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HOW MEDIA -REPORTED VIOL ENCE
SPREADS: THE CONTAGION OF
SUICIDE TERRORISM
Judith Begeer S1291165 Capstone Project: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom of Intimidation MSc. Crisis and Security Management Word count: 30.289 First reader: Dr. Alex P. Schmid Second reader: prof. Dr. E. Bakker
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Abstract
This thesis uses quantitative and qualitative methods in
analysing contagion amongst suicide terrorists. It statistically
proves that suicide terrorism spreads via a non-random
distribution. Additionally it visualises waves, clusters and
frequencies in the spread of this type of violence, pointing
towards contagion. It concludes that the influence of mass
media resulting in contagion is large but that it is an interplay
of different sources of inspiration, such as social media, blogs
and chatrooms as well as social milieu, before an individual
imitates the act of suicide terrorism. With this thesis the author
argues that part of what we now explain with radicalisation
might as well be explained by a theory of contagion and
attempts to move counter-terrorism efforts forwards by
highlighting a different explanatory theory.
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CONTENT
I. Introduction ... 6
Central Research Question... 7
Readers Guide ... 8
Scientific and Societal relevance ... 8
II. Research Design ... 10
Narrowing down of research ... 10
Concepts……….10
III. Literature Review ... 13
A Historical Overview of Suicide Missions and Suicide Terrorism ... 13
Individual and Organisational Motivations for ENGAGING IN Suicide Terrorism ... 16
Influence of the media on Clusters in Suicides ... 20
Sociology and Imitation Theory... 22
Psychology and Imitative Behaviour ... 23
Criminology and Copycat Crimes ... 25
Linguistics and Copying ... 26
Terrorism Studies and Contagion ... 28
IV. Theoretical Framework ... 29
Methodology……….34
V. Data ... 41
Global Terrorism database (GTD)... 41
Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism (CPOST) ... 42
Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) ... 43
Crosschecking Three Databases ... 43
Poisson and Negative Binomial Distribution ... 45
Trends by Year ... 51
Clustering in Countries ... 55
Clustering by Campaign ... 68
VI. Analysis ... 76
Types of Media Associated with Inducing Contagion ... 76
Non-Random Distribution of Suicide Terrorism ... 80
Who or What does the “Teaching”? ... 81
Radicalisation and Contagion ... 84
VII. Main Findings and Conclusion ... 86
Bibliography ... 90
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TABLES
Table 1 Midlarsky, Crenshaw & Yoshida Results, Results for the Poisson Model... 36
Table 2 Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980) Results for the Negative Binomial Distribution 1969 ... 37
Table 3 Comparing Trends and Numbers by Sampling the GTD, CPOST and RDWTI ... 44
Table 4 2001-2015 Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan According to GTD, CPOST and RDWTI ... 44
Table 5 2001-2015 Suicide Attacks in Iraq According to GTD, CPOST and RDWTI ... 45
Table 6 Poisson Distribution 1982-1991 ... 45
Table 7 Negative Binomial Distribution 1982-1991 ... 46
Table 8 Poisson Distribution 1992-1999 ... 46
Table 9 Negative Binomial distribuion 1992-1999 ... 47
Table 10 Poisson Distribution 2000-2005 Excluding Afghanistan and Iraq ... 47
Table 11 Negative Binomial Distribution 2000-2005 excluding Afghanistan and Iraq ... 48
Table 12 Poisson Distribution Excluding Afghanistan, Iraq & Pakistan, 2006-2010 ... 48
Table 13 Negative Binomial Distribution 2006-2010 Excluding Afghanistan, Iraq & Pakistan ... 49
Table 14 Poisson Distribution Excluding Afghanistan & Iraq, 2011 - 2015 ... 50
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FIGURES
Figure 1 Published by Pape et al. in the Washington Post, 2014 ... 42
Figure 2 The Relative Growth of Suicide Terrorism, Based on the GTD ... 51
Figure 3 The Rise of Suicide Terrorism Based on CPOST ... 52
Figure 4 The Start of the Recent Wave of Suicide Terrorism per Country 1981-1991 GTD Terrorism Database ... 55
Figure 5 Geographical Representation of Clusters in Suicide Terrorism 1982-1991 ... 56
Figure 6 Suicide Attacks per Country From 1992-1999 GTD Terrorism Database ... 57
Figure 7 Visualisation of the Geographical Clustering of Suicide Terrorism ... 58
Figure 8 Clustering of Suicide Attacks per Country 2000-2005 ... 59
Figure 9 Visualisation of Clustering and Reinforcement of Suicide Attacks, According to CPOST. ... 60
Figure 10 Suicide Attacks per Country from 2006 until 2010... 62
Figure 11 Clustering of Suicide Attacks per Country, According to the GTD... 63
Figure 12 Clustering and Frequencing of Suicide Attacks Globally from 2006-2010, according to CPOST. ... 63
Figure 13 Clustering of Suicide Attacks from 2011-2014 according to the GTD ... 65
Figure 14 Clustering of Suicide Attacks from 2011-2014 ... 66
Figure 15 Comparing Suicide Attacks in 1982 – Above - and 2015 – Below- , According to CPOST ... 67
Figure 16 Clustering of the Use of Suicide Attacks per Terrorism Campaign from 1982-2015, According to CPOST ... 70
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This master thesis attempts to contribute to explaining why and how suicide terrorism, terrorism and perhaps other forms of extremist violence spread. Building on the work of Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980), by statistically proving a non-random distribution in the spread of suicide terrorism, this research seeks to explore whether and to what extent media-induced copycat behaviour and subsequently contagion are partly responsible for the spread of acts of suicide terrorism. Contagion entails plural and proliferating cases of copycat behaviour, which is the following of an example by imitating it, similar to ‘trendsetting’ in fashion or other walks of life. The theory of social and behavioural contagion that is used in this thesis refers to copycat behaviour that is not genetically programmed, such as yawning, but to a type of behaviour that is passed on mimetically, that is, it is an element of culture or a system of behaviour that may be considered to be passed from one individual to the other by imitation (Marsden, 1998), however, unique alterations, albeit slight, can and may occur every time an act is imitated. These mimetically passed on trends often occur in waves or clusters. Therefore, in this investigation it was expected to find similar trends in suicide terrorism. To find these trends suicide attacks have been analysed per year, per country and per terrorist campaign. Taking the statistical Poisson and Negative Binomial models and the analysis of clusters into account, the results of the thesis are based on statistical data derived from three crosschecked datasets as well as qualitative data.
