Interests in coordination processes during- and after crises

Student: Luuk Rietveld

Student number: S1434152

Coordinator: Jeroen Wolbers

Second reader: Wout Broekema

Leiden University - Faculty of

Governance and Global Affairs

MSc Crisis and Security

Management

Number of words: 23812

Interests in coordination processes during- and after crises

The enactment of power and interests in coordination processes during- and after crisis

situations around Schiphol airport

1

Index

Coordination through integration of work ... 9

Conditions for integrative coordination ... 10

Fragmentation instead of integration ... 10

Power of organizations ... 12

Multiple forms of power ... 13

Power in crisismanagement ... 15

Research Design and Methodology ... 17

Research design ... 17

Data collection and research method ... 19

Validity ... 19

Setting the scene ... 21

General crisis organization of Schiphol airport... 21

Crisis management organizations at Schiphol ... 21

Cases ... 23

Findings ... 26

Schiphol cell complex fire ... 26

Alarm phase ... 26

Warm phase of assistance ... 27

Aftermath ... 30

Turkish Airlines crash ... 32

Alarm phase ... 32

Warm phase of assistance ... 33

Aftermath ... 38

Schiphol railroad tunnel fire ... 40

Alarm phase ... 40

Warm phase of assistance ... 41

Aftermath ... 42

2

General interests in crisis situations ... 44

Coordination processes ... 44

Power in crisis situations ... 45

Interests by sensegiving and meaning making ... 46

Interests in crisis situations ... 47

Discussion ... 49

Coordination processes ... 49

Power in the coordination processes ... 50

Sensegiving and meaning making ... 51

Incentives ... 51

Conclusion ... 52

3

Abstract

Keywords: Crisis Management Organizations, Schiphol airport , Coordination, Crisis situations, Interests, power.

Schiphol airport is one of the most important hubs within the Netherlands. The airport receives millions of travelers every year. Therefore, the safety in- and around Schiphol airport is very important. One of the phenomena that influences this safety are crises, and thereby the crisis management around Schiphol airport. In the last decades, multiple crises have occurred around the airport. Some with serious consequences and others that caused less damage. Around Schiphol airport, multiple crisis management organizations are involved during- and after a crisis. These crisis

management organizations have to coordinate together in- and after crises. However, all these involved organizations might have various (own) interests that influences the coordination processes. On top of this, differences in power might be present and influence the coordination in- and after crises around Schiphol airport as well. Therefore, this study examines the enactment of interests during coordination processes in- and after crisis situations around Schiphol airport. To examine this, three historical crisis situations around Schiphol airport are investigated.

The study concludes that in the crisis situations around Schiphol airport, multiple involved crisis management organizations execute coordination processes on the base of their (own) interests in- and after crises. They do this by coercion, subjectification, sensegiving, meaning making and coordination on the base of self-interested incentives. In these executed coordination processes, power has a big impact. However, the enacting on the base of interests cannot be observed that clear in the first instance. Existing partnerships, that are including plans and protocols, structural discourse between involved organizations and dependency of other involved organizations make the crisis management organizations tend to coordinate as one team with common interests. This hides the enactment of own interests that are present.

4

Introduction

The fire in the cell complex in 2003, the Turkish Airline crash in 2009 and multiple power failures that caused major problems in 2018. These are examples of some of the major crises that have occurred at the Dutch airport Schiphol over the years. Schiphol is the biggest airport of the Netherlands, and with almost 55 million passengers a year, it is one of the leading airports of Europe. With this leading status and the responsibility to facilitate and transport so many people, the safety of the airport is important1_. Crises are increasingly transboundary, crossing geographical, administrative, infrastructural and cultural borders (Boin et al. 2005; Head 2008; Ansell et al. 2010; Fimreite et al. 2014). One of the consequences of this trend is that an increasing amount of organizations are involved when a crisis occurs. Schiphol airport is an area that in particular can be seen as cross-boundary in crisis situations. This is because the airport has to deal with different jurisdictions. These are the different jurisdictions of land- and airside, several municipalities of the Netherlands, multiple Safety regions and the KMAR (Military Police) and National police. As a result of this, Schiphol airport is an area where many different kind of organizations are involved when a crisis occurs. For example, during the Turkish Airlines crash more than five large organizations were prominently involved (Onderzoeksraad, 2010). However, all these different organizations have their own interests and might conflict with each other.

This research focusses on how the different organizations around Schiphol airport coordinate their actions during- and after crisis situations. In particular, the study focusses on how these different stakeholders coordinate and enact their own interests in this process. The differences in interests have the potential to influence the way in which a crisis is handled and are able to cause different

approaches of coordination in- and after crises. However, because of the transboundary trend of crises, the possibility that multiple crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport have to coordinate and cooperate in crisis situations is increasing. Therefore, it is interesting to research how the different crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport enact their different interests in their coordination processes in- and after crises. When a crisis occurs at Schiphol, crisis management organizations such as the safety region, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer are called to respond. Crisis management organizations use predefined structures that are shaped for handling crises on very short term, which allows them to react quickly to unexpected events (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). In the crisis management literature, these organizations are referred to as fast-response organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). At Schiphol Airport multiple crisis management organizations meet the characteristics of a fast-response approach. These organizations consist of regional

organizations, each with their own emergency services namely; the safety regions and organizations of the airport itself, flight airlines organizations and organizations of the central Dutch government, such

1 _{Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (2018), ‘Externe veiligheid Schiphol’,}

5 as the Ministries (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie (IVJ), 2015). With this many different organizations involved, coordination during crisis- and emergency situations is needed.

The research question of this thesis is as follows: How do different crisis management

organizations enact their interests during coordination processes in- and after crisis situations at Schiphol airport? With this research question, the study intends to investigate how different

organizations handle crisis situations by looking at the crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport enact their interests during coordination processes in- and after crises. The period ‘after’ a crisis is the moment when the acute assistance of the involved crisis management organizations is scaled down. In this research, the enacting of interests is investigated by looking at the executed organizational power of organizations and their incentives to handle in a certain way. To understand and evaluate the coordination processes of the organizations, existing knowledge and various perspectives about coordination are elaborated.

