Radicalisation in schools: the role of teachers

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Radicalisation in schools: the role of teachers

How do teachers at secondary schools perceive their assigned role in the

Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies and to what extent does that

influence the implementation of these policies?

Name: Mariska Johanna Ruijs Student number: 1287346

Supervisor: Dr. G.M. van Buuren Second examiner: Prof. E. Bakker Date: May 11, 2017

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The 9/11 attacks in 2001 led to the global war on terrorism. Security regulations and anti-terrorism legislation were tightened around the world, to prevent such an attack from happening ever again. However, up till then the main focus had been on the ‘outside enemy’, terrorists from foreign countries. Therefore, it came as a shock that the bombings in Madrid in 2004 were carried out by terrorists who turned out to be living in Spain for quite some time before they became radicalised and decided to carry out the attack (Bakker, 2006). This attack was followed by many more comparable attacks that were executed by ‘home-grown’ terrorists.

The possibility of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands also became more likely due to three developments: an increase in European Jihad travellers and returnees; a rise in Islamic radicalisation among youngsters in the Netherlands; and the unrest in certain Muslim countries due to a change of regime (NCTV, 2013). As a result, in 2014, The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat Jihadism, was created to counter the domestic Jihadist movement and to prevent the movement from expanding by preventing radicalisation and diminishing the breeding ground of radicalisation (NCTV, 2014a). In this action plan, the local and national governments work together with non-state actors to take preventative, repressive and curative measures. In this action plan the Dutch government chose for the responsibilisation strategy to tackle radicalisation at a local level, whereby front-line professionals across different disciplines and layers in civil society play a key role in countering radicalisation and diminishing the breeding ground of radicalisation.

A specific task has been laid out for the education sector as the Dutch government requires them to diminish the breeding ground of radicalisation, to work on the resilience of their students and to act on the radicalisation of students (House of Representatives1, 2014-2015a). According to the minister of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, teachers have three tasks regarding countering radicalisation: spotting radicalisation signs, working on the resilience of their students and reporting radicalisation signs (House of Representatives, 2014-2015b). However, radicalisation is a multifaceted security problem that is difficult to solve as many factors are involved. Yet, the Dutch government requires non-traditional security actors to contribute in countering radicalisation. It is therefore likely that potential obstacles arise when a non-state and non-security actor is assigned to fulfil a security task, as they often have different priorities and objectives.

1

The House of Representatives refers to the Dutch ‘Tweede Kamer’ and is the lower house of the bicameral parliament of the Netherlands. Its 150 members are elected directly by the Dutch voters.

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This master thesis aims to assess to what extent teachers are willing and able to play a role in the Dutch counterterrorism strategy and to what extent this affects their enactment. The empirical focus of this exploratory research is on teachers at secondary schools who face difficult social problems at their schools on a daily basis. Therefore, the main research question that will be answered in this thesis is: “How do teachers at secondary schools perceive their assigned role in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies and to what extent does that influence the implementation of these policies?” Whereby the theoretical data for the analysis will be obtained through a document analysis, and the empirical data will be gathered through in-depth interviews with nine teachers at eight secondary schools in the Netherlands.

As the concepts of radicalisation and countering radicalisation have received increasing attention over the last years, both by scholars and policy makers, it forms an interesting topic to research. Yet, “few studies bridge theoretical and empirical research on extremism with policy and practice” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010: 14) and there are still gaps in the current state of knowledge. This research tries to fill that gap by zooming in to a specific case study to find out whether the responsibilisation strategy, whereby non-state and non-security actors are asked to play a role in national security policies, is feasible in practice, from the perspective of nine teachers at eight secondary schools in the Netherlands.

Besides the theoretical relevance, this study also has practical relevance. Since radicalisation and related phenomena are rapidly becoming more important concepts and issues in our society, it is important to gain insights into countering these security threats. This study examines the willingness and capability of teachers to play a role in the Dutch counter radicalisation policies and to what extent these views and experiences influence the implementation of these policies. Especially the latter is an important issue to take into consideration for future policies, considering the potential damage of such social problems.

This research will firstly discuss the literature on the concept of radicalisation and the phenomenon itself. In addition, it will examine the responsibilisation strategy the Dutch state has chosen to counter radicalisation, their decision to include the education sector, and potential obstacles that can stand in the way of this chosen strategy. The third chapter will explain how the main research question will be answered, and is followed by chapter four that will analyse the empirical data that was collected from the interviews. To conclude, the final chapter will provide an answer to the main research question, the implications for theory and practice, will discuss the limitations of this study and give recommendations for future research.

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Chapter 2: Literature review

This chapter is divided into three parts. As the focus of this thesis is on the role assigned to teachers in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies, the first section covers the concepts of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, to better understand the phenomenon. Secondly, it will answer which strategy the Dutch government has chosen to counter radicalisation and why the state requires the help of teachers to achieve this. To conclude, this chapter will briefly describe possible difficulties of assigning the security role of countering radicalisation to a non-security actor and will be clarified from the perspective of teachers at secondary schools in the Netherlands. This chapter will address the following five topics of importance:

 What is radicalisation?

 Which measures can counter radicalisation?

 Which strategies are used by the Dutch state to counter radicalisation?

 Which role has been assigned to teachers in the Dutch state´s counter radicalisation policies and how does the government support them?

 What are the potential obstacles that teachers face in their assigned task to counter radicalisation?

2.1 Defining the phenomenon of radicalisation

Academics and policy makers struggle to find one clear definition that describes the concept of radicalisation2. There is not a single description that can be applied to all radicalisation cases, nor is there a single explanation that answers the question how, why and when someone radicalises. Some academics believe that ideology is the number one factor driving radicalisation, while others believe that group dynamics are more significant (Coolsaet, 2016). Several scholars tend to focus more on individual factors and overlook the societal context, whereas other academics concentrate too much on the societal context and can unintentionally indicate a certain community as suspect community, or as ‘the problem’ (Coolsaet, 2016). In addition, the term radicalisation is often mixed up with related terms and phenomena such as violent radicalisation (someone that radicalises is not necessarily violent as the next section will make clear), extremism, and terrorism, and politicians politicise and intertwine these terms depending on different political interests (Schmid, 2013). Nevertheless, even with these

2_{The different opinions that exist among academics about the definition of radicalisation can be consulted in} detail in the research paper of Coolsaet, R. (2006), “All Radicalization is Local: The genesis and drawbacks of an elusive concept”, and in the research paper of Schmid, A.P. (2013), “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review”.

