Niels Snoek June, 2016
Master thesis Political Science
Specialisation: International Relations
Research project: Authoritarianism in a global age
Supervisor: prof. dr. Marlies Glasius
Second reader: dr. Farid Boussaid
Master thesis
Ballots, Bullets and Banners:
An in-case comparative analysis of the
relationship between election fraud and
electoral protests in Egypt
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Acknowledgments
I wish to thank various people for helping me with my thesis and during my study. First I want to thank my mother, father and sister for their love and support. I would also like to thank all of my friends who motivated me to turn this research into something I can be proud of. I wish to thank dr. Ursula Daxecker for providing me with the articles from the Nexis database. My special thanks are extended to my supervisor prof. dr. Marlies Glasius who provided me with great feedback and information.
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Abstract
This thesis gives insight into the relationship between the use of election fraud in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of electoral protests. Egypt will be used as a case in which the election years 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be analyzed. Other studies have established that there is a connection between the use of election fraud and the occurrence of electoral protests, but it is not always clear when and why these protests happen and how they are connected to the use of fraud. The research question that is being used is: How can the variance in electoral protest after election fraud in Egypt in 2000, 2005 and 2010 be explained? The argument that will be presented is that over the course of ten years, US pressure on the Egyptian regime created space in the political climate. This allowed several new social movements to emerge and they used election fraud as a focal point for mobilization against the regime. The use of election fraud functioned as an external threat towards the opposition groups and increased the level of cross ideological cooperation, which made it easier for social movements and opposition groups to organize protests against the regime.
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Content
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature review ... 2
3. Theoretical approach ... 3
3.1 Western leverage and types of election fraud ... 3
3.2 Electoral fraud and electoral protests ... 4
3.3 Cooperation between cross ideological & social movements ... 6
4. Methodology ... 8 4.1 Case selection ... 8 4.2 Research Design ... 9 4.3 Data ... 9 4.3.1 Data collection ... 10 4.3.2 Nexis database ... 10
4.3.3 Describing electoral protest and election fraud ... 10
4.3.4 Limitation and strengths of method ... 11
5. Case Study Egypt ...12
5.1 Political background ...12
5.2 International context ...13
5.3 Socio-economic background ...13
5.4 Main political actors ...15
5.4.1 Muslim Brotherhood ... 15
5.4.2 Kefaya movement ... 16
5.4.3 The April 6th Youth Movement & National Association for Change ... 17
5.4.4 Triangular relationship: Government, MB and Opposition groups ... 18
5.5 Elections 2000 ... 19
5.5.1 Political situation in Egypt 2000 ... 19
5.5.1 Examples of fraud ... 20
5.6 Elections 2005 ... 21
5.6.1 Political situation Egypt 2005 ... 21
5.6.2 May referendum ... 23
5.6.3 Presidential referendum 2005 ... 25
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5.7.1 Examples of election fraud ... 25
5.7.1 Examples of electoral protests ... 27
5.8 Parliamentary election 2010 ... 30
5.8.1 Political situation Egypt 2010 ... 30
5.8.2 Examples of election fraud………33
5.8.3 Examples of electoral protests ... 32
6. Analysis ...37
6.1 Political context 2000 and 2005 ...37
6.2 From fraud to protests 2000-2005 ...39
6.3 Political Context 2005-2010 ...40
6.4 From fraud to electoral protests 2005-2010 ...41
7. Conclusion ...43
8. References ...46
8.1 Websites ... 51
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1. Introduction
On February 11 2011 the Egyptian revolution reached its full momentum when the Egyptian president Mubarak announced his resignation. In the weeks before, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians organized daily protests calling for President Mubarak to step down (Selim, 2015: 34). The demonstrations began on January 25 and spread in a period of 18 days to most major cities. One of the reasons that contributed to the protests was the use of election fraud during the parliamentary elections two months earlier (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011: 1346. During this election almost the entire opposition was removed from parliament and the ruling party the NDP got a 93.3 per cent majority (Stacher, 2012: 7).
Due to the repressive nature of the Egyptian regime were electoral protests quite uncommon. But in the ten years before the revolution Egypt’s political climate slowly opened up. In the year 2000 political protests against the regime did not exist. In the year 2005 twelve electoral protests were organized against the regime and in 2010 twenty-seven protests were organized against the use of election fraud. The focus of this research will be on these ten years and the goal is to explain why there was a variance in the number of electoral protests against the use of election fraud. This paper will try to explain this variance by analyzing under what circumstances the use of fraud leads to electoral protests and what function election fraud has in organizing electoral protests. By doing so, this paper will contribute to the literature on election fraud and electoral protests in autocratic regimes. The research design that is used is an in-case qualitative analysis and the data comes from the Nexis data base, Human Rights Watch reports and an interview with an Egyptian political scientist. The case that is used is Egypt and the units of analyses are the election years 2000, 2005 and 2010. The following research question will be used:
How can the variance in electoral protests against election fraud in Egypt in 2000, 2005 and 2010 be explained?
The structure of this thesis will be as follows. The second chapter begins with a review of the literature on election fraud and electoral protests. Then this is followed by an explanation of the theoretical approach in the third chapter. The fourth chapter describes the methodology used, whilst the fifth chapter presents the empirical findings. At the beginning of this chapter the political and socio-economic background of Egypt will be summarised. Then the main
2 actors that were involved in organizing the protests will be described, after that the protests and fraud that happened during the elections years 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be mentioned. The sixth chapter contains the analysis and the final chapter is the conclusion.
2. Literature review
Much has been written about autocratic regimes and their reasons for using fraud during elections. Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009: 403) compiled a review of the literature that investigates the purpose of using fraud during an election. Many scholars view authoritarian elections as an tool that dictators can use to gain support from or manipulate party members and large groups within society (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Magaloni, 2006; Gandi, 2008; Wright, 2008). For example, an overwhelming electoral victory serves as a signal to the members of the elite that it would be futile to support the opposition. By manipulating the elections dictators can secure the support of the elite by promising them high positions before the elections are held. Gandhi and Prezeworski (2006: 21) showed that when autocratic regimes have elections they will have substantially greater longevity in office than those who do not. Simpser (2013: 1) argues that there is often substantially more at stake in manipulating elections than simply winning and staying in power. Election manipulation can be used to appear strong towards the opposition, businesspeople, citizens or other political actors. The regime can hereby can the regime increase its bargaining power and control over society.
Another aspect of the literature has focused on why autocratic regimes use certain techniques to manipulate elections. Schedler (2002: 42) examined the menu of manipulation and demonstrated how the voice of the people can be silenced in elections. Schedler (2006: 15) looked at the ways in which authoritarian elections affect regime and opposition dynamic. Lust-Okar (2005: 6-7) showed how different Arab regimes operate a policy of divide and rule against the opposition. Tucker (2007: 543) and Daxecker (2012: 543) have focused on whether the incidence of election fraud increases the likelihood of protests and violence after elections. This part of the literature suggests that the information on electoral fraud can serve as a focal point for action. Thompson and Kuntz (2004: 160) add to this that election fraud can facilitate and coordinate collective action for citizens and opposition actors. Electoral fraud can solve collective action problems, because it increases the likelihood that protests
3 occur after electoral fraud. However, an analyses of the circumstances that facilitate these electoral protests tends to be overlooked and omitted.