After the analysis of copycat behaviour it will be important to distinguish how copycats get their inspiration or examples. This thesis will argue that the spread of suicide terrorism and terrorism in general can only in part be explained by a process of radicalisation, with another part being due to contagion, possibly induced by mass media as well as social media. This finding could open up a new avenue for further academic research, examining the spread of other acts of violent extremism. The thesis concludes by stating that there is demonstrable evidence of contagion in acts of suicide terrorism and that there is reason to believe that mass media have played a role in encouraging copycat behaviour since the emergence of modern suicide terrorism in the early 1980s. However, mass media is not the only source of inspiration or suggestion for potential suicide terrorists – there is often an interplay between the Internet (blogs, chatrooms etc. – especially for lone wolves), conventional media, social media and public opinion.
7 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION
Historically, terrorist attacks, such as embassy occupations or hijackings, have often come in waves, with local and temporal concentrations in terms of frequency, and sometimes with the success of a new technique of one terrorist group being copied by like-minded or competing groups. Whilst such adoption can be the result of direct learning, more often than not the link is indirect: one terrorist group (or lone wolf) learns through news media or social media about a new technique or a new target and finds it attractive to repeat and copy the exemplary act. This can lead to a chain reaction where one act triggers a whole series or various new chains of imitative acts. The link between the original act and follow-up imitative behaviour is in many, perhaps most cases, the media. Both that mass media report such acts and how they report them as well as how terrorist networks make use of social media being for propaganda seems to influence the chance of imitative behaviour and encourage a process of contagion. This spread is most clear when a new technique is introduced, e.g. hijacking an airplane for ransom and then parachuting out of the plane with the money (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). Additionally, the widespread use of social media contributes to large amounts of information becoming available to potential perpetrators. Imitation, copying and learning from examples are psychological and behavioural mechanisms we are all familiar with but to look at these in terms of sequences of acts of terrorism is still unusual. The present project will make an attempt to illuminate the underlying contagion mechanism and illustrate its presence in suicide terrorism.
The central research question therefore is twofold:
“Is there demonstrable evidence of contagion in acts of suicide terrorism?”
”Is there reason to believe that mass media have played a role in copycat behaviour since the emergence of modern suicide terrorism in the early 1980s?”
Sub-questions are:
“What type of media reporting has been associated with contagion?”
“If we look at the timing, frequency and sequencing of suicide attacks in certain locations: do the available data suggest a non-random distribution of such acts of violence (e.g. clusters, waves)?”
8 “Assuming that terrorism is learned: who does the teaching: terrorist training camps; mass media reporting; social media?”
“Could it be that part of what we try to explain with the concept of radicalisation could perhaps be explained with the concept of contagion?”
READERS GUIDE
Within this thesis readers can find a justification of the research containing the societal and scientific relevance followed by a research design containing a clarification of concepts which are crucial to the research. Afterwards, an extensive literature review comprehensively incorporating several relevant academic fields complemented by a brief descriptive history of suicide terrorism. Subsequently, within the theoretical framework the boundaries of the research will be defined by describing what will and will not be researched and what is meant with the theory of contagion in this thesis. This will be succeeded by the methodology, including an explanation of the statistical models. The largest part of the research will follow in the section of data findings, describing the results of the statistical models together with the trends, clusters, frequencies and waves within suicide terrorist attacks based upon several databases (GTD, CPOST, RDWTI) containing comprehensive information on terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks. Consequently, a discussing and analysis will follow by addressing the sub- questions and the thesis will be concluded by answering the main research question.
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
Contagion of (suicide-) terrorism is under researched, with insufficient quantitative data available; this research will attempt to close this current gap in the academic body of knowledge. By doing so it will provide other scientists with building blocks for further research regarding copycat or contagious behaviour in other forms of violence as well as with perceptions on suicide terrorism and the underlying reasons for its spread. In the research process, quantitative and qualitative analyses will both be conducted. The quantitative part of the research will exist of statistical models analysing data provided by CPOST, combined with the CPOST, RDWTI and GTD databases being used as crucial data in order to analyse clustering in the spread of suicide terrorism which could provide indications about potential contagion. Much research in the field of terrorism is qualitatively, this research will therefore attempt to fill a gap in the current academic body of knowledge. The contribution of this thesis is not solely to the field of terrorism, in a wider aspect within the field of Crisis and
9 Security Management this research might produce crucial knowledge in order to manage the potential crises that these attacks pose to societies by facilitating prevention attempts. Qualitatively, this study will gather anecdotal evidence of contagion and suicide attacks from a secondary analysis of the literature on terrorism, in order to realise how contagion is facilitated, who teaches terrorism and whether radicalisation can in fact in part be explained by contagion.
Since terrorism, including suicide terrorism, is expected to continue growing in the future (Simon, 2013; Pape, 2005; Holtgraves, 2012), and become a daily threat to take into account by crisis managers and by the whole of society, the societal significance of researching its related phenomena is almost self-evident. Contributing to a body of specialist knowledge may assist governments and institutions to better understand and challenge terrorism by breaking chains of contagion with appropriate counter-measures. As has been shown in Israel, regarding suicide operations, when the mechanisms of contagion and the spread of a new terrorist tactic become better understood, countermeasures can be devised and the impact of terrorist attacks can be considerably reduced (Frisch, 2006). The aim of this research is thus to gain a better understanding of the propagation of terrorism, with a focus on suicide terrorism, in order to contribute to a more comprehensive and effective counter terrorism strategy.
Currently, in the field of terrorism, due to the assumption that radicalisation, rather than some other process such as mobilisation, is considered the root of suicide terrorism and other manifestations of terrorist violence (Schmid, 2013), a significant part of current terrorism research is focused on conceptual debates surrounding the term radicalisation and subsequently on de-radicalisation programmes and how to perfect these. A possible finding of the research proposed here might, however, find that contagion rather than radicalisation can be interpreted as the origin of at least some of the spread of terrorism. Whilst these two phenomena are sometimes difficult to separate, a focus on the psychology of imitation might open a new door of understanding as to what goes on in the minds of those who engage in such behaviour. If the findings point in the direction of copycat behaviour partly responsible for the spread of terrorism and if it is likely that mass media contribute to this process, it might influence editors in the media to reassess their publishing policies to some extent. It might also stimulate more government funding for in depth research into the phenomenon of contagion.
10 Global Terrorism
Spread of Political Violence Suicide Terrorism
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
Before embarking upon the gathering of data and its analysis, the narrowing down of the research will be explained and some concepts that need clarification will be discussed and defined in the research design. Additionally, the statistical models and the triangulation of research methods in order to safeguard internal and external validity will be clarified.
NARROWING DOWN OF RESEARCH
From an interest into the motivations behind terrorism and into how violence spreads,
terrorism is a choice easily made in a time where daily headlines about terrorist attacks all over the world decorate the papers. The recent surge of suicide terrorism lends itself perfectly for the testing of a hypothesis of contagion and its possible role in the spread of this type of violence. Three large datasets recently became available which would make accurate research into suicide terrorism possible. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) includes terrorist attacks from 1970 onwards and the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) database starts from 1982 including only suicide terrorism. The Rand Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) even starts in the 1968, but stops in 2009. In order to line up the datasets the research will include data from 1982 onwards, which is also generally seen as the start of the recent wave of suicide terrorism. The research will then naturally follow the suicide attacks throughout the years, countries and campaigns making use of the tactic.
