Douze Points For Peace
The Eurovision Song Contest and Its Role in Processes of
Transitional Justice
Verka Serduchka performing ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’ for Ukraine, 2007
MA Thesis
Lou-Anna Druyvesteyn – 11574100 1 July, 2018
Holocaust and Genocide Studies Universiteit van Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. Karel Berkhoff Second reader: Prof. Dr. Nanci Adler Amount of words: 20.894
Table of content
Abstract 3
Introduction 4
1. Transitional justice 6
1.1 The limited scope of transitional justice 6 1.2 Transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia 8
1.3 A broader scope 12
2. The Eurovision Song Contest 15
2.1 The beginnings: dreaming of unity 15
2.2 A dream come true? 16
2.3 The political side of the Eurovision 18 2.4 The case of Ukraine – Russia Goodbye! 22 2.5 Armenia – The struggle for recognition 26 3. Germany and Israel in the Eurovision 32 3.1 (West) Germany: to perform is to progress 32 3.2 Israeli participation – a celebration of the nation 36
3.3 A limited case study 39
4. (The former) Yugoslavia in the Eurovision Song Contest 41 4.1 Before 1992: unity without victory 41
4.2 The dissolution 43
4.3 A new chapter 46
4.4 Serbia: Changing the game 50
4.5 Your votes please 53
4.6 Why vote for each other? 56
Conclusion 58
Appendix A – Eurovision votes exchanged by Armenia, 60 Turkey and Azerbaijan from 2006-2012
Appendix B – Eurovision votes exchanged by Germany and Israel, 62 1973-2017
Appendix C – Eurovision votes exchanged by the countries of the 64 former Yugoslavia, 2004-2017
Abstract
Cultural manifestations that can play a supportive role in transitional justice are rarely seen as such or properly evaluated. The Eurovision Song Contest is a good example: it is a mega event that is one of the most watched television shows in the world and therefore able to reach a mass audience for any message that is wished to be send. Officially it is not allowed to be political, but the contest is often implicitly full of political references. From songs and performances to voting, examples galore. This interplay between amusement, music and politics has potential in processes of reconciliation and restorative transitional justice after (violent) conflict or even genocides in Europe (the former Yugoslavia, Germany) or within the borders of the Eurovision Song Contest (Armenia).
Introduction
Every year around late April and early May, the countries of Europe (and beyond) come together for a singing contest that has become one of the world’s most watched events in the history of television. The Eurovision Song Contest (or Eurovision) started with seven countries, an orchestra and a conductor, and grew into the biggest international musical competition with over forty countries participating every year from east to west.1
The Eurovision has seen Europe change from the broken continent it was shortly after the Second World War, the economic growth afterwards; the growing unity initiated by that other European initiative: the European Union; the wall dividing not only Germany but also East and West, and then coming down; to the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the cultural and political concept that was ‘Europe’. The Cold War was played out, wars were fought, but the Eurovision Song Contest happened every year since 1956.
The contest’s explicit denunciation of politics on stage has had little effect on the reality, for implicit political messages have been present on the stage from the early years of the contest. These messages – my personal favorite is Turkey’s submission to the contest a year after the oil crisis of 1979, a love song for a man named Pet’r Oil – are often in the context of a conflict or its aftermath. The stage of the Eurovision Song Contest provides the perfect venue to convey a message to or generate attention from a mass audience.
In this thesis, the cases of Armenia, Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia will be brought to the table to show how different sides to a conflict represent themselves variously at the Eurovision Song Contest in relation to their violent history. An analysis of these cases shows an opportunity for a mechanism of a more progressive approach to transitional justice by focusing on cultural elements and reconciliation, besides the judicial aspect of transitional justice.
Research on the Eurovision Song Contest has mostly been focused on detecting voting patterns and blocs by means of statistical analysis by Derek Gatherer, Gad Yair and others. They have detected voting blocs based on cultural and linguistic affinities. The foundations for the Eurovision were not without political implications, and with the growth in participating countries came a growth in political dimensions to the festival.2 In the past few years, more research has been devoted to this by scholars such as Dean Vuletic, Catherine Baker, Marijana
1 Chris West, Eurovision! (London: Melville House, 2017): 4.
2 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between: An Analysis of Political
Voting Bias in the Eurovision Song Contest’, Master Thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy (2012), 38.
Mitrović and Ivan Raykoff. However, in relation to genocides and transitional justice, the Eurovision has been understudied.
To demonstrate the relation between the Eurovision Song Contest and (cultural forms of) transitional justice, I elaborate on the ways in which the contest played a role in, or was a previous cultural manifestation of transitional justice, and how this can be used in future cases. My first point will be that the Eurovision Song Contest has had inherently, from the beginning onwards, political implications, whether it be on or off stage, especially in the validation of nations and states of their existence. I illustrate that side of the Eurovision Song Contest with the example of Ukraine, together with an elaboration on the voting systems. The latter can sometimes be a peculiar reflection of attitudes towards other participating countries.
Following this, I show how the Eurovision Song Contest has been employed by Armenia as a cultural-institutional (coming from the broadcasters) initiative with regards to the Armenian Genocide. This case shows the side of the victims in a quest for demanding justice. Then I employ the case of Germany to show how in the early stages of the Eurovision, used this cultural event to distract from or deliberately create modifications of perceived stereotypes of perpetrators in the early stages of the Eurovision.
This thesis will not analyze every entry of every participant of every year in this work, instead I will focus on the relevant years. And it goes without saying that not every entry is as political. There will always be enough songs merely about love, joy and happiness; here I have selected the ones that are politically charged.
