst multiple European donors, how can European donors then still legitimize the practice of coordinating projects in good faith? It is like a sick nurse walking into work to help the ill, taking ‘responsibility’, but actually doing more damage because of the own illness, contaminating the ‘patient’. When looking at “the sick man of Europe” from a neorealist perspective:
pg. 19 “Since justice cannot be objectively defined, the temptation of a powerful nation is to claim that the solution it seeks to impose is a just one. The perils of weakness are matched by the temptations of power.” (Waltz, 2010, p. 201)
To materialize this with an example: the EU and member states on the ground, emphasizing that Brexit creates a weakness within DFID goes directly about power relations. ‘The perils of weakness are matched by the temptations of power’ is a neorealist logic put in practice directly on the UK by other European donors. Brexit is “the weakness” that other more powerful nations exploit to legitimize their own projects. Donors use Brexit (the so-called ‘transition’) so they can push the attention away from the fact that their development project might just be failing because of lack of impact or internal deficiencies. It was not a coincidence that the UK representative of DFID was the only one doubting the real added value or impact of the Area C project (interview 26).
“We are still in area C, it is still part of the UK mission. We will continue to work in area C through other means, but not through the EU for bureaucratic reasons.”
(interview 26)
It was clear from talking to the EU Delegation in Palestine that the Area C project does not build social infrastructure at places where Israel puts forward major objections to the plans (interview 8). They are also not building schools or hospitals but rather extra classes, kindergartens and small clinics (EU delegation, n.d.). There is an objective question to ask: does this have a meaningful larger impact? Does it help Palestinian state-building when it always listens to objections from Israel? Does it build up strong communities when it focuses on rehabilitation? Are extra classes and clinics enough when there are just too few schools and hospitals?
When looking at the bigger picture: powerful nations do not think about justice in a universal liberal way, but rather try to claim their own solution is the just one. Defaming everything that goes against it. Thus, in this thesis the argument of transition is unravelled. This is a good example of political hiding, using the headquarter and domestic politics on a ground level in order to not question the ground mechanisms. This is the neorealist logic unravelled. It is sarcastic that headquarter politics are brought down to development policy in Palestine, seen that a Palestinian farmer, student or worker has no interest in Brexit fully happening or not. Still it is part of the local debate and has an impact on how ODA is invested. These examples are not unique, but rather an illustration of a wider paradigm.
In the section political bargaining we already talked about being “stronger together” as an incentive to embark on development coordination. Apart from it being an active political strategy to stand stronger towards the ‘partner’ on a field level, it is also a more passive position to politically hide behind a common shield towards the capitals. If donors coordinate a development project together and use for example ‘pooled funding’7, it is harder for certain lobby groups to attack8 a development project consisting out of different states as a whole, considering it is more difficult to distinguish the individual states. A hard question raised in one of the European national parliaments has less of an impact on the development project as a whole, as mentioned by interviewees, coordination with
7 Pooled funds aim to reduce the transaction costs of aid for recipients by channelling finance from multiple donors through one instrument (a multi-donor trust fund or MDTF, a pooled fund, or a basket fund) (Coppin, Manuel, & McKechnie, 2011).
pg. 20 multiple member states is an extra argument towards the headquarter level when they are being attacked, to say that for example Germany, Denmark or France are also invested in the project and they do not see any problems (interview 3;4). Thus, following the logic, if it is not a debate in a state in the exact same position, then why make a fuss?
Elaborating further on this dynamic of hiding behind a common shield, one of the interviewees argued “coordination practice is at its lowest in areas where risks are lower: here countries have the opportunity to shine in isolation” (interview 24). This last quote comes together with ‘visibility’, the urge of development workers to make their development projects visible is of course natural, they want to show to the headquarter level that they are investing the money in a useful way and want to show projects to the donor receiving country or other public as a tool for public diplomacy. In literature visibility has been mentioned as a factor for enabling or disabling coordination (Delputte & Söderbaum, 2012), it was not very clear however if it is either purely an enabling or solely a disabling factor. During the interviews collected for this thesis, it was clear that it is a more complicated relationship in which ‘political hiding’ has a very important role to play, with the mediating factor of risk.
When a project is taking space in a low risk area, donors will want to have their flag right next to it. In this case visibility can be a constraint in carrying out coordination, as mentioned above “here countries have the opportunity to shine in isolation” (interview 24). Hence, this implies when projects take place in a context of high risk and high politicization that visibility becomes an enabling factor, in the sense that donors ironically seek for less visibility in order to be able to do their work. They want to hide politically. This view on visibility was discussed in a lot of different interviews (interview 2;7;8;14;20).
“Some activities are less politically sensitive, in that case we want our flag next to it, only with innocent and wide supported activities. We have removed all our national signs from Area C, it was ruining our support.” (interview 2)
“Denmark did not want to be too much of a protagonist during Iftar in local spots, because of the elections taking place at that time in Denmark” (interview 8)
It is clear that the sense of “stronger together” in this section comes down from facing risks, being able to hide behind a ‘common shield’, donors keeping their heads low. It is a more passive position than the “stronger together” in the first section, where it was very much about standing in a more powerful position towards the local partner feeling backed by the headquarter institutions.
