Diaspora activism in transnational
social spaces
CASE STUDY: RIFFIAN DIASPORA ACTIVISM IN THE WAKE OF THE
HIRAK IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
Word count: 8,684
Emmelien Lievens
Student number: 01810222
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Koenraad Bogaert
Journal Article
A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Conflict and Development Studies
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Abstract
In October 2016, the Hirak, a popular movement, arose in the Rif, the Northern mountain region of Morocco. Later, protest occurs in the Riffian diaspora in Europe and the stronger the repression of the Makhzen1 was in Morocco, the stronger the protest in Europe became. This article tries to give an
insight in the activism that occurs in Belgium and the Netherlands, based on in-depth interviews with activists of the Riffian diaspora. Diaspora protest is often projected as an act of solidarity towards the people and/or the state of the country of origin. I state that this view is too narrow. By analyzing diaspora activism in its transnational social spaces, we distinguish four actors to provide a holistic view on the Riffian diaspora activism: the Riffian diaspora, the Hirak movement, the Makhzen and the Belgian, Dutch and European governments. In the first instance, they try to support the Hirak movement, secondly, they contest the diaspora politics of the Makhzen toward them. Thirdly, we see that they address them to the Belgian, Dutch and European governments to strengthen them in the previous two. In this case study, we could say that diaspora communities are not only mobilizing around grievances of the country of origin, but also around grievances connected to their position as a diaspora community in their country of settlement.
Acknowledgment
This article is the result of an intense year. It would not have been possible without the help of some people, who I would like to thank. In the first instance, I would like to thank my respondents who participated and gave me useful insights. Secondly, I want to thank my promoter Koen Bogaert for his support, input and feedback. Not only as a promoter, but also as a professor he gives my various interesting insights on how to conduct a research. I also want to thank professor Marlies Casier, who helped me find my way in the literature about diaspora and transnationalism. Further I want to thank my friends and family who were always willing to listen and debate about my article and who have been supportive the last year. At last, I sincerely want to thank my parents for giving me the opportunity to follow this master and for creating a loving and comfortable environment in which I could write this article during the Covid-19 crisis.
1 In this article, I will use the term Makhzen instead of the Moroccan government. This term referred to the royal family and its network of elite. Thereby I want to emphasize that their power is central and dominant compared to the elected government.
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Introduction
“Thanks for giving attention to the Hirak.”, stated one of my first respondents. In the following interviews, similar comments highlighted the need for sharing the story of the Hirak. “Little attention goes to the Hirak, journalists don’t want to write about it. It’s probably not dramatic enough.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 17 April 2020) In October 2016, the Hirak, a popular movement, arose in the Rif, a Northern mountain region of Morocco. The movement is suing the long-standing abandonment of the region. It got support in the rest of Morocco and abroad. Also, in Europe protest occurred in the Riffian diaspora.
To be honest it was also out of indignation that I did not hear about the Hirak movement before, that I started this research one year ago. My respondents, part of the Riffian diaspora in Belgium and the Netherlands, all try to share the story of the Hirak in their own way. Although also I am convinced that this story needs to be spread, I came across another valuable story to be shared. In this article, I want to look at the Riffian diaspora itself and more specific the activism that occurs within this group in the wake of the Hirak movement.
Diaspora protest is often portraited as a form of mobilization within a diaspora community that aims to intervene in the political struggles in the country of origin. They want to show solidarity with the state and/or the people there. Within diaspora studies, a lot of literature concentrates on the unique position of diaspora in conflicts of their country of origin, for example by seeing them as agents of democratization. Also, the demonstrations in Brussels and other European cities, have been seen as the Riffian diaspora who demonstrates in support of the Hirak movement in the Rif. Through answering the research question ‘How does diaspora activism in the wake of the Hirak movement play
out in the Riffian diaspora in Belgium and the Netherlands?’, I try to show the narrowness of this view.
By analyzing the Riffian diaspora in their transnational social spaces, we see that their activism is embedded in a network of relations. In the case study we focus on the agency of the diaspora community and analyze the relations the diaspora community has towards certain actors. I state that diaspora protest not only goes about grievances in their country of origin, but also says something about their own grievances as diaspora community in their country of settlement. In the case study of the Riffian diaspora, I distinguish three dimensions to describe the activism that occurs in the wake of the Hirak movement. In first instance, the Riffian diaspora mobilizes indeed around the grievances of the Riffian people living in Morocco. Secondly, they contest the Moroccan diaspora politics towards them. In third instance, they also mobilize around the politics of the Netherlands and Belgium and in a larger context the European Parliament, in response to the Moroccan politics and the Moroccan diaspora.
The article is structured as follows, first we expand on the research method and the research design. In the second section I put this case study within a broader theoretical debate, by elaborating on the concepts of diaspora and transnational social space. Before I elaborate on the three main premises cited above, I give a brief history of the migration from Morocco to Belgium and the Netherlands.
Research question and methodology
In this article, I try to give an answer to the following research question: How does diaspora activism
in the wake of the Hirak movement play out in the Riffian diaspora in Belgium and the Netherlands?
This case study has the aim to understand diaspora activism by analyzing it in transnational social spaces. This angle of analyzing diaspora activism, can been applied on activism of other diaspora
3 communities. We can consider this research as “an intensive study of single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, p.341). Through the transnational character of the activism, it’s difficult to have a territorial demarcation. For this research, I have chosen to concentrate on diaspora activism in Belgium and the Netherlands because of the intense cooperation between the Belgian and Dutch activists. Similar activism occurs in Spain and France, but because of their colonial background in Morocco, I consider them as an area that should be analyzed separately.