Finally – this will be the major part of this work – I discuss the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. I expand on the relations between these states and how these are strangely absent from the Eurovision stage. This will lead to the conclusion that mega events such as the Eurovision Song Contest, unintentionally serve as ideal venues for various manifestations of cultural transitional justice in multifold ways.
1. Transitional justice
1.1 The limited scope of transitional justice
To end a violent conflict is often quite an achievement, yet conflict as such does not fully end. New issues arise: what to do with the perpetrators, the institutions and the judicial system? If these were part of the former conflict, they need to be adjusted. That is where transitional justice – as a (relatively) new field of study and practice – enters the stage to develop strategies on how to move forward in the most inclusive possible way.3
The first step of transitional justice is the criminalization of punishable acts that occurred, or retributive justice.4 Special courts or tribunals are then set up, because the judicial
system in place is often not capable of handling the gravity, severity and multiplicity of the cases. When comparing the first case where transitional justice was implemented, the Nuremberg trials after the Second World War, to more recent cases, the shift in focus from perpetrator to victim becomes clearly visible.5 In the Military trials in Nuremberg, the focus on the victims was futile. That does not mean retributive justice should be discarded, it remains one of the cornerstones of transitional justice, because it shows (or intends to) a break with the previous regime, emphasizing the transformation to a post-conflict state.6
Transitional justice comes in all shapes and sizes; but its necessity – in any form – to a (post-) conflict society is by now widely recognized. Other components of transitional justice, next to – or instead of – criminal prosecution include seeking and reforms. The truth-seeking aspect is especially important, as tribunals search for the truth in order to come to a just sentence. However, this truth is often not seen as the whole truth, since a court looks at the juridical aspects of the conflict only. This might (and should) be the truth, but it is not complete.7 Although it might not establish the entire truth, judicial truth does, as Michael Ignatieff has
3 Makau Mutua, ‘What is the Future of Transitional Justice,’ International Journal of
Transitional Justice 1, no. 9 (March 2015): 4.
4 Rama Mani, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Might? Restoring Legal Justice in the Aftermath
of Conflict’, in Regeneration of Wartorn Societies, M. Pugh, ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 2000),
5 Rudi Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, no. 1
(2003): 71.
6 Mani, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Might?’, 6.
7 Declan Roche, ‘Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’, British
called it, ‘limit the range of permissible lies’ and formulates a ‘negative truth’ that excludes certain narratives from the possibility of being true or being considered true.8
Criminal justice has mostly contributed to the formal type of transitional justice that ensures the juridical duties are executed. But the field of transitional justice has expanded its scope over the years. Next to retributive justice, restorative justice has become a new point of focus. Instead of on hard laws and penalizing punishable acts, it is focused on the relation between perpetrator and victim, based on the (Western and liberal) belief that individuals can best heal through acknowledgement.9 Denial or incomplete acknowledgement is seen the continuation of the crime against the victims. The best-known example of restorative justice is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-Apartheid South-Africa where truth was prevalent in importance over criminal prosecution. Restorative justice aims to reconcile the parties previously at conflict by means of mediation, truth establishing and conferences.10
But what if attempts to pursue all this remain unsuccessful? The case of transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia will make clear how some tools of transitional justice do not have the desired outcome. This gap, that occurs more often than only in the case of the former Yugoslavia, between transitional justice (classical style) and reconciliation shows that there is a need for a new wave of transitional justice-thinking – one that includes both a penalizing approach as well as mechanisms for successful societal transformations, All of this requires a change of mindset.
An important element of transitional justice, that has been addressed more specifically by attempts at restorative justice, is normalizing the relations between former enemies. To erase the dichotomy between victim and perpetrator is an important goal of such strategy, just as the decollectivisation of guilt and victimhood: that not every person belonging to a certain group out of which some were perpetrators ought to be seen as a perpetrator.11 Again, the case of Yugoslavia will make clear this is not as easy as it seems. To remove grudges is one thing, but to remove collective perceptions of guilt and blame is another. This aspect of transitional justice
8 Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The philosophy and practice of dealing with the past: some conceptual
and normative issues’ in Burying the past. Making peace and doing justice after civil conflict, N. Biggar, ed. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 71.
9 Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction: memory, trauma and world politics’ in Memory, trauma and
world politics: Reflections on the relationship between the past and the present, D. Bell ed.
(London: Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 4.
10 Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, 75.
11 Michael Ignattief, ‘Articles of faith’, Index on Censorship 25, no. 5 (1996): 118. But see
aslso Andrew Rigby, Justice and reconciliation. After the violence (Bolder: Lynne Rienner, 2001) and Ruti G. Teitel Transitional justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
has received less attention from scholars in the field than the legal aspect. Only in the more recent and more social approaches has this been addressed. Their aim is shifting from justice to social transformation: an ‘enormous experiment in social engineering’.12
1.2 Transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia
Before the conflict had even ended, the United Nations issued resolutions to establish a justice mechanism to deal with the crimes that occurred in the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was a historical event: the birth of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (from here on referred to as the ICTY).13
Its mandate ran from 1993 up until 2017 and was the first UN war crime tribunal.14 The tribunal was given jurisdiction to rule over individual persons (not organizations or units) and can claim jurisdiction over the national legal proceedings.15 The categories of crimes over
which it has jurisdiction were laid down in the statute and cover grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 194916, violations of the customs of war, crimes against humanity and genocide.17 The ICTY was successful in trying some of the key actors in the conflicts such as Radislav Krstić (commander responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica, convicted for genocide) and Slobodan Milošević (president of Serbia, died before the sentence was released).
