Fortune-hunter or future citizen? : bottom-up attempts for alternative asylum reception policy by the local governments of Boxtel, Heusden and Utrecht

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‘Fortune-Hunter’ or ‘Future Citizen’?

Bottom-up attempts for alternative asylum reception policy by the local

governments of Boxtel, Heusden and Utrecht

Tom Kieft

Master Political Science. Track Management and Policy Supervisor: Jeroen Doomernik Second reader: Sander van Haperen Student number: 10003799 Email address: tom.kieft@student.uva.nl Submission date: June 24th, 2016

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the agenda setting of asylum reception policy on the national and local level in The Netherlands, and how these settings create a need for vertical interaction in multi-level settings. The Dutch asylum reception policy has been a centrally controlled policy field since the 1990s. Through agenda setting, which is formed by constellations of problem frames, policy alternatives and the political agenda, the national policy frame for a sober asylum reception has emerged. This sober policy frame comes from the notion that asylum seekers are nationally framed as possible ‘fortune-hunters’, and thus investment in the integration of these people is deemed to be undesirable as long as the asylum procedure has not yet decided if this person is a legitimate refugee.

This sober reception policy and postponing integration of asylum seekers has been challenged on the local level. The municipalities of Boxtel and Heusden together, and the city of Utrecht faced local specific problems regarding asylum reception policy, out of which alternative policy frames emerged which included immediate integration of asylum seekers. The conflicting policy frame of Boxtel and Heusden finally even aligned with the national frame through top-down coordination. Utrecht set its agenda differently. By framing asylum seekers as ‘future citizens’, instead of ‘fortune-hunters’ an new policy frame is founded in the city of Utrecht, namely: a policy frame in which immediate investment in integration is deemed appropriate, disregarding if a person will stay in the Netherlands, or not. The government of Utrecht pursued its desired policy in a more strategic way than Boxtel and Heusden. The national policy frame still prescribes that financing and facilitating immediate integration of asylum seekers is undesirable, however, the local frame which aims at facilitating integration within its municipality has been approved and even applauded upon by the COA and the Minister of Justice. Therefore, from a multi-level perspective, this event can be interpreted as a successful local-led effort for change in asylum reception policy.

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Introduction

Because of consecutive wars and accumulating turmoil in Northern-Africa and the Middle-East, an ever growing amount of people is fleeing their homes and countries (Peters & Besley 2015, 1370). The main part of these people seeks refuge in neighboring countries (Ibid.). Yet another part of these people crosses the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. This influx of asylum seekers creates a great deal of political challenges for the members of the EU. The member states together have made several attempts to curtail the influx of asylum seekers, most recently by making a deal with Turkey in which it is agreed upon that asylum seekers can be send to Turkey should they reach the coast of Greece (Cunningham 2016). However, political disagreement between the EU and Turkey has already made the future of this deal uncertain (Ibid.), and even with these plans, it is among common believe that large amounts of asylum seekers will keep on coming to Europe for the years to come.

The Dutch government and consequently its local governments are concerned with sheltering asylum seekers too. In the year 2015, 56,900 people have applied for asylum in the Netherlands, and in February 2016, the government had calculated that another 94,000 will arrive in this year (Website CBS 2016; Besselink 2016; Stokmans 2016). State Secretary for Security and Justice and Minister for Immigration Klaas Dijkhoff1 has been set before the task to set out asylum policy directions and to find sufficient new locations to shelter asylum seekers in.

The current influx of asylum seekers exceeds the administrative capacity of the IND (Immigration & Naturalization Service), which is the national administrative agency that processes asylum applications. As a result of this asylum seekers currently have to wait up to fifteen months before their application is finally filed and decided upon (Website IND). The national government has decided that asylum seekers are to be sheltered in a ‘sober’ manner during the during and before the application period. This comes out of the national government’s rhetoric, that an asylum seeker could as well be an economic ‘fortune-hunter’, instead of a legitimate refugee. Financing and facilitating immediate integration of all asylum seekers could according to this rhetoric attract unwanted asylum seekers towards the Netherlands which would allegedly endanger the Dutch social services. Out of this notion the government has set out its policy which prescribes that investment in integration of asylum seekers is not desirable (‘Dijkhoff: proef kleinschalige opvang’ 2015). Instead, the Dutch

1_{This is the official English translation of his administrative function from the website of the national} government (rijksoverheid.nl).

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asylum policy prescribes that asylum seekers should be accommodated in large capacity centers wherein their immediate integration is not financed or promoted. Some parties in parliament have opposed this policy and rejected it, finding it inhumane and undesirable (De Vries 2015).

During the current asylum seeker influx, Dijkhoff has sent out an appeal to all municipal governments to help finding and allocating locations which might serve as new asylum reception centers. However, even though new centers are to be opened within municipalities, the centers themselves are centrally governed conform nationally outlined policy. Asylum reception policy has been a centralized policy field since 1994, when the centralized executive agency the COA (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) had been erected, which centrally manages the Dutch asylum reception centers according to the national asylum policy.

Governments on the local level however often appear to be less concerned with the ideological and political standpoints and agendas out of which national policy is formed (Scholten 2011, 219). Instead, the municipal governments that are subject to this research seem to be more concerned with practical and pragmatic problems, such as the maintenance of public support, avoiding protests and the future integration and participation of accepted asylum seekers, when considering to open new asylum reception centers. In the municipalities of Boxtel and Heusden, as well as in the city of Utrecht, policies frame have been pushed forward in which the national desire of governing asylum reception through a sober policy was rejected. Instead, these local policies aimed at fostering societal harmony, through an inclusive policy which both addresses the concerns and complaints of the inhabitants of these cities, and the desire to immediately invest in integration and self-development of asylum seekers that are awaiting their procedure. Instead of framing asylum seekers as potential fortune-seekers, Utrecht frames asylum seekers as ‘future citizens,’ in whom its deemed desirable to invest and facilitate conditions to increase self-development and to start the integration process from the moment that they arrive in the Netherlands. This is thought to be a means for increasing the chance of creating a new group of self-reliant and participating civilians, either in the Netherlands or – when their procedure is declined – in their country of origin.