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different opinions, there is enough common ground to make some statements in this chapter about where we stand regarding our knowledge of radicalisation as all scholars do believe that radicalisation is a multifaceted process (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino & Caluya, 2011). To include as many aspects of the process as possible, this thesis will look at the broader definition of radicalisation that lies at the intersection between individual pathways and the societal context. However, the reader should not lose sight of the wider discussion that exists about the concept of radicalisation while reading this section.

The Nederlands Jeugdinstituut (NJI, Netherlands Youth Institute) describes radicalisation as “a process whereby a person or group develops views that are conflicting with the democratic order and whereby a person or group is increasingly prepared to put the consequences of that thought into practice, both in acting as in verbal or written statements” (NJI, n.d.-a: para 1, own translation). Buijs, Demant & Hamdy (2006) state that there are four types of radicalisation: left-wing radicalisation; right-wing radicalisation; single-issue radicalisation; and religious radicalisation. Even though they have very different ideologies, they do have in common the willingness to use violence to enforce their beliefs on the rest of the world. This thesis will look at the religious radicalisation type, to be more specific the Islamic radicals, as this type of radicalisation is at present the biggest threat to the European Union and Dutch society according to the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism3) (NCTV, 2015:17). Recent attacks4 have been carried out in the name of Islam and have created a lot of tension between different communities as these attacks were carried out by Muslim terrorists with a Western background. Therefore, it is important to understand how and why these ‘home-grown’ terrorists became radicalised and what can be done by the state and society to prevent and counter this.

The radicalisation process consists of three phases, ranging from non-violent to violent: radicalism; extremism; and terrorism (in chronological order) (Governance of Security, 2010). These three phases correspond with the three phases that are mentioned by Buijs, Demant & Hamdy (2006): crisis of trust; conflict of legitimacy; and crisis of legitimacy and explain to what extent they are willing to use violence on society to impose their ideologies.

3_{The NCTV protects the Netherlands from threats that could disrupt Dutch society and falls under the} responsibility of the Ministry of Security and Justice.

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The first phase is radicalism and is defined by the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) as “the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order, which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order” (AIVD, 2004: 13). Even though undemocratic methods are mentioned, this phase does not have a violent dimension (Governance of Security, 2010). In this phase, there is a crisis of trust towards the existing government and/or tensions between different groups regarding specific policies. In addition, they feel a distrust towards the media as they project a negative image of Islam (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006).

The second phase is extremism and can be described as “political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles (…) [such as] the core principles of democracy and human rights.” (ICSR, 2010: 12). In this phase there is the acceptance of the use of violence to achieve certain goals, but there is no use of violence yet (Governance of Security, 2010). There is a conflict of legitimacy, in which there is a distrust towards the existing system, e.g. liberal democracy, and are thus in favour of an alternative, opposing, system (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006).

The last phase is the most extreme phase, whereby terrorism is defined by the NCTV as “threatening, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social disruption, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making” (NCTV, n.d., para 2). In other words, in this phase there is the use of violence to achieve certain goals. There is a crisis of legitimacy, whereby everyone that follows the existing system and not the opposing one is dehumanised and seen as evil that needs to be destroyed (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006). Not only the political and military authorities are the evil force, but also the rest of society as they are responsible for the fact that these authorities got the power in the first place by voting for them in elections (van Dongen, 2012).

Evidently, we want to prevent that a person or group moves from a non-violent phase to a more violent phase. Even more, we want to prevent that someone becomes receptive for such dangerous ideologies. In order to do so, we have to understand the reasons why a person radicalises or becomes sympathetic to such ideas. In addition, it is important to know for what reason they decide to join a group with extreme views as most people pass through this process within a group (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006).

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2.1.1 The process of radicalisation: breeding ground

According to Buijs, Demant & Hamdy (2006) there are three dimensions that can create a breeding ground for radicalisation: the political activist dimension; the religious dimension; and the socio-cultural dimension. As terrorist groups are often considered by academics as transnational social movement organisations5, this paragraph will also look at the three motives Klandermans & Mayer (2006: 8-10) have identified for a person to join a social movement, or, in this case, a (terrorist) group with dangerous ideologies. These three motives are: instrumentality; ideology; and identity, and correspond with the three breeding ground dimensions (in chronological order).

The political activist dimension can create a breeding ground for radicalisation when there are feelings of discrimination. E.g. racial profiling at airports or international train stations, where more non-Western looking people have been exposed to stop and search practices than Western looking people. According to Bovenkerk (2006) there is also an integration paradox in this dimension since “the best integrated people are the very ones who feel most discriminated against when they are rejected” (chapter 5.3, last para). This happens for instance, when Muslims are well-educated but cannot find a job because their resumes are thrown on the reject-pile as soon as employers see their (non-Western) names. This has also been reported at a younger age, for instance when a student faces difficulties in finding an internship (Kleijwegt, 2016). These people are trying to fit into society by studying and working hard, but are still left out by that same society and looked upon as foreigners even though they are born and raised there. These feelings of injustice and exclusion form an important breeding ground for radicalisation. The main motive that convinces people in this dimension to join a social movement is instrumentality, as they believe that they can change their social and political environment by joining the group. But there can also be material incentives e.g. a career in the group (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006).

Furthermore, there is the religious dimension. This dimension can explain why the Salafist stream, and thus the most orthodox Islamic stream, is so appealing. This stream is the ‘pure’ Islam, back to its fundamentals, with exact guidelines about what is allowed and what is not (van der Valk, 2010). By believing that “only Islam can purify the world of (…) wickedness and immorality” (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006: chapter 7.8, para 5), the Salafist stream makes the complex world understandable. The key motive here is ideology. They

5_{See for instance Comas, J., Shrivastava, P. & Martin, E.C. (2015) , “Terrorism as Formal Organization,} Network, and Social Movement”; Leheny, D. (2005), “Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security: How Al Queda affects Southeast Asia”; and Beck, C.J. (2008), “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism”.

