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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University.
Dion Dumont S1641409 August 2016
Master Crisis and Security Management Institute for Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University
Campus the Hague
Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Reed Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker
Front-page design by: Sander Nijssen
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Preface
This thesis is written as final part of the Crisis and Security Management master at Leiden University in an effort to obtain my title as Master of Science. Starting this master with little knowledge on Public Administration, Geopolitics, Counter-Terrorism, Cybercrime, Crisis Management and all other aspects obtained during the last year, I can now proudly say that I consider myself somewhat of an expert in the field of Crisis and Security Management. Furthermore, besides obtaining this valuable knowledge, my assessment of the world and the people in it has changed for the better. This would not have been possible without certain people guiding me through the process of this transition. Therefore, this preface is dedicated to those individuals who have helped me through the last year and shaped me to become the person I am today.
Firstly, in regard to this thesis, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude towards Dr. Alastair Reed, without whom I would not have been able to produce the quality and content that you have before you at the moment. Dr. Reed gave me the opportunity and subject that I was looking for and from there he has guided me through the process in a manner that I can only describe as honest, supportive and constructive. For this, I would like to thank him and I wish him the best of luck in his new position as Acting Director of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Secondly, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker for his effort of being second reader to this thesis. On a more personal note I want to express my appreciation towards my parents, Marcel and Karin, who have mentally supported me throughout the entire master in general and this thesis in particular. Their support and understanding has been of great value towards the accomplishments I have made over the last year. Lastly, I would like to thank all teaching staff at Leiden University who has contributed towards my education in any way over the last year. The collaborative effort and support of the aforementioned people were a big part in getting me where I currently am.
Yours sincerely,
Dion Dumont Venlo, August 2016
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Table of content
1. Introduction 5
2. Research Question 7
3. Background of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict 8
4. Theoretical Framework 11
4.1 Foreign Fighter history 11
4.2 The current foreign fighter phenomenon 12
4.3 Definitions of a foreign fighter 13
4.4 Threat of the foreign fighter phenomenon 14
4.5 Terrorism 15
4.6 Jihadism 17
4.7 Radicalization 18
4.8 Foreign fighters and the European Union 18
4.9 Threat to the Netherlands 19
4.10 Threat to Belgium 20
4.11 Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq 21
4.12 Definition and broadening of the 18 original pathways 23
4.13 The (unintended) impact of European policies on the Pathways 29
5. Research Design 33
5.1 A working definition of a foreign fighter 34
5.2 Quantitative research 35 5.3 Qualitative research 36 5.4 Sampling 36 5.5 Data collection 37 5.6 Data analysis 38 5.7 Double counts 38 5.8 Limitations 39 6. Quantitative Analysis 40
6.1 Quantitative analysis of the Netherlands and Belgium 41
6.2 A comparative analysis of the Netherlands and Belgium 47
6.3 Additional pathways 49
4 7. Qualitative Analysis 54 7.1 Salih Yilmaz 55 7.2 Hicham Chaib 55 7.3 Brian de Mulder 56 7.4 Choukri Massali 57 7.5 Sterlina Petalo 58
7.6 Analysing the stories behind the pathways 60
8. Conclusions 63
9. Recommendations and policy advice 67
10. Reflection on Methodology 69
10.1 Random sampling 69
10.2 Sample representation 70
10.3 Biased media reporting 70
10.4 Seeking the media 71
10.5 Confidentiality 71
11. References 73
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1. Introduction
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is high on international security agendas as one of the most severe transnational security issues of our time. In recent years, extensive academic research has been conducted into the phenomenon of foreign fighters joining the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq. The predominant focus of these foreign fighter oriented researches can be divided into two main focal points. Firstly, many academics have looked into how and why these foreign fighters became radicalized in the first place, up to the point where they decide to leave the West and join the armed conflict in the Middle East. Underlying push and pull factors have been identified, circumstances described, socio-economic and religious factors researched, and numerous arguments have been made regarding possible countermeasures to prevent radicalization from happening in an attempt to prevent individuals from travelling to Syria or Iraq to join insurgencies or rebel groups.
Furthermore, a large body of knowledge is available on the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters and the potential threat the pose to the West. That these individuals can possibly pose a severe threat to the West has been underlined by numerous academics (for example Hegghammer, 2010; Bakker, 2006). A fact that has sadly also been proven by the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, where, among others, returned and failed foreign fighters have participated in suicide bombings and shootings, causing over a hundred deadly casualties and many more injured. Additionally, these researches often suggest how countries could best counter the threats posed by foreign fighters. Among possible countermeasures are reintegration programmes, prosecution of returning foreign fighters, military intervention and revoking nationality. None of these measures are a complete package to counter the phenomenon of foreign fighters, whether still fighting or returned, and therefore a comprehensive approach of all available means is needed to tackle these complex and often individual issues.
Drawing from the previous insights, it can be concluded that extensive academic knowledge is available about foreign fighters both before leaving the West, as well as upon return from the Syrian and Iraqi civil war. However, the activities in which they are involved whilst being in this conflict area is a relatively un(der)explored phenomenon. Possible explanation for this might be the assumption that as long as they are involved in a conflict in the Middle East, they do not pose a direct threat to our Western civilization (for example: Trouw, 2014), hence the lack of research into the topic. Nevertheless, their activities in Syria and Iraq might shed light
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on these individuals and offer a chance to draft specific policies or measures to better counter the threats they pose. However, at the moment there seems to be a gap in the existing literature about what happens to individuals once they leave the West and join an insurgency or rebel group in the civil war in Syria and Iraq.
It is easy to assume that these individuals travel to Syria or Iraq to join one of the many rebel groups opposing the Assad regime and take on a fighting role in the conflict. However, Alastair Reed, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker (2015) have delineated eighteen possible pathways these foreign fighters can take upon arrival in Syria or Iraq, ranging from a fighting role to peaceful integration. These eighteen pathways have been drawn up in a model with the aim that such a roadmap might be used as a tool to help in analysing different policies which are currently being used by European governments against foreign fighters, and the implications these might give.
This master thesis will build upon this research and take their model and empirically test it on Dutch and Belgian foreign fighters that have travelled to Syria or Iraq. It will do this by first quantitatively outlining to which extent the pathways have actually been taken by Dutch and Belgian foreign fighters. In order to accomplish this, a systematic and comprehensive dataset will be established containing a sample of Dutch and Belgian foreign fighters and their pathways. From there, this thesis will go into detail on a number of rich and interesting cases and qualitatively describe the personal pathways of these foreign fighters and what their journey looked like after arrival. The insight into activities undertaken by foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq can possibly help European governments and governance models in understanding what happens in these areas and how their policies might possibly affect choices and pathways of foreign fighters. Based on this knowledge, policies can be drafted or amended to prevent or counter the threats posed by these individuals.