To summarize the literature has focused on why autocratic regimes hold elections and how they manipulate them. We know that election fraud can facilitate coordination and collective action. But it remains unclear under what circumstances this works. A clear relationship between the use of fraud and the occurrence of electoral protests is missing in the literature. This research will help close this gap by looking at under what circumstances electoral protests happen in autocratic regimes and what role election fraud plays in triggering these protests. Hereby it will add to the growing literature on election fraud and electoral protests.
3. Theoretical approach
The structure of this chapter will be as follows. The first section will look at Western leverage on authoritarian regimes and the use of different types of fraud by autocratic. The different types of election fraud are described by the menu of manipulation from Schedler (2002: 42). The second section analyses the relationship between electoral fraud and electoral protests according to the theory of stolen elections by Thompson and Kuntz (2004). Finally, the third part looks at the role of new social movements and the theories of Staggenborg (1986); Van Dyke (2003) and Schdwedler and Clark (2006) on cross ideological cooperation.
3.1 Western leverage and types of election fraud
After the cold war the US started to promote democracy in several developing countries (Selim, 2015: 19). The US used their position as the hegemonic power in the world to put pressure on other countries to make more democratic reforms and hold elections. Way and Levitsky (2007: 50) defined this as Western leverage. Here, leverage is conceptualized as regimes bargaining power vis-a-vis the West, and the impact Western action can have on a state. The most important factor that influences leverage is the size and strength of the economy. For example countries that have a small economy or are dependent from aid have less bargaining power than strong countries. However Western leverage doesn’t always lead to political change. ‘’Since the end of the cold war electoral authoritarian regimes have turned into the most common form of nondemocratic rule in the world’’(Schedler, 2015:1). With electoral authoritarianism regime practices authoritarianism behind the façade of democratic elections. Hereby an autocratic regime can have multiparty or multicandidate
4 elections, but use election fraud to manipulate the results and civil rights liberties are often ignored (Way and Levitsky, 2007: 52).
Schedler (2002: 42) created the menu of manipulation in which he identifies tools that autocratic regimes use to manipulate the elections. The first tool is repression against the opposition candidates. Repression can be defined as ‘the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities’ (Davenport, 2007: 2). Repression against the opposition candidates, then means that the whole state apparatus, including the media, is used to harass or intimidate opposition candidates in the forms of acts of violence, arrests or intimidation. The second tool is repression against the voters which can be violent or non-violent. Examples for violent repression against voters are acts of violence, arrests or preventing voters from exercising a free choice. The third tool is the rigging of election results, this can be violent in the form of the burning of ballot boxes and the blocking/closing of polling stations. Or it can be non-violent in the form of: false voter registration, the stuffing of ballot boxes, the buying of votes and the forging of voter ID cards.
Table 1: Menu of manipulation
Types of election Fraud
Repression against opposition candidates:
Acts of violence, arrests, intimidation
Repression against voters:
Acts of violence, arrests, intimidation
Rigging of election results:
Burning of ballot boxes, Closing/blocking polling stations, False voter registration, Stuffing of ballot boxes, Buying of votes, Forging of voter ID cards
3.2 Electoral fraud and electoral protests
The theoretical link between electoral fraud and electoral protests is argued by Thompson and Kuntz (2004: 160). They argue that electoral fraud, or stolen elections as they call it, can trigger protests against the use of fraud (electoral protests) Thompson and Kuntz draw their argument from the Serbian revolution in 2000, where the regime hindered the opposition through manipulation of the vote count and annulment of the electoral result. Mass protest erupted as a response to the annulment and eventually succeeded in bringing down the regime. Thompson and Kuntz argue that election fraud can facilitate and coordinate
5 collective action for citizens and opposition actors. Opposition actors are hereby a combination of opposition parties and civil society movements.
Thompson and Kuntz (2004: 160) use a theoretical model in which they describe how citizens and opposition actors are influenced. Fraud can influence citizens in three ways. First of all, fraud can cause grievances among citizens, because they get the idea that they are being robbed of their vote. Thus is it not the quality of grievances that matter, but the extent to which these grievances are shared among the entire population (Thompson and Kuntz, 2004: 160). Second, when citizens are being directly confronted with election fraud then this could influence their cost-benefits calculations for participation in political protests. Seeing other people protest against the use of fraud can lower the risks of joining a protest. Being directly confronted means that a citizens sees or experience fraud themselves (Thompson and Kuntz, 2004: 160). Third, election fraud can trigger protests when citizens were expecting that the opposing party would win. When the people expect that the opposition will win the election, then they experience further disappointment and frustration when they find out that fraud has been committed on a large scale.
Table 2: Model Thompson and Kuntz
Effect of fraud
On citizens
Causes grievances (feeling robbed of vote) Influences cost-benefit calculations
Can trigger protests when expecting the opposition would win On opposition actors
Works as a focal point against the regime Initiative to mobilize supporters
Fraud can function as a message of political opportunity and a sign of weakness
For the opposition actors election fraud can be used in three different ways. First, it provides a focal point for discontent against the regime. This allows the opposition to mobilize the population in a more effective way than when popular dissatisfaction is general and diffuse (Thomson and Kuntz, 2004: 161). Anger against the regime may be long in existence, but the election brings it out into the open. Second, fraud gives opposition actors an initiative to mobilize their supporters. Opposition actors often have strong ties within society and through campaigning they can generate a network of activists that can be used to organize protests. Finally election fraud can function as a message that a political opportunity for staging an
6 uprising has emerged. Election fraud indicates weakness in the position of the regime, because it used fraud to win the elections. This image of vulnerability could motivate opposition actors to openly challenge the regime and question its legitimacy.
3.3 Cooperation between cross ideological & social movements
As aforementioned, opposition actors play an important role in organizing protests against the regime. But organizing political protests in an autocratic regime is dangerous, because there is a big risk that the regime will use force against the protesters. The ability of opposition actors to work together with social movements and ideological groups is critical for organizing protests against the regime (Clark, 2010: 103). In this part, specific attention will be paid to social movements and cooperation between cross ideological groups, because together they have the strongest capacity to organize protests against the regime (Clark, 2010: 103).