CONCEPTS
Memetic behaviour, copycat crimes and contagion are concepts closely related to one another, whilst they can be interpreted differently within different fields. The influence of the field of sociology, psychology, criminology, linguistics and terrorism studies will be
11 discussed in the literature review. In order to avoid confusion for all three of these concepts this section will discuss what they mean when taken lexically and how they can be interpreted in different context. The most important aspects of these definitions for the research into the spread of suicide terrorism are highlighted, as well as the definition of terrorism and suicide terrorism; our working definition will come forth from each of these short analyses.
The field of terrorism itself has for a long time been lacking a crucial consensual definition of terrorism (inter alia, Cooper 1978; Golder & Williams, 2004; Held, 2004). However, recently scholars have made significant advances towards a widely-supported international definition of terrorism. Ruby (2002) argues that terrorism is an act of politically motivated violence against non-combatants executed in a clandestine manner. This definition is rather vague and a more explanatory definition can be found in the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism (ed. Schmid, 2011). Here, terrorism is seen as a tactic of fear-generating, terrorising, coercive, political violence targeting civilians and non-combatants as part of a campaign of violence undertaken by individual perpetrators, groups or even states covering a broad range of motivations (Schmid, 2011). For the research being conducted in this thesis, not only the definition of terrorism in general is important, more specifically the definition of suicide terrorism should be clarified. A prominent scholar on suicide terrorism, Yoram Schweitzer, together with Shaul Shay (2011) add to the definition of terrorism that for it to count as a suicide attack it must consciously and actively be carried out with the intention of the perpetrator or group of individuals to kill him- or herself during the operations, together with the chosen target. The death of the attacker must be planned and certain and is a necessary precondition for the success of the attack.
Both the main datasets that will be used for the analysis distinguish between suicide missions and suicide attacks. For the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, Robert Pape (2005) defines a suicide mission as an attack in which the attacker does not expect to survive, however, if he or she does survive, the attack is not necessarily a failure. For example, the perpetrators of the attack in Paris in November, 2015, went into a concert hall and shot the spectators with automatic guns (BBC, 2015a). In this attack the perpetrators did not need to die in order for their mission to be a success. In fact, most attackers were killed by the police; however one of the attackers escaped and later got arrested, whilst they (assumingly) achieved their goal (ibid.). In contrast, the attacks in Brussels in March, 2016 are an example of a suicide attack in which the perpetrators blow themselves up with the intention of killing
12 as many bystanders, and inflict as much damage as possible (BBC, 2016), without them killing themselves they could not achieve this goal. The CPOST suicide database defines a suicide attack as an attack in which an attacker:
kills himself or herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others. [They] include only suicide attacks perpetrated by non-state actors; attacks authorized by national governments are not included. (…) The critical criteria is suicide: the attacker must kill him or herself, even if no one but the attacker dies in the attack. (“Data Collection Methodology”, 2016). The researchers have also not included failed suicide attacks or attacks were someone else than the attacker detonates bomb. Additionally, they too have excluded suicide missions and only included suicide attacks.
Memetic behaviour is defined by the Oxford Dictionary (2016) as the passing from a cultural element or behavioural system from one individual to another, through imitation or non-genetic means. Examples of this can be seen in trends in fashion, culture and arts as these trends spread through the imitative behaviour of individuals, however, it does not enhance our evolution of our genetics. The actual cultural element or behavioural system in itself is called a “meme” and can take the form of images, films, scripts or texts, etc. (ibid.). A recent trend is that online fabrications called ‘memes’ are humorous in nature and are copied and spread quickly by Internet users, who often add their own interpretation or alteration to the meme (ibid.) A scientific definition can be found in the article on ‘Inhibiting Imitative Terrorism Through Memetic Engineering’ of Richard Pech (2003) who researched the role of memes in the copycat behaviour of terrorists. He does not only see the meme as a material aspect such as a video or a text which gets copied, rather, he sees this material aspect as a container for information which then can be replicated from mind to mind. It can be a mental representation or cultural icon and the contents or the information can trigger a variety of interpretations as there is a wide range of receivers. The memes as representations or units of information are contagious and self-replicating.
A copycat perpetrator can lexically be defined as an individual adopting or imitating the behaviour of others (Merriam-Webster, 2016). Copycat crime, however, is defined as a criminal act which was inspired by an earlier crime that became known through the news media or was fictionally or artistically portrayed. The perpetrator incorporates factors of this published crime into his or her own act (O’Toole et al., 2014) or tries to copy it exactly. Criminologist Surette (2013) highlights the role of the media as a motivator for the crime too.
13 This partly overlaps with imitation; however, Helfgott (2015) argues that imitation is a process too simplistic to fully understand the concept of copycat crimes. In her article Helfgott stresses the role of the media again and argues that:
there is something about the salient role of technology and media in contemporary life coupled with the elevation of the criminal (specifically serial and mass murderers) to star status and the value placed on public recognition that has been reinforced by American popular culture that together contributes to the particular phenomenon of copycat crime. (Helfgott, 2015).