12 Roland Paris, At war’s end. Building peace after civil conflict (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 21.
13 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘A world unto itself? The application of
international justice in the former Yugoslavia’, in My neighbor, my enemy: justice and
community in the aftermath of mass atrocity, E. Stover and H.M. Weinstein ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32.
14 ICTY, ‘The Tribunal – Establishment’, n.d.,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment (retrieved 28 March 2018).
15 ICTY, ‘Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction’, n.d.,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-‐and-‐crimes-‐under-‐icty-‐jurisdiction (retrieved 28 March 2018).
16 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their Additional Protocols’, 2010, https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-‐and-‐law/treaties-‐
customary-‐law/geneva-‐conventions/overview-‐geneva-‐conventions.htm (retrieved 1 april 2018).
17 ICTY, n.d., ‘Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction’,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-‐and-‐crimes-‐under-‐icty-‐jurisdiction (retrieved 28 March 2018).
The focus of the ICTY was mostly on the prosecution of war criminals, more than on attempting to restructure civil society.18 This is one of the main criticisms the tribunal has received (not the only one though). The aperture that was arising between the countries where the conflicts took place and where the tribunal was (The Hague, the Netherlands) became visible by the lack of information provision, translations and action on the ground. To provide a more restorative aspect to the ICTY, Outreach was set up, a program to create a resonance of the judicial progress with a more societal focused approach. It did so by setting up conferences in Bosnian-Serb villages that were closely related to the violence of the conflict, producing documentaries and providing information. The message to be transmitted was that justice was delivered to the individuals that took part and the truth has been established.19 It was believed that through conveying that message, the schism between the different ethno-political entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be tempered (Outreach focused mostly on Bosnia and Herzegovina and less on Serbia or the other Balkan countries. One explanation for this is that the worst atrocities had taken place on Bosnian soil).20
However, that message was not at all easily conveyed. The local people remained hesitant about whether justice had really been served.21 They were not convinced that these attempts would have any effect on the other side (of the conflict). Another reoccurring point of criticism was that the role of bystanders was largely ignored in the ICTY. The ‘big fish’ were prosecuted, yet many that played a more indirect in the violent conflict remained unpunished. This reproach came from both sides and subsequently fueled the perception that the collective of the other side was guilty, yet remained unpunished.22 Overall, the ICTY was not perceived positively in Bosnia23 and Serbia24. The strained relationship between the countries and the ICTY got off on a rocky start, since the Tribunal was more or less imposed on the countries of
18 Jelena Obradovic-‐Wochnik, ‘The “Silent Dilemma” of Transitional Justice: Silencing and
Coming to Terms with the Past in Serbia’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 7, no. 2 (2013): 330.
19 Johanna Mannergren Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Focaal – Journal of Global and
Historical Anthropology 57 (2010): 55.
20 Ibid., 57.
21 Gregory Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia: An Unbridgeable Gap between Academe
and Law?’, Law, Crime and History 2 (2013): 141.
22 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 54.
23 Ibid., 59.
the former Yugoslavia by the international community, and citizens of the former Yugoslavia were barred from legal positions in the court.25 Out of the 8000 estimated perpetrators, a little over 400 have been prosecuted in trials in both the ICTY as well as regional and national trials.26 This number is perceived as rather disappointing in the area.27
This notion has returned numerous times in the research done into transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia. The dichotomy between victim and perpetrator is persistent amongst all sides. Moreover, every side feels like they are put in the position of perpetrator while they are actually not, the other side is. What their side did was self-defense and only necessary, the other side was abundant in violence and excessive.28
Some researchers have argued that the attempts at restorative justice have been counterproductive: the have only increased the polarization along the lines of ethno-political differences.29 The assumption made by the tribunal – that individual justice would pave the way
for reconciliation – underestimated the ethno-political grudges that remained. Even the ICTY itself contributed to these grudges, and was used as such by political figures, who claimed that the tribunal was not neutral and targeted one’s own ethno-political criminals differently from those of other nationalities.30 The competing claims of victimhood and denials of guilt are simply too embedded to be changed by a conference and stand in the way of the creation of a collective historical narrative, often seen as one of the cornerstones of restorative justice.31
Cooperation with the ICTY was done reluctantly as it was believed to be partial. In 2013 only one out of six people in Bosnia and Herzegovina felt that reconciliation had been achieved.32
The Tribunal’s attempts to engage the public have been met with discontent in Bosnia, and in Serbia they were largely ignored. The same social mechanisms are at place, where
25 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 54.
26 Stephanie A. Barbour, ‘Making Justice Visible: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Domestic War
Crimes Trials Outreach’ in Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach, Clara Ramírez-‐Barat ed. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014): 98.
27 Ibid., 99.
28 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 51.
29 See Selimovic ‘Perpetrators and Victims’ or Kent ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’ 30 Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 141.
31 Dinka Corkalo, et a., ‘Neighbors again? Intercommunity relations after ethnic cleansing’ in
My neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity, E. Stover
and H. M. Weinstein ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 145.
individual Serbian guilt at the ICTY is collectivized and victimhood of the other side rejected.33 But the silence to which it has led in Serbia should not be underestimated, as some researchers into transitional justice have done in the past, Political leaders have long encouraged silence by suppressing narratives different from theirs.