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2. Research Question
This thesis will be an attempt to add empirical knowledge to the (lack of) existing literature of the underexplored phenomenon of foreign fighter pathways. To do so the following research question will be answered:
To what extent are Dutch and Belgian foreign fighters distributed along the eighteen pathways and how can their journeys along these pathways be described, from the perspective of the foreign fighter?
Since the question is twofold and comprised of a quantitative and qualitative part, the following sub questions have been drafted to delineate the process of this master thesis and provide guidance along the way and ultimately give a more comprehensible reading experience throughout.
1. How many foreign fighters followed each different pathway? 2. What does their distribution along these pathways look like?
3. What are the qualitative individual experiences regarding interesting cases? 4. What do the results of the qualitative and quantitative study into the pathways tell? 5. How well does the pathway model correlate with reality?
Rather than addressing these sub questions per chapter this thesis will provide an ongoing and fluent answer to all five questions through individual chapters devoted to the underlying context of the questions. The thesis as a whole will answer every question as well as provide a concluding answer to the Research Question.
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3. Background of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict
The introduction and research question has given a preliminary view upon what will be the subject of this research. However, before delving into the topic of European foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq it is important to shed some light on the conflict that is at the heart of this current phenomenon. By doing so an attempt is made to offer some context and historic background to the topic in the hopes that the following research will be easier to comprehend for those who are not particularly familiar with the conflict in the Middle East and its sociological, religious, geopolitical and geographical underlying causes. This background article is meant to provide a good and comprehensive overview of the situation and take into account the many factors that contribute to the conflict as it has become today.
For several years Syria and Iraq have been the scene of uprisings, revolutions and Islamic extremism (Jones, 2012). Whereas Iraq has been in a state of conflict for the last decades with war, dictators and Western intervention (BBC, 2016), Syria has seen a major rise of resistance against its government in the last five years (BBC, 2016). These events ultimately lead to a bloody civil war in which Jihadist groups now thrive. It has seen many diverse groups that fight against the regime in Damascus, but also, and more predominantly, against each other. According to the Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), the violence and the disintegration of both the Syrian and the Iraqi state not only threatens the security of its own population, but also the security in the region and beyond (2014).
The civil war in Syria began in March 2011 as the Arab Spring uprisings reached Syria and targeted the dictatorial regime of President Bashar al Assad. The protesters blamed the regime, among other things, for nepotism, corruption and an unbalanced distribution of wealth (AIVD, 2014). The security forces and the army struck the call for more democracy down with brutal crackdowns, which caused the Syrian protesters to increasingly become more armed in their protests (the Telegraph, 2011). A long struggle against the regime followed, which slowly turned into an outright civil war. The fragmented nature of the conflict can be observed as several countries gave military and political support to parts of the opposition, while the regime was helped by allies in the fight as well (AIVD, 2014). As the conflict progressed, some of this highly fragmented Syrian opposition took on an increasingly violent Islamic character. Within the last few years, Syria has evolved into a prominent Jihadist battleground with originally many Salafist and Jihadist insurgents from Syria itself. Soon,
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however, the country was an attractive destination for non-Syrian Jihadists (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016).
Thousands of radical Muslims from the Middle East, North Africa and Asia travelled to Syria to join Jihadist groups. Furthermore, thousands of Europeans have taken the step to move to the region and actively take part in the conflict (Soufan Group, 2015). Many of these inexperienced and inept foreign fighters end up involved in war crimes and other atrocities. Others are persuaded to commit suicide attacks or contribute to the fight in another way. In 2012, Jahbat al-Nusra became active in Syria, initially as a radical Syrian battle group but later as the Syrian branch of Al Qaida. In 2013 the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), back then still an affiliate of Al Qaida, moved in to the Syrian conflict and soon became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS1). The Islamic State distinguishes itself from the other groups because contrary to the other rebel groups their main focus was not on battling and toppling the Assad regime, but rather the establishment of an Islamic state (AIVD, 2014).
To understand why radical Muslims from the Netherlands, Belgium and the rest of Europe travel to Syria or Iraq to join the fight, the conflict should be placed in an ideological context. Syria has a special meaning for many Jihadists as it is considered, in early Islamic writings, as the heartland of Islam. The Levant, which is located in Syria, includes Jerusalem. Jihadists dream to eventually liberate Jerusalem from the hands of the "enemy" Israel. They see the struggle in Syria as a battle that they can actually win and which also serves a long-term goal, the establishment of an Islamic state with Sharia law. The caliphate is central to the motivation of many Jihadists to come to Syria (AIVD, 2014).
In June 2014 the Islamic State called out the so called Islamic caliphate (NRC, 2014). It carries the ambition to bring an area under control that is not limited to Iraq and Syria but should include much of the Middle East, hereby underlining that they do not recognize existing borders. Since their claim of the caliphate, there have been many other countries in which the Islamic State has gained a foothold or where pre-existing rebel groups pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Glenn, 2016).
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The so called Islamic State is known and referred to by a myriad of names and abbreviations (See: International Business Times, 2015). This research will henceforth refer to the group as the Islamic State.
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Parts of Syria are now controlled by rebel groups and Jihadists from all over the world travel to Syria with the idea that they can already live in the Islamic caliphate in the Levant. They assume that they can raise their children as the first generation citizens. Islamic State propaganda is responding to this expectation of salvation of the caliphate by, for example, spreading online images of Islamic State fighters who repair roads, schools and open up courts (Winter, 2015).
However, the causes and motivations for the conflict cannot be understood by just looking at the long-term goal of an Islamic caliphate or the toppling of current governments, but rather goes deeper into the Muslim religion and its sectarian nature. Many individual Sunnis from the Arab world have joined forces with Jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. A number of prominent Sunni Islamists do not only propagate Jihad against Assad but see this as a battle against Shiism. Shiite Iran and Hezbollah have backed Assad in the conflict (Sullivan, 2014). This led to the involvement of a number of Sunni regimes in the Middle East who want to minimize the power and influence of Iran. Linear to the uprising against the government in Damascus and Baghdad, the power struggle between regional powers plays an important role in the intertwined and difficult nature of the conflict. The political rivalry among regional powers, fought out on Syrian and Iraqi territory almost as proxy wars, makes it seem as a character of a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites (ABC News, 2016). The sharpened divisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims have negative consequences for social order throughout the Islamic world, where the geopolitical power struggle between regional powers plays an important role. Moreover, it can also lead to the creation or increase of tensions between Sunni and Shiite minorities in the West (AIVD, 2014).