In researching social and behavioural contagion, it is important to clarify to the reader what is meant in the thesis with this concept as it is used in so many different fields, which will be touched upon in more detail in the literature review. In a purely lexical sense contagion is seen as a rapidly spreading influence of any kind (Merriam-Webster, 2016). When talking about suicides and their spread amongst youngsters, Gould (1990) defines it more narrowly by specifying the contagion to be about similar behaviour that spreads rapidly and spontaneously through a group of people. In addition, when moving towards the field of criminology, it is specified to be some form of copycat crime, or an imitation of violence which is deemed attractive by violence-prone individuals and groups. They base their imitation on examples often displayed in the mass media (Nacos, 2010). The definitions of copycat behaviour, memes and imitative behaviour show what contagion signifies. In researching the concept in terrorism this thesis will make use of the definition of contagion of Midlarsky, Crenshaw & Yoshida (1980), as it can be calculated and shown by the numeric results of empirical data analysis and as is tuned to the field of terrorism. They argue that “in the matter of contagion, the probability of each country experiencing a terrorist incident is increased after the occurrence of a prior incident in another country” (ibid., p.264). This definition will be applied not only to the spread of suicide terrorism from country to country but also from network to network and per year. Research on contagion and copycat behaviour can be found in many academic fields; the following section will provide an extensive review of this literature.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
14 Using violence and the threat of violence in order to urge individuals, governments or groups into some action or into desisting from some action is as old as mankind. However, a recent form of violence used as mean to an end, terrorism and the suicide attack, has recently been growing extraordinarily. Going back into time the first recounted incidence of a suicide campaign is from approximately 4 B.C. till A.D. 70, when Jews tried to liberate Judea from Roman occupation and attempted to kill Herod with sickle-like daggers in broad daylight (Pape, 2005); these were suicide missions rather than suicide attacks. The attackers willingly confessed to their crimes whilst they were aware that after going through all sorts of torture before they would be put to death. After this first known campaign suicide attack techniques have developed over time; the ‘human bomb’ was used by the Russian anarchists already, however, the bomb was not yet fully integrated with the bombers, therefore allowing a chance to survival for the attacker (Lewis, 2012). In English, the word ‘terror’, used so often to describe the current wave of violence, originates from a phase in the French revolution (1793 till 1794), when the revolutionary Robbespiere announced terror to be a virtue and a general principle of democracy (Bongar, 2007). However, this concerned state terrorism using the guillotine rather than individual self-sacrifice. State terrorist campaigns requiring individual self-sacrifice did occur, as suicide attacks were conducted by thousands of Japanese Kamikaze pilots in WWII (Schweitzer, 2006) where the chance of survival was almost completely eliminated from the tactic. Barlow (2015) found historical examples of suicide terrorism, or the ‘warrior-martyr’, as he coins it, amongst Muslims, Christians, Assassins and Sikhs, whilst contemporary examples often cite the Black Tigers of Sri Lanka and various Palestinian and radical violent Islamist groups.
David Rapoport (2004) analysed the history of terrorism in general and categorised different methods and motivations into four ‘waves’. The first wave he distinguished was the ‘anarchist wave’, running from the 1880s till the 1920s, followed by the ‘anti-colonial wave’ from 1920 till 1960. The ‘new left wave’ stretched from 1960 until 1990 and was succeeded by the current ‘religious wave’ which started in 1979 with the Iranian revolution; Rapoport links the tactic of suicide bombing to this current wave. The influential theory of Rapoport has been criticised by Parker and Sitter (2015) who argue that using the term ‘waves’ implies no connection between the different terrorist movements. They suggest the term ‘strain’ instead, claiming that different strains suggest that they are interconnected and terrorists learn from each other and emulate each other. The authors categorise them with a focus on the political conviction and motivation of the terrorists and discerned them as socialist,
15 nationalist, religious and exclusionist. Within this exclusionist strain or religious wave, Scott Atran (2003) asserts that the first suicide attack of the current terrorist strain took place in 1982 in Beirut, which destroyed the Iraqi embassy; this practice was then used again in 1982 (ibid.). He claims that most contemporary suicide terrorist attacks are being driven by a Jihadism (Atran 2006). However, even though most contemporary suicide terrorists are indeed Muslims, Pedahzur (2006) argues that suicide attacks are not a unique Islamic practice as secular organisations, e.g. the PKK and the LTTE, have also used suicide operations as a specific method of attack. Robert Pape (2003; 2005) even holds that religion is rarely the root cause for a suicide attack, arguing that it is a tactic used to fight foreign occupation. This has been denied by many, including Falk and Morgenstern (2009) who argue that terrorists do want to achieve those goals, however, their struggles to “liberate their land, not have foreigners on their shores, not be humiliated by our Western culture” (p.34) are part of a much longer and larger struggle of the ummah – the Muslim community - against the Kufar - the infidel - with the final result being the eradication of the infidels. In agreement with Falk and Morgenstern, Mia Bloom (2006) argues that terrorism is not exclusively used as a tactic in ethno-nationalist conflicts and likewise that it is not solely used by religious groups; however, she claims that it would be a mistake to view suicide terrorism as devoid of any religious content. A contrast of the current strain of exclusionist terrorists with the former national and secular terrorist groups as the IRA, ETA, RAF, etc. is shown by Gerwehr and Hubbard (2007), who contend that the latter were aiming to replace a ruling order by another, or to at least achieve something earthly in this contemporary life, whilst for the religious terrorists this does not hold; their ‘winning’ is not measured by earthly success, but in theological terms; these tend to be “absolute, uncompromising, and not subject to normative constraints. To religious terrorists, killing is a sacred act, not a political act” (Ibid., p.95).
The development and learning which occurs amongst terrorist networks regarding suicide terrorist tactics is apparent when analysing female suicide terrorism, which had always been part of the suicide division, the “Black Panthers”, of the LTTE (Schweitzer, 2000). However, it used to be unacceptable in Palestinian terrorism networks for a woman to be participating in the fight since they claimed it was not needed, let alone accepting to let a woman blow herself up. Being inspired by a Christian woman who killed herself in 1985 for the Palestinian case, women started participated in suicide terrorism from 2002 onwards. Whilst in the 1980s religious leaders clamped down on the participation of women in violence, in 2002 Yasser Arafat invited Palestinian women to join his “army of roses”.
16 Barbara Victor (2003) called this the new level of cynicism. Unfortunately, some women responded swiftly and devastatingly to the call from Arafat: on that very same day Wafa Idris became the first female Palestinian suicide bomber. An interesting discovery regarding female suicide terrorism is highlighted by Rajan (2011): she found that in Western media these women are often portrayed as sexual victims and as victimised by their ‘backwards third world’ culture, whilst oppositely, rebel groups portray them as mythical heroes, even more so than male bombers, in order to inspire or influence others women into volunteering for the act. Rosemarie Skaine (2006) researched the recent phenomenon of male and female suicide terrorists and found that their battlegrounds are widespread and include, inter alia, Lebanon, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Chechnya and Israel and Palestine. She argues that those who assume women only contribute to terrorism in nonviolent roles ignore the recent trend in suicide terrorism. Correspondingly, Weiss (2016) reports of over a hundred female suicide bombers in West Africa, although it should be taken into account that many of these girls and women were forced or tricked into suicide attacks, especially teenage female terrorists of Boko Haram.
Falk and Morgenstern (2009) argue that having an accurate understanding of the motivations of terrorism will limit costly policy and procedure errors. Many authors have claimed that suicide terrorism has grown exponentially in the last two decades (Bloom, 2006; Atran, 2006; Speckhard, 2006; Merari, 2005; Moghadam, 2009; Pape & Feldman, 2010, inter alia). One author found that “of the 583 suicide attacks that were carried out around the world from 1981 to 2004, 435 of them (75%) took place between 2000 and 2004” (Merari, 2005, p.102). Similarly, Yoram Schweitzer (2006) labelled the latest wave as an ‘epidemic of suicide attacks’. Schitrit, Yogev and Schweitzer (2016) have argued that suicide terrorists have not only become more widespread but also much more deadly than ever before. Likewise, Robert Pape (2005), in agreement with Silke (2004), Schuurman, Eijkman & Bakker (2014) and Holtgraves (2012) claims that suicide terrorism has been growing both in numbers and geographically, adding that “we do not have good explanations for the growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism” (16). The research in this thesis will contribute to explaining the spread of this tactic.
INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANISATIONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR ENGAGING IN SUICIDE TERRORISM
17 A valuable starting point when researching the surge of suicide terrorism would be the (socio-) psychological process that leads to the support of, and commitment to, violent extremism. John Horgan (2008), a leading researcher in the field of radicalisation studies, identified six commonly found factors which are most often linked to reasons for an individual to become a terrorist (i), emotional vulnerability due to anger or alienation; (ii), dissatisfaction with current political future or undertaken actions; (iii), the individual usually identifies with victimised groups; (iv), the person is convinced that violence against the state is justifiable; (v), a sense of reward – this is particularly important in the motivation for a suicide terrorist as he or she will expect earthly rewards or a better life in the afterlife and (vi), kinship or social ties are crucial in the choice to commit oneself to the violent extremist cause. Lindsey Holtgraves (2012) has suggested that jihadi terrorism has been growing in Western European countries as a result from the identity crisis second and third generation immigrants encounter when they do not feel at home in their host societies nor in their father’s or mother’s country of origin. Similarly, Alex Schmid (2013) identified recurring push and pull factors found in the literature regarding radicalisation. Push factors often involve traumatic experiences of violence, anger, the longing for revenge after humiliation of being the victim of discrimination or injustice, being an outsider from mainstream society, being marginalised (socioeconomically or politically) - similar to the personal identity crisis as mentioned by Holtgraves (2012) - and the lack of future perspectives and unresolved political conflicts. Pull factors can be the existence of extremist ideology justifying violence, charismatic leaders who translate grievances into incentives to engage in violent jihad, finding and being part of a like-minded militant peer-group, lure of adventure, imitation, personal recognition as a result from engaging in a fight and the promise of rewards in the afterlife. One can easily see how copycat behaviour influenced by several inspirational sources such as the media can play a large role in providing the pull factors to individuals. Ariel Merari (2007) similarly attempts to profile terrorists on demographic details and psychological characteristics. Demographically he analyses age, marital status, gender, socioeconomic status, educational level and whether they are refugees or not. Merari claims that psychological theories of suicide cannot readily explain the phenomenon of terrorist suicide terrorism its’ spread and concludes that the profiles of the terrorist do not resemble a typical conventional suicide candidate. Instead, he argues that the factor explaining suicide missions is the influence of peers or a group on its individual members. The aforementioned authors identify reasons for terrorism in general and for foreign fighters, however, they do not explain why terrorists increasingly choose for the tactic of suicide terrorism rather than other acts of terrorism.
18 One of the factors identified as a motivator for terrorists is the Islamist narrative that in many cases is being used to justify the use of violence and suicidal terrorism and of which Istihad (self-sacrifice) is a crucial part (Schweitzer, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003). As a consequence, the term ‘fatalistic altruistic suicide’ was coined by Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinberg (2003), which they use to explain suicide attacks perpetrated with the motivation of a better future for their society or family. Additionally, Azam (2005) argues that suicide terrorism is intergenerationally motivated, whereby the suicide terrorists do it for a better future for their ‘group’ or their loved ones. As Istihad is seen as something honourable, Victoroff (2005) claims that some individuals may use the pretence of the group and the Istihad as a disguise for their own aggressive and remorseless drivers.
As briefly touched upon before, when discussing the articles of Merari (2007) and Azam (2005), group behaviour is seen by many authors as a crucial factor in the motivation for an individual to become a suicide terrorist (Victoroff, 2005; Koehler, 2015; Sageman, 2004; Leuprecht, et al., 2010; F. Moghaddam, 2005, inter alia). This does not sufficiently explain the rise of suicide terrorism as opposed to any other act of violence and it is not applicable to the so-called ‘lone actors’ or individuals that are self-radicalised. Thus, Assaf Moghadam (2006) stresses the importance of analysing the roots of suicide terrorism on three different levels: L3: environmental level, this provides the economic, political, historical, social, cultural and religious context in which recruiters or groups can place their narrative; L2: the organisational level, analysis on this level is needed when an individual is willing to carry out an attack but lacks the resources, the operational intelligence and logistical capacity needed to organise an attack; and, L1: the individual level of analysis focuses on the individual motivations of each terrorist and their particular role in a network. Mia Bloom (2006) combines his first and second level in distinguishing motivations for individuals to engage in suicide terrorism whilst adding the incentive on the organisational level. She claims that it is a strategic tactic mostly used by the weaker party in a conflict, as they can inflict a large amount of damage with relatively few means. For a group to engage in terrorism, Bloom identifies national or religious drivers. However, for suicide terrorism she distinguishes group competition and outbidding as essential; suicide terrorism can be used to set a group apart from other organisations and attract recruits. Additionally, gaining or keeping public support influences the choice of a network to renounce or use violence and suicide terrorism as a means to their end. Using terrorism as a tactic to gain support also has a
19 different side of the same coin: terrorism that is being used to install fear in populations and governments (Hassan, 2014). As Brian Jenkins, once said “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” (1974, p.119). Even though the aim to create publicity and alarm is still present, the constraints in moral considerations and political utility that Jenkins distinguished seem to have been let go of. Jenkins (2006) recently retracted his frequently cited quote by arguing:
“[m]ayhem as such (…) [seldom used to be] an objective. Terrorists had a sense of morality, a self-image, operational codes, and practical concerns—they wanted to maintain group cohesion, avoid alienating perceived constituents, and avoid provoking public outrage, which could lead to crackdowns. But these constraints gave way to large-scale indiscriminate violence as terrorists engaged in protracted, brutal conflicts; as the more squeamish dropped out; as terrorism became commonplace and the need for headlines demanded higher body counts; and as ethnic hatred and religious fanaticism replaced political agendas”
Ulrich Beck (2006) has suggested that we currently live in a ‘risk society’. As it is no longer assumed that disasters come from nature or divine revenge or punishment, it has become the idealistic aim to stop risk all together. In order to realise this, one will need to calculate the risk for the future and attempt to minimise this; subsequently; a need to ‘colonise the future’ arises. Whilst calculating in order to prevent certain risks, Western societies have now become, in many countries, safer than ever, resulting in the inhabitants of secure societies ever more aware of negative changes in or interruptions of their daily routines, making Wester societies attractive targets for terrorists as the psychological damage will be relatively large. Frank Furedi (2006) has argued that the combination of our safe society and events like the widely reported attack on the World Trade Centre have given us reasonable fear for the future. However, the Western societies no do not only panic over large terrorist attacks, we do so over minor abstract risks as well which, he argues, can distract society from dealing with the old-fashioned dangers that have always threatened our lives. The unpredictability of a suicide attack strategically and psychologically plays into a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2008).