The genocide of Srebrenica is a key issue within the competition for victimhood. Most (Bosnian-)Serbs deny the claim that it was a genocide and use the conviction of the ICTY that Srebrenica was a genocide as evidence that the ICTY is partial. They then point to other crimes of substantial gravity that were assessed to be crimes against humanity instead of a genocide and argue that they are framed for being only the perpetrators of genocide.34 Bosniac politicians in their turn argue that the foundations for the Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina were built on the Srebrenica genocide and other massacres and therefore Republika Sprpska has no right to exist.35
In short, as the Yugoslav case shows, retributive justice alone is not enough and restorative justice can also fall short. On the contrary, both have had the opposite effect. In both Bosnia and Serbia, denial was on the rise together with a renewed sense of ethno-nationalism. The complicated dynamic between victimhood and guilt created a chasm between ethno-nationalities.36 The international attempts to rebuild the region inadequately address the underlying waves of nationalism.37
Are there alternatives? Several transitional justice scholars have argued for the importance of education in post-conflict societies to create congruence on the narratives as well as to inform and to counter misinformation.38 It is part of the bigger context, with the same aim as restorative justice – peacebuilding. Education on the wars has been little to none in the former Yugoslavia, mostly because of the reluctance of politicians and the refusal to adhere to a more
33 Obradovic-‐Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 333. 34 Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 152.
35 Obradovic-‐Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 330.
36 Diane Orentlicher Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018): 21.
37 Fletcher and Weinstein, ‘A world unto itself? The application of international justice in the
former Yugoslavia’, 35.
38 Elizabeth A. Cole, ‘Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education’, The
nuanced narrative.39 Outreach has been attempting to promote education on the history, but it has been met with reluctance and passivity.40
For all these reasons, therefore, perhaps the scope of transitional justice should be extended further to include socio-cultural events, or focus on the areas where there is a common ground.
1.3 A broader scope
One of the researchers of transitional justice searching for more inclusive ways by highlighting the importance of culture and society is Pablo de Greiff, who currently serves as a UN-rapporteur on human rights. His line of reasoning is that in order to transform post-conflict societies, changes at the level of the individual are prerequisite, and that this requires employing cultural instruments.41 Since is foundation, traditional transitional justice has left out cultural
elements of its tool package.42 However, cultural manifestations have always accompanied more acknowledged forms of transitional justice. De Greiff also mentions technological innovations and changes that societies go through after a conflict and the impact of this on cultural manifestations.43
In cultural forms of transitional justice, it is wise to distinguish between state- or institution sponsored initiatives from others. Examples of the former include the documentaries made by Outreach in the name of the ICTY as part of the information provision in the former Yugoslav countries.44 Other examples are the institutionalized places of remembrance and information such as museums or memorials. These contribute to awareness and acknowledgement, but are not developed by popular initiative. The latter initiative includes local artists creating exhibitions, novels written or movies made and distributed in the public sphere. They are the contributions to public interaction without ‘suggesting that such contribution is their only function or source of value’.45 Once picked up by the media or news,
39 Obradovic-‐Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 332.
40 Barbour, ‘Making Justice Visible: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Domestic War Crimes Trials
Outreach’, 95.
41 Pablo de Greiff, ‘On Making the Invisible Visible: The Role of Cultural Interventions in
Transitional Justice Processes’ in Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach ed. Clara Ramírez-‐Barat (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014): 14.
42 Ibid., 13. 43 Ibid., 12.
44 ICTY, ‘Outreach Programme’, n.d., accessed 30 March 2018.
http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-‐programme.
cultural manifestations have the power to reach a great audience and generate attention, something the ICTY for example did not achieve. Not only do cultural expressions reflect opinions or shared values from a societal perspective, they can produce new opinions, generate discussions and promote reconciliation, just as well as state- or institution-sponsored interventions).46
Cultural transitional justice can also contribute to the visibility of victims and raise empathy. This visibility through cultural means could also be an effective answer to denial. However, this can only be done once institutional changes have been made (protection of citizen rights, guarantee of independent media and freedom of opinion).47
Research into cultural manifestations of transitional justice has been limited, and has been mostly focused on the visual art and media. This focus has been on transitional justice in the cultural sphere in South Africa48 and more general works on literature and film.49 It has not
yet been extended to music, let alone the Eurovision Song Contest, although music, as well as the Eurovision, is known to play an important role in nation-building, or in what some have called ‘banal nationalism’50. Especially the Eurovision Song Contest is a well-fitting example of banal nationalism, which can best be described as everyday representations that (not always deliberately) support the existence of the nation-state and make citizens aware of belonging to that nation-state.51
But the contest can also be conceived as more than that: as an active promotion of nationalism by states on stage; overt nationalism. The latter is inherent to international events where countries compete, since the whole nation is represented by a group (or person) that is then reduced to his or her nationality (besides whatever it is doing in the context of the event). The contestant becomes an embodiment of the nation; when he, she or they win, the nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation- nation-
46 Clara Ramirez Barat, ‘Transitional Justice in the Public Sphere’, in Transitional Justice,
Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach Clara Ramírez-‐Barat ed.(New York: Social Science
Research Council, 2014): 34.
47 Ibid., 36.
48 Eduardo Gonzalez Cueva and M. Florencia Librizzi ‘Photography and Transitional Justice:
Evidence, Postcard, Placard, Token of Absence’ in Clara Ramírez-‐Barat ed. Transitional
Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach (New York: Social Science Research Council,
2014).