Little literature exists about the Hirak movement and the demonstrations abroad, so I used in-depth interviews to overcome the limited written sources (Della Porta, 2014). My primary sources are interviews I conducted with activists, which makes it possible to bring more human agency to the center of my analysis (Blee, 2013). The interviews give me insights in the motives, beliefs and emotions of the activists. Working with semi-structured interviews creates the possibility to get more in-depth answers on certain questions and change the questions over time and with various respondents. For instance, in the interviews with the female respondents I asked more about the experience of women within diaspora activism. These data are complemented with secondary sources like recordings of debate evenings on the theme, reports of human rights organizations and previous research and analysis on the theme.
In the beginning, I went searching for people who are supportive of the Riffian protest in Belgium and the Netherlands, departing from my own contacts within the peace movement. Besides that, I also contacted people mentioned in news articles about the protest, which often led me to spokespeople of the Riffian protest, who are in most cases highly skilled middle-aged men. Getting them aboard as entry point helped to take away some suspicion around the research and towards myself as researcher. From that point onwards, through a snowball effect, I came to the achieved sample. This article is based on in-depth interviews with ten interviewees. Nine of the respondents are activists: four Belgian and five Dutch. Three of the participating activists are female, the others were men. I chose to keep all the activists anonymous, with the main reason to keep them under the radar of the Makhzen and its ‘long arm’. In addition, I also had an interview with expert Sietske de Boer, a Dutch journalist and writer who has lived in Morocco for 12 years. It was interesting for me to talk to her about our position as outsiders.
The first five interviews were held in person, in both Belgium and the Netherlands. As the Covid-19 virus and lockdown constrained opportunities to meet in person, I eventually switched to interviews on Skype and through e-mail. Although Skype-interviews created more flexibility regarding the timing of the interviews, it was more difficult to find respondents willing to conduct interviews online. Online interviewing also made it more difficult to obtain in-depth responses to sensitive questions (La lacome, Symonds & Brown, 2016). This became clear, for example, by the reply to a question about the pressure they feel of the Makhzen. Besides this some side-effects of interviewing in real life disappeared, such as the opportunity to enter people’s houses, meet their family and have an informal chat.
At last, I will discuss my position as a researcher. I have always been open to my respondents about my own position. I introduce myself as a student of Conflict and Development, but also as a peace activist. Some of my respondents I contacted via Facebook, always with my own account. Positioning myself as a peace activist, was helpful to get access to and create confidence towards my targeted respondents. Departing from my own position, the aim of the article is to tell the story through the eyes of the activists and as such it does not have the intention of bringing an objective view on the case.
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Conceptual framework
Diaspora
Within diaspora studies, there is no consensus about the concept of diaspora. In the broadest sense, we could say that a diaspora is a transnational group that is formed because of boundary-crossing processes. In the beginning, the term was often used for Jews or other groups who have experienced a traumatic dispersal. Later, other groups have also started to be considered as a diaspora community, such as exiled groups, overseas communities or labor migrants (Tölölyan, 1996).
I employ a constructivist view on diaspora communities, thereby going beyond an essentialist concept. This essentialist view, which sees the diaspora as something natural, neglects the historical contingency of nation states and identities (Soysal, 2000). Similarly, Anthias discusses the assumption of diaspora seen as a natural community “without division or difference, dedicated to the same political projects.” (Anthias 1998, p. 563) However, diaspora is not a monolithic concept, it can carry strong cultural, generational, ethnological or religious differences (Mekouar, 2019).
Benedict Anderson (2006) introduces the concept of “imagined communities” in his work about the origin and spread of nationalism in the 19th century. Anderson conceptualizes nations as imagined
communities: without meeting or knowing their fellow members, they imagine themselves as being part of the same nation. Further he analyses how nationalism has been a successful mobilizing category, through focusing on a shared history and culture to establish and maintain a shared identity. In line with nations, we can also conceptualize diaspora communities as imagined communities which are socially constructed through discourses by political entrepreneurs (Adamson, 2012 & Sökefeld, 2006). Within this constructivist approach, “there can be no diaspora community, without a consciousness of diaspora, in other words without an idea of shared identity, of common belonging to that group.” (Sökefeld 2006, p. 267) This consciousness is built by political entrepreneurs, through discursive and non-discursive practices (Sökefeld & Schwalgin, 2000).
In the case of people originating from the Rif living in Europe, there are different political entrepreneurs who want to make them part of the Riffian diaspora. With the Riffian diaspora I mean those who have come to share the idea of a common belonging to the Rif. A community that is not fixed and that differs internally, its members are migrants as well as their descendants. I have chosen to speak about the Riffian diaspora instead of the Moroccan diaspora. This stems from the fact that some respondents emphasize they feel connected with the Riffian region and people, but that does not mean they feel connected to Morocco or the Makhzen. Although feelings of belonging towards the country of origin are often not that straightforward and rather ambivalent.
Diaspora activism in a transnational social space
Diaspora communities and hence diaspora activism, are constituted in transnational social spaces. This means a diaspora community is partially embedded in the social institutions and networks of its environment and it also retains its own autonomous space relating to Lefebvre’s idea of the production of space. Lefebvre (1992) states that every group produces its own ‘social space’ as an aspect of group identity formation. This space is transnational because it is a combination of relations between diaspora community members, governments and civil societies of both the country of origin and of the country of settlement (Kivisto, 2003 & Faist, 2000).