With the formation of an international coalition to stop the rapid advance of the Islamic State, the conflict has gotten an even more international character. Both the Netherlands and Belgium participate in the coalition that is conducting air strikes over Iraq (Telegraph, 2014), and more recently also Syria (NRC, 2016). This has led to sometimes violent reactions from foreign fighters, who called on Westerners through social media to perpetrate attacks in Western countries, including the Netherlands and Belgium
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4. Theoretical Framework
The following pages will provide an extensive theoretical framework of existing literature regarding the phenomenon that, in any way, are important to this research. By doing so it will explain the historical background of these phenomenon and argue why current Jihadist terrorism is thriving today. Concepts will be explained to give an impression of what a foreign fighter is and when something can be called terrorism or radicalization, also showing that while the words are used on a daily base in the news and even academic research, they are not as easy to comprehend as one might expect. Furthermore the theoretical framework will paint a picture or the current threat that the foreign fighter phenomenon poses to the Netherlands, Belgium and Europe as a whole. This theoretical framework will end with an overview of the theory that lies at the heart of this research and to which it has made an attempt to expand to the body of knowledge on.
4.1 Foreign Fighter history
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of foreign fighters is hardly a new one, the contemporary literature appears to be merely a decade old. Since 2005, a dramatic rise of transnational insurgents fighting in the Middle East can be observed resulting in an increase of scholarly research on foreign fighters. (Malet, 2015). In The History of Foreign Fighters (2013), Malet researched 331 conflicts between 1816 and 2005 and concluded that 70 had a presence of foreign fighters. While in our current society the phenomenon of foreign fighters is almost exclusively linked to Islam and violent Jihad, and is indeed almost taken for granted as a normality in conflicts in the Muslim world (Hegghammer, 2011), there have been conflicts, like the Texas Revolution (1835-1836) or the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) where this was not the case (Malet, 2013). But even Islamic foreign fighters were present long before the rise of academic research into the phenomenon became noteworthy. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union caused foreign Muslims to travel to Afghanistan and fight off the communists, and the Bosnian war in the nineties also saw foreign fighters joining the conflict (Mustapha, 2013). Hegghammer, a renowned scholar in the field of counterterrorism, estimates that between 10.000 and 30.000 of these Muslim foreign fighters have been involved in conflicts between 1980 and 2011 (2011). According to him, foreign fighters are very significant, since they can affect the conflicts they join by endorsing religious violence and indiscriminate procedures. Furthermore, they empower transnational terrorist groups, like
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al-Qaida and the Islamic State, by their individual involvement in extreme forms of militancy (Hegghammer, 2010/11). These foreign fighters often radicalize at home, but rather than planning terrorist attacks in their home countries, they commonly choose to join a terrorist group in a conflict zone abroad (Hegghammer, 2010/11).
Rebel mobilization in for example civil war literature has been explained by greed or grievances of local insurgents, without taking into account transnational insurgency (Malet, 2013). However, social identity theory and literature on military service suggest that individuals are willing to sacrifice for the security of their group. Research shows that effective activists use framing to make relevant audiences feel as if they have a direct stake in the outcome of political conflicts. Additionally, globalization has contributed towards a wider reach to transnational groups (Malet, 2013). Malet argues that ‘Foreign Fighters are the
product of the successful construction of a transnational identity through social institutions, and of the successful framing of a threat to its existence’ (2013). This was showcased by
Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who, in his writings (1987), stated that it is the obligation of every Muslim to defend the Ummah2 when being oppressed, hereby urging transnational Muslims to perform a defensive Jihad to fight of an oppressor. This Ummah, supported by the narrative that it’s every Muslim’s individual obligation to defend it, transferred distant conflict into struggles that Muslims should concern about worldwide (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014).
4.2 The current foreign fighter phenomenon
A major contributor to the success of the Islamic State and other rebel groups has been its foreign fighters. Since they moved into Syria in May 2014, it is believed that up to 80 percent of foreign fighters are now part of the Islamic State, despite the fact that most foreign fighters joined the al-Qaida linked Jahbat al-Nusra front in the early phase of the conflict (Schmid, 2015). There is no official number of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq and estimates by several sources differ. The Soufan group, based on their own investigations, estimates that between 27.000 and 31.000 individuals coming from 86 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State or other rebel groups (2015). A recent study published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) states that between September 2014 and September 2015 the number of foreign fighters reportedly reached 30.000 combatants coming from 104 countries (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). It has calculated that between 3.922 and 4.294 European foreign fighters, of which 17% female, are
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believed to have joined the fight. Remarkable is that a majority of around 2,838 foreign fighters originate from just four countries: Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Estimates are that around 14% of these foreign fighters have died. Furthermore, it is believed that around 30% of European foreign fighters have returned to their country of origin (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016).
4.3 Definitions of a foreign fighter
While nowadays the term foreign fighter is often used by journalists, policy makers, institutions and academics to describe those people who choose to leave their home country and fight elsewhere, usually referring to conflict states in the Middle East or North Africa, there seems to be a lack of common terminology resulting in the absence of a universal and agreed upon definition of a foreign fighter. However, essential for researchers to analyse the same propositions is conceptualization and justification of which data should be included (Malet, 2015). Therefore, this section will provide some information on several definitions by key scholars in the field.