To answer the research question, multiple crisis management organizations that are involved during crisis situations at Schiphol airport will be investigated by means of a comparative case study. For this comparative case study, three cases regarding crisis situations in- and around Schiphol airport are used. These are; the fire in the cell-complex in 2005, the Turkish Airlines crash in 2009 and the fire incident in the Schiphol railroad tunnel in 2009. The specific cases have been chosen because of the various outcomes of the crises and the different moments within the crisis where enacted interests were present. By using these cases, multiple observations regarding different kind of crisis situations can be investigated. These are the differences between a near miss and crises with disastrous outcomes and the different phases of the crises where most interests were enacted.

Academic relevance

By investigating how the coordination processes of crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport in- and after crises are executed and based on their interests, more knowledge on the incentives for certain coordination processes in crisis- and emergency situations will be present. At the moment, the knowledge on enacting interests of crisis management organizations in- and after crisis situations and during sensegiving processes is scarce (Helms Mills, Thurlow, & Mills, 2010, Marshall &

Rollinson, 2004). By investigating the enacting of interests in crisis situations, the more knowledge on how organizations enact on the base of their interests in- and after these crises will be present. This adds to the scientific knowledge on the environment around crises. On top of this, the research investigates the use of power and incentives of organizations during- and after crisis- and emergency situations. The knowledge on power used by organizations is present (Boin et.al, 2016), however the use of this power in coordination processes in- and after crisis situations is not that familiar. With this study, more information on these processes becomes present.

6 Societal relevance

Crises can be very harmful for people and society. Therefore, it is important that these disasters and or crises are handled in the best way possible. During crises, and after disasters, different organizations (public and private) have to work together to manage these situations. Schiphol airport is a very important hub in the Netherlands. Multiple land- and air traffic flows are present in the area, which increases the risks. In the past years, Schiphol has had to deal with multiple major crises (VRK, 2017). So the chance of a crisis occurring at Schipol airport again is plausible. If the different organizations at Schiphol airport are able to cooperate properly, the chance of solving the crisis in the best way

possible increases. Hardy et.al (2003) state that the more knowledge different organizations have about each other, the better their interorganizational cooperation will be. So more knowledge on the enacting of own interests of organizations other than their own helps with handling a crisis in a more efficient way when multiple organizations are involved. So, the enacting of interests can influence the outcome of a crisis. Therefore, the more knowledge is present on the enacting of these interests, the better crises can be handled and solved. This is relevant for society.

7

Theoretical framework

This framework describes the topics of fast-response organizations, coordination, sensegiving and power. Fast-response organizations are the kind of organizations that are being investigated in this research. Therefore, the characteristics, environment and work processes of these organizations are elaborated on. Within the literature of fast-response organizations, the processes of coordination and sensegiving are prominent. As a result of this, these processes need description. The research adds the underexposed perspective of power to the literature.

Fast-response organizations

The crisis management organizations at Schiphol aiport can all be seen as fast-response organizations. Fast response organizations can be defined as ‘organizations where decisions must be made rapidly and where errors can be fatal.’ (Faraj & Xiao, 2006, p1155).

According to Faraj and Xiao (2006), fast-response organizations have to operate under specific circumstances. Fast-response organizations operate in an environment where the level of uncertainty is high and decisions need to be taken during time sensitive and high pressure situations. On top of that, the decisions that these organizations make can have catastrophic consequences. The specific

circumstances are named extreme by Wolbers et.al, (2018). These are settings where actors have to adapt on the run and react swiftly. This makes it hard to integrate their activities. In most of the fast-response circumstances, professionals of various emergency fast-response organizations need to gather and come up with immediate actions. However, it is difficult for these various organizations to manage the situation because the setting quickly becomes ambiguous and leads to discontinuity (Wolbers et.al, 2018).

Another way to identify fast-response organizations is by looking at their own characteristics and practices instead of their environment. Faraj and Xiao (2006) state that a fast-response

organization can be seen as more dynamic and able to improvise when needed. On top of this, fast-response organizations have a high capability of adapting to uncertain circumstances (Houtman et.al, 2014). Grabowski and Roberts (1999) and Weick et al. (1999) add to the characteristics of fast-response organizations that these organizations develop specific structures and use risk-mitigation processes. They implement these structures and processes to function in a reliable way in demanding situations. Fast-response organizations can be seen as dynamic and are able to adapt to situations. On top of this, they develop structures and processes to operate in demanding situations. These

characteristics are needed to identify the fast-response organizations at Schiphol airport.

Altogether, the literature shows that fast-response organizations can be identified by their environment and their characteristics. The crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport are likely to face these circumstances and own the described characteristics. One of the most important processes of fast-response organizations is coordination. In this process, the collective performance of organizations is elaborated (Faraj & Xiao, 2006)

8 Coordination

Coordination is a phenomenon that is traditionally studied in organizational- and management research. Coordination is defined as ‘The joint efforts of independent communicating actors towards mutually defined goals’ (Crowston, 1990). This can be seen as the general definition of coordination. However, in a fast-response setting, organizations need to act very quickly and deal with uncertainty. Therefore, a more specified definition of coordination can be stated as: ‘a temporally unfolding and contextualized process of input regulation and inter action articulation to realize a collective performance’ (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). This definition focusses on the settings of fast-response organizations and is therefore used in this research.

Over the years, the theoretical insights of coordination have changed and developed in different directions. The principle of coordination started as a result of the technological development and the rise of manufacturing establishments (Jacoby, 1984). Because of the high rise of employees and working units, more efficiency was needed. Coordination was one way to accomplish this efficiency. By first using various designs of work, by developing schemes to accomplish efficiency, coordination was present. One of the most famous forms of this kind of coordination was Scientific Management by Taylor (1916). After this, the theoretical perspectives of coordination changed into the design of Management rather than work. The right management systems had to be in place to get work finished. Fayol (1949) was one of the main pioneers of this perspective. According to him, a proper design inside organizations was needed and hierarchical systems (unity of command, centralization) had to be in place. One characteristic that the perspectives of design of both work and management had in common was the deliberate nature of the attempts they did to plan certain systems to

accomplish coordination activities. Central to these approaches was designability. The upcoming trend of coordination was the result of specification of exchanging processes between different working areas by rules, roles and structures (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).