Arguing this culture of fear would complement the argument of Alex Schmid (2013), that radicalisation does not only happen to non-state actors such as individuals and terrorist networks, but that policy-makers can also radicalise in their attempt to control terrorism in society; e.g. they could employ torture techniques and depart from standard democratic rule
20 of law procedures and international human rights. Part of suicide terrorism may thus be part of a downward spiral in which state and non-state actors become increasingly more violent in their (re-)actions. This falls in line with other scholars claiming that game theory explains acts of terrorism (e.g. Chatagnier, Mintz & Samban, 2012; Martin & Perliger, 2012). However, Crenshaw (2000) claims that a game theory approach to explaining terrorism is not sufficient as the goal of terrorist groups are usually unlikely to be achieved, which is in agreement with Schbley (2000) who has found many individuals that rationally believe that terrorism may advance their cause, do not, themselves, become terrorists. Reasons for organisations not to employ suicide terrorists as a strategic choice have been researched by Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca (2005) and have been identified as: “cognitive accessibility, normative preferences, counterproductive effects, constituency costs and technological costs” (p.210), together with the lack of volunteers. Although this explains why some organisations refrain from using this tactic, it lacks the capability to explain why increasingly more organisations use suicide terrorism and why lone actors, when radicalised, sometimes opt for suicide missions or suicide attacks.
INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA ON CLUSTERS IN SUICIDES
Emile Durkheim (Durkheim & Simons, 1992), writing before World War I, saw the rise of suicide rates and the decline of birth rates as a direct result of the modern decline of the traditional family and family sentiment. Reasons for suicide, according to him, were either the individual being in disequilibrium due to its social surroundings or the being itself being tainted in itself. When Durkheim (1951) conducted his research in the 19th century, he did not think imitative suicide was of great importance, for three reasons: (1) The effects he found were only local, (2) he argued that people who imitated suicides would commit suicide at some point in their lives anyway and (3) it only affects a few individuals. Written a long time ago, perhaps Durkheim did not foresee the influence widespread instant media would have on imitative suicide deaths; additionally, the narrative of Islamist extremism commits individuals to suicide attacks who would not have done so if they had not been taught that violence was an acceptable means to an end and that rewards would be awaiting them in the afterlife. Niederkrotenthaler et al. (2012) finalised their research into rising suicide rates with the conclusion that reporting on celebrity suicide increases the numbers of suicides; more specifically, the kind of celebrity appeared to matter for the effect it had, after famous and liked celebrities committed the numbers rose relatively more. Chen et al. (2016) found
21 similar results in their analysis but add that the manner in which media reports about suicides matters too; the method of charcoal suicides was glamorised and widely published which led to an increase in the use of the technique. Ordway (2016) reported that medical health experts have been critical of the media for their sensationalist reporting and lack of referral to professional help, thereby recognising the role of the media too. Kanz (2015) hypothesised whether an existing predisposition towards violence was necessary to copy violence from the media and therefore analysed parental maltreatment in combination with exposure to violence via media. However, she could not construct a convincing link that would prove the need for an already existing disposition for the media to be effective in this distribution of violence, leading to the conclusion that not only people that have grown up with violent surroundings are vulnerable to be tempted by imitation of fictional and pictured aggression.
The Werther effect, coined by David Phillips (1974), specifically focuses on the effect of media on suicide. Phillips was inspired by the effect of Goethe’s novel The Sorrows of the Young Werther in which the hero commits suicide. What was mere poetry was copied by several readers of the novel; first within Goethe’s own social circle and later this occurred amongst the general reading public. Phillips researched suicide publications in the United States and Great Britain from 1947 till 1968 and found that immediately after a publication on the suicide of a prominent person, the numbers of imitative deaths increased. In the cases Phillips investigated this happened only locally (ibid.; Phillips & Carstensen, 1986). However, as his article is using data from half a century ago, the World Wide Web and social media may have extended the reach of suicide-suggesting publications. Interestingly, in many articles that follow, Phillips researches the effect of ‘suggestion of suicide’ on what could be seen as the ‘will to live’. He finds that after suicide and murder publications there are more motor vehicle fatalities (Phillips, 1977) and more airplane accident fatalities (Phillips, 1978). Likewise, even fictional television stories were found to have a stimulating effect on American adult fatalities (Phillips, 1982). Ira Wasserman (1984) argues for a more narrow approach of the Werther effect; she found that solely after a celebrity or highly esteemed individual committed suicide it would lead to imitation. John Williams (2011) has done more recent research with the same outcome: published and broadcasted media influences suicide rates and results in small clusters of individuals committing suicide. In partial analogy, many authors have claimed that playing violent video games or watching aggressive films influences youngsters to be violent in real life too (Anderson, Gentile & Buckley, 2007; Kirsh, 2003; Gould 1990; Gould et al., 2003; O’Carroll & Potter, 1994; Michel et al., 2000 ).
22 Through this previously conducted research the influence of mass media on individuals becomes apparent; Etzersdorfer and Sonneck (1998) have conducted an experiment in Vienna from 1980-1996, in which they gave the media certain reporting guidelines and launched a media campaign in order for them to report less dramatically about committed suicides on the new subway system. They found that as soon as this was implemented, within half a year the committed suicide rate and the attempts dropped more than 80%, thereby showing the important role media plays in influencing individuals into actions. In the same way, Stack (2003) has found convincing results in Austria and Switzerland that indicate that suicide prevention organisations can successfully convince media to alter their reporting style when it comes to suicides. Conversely, Martin (1998) sees this conclusion as too optimistic as he argues that media will continue to cover suicides as a “matter of public interest” (51) and that national and international agreements cannot halt this. Additionally, not only mass media is of influence on suicide numbers; regarding suicide amongst youth, Gould, Jamieson and Romer (2003) have analysed the role of social media and found a large influence of social media as well. This is in agreement with Andrew Harding (2004) who wrote a news article that highlights the existence of Japanese online chatrooms in which people can find someone to die with when they are considering suicide terrorism but do not want to be alone in their final act. Nowadays, with social media and the World Wide Web available to almost half of mankind, at any time and many places, the reach of media and coverages of suicides or suicide terrorism significantly increases the possibility of copycat behaviour. The role of extensive mass media reporting on imitative suicides has long been recognised by editors of news media and made (some of them) hesitant to give suicides much coverage. However, when it comes to political suicide attacks, such restraint is rare.
Copycat behaviour does not only occur in relation to committing suicide or to suicide attacks; in fact, in all realms of life some kind of copycat behaviour, memetic behaviour or contagion can be found. When researching something as multifaceted as suicide terrorism with its many reasons, motivations and consequences, it is important to incorporate a multidisciplinary approach. Some prominent examples can be found in the field of sociology, psychology, criminology, linguistics and, most importantly, terrorism studies.