In the nineties we saw a transnational turn in migration studies, which moved the focus on “the circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labor migration” (Vertovec 2009, p. 13-14). Transnationalism can be defined as “a process by which immigrants build
5 social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” (Glick Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992, p.26). If we want to analyze the transnational feelings and practices of the Riffian diaspora, we also need to consider the impact on transnationalism by the governments of the countries of origin and settlement and not only by immigrants. A distinction often referred to is transnationalism from above and from below, where we define the former as activities “conducted by powerful institutional actors, such as multinational corporations and states” and the latter as activities “that are the result of grass-roots initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts” (Portes et al. 1999, p.221).
In the case of the Riffian diaspora, we distinguish four actors to provide a holistic view on what characterizes the diaspora activism: the diaspora community, civil society in country of origin, the government of the country of origin and the government of the country of settlement/international institutions. Faist (2000) also mentions the civil society in the country of settlement, but in the case of the Riffian diaspora in Belgium and the Netherlands, we see none or only minimal interaction between both. Although the wish to create more cooperation was expressed by some of my respondents. These actors are embedded in a whole set of relations that interact with each other. This article focusses on the agency of the Riffian diaspora within transnational social spaces and will describe their relation towards the other three actors. In the first place, the Riffian diaspora interacts with the political struggles in Morocco, more concretely these of the Hirak movement. Secondly, the Riffian diaspora contests the state policies of the Makhzen towards them. And in third instance, it also interacts with the governments of Belgium and the Netherlands, and to a larger extent with the European Parliament.
1. Diaspora activism and the civil society of the country of origin
In diaspora communities, people are developing ties with ‘co-ethnics’ in the country of settlement, but also elsewhere in the diaspora and in the country of origin (Faist, 2000). The speed of communication and high mobility makes it easier for diaspora communities to sustain social relations with the people in the country of origin and easier to participate in conflicts in their country of origin and “live their politics long-distance.” (Anderson, 2006 & Demmers, 2002) Also Koinova (2017) describes the increasing role of diaspora communities in transnational justice processes. According to
6 her, the political power of diaspora communities lies in challenging the sovereignty of their country of origin. The context of the country of settlement can provide the opportunity for mobilization around some grievances when the country of origin does not leave any or little space to do so.
In addition, we can see the social space of a diaspora community as a space where subaltern identities can flourish away from state control over, for example, language, religious practice or political expression (Adamson, 2002). It can provide the opportunity to produce narratives that support a subaltern identity, which differs from the hegemonic identities imposed from above (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). Likewise, Bhabha, sees identities of transmigrants as counter-narratives of the nation and they “disturb those ideological maneuvers through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities.” (Bhabha 1990, p.300).
If we look at the Riffian diaspora, we see that they partly mobilize around the same grievances as the Riffians in Morocco. They try to strengthen the Hirak movement with their local activities and resources. The environment of the diaspora community provides opportunities to mobilize around these grievances, but also around the Amazigh culture, without repression or limitations.
2. Diaspora activism and the government of the country of origin
Bauböck (2010) argues in his work about transnational citizenship, that it is important not only to look at the agency of the group from below, but that we need to see this agency in relation to the political institutions from above: nation-states who have the power in shaping, delimiting and encouraging transnational movement (Al-Ali & Koser, 2003). Within the transnational space, the aspect of state sovereignty is changed. It extends the control of borders to an implicit contract between sovereign state and citizen, which is also active outside the borders of the state (Brand, 2006).
These overlapping geographically separated policies result in a political transnationalism with changing understandings of citizenships and memberships. The development of transnational identities made double citizenship more common and led to changing citizenship rules in many countries (Bauböck, 2003 & Faist, 2007). The practice of double citizenship is often contested, it can be seen as a tool for the origin state to maintain political control and to be seen as undermining the integration of migrants and their offspring in the country of settlement. Also, Morocco maintains double citizenship, and in the wake of the Hirak movement, this practice gets contested again. Besides citizenship, origin states have a wide spectrum of strategies to establish and maintain the ties with their citizens abroad, for instance financing origin country’s language and cultural education abroad (Mahieu, Timmerman and Fadil, 2017). According to Gamlen, diaspora institutions, “formal state offices dedicated to migrants and their descendants”, play a role in social and political transformations : the new patterns of national and transnational citizenship and individual identity-construction through collective identities (Gamlen 2014, p.182-183). Later we will discuss the evolution in diaspora institutions of Morocco and how this also gets contested by the Riffian diaspora. Diaspora policies have the aim to secure loyalty towards the country of origin. Waterbury distinguishes three motives to keep access to diaspora communities and their resources. In the first place, “the extraction of material resources for economic gain”, mostly focused on remittances. Secondly, “the creation or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy” and at last “the utilization of those abroad as a cultural-linguistic resource to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity” (Waterbury 2010, p.137)
7 3. Diaspora activism and the government of the country of settlement
The transnational political practices of diaspora communities go further than direct cross-border participation in the politics of the country of origin. It also includes the indirect participation via the political institutions of the country of settlement (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Through networking with state and non-state actors, activists try to create more international awareness and create more pressure that way. As such countries of origin harness the political power of the diaspora as domestic actors within the system of the country of settlement (Adamson, 2002). As discussed before, in the case study of the Riffian diaspora, we only focus on the state actors.