While examining foreign fighters in Chechnya, Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty (2008) described foreign fighters as ‘non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated
by religion, kinship, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary reward, enter a conflict zone to participate in hostilities’. David Malet (2013) describes the phenomenon as ‘non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict’. Excluded from his definition are
terrorists, foreign militaries, employees of private security firms or foreigners who join a state army in return for a personal gain. Thomas Hegghammer (2011) gives a narrower definition than Malet and identifies four criteria for inclusion. According to him a Foreign Fighter is an individual who: ‘1. has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency; 2. Lacks
citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions; 3. Lacks affiliation to an official military organisation; 4. is unpaid’. In later work, Hegghammer gives an
alternative and broader definition which characterizes foreign fighters as any individual ‘who
leaves or tries to leave the West to fight somewhere else’. This definition, somewhat contrary
to Malet’s definition, includes individuals who participate in ‘any military activity (fighting or
training), using any tactic (terrorist or guerrilla), against any enemy (Western or non-Western’), as long as it occurs outside the West’ (2013). Insurgents from non-Western
countries are hereby excluded, thus not taking into account the vast numbers of insurgents from the Middle East, Africa or Asia. David Malet also revises his definition of a foreign
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fighter and proposes that, after analysing several recent and contemporary definitions, the following delineation between: 1. Transnational Insurgent, 2. Foreign-trained Fighter, 3. Foreign Terrorist and 4. Foreign Fighter should be made to add clarity to future policy debates. According to him a foreign fighter in this sense is ‘A non-citizen of a state
experiencing civil conflict who arrives from an external state to join an insurgency’ (Malet,
2016). Some general concern is the fact that the definitions by Malet and Hegghammer seem to be based on motivation of an ideological, religious or political ground, hereby trying to exclude reward or financial incentives. However, evidence suggests that groups like Jahbat al-Nusra or the Islamic State pay their insurgents, including foreign fighters (NBC news, 2014). As this paragraph shows, there is an abundance of definitions to capture the foreign fighters phenomenon, all somewhat including the same characteristics, but also all different from each other.
4.4 Threat of the foreign fighter phenomenon
Violent acts and threats committed by foreign fighters linked to Jihadist groups such as Jahbat al-Nusra and the Islamic State have caused public outcry and grave concern in the countries of origin of these foreign fighters. It has affected the way that politicians, policymakers and the general public view the threat of violent religious extremism and terrorism (Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015). Evidently, it adds to the general perception of Jihadism and foreign fighters as the greatest concern to Europe, especially regarding their return to Europe and the potential threat they pose to their countries of origin upon return. This concern is legitimized by a number of attacks on European soil since the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, such as major incidents in Paris in January and November of 2015 and Brussels in March of 2016. Although not all suspects of these attacks had direct links to foreign fighting, recent history suggests that they are viewed through the lens of the foreign fighter phenomenon (Bakker et al. 2015). Moreover, it is not simply these violent incidents, but also persistent threats made by foreign fighters that causes the phenomenon to be perceived as threatening in and to European countries (Bakker et al., 2015).
Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn have tried to analyse the perceived threat of terrorism and foreign fighters against the actual threat. They argue that terrorism is predominantly about the creation and dissemination of fear, anxiety, and intimidation of a population or government and state that to this day terrorists know this and aim to incite reactions to attacks and threats by the public, politicians, the media and opposing groups (Bakker et al., 2015). Furthermore,
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they state that in order to assess the impact of terrorism, looking at the perceptions and reactions among the general public in relation to these incidents is necessary. This is because the imaginations, perception and vulnerability of targeted audiences are the product of any terrorist activity (Bakker et al. 2015). They conclude that Jihadist foreign fighters have not yet posed a significant physical threat to Europe and European citizens (Bakker et al., 2015). This did not align with the increase in concern among policymakers, general public and other parties. A great increase of fear of terrorism, including the foreign fighter phenomenon, can be witnessed between 2011 and 2015 (Bakker et al., 2015), which shows that the impact of Jihadist terrorism and foreign fighters is very large, even when the physical incidents are relatively small in numbers and casualties. Besides fear of Jihadi foreign fighters, the phenomenon has also provoked anti-Muslim rhetoric and rallies, making is not only a security issue but also a threat to social peace and cohesion (Bakker et al., 2015). Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn concluded that Jihadi terrorism and the foreign fighter phenomenon is one whose impact is not proportional to the physical threat it poses. In other words, a “low-probability, high-impact” threat3 (Bakker et al., 2015).
4.5 Terrorism
Terrorism is a highly complex and ever changing phenomenon. It makes daily headlines and is on many national and international agendas (Bakker, 2006). However transnational terrorism is a fairly new phenomenon, and over the course of the last century, its continuing presence suggests that is has its roots in important features of our world (Rapoport, 2004). In his article ‘The four Waves of Modern Terrorism’, David Rapoport distinguished four waves of terrorism that the world has seen in the last 125 years. He argues that “we can more fully
appreciate the difficulties ahead by examining features of the history of rebel (non-state) terror” (Rapoport, 2004).
The first truly international and global terrorist experience in history initiated in Russia in the 1880’s and started to appear elsewhere within a decade. Rapoport refers to this first wave as the Anarchist wave. The second wave, called the Anticolonial wave, began in the 1920’s and lasted for approximately four decades, after which the third “New Left wave” emerged. These waves are composed of organisations and a wave only disappears when its energy cannot
3 The analysis and results of this report were published before the attacks in Paris (2015), Brussels and Nice (2016), in which over 200 persons were killed, and was based on six violent attacks since 2011 which killed 33 persons, including four perpetrators. Therefore the numbers and attacks portrayed in the report are not up-to-date anymore. However, the physical threat of terrorism after the attacks in Paris, Brussels and Nice remains much lower than the big impact they have on European society, keeping the status-quo on their conclusions.
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inspire new organisations to continue the wave. These first three waves all lasted about the duration of a human life cycle each. The fourth and current wave of terrorism is called the Religious wave. If this wave follows the same pattern as its three predecessors, it could disappear by 2025 and be replaced by a new wave (Rapoport, 2004).
Rapoport argues that Islam lies at the heart of the Religious terrorism wave (Rapoport: 2004). In 1998 Osama bin Laden declared a war against the United States which initiated the surge of terrorist activity leading up to and preceding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the following colonialism in the 20th century has led to a revival of anti-Western sentiment and a call for stricter adherence to the law of Allah (Wright, 2016). Fukuyama (1989) argued that the ending of the Cold War gave way to the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government, calling this the end of history. Nevertheless, because the idea of democracy is unimaginable without a substantial amount of secularism, the spirit of the Religious wave seems to be explicitly antidemocratic (Rapoport, 2004).
Like the foreign fighter phenomenon, there is a substantial amount of research on terrorism available, and yet there does not seem to be an agreed upon definition. Governmental, non-governmental, academic and journalistic sources seem to use some sort of definition that best fits their personal role, purpose or bias. In 1984 Schmid and Jongman attempted to develop a comprehensive consensus on terrorism, resulting in the following sixteen category definition:
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or State actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target [audience(s)], turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.”