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want to express and share their views, what often results in these people adjusting to the group’s ideology.

Lastly, there is the socio-cultural dimension. Most Muslims with a Western background struggle with a hybrid identity. They don’t feel they have the same identity as their own parents (who are born and raised in Muslim countries), but they are not completely Western either, what their Western environment often remind them of by excluding and discriminating them. The Salifist groups take advantage of these feelings, by giving these Muslims a sense of belonging and the subculture they were looking for (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006). The main motive that convinces the people in this dimension to join a social movement is identity. They identify themselves with a group that has been done injustice and want to improve the group’s situation (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). By doing so, it creates an us-against-them feeling. Sageman goes even further by stating: “These bonds facilitate the process of joining the jihad through mutual emotional and social support, development of a common identity, and encouragement to adopt a new faith. […] They are more important and relevant to the [radicalisation] transformation of potential candidates (…) than postulated external factors, such as a common hatred for an outside group” (as cited in Bakker, 2006: 12). Thus, according to Sageman, these social bonds, or in-group love, are the most important part in the radicalisation process.

These dimensions are intensified by the phenomenon polarisation. Polarisation is described by the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (BZK, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) as “the sharpening of differences between groups in society which can result in tensions between these groups and an increase in segregation along ethnic and religious lines”(BZK, 2007: 5). It has shown in the past6

that attacks in the Netherlands that were carried out by Dutch Muslims led to social unrest whereby a part of Dutch society pointed its finger at the Muslim community as a whole instead of the individual that planned the attack. But also in more recent times this ‘blaming-game’ is still visible as is shown by one Dutch politician in particular who accused the Islamic ideology, and thus the Muslims in general, after the 2016 Brussels bombings (PVV, 2016). This view is supported by right-wing groups and they use these happenings to create support for their own radical ideas to counter the Islamisation of the Netherlands. These accusations have an immense impact on the Dutch Muslim community as they feel threatened and less welcome in the Netherlands (Bovenkerk, 2006). These feelings in turn, as is shown in the

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previous paragraphs, increase the likelihood that someone becomes more receptive for radicalisation. Polarisation can therefore be seen as a vicious circle in the blame-game whereby it leads to more social unrest between different communities and may stimulate radicalisation.

Especially Muslim adolescents are receptive for the radicalisation process as youngsters in general are constantly struggling with their own identity. It is even more confusing for them when there is a cultural mismatch between the contexts of home, school and the street. These three social environments can spread conflicting messages what values and standards adolescents need to have (NJI, n.d.-b). In addition, Muslim youngsters in particular try to find an answer to the question what it means for them to be a Muslim, and thus, are searching for their religious identity as well (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006).

Even though all motives and causes mentioned above play a critical role in how and why a person radicalises, a ‘cognitive opening’ has to be present in order for a person to use violence for his or her ideologies. This cognitive opening “shakes certitude in previously accepted beliefs (…) [and] become[s] more receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews (…) and can be produced by idiosyncratic experiences, such as a death in the family or victimisation by crime.” (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 5, 20, 85). In other words, some form of crisis has to occur that makes a radicalised person to want to set aside his or her previous norms and values to make that final step to terrorism.

Nevertheless, radicalisation is a dynamic process and can mean different things to different people. For some, radicalisation is a slow process consisting of many steps and motives, while others can jump from one phase to the next at lightning speed. Thus, to conclude, radicalisation is a wicked policy problem7 as it is ever-present and there is no immediate or obvious solution. It has a polarising and dividing effect on society and undermines the universal democratic values.

2.2 Measures against radicalisation

Up until 2004 the traditional counterterrorism actions by states were focused on the ‘outside enemy’, terrorists from foreign countries. These traditional measures focus on the work of law enforcement agencies, such as the police, intelligence and the secret services, that emphasise the coercive powers of the state and exercise hard power (Crelinsten, 2009). However, the

7_{Wicked problems have characteristics that distinguish them from hard but ordinary problems and makes it even} more difficult for a policy maker to solve the issue. It is even said that a wicked problem cannot be solved, only tamed. For more information on the subject, see Camillus, J.C. (2008), “Strategy as a Wicked Problem”, and Rittel, H.W.J. & Webber, M.M. (1973), “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”.

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terrorists that were involved in the Madrid bombings in 2004 were from inside Spain’s own house. The terrorists involved in this attack turned out to be living in Spain for quite some time before they became radicalised and decided to carry out the attack (Bakker, 2006). This attack was followed by many more comparable attacks that were executed by ‘home-grown’ terrorists, such as the London bombings in 2005 and the bombings in Brussels in 2016. This change in terrorism has caused a shift in counterterrorism as well.

The underlying thought nowadays is that no one is born as a terrorist, but instead, becomes one by circumstances, external influences and personal experiences8. Crime and linked phenomena such as radicalisation are no longer seen as an exception, but instead, as part of everyday life. Due to this change in perception, there has been a shift in the government’s response to crime. Crime used to be seen as deviant behaviour, whereby the offender was seen as a ‘monster’, and as an individual wrongdoer. There was a backward-looking perspective of punishment and a focus on the effects of crime, such as costs and help for victims. Even though this perception still exists9, a new, more forward-looking approach arose that focused on the causes and prevention of crime. It is no longer about deviant behaviour, but instead about crime opportunities and people ‘rationally’ responding to these opportunities: ‘the situational man’ (Garland, 1996), or in this case, to the different motivations that form the breeding ground of radicalisation. This view sees radicalisation as a risk to be forecasted or as a calamity to be avoided by the potential offender or the potential victim. Hence, it did not mean that the traditional counterterrorism weapons were replaced, instead they were enhanced and complemented with measures against radicalisation. As the previous chapter has described, there has been a blurring of the lines between terms as (violent) radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This is also applicable to the different terms that are used to describe measures against radicalisation. While Schmid (2013) mentions a difference between de-radicalisation, disengagement and counter-radicalisation, Clutterbuck (2015) brings in a fourth term: anti-radicalisation.