Østergaard-Nielsen states that a “multi-level institutional channeling is taking place” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 774). Transnational political practices do not only adapt to local social institutions and networks, but also to ‘global’ (Western liberal) norms of democracy and human rights. Therefore, they do not only interact with national, but also with international institutions. In this case we can also see how the human rights discourse is used to approach the Belgian and Dutch governments, as well as the European Parliament.
Transnational practices are supported by transnational feelings, which also include feelings of belonging to the country of settlement. In literature, there is a lot focus on the interaction between integration and transnationalism (see Erdal and Oeppen, 20132). Expanding on this topic would bring
us too far, but we will discuss how diaspora members perceive their feeling of belonging to the country of settlement. In the case study on Riffian activism, we will see how feelings of belonging to the country of settlement are translated into their activism.
Declination and analysis
Context: migration history
After the closing of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1954, through the outbreak of the Algerian independence war, the unemployment in the Rif region increased. A lot of Riffian people lost their jobs as seasonal workers for the French farmers in Western Algeria (De Boer, 2019). In 1958 this situation led to a revolt, which was put down with heavy repression by the Moroccan army. This ultimately resulted in the first emigration wave to Western Europe supported by bilateral labor recruitment agreements. The Makhzen concluded a bilateral agreement with the Belgian government in 1964 and with the Dutch government in 1969. These agreements were seen by the Makhzen not only as a solution for the unemployment and poverty in the Riffian region, but also as a solution for the political opposition from the Rif. (el Kaddouri, 2018). With the oil crisis in 1973, the Belgian and Dutch governments put an end to the recruitment, but that did not mean the end of migration to Europe. When it became clear that the migration was not something temporary, a new emigration wave came through family reunification. In the eighties, we see a revival of people who fled from the regime of Hassan II. Since the Hirak was formed in 2016, new stories are still turning up of young Riffians who are crossing the Mediterranean Sea by jet skis or boat with the hope of finding new opportunities in Europe.
In the Netherlands, 2,3% of the citizens have a Moroccan migration background (CBS, sd). Belgium does not keep ethnic statistics, but most estimates are around 3,7%. Of these people, 70%, which is a rather low estimate, would have a Riffian background. One of my respondents notes that, in the beginning of the migration process, Arabic-speaking Moroccans were a lot more dominant.
2 In their article Migrants Balancing Acts: Understanding the Interaction between integration and
8 Furthermore, they had access to the French language and educational system in Morocco in the colonial period. Hence, they were in a better position when they emigrated to Europe. The Tamazight speaking Riffians had a much bigger issue to establish themselves when they came to Europe, although they are by far the majority of the Moroccan immigrants. “Now the backlog is caught up through the (Dutch) education system, and the proportion is changing.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 7 March 2020) This demographic majority abroad makes them an important factor for the Hirak movement to mobilize the Riffian community abroad.
1. Diaspora activism and the Hirak movement
The Hirak movement
The Riffian diaspora mobilizes transnationally their communities in support of the protest of the Hirak movement. This popular movement started in 2016 with the death of Mohsin Fikri, a fishmonger in Al Hoceima. He died in a rubbish truck, whilst trying to rescue his confiscated fish. The incident led to major protest not only in Al Hoceima, but also in other regions and in the Riffian diaspora (Wolf, 2019). The Hirak is seen as an offshoot of a longstanding history of rebellion in the region but can also be placed within the historic process of growing protest in the whole of Morocco (Bogaert, 2018). The movement sues the historic marginalization of the region. It has some basic key demands like a better health care, a university, infrastructural projects or the demilitarization of the region (ASDHOM, Rif Alert, CMODH, 2017). In May and October 2017, a lot of people got arrested for their participation to the movement. In June 2018, 54 people got sentenced to imprisonment for their involvement after an unfair trial. Five of the leaders, including Nasser Zefzafi, who is often seen as the leader of the movement, got 20 years of imprisonment for “plotting to undermine the internal security of the state” (Amnesty, 2018). Recently on the occasion of Throne Day, 24 political prisoners of the Hirak Movement got released. It is not the first year that Mohammed VI grants royal pardon to Hirak activists. This practice has been seen as a way to promote the King: “Justice hits, the King soothes”. In the meantime, certainly 22 activists, including all prominent leaders, are still in prison and the demand to get the release of all Hirak activists stays.
Mobilization in Europe
“Aish-er Rif! Leve de Rif!” Through online livestreams, the diaspora communities can follow the situation of the Rif on platforms such as Rif24, Araghi.Tv or Telrif.Tv. They could see the demonstrations and listen to the speeches of Nasser Zefzafi, who often referenced to the European Riffians and the importance of their support. In his interview in 2017 with Btisam Akarkach3, he stated
that the Riffians living in Europe also are victims of the corrupt state when they come to Morocco, because of, for example, high prices for flight tickets to the Rif or problems at the customs authorities (Akarkach, 2017).