This thesis argues that the different views on asylum reception policy originate from agenda setting at these two levels of government. The model of Schoten (2013) of agenda setting in multi-level settings is used to uncover the way certain policy perceptions, political trends and policy factors lead to certain types of policy frames, and through which multi-level

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settings these governments interact to push the preferred policy frames forward. Scholten’s multi-level settings are categorized into four ideal models of governance coordination. These are: the top-down, the bottom-up, the multi-level and the decoupled setting (Scholten 2013, 4).

When problem frames differ at the various levels, governments on the local level can interact differently with the national government. In the case study of Boxtel and Heusden, the national government’s policy frame was eventually transferred to the local level through top-down coordination. To the contrary, in the case of Utrecht specific local policy plans are successfully pushed forward from the bottom-up, and state approval was given to put these policies into practice. These events are studied in this thesis, in which the following questions are posed and answered: What policy frames on asylum seeker integration were formed due to agenda setting on the national and the local level in the two small cities of Boxtel and Heusden, and in Utrecht? And in what multi-level settings did the national and local governments interact in an attempt to put their desired policy into practice?

The differences between an asylum seeker and a refugee

The terms asylum seeker and refugee are often falsely interchanged. It is important to rightly define these two terms before going deeper into this research, because the subject of this thesis regards the sheltering of one of the two, namely: asylum seekers. The term asylum seeker is defined by the UNHCR (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) as ‘someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed’ (UNHCR 2016). Thus, an asylum seeker is a person that applies for asylum in a country, hoping to attain refugee status, but has not been granted this status (yet).

In the Netherlands, there are several grounds on which a person can be recognized as a legitimate refugee. If a person can prove that he or she meets one of these legal terms, this person will attain refugee status. The most important and immediate terms by which a person can qualify for refugee status are the terms that are defined in the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2010). According to this Protocol, refugee status is granted to a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (Ibid. 3).” Thus due to this convention, a person facing persecution on any of these five grounds in the country of

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origin, will be granted refugee status. Someone who has refugee status is also referred to as a ‘status holder.’

However, in the Dutch Alien law, refugee status can also be attained by people that do not necessarily meet these criteria of the Convention. The Alien Law also grants asylum to a person that can prove that he or she has founded reasons to believe that if he or she would be evicted that he or she will face: torture, execution, or random violence because of international or domestic wars (Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (2000) art. 29. Lid 1B). Almost every asylum seeker from Eritrea and Syria, the two countries out of which the largest part of the asylum seekers in the current asylum influx come from, attain asylum in the Netherlands either on the terms of the Convention, or on these additional terms (Interview IND).

When an asylum seeker attains refugee status, he or she will attain a residence permit; if a person does not attain asylum, this person is requested to return to his or her country of origin.

Literature review on immigration policy in multi-level settings

This thesis elaborates on the current literature on migration and asylum policy in multi-level settings. Multi-level settings are the various modes of governance and the various ways in which governments on the local, national and European level can interact (for example: top-down or bottom-up) (Scholten 2013, 4).

Governance in EU-states has increasingly become a multi-level phenomenon over the last decades (Ibid. 3) And by now there is no denying that modern complex governmental issues are often subject to a complex array of multiple levels of governance. Because of decentralization processes and the European integration, EU-states at this day for sure are no longer fully centralized states (Hooghe & Marks 2001, 1).

In some occurrences, policy is however still governed in a top-down manner. The subject of this thesis, the Dutch asylum reception policy, is an example of a top-down governed policy field, in which a responsible centralized organ executes the national policy that is set out by the responsible minister/State Secretary.

However, since the turn of the millennium, many scholars have increasingly emphasized the local dimension of immigrant integration policy making (Alexander 2007; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Pennix, Kraal, Martinello & Vertovec 2004; Myrberg 2015; Kos, Maussen & Doomernik. 2015; Scholten 2013, 2015). These studies, out of many things,

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reveal that local policy efforts may deviate significantly from the nationally formulated policies on immigrant integration. This led many scholars to no longer to merely try to understand how policies on immigration and integration are decided upon and carried out through the traditional top-down manner of analysis. Instead, they have underlined the importance of researching immigration and integration policy from a multi-level perspective (Zincone & Caponio 2006, 269).

Myrberg (2015) for example has analyzed the way in which municipal governments in Denmark and Sweden urged for changes in national migration and asylum policies, because of the larger ‘burden of reception’ these municipalities had to carry as a result of growing amounts of asylum seekers coming in. In doing so, local governments in these countries were shifting from a passive to an active role in multi-level settings in terms of the decision process of asylum reception policy making (Myrberg 2015, 3).

The study of Kos e.a. (2015) even shows how a local government has bypassed national policy that rejected a policy aimed at providing shelter for rejected asylum seekers and illegal aliens. Scholten (2013, 2015) elaborates on these studies and the active role of local governments in creating immigration policy. He uncovered that integration policy as made and framed by the Dutch government diverted from the local policy frames in the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. From a multi-level perspective, he discovered that the Dutch policy frames divert because a strong vertical policy coordination structure on immigration and integration policy is absent in the Netherlands. He argues that because of the absence of this mechanism, frame alignment does not occur, and consequently does policy as it is carried out on the local level differ from the policy frame on immigration on the national level. He called this multi-level setting the decoupled scenario (Ibid.).

Relevance of this thesis

Asylum reception policy is currently subject to much debate. The national government just barely keeps up with opening sufficient new asylum reception centers to cope with the influx of asylum seekers (‘Dijkhoff: gemeenten moeten snel’ 2016). On the local level, asylum reception poses yet other problems and opportunities. This thesis addresses some of the most recent debates on the Dutch asylum reception policy. For the obvious reason that all these events have only just happened, there has been done little research on these matters. In fact, by my knowledge there is no published research on this subject and the studied cases yet.

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Therefore, this research is one of the most recent contributions in the field of research on asylum reception policy in the Netherlands.

In past research, asylum reception policy has been only marginally studied from a multi-level perspective. After reading the second chapter of this thesis, one might realize that this is no coincidence. Asylum reception and integration policy has been a typically centralized, thus top-down governed field of policy. Studying this field in multi-level settings perhaps had not been too interesting, because local governments had little or no say in the way asylum reception centers were governed. In the current events, in which local governments have been asked to find new locations for asylum reception centers within the borders of their municipalities, some municipalities have urged for changes in asylum policy and have also pursued these new policies. This study has analyzed the emergence of these alternative agendas of Boxtel and Heusden together, and Utrecht, and it also has analyzed the efforts of these governments made to both influence national policy and to pursue their own policy paths on the local level. In doing so, this study is a relevant addition to the scientific field, but could also serve as an inspirational and informative source of information for policy makers on both the national and local level.