Current studies perceive coordination as ‘the integration of organizational work under conditions of task interdependence and uncertainty’ (Bechky & Ockhuysen, 2009, p469). The current definition focusses more on the process of coordination. Coordination is seen more as a process and based on practical insides in this definition. The older theories of coordination such as that of Taylor (1916) and Fayol (1949) focused on the designability of organizations to accomplish optimal performance. The new research on coordination however, focusses more on how work of such structures is executed. Therefore, it investigates coordination as it happens. Therefore, the new theories assume that organizations have to coordinate regardless the design of the organizations. As a result this trend, research focusses on multiple characteristics and areas of coordination differing from communication (Ballard & Seibold, 2003) to cooperation (Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993). So the theoretical insights regarding coordination have changed over the years, from design of work to design of management, and towards coordination as a process.

9 Within the field of crises- and emergency situations, there are multiple ways to look at

coordination. These are the perspectives of integration and fragmentation and elaborate further on the coordination as a process. Integration and fragmentation are perspectives that see coordination as a process instead of a design for work or management. The perspectives can be seen as both certain ways and handles to coordinate in crisis- and emergency situations. The perspectives state that the coordination in crises differs from the original idea of designability to coordinate organizations. Integration can be seen as coordination processes in crisis- and emergency situations that are about ‘the integration of organizational work under conditions of task interdependence and uncertainty’ (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). The perspective states that integration is needed to cope with crisis situations by integrated structures and methods. However, organizations that are operating in a fast-response setting have to deal with ambiguity and discontinuity. To cope with these settings, the coordination perspective of fragmentation is needed. Fragmentation disagrees with the designability of organizations to coordinate during crisis. Coordination practices in an environment that is fast-paced during crisis situations do however, create fragmentation instead of integration (Wolbers et.al, 2018). By looking into this, fragmentation states that in times of crisis, fragmented coordination processes need to be executed and designed integrated structures have to be ignored to handle the situation. Another characterisitic of fragementation is that it gives room for interests of organizations. The coordination process can be influenced by power of organizations. On top of this, fragmentation gives room for the own interests of organizations in the form of power. The perspectives will now be elaborated to gain knowledge on how different organizations can coordinate in- and after crisis situations.

Coordination through integration of work

The process of coordination has evolved over the time. It started as a way of designing work within organizations where coordination was used to sort out and arrange all working processes to become efficient. After this, coordination evolved towards the arranging of management systems. In this form, coordination was used to establish management systems.

However, Faraj & Xiao (2006) were one of the first academics who questioned the

designability of coordination. In fast-response settings, the designability of coordination can be seen as limited. These organizations benefit from seeing coordination as a process instead of a designed framework. Okhuysen en Bechky (2009), identified the phenomenon of coordination as a combination of developed design and emergence handling. According to them, coordination is encompassing the integration of organizational work where an environment of interdependence and uncertainty is present.

10 Conditions for integrative coordination

After analyzing and surveying coordination mechanisms in the literature Okhuysen & Bechky (2009) have provided a framework that explains the functioning for certain coordination mechanisms. They have developed this framework after studying the literature about coordination and noticed the similarities of the concept of coordination that were stated. As a result of this, Okhuysen & Bechky (2009) came to three integrating conditions for coordination. Every integrated condition for

coordination can be achieved by a variety of coordinating mechanisms (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). This research investigates how organizations enact their own interests in their coordination processes in- and after crises. To make this investigation possible, certain handles and measurements for the coordination of organizations in- and after crises are needed. The three integrative conditions will be used to determine how the coordination of the various organizations is in- and after crisis- and emergency situations. On the base of this, the enacting of their own interests in these coordination processes is analyzed.

The three integrated conditions for coordination are accountability, predictability and common understanding. Accountability focusses on the question who has responsibilities for certain elements of a task. When accountability is created, the different members of organizations clarify where the responsibilities of interdependent parties lie (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Accountability can as well be achieved by formal means, like plans and rules, as by informal and emergent actions, like objects where parties are accountable for their own contributions. The condition of predictability makes sure that interdependent parties anticipate in a certain way that is subsequently related to their task. This is because these parties know what the elements of the task are and when these tasks happen (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Predictability contains knowing what subtasks are needed to accomplish larger tasks and which sequence needs to be persisted. It can be achieved by plans and objects that define tasks that have to be completed (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Common understanding does help coordination by accommodating a shared and unambiguous perspective on the task that needs to be executed and how the work of ‘individuals’ fits in this whole process (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). To achieve common understanding, shared knowledge, of the work that has to be done by

interdependent parties needs to be present, of how certain of these interdependent tasks take place and of what the goals and objectives of the work are. This condition can also be created by planned and formal mechanisms and emergent interaction within the organization (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Fragmentation instead of integration

In many response operations the occurrence of ambiguity makes it hard to bring disconnected and divergent elements together. This happens due to time constraints and physical distances between actors. A perspective that provides more scope to describe the aspects of ambiguity and discontinuity and how these aspects disturb processes in impetuous circumstances that crisis management

11 norm is the presence of contradictions and discontinuity. The perspective of fragmentation explains how coordination ‘is carried out in fast response settings under conditions of ambiguity and

discontinuity, accepting that the situation is in constant flux and that this allows action ambiguity and multiple perspectives to prevail.’ (Wolbers et.al, 2018, p1525).

Wolbers et.al. (2018) have executed a study in the coordinating mechanisms in emergency response operations. Emergency organizations are confronted with several working practices in fast-response settings such as varying demands, opposing interests, time pressure and unexpected turn of events. In the study Wolbers et.al, (2018) use the fragmentation perspective of coordination to examine the coordination processes of crisis management organizations in these crisis situations. The study shows that officers in the field use specific kinds of coordination practices to deal with this discontinuity and ambiguity. These interrelated practices are working around procedures, delegating tasks and demarcating expertise.

During incidents certain events occur that do not conform to the scenarios that are included and worked out in procedures and plans (Wolbers et.al, 2018). Because of this phenomenon, the emergency officers have to adapt to these unforeseen circumstances and need to find new creative solutions to cope with the situation, they do this by working around procedures. This practice includes bypassing the strict actions that are codified in plans and protocols. Working around procedures can be seen as an informal- and provisionally practice for handling disruptive situations for the normal workflow. As a result of a disruption in the normal workflow, different expectations and equivocality are created (Obstfeld, 2012).