A network of support committees, which are concentrated in large cities, was established in Europe, not only in Belgium and the Netherlands but also in France, Spain, Norway and Germany. In Belgium, the first demonstrations took place in Brussels, Antwerp, Mechelen and Liège. In the Netherlands demonstrations were held in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. In the beginning, the protest in Europe was dedicated to the commemoration of the death of Mohsin Fikri. The more the protest in Morocco got repressed, the stronger the mobilization in Europe became. After the first wave of arrests, new human rights organizations, such as ANZUF, Stichting Ontwikkeling Rif or Rif Alert, were born (el Kadouri, 2018). The character of the manifestations changed, they asked the release of the prisoners and started to lobby for more political pressure. The manifestations get more numerous
9 and frequent. Weekly, people came out to protest on the streets in Belgium and the Netherlands. Besides that, Belgian and Dutch activists traveled with buses to, for example, Barcelona or Paris, to protest, debate and share their experiences. According to Ayad Zaroual (2018), in his essay ‘The state, the Rif and the diaspora’, the sentence of the trial of the Hirak can be seen as a punishment for the strong support of the diaspora communities. The Riffian diaspora, through their alliance with and the mediatization of the protest, largely backed the Hirak in Morocco.
Five of my respondents declared that they were actively supporting the Riffian case before the Hirak was formed, four of them say that their activism started in the wake of the Hirak. The Hirak in Morocco and the hard repression opened the eyes of a lot of European Riffians. Also, the activists who protested before the Hirak existed, claim they saw a big change in awareness for the Riffian case in their community. In the wake of the Hirak movement, it was the first time so many Riffians could be seen on the streets in Europe. The protest was broadly embedded in the community, whereas before, the protest was more supported by the elite. It also brought atheist and religious people together in the same place: “My uncle sees it as his religious duty, I as my human duty.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 6 March 2020) The presence of families and women in the protest was remarkable. The same comment can be made for the protest in Morocco. However, the position of women in the Hirak movement and in the Amazigh culture in general, in Morocco and abroad, requires more research.
Most of the respondents mentioned their solidarity towards the region as one of their motives, their solidarity towards the region. Reasons for this are different, for example: having family living there, having the desire to go back or having been a political refugee of the eighties. “We have left to escape from marginalization because there was no perspective. Now those who also want improvement, get detained for the same case our parents fled for.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 26 February 2020)
Historical-Cultural denial
“The Hirak has broken out, because the Riffians are tired of being underestimated in their own historical-cultural identity”, stated M’hamed EL Aboundi 4(2018, p.19). Under this historical-cultural
denial, we can understand the absence of Riffian history and heritage in the general Moroccan historiography and the under-representation of the Tamazight language and the Amazigh identity (El Aboundi, 2018). After the independence, the Makhzen profiled Morocco as an Arab and Islamic nation state. They tried to overcome the artificial distinction made by France during colonial times, between Arabs and Amazighs. Through standardized education and, in particular, history education, they want to create and sustain national identities or a sense of belonging (Karrouche, 2017b). With the ascension of Mohammed VI, we see a rapprochement to the Amazighs. In 2001, Institute Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) was founded. Although it falls under royal decision-making, it has created some opportunities like airtime and newspapers in Tamazight (Ben Kaddour & el Kaddouri, 2006). In 2011 followed the recognition of Tamazight as an official language by Morocco.
Amazigh activism has had a transnational character from the beginning and got supported from diaspora communities, through their strength and inspiration (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001). In some diaspora communities, Amazigh cultural and linguistic movements have had the opportunity to flourish away from repression. Also, in the Netherlands and Belgium, since the sixties, Amazigh organizations have existed. (Karrouche, 2017a).
4 M’hamed El Abdoundi is the author of different Dutch books about the history of the Rif, for example,
10 The Hirak not only caused a reappraisal of the Amazigh identity in the Rif, but also abroad. Traditions became more visible again, new initiatives were founded, such as building up a cultural archive or learning Tamazight. In the beginning, Amazigh activism in Belgium and the Netherlands was more in the hands of the elite, who were often political refugees who fled from the regime. With the Hirak, the Amazigh activism got broader and much stronger. The Amazigh identity and the already existing movement around it has been a good basis to mobilize the Riffian diaspora, in the footsteps of the Hirak movement, in the countries of settlement. Most prominent is the growing consciousness of the youth, which is mentioned by all the respondents. In her research about Amazigh activism, Norah Karrouche (2018) describes how young Riffian activists in Belgium are searching for similar experiences as during the revolts of the past, through actively participating in current demonstrations. In this way they also give expression to the cultural heritage of the Rif. During the protests, we see portraits of Abdelkrim El Khattabi on T-shirts and placards. Abdelkrim El Khattabi was the leader of the resistance against the Spanish troops and the founder of the official Riffian Republic that existed from 1921 to 1926. The flag of the Riffian Republic is used during the protests in Morocco and Europe. Not only in the streets but also online, reference is made to the history and heritage, for example: nicknames on Facebook that are referring to previous resistance heroes. “With the Hirak we could see how the history emancipates via blogs, YouTube and Facebook.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 6 March 2020)
2. Diaspora activism and the Makhzen
Diaspora institutions
Since the beginning of the migration in the fifties, the Makhzen have made a lot of effort to maintain loyalty with the so-called Moroccans Living Abroad. The Makhzen sees them as an important actor to invest in the Moroccan economy (Bouddouft, 2019). The control of the remittances, estimations go from four to eight per cent of the Moroccan GDP, is prominent in their diaspora policies (Mekouar, 2019). Besides this, a lot of Moroccans Living Abroad annually go on family visit, so they are also an important part of the tourism. At the same time, the diaspora members got more insight into the political arbitrariness, corruption and the restriction of their individual freedom by the Makhzen. Under the migrants, certainly in the eighties, there were also political refugees who started to get organized abroad (Bouddouft, 2019).