23 In sociology, by looking at crowds and their behaviour, de Tarde (1903) was the first who developed an imitation theory. This theory holds that every action of humans is either imitation, conflict or invention, with the latter two being a product of imitation: conflict is the refusal of imitation whilst invention is the merging of several imitations (Akers & Lee, 1999). Even the well-known evolutionary biologists Richard Dawkins (1976) reports of several sociological imitations, such as catch-phrases, fashion and ways of building, coining the term ‘meme’ for it, which Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) later popularised. Burman (2012), however, argues that in explaining of the concept of a ‘meme’, Hofstadter and Dennett simplify the concept too much. In his book Thought Contagion, Aaron Lynch (1996) categorises seven general patterns in which imitation can be actively achieved, called ‘modes’. These are different ways in which a bearer of an idea of a meme can transfer this to other potential bearers.
An interesting example of how the knowledge of memetic behaviour from sociological research is used in day-to-day routines is the new technology supermarkets are trialling, playing on the ‘herd instinct’ of people. Supermarkets gave every individual shopper a barcode-scanner which would show how often a product had been bought by previous shoppers; the larger the number of people that bought the same product, the more the shopper felt like they were buying the ‘right’ product (Economist, 2006). The same technique is used with online shopping and downloading songs (ibid.). Sociologists have also distinguished memetic behaviour on the Internet; Alice Marwick (2013) found two kinds of online memes: viral videos and memetic videos. The first category only requires the sharing of the video whilst the second category requires slight alterations by each individual sharer. Subsequently, she concludes that memetic behaviour mirrors the key aspects of an online community: sociability, replicability and participation. On the basis of the aforementioned motivations for a suicide terrorist to commit the act of violence, one can claim that these three aspects are crucial in their decision too, as peer and group pressure together with mass media and online community can influence an individual into perpetrating suicide terrorism.
PSYCHOLOGY AND IMITATIVE BEHAVIOUR
As with sociology, imitative behaviour has a prominent spot in academic discussions regarding psychology and cognitive development. Meltzoff and Decety (2003) researched infants that copy adults and concluded a three-step argument, in agreement with many other authors in the field of psychology (Wiegman, 1975; Meltzoff &Moore, 1983; Brass & Heyes,
24 2005). Meltzoff and Decety argue that (i) imitation is innate in humans; they claim it develops regions in the partial cortex, needed for the distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, “(ii) imitation precedes mentalising and theory of mind (in development and evolution); and (iii) behavioural imitation and its neural substrate provide the mechanism by which theory of mind and empathy develop in humans” (p.491). Correspondingly, Ellwood (1901) claims that imitation is always present in the process of development, in one way or another, however, he adds a hereditary level to it; e.g. when a kitten grows up in isolation, it still knows how to get food and how to develop independently. Nonetheless, he argues against the implication of imitation theory making the social process something apart from the life-process, as it omits the natural selection needed for evolution. Contrariwise, Khan and Cangemi (1979) show that imitation theory needs not to explain every aspect of life but that modelling and imitation learning is the method through which the majority of socially desirable behaviours are learned.
Social learning theory involves the copying of behaviour patterns which society expects from its members, this could be applied to terrorism in much the same manner, however, the behaviour of suicide terrorists could only be seen as desirable by specific groups in society. Bandura, Ross and Ross (1963) found that not only real-life role models can be copied by infants and children, but that aggression portrayed on film or aggressive cartoon characters too resulted into heightened frustration levels. In line with Meltzoff and Decety (2003) they found that the larger the similarities between the child and the actor, the more likely it was for the child to copy them. Moreover, not only children are subject to the imitation of role models, and not exclusively in cases of portrayed aggression. As briefly discussed earlier, when prominent celebrities commit suicide, the suicide rates in the following month are generally significantly higher (Wasserman, 1984). After Marilyn Monroe committed her suicide, 197 more suicides were observed than expected (ibid.). Coleman (2004) found that individuals similar to the reported person committing suicide were more likely to be sensitive to the ‘suggestion’ of suicide. She found that imitative behaviour was also apparent in cult-membership and in case of the violent act of murder. In a study into the psychology of a suicide bomber, university students experimented with a role play by taking on the persona of an apprehended suicide bomber, the researchers found that:
Results were eerily similar to accounts of real (failed) suicide bombers. Subjects identified with secondary trauma and fictive kin; and reported revenge and justice seeking as motivators; dissociation, some having experiences of euphoria or empowerment when
25 contemplating strapping on a bomb. Their moral reasoning was nearly identical with the one of suicide bombers, despite none of them being Muslim. Most imagined targeting children or civilians. This leads us to the tentative conclusion that psychological mechanisms underlying the contemplation to engage in suicide terrorism may be universal (Speckhard, Jacuch & Vanrompay, 2012)
Regarding the psychological imitation mechanisms, Paul Marsden (1998) argues that contagion can be seen in many instances, from yawning, to psychogenic disorders, to fashion, to aggression and even suicide. A partial explanation for the quick and deadly response of female suicide terrorists to the call of Yasser Arafat may be that women are more likely to be influenced by empathic contagion (Norscia, Demuru & Palagi, 2016). Taiminen (1992) claims that the intrapsychic mechanisms of contagion are poorly understood and that not only ‘suggestion’ but also ‘identification’ plays an important role in imitative suicide. More recently, Larson (2003) claimed that mass media plays an important role for most people in the development of cognitive and behavioural scripts. René Girard argued that even desires of individuals are influenced by what other individuals want; due to memetic desires one can never be sure what one really desires, as it changes when the masses change their desire (2000). A consequence of this memetic desire is rivalry; when everyone desires the same object it is easy to see conflict arising. Girard claimed that in this conflict individuals can forget about the object and become focused on each other, with both hatred and fascination. Subsequently, in a situation where there are no institutions controlling violence, violence can spread acutely, like a contagious disease (ibid.)