Tilly (2004: 3) defined social movements as ‘’sustained series of interactions between challenging groups and the state’’. Social movements consist out of the following mechanisms: first they are involved in a conflicted relationship in which they have a clear opponent. Second they are linked by informal networks. Third, they share a collective identity (Della Porta and Dani, 1998: 20). New Social Movements (NSMs) are characterized by the following features: decentralized, loose organizational structures, rejection of traditional leadership and reliance on members to initiate activities (Abdelrahman, 2013: 571). NSMs have a horizontal network in which there are no leaders. The movement’s capability of organizing is based on the initiative of its members. Lim argues that social media played an important role for opposition movements, because it provided the space and tools needed for protest formation and the expansion of networks (Lim, 2012: 244). The benefit of such a movement was that the horizontal structure made it harder for autocratic regimes to repress it, because there were no leaders or targets.
Cross-movements coalitions are coalitions between political movements that have different ideological backgrounds. An example of cross-movement coalitions can be found in the Middle East where over the last decade, Islamists, leftists, and other ideological streams have formed coalitions in opposition to their authoritarian regimes (Clark, 2010: 101). The term Islamist refers to diverse groups that advocate social, political and economic reform through the application of Islamic teaching (Schwedler, 2007: 57). Staggenborg (1986: 374) and Van Dyke (2003: 226) have both examined the circumstances that facilitate cooperation between
7 cross ideological movements. They argue that cross ideological movement coalitions are being influenced by their external environment. The position that the government takes against the opposition parties or movements may alter the costs of cooperation. For example Islamists and leftist parties may refuse to cooperate on the basis of ideological disputes. But when the government threatens to prosecute or threatens both of these groups, it becomes more interesting for both parties to try and work together to form a united front against the government and eventually reach a higher level of cooperation.
Table 3: Level of cross ideological cooperation Indicators
Low - Tactical - Issue by issue - Short term Mid-level - Strategic - Multiple issues - Engagement is sustained High level
- Develop collective vision - Encompasses broader issues of identity
- Shares the same worldview
Schdwedler and Clark (2006: 10) have defined three levels of cross ideological cooperation. The lowest level of cooperation is purely tactical: groups engage in joint activities on one issue and only cooperate on a short term basis. Cooperation can be repeated in the future but there needs to be a common narrative. The mid-level cooperation is more strategic and engagement is sustained and encompassing of multiple issues. On this level cooperation is based on a particular set of aims that can also be expanded, but is not forging a shared political vision or ideology. High level cooperation is when groups remain distinct entities but strive to develop a collective vision for political, social and economic reform (Schwedler and Clark, 2006: 10). High-level cooperation encompasses broader issues of identity and participants share the same worldview as well as specific policies about how to realize that vision.
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4. Methodology
This chapter will explain the methodology that has been used. In the first part the case selection will be justified. After that the research design and data collection will be described. Finally the limitations and strengths of the method will be explored.
4.1 Case selection
Figure 1: Electoral protests and Election fraud
The first reason why it is important to look at Egypt is its population size. Egypt is the most populous country in the MENA region and its population has been increasing rapidly over past decades. It has grown from 68 million in 2000 to 81 million in 2010 (worldbank, 2016). The second reason is that Egypt can be seen as a typical case with a strong in-case variation. What makes this case typical is that Egypt under Mubarak was an example of an authoritarian state that used election fraud to secure its own victory (Schedler, 2015: 1). This case is interesting for research, because there is a variation in the amount of electoral protests and election fraud between each election year as can be seen in figure 1.
Looking at figure 1 it becomes clear that the reports on fraud from the Nexis database vary for each election year. The most fraudulent events (61) were reported during the parliamentary elections of 2005. There is only a slight variation in the number of reported fraud in the parliamentary election of 2000 (26) and the parliamentary election of 2010 (35). Therefore it can be concluded that in each election year there was a certain level of fraud being used against the government, but no increasing pattern can be found when the three election years are compared. Furthermore figure 1 shows that there is a positive linear pattern in the amount of electoral protests. In the year 2000, no electoral protests were organized. In 2005, eleven electoral protests were organized against the use of fraud and in 2010
twenty-0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000 2005 2010 Electoral protests Election fraud
9 seven electoral protests were organized against the use of fraud. This increase in protests cannot simply be explained by looking at the increase in electoral fraud between the year 2000 and 2005, because in the year 2000 electoral fraud was happening during the elections, however there were no then there were no resulting electoral protests. Therefore other explanations must be used to account for the variance.
A typical case study make it possible to explore the causal-mechanisms that are at work in general (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 296). For Egypt this causal-mechanism was the relationship between electoral protest and election fraud. The advantage of such a case study is that by exploring the causal-mechanisms within a case it can be possible that new conclusions can be found (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 296).
4.2 Research Design
The research design that will be used is an in-case comparative analysis. It is comparative because three election years in Egypt (2000, 2005 and 2010) will be compared with each other. These election years were chosen because there was a variance in the amount of electoral protests during each election year. By comparing the three election years it becomes possible to analyze the amount of electoral protest and fraud, but also the circumstances in which they took place. The research method is a qualitative document analysis. This research method was chosen, because documents provide a broad coverage over a long period of time. This makes it possible to study the fraud and protests in each election year. Another advantage is that documents are exact, because they include names, places, dates and details of events that contributed to the creation of the context. The last reason why qualitative documents analysis was chosen, is that it less time-consuming than other research methods and it provides stability in the sense that the documents are not influenced by the presence of the researcher (Bowen, 2009: 31). A disadvantage of document analysis is that documents are produced for some other purpose than research. Therefore are documents not always providing enough detail to answer a research question (Bowen, 2009: 31).
4.3 Data
This part will have the following structure. First, the data that was used is listed and an explanation of how it was collected is provided. After, it will be described how the use of the Nexis database was used. Then there will be an explanation of how protests and election fraud were described and analyzed. Finally the strengths and limitations of the method are mentioned.
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4.3.1 Data collection
The data that was used consisted of newspaper articles from the Nexis database and Human Rights Watch reports on Egypt. The articles from the Nexis database are the main source and were obtained through contacts with the Electoral Contention and Violence Data Project (ECAV). The Human Rights Watch reports were used to provide background information on the political situation in Egypt. Furthermore, one interview was conducted with Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat, an Egyptian political scientist and previous member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The information from the interview was used to complement the findings from the database and the reports. This has been done by adding quotes from the interview that support or further explain the empirical findings.
4.3.2 Nexis database
The newspaper articles from the Nexis database describes contentious events during the election period in a country. In this database contentious events are defined as ‘’public acts of mobilization, contestation, or coercion by state or nonstate actors that are used to affect the electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition’’ (Daexker, 2016: 2). For each event the database described the following: date, location, actor, target, direction, violent/non-violent, deaths and participation number. The newspaper articles from the Nexis database were from the BBC, Associated Press and Agence Press France. The following keywords were used to find the events that were related to election fraud and political protest: elections, strike, riot, violence, attack, killing, intimidation, harassment, unrest.