49 Nadia Siddiqui and Hjalmar Jorge Joffre-‐Eichhorn, ‘From Tears to Energy: Early Uses of
Participatory Theater in Afghanistan’ in Clara Ramírez-‐Barat ed. Transitional Justice, Culture
and Society: Beyond Outreach (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014).
50 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 51 Ibid., 13.
state wins. This aspect of nation-building comes close to or can overlap with aspects of transitional justice such as the desire for acknowledgement or the desire to ‘move on’.
Eurovision provides a stage where messages can receive attention, including messages regarding former conflicts. It is also a place where countries are in contact with each other and forced to acknowledge each other in a setting where every participating country has an equal opportunity.
Following performances come the votes, that can reflect relations between countries. The political side of the Eurovision Song Contest can be connected to certain aspects of restorative justice, such as searching for acknowledgement, looking forward, decollectivizing victimhood and guilt, and shaping perceptions of former enemies.
2. The Eurovision Song Contest
2.1 The beginning: dreaming of unity
In 1954, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was given the task to develop and promote pan-European television.52 Television had just been introduced in households and it would not be long before most would have one (in 1966 already more than seventy-five percent of the households had a television).53 Marcel Bezençon, the president of the EBU, drew inspiration from the Italian San Remo Festival, a yearly song competition founded a few years before.54 He was an acquaintance (and admirer) of Jean Monnet, commonly known as one of the founding fathers of European integration.55 Two goals were set for the EBU: to manifest the
EBU as a determining medium in television broadcasting and to create unity and ‘European’ identity. The idea was to have a mixture of the successes of San Remo and sports games on European level. Bezençon believed a festival centered around music could create unity in (Western) Europe that had for centuries been divided by wars and conflict.56
Two years later, the 24th of May 1956, the contest became reality. The Grand Prix
Eurovision de la Chanson Européenne, as it was initially called, was organized in Lugano,
Switzerland. A location not only chosen because of Bezençon’s Swiss background, but also to prevent inevitable scuffling between the participating countries without a history of centuries of neutrality57. Seven states took part in the first contest and could all perform two songs. Seven states: Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Germany, fourteen songs and only one place to reach: first - there was no second or third place. Switzerland won, not unexpectedly, since for some reason the Luxembourg jury was made up of two Swiss.58 It was a work in progress, but looked like a success. It was the first yearly returning event, apart from the European broadcast of the flower parade in Monaco, that aired all over Europe simultaneously.59
52 Geert Willem, Douze Points, Twelve Points (Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Unieboek, 2014) p. 17 53 Ger Sleijpen, ’60 jaar televisie in Nederland’, 2008, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-‐
nl/nieuws/2008/49/60-‐jaar-‐televisie-‐in-‐nederland, (retrieved 25 March 2018).
54 John Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest (London: Carlton Books Limited,
2005): 8.
55 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 17. 56 Ibid., 18.
57 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 10. 58 Ibid., 7.
From 1956, the Eurovision Song Contest has evolved one final with seven participants to the division of the program into the finals and semi-finals in which the participants compete for a place in the finals, of which there are 26 available. Participation is not limited to the borders of the European continent, but to the borders of the EBU, which are set by the International Telecommunication Union60. In order to be a member of the latter, a state needs to be recognized by the United Nations as an autonomous state. In the case of Kosovo, this has been problematic, because it has not been recognized as an official state by several European countries, amongst which Serbia. Kosovo has never participated in the Eurovision since its independence, although it wants to.61
The EBU borders and its non-confinement to the European continental borders explains the odd ones out at the competition like Israel (participating since 1973), Australia (since 2015) and Morocco (once, 1980). One thing that has not changed since the beginning is that participation is a matter of prestige as well as felt to be tantamount to inclusion to the European community.
2.2 A dream come true?
The year that exemplifies the role of the Eurovision Song Contest in the development of Europe very well is 1990. The festival was hugely popular amongst the participating countries, and although televoting had not yet been introduced, popular engagement with the festival was significant. More and more countries had joined every year. More members required more rules, such as the length of a song, the number of composers and the nationality of the performers.62
In 1989, the Contest was won by Yugoslavia with what by some is called the worst song in Eurovision history.63 Regardless, this meant that the following year, the festival was to be held in Zagreb. This was a first for Eastern Europe, and although the Eurovision had travelled outside of Western-Europe (to Israel in 1979), most Eastern-European countries were until a year before still under the yoke of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Yugoslavia, that took part since 1961.64
60 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 21. 61 Ibid., 45.
62 Chris West, Eurovision!, 159
63 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 120.
Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Eurovision 1989 Yugoslavia -‐ Riva -‐ Rock me’, filmed May 1989, YouTube video, 4:45, posted July 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_IJ3ukzLQp4
1990, Yugoslavia, all around Eastern Europe protests were still raging, the Soviet empire was crumbling down, it had been half a year since the wall was torn down. Out of the twenty-two countries participating, six songs referred to European unity, the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.65 The winning song ‘Insieme: 1992’ by Toto Cutugno representing Italy, advocates unity in Europe (even in English) as the lyrics go: ‘Insieme, unite, unite, Europe’.66 If the fall of the wall exemplified the end of the division of Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest in the following year made sure everyone got the message. The festival bursted from optimism, which was transferred to the living rooms in both east and west. A festival about music did not mean that repressive regimes immediately put down their arms and that Europe joined in a continental group hug, but it did have an influence on the general atmosphere over Europe. There was a sense of optimism, and it was at an optimum in these years.67
After 1990, the former Soviet states were eager to join, and to win. As always, to win means to organize the next festival and this is the perfect opportunity to show the rest of the world how far a country has progressed, even though the costs of organizing a festival are incredibly high. The Eurovision Song Contest in 1990 cost approximately six million euro, which was considered a large amount of money.68 Being a host meant not only to show how a state made progress, but also to show how well that progress fit in the European ideal of a modern state.