“Individuals are much more sensitive to attacks. It is much easier for a group to stand against vulnerability. If the lobbyists feel that they are successful, they are encouraged to multiply efforts and target others. As a group you can argue better towards the own capital. Pushing back is easier in a group, less subject to intense pressure. ‘Your response strengthens me, we boost each other.’ Individually that is much harder to do.” (interview 14) Looking at this dynamic, we can ask ourselves, do donors reflect on the possibility that a low risk coordination project might get more scrutiny, that the political risk might get higher? The FAO coordination project can be considered a political low risk development project, still the donors are
pg. 21 very much aware of this possibility. To avoid this scenario, the way of political hiding is ironically already happening, at a lower level of course. But even low risk coordination projects are anticipating scrutiny by trying to hide as much as possible and not go into sensitive areas or topics. An important donor of the FAO project noted:
“You never know when the Israeli open their eyes. We work very local, and there is room enough for improvement in area A and B. I cannot talk about Area C, you have to talk to the political section about that. Personally, I do not think we are going to work in area C, although it is possible. We are not working with the Palestinian government, nor with CSOs, we are focused on the private sector. That is not politically sensitive, even a right-wing party would support this.” (interview 31)
Interestingly another donor added to this debate:
“There is a fatigue on the state building agenda due to lack of peace process, Palestinian leadership, etc.: so people and aid moves to the private sector.”
(interview 24)
So, the strategy and way of political hiding might more fundamentally lead to a switch of what impact development aid aims to have in Palestine. Working on things that are more politically sensitive is tiring for donors. A lot of energy is lost on staying out of sight. This dynamic is of course not very hopeful for the earlier mentioned demand of the local Palestinian implementing partner, “On the EU; we need to have a player, not only a payer. EU needs to become a player. We need to have a strong voice.” (interview 29).
To summarize, in this section we can see domestic politics impact coordination of development cooperation in a more assertive way. Through this way, the headquarter level makes local staff politically hide. Different strategies are an example of this. Hiding behind the so called “transitions” taking place at a headquarter level. Local donors looking for weaknesses in the larger structure of a donor (e.g. Brexit), in order to avoid self-reflecting scrutiny. Trying to work together, to be “stronger together”, motivated by being forced to share risk and hide behind one another. Through these different local strategies, we can see that these are coping mechanisms towards the power that comes from states. The backing from the headquarter level is far less than was the case in the first section, the mechanism of using coordination as a political means not for pure development goals but to serve other interests is starting to backfire.
III. Political pressure
The third and last way in which domestics politics impact development cooperation and coordination is by the way of putting political pressure. What is more unique about this way is that European diplomats and development workers on the ground are taking a completely passive position, compared to the other two ways. They can often even be described as a ‘victim’ of electoral and political power play taking place on a headquarter level that is out of their reach. As a result, local staff often express the feeling of having a disability to steer decision making or assert their voice back home.
pg. 22 A perfect example of this way in the Palestinian context is the case of Belgium leaving the JFA coordination project. Unlike the case of the possibility that the UK would stop its contribution to the Area C project - in which the DFID representative did not blame it on political debate (Brexit) on a headquarter level (interview 26) - is that in the case of the Belgian exit out of the JFA, it was according to the Belgian representatives directly related to political debate and electoral logic on a Belgian headquarter level (interview 10), from which a lot of frustration derived. The Belgian minister of development cooperation at that time made the decision to exit from the education sector in Palestine because a school was named after Dalal Mughrabi9, however this school was not included in the JFA coordination project but was part of a bilateral Belgian initiative and on top of that an agreement was reached between the Belgian minister and the Palestinian minister of education to solve this issue (interview 10;12;19;24). All interviewees connected to the JFA project emphasized that considering these events, Belgium exiting was very much a headquarter political decision. European donors who are continuing the coordination project argued that missing Belgium is very hard, they always have been a very good partner and did not want this situation at all (interview 23;24;25;27). The quote “Antwerp and diamonds” was even used to describe the strong political pressure from the Israel lobby on a headquarter level. It is clear from this case that power relations stemming from a headquarter level can impact development coordination strongly, which results from a very neorealist reading of doing politics. The cleavage between field and headquarter is very clear in this section.
There is large evidence of this way of political pressure to be found in media outlets and in parliamentary questions. One of the roots of political pressure in the context of Palestinian development cooperation was often traced back by various interviewees to Israeli semi-governmental organizations such as NGO Monitor (interview 4;10;12;14;19;24;28) and IMPACT-se (interview 10;19;20;24;27) arguing that the development IMPACT-sector is getting “attacked” and “targeted” more and more. Domestic media in Europe such as for example ‘Joods Actueel’ are echoing these organizations, making the lobby even more strong (interview 19). The evidence found on these media outlets thus present an insight into how the complete way of political pressure takes place.
A lot of the reports made by IMPACT-se and NGO Monitor, who both have to analyse and report on respectively school curricula and international NGO output, are often directly echoed in European media outlets. Whereas, NGO Monitor is a semi-governmental organization widely known to be pro-Israel and right-wing biased10, IMPACT-se is focused on the educational sector
9 TBT News. (2018, September 14). Belgium suspends support for Palestinian schools. Retrieved from https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/belgium-all-news/50730/belgium-suspends-support-for-palestinian-schools/
DeTijd. (2018, September 15). België stopt steun aan Palestijnse scholen na verheerlijking terreur. Retrieved from https://www.tijd.be/nieuws/archief/belgie-stopt-steun-aan-palestijnse-scholen-na-verheerlijking-terreur/10049830.html
10 The Economist. (2007, September 20). New pariah on the block. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/international/2007/09/13/new-pariah-on-the-block
Haaretz. (2013, June 17). Aligning Text to the Right: Is a Political Organization Editing Wikipedia to Suit Its Interests? Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20170322172140/http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.530285 &