Various emergency response organzations adapt to evolving and rapidly changing situations in an ad hoc way, by working around procedures for instance.Therefore concerned officers need to try and gain an overview of this situation. They try to do this by delegating tasks. Delegating tasks involves assigning certain tasks to subordinate officers to disconnect themselves from the task complexities of the incident for the umpteenth time (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). By doing this, the officers are able to attain an overview of the situation. To coordinate during an emergency situation one needs to disconnect oneself from the operation (Wolbers et.al, 2018). One of the consequences of delegating tasks is that concerned emergency officers lose a certain amount control. As a result of delegating tasks, fragmentation arises (Wolbers et.al, 2018).

In some emergency situations the characteristics of the situation create uncertainty which can even interrupt or stop the response operation. In these kind of situations the general slogan of

emergency services is safety first. When the nature of the threat is uncertain, the officers need to assess the situation and determine how to coordinate and operate. During these uncertain situations officers deal with this uncertainty by demarcating expertise (Wolbers et.al, 2018). Demarcating expertise can be seen as a process where an officer with specific expertise will take responsibility for handling the dangerous and uncertain situation. The other officers that are involved order their personnel to stand down and rely on the expertise of the appointed officer (Wolbers et.al, 2018).

12 The perspective of fragmentation gives room to look at the way organizations enact their own interests. By describing the practices and characteristics of fragmentation, Wolbers et.al (2018) show that power of organizations can have an influence on their coordination. By stating that negotiation is a form to accomplish sense- and decision making, expertise is demarcated in crisis situations, separate pockets of control in circumstances of ambiguity and discontinuity are present and tasks are delegated. The perspective of fragmentation shows that differences in power between organization have

influence. The coordination perspective of fragmentation contains multiple elements of power. One of these elements, power by negotiation, has already been elaborated on. However, fragmentation contains more elements of power that have not been explicitly elaborated on yet. To treat the other forms of power that are part of the fragmentation perspective, the existing perspective of power by Fleming & Spicer (2014) is used to give content to this.

Power of organizations

Fast-response organizations are confronted with multiple coordination isues in crisis situations. One of the perspectives that comes forward is fragementation, a coordination perspective that contains

multiple elements of power. During the process of fragmentation, there is room for power to influence certain coordination processes by organizations. Therefore, the phenomenon of organizational power is elaborated in the next paragraph. Organizational power is seen as power by organizations as a whole.

Power of organizations can have a lot of influence on proportions between organizations and the way they act. Salancik & Pfeffer (1977, p89) have looked into the subject of the organizational power process of gaining this power. According to them power is ‘simply the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done’ . With this they elaborate on the fact that certain organization make other organizations handle situations in the way they want to as a result of their power. Salancik & Pfeffer (1977) state that this power of organizations is gained by being most able to cope with critical problems and uncertainties. So the organization that is most capable of handling critical problems and uncertainties gains more power than other organizations. Another insight on the gaining of- and the differences between power of organizations is investigated by Provan et.al (1980). They state that organizations will be relatively powerful in relation to others if they control resources that are needed by other organizations and are able to reduce their own dependencies for resources by other organizations. These are ways to gain more power than other organizations. According to Barksdale (2008), the enacting of power can be seen from various perspectives and social contexts. This social context starts at the individual level and also describes the organizational and even societal levels. They also mention that power is present at multiple sites of organizations. This is in line with the theoretical insight of Fleming& Spicer (2014).

13 Multiple forms of power

Organizational power is present in the coordination processes in crisis situations. However, this phenomenon is ambiguous. Therefore, the concept of organizational power needs more deepening. According to Fleming & Spicer (2014) power comes in multiple forms and appears at various

locations in- and around organizations. Fleming & Spicer (2014) have observed four faces and sites of organizational power. The four faces of this power are coercion, manipulation, domination and subjectification. These forms of power may occur in multiple locations in and around organizations. These four sites are power ‘in’, ‘through’, ‘over’ and ‘against’ organizations. Because this research intends to investigate organizations as a whole unit, the power ‘through’ and ‘over’ organizations are mainly used to determine the use of power. So the forms of power ‘through’ and ‘over’ organizations will be used to determine if and where the organizational power of the selected organizations in the three cases has influenced the coordination processes in- and after a crisis situation.

Coercion and the sites of power

The first face of power that Fleming & Spicer (2014) specify is coercion. Coercion as organizational power focusses on the direct exercise of power of organizations or individuals to achieve certain political ends. According to Dahl (1957) this type of power involves getting another organization or individual to do something that they would not otherwise. To give a simple definition they are told to do something or there will be consequences for this actor.

As stated before coercion can be located at multiple sites. To begin with, we look at the first site; coercion ‘through’ the organization. This site of coercion takes place when the organization becomes a collective actor that mobilizes its own resources to change something in the external environment. If this collective organizational approach was not present the external environment would not change (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). The power of coercion that can be done ‘over’ organizations is present when organizations use resources to take control over a certain other organization. This can be done by a takeover or the occupying of an important position of the other organization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

Manipulation and the sites of power

The second face of power that Fleming & Spicer (2014) talk about is manipulation. With this face of power, organizations seek to limit present issues that are discussed or fit issues within perceived acceptable boundaries. Manipulation is a type of power which regards agenda setting. Certain issues are shaped to be important or relevant. This form of power is accomplished by shaping anticipated outcomes of behavior and subtly influence decision making processes by using one’s position within an organizational network (Selznick (1949).

This face of power is located at multiple sites of the organization. To start manipulation ‘through’ the organizations means that broader processes of manipulation are executed by

14 The other site of manipulation, ‘over’ organizations, refers to organizations that have control over processes of persuasion and networks. With this control, the organization gains power over other organizations (Fleming & Spicer, 2014).

Domination and the sites of power

The third face of power is power by domination (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). In the case of domination organizations establish influence on others by constructing ideological values that become dominant within the field of the organization. With this face of power, a little coercion and manipulation is occurring openly. Domination is present when organizations set up a certain assumption which becomes legitimate, standard and more prudent.

Domination can be sited ‘trough’ organizations. This is the case when a certain environment is present through the organization by multiple actors that produces power. Domination as a face of power can be ‘over’ the organization when external actors are present that execute institutional practices with a certain agenda. In this way a certain ideology is pushed into the environment by the external actors and domination can evolve (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011).

Subjectification and the sites of power

The last face of power that Fleming & Spicer (2014) describe is subjectification. This face of power seeks to determine an actor’s very sense of self. This even includes the emotions and identity of the actor. The focus with subjectification is not on decision making (manipulation) or ideological suppression (domination), but on the formation of an actor that makes decisions itself. The role of discourse is leading for this face of power. The system of talks and texts that construct social reality does influence the power of subjectification.