Two types of contentious events were used from this data base: protests and types of election fraud. To select the protest from the database the following criteria were used: first, the protests must have happened during the election year of 2000, 2005 and 2010. Second, the protests must be clearly connected to one of the elections. Types of election fraud were selected with the following criteria: first the fraud must occur during the election year of 2000, 2005 and 2010. Second, fraudulent events were only selected when they were mentioned in the menu of manipulation from Schedler (2002: 42)
4.3.3 Describing electoral protest and election fraud
A combination of qualitative data and descriptive statistics was used to describe the electoral protests and electoral fraud. The descriptive statistics consisted of a number of graphs and figures that showed the variance in political protests and election fraud between each election year. The qualitative data on election fraud is based on a description of the context in which the fraud or protest took place. Because it was not possible to describe all the cases of fraud, a
11 selection was made of events that were representative for a type of fraud based on the menu of manipulation from Schedler (2002: 42). The examples consisted out of an analysis of how, where and by who the fraud and protests took place. The number of arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as an indicator of fraud, because they were the main opposition group. The qualitative data on protests is based on a description of the electoral protests with at least 1000 participants. For each protest a description of when, where, by who and why the protest was organized, has been included.
4.3.4 Limitation and strengths of method
It must be noted that it is impossible to establish the exact amount of fraud or electoral protests that was committed during the election year. It is likely that there were other reports of fraud or protests that were not mentioned in the Nexis database or in the Human Rights Watch reports. A possible explanation for this was that no Arabic sources were used that could possibly have mentioned them. Another explanation was that no reports were made when the fraud or protests happened in a remote area. Therefore the reports are skewed in the sense that most of the Nexis and HRW reports mention the events in the major cities and only occasionally mention reports in rural areas. There is also a temporal bias in the sense that newspapers such as the AP and AFP can report more on election fraud or electoral protests when these events have already happened in the past. This may be possibly why there were fewer reports in the year 2000. Another limitation is that the description of the protest and the reasons why they were organized is based on newspaper articles from the AP, APF and the BBC. No primary sources such as interviews were used with people who were there during the protests.
Yet because the documents were detailed and cover each election year they can be used as indicators of the level of fraud nevertheless. This research is qualitative but the combination of descriptive statistics and qualitative data gives more insight into the fraud and protests that took place during each election period. The descriptive statistics makes it possible to compare the variance in the amount of reported election fraud and electoral protests. The qualitative data makes it possible to provide a brief overview of the context and the reasons why the protests took place. For both fraud and protests a selection has been made of several events that give an illustration of how fraud can lead to protests.
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5. Case Study Egypt
The first part of this chapter will briefly examine political background of Egypt from its independence until Mubarak. This is then followed by an explanation of Egypt’s socio-economic background. The third part mentions the role and influence the main players had in organizing electoral protests against the government. These main players are: The Muslim
Brotherhood, the Kefaya movement, the April 6th Youth Movement and the National Alliance
for Reform and Change. Finally there is an analysis of the amount and types of election fraud and the electoral protests, during the election years 2000, 2005, 2010.
5.1 Political background
Egypt gained its independence from Britain in 1922 and acquired full sovereignty after WWII. In 1952 Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy and ruled the country until his death in 1970. His successor Anwar al-Sadat established a strong presidential system with nominal guarantees for political and civil rights that were not respected in practice (Freedomhouse, 2016). After Sadat’s assassination in 1981 Hosni Mubarak became president. Mubarak inherited a political system in which the presidency dominated the political order (Stacher, 2012: 5-6). The power of the president was provided by the 1971 constitution that enabled the president to overrule the People’s Assembly, issue laws in the absence of parliament, rule by degree and declare a state of emergency (Selim, 2015: 31).
In the 1980s the political system in Egypt saw some growth in political and civil liberties (Selim, 2015: 34). The regime wanted to form a front against the threat of extremist Islamist and was willing to pursue a policy of accommodation towards the opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s strongest opposition group. This policy of accommodation allowed the opposition groups to participate in the parliamentary elections and the Muslim Brotherhood was consequently allowed to participate in student union elections and the elections of professional syndycates (Selim, 2015: 34).
In the 1990s the Egyptian state changed its policy of accommodation and tightened its control of society. This started with the amendment of the Law of Political Parties in 1992. This law limited the activities of existing parties and members of any new parties were not allowed to exercise any political activity as long as the party had not been approved by the Committee of Political parties and Affairs (Selim, 2015: 35). In 1999 the regime introduced Law 153/1999 by which the regime gained more control over the activities of civil society organizations.
13 This law prohibited NGO’s from carrying out any political activities such as providing legal aid, election monitoring and the defence of political prisoners (Selim, 2015: 35).
In 1995 the parliamentary elections were held. The NDP won with 388 seats the New Wafd party had 6 seats, the Tagammu Party had 5 seats and the Muslim Brotherhood who ran as independents gained 17 seats. In July 2000 the SCC (Supreme Constitutional Court) declared the election to be invalid on the basis that the law governing the election was unconstitutional (Selim, 2015: 36). The SCC was independent from executive authority and acted as a catalyst to promote electoral reform, freedom of expression and the protection of civil society and opposition groups (Selim, 2015: 31). After the ruling of the SCC the supervision of the 2000 parliamentary elections came into in the hands of the judges.
5.2 International context
For decades Egypt received $1.55 billion annually from the US $1.3 billion in the form of military assistance and $250 million in economic assistance. This gave the US considerable influence over Egypt’s policy (Selim, 2015: 99). After the 9/11 attacks there was an increase in the focus on democracy promotion and political reform in the Arab World (Selim, 2015: 81). The US invested in democracy promotion in Egypt through several projects such as the Middle East partnership Initiative (MEPI). One of the main pillars of this project was to form free trade agreements with Middle Eastern countries. The Bush administration used this free trade agreement to pressure Mubarak for further democratic reforms (Selim, 2015: 85). This free trade agreement had the potential to increase Egypt’s economic output by 3,6 per cent as well as allowing Egyptian companies greater access to the US market overtime. In March 2005 the US government launched another round of free trade talks with Egypt. During these meetings the Egyptian government promised to hold open presidential elections. This initiative triggered an unprecedented number of protests and civil activism in Egypt.
5.3 Socio-economic background
Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East. The population between the ages of 15-29 make’s up one-third of the country’s total population (Lim, 2012: 234). About 45% of the population lives in urban areas. During the period of 2000-2010 the Egyptian economy grew around 5 per cent a year. But Egypt’s wealth did not trickle down to its workers. The unemployment rate stayed around 8%, but youth unemployment was much higher and by December 2010 it reached 24%. Furthermore 40% of its population lived on less than 1 dollar per day (Lim, 2012: 235).
14 In May 1991 the Egyptian government signed an agreement with the IMF in order to reduce its debt and seek macro-economic stability. This agreement was known as the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP). Reform occurred in two main policy areas. The first one was focused on short-term stabilization and included reforms that would reduce public consumption and achieve sustainable growth. The second was focused on long term structural adjustments and included privatization of the public sector, liberalization of the economic infrastructure and a more market-oriented economy (Selim, 2015:52). The outcome of the ERSAP resulted in the stabilization of the economy. The GDP growth rate increased from 1.9 per cent in 1991/1992 to 7,2 per cent in 2007/08 (Selim, 2015: 52).