CRIMINOLOGY AND COPYCAT CRIMES
In addition to the field of sociology and psychology, criminology too has its interpretation of imitative behaviour. A copycat crime is a crime in which the perpetrator is inspired by crimes visualised in for example art or by the media reports of a crime; a copycat then incorporates aspects of the old crime into a new crime (Fister, 2005). Doley, Ferguson & Surette (2013) recently bridged a gap in copycat research and fire setting and found data that suggests the existence of copycat fire setting, perhaps through media as a cause or a catalyst. Additionally, the authors found that “why media representations would be likely to influence criminal behaviour is related to the role that crime models play in the production of criminality” (1472). In additional research, Surette (2014) argues that copycat crime was indicated as a characteristic of a substantial number of offenders and at-risk youth. However, on the other
26 hand, Clarke and McGrath (1992) found that media reporting of successful bank robberies in newspapers did not result in any copycat behaviour, nor did the newspapers pay undue attention to succeeded robberies. The fact that the copycat robberies did not occur could be in part explained by findings reported in the dissertation of Peterson-Manz (2002) who argues that copycat behaviour is most likely when the reports contain: (1) celebrities, (2) rich descriptive words, (3) multiple stories, and (4) characteristics causing identification with the defendant or victims (p. iv). Helfgott (2015) adds a fifth driver for copycat behaviour: seeing crime as art (p.53). She compiled a literature review on copycat behaviour and argues that there is insufficient criminological empirical research done
Pragmatically, mass media, and nowadays social media too, plays a role in inspiring criminals in selecting their first crime, as otherwise they may not have considered the use of similar tactics (Felson, 1996). Felson found that non-violent behaviour can also be influenced by reported violent crimes, which is in line with Lindberg, Sailas & Kaltaila-Heino (2012), who, when researching Finnish school shootings, found criminal behaviour amongst adolescents in threatening to perpetrate the same act, inspired by reports of a shooting, rather than actually doing it. Likewise, Ramsland (2013) found that after the release of the film ‘Scream’ for almost 4 years teenagers tried to copy it in committing murder. Larkin (2009) researched the consequences of the Columbine shooting, concluding that rampage shootings were inspired by earlier shootings, the strong evidence for his research existed of perpetrators literally mentioning the earlier shootings as their inspiration. Rowell Huesmann, in the Washington Post, claims that “[i]f you’re exposed to violence, you’re more likely to catch it” (Swanson, 2015). Furthermore, Slater et al. (2003) argue that adolescents not only get inspired to commit violent crimes when they see them portrayed in the media, they particularly seek out violent films; they prefer these over more gentle films. The authors name this the downward spiral in crime. As shown, many criminologists tend to agree with Helfgott (2015) when she claims that “Criminological theory and research in the 21st century has to be concerned with the ways in which cultural technological changes influence criminal behaviour”, this criminal behaviour would include the violent act of suicide terrorism.
LINGUISTICS AND COPYING
As with the previously discussed fields of academia touching upon imitative behaviour, many language scholars too show the inherent drive to copy others, already visible in infants (Osser, Wang & Zaid, 1969; Legerstee, 1990; Tobey et al., 1991; Kuhl, 2004). Following up
27 on infant research, Delvaux and Soquet (2007) experimented with adults hearing a language different than their own, and observed that the speech of the listener was unconsciously influenced and changed, in order to sound more like the language they were hearing. As this effect stayed for close to ten minutes after the conversations had ended the authors concluded that the copying leaves a memory trace. Raymond Kent (1973) stressed that not enough research had been done into the imitative capabilities of adult American English speakers and researched their ability of copying synthetic sounds. Stuart-Smith (2007) argues that the likelihood of imitating speech is dependent on three factors: superiority of the potentially copied language, its’ social attractiveness and dynamism. As an additional factor, Peter Trudgill (1974) identified that the key to language change is diffusion; in this field too, the role of media is stressed as a possible catalyst as it makes diffusion easier and increasingly widespread. Evidence of this has been found by Stuart-Smith et al. (2013) when researching the development of an urban dialect. Similarly, Tagliamonte and Roberts (2005) researched the influence of the well-known television series ‘Friends’ and argue that media pick up on changes in language and contribute to the quicker spread of a new language phenomenon. Linguistics therefore shows that imitating is innate to human beings and can be spread more widely and quickly through media. However, subconsciously copying language does not get far when attempting to explain the copying of the conscious act of suicide terrorism and the recent rise of it. Nevertheless, Meltzoff and Prinz (2002) argue that the research done on infants reveals a great deal about adult imitation. “Such imitation [in infants] reveals an innate link between observed and executed acts, with implications for brain science, emotional development and intersubjectivity” (p.19). Not only infants and adolescents are likely to imitate. Susan Kemper (1986), researching psycholinguistics, found that in young adults between the age of thirty and forty-nine, complex long syntactic constructions were easily imitated. For elderly adults, this was still the case too, however, only in shorter constructions. Phoebe Caldwell (2006) argues that intensive interpersonal social interaction is likely to influence a more effective imitation. Even in the field of law, practitioners encounter linguistic imitation from the media. Quinlan & Persels (1994) found that defendants in law suits copied actions and subsequently arguments they had heard in music or seen on television, such as an argument used in the film and subsequently in a real court case: “[i]t’s not my fault, the devil made me do it” (p. 417).
28 TERRORISM STUDIES AND CONTAGION
Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980) can take credit for one of the first publications on the topic of contagion in the field of terrorism studies. Their research focused on terrorism in Latin America and Western Europe and they found evidence, based on statistical modelling, that some forms of terrorism spread through contagion. They argue that if a terrorist attack occurs in one country it is more likely to happen soon thereafter in a neighbouring country too (ibid.). By identifying clusters of similar crimes, Alex Schmid & Janny de Graaf (1982) identified media-induced contagion of terrorist violence with ten small case studies; including the case in which they identified a surge of plane hijackings where the hijacker demanded a sum of money and a parachute with the intention to bail out in flight so as to never be found again. More recently, in order to explain the phenomenon of contagion in terrorism, Pedahzur and Perliger (2006) argued that social networks are used as tools to spread certain terrorist attacks. Similarly, by researching hostage takings in four Middle Eastern countries, Judith Tinnes (2010) concluded that organisational affiliation, functioning as a social network in this case, influences the choice of tactics to a large extent. However, whilst viewing it from the side of the media producers as opposed to the consumers, Michael Jetter (2014 - forthcoming) has written a report in which he analysed media behaviour regarding 60,000 terrorist incidents over a forty-two year period, by researching the coverage the New York Times attributed to a country of attack a day before the attack and a day after the attack. The increase in coverage was induced as coverage on the terrorist attack. From the five conclusions he draws, two are particularly interesting when researching contagion in the field of suicide terrorism; firstly, suicide missions receive significantly more coverage than other terrorist or violent attacks – this could in part serve as an explanation for its surge - , and, secondly, as soon as the media reports a terrorist attack the country in which it happened is more likely to be the victim of a second attack within seven days and will more quickly be affected by a next attack in general. Scott Atran (2006) agrees with the claim that media provides inspiration, not only through a technique, example or idea, but also by images of social injustice and political repression of a society or terrorist network that many of the Muslim world identify with and that are making use of certain tactics and acts of violence.
A wide interpretation to the imitation of ‘technique’ is taken by Lewis (2012) who argues for a definition of technique that incorporates “processes that integrate behaviour, thinking, and physical materials and transform them into goods or services of greater utility” (p.7), thus, it is more of an interactive process, combining technical aspects of a human