The subjectification ‘through’ organizations is described by Fleming & Spicer (2014, p25) as ‘This mode of power seeks to change a particular organizational field by reconstituting the identities of other actors, using the focal organization to so. Second, this implies some kind of ‘activism’ since the focal organization aims to persuade other institutional actors to adopt a subjective position that may be significantly different to the one they currently occupy. And third, subjectification through organization requires certain maintenance protocols to keep the pressure on and avoid institutional reversals.’. The other site, which is the subjectification ‘over’ the organization, focusses on the way external change agents can instigate identity-related and subjective decisions that causes a new orientation on how organizational members manage themselves (Kondo, 1990).

By pointing out the different faces of organizational power, it is possible to investigate if these forms of power are or were present at the involved crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport and if these forms of power have influenced the coordination processes in- and after the crises of the three selected cases. As stated before, the sites of power ‘through’ and ‘over’ organizations are used in this research. So to research the use of organizational power, the various forms of power are determined by this power ‘trough’ and ‘over’ the investigated organization

15 Power in crisismanagement

In the last paragraph the concepts and forms of organizational power were highlighted. However, in crisis situations, multiple ways of enacting power are executed by organizations. Rosenthal et.al, (1991) state that power is a crucial element in crisis management. Three concepts that can be linked to this ‘power’ during- and after crises are sensegiving, meaning making and incentives. Sensegiving can be seen as ‘the process of social construction that occurs when discrepant cues interrupt individuals’ ongoing activity, and involves the retrospective development of plausible meanings that rationalize what people are doing’ (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010, p56). With this statement, Mailtis & Sonenshein (2010) mean that sensegiving is the process of connecting existing cues and frames to create an image of what is going on. Mailts & Sonenheim base their statements on the article of Weick (1988). Weick (1988) makes clear that the concept of enactment is important in sensegiving. With this he states that people and organizations generate the general environment in a crisis by their actions and through their efforts to give sense of these actions. In other words, organizations are able to create a certain

environment by acting in a specific way. This enacting can work through around crisis situations in multiple ways. Maitls & Sonenheim (2010) define two forms of sensegiving around crises. These are sensegiving processes during the crisis and after a crisis. Sensegiving during a crisis spans a certain range of contexts. This gives a first image of what is going on. Sensegiving after a crisis is more focused of what has happened and how the event is seen by involved actors. This is often drawn upon in public inquiries and other documents. These inquiries and documents are focusing on what

happened, why it happened and who is responsible. Both forms of sensegiving can have positive as well as negative consequences for organizations. This has to do with how an organization fills in the way of giving sense of a situation (Maitls & Sonenheim, 2010).

Sensegiving in- and after a crisis is subject to power. According to Brown, Colville & Pye (2015, p98) power is inherent to the process of sensegiving, they state that ‘the creation of new understandings is not free of power issues and self-interested behaviour’. By this Brown, Colville & Pye (2015) want to make clear that power is present in sensegiving. They even point out that

authorative sensegiving is a hegemonic act. So sensegiving can be influenced by organizational power. This is supported by Rouleau & Balogun (2011), who state that strategic sensegiving is likely to be more influential if people or organizations position themselves in a way where they express their power and status. So the more power an organization expresses, the more effective and influential their sensegiving will be. Consequently, organizational power can be paired with sensegiving and the other way around. Sensemaking is influenced by power and by power sensegiving can be executed in a influential way.

Meaning making is strongly connected to sensegiving and is defined as: ‘the attempt to reduce public and political uncertainty and inspire confidence in crisis leaders by formulating and imposing a convincing narrative’. (Boin et.al, 2016, p79). With this, Boin et.al (2016) state that in- and after a

16 crisis, the communicated narrative by crisis leaders makes a difference in how the crisis is perceived by the external environment. The crisis leaders need to formulate a narrative regarding the event and communicate this. According to Boin et.al (2016) the process of meaning making is very political. With this, they point out that meaning making is subject to power. Meaning making influences the way a crisis is perceived and thereby the way their actions are supported by the public and

stakeholders.

Because organizations all have different purposes and means, their goals and methods to handle in certain circumstances might differ. In that case, the organizations have incentives to act in a certain way. The concept of incentives is not totally clear and partial (Meijerink, 1997). According to Enters et.al (2003) incentives can be defined as any means that provide encouragement to do things in a certain way. When we look at the individual approach towards incentives Sharp (1978) states that ‘incentives are benefits which are offered to individuals, and that some explicit participation commitment is required of individuals in order to obtain these benefits’ (Sharp, 1978, p52). In this research the focus of incentives will be on the incentives for coordinating in a certain way by the crisis management organizations around Schiphol airport in- and after crises. Because of this, the word incentive refers to the defintion by Sharp (1978) in this research. In this way, the individual refers to an individual organization.

These incentives do have a connection with power in crisis situations. According to Rosenthal et.al, (1991) organizations might have incentives that are based on self interests. As a result of this, a sense of power comes into place. Organizations that have certain incentives and the power to enact on the base of these incentives are better able to force actions into their advantage. However, incentives can also cause consent between involved crisis management organizations. This is the case when the incentives of organizations serve a common cause. In these cicrumstances bureau-politics and power flourish because all concerned parties are convinced to be able to make a positive contribution to the public cause (Rosenthal, et.al, 1991).

17

Research Design and Methodology

Research design

This research investigates how crisis management organizations around Schiphol airport enact their own interests during coordination processes in- and after crisis situations. With this, the study intends to explore how different crisis management organizations coordinate and enact their interests during these processes in- and after crisis situations that are characterized by uncertainty, discontinuity, ambiguity and rapidly changing circumstances (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009) (Wolbers et.al, 2018). In various crisis situations around Schiphol airport, multiple organizations were involved and various coordination processes have been executed. The research intends to compare these crisis situations and investigate the common and differing coordination processes that were executed during- and after these crises. In particular the enacting of interests by the involved crisis management orgazations in these processes is investigated. To study various crisis situations around Schiphol airport, multiple cases of crises need to be researched and compared. Therefore, this research can be seen as a comparative case study that interprets the outcomes within the field of crisis management. The research can be seen as an embedded multiple case design. The unit of analysis in this research are crisis- and emergency situations at Schiphol airport, while the unit of observation are the three historical cases that are investigated (see figure 1)

Figure 1. Embedded multiple case-study.