Figure 2: Egypt’s GDP (WorldBank, 2016).
Nevertheless, the influence of the ERSAP was positive at the macro level but between 2000-2010 there were indicators that showed that the socio-economic conditions in Egypt where declining (Selim, 2015: 59). Living costs increased because the government would no longer provide social subsidies and the total inflation rate for basic food and beverages increased with 128 per cent between 2001-2008. The increase in unemployment was visible in the diminishing government role in creating job opportunities for graduates in state-owned enterprises. The unemployment for secondary school graduates increased from 22.4 per cent in 2001 to 61.9 per cent in 2006. The number of Egyptians living in absolute poverty increased from 10.7 million in 2000 to 13.6 million in 2005.
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5.4 Main political actors
The following part presents the political actors that played that an important role in organizing political and electoral protests against the regime. For each actor a description is given of its history and its function in Egypt’s society. In the last part the triangular relation between the government, the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition groups is explained.
5.4.1 Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was created in 1928 and wanted to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism. It combined Islamic ideology with grass-roots political activism and called for Islamic law in Egypt. (Leiker and Brooke, 2007: 108). The Muslim Brotherhood was banned since 1954 and renounced violence in 1970. The state tolerated some of its activities, but its leaders were frequently arrested. Although the MB was banned its members were still active in parliament as independent candidates. But their affiliations to the MB were well known.
Despite the fact that it was banned the MB was Egypt’s most powerful opposition group (Antar, 2006: 4). The MB had thousands of supporters across the country and it was the country’s most powerful Islamic movement. One of the strengths of the Muslim Brotherhood was that it interacted with the wider society. It did so by using its contacts in mosques, university campuses and syndicates. The Brotherhood was popular among students, because it provided material services to all students. The MB had built a reputation that cared about student interests. Examples for such material services were the sales of cheap academic books or medical and engineering tools. The MB gained its legitimacy from its support from the masses. It spent decades constructing a grass root network linking mosques, schools, clinics, financial institutions and other community groups that raise money and attract followers. The MB controlled 20% of the active NGOs in Egypt and was often referenced as a state within a state (Antar, 2006: 12). The MB had many followers, but especially so in middle income areas. The people there believed that the Brotherhood tackled the problems of daily life, such as providing drinking water or paving the roads. In contrast, they regarded the government as corrupt and inefficient. During an election period, people often voted for Muslim Brotherhood members, because they were community leaders and looked up to them.
‘’That people look up to them as community leaders. And they happen to be a Muslim Brotherhood member so they would vote for them anyway’’ (Ezzat, 2016).
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5.4.2 Kefaya movement
In 2004 a new group entered Egypt’s political arena called the Kefaya movement. Kefaya (meaning ‘enough’) first organized major anti-Mubarak demonstration in the autumn of 2004. Kefaya did not see itself as a political party, but as a movement. It functioned as an umbrella that contained a coalition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition parties. Its goal was to break the paralysis of Egyptian politics and promote a new political environment with more democratization. The movement was unique in its successful efforts to unite communists, nationalists and Islamists members (Oweidat et al, 3: 2008).
‘’Kefaya was a platform and many members of Kefaya were Muslim Brothers at the same time. So Kefaya was not something completely separate from the Muslim brothers and was not under the authority of the Muslim Brothers’’ (Ezzat, 2016).
Table 4: Kefaya’s structure
Kefaya had a horizontally structured network and its decisions were taken by consensus between different political forces, namely the Nasserites (Al-Karama Party), the Marxist-Socialists (The Revolutionary Socialist Organization), Liberals (Al-Ghad Party), Islamists (Al-Wasat party and Labor Party) and some independent figures (El-Mahdi, 2009: 9). This consensus was reached by addressing at issues which all groups could agree on and avoiding issues that caused disagreements (Abdelrahman, 2009: 45).
‘’Kefays itself cannot mobilize on the street. Because the members of Kefaya had their own little tiny circles that they bring together to mobilize. And the circle of the MB is that big’’. (Ezzat, 2016).
In the past decade Egypt’s internet users have increased significantly (see figure 3) and Kefaya used the internet to organize political protests (Oweidat et al, 20-22: 2008). Kefaya communicated with its members through: electronic messages, online advertisements,
Kefaya
Muslim Brotherhood
Opposition
parties
:
17 political cartoons, and also used bloggers and online video’s to access the general public and the international media (Oweidat et al, 21:2008).
Figure 3: Egypt’s internet use (RealtimeStatisticsproject, 2016)
The rise of the Kefaya movement materialized at the same time that the blogosphere in Egypt came into existence. Prior to 2005 there were only 40 bloggers in Egypt, by 2005 it had increased to 400 and by September 2006 they jumped to more than 1800 (Lim, 2012: 237). The blogosphere had two important roles within Kefaya. First, it provided the means to mobilize and second, it made people aware of the regime’s corruption and police brutality by sharing videos and stories of violence and sexual assaults by police forces (Oweidat et al, 2008: 22-23). The forum on Kefaya’s Web site was used to document corruption on police brutality, monitor local events, and publish articles.
5.4.3 The April 6th Youth Movement & National Association for Change
After 2005 the influence of Kefaya and its ability to organize protests declined. By the end of 2006 Kefaya had largely disappeared from the streets (Lim, 2012: 238). However other social movements took its place, one of which those was the National Association for Change. This movement brought together a number of youth movements and political groups. But the most important one was the April 6the Youth Movement. They represented young Egyptians from different political backgrounds and were the first opposition group to make use of facebook (Lim, 2010: 239). The movement used blogs, YouTube, Flickr, e-mails and text messages to reach the Egyptian youth. Many young Egyptians joined the movement not because they
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Egypt's internet users *1000
Egypt's internet users *1000
18 were political, but because their friends were inviting them. The movement grew to 70.000 members in 2009.
5.4.4 Triangular relationship: Government, MB and Opposition groups
Figure 4: Triangular relationship between the Government, the MB and Opposition groups
* Opposition parties in Egypt: New Wafd pary, National progressive Unionist Party, Arab Democratic Nasserist party, Liberal Socialist party, AL-Ghad party, Islamist Labor party
In Egypt the relationship between the three main political groups can be seen as triangular (see figure 4). The three main groups were: the government, the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition groups. The latest group consisted out of the different opposition parties and the social movements. The bond between the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups (C) has long been divided by ideological differences between Islamist leftists and liberals. These differences resulted in a fragmented opposition force that was easily suppressed by the regime. As previously mentioned the Kefaya movement and other social movements were able to strengthen this bond between the MB and other opposition groups by creating a platform that would allow each group to maintain their independence and at the same time cooperate with other groups (Adelrahman, 2009: 45). But the cooperation between the MB and other opposition groups focused on short term missions and specific demands. The initiative for collaboration mostly came from the leftists because they were considered as the weaker partner in the coalition. The Muslim Brotherhood consistently ignored invitations from other parties to participate in protests (Adelrahman, 2009: 45).