The first term, de-radicalisation, is the process “(…) whereby radicals abandon violence and are brought back into society, creates the conditions conducive to dialogue [and] is therefore an important strategic tool in the fight against terrorism” (Dechesne, 2011: 287). According to Clutterbuck (2015, para 15) de-radicalisation “is a process that can only be

8_{This debate is also known in the sociology as the nature-nurture debate. See for instance Macionis, J.J. (2010),} “Society: The Basics”.

9_{In criminology there is debate between criminology of the self (the situational man, could be anyone) and} criminology of the other (whereby the offender is seen as a ‘monster’ and as an individual wrongdoing). For more information on the subject, see Garland, D. (1996), “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society”.

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applied to individuals or groups after radicalisation has occurred”. In other words, when a person has been imprisoned due to his or her active involvement in terrorist activities. The goal of these de-radicalisation measures is to reconnect these inmates to society before they are released from prison through training and counselling programs that make them want to abandon violence and their extreme ideology. However, there is a disagreement on what de-radicalisation exactly entails. Some argue that it is a change in radical behaviour (behavioural modification or behavioural radicalisation), while others believe that it should include a change in radical views (attitudinal modification or cognitive radicalisation) as well (Horgan, 2008; Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Among scholars the first is considered to be disengagement, while the latter is called de-radicalisation (Noricks, 2009).

People with diverse backgrounds feel attracted to join groups with radical ideas for different reasons. Therefore, it is important to understand why people would consider to leave a radical group or to de-radicalise. These motivations play a role in counter-radicalisation programs as well as needing to know how to prevent someone from joining such a group or how to avoid that someone strives for a more active role within the group. According to Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie (2008) there are three factors that can explain this: affective factors; normative factors; and continuous factors. Affective factors are also called movement factors and arise when the group does not live up to that person’s expectations, e.g. leadership failure. Normative factors, or ideological factors, occur when the radical view of that person changes, e.g. opposing the use of violence. Lastly, continuous factors, also known as practical factors, arise when the disadvantages of being part of the group become an issue for that person, e.g. desiring a normal life.

In addition, these different factors can be divided into push and pull factors (Noricks, 2009). A push factor can be seen as a negative condition that makes the group no longer appealing to that person, e.g. when the person no longer feels connected with or can no longer identify him- or herself with the group. A pull factor is a positive factor that makes another environment, e.g. a normal life, more appealing than a life within the group. Furthermore, just like in the radicalisation process, some form of crisis is mostly the decisive element that results in feeling compassion towards the other (Noricks, 2009).

On the other hand, there are also factors that can make it harder for a person to leave a group. The three factors mentioned earlier that can explain why someone decides to leave a group, can also work the other way around. When ideology plays a dominant role in the perception of someone it is called a normative obstacle; an affective obstacle can be the social dependency of a person to the group; and a continuing obstacle is e.g. that the group provides

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care of that individual’s family, what makes it harder to leave the group (Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie, 2008). In addition, Bjorgo (as cited in Demant, Wagenaar & van Donselaar, 2009) mentions restraining factors that make it harder to leave the group, e.g. when a person has been a part of the group for a very long time.

Furthermore, de-radicalisation programmes can take place on two different levels: on the collective level and the individual level (Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie, 2008). The latter can be further subdivided into two approaches: one that targets the hard core of the group; the other that targets the followers and newcomers in the group (Demant, Wagenaar & van Donselaar, 2009). When targeting the latter group, it is important to draw them out of isolation and to offer them alternatives, with an emphasis on the disadvantages of group membership. With the hard core of the group on the other hand, isolation is the best solution. However, in that case, it will take much longer as there are more obstacles to overcome. In the meantime they can still pass on their radical ideas. Isolation can prevent this (Demant, Wagenaar & van Donselaar, 2009).

Some academics argue that all violent radicals start out as cognitive radicals and for that reason the state should intervene as early as possible with the help of counter-radicalisation measures. Critics on the other hand point out that not all radicals make that final step towards violence (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Vidino & Brandon (2012) state that the European counter-radicalisation measures can be broadly divided into two categories: general preventative measures and targeted interventions. The latter strategy focuses on persons that are already in the radicalisation process but have not committed a criminal act or have not fully embraced the extreme ideology yet. These persons are mostly detected by their environment as they can display signs of radicalisation (e.g. in their opinions or their appearance) to the people in their immediate surroundings. Once there is a suspicion that someone is on the path of radicalisation, authorities will be informed and an individual intervention will take place. Nevertheless, there is always a risk that a signal is misread which could lead to a broadening of the gap between the individual and his or her (local) environment.

General preventive measures on the other hand, focus on persons that have not taken part in the process yet but have a higher risk of becoming receptive for radicalisation. These preventive programs often try to tackle the motives that form the breeding ground of radicalisation: instrumentality; ideology; and identity. Some programs focus on making these ‘at-risk’ persons more resilient against the appeal of joining a radical group by offering better schooling and job perspectives to make sure these persons feel included in society. Other

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programs focus more on the religious part, especially when it is concerning Muslims, e.g. by discussing religion in a constructive manner with moderate imams. However, with the latter program, there is always the danger that a state unwillingly promotes a ‘state-approved Western Islam’, which will only work adversely as Muslims will feel misunderstood and will feel that their religion or beliefs are being perceived by the government as ‘bad’. In addition, by indicating persons from a certain community as at-risk, it could also give the feeling that the entire community is perceived by the state as a security threat (Vidino & Brandon, 2012; Coolsaet, 2016). Furthermore, some scholars argue that cognitive radicals should be “tackled as social problems, not as a ‘subset of the al-Qaeda threat’”(Bartlett, Birdwell & King, 2010:38) because by linking these broader social goals (improving social cohesion, and opposing discrimination and polarisation) with counterterrorism, “they became part of a negative objective (preventing terrorism) instead of a positive endeavour (a caring society, with equal opportunities for all)” (Coolsaet, 2016: 42).