(Schmid and Jongman, 1988)
While the work is frequently cited, this actual definition has not often been utilized by other academics and a coherent and accepted definition remains unavailable. This is portrayed by the inability of the United Nations to provide a coherent definition of terrorism that is
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accepted by all nations (United Nations, 2005). This inability to reach consensus on a definition and criminalize terrorism poses a problem in countering transnational terrorism. The Council of the European Union formulated a definition in 2002 and states that terrorism refers to “seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”.
These definitions of terrorism are broad and suggest that the phenomenon ranges from nationalist-separatist organisations, left-wing and right-wing groups, to lone wolves and political religious networks and groups. Of all these different kinds of political-religious terrorism, (transnational) Jihadi terrorism poses the greatest threat to Western values, interests and societies (Bakker, 2006).
4.6 Jihadism
Jihadi terrorism is the product of a combination of the idea of Jihad and an Islamist ideology, both historical phenomena. The trend of transnational Jihadi terrorism emerged with the beginning of the fourth wave of modern terrorism (Rapoport, 2004) in 1979 when the Iranian Revolution and the unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets provided the hope or dramatic political turning point that was vital to the launch of a new Islamic century which inspired the call to Jihad, the recruitment of Mujahideen4 from all over the Muslim world and which eventually led to the formation of Al-Qaida (Weinberg and Eubank, 2010). The term Jihad can be explained in a wide range of meanings as a quest or fight. A distinction can be made between two types of Jihad, the so-called ‘greater Jihad’ and the ‘lesser-Jihad’. The former is inward-seeking and is about the effort of each Muslim to be a better person and the struggle to improve. The greater Jihad is considered to be a test of each Muslim’s obedience to Allah and his preparedness to fulfil his commands on earth (AIVD, n.d.). The ‘lesser-Jihad’ can become the means to mobilize a political and social struggle by using violence against an unjust ruler, whether this ruler is Muslim or not (AIVD, n.d.).
Recent and contemporary violent and radical Islamic groups choose not to follow the ‘greater-Jihad’ but rather use the ‘lesser-‘greater-Jihad’ as a complete political and social philosophy. Additionally, these Islamic groups advocate the lesser Jihad to be a duty of individual Muslims worldwide (Bakker, 2006). Individuals who fight a violent form of the lesser Jihad
4 A “Holy Warrior”; one engaged in Jihad
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are referred to as Mujahideen, Jihadi or Jihadi terrorists, depending on the actions they take while performing the lesser Jihad. The violent acts in which Mujahideen are involved are justified by the claim of furtherance of the goals of Islam. A (pan-) Islamic theocracy and the restoration of a caliphate are among these goals (Bakker, 2006). The latter not being a great issue at the time Bakker wrote his article in 2006, but extremely relevant since the formation of the Islamic State and their self-proclaimed caliphate in 2014.
4.7 Radicalization
Radicalization is described in most dictionaries as the process through which individuals or groups adopt extreme ideas. However, what stipulates an extreme idea and what is considered radical varies in different societies and depends on social and historical context. Rabasa and Benard define radicalization as “the rejection of the key dimensions of modern democratic
culture that are at the centre of the European value system” (2014). They argue that
radicalization among European Muslims is an exception and that the minority that does become radicalized, often started this course towards extremism with feelings of disaffection or alienation. The circumstances under which these feelings were generated provide a cognitive opening where radical ideas are more easily introduced (Rabasa and Bernard, 2014). Since the increase of European Jihadist foreign fighters in 2012 a pressing question for academics and policymakers has been how European Muslim men and woman have become involved in a violent Jihadist conflict abroad. According to Weggemans, Bakker and Grol (2014) obstacles for early detection and intervention on radicalization are, among other things, a systemic lack of knowledge among front line social workers and police officers, little experience and limited means for countering radicalisation and that notion that individual signs of radicalization often do not draw a complete picture of a situation.
4.8 Foreign fighters and the European Union
Before the Madrid bombings in 2004, Europe had been predominantly confronted with nationalist, left-wing or right-wing terrorists (Bakker, 2006). Jihadi terrorism is a phenomenon that only started to become news in the 1990’s (Bakker, 2006), and even then the threat it posed was mainly perceived as an issue in the Islamic world as most attacks occurred on and among Muslims. Consequently, the Jihadi terrorism threat in Europe was underestimated, overlooked and frequently misunderstood (Bakker, 2006).
From the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, fighters from other parts of the world were drawn towards the conflict, including individuals from EU Member states. These EU member
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states raised worries about the presence of Jihadist foreign fighters. National authorities in Europe feared that persons who are involved in the war in Syria or Iraq may further radicalise, change their world view, become experienced in the use of weapons and explosives and then return to their European country of origin as part of a global Jihadist movement (Byman, 2015). Implications for European countries are that they often do not have the capacity to track or pursue possible returnees, which poses a serious security problem (Weggemans et al., 2014). As a response to this problem many European countries have put a strong emphasis on preventing potential Jihadist to leave for Syria or Iraq, but the legal tools at their disposal are limited since ‘It requires a great deal of capacity and experience, and the necessary
manpower, as well as excellent coordination and cooperation between authorities and other relevant stakeholders to at least have a chance to stop potential Jihadists from departing (via Turkey) to Syria’ (Weggemans et al, 2014).
Regarding complex, multidimensional and transnational security threats governments often favour the so called “Comprehensive Approach” (Bakker et al., 2015), which addresses all different aspects to a certain phenomenon as well as a well-adjusted use of different types of available measures. The European Union counterterrorism-strategy is comprehensive and based on four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond (Council of the European Union, 2005). This prism is still the primary source through which the EU perceives the foreign fighter phenomenon and by which policy options are formulated (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). With regards to policy options available to Western governments it is argued that a good balance between hard and soft measures prevents a rise in a feeling of victimization felt by parts of the community (Vidino, 2014). These feelings can cause a division between communities which fuels an increasingly conservative and extremist view in other parts of society. This in turn contributes to a breeding ground for extremism which causes a vicious circle of radicalisation, aggression and violent responses (European Commission, 2014).
4.9 Threat to the Netherlands
There continues to be a complex threat level in the Netherlands in which various actors (terrorist organizations, transnational networks, small cells and lone actors) are able to commit small and large-scale attacks (NCTV, 2015). The threat level for the Netherlands is currently set at substantial which means that an attack on the Netherlands is realistic. Substantial is the second highest rank, just below critical which would mean that there is an immediate threat to the Netherlands (AIVD, 2016).