Government
*Opposition parties & social
movements Muslim
19 ‘The two political programmes are very different and there is no attempt to find a common middle ground or formulate a new programme that is a combination of elements of the two. Each side retains its independent political character’ (Abdelrahman, 2009: 46).
The bond between the MB and the government (A) can be described as an informal pact. The Muslim Brotherhood was Egypt’s strongest opposition force and therefore the regime arrested thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members to prevent the MB from gaining more influence. However the regime was also aware they could not fully suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities. The Muslim Brotherhood provided many social services in society that the state was not able to provide (Antar, 2006: 5). Furthermore the regime was afraid that if the Muslim Brotherhood was completely suppressed, a more violent Islamic group would take its place (Walsh, 2003: 32). The deal created between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime was that the regime continue to suppress the MB in the form of arrests, but would allow them to still have a role in society. The most clearest example of this deal was that Muslim Brotherhood members were allowed to participate in the parliamentary election as independent candidates.
5.5 Elections 2000
Here a short summary of the political situation in Egypt in 2000 will be given before examining the use of election fraud before and during the elections. There were no reports of any electoral protests in that year. Therefore only the use of election fraud is described in the data. This was done by looking at the number of arrests against the MB and the reports on election fraud from the Nexis database. Furthermore several examples were given of the most common type of fraud that was used.
5.5.1 Political situation in Egypt in 2000
In the year 2000 the government of Mubarak intensified its efforts to control civil society institutions and restricting activities of political parties (Human Rights Watch, 2001). On May 20, 2005 the activities of the Islamist Labour Party were frozen and its publications were banned. This act was widely believed to be part of a government strategy to silence the opposition ahead of the elections (Human Rights Watch, 2001). In the months leading up to the elections 1600 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 7). During that period twenty Muslim Brotherhood members were being trialed in military courts, accused of membership of an illegal organization. But it was widely known that the government tried to prevent that these MB member running as independent candidate during the elections (Human Rights Watch, 2001).
20 Table 5: Election date’s 2000
18-10-2000: Parliamentary elections stage 1 28-10-2000: Parliamentary elections stage 2
8-11-2000: Parliamentary elections stage 3
The parliamentary elections of 2000 started on 18 October 2000 and were held in three stages to allow monitors to travel across the voting regions. This was the first time that legislative elections were held under the supervision of judges. In the past elections were held on one day, but in July 2000 the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that judges must monitor all polling stations. Nevertheless, despite the supervision of judges massive fraud was still committed by the government and the NDP won with 87,8 % of the votes (Thabet, 2006: 17).
Table 6 :Distribution of seats 2000 (Thatbet, 2006: 17)
Political groups Total
National Democratic Party (NDP) 388
New Wafd Party 7
Muslim Brotherhood (as independents) 17
Nasserite Party 3
Independents 20
Others 17
5.5.1 Examples of election fraud 2000
In the year 2000 there were 26 fraudulent events recorded by the Nexis database: 1 case of violence against candidates, 8 cases of repression against voters and 17 cases of polling stations being blocked by police officers. The most common type of fraud during the parliamentary elections was the closing/ blocking of polling stations by police officers. This happened, for example, during the third stage on November 8 in Hawamdeya south of Cairo, where voters became fed up with the delays and hurled stone at the police that were blocking the way to the polling stations. The Hawamdeya protesters set fire to tires and were dispersed by the police with tear gas (Mortimer, 2000: 1). In Abnub in the Assiut province, police cordoned off the polling station after they realized that most of the voters supported an independent candidate running against the ruling candidate. Riots broke out in response and voters threw rocks at the police who responded with tear gas and baton charges (Mortimer, 2000: 4). In many other cases, voters that wanted to vote for the opposition parties were denied entrance into the polling station. This resulted in several clashes with the police. In the first stage these clashes lead to the death of one person, with 60 injured. In the second stage,
21 clashes involving rival groups and police intensified. For example in Kerdasa a town 16 kilometres west of Cairo, two Muslim Brotherhood members were running as independents. The voters in that area were chased by policemen to keep them away from the polling station. Despite these clashes and the use of fraud there were no reports of electoral protests organized against the use of fraud.
Figure 4: Types of fraud election fraud in 2000
5.6 Elections 2005
The structure of this part will be as follows. First a summary of the political situation in Egypt in 2005 will be given. This is followed by a description of the other elections earlier that year: The May 6 referendum and the Presidential referendum on September 7. For each election a chronological narrative is given that describes all the protests in which at least 1000 people participated. Finally for each different type of fraud an illustrative example will be described.
5.6.1 Political situation Egypt in 2005
In the year 2005 more demonstrations and protests were organized that explicitly called for Mubarak to step down, then in the previous twenty-five years combined (El-Mahdi, 2009: 1) . Street protests were forbidden in Egypt and in previous years they were almost non-existent due to being met by harsh reprisals from the state. However, in 2005 the political climate in Egypt was opening up in the form of an increasing number of protests organized by new social movements such as Kefaya.
Types of fraud: Parliamentary
election 2000
Violence against
opposition candidates (1) Repression against voters (8)
Closing/blocking of polling stations (17) Bribing of voters (2) Stuffing of ballot boxes (1)
22
Table 7: Election date’s 2005
06-05-2005: Constitutional referendum
07-09-2005: Presidential referendum
09-11-2005: Parliamentary elections first round stage 1
15-11-2005: Parliamentary elections run-off stage 1
20-11-2005: Parliamentary election first round stage 2
26-11-2005: Parliamentary elections run-off stage 2
1-12-2005: Parliamentary elections first round stage 3
7-12-2005: Parliamentarian elections run-off stage 3
In 2005 three elections were held in Egypt: A constitutional referendum on May 6, the presidential referendum on September 7 and the parliamentarian elections that were held over three rounds in November and December. Each of these elections was won in favour of the NDP and Mubarak, but there were massive reports of fraud during these elections (Anatar, 2006: 11). Compared to earlier elections in Egypt the use of fraud by the government is nothing new, but 2005 was the first year in which nationwide protests were organized against the use of fraud and against Mubarak. In total there were twenty-one political protests organized in the year 2005. Of the twenty-one protests twelve were organized in response to the use of fraud by the government. Of these twelve protests the majority (7) were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. The biggest protest against electoral fraud was held on 18 November in Alexandria when 20.000 people participated against the barring of candidates at polling centers
Figure 5 shows that 19% of the political protests were organized against Mubarak and the possible succession of his son Gamal. From 2000 there were indicators that Mubarak could appoint his son as possible successor. Gamal joined the NDP in January 2000 and after a few months he was appointed to the general secretariat. Two years later in 2002 he was named Secretary-general for policies, the party’s third most powerful position. At that time Gamal was thirty-eight years old and Mubarak was seventy-four. People feared a repetition of the succession in Syria. In 2000 president Hafiz al-Assad died at the age of seventy and was succeeded by his son Bashar al-Assad who was thirty four. Gamal and Mubarak always denied a possible inheritance of power, but by the opposition and social movements such as Kefaya it was believed that Gamal was being groomed to become the next president (TheWashintonInstitute, 2002).