For public broadcasts, these amounts of money are not so eagy to raise. There have been near bankruptcies because of the organizing the contest.69 Not only the organization, taking part is also very costly, and has withheld several countries from participating, such as Yugoslavia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina.70 On numerous occasions, the hosting country won a second time, but was unable to organize the festival for a second year in a row because of budgetary reasons, such as the Netherlands in 1959.71
65 Italy with ‘Insieme: 1992’, Ireland with ‘Somewhere in Europe’, United Kingdom with ‘Give
a little love back to the world’, Germany with ‘Frei zu Leben’, Norway with ‘Brandenburger Tor’ and Austria with ‘Keine Mauern Mehr’.
66 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Insieme 1992 -‐ Italy 1990 -‐ Eurovision songs with live orchestra’,
filmed May 1990, YouTube video, 3:24, posted February 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0b5whZydVZc
67 Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic, Performing the ‘New’ Europe, Identities, Feelings and
Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 21.
68 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 123.
69 Ireland for example, but also Ukraine struggled to finance hosting the event. 70 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 17.
Regardless of the financial aspect, both hosting and taking part are a matter of great prestige, image-building and Europeanness, research has shown.72 In this regard, by seeing unity post-1989 as a sense of belonging to Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest serves its original purpose. It is a unique phenomenon that, with a few ups and downs, the EBU managed to have the majority of televisions in the member-states tuned to the Eurovision.
2.3 The political side of the Eurovision
Before 2004, winners were chosen by juries, each jury existing of five members.73 Before, votes were given by juries. The points distribution was the same as with televoting: countries cannot vote for themselves; the favorite entry gets twelve points, the second favorite ten points, the third eight and then from eight to one to the favorites in line. The votes of a jury of experts are likely to differ from votes from viewers. A professional jury will give a more professional opinion than the average family on the couch.
The differences between jury and popular votes is often well seen in the announcements of the votes. In 2017 these were done separately: a new voting system was introduced, or rather an updated one, in which first the jury votes were announced in the traditional way of every country giving out its points. This showed the clear deviations between the two.74
In 1995 (before the influx of Eastern European states), the sociologist Gad Yair identified several voting blocs, such as a Scandinavian one, a Mediterranean one and more. These were based on different sentiments, not necessarily all political, but also linguistic and cultural. He notes that with most international mega events, winning is based on being the best. However, this is impossible in the case of transnational music, since musical taste is so culturally bound. The quality of music has no clear criteria (there are indicators, but no real objective criteria), so it remains a matter of (national or regional) taste. Songs and voting represent national taste in music. Even preferences in rhythm and such are culturally
72 Cornel Sandvoss, ‘On the Couch with Europe: The Eurovision Song Contest, the European
Broadcast Union and Belonging on the Old Continent’, Popular Communication 6, no. 3 (2008), 198.
73 EBU/Eurovision, Public Rules of the 60th Eurovision Song Contest,
2015,https://web.archive.org/web/20150430201605/http://www.eurovision.tv/upload/pres s-‐downloads/2015/2014-‐09-‐02_2015_ESC_rules_EN_PUBLIC_RULES.pdf (retrieved 5 May 2018).
74 See for example: https://eurovisionworld.com/eurovision/2017 in comparison to
determined: ‘The evaluation of foreign songs is dependent on a cultural match between the evaluator and the evaluated’.75
Although it is a common outcry of frustration by participating countries that do not seem to do well in the contest – think of Terry Wogan, the British Eurovision-commentator who quit presenting the show after years of loyal service out of frustration of the lack of British victory for years, that was according to Wogan causally related to voting blocs in the rest of Europe – voting is not only political. Eurovision specialist Sietse Bakker argues that many elements determine voting behavior, there is cultural recognition, language preference, personal taste and of course the quality of the song.76 A really good song will transcend other voting variables.
Opinions on the political side of the Eurovision seem to be myriad, yet what exactly is considered as political voting is rarely spelled out. Bloc voting is often seen as synonymous to political voting, an assumption that is not entirely correct. Simply put, one could argue political voting is that the choice of who to vote for is based on political preferences or standpoints. This means that when Ukraine would release a song on the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 1944 in the midst of the actual Russian annexation of the Crimea, and it is then voted for by many of the other participating countries, this would be political voting, because that vote is based on solidarity for political reasons (in 2016). A similar situation was the increase in votes for an openly transvestite performance, when the climate for gay rights seems to be deteriorating in other European countries (in 2015). Or the obvious decrease in votes between Great Britain and Ireland in the times of The Troubles.77 These are the type of votes that are political.
Bloc voting, however, rarely ever is political. Instead it is cultural or linguistic, studies have shown.78 What is commonly called political voting actually is cultural voting, a term that has less of a sting to it and is far less controversial.79 Cultural voting can be explained by overlapping or transcending cultural habits, especially related to musical traditions or language. Shared conceptions of taste and style can transcend borders resulting in overlap amongst
75 Gad Yair, ‘”Unite, Unite Europe”. The Political and Cultural Structures of Europe as
Reflected in the Eurovision Song Contest’ Elsevier 17, no. 2 (1995), 150.