Methods

This thesis consists of a qualitative case study of the creation and formation of the Dutch national asylum reception policy, as well as how alternative policies are made and pushed forward on the local level of the small municipalities of Boxtel and Heusden together, and Utrecht. Using the concept of policy framing, this study takes in the ontological position of constructivism (Bryman 2008, 33). These policy frames are products of structured social relations, and are attained through Scholten’s model on agenda setting in multi-level settings (Scholten 2011, 2013). The agenda setting accounts for understanding the constant changing perception of the problem at hand and consequently the policy which is thought to address this problem best. This qualitative research is done by a deductive approach, and analyses how the policy frames on the local and national level have come about and how these frames interact through the theoretic model of Scholten (2013).

In order to understand the frames and agendas, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with policy makers and politicians from several local governments. These types of interviews are therefore particularly useful for obtaining insights on problem and policy

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frames of the interviewed respondents, because semi-structured interviews are specifically used for their capacity to provide insights into how research participants see the world (Ibid. 471). Some questions regarding the way problems concerning asylum reception were asked at the several respondents in a similar fashion, in order to attain consistent information on the way the policy and problems regarding asylum reception policy are perceived. However, most questions were different for each of the respondents, because of the array of contextual differences between the two cases. This is no limitation for this study. To the contrary, the differences between the cases give a fine perspective on how differences of context and different ways of agenda setting can result in different settings of governance coordination.

To understand the vertical policy coordination structure I have conducted several open and semi-structured interviews with policy makers of the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG), as well as local policy makers and politicians. Additionally I have gathered information on this coordination from existing literature, policy documents and the websites of the national government and of the executive agency the COA. Due to reasons of non-compliance by the respondents that I approached for obtaining information in order to create the national frame and agendas (The ministry of Justice and Safety and the COA), I have used a combination of the existing literature on national immigration policy, newspaper articles and policy documents for the analysis of the national policy frame.

The first chapter of this thesis consists of the used theory of Scholten (2013) on agenda setting in multi-level settings. The second chapter forms the analysis of the agenda setting on asylum reception policy on the national level. To understand the current trend of asylum reception policy, a historical trend and the emergence of asylum reception policy is outlined first. Thereafter, the way the national government has framed the problem, which policy is desired to resolve this problem and how the new policy came about through agenda setting. After the national agenda setting is outlined, the national policy is elaborated on as it is written down in the national policy documents: the administrative agreements. The second chapter consists of the agenda setting of the municipal governments of Boxtel and Heusden, on the way these municipalities together came to an alternative policy, and on how these governments tried to engage with the national government to pursue their policy plan. The final chapter does the same for the agenda setting on asylum reception policy in the city of Utrecht. This chapter is followed by the final conclusion and the limitations of this study.

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Case selection: Boxtel and Heusden, and Utrecht

The cases were selected for their uniqueness and should not necessarily be seen as generalizable cases. Instead, the selected cases, Boxtel and Heusden together and Utrecht, describe events of pioneering and entrepreneurialism from municipal governments that are advocating for changes in asylum reception policy from the bottom-up. Because of their uniqueness, I found that these cases are particularly interesting in the light of the used theory. The theory of Scholten (2013) aims at finding intractable policy controversies that create conflicting agendas on the national and local government from a multi-level perspective. His theory hypothesizes that these conflicting agendas can pave new paths of vertical coordination. The national asylum reception policy has been a highly politicized and centralized issue since the 1990s. Currently however, different visions on asylum reception policy on the local and national level seem to lead to a change in this vertical coordination. The cases of Boxtel and Heusden combined and Utrecht alone stand out as cases in which municipal governments have attempted to engage in ways of multi-level governance to change the current status quo on asylum reception policy. Boxtel and Heusden are taken together because these neighboring municipal governments opted for change together. The mayors of these two cities together created an alternative policy frame, which they tried to push through on the national level. The municipal government of Utrecht has recently successfully stood up as a policy entrepreneur in asylum reception policy.

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1. Theoretic framework: Agenda setting, intractable

controversies and multi-level settings

The theory that is used in this thesis is Scholten’s agenda setting for intractable policy controversies in multi-level settings. This theory seeks to understand how policies are framed due to patterns of agenda setting on various levels of government, and also serves as a model to investigate how these agendas interact in terms of multi-level settings (Scholten 2013).

Intractable policy controversies

Policy frames are socially constructed, reformulated public discourses through which it is argued that certain problems are to be addressed through a certain desired (set of) policy (Scholten 2011). These frames are typically construed to instigate normative leaps from the way a particular policy currently exists and operates, towards how this policy ‘is ought to be’ according to the actors that support this particular frame (Ibid.).

Scholten’s (2013) model is aimed at analyzing particular problems in regard to policy frames. These problems are called ‘wicked problems’ (Durant & Legge 2006) or: ‘intractable policy controversies’ (Schön & Rein 1994). These terms refer to situations wherein there is an absence of a generally accepted policy frame at the various levels of government (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008, 4).

Policy frames are intractable when the involved actors have different ideas about the issue, or even worse, disagree about if there even is an issue to begin with (Scholten 2013, 219). This could pose very specific problems and challenges in multi-level settings, because the framing of the problem and the preferred policy to address the problem can differ severely between the policy frames on the different levels (Ibid.). Conflicting frames appear to resist resolution of the problem and can obstruct critical debates about the problem between the different levels (Ibid.). When governments at the local and national level have divergent ideas about what the problem is, and how this problem should be solved, successful coordination and interaction between the levels can be complicated (Ibid.). Diverting policy frames as the result of intractable policy controversies can consequently end up in stalemates. However, these frame conflicts can also instigate demand for changes in policy.