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In December of 2012 a rapid growth was observed by Dutch authorities of Dutch citizens travelling to Syria to engage in the fight against the Bashar al Assad regime, often joining the Jahbat al-Nusra Jihadist group (Weggemans et al., 2014). Nowadays, many travellers attempt to join the Islamic State. The AIVD argues that the Dutch Jihadist movement doesn’t seem to go through any major changes in size. This movement in the Netherlands has hundreds of supporters and several thousand sympathizers. According to the AIVD, as of March 1st 2016 approximately 240 Dutch individuals have travelled to Syria or Iraq, 42 have been confirmed killed, and about 40 have returned to the Netherlands. This means that around 160 Dutch people are still in Syria, of whom about 40 percent are women. In the eyes of Jihadists the Netherlands is a legitimate target. The participation of the Netherlands in the air strikes on the Islamic State and Syria could raise the profile of the Netherlands among Jihadists. It is also a fact that the expulsion of the Islamic State from its occupied areas affects its capacity to carry out attacks (AIVD, 2016).
4.10 Threat to Belgium
A system of four terrorism threat levels was introduced in Belgium in 2015. It ranges from 1 (low) to 4 (serious). Advice on the threat level is given by the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (OCAD) (IBZ Crisiscentrum, n.d.). This threat level in early 2016 was set at three, meaning the threat level in Belgium was severe. A high threat level states that the threat against the group, person or event that is the object of the analysis is probable and possible (IBZ Crisiscentrum, n.d.). Over the last few years the threat levels in Belgium have been amended, including a raise to the fourth level after the attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014. After the attacks in Brussels in March of 2016 the level was raised again to four, but after two days downgraded again to three (Politico, 2016).
According to the federal government, Belgium is a potential target, one of the reasons being their involvement in the coalition active in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). Furthermore, Belgium’s open society, at the heart of the European Union, combined with their high number of foreign fighters who have or might return, makes them vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Although Belgium has developed many plans and documents, covering a great number of different actors involved in their counter terrorism policy, it does not have a national strategy to counter the foreign fighter phenomenon (de Standaard, 2016).
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The most recent estimates of Belgian foreign fighters who have travelled to Syria or Iraq since 2011 state that between 420 and 516 foreign fighters have left the country, making Belgium the country with the most foreign fighters per capita of any European Union country. Between 60 to 70 of these foreign fighters have been killed in combat, while an estimated 120 to 260 still remain in either Syria or Iraq. Between 55 to 120 individuals have returned to Belgium. It is also estimated that about 47 foreign fighters are female (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016).
4.11 Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
A fairly untouched subject in the academic research into foreign fighters is the courses of action foreign fighters engage in whilst participating in armed conflict. In a recent ICCT policy paper a framework was developed in which multiple different options were outlined that foreign fighters can take once they arrive in Syria or Iraq (Reed, Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015). These were linked with four different policy options and their possible (un)intended outcomes and consequences. The ICCT policy paper is based on and builds further on research done by Ms. De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Prof. Dr. Bakker (2014). The aim of the deductive paper is that by delineating possible foreign fighter pathways, the schematic overview that is developed can act as a conceptual tool to help analyse the different policies currently pursued by European governments and the implications these might have (Reed et al., 2015).
The framework delineates eighteen pathways that foreign fighters can follow while they are in Syria or Iraq. The result was an overview of these pathways in a model which outlines all the options and categorized them depending on what an individual had done in Syria or Iraq. The full framework is depicted on the next page to offer a complete overview of the eighteen pathways and an illustrated summary of the article.
22 Figure 1: Schematic overview of pathways (Reed et al., 2015)
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4.12 Definition and broadening of the 18 original pathways
The following section will delineate and partially provide a broadening on the concepts of the pathways as they were used in this thesis. This is done in order to firstly explain the concepts to the reader. Secondly, and more importantly, this following operationalization, including the broadening of the concepts of the pathways, is developed in order to create a methodology that allows for a better fitting of the research subjects into one or more of the pathways. Where it was thought to be relevant, theory is added to explain why the pathways should be taken into account when dealing with foreign fighters. This means that a justification, based on previous research, possible outcomes or consequences, for their inclusion is given.
With the objectives of this section being made clear in the paragraph above, the reason for the broadening of some of the pathways is the fact that during the research and the establishment of the dataset it has become clear that the pathways are not as simple to tell apart as the original article explains it when researching the activities of foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq. What this means is that these foreign fighters do not simply choose to follow the developed pathways. Their pathways are an accumulation of their actions, a process that starts from the moment they arrive in Syria or Iraq. Factors like the city they end up in or the training camp they get assigned to might determine what their activities later on will be. These foreign fighters have little personal say into the destination or activities upon arrival. Rather, it is an outcome of decisions taken along the way, both by the foreign fighters themselves and the organisations they choose to affiliate themselves with.
What happened during the research was that some of the research subjects only partially followed a pathway, or not enough sufficient and relevant data was available to put them in a particular pathway. Therefore, a more comprehensive explanation of the pathways has been used to allocate foreign fighters to them. These classifications were only used in this research and do not necessarily reflect the views of the original authors of the model.
4.12.1 P1 – Death
The discourse of “taking” this pathway is sensitive and subject to interpretations since P1 entails foreign fighters that have died. As is mentioned in Reed et al.’s paper (2015), this includes fatalities from fighting as well as fatalities from suicide missions or disease. The former implies that the pathway is not “chosen” or “taken”, but rather the outcome and result of their choice to join an armed conflict. The latter however does suggest that the pathway
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was consciously chosen, perhaps in an effort to become a Martyr5. This research, nor Reed’s article, has made a distinction between the causes of death, meaning that whatever way a foreign fighters dies, results in being included in the P1 pathway.
4.12.2 P2 – Fighting
This research has chosen to include foreign fighters in the P2 pathway who were documented, prosecuted or have confessed to being engaged in fighting. Where no written documentation was found, but images of the subject were available, the choice has been made to include people who were pictured with a weapon in the P2 pathway. However, one exception has been made for Mohamed B., who is known to be fully blind (NRC, 2015), and cannot realistically be characterized as a fighter, since he has no ability to see where to shoot.