76 Lucy Westcott, ‘Your Guide to The Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest’, The Atlantic,
May 6 , 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/05/your-‐guide-‐to-‐ the-‐politics-‐of-‐the-‐eurovision-‐song-‐contest/361707/ (retrieved 21 February 2018).
77 The Troubles is the name for two phases in 20th century Ireland revolving around the very
violent conflict, by some qualified as a civil war, in Northern Ireland and Ireland.
78 Yair, ‘”Unite, Unite Europe’’. The Political and Cultural Structures of Europe as Reflected in
the Eurovision Song Contest’, 152.
79 Victor Ginsburgh and Abdul G. Noury, ‘The Eurovision Song Contest. Is Voting Political or
neighboring countries, that leads to bloc voting. I will go into this more when discussing the case of the Balkan countries and the so-called Balkan bloc. For now, what suffices is that political voting is not to be confused with bloc voting. Both might be considered as solidarity voting, but they are different forms.80
Not only responses (voting) can be political, submissions can be as well. The Eurovision has influenced national policies and political discourse.81 It has become an arena for ‘soft power’.82 Governments are not the organizers, national broadcasters are, and these are often under influence of more politically aimed institutions. Contestants are in their way ambassadors ‘behind whom stand not only backing groups and cliché set designs, but also ministers of culture, flags, prisons, border guards and armies’,83 especially when countries are determined to prove or showcase themselves as newly (or re-)established nations and to boost their images on the continent.84
There are guidelines for the level of politics in participation. The Reference Group – the executive expert committee on behalf of all Participating Broadcaster85 sees to that the EBU guidelines are followed. The executive supervisor of the organizing year has the last call on whether a song is eligible for participation, after it has been approved by a national board.86 An example of national political screening is the case of Italy in 1974 that would take part with a song called ‘Si’. However, in the upcoming weeks a referendum would take place in Italy and although the lyrics of the song had nothing to do with the referendum, the Italian broadcaster of the Eurovision, the RAI, was afraid it might influence the outcome of the referendum.87 In
80 Ibid., 44.
81 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between’, 40.
82 Frances Robinson, ‘13 times Eurovision got super political’, Politico, 3 May, 2017,
https://www.politico.eu/article/13-‐times-‐eurovision-‐song-‐contest-‐got-‐political/ (retrieved 30 March 2018).
83 Stephen Coleman, ‘Why is the Eurovision Song Contest Ridiculous? Exploring a Spectacle
of Embarrassment, Irony and Identity, The International Journal of Media and Culture 6, no 3 (2008): 132.
84 Westcott, ‘Your Guide to the Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest’.
85 The main rule is: The lyrics and/or performances of the songs shall not bring the Shows,
the ESC as such or the EBU into disrepute. No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted during the ESC. No swearing or other unacceptable language shall be allowed in the lyrics or in the performances of the songs.
Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Reference Group’, n.d.,
https://eurovision.tv/about/organisers/reference-‐group/ (retrieved 17 April 2018).
86 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Rules’, n.d., https://eurovision.tv/about/rules (retrieved 17 April
2018).
the end, the song was allowed to participate but it was not broadcast in Italy until after the referendum.
In the case of Georgia in 2009, the Reference Group had to intervene. It was the year after Russia had invaded South-Ossetia preceded by a protracted conflict in the region between the Georgian government and the people of Ossetia. The Georgian entry was the song ‘We Don’t Wanna Put In’ by Stephane & 3G and contained the lyrics: We don't wanna put in / the negative move / It's killin' the groove88, which sounds, once sung, a lot like ‘we don’t want Putin’, a reference to the Russian president. This is, according to an official statement by the EBU, a violation of the Eurovision policies. A spokesman declared: ‘No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted.’89 Georgia was given the choice to either rewrite the song, to withdraw or to be disqualified for the contest, which was coincidentally held in Russia that year. The country withdrew; another clear political message to Russia.
There are countless examples of the political aspects of the Eurovision and the way the participating countries use the mega event to pursue their political agendas. From Turkey, first trying to seem more European by participating in the contest, ‘promoting Turkey’s European credentials’ to its refusal to take part anymore (but instead organizing Turkvision, a song contest for Turkish speaking or ethnically Turkish countries and regions) to Germany’s slogan (‘Feel Your Heartbeat’) when it was hosting the Eurovision Song Contest in 2011 – a small reminder as to who forms the heart (read: the driving force) of Europe.90
Countries trying to come across as more European is one of the most important aspects of the Eurovision that scholars have researched in the past years. Especially since the fall of the curtain, Europe suddenly grew with newly independent countries that aimed westward instead of east. In this context, the Eurovision Song Contest is just like any other mega event with a culture of hegemony in different fields, political economical or cultural. 91 In the case of Eurovision, the hegemonic powers are centered in Western Europe, the countries
88 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘We Don't Wanna Put In -‐ Eurovision Song Contest 2009’, filmed
May 2009, YouTube video, 3:11, posted September 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5P6-‐7Rw4xug.
89 BBC, ‘Eurovision axes ‘anti-‐Putin’ song’, n.d., BBC, 10 March 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/7935865.stm (retrieved 10 April 2018).