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Scholten uses agenda setting to uncover how policy is being framed at the various levels of government (Scholten 2013, 219). This comes from the literature on agenda setting, which argues that the patterns of agenda setting affect the way in which policy problems are framed (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Jones & Baumgartner 2005). Indeed, Rein and Schön, (1994) understand frames in a relational perspective, and recognize the influence of structural settings, political agendas and institutional policy factors, on the way in which framing takes place (Scholten 2011, 33). Elaborating on the broader literature of agenda setting, Scholten’s (2013) model consists of three agendas: the problem, political and policy agenda. These three agendas together can create structures for policy frames to emerge.

The problem agenda

This agenda indicates the way problems are illustrated or ‘framed’ by decision-makers (Balzacq 2010). Therefore it is necessary to address the problem agenda from a framing perspective (Scholten 2013, 219). It is required to look at the indication and framing of a problem on a certain level of government. As is the case with intractable policy controversies, problems that are recognized as such on one level, may not be recognized as a problem at all on another level. Furthermore, an issue only becomes a problem from the moment that decision-makers see and frame the issue as such. It also can be the case that out of the same event or issue, two different problems are derived on the various levels.

The political agenda

The political agenda in Scholten’s theory is determined by the political balance of power on a level of government. Several elements are important in this agenda, such as elections, changes in parliament, but also campaigns or strikes by pressure groups or civilians (Kingdon, 2014). Another important part of the political agenda is the way certain topics are being prioritized and pushed forward for attention, and how other topics are being structurally ignored (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). Politicizing, or instead depoliticizing a subject can respectively attract or push away certain topics from the central government’s agenda. On the other hand, local governments can engage in strategic interaction to push a certain issue on the national agenda (See Table 1). This can be done formally, for example by addressing a local issue in the news to draw national attention or by meeting with a national politician. It

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can also be done through more informal processes, like vertical venue shopping (Scholten 2013, 219).

Guiraudon (2000) uses the term vertical venue-shopping as a political tactic by which local governments try to by-pass the national political power center by addressing an international institution or law. Or in Scholten’ words, vertical venue-shopping is: ‘strategic interaction between government levels in an effort to achieve policy opportunities that cannot be realized on another level’ (Scholten 2013, 220). An example of this is the way the municipality of Utrecht used an EU-charter on human rights to by-pass the national legislation that was opposed to sheltering rejected asylum seekers and immigrants. This EU charter stated that all people have the universal right on shelter, food and clothes. Finally, the European Committee of Social Rights had decided that the national government had wrongfully excluded aliens because they had ignored this human right. Consequently, the national government had to comply with this higher legislation, by which Utrecht could continue sheltering rejected asylum seekers (Interview Braat).

The policy agenda

Scholten’s policy agenda encompasses the institutionalized policy at the several levels (Kingdon 2014; Scholten 2013, 219). These factors can play a decisive institutional role regarding the multi-level setting by which governance is coordinated (See Table 1). If the national policy agenda is for example centralized, policy frames are typically transferred in a top-down structure. Such a top-down structure can lead to path-dependency of the policy frames on the lower levels of government (Ibid. 220).

New policy can be put on the agenda too. The various levels of government have their own policy legacies which can provide opportunities for policy learning. By combining existing policies, new problems can be addressed through a process of issue-linkages. To solve a new problem, issue-linkages can be created between a new problem and an existing policy (Scholten 2013, 219).

Agenda setting in Multi-level perspective

The theory of Scholten hypothesizes a relationship between the level-specific waysof agenda setting, and modes of governance in multi-level settings (Scholten 2013, 220). As can be seen above, diverting policy frames are in need of different solutions, creating an intractable

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policy controversy. Because of this need for different solutions, new paths in multi-level settings can be demanded, and through specific policy institutions or political strategies can these policy frames be pushed forward. In his theory, Scholten has categorized the vertical interaction between the various levels in the multi-level setting in four different ideal models of multi-level settings. These models are: the centralist, the multi-level, the localist and the decoupled setting.

The centralist model reflects the classical top-down relationship between national and local governments (Scholten 2013, 220). The fundamental idea of this perspective is that the national government holds primacy on formulating the policies. The role of local governments is confined to being involved in implementing the policy at most. In terms of agenda setting, the centralist model is most likely to occur when policies regarding to the issue are framed as national problems in need of clear national solutions (Scholten 2013, 220). In a centralist scenario, the issue is usually politicized on the national level, and it is expected that there is a strong national framework for vertical policy coordination (Table 1). A means of consolidating a strong nation-led vertical coordination can be done by assigning a politically responsible minister that governs a certain policy field, which then is executed by a specialized central department (Scholten 2015). In these cases it policy frames on the various levels are typically vertically aligned in the way prescribed by the national government, meaning that local policies will be reframed in accordance to the national frame (Ibid).

The multi-level model assumes some form of horizontally and vertically coordinated interaction in a specific policy domain between various levels of government (Scholten 2013, 220). With regard to agenda setting, a multi-level governance model is most, and perhaps only likely to occur in situations where the multi-level character of the policy problem is recognized (Scholten 2013, 220).

Thirdly, localist approaches refer to types and fields of governance that have devolved policies to local governments. This model consists of a bottom-up scenario wherein policies are not only made by national governments, like in the centralist model, but instead are made from within localities. This model illustrates a setting of governance wherein local governments steer upon new paths of policy, and instead of only following up on national policy, local governments in this model set the agendas and make policy themselves (Ibid.). In agenda setting, this perspective may erect when problems are defined as specific local problems in need of local solutions, or nation-wide problems which are in need of clear adjusted local solutions (Ibid.). In doing so, the policy problems are often phrased as in need

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of policy that is ‘close to the citizen’, or ‘requiring practical knowledge’ (Ibid.). Strong local leadership is often required to define an issue as distinctly local and to put forward an alternative policy for example by engaging in political strategies such as vertical venue shopping (Ibid.).

The last model is governance decoupling. This scenario is the most likely to occur when there is no meaningful or working vertical interaction between the levels of government. Policy frames are created differently at different levels, and may even contradict and conflict with each other. These situations can occur for example when the various government levels are involved in the same policy area, but they define and frame the policy problem in a different way (Scholten 2013, 220). This could not only lead to political conflict between the levels, but could also create conflicting policy messages which can result in a diminishment of policy effectiveness (Ibid.).