4.12.3 P3 – Support terrorist activity in Syria or Iraq
Where it was not possible to determine whether a foreign fighter picked up arms or not, thus classifying him as a fighter (P2), but evidence suggested that they were linked to a rebel group, the P3 pathway was allocated to this individual. This research has not delineated between peaceful and violent rebel group affiliates, since the simple fact of joining, supporting and perhaps supplying a rebel organisation in Syria or Iraq that uses terrorism as a means to reach their ideological goal, classifies an individual as supporting terrorism in Syria or Iraq. Furthermore, since fighting in Syria or Iraq (P2) implies that terrorism is being supported, fighters of the P2 category were also automatically appointed to the P3 pathway. This also goes for those persons of whom it is verified that they joined multiple rebel groups in Syria or Iraq (P4). These three factors combined make it likely that the pathway for supporting terrorism in Syria or Iraq might be the biggest one in numbers. Caution should go to the narrative of this pathway since there is a difference between actively supporting terrorism, which is explained above, and being a supporter of terrorism while not doing anything to show or manifest this support. The latter is not used as an indicator for this pathway.
4.12.4 P4 – Supporting terrorist activity from Syria or Iraq in another country
This fourth pathway has been conceptualized and classifies those individuals who are still in Syria or Iraq but who support terrorism in another country. This pathway was allocated to individuals when there was documented evidence, whether it is media, social media, radio or video, where they urge other people to commit attacks or suicide missions in other,
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predominantly Western, countries. There is a real threat that those individuals in Syria and Iraq can help other terrorist groups to mobilize and carry out attacks. Furthermore, they can provide information about potential targets (Reed et al., 2015).Technical skills and the ability to speak European languages aids these people in getting their ideological message across to more and new people in Western countries.
4.12.5 P5 – Switch rebel group affiliation
The P5 pathway entails those foreign fighters that leave a rebel group and join another. It has been documented that as the Islamic State crossed borders and moved in to Syria many former Al-Qaida or Jahbat al-Nusra affiliates decided to switch groups and join the Islamic State (Karouny, 2013). Furthermore, research showed that some Belgian foreign fighters initially joined a certain rebel group upon arrival and regularly moved on to one or two additional groups during their time in Syria or Iraq (de Bont, 2015).
4.12.6 P6 – Non-violent role in conflict
While the term foreign fighters suggests that all those that travel to Syria or Iraq do so to take up arms and violently engage or participate in the conflict, there is the possibility that individuals choose to travel to Syria and Iraq to play a non-violent role in the conflict. One possible direction in this pathway could be that they contribute to the provision of humanitarian aid. However, evidence suggests that while it is often stated as a reason to leave, only a very small amount seem to have actually followed a peaceful or humanitarian pathway in Syria or Iraq. This suggestion is confirmed by anthropologist Martijn de Koning who, when asked if he ever noticed a foreign fighter going to Syria or Iraq solely for humanitarian reasons, answered with a short but clear “No” (Vrij Nederland, 2015). The P6 pathway is allocated to those individuals who have not joined a rebel group or participated in a violent way in the conflict but who do contribute to the conflict society by, for example, building roads or provide medical aid.
4.12.7 P7 – Peaceful integration in Syria or Iraq
The last pathway that entails foreign fighters staying in Syria or Iraq after having travelled from the Netherlands or Belgium is P7, which states that foreign fighters simply peacefully integrate into Syrian or Iraqi society without having anything to do with the ongoing armed conflict. While common sense might suggest that integrating into a war-torn country might not seem as a very likely pathway, it is still a possibility and should thus be regarded as such.
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4.12.8 P8 to P18
The following eleven pathways are all aimed at foreign fighters that left the conflict in Syria or Iraq, making a distinction between returning to Western countries and moving on to third non-Western countries. The Rand Corporation estimates that between January 2012 and July 2014 between 1500 and 2500 Sunni foreign fighters from Europe arrived in Syria. However, evidence suggests that around July 2014 about 300 to 400 of these foreign fighters have left Syria again and their most likely destination is a journey back to their home country (Jones, 2014). The journey or pathway these foreign fighters can take upon leaving Syria or Iraq and relocating to their home country or other non-Western countries can fall into three categories; peaceful integration, engagement in domestic terrorist activity or travel to a non-Western home-country.
4.12.8.1 P8 to P10 – Peaceful Integration
The following three pathways describe foreign fighters who return to their Western home country and peacefully integrate. Peaceful integration means that the use of violence in a Western or home country is not likely anymore (Reed et al., 2015). The first pathway regarding peaceful integration is P8, which states that individuals who return from Syria or Iraq become counter-activists. These people can become an important benefactor as they may prove to be a crucial resource in countering radicalisation and discouraging potential foreign fighters (Noor and Dorsey, 2014) since they enjoy a great deal of credibility in radical circles. An ex-foreign fighter delivering a negative narrative towards Jihad or travelling to Syria or Iraq may prove much more effective than what any government can do (Barrett, 2014).
Individuals who have returned to a Western country may not have disengaged from their radical believes, but might change their tactics by spreading their ideological beliefs as a non-violent activists. The P9 pathway was developed for these people. While the pathway still falls under peaceful integration, these individuals can pose a severe threat by spreading their radical narrative within delicate or potential radical groups. Since ex-foreign fighters seem to enjoy high levels of respect by those who may be in doubt, especially impressionable and vulnerable young Muslims (Reed et al., 2015), their message may end up being a final pivotal point for others to leave or pick up a violent role, either in their home country or in Syria or Iraq.
Finally, there are those individuals who distance themselves completely from their former Jihadist and extremist believes, settle back in their home country and simply move on with
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their lives (Reed et al., 2015). These last people fall into the P10 pathway, which is based on the notion that when an individual can go through the process of radicalization, which is assumed to be a process of nurture rather than nature, then the reverse can also be done and thus peaceful reintegration including complete removal from former beliefs is possible (Reed et al., 2015).
4.12.8.2 P11 and P12 – Engage in terrorist activity
One of the major concerns of (Western) countries that have brought forward foreign fighters is not so much that these individuals engage in terrorist activity whilst being in Syria or Iraq, but rather that they return home and decide to use violence, extremism and terrorism in their home countries (Reed et al., 2015). Therefore, foreign fighters that have left Syria or Iraq, travelled home to their country of origin and engage in terrorist activity will be allocated to the P11 pathway. Although there are little incidents involving returnees that have engaged in terrorist activity upon their return, there have been incidents, like the Brussels Jewish Museum shooting in 2014, which have proven that the threat should not be underestimated (Reed et al., 2015). It is also believed that both al-Nusra and the Islamic State have engaged in recruitment of Westerners in an attempt to use them for terrorist purposes in their home countries (for example: Vidino, 2014 and Stern, 2014).