To execute a comparative case study three historical crisis situations around Schiphol airport are selected and analyzed. These selected cases are the fire in the cell complex at Schiphol-Oost in

Topic: Enacted interests during coordination in- and

after crisis- and emergency situations.

Unit of analysis: Crisis- and emergency situations at Schiphol airport

Unit of analysis: Crisis situations at Schiphol

airport

Unit of observation: Three historical cases

18 2005, the fire in the Schiphol railroad tunnel in 2009 and the Turkish Airlines crash in 2009. The cases are selected for multiple reasons. To start, all cases describe a crisis- and emergency situation at Schiphol airport. Moreover, in all three cases multiple crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport were involved and had to execute coordination processes. During the coordination processes, the enacting of interests by the investigated organizations can be highlighted in all three cases. So power and incentives are present in the coordination processes. However, the main reasons for selecting these cases are because the three crisis situations have various outcomes and the enacted interests take place at various phases of the crisis situations. The fire in the cell-complex and the Turkish Airlines crash are cases with multiple casualties and the incident already took place when most involved crisis organizations were active. On the other hand, the fire in the Schiphol railroad tunnel case, can be seen as a near miss with no casualties or injuries. In this case, the crisis

organizations had to deal with a threat instead of an occurred incident when they became active. The other main reason for chosing the cases is the differing phases of the crisis where most interests were enacted by the involved organizations. In the Turkish Airlines case, most interests are enacted during the warm-phase of assistance. In the cell-complex and railroad tunnel cases however, most interests are enacted in the aftermath of the crises. This influences the tendency of a crisis situation. The differences in outcomes and phase of present interests make it very interesting to investigate the enacted interests in the coordination processes of the crises.

As a result of the different kind of crisis situations that are investigated in this research, the involved organizations in the three cases differ. However, three crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport are involved in all three chosen cases. These are Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS), the Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland (VRK) and the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer. On top of this, the three organizations had to coordinate with each other in the crisis sitautions. Therefore, these are the three crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport that are investigated in this research.

Multiple sources are used to collect the data to analyze the enacted interests of the involved crisis management organizations. To start, official inquiries of the three crisis- and emergency situations at Schiphol airport are researched.The inquiries are used to investigate which crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport were involved in the cases and how the coordination processes of the various organizations in- and after the crises was executed. This is done to investigate if the organizations have enacted on the base of their own interests in these cases. Secondly, published and unpublished articles regarding the three crisis- and emergency situations at Schiphol airport are used. These articles are used to obtain information on the coordination of the involved crisis

management organizations in the three cases. On top of this personal interviews with involved actors from the picked crisis management organizations around Schiphol airport are used to gather inside information on the coordination processes of specific actors during- and after the three crisis- and emergency situations. To finish, various internet sources are used to gather more information on the coordination processes of the involved actors.

19 Data collection and research method

This research uses data that is obtained in multiple ways and by multiple techniques. The data has been collected through semi-structured interviews and a content- and document analysis. The analysis of content and documents complements the data gained by the interviews in this research.

For this research five interviewees have been selected to collect the data. Each of the

individuals interviewed for this research are crisis management professionals who were involved in or after, at least, one of the three investigated crisis situations and in service of one of the investigated crisis management organizations.The researcher of this study put together this selection of

interviewees on the basis of their specific operational, tactical or strategic role during the crisis situations and the specific organization they acted for. The intention of this is to gain data from involved crisis management professionals of the picked organization on a operational, tactical and strategic level and from every investigated crisis management organization. In this way, the research obtained data from coordination processes on every level within organizations. The interviews of this research have a semi-structured character. This means that the main questions of the interview are fixed and planned. However, there is room for interaction and flexibility during the interviews. The semi-structured interviews are suitable for this research because they give the best answers to ‘why’ questions and they address aspects that are important for individuals (Fylan, 2005). In this way, a better understanding of the research question is gained. On top of this, it gives room for interaction with the interviewee and thereby examine his or her vision (Bryman, 2012).

To complement the gained knowledge from the interviews, a document analysis is conducted. In this document analysis multiple official inquiries, reports, crisis plans and articles regarding all of the cases and involved crisis management organizations are used and analysed. With this the research owns a solid fundament of data. The research focusses on the official inquiries of the picked cases to collect data. This is because these inquiries are executed by independent research organizations (Onderzoeksraad, Inspectie openbare orde en veiligheid) in an extensive way. As a result of this, the collected data can be seen as reliable, factual and complete. Other reports, crisis plans and articles are used to gain a complete image of the various cases and crisis structures that are in place. With these picked documents, the most complete and reliable data is used in the study.

The obtained data by the interviews and document analysis are analysed in systemic way. Despite the fact that a certain level of subjectivity is unavoidable, this study will use systematic techniques for analyzing the interviews and documents in order to limit the subjective involvement of the researcher and thus improve the reliability and validity of the study. To accomplish this, the researcher looks for coordination processes and enacted interests in the interviews and documents. Validity

‘An account is valid or true if it represents accurately those features of the phenomena, that it is intended to describe, explain or theorise.’ (Hammersly, 1987, p78). So this research is valid if it

20 accurately represents how coordination of various crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport in- and after a crisis is. To be valid, the internal- and external validity of the research needs to be solid. The internal validity of the research is secured by the involvement of multiple experts of the crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport. Because these experts have a lot of internal knowledge about the coordination at the crisis management organizations and were involved during the specific crises or emergency situations the research is able to represent the coordination in a valid way. On top of this, official documents, scientific articles and comprehensive evaluations and reports are used to collect data which contributes to the internal validity.

Because of the involvement of multiple experts of various crisis management organizations and their contribution to the information and knowledge of thesis, the external validity is strengthened. With this information results can be applicable for external fields. However, the involved crisis management organizations are all part of Schiphol airport and this weakens the external validity. The external validity would be of more value if experts and crisis management organizations of multiple fields were studied.

The study contains some restrictions as well. In the first place, only three crisis situations from one specific airport in the Netherlands are investigated. This influences the external validity of the study. On top of this, three involved crisis management organizations are looked into during- and after the crisis situations around Schiphol airport of this study. However, during these crisis situations many more crisis management organizations were involved. Other crisis management organizations could result in different outcomes and findings. As a result of this, the findings might be biased. The last restriction of the study is the fact that five respondents are interviewed. The investigated crisis

management organizations exist of far more individuals who were involved during- and after the crisis situations.