However, Clutterbuck (2015) believes that these two strategies do not fall under the same umbrella. According to Clutterbuck (2015) counter-radicalisation is used to stop or control radicalisation by slowing the process down or mitigating the process while it is actively occurring, thus comparable to targeted interventions. However, she speaks of anti-radicalisation to describe measures to discourage and prevent anti-radicalisation from happening in the first place, thus similar to the general preventative measures. Nevertheless, this thesis will not differentiate between the terms counter- and anti-radicalisation and will use the term counter-radicalisation as an umbrella concept to describe both, as policy makers within the EU often do (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Therefore, this thesis will use the broader definition of counter-radicalisation by Schmid (2013): “the main focus of counter-radicalisation efforts is (…) not the terrorists themselves but rather the strengthening and empowering of the community from which they might emerge and which might, if neglected, be deemed potentially supportive of them”. Countering radicalisation can therefore not only be used as a tool to counter the threat, but also as an opportunity to improve social cohesion and increase the satisfaction among (minority groups in) society about living in a multicultural country such as the Netherlands.

2.3 Countering radicalisation in the Netherlands

The Dutch counterterrorism strategy is based on the assumption that no one is born as a terrorist, and thus, anyone has the potential to become one due to circumstances. The Dutch counterterrorism strategy consists of five intervention areas:

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 acquire, by gathering intelligence and information in time;  prevent, by tackling the breeding ground of radicalisation;  protect, by shielding society from new attacks;

 pursue, by hunting the terrorists and their network down; and

 respond, by managing and minimising the consequences for society of a terrorist attack (NCTV, 2016)

The Dutch strategy focusses on the intervention areas prevent and acquire as the underlying assumption is that the more successful the preventative measures are, the less effort is needed in the other intervention areas. In addition, it has been internationally recognised more and more that there is a strong correlation between early prevention and a reduction of the terrorist threat in the long run (NCTV, 2011: 37). Thus, the sooner action can be taken, the smaller the chance a terrorist attack occurs. It is therefore important that not only the terrorist attacks are being tackled, but also the path that is preceding these attacks.

In March 2013, the NCTV raised the threat level10 to the current level: substantial. Which means that there is a realistic possibility that a terrorist attack will occur in the Netherlands. The NCTV raised the threat level because of three developments: an increase in European Jihad travellers and returnees; a rise in Islamic radicalisation among youngsters in the Netherlands; and the unrest in certain Muslim countries due to a change of regime (NCTV, 2013). That is the reason why the Dutch government tends to focus more on jihadist terrorists in its counterterrorism strategy than any other ideological radical group. As a result, in 2014, The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat Jihadism, was created. A joint effort between the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to counter the domestic Jihadist movement and to prevent the movement from expanding by preventing radicalisation and diminishing the breeding ground of radicalisation (NCTV, 2014a). In this action plan, the local and national governments work together with non-state actors to take preventative, repressive and curative measures. This combination of measures, also referred to as ‘the comprehensive approach’, was established in the late nineties by the AIVD and has formed the basis of the Dutch counterterrorism strategy today (NCTV, 2016). Dutch parliament is informed four times a year by the government about the progress of each of the thirty-eight measures and to what extent these measures are monitored and implemented (House of Representatives, 2014-2015c).

10

The threat level estimates the risk of an attack in or against the Netherlands. There are five levels of accumulating threat, ‘substantial’ is the fourth level.

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2.3.1 The responsibilisation strategy

One of the pillars of the Dutch action plan is the cooperation between the national government and the local government as municipalities have an important role in preventing and countering radicalisation. Due to their local knowledge of the social context, they are able to detect and identify signs of radicalisation early on and can respond accordingly to the individuals or groups who are radicalising (NCTV, 2014b). However, local governments rely on the help and input of non-state actors within their municipality, such as key figures in civil society and front-line professionals in different fields, in order to do so. This approach, whereby non-traditional security actors are assigned a role by the state to counter a security issue, is known among scholars as ‘the responsibilisation strategy’ (Garland, 1996). This strategy aims to “(…) shift primary responsibility for crime prevention and public security away from the state and towards businesses, organisations, civil society, individuals, families and communities [and to encourage them] to take a more active interest in reducing criminal opportunities” (responsibilization, n.d.). It reflects the understanding that the sovereign state, who used to be the only one responsible for providing security, can no longer live up to this expectation. This can mainly be explained by the rise in crime, budget cuts, and ideological changes that advocate a smaller role for the state and a greater role for society and businesses (Garland, 1996; Crawford, 2006).

The responsibilisation strategy is clearly present in the Dutch action plan to combat Jihadism, particularly the measures concerning countering radicalisation and diminishing the breeding ground of radicalisation. The cooperation between the state and non-state actors, ranging from imams and neighbourhood watches to educators and youth workers, is key to this action plan. By reaching out to these front-line professionals across different disciplines and layers in civil society, the government tackles radicalisation at the core: at the local level, where the process begins.

2.3.2 The role of the education sector in the Dutch action plan against Jihadism

One of the actors that is specifically mentioned in the action plan, in measure twenty-four, is the education sector. As mentioned before, the threat analysis by the NCTV has detected a growth of radicalisation among youngsters in the Netherlands. Therefore, an important part has been laid out for the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Measure twenty-four of the Dutch action plan is specifically about the government support for educational institutions to help them in their task to diminish the breeding ground of radicalisation, to work on the resilience of their students and to act on the radicalisation of students (House of

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Representatives, 2014-2015a). In this measure, the Dutch government declares that it will supply radicalisation experts and confidential advisors from the education inspectorate for consultation whenever a school requires assistance in this respect or when a school is identified by the government as an ‘at-risk’ school that has a greater risk of being faced with the issue of radicalisation. Furthermore, the government claims that it will share up-to-date information about the issue on educational web platforms, will support schools with their citizenship training for students and that it will take measures if administrators or others responsible for educational institutions publicly support terrorist groups (NCTV, 2014a).