The establishment of the Amicales, an institution of the Makhzen that needed to help the guest workers in the countries of settlement, happened in 1973. They would help them with their return and with family visits to Morocco, building mosques or providing education in Arabic (Bouddouft,2019). The Makhzen opposed to integration in the country of settlement because that would undermine their affiliation with Morocco (Mahieu, Timmerman and Fadil, 2017). It rapidly became clear that the Amicales was used as a repression mechanism of the Makhzen. They used a network of informants to report the political activities of their emigrants. Although it was founded to prevent division among the citizens abroad, it created division. During the eighties, the protest about the presence of the Amicales became broader, which ultimately led to the end of the Amicales in 1990. In the nineties, the position of Hassan II, former king, changed towards the Moroccans Living Abroad. Two new institutions were founded: The Ministry in Charge of Moroccan Living Abroad and the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad. These not only have the job to strengthen the ties, but also to take away the mistrust of the governments of the countries of settlement. (Bouddouft, 2019). After the entrance of Mohammed VI, we see a further shift in discourses and governing techniques with a more holistic governing strategy characterized by cultural, religious, social and political dimensions (Mahieu, 2019). Mohammed VI goes further in the positive approach in diaspora policies.
11 The Makhzen has actively been searching for people who were raised abroad and have important economic and political functions in the countries of settlement. By committing them to the Makhzen, they create good ‘ambassadors’ to lobby for Morocco abroad. To support this practice, Mohammed VI established the Council of Morrocan Community Living Abroad (CCME) in 2007. The CCME is “responsible for issuing notices to ensure the defense of the interests of overseas Moroccans, strengthening their contribution to the economic, social and human development of the country.” (The Council, sd)
Fear
Since 2011, with the 20 February Movement5, and certainly since 2016 with the Hirak movement, we
see an increase of intimidation and repression practices (Bouddouft, 2019b). Some examples: informants of the Makhzen photograph demonstrators in protests in Antwerp and Amsterdam, arrest warrants are issued for European demonstrators, imams are influenced to incite not to participate to the demonstrations (el Kaldouri, 2018). In 2017, Rif Alert!, a Dutch human rights organization, started a hotline to monitor all the signals of ‘the long arm of Rabat’ in the Netherlands. The following was published on their site:
“Since the beginning of the Hirak and the massive expression of solidarity in the Netherlands and in Europe, at the same time also a hate-campaign is launched to counter those who are solidary with the Rif. […] Also in the Netherlands the long arm of Rabat via consulates, organizations and individuals, make them guilty to this hate campaign.“ (Actiegroep Rif Alert! opent meldpunt voor bedreigde Marokkaanse Nederlanders, 2017)
Later in 2019, another hotline named ‘Safe in the Rif’ gets launched through seven Riffian-Dutch organizations for people who get in trouble during their visit to the Rif (Butter, 2019b). According to a survey of Republiek Alloctonië6 by 70 Hirak-activists in the Netherlands in 2019, 58% of the
participants said not to go to Morocco this year out of fear to get arrested or to get family members in trouble (Butter, 2019a). Their fear seems to be well-grounded. Two Belgian activists, Wafi Kajoua and Mohamed El Ahmadi got arrested at the border. Wafi Kajoua has been in prison for eight months and Mohamed El Ahmadi’s case is still pending.
Among my respondents, only two are still going back to Morocco. They did not experience any problems. Both are younger than 25, and as mentioned by one of them, it is probably their age that gives them an advantage at the border. The other seven have not been back since the repression, although they would like to, for different reasons: family visits, to visit the graves of (grand)parents or for family occasions such as marriages. The reasons for not going back which they are mentioning here are, also, fear of getting arrested or of putting their environment in danger. Two activists also mention that family members have been contacted in the past and have been held responsible for the activities of their spouse, child or sibling.
On the question if they feel pressure of the Moroccan government, two respondents wish not to answer the question out of self-protection or protection of their environment. Others describe the pressure as being subtle, by making known they are aware of their whereabouts. Examples are letters of the consulate or phone calls, like those to family members. Also, the presence of some institutions and organizations can create the feeling of pressure, “people are always afraid of the Moroccan state,
5 In 2011, regional protests take place in Morocco, after some Moroccan youth called on social media to protest in the wake of the so-called Arabic Spring. This has been called the 20 February Movement. (Bogaert, 2018).
12 the presence of a Moroccan bank has an emotional impact, as if the state was present” (Anonymous, personal communication, 6 March 2020). Some activists also mention the pressure from the community. Social media was not only a tool of mobilization and exchange that supported the movement, it also created division internally and backed the hate campaign against Hirak activists. Four respondents declared to never speak publicly about their engagement, they keep a low profile out of self-protection.
However different respondents suggest that there, again, is more intimidation, it is not similar to the situation of the eighties. The situation has changed in the last twenty years, there is more freedom to protest and to speak out. “Now we can say in the media that Morocco is a dictatorship, in the eighties you would get kidnapped. “(Anonymous, personal communication, 6 March 2020)
Dual citizenship
The dual nationality has been an important tool for the Makhzen to maintain the ties with the Moroccans Living Abroad. The Moroccan citizenship is obtained by birth, from the moment one of your parents has the Moroccan nationality. In fact, according to the Moroccan constitution, a Moroccan citizen abroad can ask permission to renounce to their Moroccan citizenship, but in practice this has not been possible. Morocco maintains the principle of perpetual allegiance; no Moroccan citizen can renounce to their citizenship. Besides this, their citizenship does not give them any political rights. According to the constitution, Moroccans Living Abroad should have the right to vote and to be elected in all elections, but this has not been put into practice either. This shows the ambivalent relation the Makhzen has towards its citizens living abroad. On the one hand, they keep the ties tight and on the other hand being suspicious of their destabilizing potential (Perrin, 2011).