21

Setting the scene

In the next chapter of this research, the investigated scene is described. This encompasses the description of the three historical cases and the crisis organization of Schiphol airport. After this, the three elected crisis management organizations that are investigated are described.

General crisis organization of Schiphol airport

To examine the enacted interests by involved crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport during crisis situations, three specific cases of crisis are used. Namely, the fire in the cell complex at Schiphol-Oost in 2005, the fire in the Schiphol railroad tunnel in 2009 and the Turkish Airline crash in 2009. The different crisis management organizations that are examined on behalf of their coordination processes during these three cases are picked because of their involvement in the cases. To elaborate on this, at first the crisis organization at Schiphol airport is described and the crisis management organizations that are going to be examined during this research are picked. After this, the three cases of crisis at Schiphol airport are described.

Crisis management organizations at Schiphol

To explore the coordination of the different crisis management organizations at Schiphol airport in emergent crisis situations these crisis management organizations need to be examined. Therefore, different public- and private organizations that are involved during emergent crisis situations need to be examined.

According to the report of the Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie (VenJ) (2015), Schiphol airport encompasses many various crisis organizations that are involved during crises at the sight. With this, the report confirms that airports have to deal with a specific kind of environment. The crisis

organization of Schiphol airport contains different components. These are: the crisis organization of Schiphol itself, the crisis organization of the safety region (Veiligheidsregio), the crisis organizations of the airlines that are part of the airport company, and the crisis organization of the Dutch government (VenJ, 2015). These organizations are as well public as private organizations (Crisisbestrijdingsplan Schiphol, Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland (VRK), 2018). Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, VRK and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer are all organizations that are in line with the prescribed kind of organizations that are involved in crisis situations around Schiphol airport.

All these different crisis organizations possess their own responsibilities, legal tasks and interests. Most of these aspects are tuned between the different organizations by protocols, plans and agreements (VenJ, 2015). The investigated organizations of this research all have to deal with the various protocols, plans and agreements that are in place around Schiphol airport.

Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS)

Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS) is the largest airport of the Netherlands and one of the most important of Europe. The airport is owned by the Schiphol Group (N.V. Luchthaven Schiphol) which

22 exists of shareholders of the Dutch government and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam2_. AAS features several alarm rooms which include the Meldkamer Schiphol, existing of the

Regiecentrum Schiphol and the general alarm room, the security control center and the alarm rooms of the KLM, Koninklijke Marrechaussee and customs. The Regiecentrum directs the organization in the case of a crisis or emergency situation (Onderzoeksraad, 2010).

It is the responsibility of the Regiecentrum Schiphol to inform and alarm all the organizations and employees in a certain situation. To handle crisis- and emergency situations, AAS also has an extensive in-house emergency service organization and features a own private company private fire department. This company fire department is specialized in coping with fire in- and around airplanes (Onderzoeksraad, 2010). AAS facilitates the municipality and airlines in the case of a emergency situation. These facilitation are regarding the care, shelter, registration and accompaniment of all the involved persons.

Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland (VRK)

De Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland (VRK) is one of the 25 safety regions in the Netherlands. The Dutch Safety regions are a partnership between the various emergency organizations in the region 3_. The Safety region exists of ten municipalities, this includes the municipality of Haarlemmermeer. This partnership is based on the Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen and the ‘conceptwet’

Veiligheidsregio's fysieke veiligheid. The VRK is responsible for the fire department, the medical care at accidents and disasters (GHOR) and crisis- and emergency management. The VRK also manages the alarm rooms of the police-, fire- and ambulance departments. This is the Meld-, Informatie- en Coördinatiecentrum Kennemerland (MICK). This alarmroom is a common alarm room for multiple services to work efficiently during crisis situations (Onderzoeksraad, 2010). The VRK is led by the daily executive committee which needs to account at the ten mayors of the municipalities of the Safety region and the aldermen of these municipalities. During crisis- and emergency situations, individuals of the VRK are also involved at the governmental crisisteams called the BT and OT.

Municipality of Haarlemmermeer

The municipality of Haarlemmermeer consists of around 150.000 citizens and encompasses multiple cities and villages with Hoofddorp as biggest city 4_{. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is also situated in the} Haarlemmermeer area and because of this, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer is responsible and leading in within the field of security and crises. According to the law named ‘Wet rampen en zware ongevallen’ the mayor and alderman of a municipality are responsible for the preparation for

2 _{Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (2017), Schiphol Group, https://www.schiphol.nl/nl/schiphol-group/, visited on}

December 10th_.

3 _{Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland (2018), Wat doen wij, https://www.vrk.nl/nl-NL/Wat-doen-wij, visited on}

November 20th.

4 _{Gemeente Haarlemmermeer (2018), Cijfers Haarlemmermeer,}

23 catastrophes and large accidents. On top of this, the law demands the municipality to design a crisis plan to prepare for these situations. In case of a crisis or emergency situation the mayor of the involved municipality is in command and responsible for the administrative handling of the situation. All the involved actors are in theircommand. When a crisis or emergency situation occurs the mayor is supported by a multidisciplinary team. This is called a ‘beleidsteam’ (BT), this team exists of multiple people with strategic functions of the involved organizations. This BT leads another team called the ‘operationeel team’ (OT). The OT also extists of people of multiple organizations and is responsible for the tactical coordination during a crisis- and emergency situation. (Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid, 2015). With this team, the municipality is involved in crisis and emergency situations.

Cases

Case 1: The fire in the cell complex at Schiphol Oost

In the night from the 26th _{to the 27}th _{of October 2005 a fire broke out at the ‘Detentie- en}

Uitzetcentrum Schiphol-Oost’. This is a cell complex that offered space for 298 inmates. On October the 26th _{at 23:55 the fire detection installation of the prison detects a fire in the K-wing of the complex.} This is followed by the alarm button that is pushed by the inmate of cell eleven (Onderzoeksraad, 2006). A few minutes later the cell keepers are alarmed and open cell eleven. From that point, the fire and smoke spreads around de K-wing. The cell keepers are able to open more cells and free a total of 31 inmates. Around 00:08 on October the 27th_{, the first emergency services arrive at the cell complex.} The emergency services were able to enter the complex around 00:15 (Onderzoeksraad, 2006). Around two and a half hours later the fire was officially under control and the emergency services started to scale down. In the meantime the emergency services scaled up, and even a team from the municipality became active to deal with the crisis situation.