90 Westcott, ‘Your Guide to the Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest.
91 Mega events are places where ‘national identity branding’ is used to promote countries.
One of the most important elements of national identity branding is culture, according to Simon Anholt. Simon Anholt, Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations,
whose integration has been accomplished. These are the same countries that do not care much for the Eurovision as a tool to prove or showcase themselves.92 This hegemony makes winning more than a prestigious accomplishment, it is paired with a sense of belonging and acceptance for the non-hegemonic participants. 93
When Estonia won in the contest in 2001, it was perceived as a step into the direction of European integration and membership of the EU.94 The prime minister proudly proclaimed: ‘We are no longer knocking at Europe’s door. We are walking through it singing’.95 ‘Newly Europeanizing states’96 project an image on stage of how they wish to be seen by the rest of Europe, and through this (re)construct a sense of the self.97
In 1979, Turkey had to withdraw because of the oil crisis in the Middle East and the increasing tensions in the Region. The following year, it joined again with a song called ‘Pet’r Oil’, a love song about a man that goes by that name, but when combining the words, it becomes a love to Petroil, as an assertion that Turkey would remain a player in the field.98
The contest is thus often used to convey a message about the participating countries. These messages are predominantly about the nation itself (Turkey, Estonia), but can also be directed at others (Georgia), albeit indirectly (the rules still apply). The examples of Ukraine and Armenia embody every aspect of political connotations in the Eurovision, from nation-branding to history-sharing.
2.4 The case of Ukraine – Russia Goodbye!
Political connotations in abundance, but there is one participant that embodies all the political aspects of the Eurovision: Ukraine. Joining for the first time in 2003, it has been eager to win
92 Ivan Raykoff, ‘Camping on the Borders of Europe’, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and
Politicsin the Eurovision Song Contest, I. Raykoff & D. Tobin ed. (Hampshire: Ashgate
Publishing, 2007), 7.
93 Coleman, Why is the Eurovision Song Contest Ridiculous?’, 133.
94 Irving Wolther, ‘More than Just Music: the Seven Dimensions of the Eurovision Song
Contest’, Popular Music 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 167.
95 Joel Vessels, ‘The Congress of Eurovision: Building European Community One Bricolage at
a Time’, E-‐International Relations, 8 May 2015, https://www.e-‐ir.info/2015/05/08/the-‐ congress-‐of-‐eurovision-‐building-‐european-‐community-‐one-‐bricolage-‐at-‐a-‐time/ (retrieved at 1 April 2018).
96 Shannon Jones and Jelena Subotic, ‘Fantasies of Power: Performing Europeanization on
the European Periphery’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 14, no. 5 (October 2011): 544.
97 Ibid., 550.c 98 O’Conner, 1980.
and prove itself as an independent nation.99 It won the second time participating with ‘Wild Dances’ by Ruslana, a ‘breaking free’ song referring back to Hutsul folklore by the costumes and the instruments to emphasize the return to the Ukrainian culture before Russian and Soviet intervention.100 The song (and its energetic performance) symbolized the revival of the nation Ukraine.101 ‘Wild Dances’ scored high in charts all over Europe – even Western Europe – which is not so common for Eastern European musicians and put Ukraine on the map of Europe. It changed the Eurovision entries from Eastern Europe in the following years: more countries sang in their own language, political themes became more present just as pre-Soviet folklore.102
Figure 1. Ruslana performs ‘Wild Dances’ in the 2004 Eurovision.103
99 Dean Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest (London: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2018): 21.
100 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Ruslana -‐ Wild Dances (Ukraine) -‐ LIVE -‐ 2004 Eurovision Song
Contest’, filmed May 2004, YouTube video, 3:16, posted October 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10XR67NQcAc.
101 Ibid,.
102 Catherine Baker, ‘Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and
National Identity at the Eurovsion Song Contest’, Popular Communication 6, no. 3 (2008): 177.
103 Image source: http://versuri-‐in-‐romana.blogspot.com/2015/10/ruslana-‐wild-‐dances-‐
The following year, Ukraine took part with the song ‘Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty’ meaning: ‘Together we are many, we cannot be defeated’ by the band Greenjolly.104 The song was a direct protest to the 2004 elections in Ukraine that were the reason for the Orange Revolution that took place. It later became the official anthem for it.105
In 2007, Ukraine sent Verka Serduchka, a man dressed as a woman, with the song ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’. It is by far one of the most peculiar submissions for the Eurovision ever.106 Some critics have said it was ‘very end of history’ because of the outfits (more 80s futuristic than realistic), the suggestive dancing, the unusual beat and the combination of Russian, German and English lyrics.107
Figure 2. Verka Serduchka performing ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’, 2007.108
104 Alyona Zhuk, ‘What happened to Orange Revolution band Greenjolly?’ Kyiv Post, 23
November 2011, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/guide/music/what-‐happened-‐to-‐orange-‐ revolution-‐band-‐greenjolly-‐117460.html (retrieved 20 February 2018).
Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Greenjolly -‐ Razom Nas Bahato (Ukraine) Live -‐ Eurovision Song Contest 2005’, filmed May 2005, YouTube video, 3:01, posted December 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5u6J_mbhLU.
105 Zhuk, ‘What happened to Orange Revolution band Greenjolly?’
106 Verka Serduchka (Andriy Danylko) is dressed in all silver with a silver cross on her head
and the number 69 on her back. The dancing is an eclectic mix of some sort of robot dance and folklore, just as the song itself, that features four languages. The lyrics come down to: Hello everybody! /My name is Verka Serduchka / Me English nicht verstehen! / Let's speak DANCE! / Sieben, Sieben / Ai lyu lyu and so on, accompanied by a Balkan disco beat.
Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Verka Serduchka -‐ Dancing Lasha Tumbai (Ukraine) 2007 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2007, YouTube video, 3:12, posted January 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfjHJneVonE.
107 Dean Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 54.
108 Image retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/music/artists/10f87b54-‐0e95-‐4268-‐9857-‐