The dual citizenship has been contested in different countries of settlement, most prominently in the Netherlands. In 2005, the Dutch government formally requested the Moroccan government to facilitate the loss of citizenship for the third generation of Moroccans abroad, which was refused by the Moroccan government (Perrin, 2011). In Belgium, we see less public debate about Moroccan citizenship.
The dual citizenship makes it possible for the Moroccan government to arrest European activists when they cross the Moroccan border, which we have seen in the cases of Wafi Kajoua and Mohamed El Ahmadi. This possibility to get arrested, together with the growing aversion towards the Moroccan regime since the Hirak protest, created a new angle in the debate and a broader support to denounce the practice of double citizenship. In response, some Dutch Riffians published a manifest for freedom of choice of nationality in September 2019.
The manifest is addressed to the Dutch government and society. They ask to redeem them for the fear and the lack of freedom that are inseparably connected to the dual citizenship. “Recently Dutch citizens with Moroccan nationality feel they are not free to openly express themselves about the human rights violations and the failed rule of law in Morocco.” (Manifest voor Keuzevrijheid van Nationaliteit, 2019)
Not all the respondents have the explicit desire to renounce to their Moroccan citizenship, but all of them agree that there must be freedom of choice. One of them points out that the double citizenship is often perceived in a negative way: Hirak activists who are against the Moroccan state, “but it is also about giving back the land, taking responsibility here and being grateful of being here.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 7 March 2020) Giving the land back refers to one of the disruptive effects of the emigration, which leaves a lot of desolate land plots, that are owned by European Moroccans.
13 Losing land or inheritance are the main reasons to maintain their Moroccan nationality. Some argue they should get rid of the Moroccan nationality without losing the rights on land or inheritance.
‘The Long Arm of Rabat’
“The protest showed what is underneath the facade and what united the opportunists with the Moroccan regime. These hypocritical figures are the first ones to comment about Palestine or other countries, but if you talk about the Rif, they are staunch defenders of the Moroccan regime.” (Anonym, personal communication, 16 April 2020)
There has been a long struggle against ‘the long arm of Rabat’, certainly in the Netherlands again. Activists stated that not only the attention for ‘the long arm’ increased with the Hirak, but that ‘the long arm’ also became stronger. “The meetings from the CCME have increased since the Hirak exists. Theme of the meeting is, for example, ‘How do we give an honest and positive view of Morocco in Europe?’” (Anonymous, personal communication, 6 March 2020). With ‘the long arm of Rabat’, they mean Moroccans Living Abroad like imams, politicians and footballers, who get seduced by the Makhzen to spread the official hegemonic narratives abroad.
This ‘long arm’ spreads a narrative which shows a positive image of Morocco. They try to create a connection between Moroccans Living Abroad and the Makhzen. Besides that, they try to spread an uncritical view of Morocco in European society: a democracy under development, a holiday destination, a moderate Islamic liberal state or a stable land that holds back refugees. This view takes away the attention from the oppression of the Rif and from expanding “the non-democratic corrupt Makhzen who have no intention to change” (Anonymous, personal communication, 7 March 2020). To some activists, challenging this narrative is a goal and tool of their mobilization. “There is so little known, the Moroccan regime and its henchmen have done their best to spread this narrative and it’s important to illuminate this.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 17 April 2020). Stories of the Hirak, the repression of the Rif at micro-level, especially reached the Riffian diaspora which tries to spread these messages. These micro-level stories confront the image that was educated and presented to them. By challenging the official hegemonic narrative, the activists are suing the ‘long arm of Rabat’ and the unwanted influence of the Makhzen in their country of settlement.
3. Diaspora activism and the Belgian, Dutch and European government
In this last part, I discuss the relation of the Riffian diaspora to the Belgian and Dutch political institutions and by extension to the European Parliament. I have already mentioned how the Makhzen tries to use the political power of its citizens abroad as domestic actors within the system of the European countries.
Working together with political parties is a delicate matter within the Riffian diaspora, certainly in the beginning, considering their bad experience with ‘corrupt’ politicians in Morocco. “We have learned to adapt; our anarchist mentality is less possible here.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 16 April 2020) The movement started to be directed towards politicians over time. Through lobbying towards politicians and journalists, they try to create international awareness to enlarge the international pressure on the Makhzen as well. “If it only stays in the streets, there will not be a lot of change, political and diplomatic pressure is necessary.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 26 February 2020)
Some respondents distinguish two ways of activism within the Riffian diaspora. The first one works in a diplomatic way and tries to influence the public opinion through lobbying and tries to denounce the injustice and oppression towards the Riffians. The second one is more militant through
14 demonstrations, but also through Facebook, and focuses on the cultural and historical uniqueness of the Riffians (El Kadouri, 2018). For other respondents, these two ways come together in their activism and we certainly cannot deny the fact that these two strengthen each other.