After the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris in 2015, executed by home-grown terrorists, the measures from the Dutch action plan were re-enforced as this attack made clear that “radicalised youngsters – even though they are relatively small in number – can pose a severe threat to security’, according to Dekker, the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science (House of Representatives, 2014-2015d: para. 3, own translation). At that same time, various media in the Netherlands reported the struggles at schools by teachers to make topics such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting and related issues of freedom of speech and radicalisation discussable among their students11. Therefore, as of March 2015, measure twenty-four is further strengthened e.g. by extending the online platform ‘School en Veiligheid’, by offering a ‘hotline’ for schools to consult, and by offering more training to teachers on how to recognise and deal with radical ideas and statements by students (House of Representatives, 2014-2015c). It also includes additional support consisting of citizenship- and debate activities for students (House of Representatives, 2014-2015e). Furthermore, the cooperation between schools and local stakeholders, e.g. municipalities, police, youth care and parents, who are the eyes and ears of the community, is strengthened, according to the Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (V&J, The Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice) (V&J, 2015).

Priority is given to professionals at ‘at-risk’ schools (House of Representatives, 2014-2015f) and the exact nature of the state’s support that is offered to these schools has been determined in collaboration with the involved municipalities, based on the needs of that particular educational institution. According to Bussemaker, the minister of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, an educational institution has three tasks regarding countering radicalisation:

11_{See for instance the Dutch newspapers AD (2015, January 15), “Leerling Mo vindt de jihad ‘echt vet’”; de} Volkskrant (2015, January 15), “Niet iedereen in de klas wil over Charlie Hebdo praten”; de Telegraaf (2015, January 15,), ‘Schooldirectie laat de docent openlijk vallen”.

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 a preventative role by teaching their students a sense of citizenship and how to conduct an open dialogue about their norms and values to make them less receptive for radicalisation

 a curative role by spotting signs of radicalised behaviour or when a student starts to withdraw him- or herself from society

 a repressive role by reporting these spotted radicalisation signs to the appropriate authorities (House of Representatives, 2014-2015b)

At the moment, schools in eighteen municipalities12 are made aware of their duty of care responsibilities regarding their students to avoid radicalising behaviour (House of Representatives, 2015-2016b). The state’s support in 2017 is mainly focussed on training first-line professionals, supporting the local environment of radicalising youngsters, building strategic partnerships with key figures in the local community and strengthening the role of the education sector in spotting radicalisation signs, working on the resilience of their students and reporting radicalisation signs (NCTV, 2016, December 22).

2.3.4 Potential issues with the implementation of the responsibilisation strategy

As the previous paragraph explained, teachers are assigned with a specific role in the Dutch counter radicalisation policies. However, by involving non-security actors, such as teachers, in security issues, possible obstacles can get in the way of the policy implementation. In essence, the question is whether schools and teachers are actually willing and capable of playing the role they were assigned to by the state regarding this security issue. Garland (1996) already identified some possible difficulties in making a responsibility strategy succeed. According to him the responsibilisation strategy is liable to give rise to huge disparities in the social provision and distribution of security. Furthermore, a state still has some distinctive functions that a non-state actor does not have, especially regarding security (Crawford, 2006). The question is whether countering crime, and linked phenomena such as radicalisation, is not a job solely for the state and that it is best left to the experts (Garland, 1996). After all, the ultimate responsibility for security rests with the state as they have the accountability to do so (Crawford, 2006). According to Garland these non-state actors “(…) must be made to recognise that they too have a responsibility in this regard, and must be

12_{The following municipalities are actively supported by the Dutch government in their task to counter} radicalisation in 2017: Den Haag (€1.052.000); Amsterdam (€920.000); Utrecht (€956.080); Rotterdam (€754.800); Delft (€484.600); Arnhem (€452.800); Zoetermeer (€272.280); Gouda (€237.880); Huizen (€142.440); Nijmegen (€100.000); Tilburg (€183.000); Almere (€173.043); Schiedam (€134.800); Haarlemmermeer (€117.600); Amersfoort (€78.200); Culemborg (€85.000); Leiden (€76.015); and Zwolle (€69.000) (NCTV, 2016, December 22).

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persuaded to change their practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal controls” (Garland, 1996: 453), as it is in the interest of both parties. This strategy asks for collaboration and cooperation, a challenging job as non-state actors often don’t have crime as a priority and will pursue their own objectives when crime does not directly influence these objectives (Garland, 1996).

However, this thesis will not go into this matter any further, as the Dutch government has already chosen to implement the responsibilisation strategy. Instead, this thesis will focus on the question how schools and teachers perceive their assigned role in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies and to what extent this influences their enactment. Firstly, the state assumes that teachers want to play a role, but is this actually the case? Do they think it is their responsibility as well, or, instead, believe that ‘these kind of issues’ are best left to the experts and appropriate authorities as Garland mentioned before? Secondly, is this role voluntarily or not and to what extent do schools feel pressured to implement the policy? On the one hand, the literature about ‘responsibilisation’ shows that the state tries to ‘persuade’ non-state and non-security actors to play their part, while on the other hand, the government wants to steer schools in a certain direction as well (Crawford, 2006). A third related issue is how teachers perceive their assigned role in the light of their professional autonomy and discretion (Garland, 1996). And, as a result, will teachers be faced with moral and ethical dilemmas regarding the relationship of trust with their students? And lastly, if they are prepared to play a role in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies, are they able to do so? Does the state support them enough to fulfil their task? And to what extent do these views and experiences influence the implementation of the Dutch counter radicalisation policies?