The fire caused a total of eleven casualties. These were all inmates of the prisons and placed in the cells of the K-wing that could not be opened by the cell keepers when the fire broke out. On top of this, the casualties were all asylum seekers who had exhausted all procedures, which caused a lot of political discussion in the Netherlands. (Onderzoeksraad, 2006). As a result of the fire and casualties an official inquiry was set up by the Dutch Onderzoeksraad. In 2006 a report was published and concluded that the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and

Environment and the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer were accountable for the fire and did not act in the right way before the fire broke out. The outcomes of the public inquiry did have political influence too. As a consequence of the report, the Ministers of Justice and Public Housing, Spatial Planning and

24 Environment and mayor of Haarlemmermeer resigned on the day the report was published 5_{. On top of} this the cell complex was closed by the Municipality6_.

Case 2: The Turkish Airline crash

Wednesday the 25th _{of February 2009, Turkish Airline flight 1951 is on the way from Istanbul to} Schiphol airport. Just before the airplane is supposed to land, it disappears from the radar. At 10:28 the alarm room of the VRK, called MICK, receives the first calls of eye witnesses who report that a plane has crashed nearby Schiphol airport (Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 2010). This is followed by more alarm calls to/frommultiple alarm rooms of Schiphol airport and VRK. There is confirmation that the airplane has crashed. After the confirmation that the Turkish Airlines airplane crashed, the emergency services come out in large numbers (Onderzoeksraad, 2010). However, even with all the help from the emergency services, nine people, including four employees of Turkish Airlines, do not survive the crash. On top of this, 86 people areinjured during the crash. As a result of the crash, Schiphol airport freezes all airplane traffic around the airport. Because of this manyairplanes had to land at other airports in the Netherlands and Belgium. The ‘Polderbaan’ landing strip, where the incident took place, is closed for another five days (Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 2010). After the accident multiple inquiries are set-up to investigate the cause of the crash. The investigations point out that the crash was caused because of two main reasons. These were a technical defect on the altimeter in the plane and the pilots who did not handle according to the protocols. Because of these two reasons the airplane crashed nearby Schiphol Airport (Onderzoeksraad, 2010).

Case 3: The fire in de Schiphol railroad tunnel

On Thursday the second of July 2009 around 5:30 p.m. a largeamount of smoke is noticed in the Schiphol railway tunnel. This is a five kilometer long railway tunnel which connects the railway station of Schiphol airport with other railway stations. Short after the detection of smoke, the train security installation within the tunnel malfunctions. Because of this, the signs and railroad switches within the tunnel fall out (Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 2009). At the moment of the smoke development and malfunctioning of the security installation, eight trains are present in the Schiphol railway tunnel. As a result of the malfunctioning of the signs and railroad switches within the tunnel, all trains have stopped and are standing still in the tunnel.

At the same time, multiple actors alert the alarm rooms of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and the VRK with calls about the smoke development in the tunnel. After around ten minutes, the

commander of the railroads around Schiphol airport decided to stop all railway traffic around Schiphol airport. At the same time, the Schiphol airport railway station is cleared. When the first fire department

5 _{Parlement (2006), Minister Donner en Dekker om onderzoek Onderzoeksraad,}

https://www.parlement.com/id/vhe7k0yaazes/nieuws/ministers_donner_en_dekker_afgetreden_om, visited on Januari 5th.

6 _{NRC (2003), Detentiecentrum Schiphol moet dicht,}

25 teams investigate the tunnel, no fire seat is observed. However, the development of smoke is still present. Because of this, the trains are being cleared from the tunnel, this takes around 30-45 minutes (Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 2009). When the Schiphol airport railway station is empty and the eight trains are cleared from the tunnel, the fire department examines the tunnel for the last time. They do not spot a fire seat in the tunnel and determine that the fire stopped by itself. The inquiry of the Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (2009) showed that certain wires of the train security installation started to smolder as a result of litter within the tunnel. This caused the smoke and malfunctioning of the security installation. There were no injuriesas a result of the fire.

26

Findings

After analyzing all the interviews, official inquiries, documents and articles. The findings will be presented in the next chapter. During the analysis of the data it became clear that all investigated crisis situations did consist of three phases of coordination processes. These are the alarm phase, where the first notification of the situation arrived at the crisis management organizations, the warm phase of assistance, where the crisis management organizations had to coordinate and handle the situation and the aftermath of the crisis, where the first emergency actions were over but the incident still needed coordination. As a result of this, this paragraph will be divided in three sub-paragraphs in which the coordination processes of each of the three phases of the incidents are elaborated.

In the findings section of this research multiple interviewies will be quoted and used for insights about the topic. To make these quotes more clear in the texts. The quotes will be appointed by abbreviations of their functions. To make clear which abbreviations in the text refer to which person that had a certain function during the crisis- and emergency situations around Schiphol airport, a short overview of the persons is given:

(MCO): refers to the Monodisciplinair Chief Officer of the Fire department Kennemerland during the Turkish Airlines crash.

(CSF): refers the Senior Officer Continuity and Crisis at Schiphol airport and the Commander of the Schiphol Fire department during the Fire in the cell complex and the Turkish Airlines Crash.

(OL): refers to the Commander of the Fire department of Kennemerland and the Leader of the Operational Team during the Turkish Airlines Crash.

(DMH): refers to the current mayor of Rijswijk and Deputy Mayor of Haarlemmermeer during the Cell-complex fire and the Turkish Airlines Crash.

(MOH): refers to the current mayor of Tilburg and mayor of Haarlemmermeer during the Turkish Airlines crash and the fire in the Schiphol railroad tunnel.

Schiphol cell complex fire Alarm phase

On October the 25th _{2005 around 23:55 a fire breaks out in the cell complex at Schiphol Oost. At first} the general fire installation of the cell complex detected the fire in the K-wing of the location. This was followed by an alarm coming from cell eleven that was activated by one of the inmates

(Onderzoeksraad, 2006). The two alarms reached the guards of the cell complex who came into action. However, because of the specific alarm code that was given by the general fire detection system there was some unclarity about the exact location of the fire. This caused a little delay in the first forms of assistance (Onderzoeksraad, 2006).