Overview of perspectives on governance in multi-level settings

Centralist Governance Multi-level governance Localist or devolved governance

Governance decoupling Problem

agenda

Problems are defined as central problems requiring central solutions

Differentiated

perspective on problems, with national as well as local aspects

Problems are defined as ‘local’ problems requiring ‘local’ solutions Problems defined in conflicting ways Political agenda Political primacy, national political leadership, centralist political network Depoliticization, technical orientation, vertical venue shopping

Politicization on local level, local leadership

Political conflicts between levels

Policy agenda

Strong central policy coordination structure (hierarchy), issue connections with broader central policies

Weak central policy coordination structures, strong multi-level ‘functionalist’ structures Little or no central policy coordination, horizontal policy learning at local level

Policy conflicts between different levels, conflicting policy messages

Table 1. (Scholten 2013, 221).

Policy entrepreneurs and new paths of coordination

These four models of vertical coordination are not rigid. Different configurations of agenda setting in multi-level settings can contribute to altering the vertical coordination structure. If a certain policy is framed as a typically national problem in need of national solutions, it is

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probable that a strong vertical coordination structure is also established to address the problem in a centralized way. Instead, when a certain issue that is framed on the local level as an issue in need of clear local solutions is not represented on the national agenda at all, local governments can defect from national policy, and, if possible, follow its own desired policy path. This creates the decoupled setting. Secondly, local governments can stand up and act as policy entrepreneurs. By performing entrepreneurial maneuvers, local governments can push locally framed policies forward from the bottom-up, leading to what was described above as a localist mode of governance (Scholten 2013, 222). Scholten (2015) shows how the city of Rotterdam stood up as a policy entrepreneur on immigration policy. In 2005, this city’s government managed to push through a new law on the national level which was aimed at preventing the settlement of people with a low-income or with social security benefits in certain urban areas. This law itself is only implemented in Rotterdam. However, it was necessary to turn to the national government in order to create such a law (Scholten 2015, 17).

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2. Dutch national policy frame on asylum reception

The national asylum policy legacies and political trends

Immigration control and asylum seeker reception policies came into existence through a lengthy process in which consecutive national governments have tried to increase control over immigration processes (Doomernik 2008, 142-143). Before the 1980s there were hardly any laws restricting immigration: national asylum laws were almost entirely based on the Geneva Convention (Mattheijer 2000, 9). As can be seen above in the introductory chapter, the Geneva Convention had outlined who has to be granted asylum – and who was not. Additionally, the terms of this Convention have lain out the rights of people who are granted

asylum (UNHCR 2010).

Creating the national policy legacy: centralizing and tightening up

Until deep in the 1980s, asylum applications had been incidental. When this changed, the Dutch government started tightening up immigration laws and centralized asylum policy. The first severe changes in the Dutch asylum policy were implemented as a reaction to an unprecedented wave of asylum seekers from former-Yugoslavian countries, fleeing this war-ravished region (Mattheijer 2000; Doomernik 2008, 131). In the peak year in 1994 about 52,500 people requested asylum in the Netherlands (Salm 2015). Asylum became a central political problem throughout much of this decade (Doomernik 2008, 138).

The decentralized way in which asylum reception had functioned prior to the 1990s was deemed to be unsustainable and undesirable for the reception of large amounts of asylum seekers (Matthijer 2000, 9). People that applied for asylum in the Netherlands before this decade were free to live where they wanted in this country during the asylum procedure. They could settle in the city, and even in the neighborhood of their preference. Asylum seekers attained welfare allowance, which they could use freely as pocket money (Ibid.).

To control and manage the large influx of asylum seekers, the COA was established in 1994. This executive agency is responsible for facilitating the centralized regulation and reception of asylum seekers. Apart from the organizational advantage of this centralized reception system, this new system turned out to be much more cost-efficient, as the costs per asylum request had decreased after the installation of this institution (Doomernik 2008, 139).

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Two years later the IND was established. This centralized agency assesses whether an asylum seeker is to be granted asylum, or not (Matthijer 2000, 24).

After 1994, subsequent policies on immigration control and asylum regulation were implemented which were focused on internal control: measures that are aimed at regulating and controlling as well as excluding illegal residents from certain goods (Engbersen and Broeders 2007, 1592). As the result of the European integration, outer border control decreasingly became a national matter. This became part of the European immigration and asylum policy (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, Pluymen 2008, Doomernik 2008; Kos e.a. 2015).

The exclusionist character of asylum policy frames

Many laws such as the compulsory identification act of 1994/2005, the Marriage Convenience Act of 1994 and the Linkage Act of 1998 were implemented, which were aimed at categorizing those who have rights – and those who do not (Doomernik 2008, 137). According to Joanna van der Leun (2006) this policy path of exclusion of (unwanted) immigrants, came from the idea that the Dutch public welfare services served as a ‘migrant-magnet’, as well as from the growing notion that the Netherlands was ‘full’ (Van der Leun 2006, 313). Because of this, the influx of Yugoslavian refugees was being perceived as a ‘refugee crisis’ which, if left uncontrolled, could ‘endanger the welfare state’ (Ibid.).

Important policy measures regarding asylum seekers and aliens in the years after further established the exclusionary asylum policies. These were again to curtail the influx of asylum seekers (Ibid.; Doomernik 2008, 313). First, the new law on remigration went in effect in 1998, and in 2001 the revised Aliens Act was enacted. The first law was to simplify the deportation of rejected asylum seekers; the latter aimed at speeding up the asylum procedure, by allowing the authorities to deny certain asylum applications right away (Ibid).

These new laws successfully curtailed the influx of asylum seekers, and in the years after, the implementation the amount of asylum applications dropped dramatically (Doomernik 2008, 139). The Aliens Act proved to be very strict. With the ability to reject asylum seekers at the first instance, over 70% of the asylum applications were rejected (Ibid.). Because of these laws, the Dutch asylum policy attained the reputation of being one of the strictest in Europe, having the lowest acceptance rate in Europe at the start of the millennium (Versteegt & Maussen, 2012, 15, 26). In the years after 2004 until 2013, the annual amount of asylum applications had dropped to 10-15,000, while a year prior to the

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implementation of the Aliens Act in 2000, 44,000 applications were registered (Doomernik 2008, 139; CBS).