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, the literature on the concept of radicalisation and the phenomenon itself have been discussed. It became clear that there are different views among scholars about what radicalisation and countering radicalisation entails. What all scholars do agree on, is that radicalisation is a complex multifaceted problem with no immediate or obvious solution. This makes the question to what extent teachers will and can play a role in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies even more pressing. Secondly, the strategy the Dutch state has chosen to counter radicalisation has been examined. The Dutch state focusses in its counterterrorism policy on tackling the breeding ground of radicalisation and acquiring information in time. To achieve this, the government uses the responsibilisation strategy to actively try to involve non-state and non-security actors in its counter radicalisation policies,

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as they are the eyes and ears of the community. Moreover, this chapter briefly described the role teachers were assigned to by the Dutch state in its counter radicalisation policies and in what way the government supports them in their task. To conclude, this approach has been problematised by naming a few possible obstacles that can stand in the way of the chosen strategy. In short, it is the question how teachers perceive their assigned role in the Dutch’s counter radicalisation policies and to what extent these perceptions influence the implementation of these policies, that forms the primary research objective of this master thesis. The next chapter will explain how this research question will be answered.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

Prior to the chapter that discusses the empirical findings, this chapter will describe the used methodology. The first section of this chapter justifies the research design and explains the way data has been gathered and analysed. It is then followed by an overview of the research limitations in which the validity and reliability of the research will be discussed.

3.1 Research design

Scholars agree that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that means different things to different people. It is a multifaceted security problem that is difficult to solve as many factors are involved. Nevertheless, the Dutch government requires non-traditional security actors to contribute in countering radicalisation. This thesis aims to assess to what extent teachers are willing and able to play a role in the Dutch counter radicalisation policies and to what extent these perceptions influence the implementation of those policies. In order to do so, an exploratory study will be conducted whereby no clear hypotheses and assumptions were formulated in advance as exploratory research is “(…) an initial attempt to understand or explore some social process or phenomenon” (Matthews & Ross, 2010:57) and “(…) points the way to more-refined research on the topic” (Babbie, 2014: 479).

Because the research regarding this matter still finds itself in an exploratory phase and lacks a theoretical framework, it was not feasible to conduct a quantitative survey. Nor was it possible, due to time and resources at the researcher’s disposal, to include the entire target group in a sample that would be representative of the real situation. For that reason, a single case study was chosen to explore the issue in detail and great depth in a particular research setting. In addition, a case study allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the radicalisation phenomenon and its real-life context. As the literature has shown, especially adolescents are receptive for the radicalisation process. This case study uses an ideographic approach by focussing solely on teachers who teach youngsters from this age group nearly every day and thus, this research only contains empirical data from in-depth fieldwork that was conducted at secondary schools in the Netherlands. The crucial point is that secondary schools are not the unit of analysis; rather it is the sample that is the unit of analysis. In short, this research focusses on the experiences and views of teachers and governors at secondary schools who face difficult social problems on a daily basis at their schools, and the impact of these experiences and views on the schools’ compliance with the Dutch counter radicalisation policies.

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To achieve this goal, the data gathering has to arise naturally to identify patterns (Babbie, 2014) and qualitative research is better suited for the task as “(…) it is typically associated with the generation rather than the testing of theory and with a relatively unstructured approach to the research process” (Bryman, 2012: 41). Babbie (2014: 137) furthermore states that “in some forms of qualitative research, the clarification on concepts is a key element in the collection of data”. This is also the case for such a complex concept as radicalisation. Rather than imposing the academic clarification of the concept on the respondents, the interviewees will be asked to explain the concept of radicalisation in their own words to ensure the experiences and views of the educators are the point of orientation and to understand to what extent and in what way they deal with this complex phenomenon.

3.2 Data gathering

This study has used two methods of data gathering. Firstly, a document analysis of multiple policy documents and scientific papers was conducted to create the literature review and to help shape the interview guide. It allowed the researcher to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of radicalisation, as well as an insight into the Dutch government’s point of view regarding this security issue and the possible difficulties a non-security actor encounters when they are assigned a role in countering a security issue. Secondly, interviews were carried out with relevant persons in the secondary education field, to provide an answer on the empirical research questions.

3.2.1 Document analysis

Prior to the interviews, an analysis of multiple documents has been conducted to gain a better understanding of the problem at hand. These documents included scientific papers that discussed the concepts of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, as well as the strategy of ‘responsibilisation’ by Garland (1996). Furthermore, official documents derived from the Dutch government, such as parliamentary papers, have been consulted to understand the state’s view on these phenomena and the role the education sector has been given by the state in the fight against radicalisation. The measures in the document The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat Jihadism (2014) have been the starting point of this research. And lastly, papers from private sources and newspaper articles that were relevant to this study have been checked.

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3.2.2 Interviews

The interviews in this thesis are in-depth qualitative interviews with a semi-structured design. The researcher created a general plan of inquiry, often referred to as an interview guide, including the specific topics to be covered to help structure the conversation. The researcher chose for a semi-structured design as “(…) one of the special strengths of field research is its flexibility” (Babbie, 2014: 327), giving respondents the freedom to answer in their own terms and time and “to focus on what they think is most relevant to the question, providing the broadest set of perspectives” (Duke Initiative of on Survey Methodology, n.d.:1). As all the interviewees are Dutch, the interview guide was created in Dutch, and all the interviews will be conducted in Dutch as well.

3.2.3 Interview guide

A flexible interview guide enables the respondents to talk about their views and experiences in their own way. The questionnaire consists of a number of topics and has been constructed with the help of the document analysis. An advantage of using topics instead of questions, is that it invites a conversation around some themes rather than through a completely structured questionnaire. It allows the researcher to go in depth, respond to reactions and to ask follow-up questions. The interview guide consists of five topics. The first topic is aimed at obtaining more background information of the respondents. The second topic is focussed on the tension between the detecting and counteracting of radicalisation among students by teachers on the one hand, and the relationship of trust between teachers and students on the other hand. It aims to answer to what extent teachers and schools are willing to play a role in the state’s counter radicalisation policies. The third topic is of a more practical nature, how radicalisation can be detected and counteracted and whether schools and teachers are equipped to do so. The fourth topic is about the government’s support for schools and teachers to help them with their task to counter radicalisation. And lastly, to what extent schools are prepared and able to share sensitive information about their students with external parties, such as the police. Each topic consists of multiple questions and can be consulted in appendix A.