23 Figure 5: Reason for protest in 2005
.
What follows will be a description of all the political protests that happened in 2005. Most of these protests were organized around one of the three elections that happened that year. Therefore the description is divided into three parts: The May referendum, the presidential referendum and the parliamentarian elections.
5.6.2 May referendum
The constitutional referendum that was held on May 6 2005 allowed multiple candidates to participate in the presidential referendum that would be held on September 7. Until then Mubarak was the only presidential candidate. This referendum was met by strong criticism from the opposition and civil society movements such as Kefaya. Their biggest critic was that the constitutional amendment that was proposed, allowed a multi-candidate presidential election for the first time, but it was phrased in such a way that it benefited Mubarak the most The constitutional amendments stipulated that presidential candidates must get 250 recommendations from both houses of parliament. But the opposition groups said that it is impossible to get, because both houses were dominated by the NDP (Antar: 2006: 8).
The first political protest in 2005 was organized on February 21, 2005 and was the largest anti-Mubarak protest in history at the time. The protest was organized five days after Mubarak announced that he would allowed more than one candidate to run for the presidential elections (Brouwers, 2007: 5). This demonstration included demonstrators from various ideological trends, including leftists Islamists and liberals. On March 27, 2005 the Muslim Brotherhood organized a demonstration in which Kefaya and other groups participated, calling for political reforms (Brouwers, 2007: 5).
Reason for protests 2005
Against election fraud (12)
Political reform (5)
Anti-Mubarak/ Gamal (4)
24 On May 6, the day of the constitutional referendum the Muslim Brotherhood organized different protests across the country. There were protests in Cairo, the Nile delta region, Suez, Cairo and in Mansura. These protests were organized in response to the wave of arrest against MB members. Arresting Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters was a widely used tactic by the regime (Antar, 2006: 51). The government used a degree from 1954 that banned the Muslim Brotherhood for alleged acts of violence in order to arrest thousands of Brotherhood members on the basis of their membership (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 3) During the demonstration in Mansura, security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse to crowd, resulting in the death of one person after inhaling tear gas.
After the May referendum the Muslim Brotherhood and Kefaya organized several protests against the use of election fraud and demanded democratic change. Take for example May 9 2005 when more than 4000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated in front of a mosque in the Asyut governorate. They were protesting against the arrest of 26 Muslim Brotherhood members. The protesters were demanding their release and called for political reforms (BBC, 2005). On May 10 the Muslim Brotherhood organized a wave of reform rallies across the country demanding political reform (Agence France Presse, 2005). On June 1 2005 in Cairo, 1000 political activists and journalists protested against sexual assaults experienced by female journalists and protesters during the May 6 referendum. On August 14 2005 more than 60000 protesters from the National Alliance for Reform and Change demonstrated against Mubarak. The National Alliance for Reform and Change is a coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The reason for the protest was Mubarak’s decision not to allow international monitors observe Septembers presidential poll (El-Magd, 2005:1).
In July and August cross-ideological protests were organized between Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood. During these protests it became clear that both parties used a different strategy and style that influenced their cooperation. For example, on July 20 2005 the Muslim Brotherhood and Kefaya organized a pro-reform protest in which over 5000 demonstrators demanded for more democratic change. During the protest the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood decided to leave. The reason for this was that members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood would shout ‘’Islam is the solution’’ and raising the Qur’an. In contrast the more secular groups focused on criticizing the regime and Mubarak, and didn’t want to mention Islam (El-Magd, 2005:1).
25
5.6.3 Presidential referendum 2005
The second election in 2005 was the presidential referendum on September 7 2005. During this referendum Mubarak won with 88,6% of the votes (Brownlee, 2008: 26). His biggest competitor was Ayman Nour who got 7,3% of the votes. Ayman Nour was the leader of the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) party. Beside the Muslim Brotherhood he was seen as the leading opposition leader. After the election he became a target of the regime. On 24 December 2005 Nour was convicted on the basis of forgery charges. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment (Brownlee, 2008: 74).
On September 7 2005 the day of the presidential referendum, there were widespread charges of voter fraud and intimidation. More than 3000 people marched through downtown Cairo to protest against Mubarak. The police did not intervene during the protests, but two demonstrators were beaten by government supporters. (Fam, 2005: 1). The following are examples of the fraud that was reported: In Beni Suef, 90 kilometres south of Cairo, NDP officials were intimidating and bribing voters. In a poor neighborhood in Cario votes were sold for $10. In the southern town of Luxor, 500 kilometres from Cairo, university students were told that they could not vote unless they had an NDP-issued voting card (Fam, 2005:1).
When Mubarak was sworn in on September 27 2005 a group of 2000 activists staged an ant-Mubarak protest during the ceremony in downtown Cairo. This protest was organized by Kefaya. Amin Iskandar, a leader of the movement said that ‘’We will no longer recognize Mubarak as president’’ (Hendawi, 2005: 1). After the presidential referendum the opposition groups formed a united front against the government for during the parliamentarian election. In October 2005 the United National Front for Change (UNFC) was founded. This group brought together the following 11 political parties and opposition groups: The Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd party, Tagammu, Nasserists, Labour Party, Wassat and Karma party, Kefaya, the Popular Campaign for Change, the National Coalition for Democratic Transformation, the National Alliance for Reform and Change (Selim, 2015: 117).
5.7 Parliamentary election 2005
5.7.1 Examples of election fraud
The third election in 2005 was the parliamentary election that was held in November and December 2005. In the months leading up to the elections 800 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 7). The parliamentary election was
26 divided in to three stages each consisting of two rounds (See table 7). The government party, the NDP, won the election with 70% of the votes. Figure 6 illustrates that there were thirty-one reports in the Nexis database on the closing/ blocking of polling stations. This happened, for example in Sandoub 75 miles north of Cairo. Hundreds of people lined up in front of a school used as a polling station, but were prevented from approaching by lines of riot police, armed with sticks, rifles and tear gas. In the town of Bussat voters were shouting at the police that were blocking the entrance to the pooling station. Men and woman were putting up ladders to climb over the back walls to cast their vote in the polling station (El-Magd, 2005: 1).
’People would go to vote and they would find a very long queue, they say oke it is a day off officially. So we can stand for an hour or two. But it doesn’t move, inside they keep saying to those who were staying in the row. There are so many people inside that we can’t let you in. Eventually people get bored and they leave’’. (Ezzat, 2016).