The second pathway that describes engagement in terrorist activity by foreign fighters upon return is P12, stating that returnees do not necessarily have to engage in terrorist activity in their home countries. They can use their home country as a base from which they plan and execute an attack on a third Western nation (Reed et al., 2015). Furthermore, the spreading of propaganda, fundraising or recruitment for the conflict in Syria or Iraq is possible upon return and falls under the P12 pathway.
4.12.8.3 P13 to P18 – Travel from Syria or Iraq to a non-Western country
Leaving Syria or Iraq does not automatically mean that these individuals will return home. Rather than going back to their country of origin, there is the possibility that people choose to move to a third, non-Western country. One of the possibilities here is that foreign fighters move from one Jihadist theatre onto the next (P13), a phenomenon which is also seen in previous conflicts such as the Chechen conflict in the mid-nineties, where raw young volunteers from the Tajikistan, Kashmir, the Balkans and Afghanistan conflicts moved on to the Chechen conflict (Rich and Conduit, 2014). By doing so these foreign fighters can bring with them much needed experience, skills and access to funding through connections from
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previous conflicts, hereby strengthening the local Jihadist cause (Bakke, 2014). However, while foreign fighters migrating to new conflict zones can facilitate greater resources, their impact on the ideological and political aspects of national causes has been less positive in general (Rich and Conduit, 2014).
Another option that foreign fighters can take is that they move to a non-Western country which is currently unaffected by conflict, and decide to engage in terrorist activity in these countries (P14). This pathway poses a much greater risk for geo-political destabilisation and would cause widening of conflict areas and assistance to Jihadist groups in spreading their violence to perhaps previously stable and safe regions (Reed et al., 2015). Negative outcomes of this pathway have already been documented in Libya (Jawad, 2015) and Yemen (Mendelsohn, 2015) where the Islamic State has seemed to get a foothold. Splinter groups of the Islamic State in other countries are known as Wilayat6, which they have already established in parts of Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Caucasus. Terrorists or fighters operating in the Islamic State’s name have also conducted attacks in Bangladesh and Kuwait (Byman, 2016). A third possibility for foreign fighters is that they try to find a safe haven in a non-Western country and decide to plan or support terrorism in another country, possibly their Western home country (P15) (Reed et al., 2015).
The previous three pathways all entail foreign fighter taking up a violent role while travelling to a Western country. The last three pathways suggest that they can also take a non-violent role and peacefully integrate into society in these non-Western countries. They can hereby take three different roles, similar to the non-violent roles they can take whilst returning to their home countries. They can become a Counter-Activist (P16), a Non-Activist (P17) or an Activist (P18).
6 Arabic for provinces
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4.13 The (unintended) impact of European policies on the Pathways
As authorities have become increasingly worried about the high number of foreign fighters leaving their countries to join the conflict in the Middle East, there have been numerous reports published on the dangers that these foreign fighters can pose upon return (Byman and Shapiro, 2014; de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014). Both local, national and international forums conducted high level meetings in which new measures and “Action programmes” were introduced to counter the threat of those individuals who are already foreign fighters. In this context, a general trend can be observed of a slow but steady move towards more repressive measures (Reed et al., 2015), partly fuelled by incidents like the Brussels museum shooting or the more recent Paris and Brussels attacks.
In the case of national policies regarding returning foreign fighters, some significant differences can be observed. Reed et al. focus on four types of measures taken by a number of European countries in their fight against returning foreign fighters, three of which will be discussed here. They not only explain what these measures entail but also focus on (unintended) outcomes that might deter foreign fighters from taking particular pathways and possibly force them into others.
4.13.1 Reintegration programs
There is no one-size-fits all approach when it comes to countering the threat of foreign fighters. Therefore, European governments often favour a comprehensive approach in which they use both soft and hard measures (Reed et al., 2015). At the heart of the soft approach are reintegration programmes. These programmes focus on getting foreign fighters back into society rather than criminalizing their actions and prosecute them. Denmark, which has the fourth highest number of foreign fighters per capita in Europe (van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016), has become known for its use of the “Aarhus model” (Bertelsen, 2015). This reintegration programme involves offering help to get education and employment, voluntary psychological counselling and assigns returnees with a mentor that guides them through the process (Higgins, 2014). While promising, this soft approach is not immune to criticism, as some state that the threat of returnees is underestimated and paints a naïve picture (Faiola and Mekhennet, 2014).
The reintegration programmes are predominantly focussed on disengagement but also aim to separate returnees from radical environments and promotes the reintegration into society. However, this does not necessarily mean de-radicalisation. Therefore, after completing the
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program the returned foreign fighter can still be an activist, as long as his means of doing so do not entail violence or extremism (P8) (Reed et al., 2015). A positive consequence of these programmes could be that they encourage more foreign fighters to return to their home country instead of keep fighting or travelling to another country while adhering to their radical beliefs. This in contrast to for example prosecution which can deter foreign fighters from returning and therefore push them to remain fighting or travel to other countries (Reed et al., 2015). Besides a possible lesser security threat, participation of former foreign fighters in these programmes might also increase insight into their motivations and hereby provide information that is needed to make a more accurate risk assessment of the threat that they pose (Reed et al., 2015).
However, while the above describes positive outcomes of the soft approach, there can be negative and possible unintended consequences to this measure as well. One of these unintended consequences could be that there is indeed a higher number of foreign fighters returning to their home countries, and that these returnees could use the safe umbrella of the programmes as a cover for getting involved in terrorism, therefore instead of peacefully reintegrating turning towards the P11 and P12 pathway (Reed et al, 2015). Furthermore, rather than being a deterrent for individuals to become a foreign fighter, like hard measures are, the reintegration programmes might signal that their decision to become a foreign fighter does not seem to have any negative or long-term consequences.
4.13.2 Prosecution of foreign fighters
Whereas the first wave of foreign fighters that travelled to Syria or Iraq in 2013 and early 2014 could return to their home country with relative ease, the prosecution of returnees has increasingly become more common in the past years (Reed et al., 2015). While in most countries it is not illegal to join a foreign fighting force as long as this force is not in conflict with the specific country, most countries try to prosecute these individuals none the less. This is done on grounds of terrorism charges whereby joining a designated terrorist organisation is criminalized. Furthermore they can be prosecuted for planning or executing a terrorist offence while in Syria or Iraq (Reed et al., 2015), even when a foreign fighter is still in Syria or Iraq. The former has been implemented both in the Netherlands (NOS, 2016) and Belgium (de Standaard, 2015)
While prosecution might lead to a feeling of satisfaction within a society, this policy option can have two downsides. Firstly, family and friends, who are a major information provider for