3.2.4 Respondents

For this research the selection of respondents have been conducted through purposive or judgemental sampling as these approaches are often “(…) focused on the exploration and interpretation of experiences and perceptions [including case studies]. (…) People or cases are chosen ‘with purpose’ to enable the researcher to explore the research questions (…) and are

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selected on the basis of characteristics or experiences that are directly related to the researcher’s area of interest and her research questions, and will allow the researcher to study the research topic in depth” (Matthews & Ross, 2010: 167). The criteria for the selection of the respondents were that they are all employed at a secondary school in the Netherlands and deal with social problems at their schools on a daily basis. Due to the limited time and resources at the researcher’s disposal, convenience sampling has been used where the researcher reached out to her own social circle in May 2016 to find respondents that were relevant for this research, met the criteria and were willing to assist. After finding six respondents that fulfilled all the requirements, three additional respondents were found through snowball sampling. Whereby “(…) [two] sampled participants propose[d three] other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research” (Bryman, 2012: 424),

In total nine interviews have been conducted with nine respondents of eight different secondary schools. The list with respondents and interview data can be found in appendix B. This list consists of five social studies teachers, one history teacher, one religious education teacher, one principal, and one former principal who is currently an advisor to the school governors. The interviews were conducted in the months June and July of 2016. Five interviews took place face-to-face at the respondents’ schools, three interviews were conducted through Skype and one interview was held by telephone. The duration of the interviews ranged from 40 minutes to 1 hour and 10 minutes. Because most respondents preferred to stay anonymous as they felt that their answers could potentially harm their relationship of trust with their students, no names are listed in the analysis. To ensure transparency, the names and transcripts have been made available to the supervisor Dr. G.M. van Buuren. Furthermore, all nine interviews were carried out by one researcher, the writer of this thesis, to ensure consistency.

3.3 Data analysis

The semi-structured interviews that were carried out face-to-face have been recorded with the app Smart Voice Recorder, the interviews that were conducted through Skype were documented with the computer program Amolto Call Recorder and the telephone interview was recorded with the app Call Recorder – ACR. All nine respondents gave permission to record the interviews to ensure transparency. Once the interviews were recorded, the interviews have been transcribed with the online computer program oTranscribe.

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Thematic data analysis has been used to discover patterns in the responses of the interviewees. The attractiveness of qualitative data is its richness, but it is difficult to find analytic paths through that richness (Bryman, 2012). The Framework approach, a matrix based method that represents an index of themes, has been used to order and synthesise the data (Bryman, 2012). Statements and reactions of the first four respondents have been brought together by sub question and theme. These themes became the categories of the analysis. The final five interviews were analysed in the data matrix by using the constant comparative method, whereby the responses of these interviewees were constantly compared to the reactions of the first four interviewees. When a category was identified from the data that did not fit the themes that were already identified, a new theme was created. By doing so, it allowed the researcher to gain an insight into the different, and sometimes, opposing views of the interviewed educators at secondary schools in the Netherlands. Specific quotes from the interviews that were used in the data analysis have been translated by the researcher from Dutch to English as objectively as possible to ensure the experiences and views of the educators were the point of orientation.

3.4 Limitations of the research

This research focuses its efforts on nine educators at eight secondary schools in the Netherlands and their willingness and capability to play a role in the state’s counter radicalisation policies and to what extent these perceptions influence the implementation of these policies. In order to assess the quality of the research, the reliability and validity have to be taken into account. While “reliability is concerned with the question whether the results of a study are repeatable” (Bryman, 2012: 41), validity is concerned with the means of measurements and whether they are accurate and are actually measuring what they are intended to measure and is often divided into two types: internal validity and external validity (Golafshani, 2003). According to Brink (1993:35) “internal validity is the term used to refer to the extent to which research findings are a true reflection or representation of reality rather than being the effects of extraneous variables. External validity addresses the degree or extent to which such representations or reflections of reality are legitimately applicable across groups.” It is important to pay attention to these aspects as the methods that are used in qualitative research are often more subjective than the methods in quantitative research (Brink, 1993).

As stated before, this research focuses on the experiences and views of educators at secondary schools regarding the phenomenon radicalisation, and the impact of these

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experiences and views on the schools’ compliance with the Dutch counter radicalisation policies. The interviews that were conducted were recorded on tape, allowing repeated revisiting of the data to check emerging themes and to remain true to the participants’ views, safeguarding internal validity and strengthening reliability as well (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). In addition, an interview guide was used and all interviews were carried out by one researcher, ensuring that the interpretations of data were consistent and transparent.

Yet, research bias may be introduced by the respondents and/or the researcher. The reader must take into consideration that the data analysis consists of the researcher’s interpretation of the interviewees’ interpretation of reality and there is a possibility that the respondents’ perspectives were not accurately understood by the researcher (Noble & Smith, 2015). Furthermore, interviewees may have attempted to please the researcher by responding in the way that they believe the researcher expected, they might have sought to reveal themselves in the best possible light and might have also been unwilling to share certain information with the researcher and deliberately withheld or distorted information (Brink, 1993). It is therefore more than likely that a replication of the study will not yield the same results as human behaviour is not static and the respondents’ views and the researcher’s understanding can change (Merriam, 1995). Nevertheless, qualitative in-depth interviews do allow the researcher to discuss various topics from different angles and to respond and ask follow-up questions. This enhances the understanding by the researcher, thus making it more reliable, as well as strengthens the level of internal validity (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009).

Countering radicalisation is often “very context-specific in terms of both culture and locality. They cannot easily be transferred to other places or to other types of movements” (Schmid, 2013:47). As this study is based on a small case study conducted in a particular research setting, the secondary educational field in the Netherlands, the research findings cannot be generalised to other cases. Nor can the results be used to make statistical generalisations about the entire target group of the research: how teachers in the Netherlands view and experience their part in the Dutch state’s counter radicalisation policies. Moreover, the reader has to take into account that, during the selection of the sampled schools, no distinction has been made as to the geographical location or educational level of the school, nor to what extent radicalisation was present at the school. It is possible that these conditions and the presence or lack of radicalisation at a school have a significant impact on the viewpoint of educators regarding their assigned role in countering this issue. This threatens the external validity of the research. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the way Dutch

Radicalisation in schools: the role of teachers