Discouragement polices and political agenda

More efforts were made to exclude rejected asylum seekers and illegal immigrants from profiting from social benefits. The Linking Act (Koppelingswet), which was aimed at discouraging illegal work and residents, is an example of this. It was assumed that these measures would make illegal immigrants return to their home countries (Kos e.a. 2015, 9; Bruquetas-Callejo Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx & Scholten 2011, 155). These measures have been called the so-called Dutch ‘discouragement policy’ (Van der Leun 2006). These policies were aimed at deterring ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and economic refugees – who in the current debate would be referred to as ‘fortune-hunters’i (Van der Velden 2014, 6). So, as will be seen below, this same rhetoric is used in the current national problem frame. And within the tradition of discouragement, recently it is suggested by members in parliament to implement policy to discourage asylum seekers from coming to the Netherlands (Pelgrim, Versteegh, Kuiper & Brummelman 2016).

Political agenda: tough immigration policy

Already being the main political concern in the 1990s, asylum seeker and immigrant policy became even more of a politicized subject after the change of the millennium (Doomernik 2008, 138; Scholten 2011, 184). In his study on changes in immigrant and integration policy frames over the previous decades, Scholten (2011) indicates that due to the internationalization processes of the EU and rising questions about national identity in the Netherlands and in other EU countries, Dutch immigration and integration policy issues have become increasingly politicized (Scholten 2011, 184). This trend was amplified because of the murder of the right wing populist politician Pim Fortuyn. After his death, immigrant integration became a highly important and symbolic political agenda point for national politicians (Scholten 2011, 225). As will be seen later, this trend is still very much existent in national politics on asylum seekers and migration. The national government holds strong political primacy concerning immigration and asylum policy. Politicians on the national level feel the need to immediately respond tough on immigration issues, to resolve unrest and counter populist agendas (Kos e.a. 2015). At the same time, a different trend emerged on the

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local level of government according to Scholten (2011, 280). Here, more pragmatic attempts are made to conduct policies in a more effective, local-specific way.

The national government and asylum problem framing

The current national government consists of a coalition of the moderate right-wing liberal VVD (40 seats) and the social-democratic PvdA (36 seats). These two parties take in conflicting positions in the asylum reception policy debate. The VVD has repeatedly stated to hold a benevolent stance towards taking measures to keep asylum seekers outside of Europe altogether (Azmani 2015; VVD 2015; Hoedeman & Den Hartog 2015; website VVD 2016), while the PvdA insists that it is the responsibility of the EU and the Netherlands to take in asylum seekers in a just way (Herderscheê, 2015; De Vries 2015). In March 2015, VVD-parliament member Malik Azmani published his – then – controversial plan to control the influx of asylum seekers. In this plan he emphasized that the EU policy on immigration was no longer sustainable (Azmani 2015). This was because the ‘ever growing influx of asylum seekers’ according to his plan, ‘forms a big threat to our [the people of the Netherlands] safety’ (Ibid.). This threat was multiple. According to his plan, the influx of asylum seekers “puts the social services under pressure.” Azmani sees too many asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands and he puts their motives for coming to this country to question. “Currently, there is no way knowing who we take in: a real refugee, a fortune-hunter or a terrorist.”ii (Ibid.).

The problem that Azmani indicated, namely, that many asylum seekers might be economic ‘fortune-hunters’ (people that allegedly flee their countries not out of fear of persecution, but to seek a better economic future), has become a fundamental part of his party’s rhetoric and is an important part for the justification of attempts for implementing asylum policy which is to stop unwanted asylum seekers from coming to, and staying in the Netherlands. This terminology is not only used by the VVD. The populist party the PVV continuously uses this term, and it has become a part of protest discourse against the coming of asylum reception centers (De Graaf & Huisman 2016). The Dutch European Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans also used this term, when he stated in February 2016 that 60% of the incoming asylum seekers are fortune-hunters (Rosman 2016). These statistics were already countered and suggested to be false by the IOM and other organizations a day after. However, this statement shows how deeply embedded the fortune-hunter frame is, and

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how it is used to put pressure on political agendas towards finding ways to curtail the influx of these unwanted people from coming into the EU (Ibid.).

The plan of Azmani to close the borders was rejected by the PvdA, and failed to attain a majority in parliament. This plan consequently did not pass through as governmental policy (‘Kabinet neemt VVD-plan niet over’ 2015). However, during the height of the asylum seeker influx in October 2015 the fraction leader of the VVD, Halble Zijlstra, published a new plan which shows strong resemblance with the plan of Azmani. Zijlstra framed the increased influx of asylum seekers in an interview as a problem that could bring the Dutch society into a “deep crisis” (Hoedeman & Den Hartog 2015). He elaborates on these words by saying that “the European societies cannot cope with the enormous amount of migrants.”iii According to him, the problem lies in the “current asylum policy”, which “is no longer sustainable”iv

(Website VVD 2016). If nothing is done, “the social services of the Dutch people are at stake.”v

(Ibid.).

To address this problem, the VVD proposed a twofold policy plan which included putting the influx of asylum seekers into the EU to a halt, as well as making the Netherlands less attractive for asylum seekers (Pijpker & Smal 2015).

Because they can

In their plan, the VVD framed the influx asylum seekers and consequently asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands, as the problem. In the policy plan of the VVD, named ‘Limiting shelter’vi

, which was published in October 2015, two causes for the asylum problem were put forward. Following up on Azmani’s plan, this plan insists that the first and foremost reason of the increased influx of asylum seekers into the Netherlands, is that asylum seekers can come into the Netherlands (Website VVD 2015). By saying that they can, the plan refers to the open borders of the EU. Also, within the EU the Dublin protocol fails to organize asylum reception by EU countries. The Dublin Protocol prescribes that the member state through which an asylum seeker first entered the EU or the Scandinavian Peninsula, is the state “responsible for the examination of an asylum claim” (Website ERCE). At the moment, this Protocol is being ignored by the member countries, and thus asylum seekers regularly move through several EU-countries until they apply for asylum in a specific country (Kieft & Smit 2016; Schmidt 2016).