Figure 6: Types of fraud in Parliamentary elections 2005
Other examples of the blocking of polling station were seen in the north Sinai town of el-Arish and three other Nile Delta provinces. There clashes broke out between voters and the police when voters were waiting for hours outside polling stations, but were blocked by lines of police forces (El-Magd, 2005: 1). In total 30 people were injured during the clashes. At a polling station in the city of Zagazig there was a clash between Muslim Brotherhood members and government supporters. The clash erupted when government supporters attacked voters who were trying to get past the police blockade. The police used tear gas
Types of fraud in 2005
Repression against opposition candidates (9) Repression against voters (15) Closing/blocking of polling stations (31) False voter registration (2)Bribing voters (3) Stuffing of ballot boxes (1)
27 against the MB members and the voters but did not arrest the government supporters (El-Magd: 2005). There were also several reports of repression against Muslim Brotherhood voters and supporters who were attacked by Mubarak supporters. Some of the Mubarak supporters had a criminal backgrounds and were described as government thugs.
‘’The people that are supporting the government can be thugs and not necessarily using violence. So people are brought who support the government and have some sort of criminal background or record and they make a mess in popular areas ‘’(Ezzat, 2016).
‘’They were not joking and that is way the government increasingly used thugs. Because at the end of the day an officer has got limitations in the degree of violence he can use.’’(Ezzat, 2016).
Table 8: Distribution of seats 2005 (Sharp, 2005: 5).
Political groups Total
National Democratic Party (NDP) 324
Muslim Brotherhood (as independents) 88
Secular Parties: 12
Unresolved: 12
Appointed 10
Independents 8
5.7.1 Examples of electoral protests
The first stage of the legislative elections was held on November 9 with run-off elections on November 15. During this stage of the election there were three reports of protests against fraud. One of those protests was staged in Cairo on November 11 2005, with a turnout of three thousand supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were protesting the rigged results of parliamentary vote that was in favour of the NDP. A Brotherhood spokesman named Abdelmonem Mahmud claimed that the judges at the polling station expelled all the monitors and opposition party’s delegates to be able to rig the vote. (Agence France Presse, 2005: 1). During another protest on November 15 2005 several thousand Brotherhood supporters demonstrated in front of the main counting centre for the Cairo district of Nasr city (El-Magd, 2005). One of the biggest protests was a demonstration of some 20.000 women who demonstrated veiled in Alexandria on November 18 2005. The demonstration was organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. After the polls closed several thousand Brotherhood supporters were demonstrating in front of the main counting center of Cairo. They were protesting that security forces were barring candidates and monitors from
28 attending the ballot count (Agence France Presse, 2005: 1). During the first and second stage the Muslim Brotherhood members, played an important role on monitoring the election results within the polling stations. MB members were assigned a station to attend the counting and to make sure that no fraud was committed.
‘’You were given a mission. You kill yourself over this box, don’t let them. And you stay there and you have to be present during the counting. This is what made them win in 2005. Because it was a zero sum game, it was a fight for Islam.’’(Ezzat, 2016)
On 12 December 2005 a few hundred Kefaya activists took part in a demonstration in front of the public prosecutor’s office in Cairo. The opposition activists were opposing the results of the recent elections and were calling for solidarity in order to topple the parliament. Among the protesters were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Kefaya Movement, the Al-Wafd party, the Al-Karamah party, the Al-Ghadd party, independent MP’s, the April 6 Movement, and the National Assembly for Change (Agence France Presse, 2010: 1).
Table 9: Political protests in 2005
Date Place & governorate Number of participants Groups participating Reason(s) for protest
Feb 21, 2005 unknown unknown Leftists,
Islamists and Liberals
Mubarak announces candidacy
March 27, 2005 unknown unknown MB Political reforms
May 6, 20051 Mansura/ Dakalia governorate 5000 MB Pro-reform rally May 9, 2005 Asyut governorate 4000 MB Against arrest of MB members
May 10, 2005 Egypt unknown MB Against arrests
of MB members
May 25, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
governorate
unknown Kefaya Against May 6
referendum
Jun 1, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
governorate 1000 Political activists and journalists Sexual assaults on female journalists and protesters during referendum
29
June 22, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
650 Political
activists
Demanding political reform
July 14, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate 2000 Pro-reform activists and Kefaya Against unemployment and reelection of Mubarak
July 20, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
5000 Kefaya and MB Demanding
democratic change
August 14, 2005 Egypt 60.000 National
Alliance for Reform and Change Democratic reform and election transparency
Sep 7, 2005 2 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate 3000 Kefaya and political activists Against fraud and intimidation
Sep 10, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate 2000 Kefaya, Marxist party, Al-Ghad party Against fraud in presidential referendum
Sep 27, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate 3000 Kefaya and political activists Anti-Mubarak protest
Nov 11, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
3000 MB Against fraud in
parliamentary elections
Nov 15, 2005 Nasr City/ Cairo
Governorate Several thousands MB Against fraud and blocking of polling stations Nov 18, 2005 Alexandria/ Alexandria Governorate 20.000 MB Against the barring of candidates Dec 1, 2005 Mansura/ Dakalia governorate
unknown MB Against police
blockade’s at polling station
Dec 5, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
200 Al-Ghad party Against arrest of
opposition leader Aymon Nour
Dec 12, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
A few hundred MB, Kefaya ,
the Al-Wafd party, the Al-Karamah party,
Against fraud in the elections and against the legitimacy of the
30 the Al-Ghad party, independent MP’s, the April 6 Movement, and the National Assembly for Change
new parliament.
Dec 24, 2005 Cairo/ Cairo
Governorate
200 Al-Ghad party Against arrest of
opposition leader Aymon Nour
1= Day of constitutional referendum 2= Day of presidential referendum
5.8 2010 Parliamentary election
Table 10: Elections date’s 2010
28-11-2010: Parliamentary election round 1
5-12-2010: Parliamentary election round 2
5.8.1 Political situation Egypt 2010
Despite the rise of political protests calling for open and fair elections the government undertook several measures that would helped secure their victory in the parliamentary election. One of those measures was that the government had drastically limited independent judicial supervision of the polling stations (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 4). The government had rejected calls from the Egyptian population and other governments for international observers. The other measure was that in October 2010 the government silenced several satellite channels that were critical of the regime. Opposition leader Ibrahim Eissa said that ‘the Egyptian regime cannot give up cheating in elections, so the only solution for the authorities is to stop talk about rigging, rather than stopping the rigging itself’(Human Rights Watch, 2010: 5).
In 2010 new social movements such as the April 6 Youth Movement and ‘We are all Khaled Sais’ organized political protests against Mubarak to step down. On April 6 2010 the April 6 Youth Movement organized a demonstration that called for an end of the state of emergency and asked for open and inclusive presidential elections (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 4). Two months later in June 2010, widespread demonstrations took place in Alexandria after 28-year