To address the perceived problem – being: unwanted asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands because they can – new restrictive measures have been put forward by the VVD

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(Du Pre 2015a). The VVD’s policy plan has been set out to find ways to curtail the influx of unwanted asylum seekers coming into the Netherlands, preferably by keeping them out of the EU altogether. In accordance to this, the national government wishes to accomplish curtailing the influx of asylum seekers by closing the borders and financing reception centers ‘in the region’ (Website VVD 2016). With centers ‘in the region’ one should think of reception centers being placed near the asylum seeker’s country of origin, and outside of the EU. The accommodation in the region should serve as an alternative for housing asylum seekers in the Netherlands. On the website, the VVD insists that “refugees have right on safety.” But in their perspective: “this does not have to be in Europe” (VVD 2015, 2).vii

Because they want to

The VVD’s second problem frame addresses inner control and asylum reception policy, and thus its framing and policy is a central part of this thesis’ analysis. The second part of the VVD’s problem frame, indicates that asylum seekers come to the Netherlands because they want to (VVD 2015, 1).viii According to this VVD letter, asylum seekers come to the Netherlands because of the country’s “generous social services” (VVD 2015, 1).ix

Zijlstra

frames asylum seekers as being a threat to the welfare state: “The medical costs are rising, the housing market is stuck. We have to go towards a minimum level for these refugees. The Dutch social services are on the line, and it is my duty as a politician to defend our welfare level that we have worked so hard for”x (‘Zijlstra pleit’ 2015).

To address this problem, the VVD suggests that the asylum reception policy should become of a ‘sober’ kind. Sobering up asylum policy, should make “the Netherlands unattractive for people that do not seek safety, but that come here to find a better economic future” (Ibid.).xi

A sober policy, according to the VVD would thus be a means to make sure that asylum seekers “don’t want to cross our [the Dutch] border” (VVD 2015, 1).xii

This plan of the VVD clearly comes from the frame which sees asylum seekers as potential fortune-hunters, who should be discouraged from coming to the Netherlands.

Different visions on asylum reception policy

The coalition party the PvdA opposed the new plans of Zijlstra. Closing off the borders did not fit in the PvdA’s perception on the issue of asylum seekers. Instead of entirely closing off the borders, the PvdA urges for a controlled manner of taking in asylum seekers. The PvdA

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states that they do not wish to keep asylum seekers outside of Europe altogether. Instead, they state to aim at creating a “humane, sustainable and legal route for asylum seekers to enter Europe”xiii

(Samsom 2016).

The sober and even discouraging policy of the VVD did not fit in the PvdA’s vision either. During a parliamentary debate, Samsom stated to find it undesirable to sober up the asylum reception centers and especially rejected using a sober policy as a means to discourage asylum seekers from coming to the Netherlands (De Vries 2015). Its Member of Parliament Attje Kuiken said to “reject strategic discouragement through means of unequal treatment. Instead, we wish to house refugees decently, the way we have always done”xiv (Herderscheê, 2015).

Yet other views are heard by the opposition parties in parliament. The populist right-wing party the PVV of Geert Wilders (12 seats) aims at keeping asylum seekers outside of the Netherlands altogether and has published that they find efforts of other parties aiming at letting asylum seekers come into the Netherlands ‘absurd’ (Website PVV ‘Debat over opvang’). From the central and left-wing parties such as the D66 (12 seats) and GroenLinks (4 seats) other voices are heard. These parties urge for a humanitarian approach of asylum seekers reception which includes taking in asylum seekers and facilitating immediate integration (Website GroenLinks ‘Vluchtelingen’; Website D66 ‘Een rechtvaardig asielbeleid’).

An imminent need for new reception centers

The governmental debate regarding new asylum policy went on, but did not come to a resolution until half a year later. Asylum seekers coming into the Netherlands could obviously not wait until the Dutch national politicians would overcome their ideological differences, and beds and shelter for these people had to be found immediately. Only just before the asylum influx intensified, the COA only had a capacity to accommodate 13,000 asylum seekers (COA 2013, 15). The COA has always adjusted its shelter capacity to match the amount of asylum seekers that were residing in the centers (Ibid.). This capacity had been low until 2012, because the influx of asylum seekers had been relatively low since 2002 as the result of the restrictive national policies, shorter procedures and an overall decrease of asylum seeker applications in Europe (Doomernik 2008; Van der Leun 2006, 313; COA 2013, 15).

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This trend turned dramatically in 2014 when an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers entered Europe as well as the Netherlands. And a year later the Netherlands experienced the largest amount of asylum applications to date. According to the IND, 56,900 people had sought refuge in the Netherlands in this year (Website CBS 2016). These people predominantly originate from Syria and Eritrea (Ibid.).

The responsibility over the governmental task to manage and search new asylum reception centers had been handed over to Klaas Dijkhoff in March 2015, when he became the successor of Fred Teeven as the State Secretary for Security and Justice and Minister for Immigration. Dijkhoff and the COA had intensively sought places to open asylum reception centers. In 2014, the COA quickly had opened twenty new (temporary) centers in an effort to keep up with the increased influx of asylum seekers (COA 2015).

These efforts were however insufficient to keep up with the growing influx of asylum seekers. Therefore, Dijkhoff did an appeal on the country’s municipal governments and asked these governments to help finding and allocating (temporary) locations to shelter asylum seekers (Hendrickx & Righton 2015).

Oranje: public unrest and political agenda changes

October turned out to be the most critical month of this year for Dijkhoff. In the month before, 12,800 asylum seekers had tried to apply for asylum (Van den Dool 2015). The IND and the COA were not prepared for administering this amount of asylum seekers. Not enough new locations were allocated, and consequently the COA did not dispose of a sufficient capacity to house the newly arriving asylum seekers (Ibid.). Therefore, Dijkhoff had decided not to wait any longer and took matters into his own hands. He abruptly decided that the existing temporary asylum reception center in the small municipality of Oranje had to double its capacity. This meant that this center had to house an additional 700 asylum seekers, while this town only inhabited 150 people (Fontein, 2015). The reception center was indeed spacious enough and considered fit for housing double the amount of asylum seekers (Ibid.). However, the municipal government had only six months earlier opened this center under the condition that this center would house no more than 700 asylum seekers (Van de Poll 2015).

The inhabitants of Oranje felt betrayed by the decision of Dijkhoff and started a riot when Dijkhoff came into this town to announce his plan (Fontein 2015). This upheaval clearly had an impact on the Minister for Immigration, who reversed his decision and the amount of asylum seekers that would be housed in Oranje was brought back to the initial 700

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(Van de Poll 2015). This event also instigated two other changes. First, Dijkhoff has not forced any municipality to host more asylum seekers since, nor has he ever forced a municipality to open a new center (Interview VNG), although he did tell the press on the day after the riot in Oranje that he might still use his power to demand the opening of an emergency asylum reception center in the future (Van den Dool 2015). But even more striking was that this decision and the riot that followed out of it put urgency on the national political agenda to resolve the stalemate in the national asylum policy debate.

Political agenda and agenda setting for new policy

After this event, the national government felt the need to come to a resolution in the asylum policy debate. The policy plan of Zijlstra, which only a week before was confronted with a similar opposition by the PvdA as the plan of Azmani, suddenly came to be seen as a viable option. A parliamentary debate was held, in which the PvdA agreed upon a compromised version of the VVD’s ‘sober’ policy. The compromised asylum policy would be called ‘Sober and Just’xv

(De Vries 2015; Abels 2015). Whatever this ‘Sober’ and ‘Just’ practically implied remained largely unclear in parliament (De Vries 2015). However, the rejection of the PvdA of the VVD’s plan’s on sobering up asylum reception was in the end only short-termed, and so the new path for asylum policy frame be promoting a sober reception policy.

Samsom reacted on his party’s compromise as that “it is already a step in the right direction that the people see that the government does something”xvi

(Abels, 2015), clearly underlining the politicization of immigration policies since the 2000s in which politicians feel compelled to respond quickly and boldly to migration issues. Kos e.a. (2015) elaborate on this trend, stating that governments are currently under high pressure to act ‘tough’ on immigration “in response to electoral pressure from the rise of the populist Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders” (Kos e.a. 2015, 8).

This rise in popularity of the populist PVV indeed likely influences the government’s stance towards immigrants. The PVV addresses the popular concerns in the most radical way. According to national polls it seems that this political stance has contributed to a steep rise in support for the PVV. Since the peak of the asylum seeker influx in October 2015, Wilders’ party gained an average of 1 extra hypothesized seat per week (“Keulen’ levert monsterscore’ 2016). When at New Year’s day a large group of predominantly newly arrived people from African and Middle-Eastern origin, had sexually assaulted many women in Köln, the polls

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spiked in favor of the PVV. A couple of days after this event, the national polls predicted that this party would attain 41seats if elections were held at that time, which at the same polls was only five seats less than the current biggest parties (the VVD the PvdA and the CDA) combined (Ibid.).

These polls are most likely not an adequate reflection of the actual elections. However, it shows how the national mood is shifting towards being supportive of radical anti-immigrant sentiment. To maintain credibility and public support, it is likely that the political agenda of the national government is influenced by this, leading the coalition towards preferring tough policy on immigrants and asylum seekers, especially with the eye on the upcoming national parliamentary elections of 2017.

The national policy: two administrative agreements

Out of this sober policy frame, a policy was formed which was outlined in two administrative agreements. The sober notion of the asylum reception policy can be found back in this agreement. First however, it is important to take notice of the way the administrative agreement was formed, to attain a better understanding of the multi-level setting in which the national policy is organized, formed and transferred to the municipalities.

Policy agenda: the vertical coordination mechanism

After the debacle in Oranje, it became clear that a good cooperation and coordination between state and municipality was key in finding solutions to accommodate asylum seekers and to avoid future unrest. After the agreement had passed parliament, Dijkhoff started the dialogue about the new national policy with the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) to clearly define the role of the COA, the state and the municipalities in this new agreement (Interview VNG). The policy agreement (Het Bestuursakkoord Verhoogde Asielinstroom) that came out of this dialogue was published in November 2015 and ratified by the VNG a month later (Interview VNG). This agreement, and the subsequent agreement that was published on April 28th, set out the asylum reception and integration policy. These agreements also define the roles of the municipalities and the national government on these policies, and the way which the implementation would be coordinated (‘Bestuursakkoord’ 2015, 2).

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The administrative agreement aimed at a ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ approach between state and municipalities in solving the asylum reception problem (‘Bestuusakkoord’ 2015, 2). This might suggest that this agreement acknowledges the multi-level character of the issue. Indeed, with this agreement, municipalities and the national government were set out to find a workable way to cope with the influx of asylum seekers together and the important position of the municipalities for the success of asylum policy was acknowledged (Interview VNG). It also recognizes that problems will likely occur on the local level, and therefore an intensive coordination and cooperation between the national government, the provinces, COA and the local governments is highlighted (‘Bestuursakkoord’ 2015, 2).

However, to the contrary to what a shoulder-to-shoulder approach may suggest, should the collaboration between the VNG and the national government not be interpreted as the start of a new form of vertical coordination on asylum reception policy (Interview OTAV). The COA and Dijkhoff indeed explicitly acknowledge their reliance on municipalities for finding suitable locations for the establishment of new (temporary) asylum reception centers. But the role of the local governments is still limited in the way that these governments can only suggest a certain location to the COA that they deem to be suitable to be used as an asylum reception center. Thus bottom-up coordination goes as far as that municipalities get into contact with the COA for the allocation of a location for a new asylum reception center. In doing so, municipal governments indeed have some say in the decision making over where an asylum reception center gets established. However, with regard to the size and the way things are managed within the centers, the national policy is indisputable. And if the suggested center does not fit within the specifications as defined by Dijkhoff, the suggested location will not be used as an asylum reception center. Dijkhoff has the final say in the decision-making; and the COA has to execute the asylum policy in accordance to the administrative agreement (‘Handreiking’ 2015, 7). And thus, even with this new agreement, the policy agenda still prescribes a strong central policy coordination structure, which is distinctive for a centralist multi-level setting, as seen in Table 1.

The additional guide of the agreement, published by the Ministry of Justice, prescribes that from that moment on, a new asylum reception center is only established in agreement with local governments (‘Handreiking’ 2015, 7). However, if deemed necessary, Dijkhoff still holds the authority to force a decision on through by opening an asylum reception center without consent of a local government (Van den Dool 2015; Interview VNG).

Fortune-hunter or future citizen? : bottom-up attempts for alternative asylum reception policy by the local governments of Boxtel, Heusden and Utrecht