Role of European parliament
After the first arrest wave in the Rif, some protest committees in Europe turned towards the European Parliament to ask attention for the political prisoners. Different initiatives were initiated, an important one is the creation of the Freedom and Human Rights Organization (FHRO). The organization was born out of a group of activists, who were lobbying for Nasser Zefzafi as a candidate for the Sakharov Prize. In 2018, Nasser Zefzafi was chosen by the members of the European Parliament as one of the three finalists for the Sakharov Prize, the European Prize for Freedom of Thought and Human Rights. On the occasion of the presentation of the Prize, the parents of Nasser were invited to the European Parliament. A lot of my respondents acknowledge this nomination as an important moment, not only for the people in the Rif, but also for the European Riffians. It gave them recognition for their protests and lobbying in Europe and created a moment of hope to continue.
The nomination created more awareness in the European Parliament as well, and in February 2019, the establishment of Friends of the Rif followed. Friends of the Rif is a group of members of the European Parliament who commit themselves to follow the detainees’ files as well as the development of the Rif region, most prominent are the parties Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA).
According to many activists, the European Parliament has a prominent role, as human rights defender, to speak out about the situation in the Rif and about the detainees. Besides this, the European Union has a good relationship with Morocco. There are different trade agreements and there is a refugee deal between them, so according to the activists, the European Union is in the position to appeal to Morocco on their policies in the Rif. Also, the increasing number of refugees that come from the Rif, is cited as one of the justifications for European intervention.
Role of the Dutch and Belgian government
Different respondents mention that the Hirak has led to a reappraisal of their country of settlement. It was noticed by one of my respondents, that at a demonstration in Paris, not only the Amazigh and Riffian flag were present. Varying demonstrators carried the flag of their country of settlement with them.
In the first instance, the demands to the Belgian and Dutch government are similar to those to the European Parliament: questioning their partnership with Morocco and suing the human rights violations as a democratic country. The Dutch government was mentioned as a good example, although one respondent points out to me: “Compared to the rest of the world, the Netherlands is number one, simply because of the fact that the rest is not doing anything.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 9 May 2020) Instead, Belgium is called ‘a little colony of Morocco’ by some of my respondents. In Belgium, ‘the long arm’ gets a lot more space to act than in the Netherlands. The Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament speaks out about ‘the long arm of Rabat’, but also expresses their concerns about the human rights violations. This has led to several diplomatic tensions and incidents between the two governments. For example, the Makhzen has refused to take back declined refugees.
15 Besides this, the activists have another clear demand for their governments: protection. Marlies Glasius7 (2019), stated during a debate at De Balie8 about ‘the long arm of Rabat’: “Changing the
question from ‘Are Dutch Moroccans integrated enough’ to ‘Are Dutch Moroccans protected enough’”, which was followed by a big applause by the audience. The absence of the Belgian Embassy when Wafi Kajoua and Mohamed El Ahmadi were arrested, attracted a lot of criticism. Later, when activists gathered in front of the building of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attendants were asked “if they could hold off the case of Wafi Kaouja, because a Belgian trade mission to Morocco was coming up”.
In the travel advice of the Dutch government for Morocco, we can read:
“According to the Moroccan law, Dutch who have the Moroccan nationality, get treated as Moroccan citizen on Moroccan territory. Therefore it can happen that the Dutch embassy, in the case of problems (for example arrests), doesn’t get informed by the Moroccan authorities.” (Reisadvies Marokko, sd)
Similar messages can be found in the Belgian travel advice, but there is one crucial difference : whereas the Dutch travel advice recommends to always ask for consular assistance of the Dutch embassy in case of problems, the Belgian travel advice displays the following: “They [Moroccan Belgians] can’t benefit of Belgian consular assistance.” (Marokko, sd)
Conclusion
In this article, I answer the question: How does diaspora activism in the wake of the Hirak movement
play out in the Riffian diaspora in Belgium and the Netherlands? By analyzing the Riffian diaspora and
their activism within their transnational social space, we see how their activism is embedded in a network of relations. From the perspective of the Riffian diaspora, we have analyzed how their relationship with the Hirak movement, the Makhzen and the Belgian, Dutch and European governments, has formed their activism.
The results confirm our hypothesis that diaspora activism goes further than mobilization in solidarity with the state and/or the people in the country of origin. The Riffian diaspora also sue their own grievances as a diaspora community in their country of settlement. In the debate about ‘the long arm of Rabat’ at De Balie, Merouan Mekouar9 (2019) stated that diaspora communities are living in a
context of double vulnerability. They or their (grand)parents have left their country of origin because of vulnerability, but they also experience some vulnerability in their country of settlement. We see this double vulnerability translated in the Riffian activism. Mekouar sees this vulnerability in the country of settlement in a rather narrow interpretation and refers to discrimination and racism with which diaspora communities are confronted in their country of settlement. However, the Riffian diaspora has emphasized that this vulnerability is exacerbated by the policies of the Makhzen.
7 Marlies Glasius is a professor in International Relations at the Department of Politics, University of
Amsterdam
.
Her research is focused on authoritarianism, global civil society, international criminal justice and human security.8 De Balie is a public debate center in Amsterdam.
9 Merouan Mekouar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Social Science at York University in Canada. His research is focused on social movements, authoritarianism and democratization in the MENA, as well as the diffusion of social norms.
16 Multiple respondents emphasized that the position of the diaspora members has become stronger in their country of settlement. “Time and age are in favor of the Riffian diaspora; they are more and more rooted here and in leading positions.” (De Boer, personal communication, 24 June 2020) In the beginning, when they arrived as newcomers, their position was weak, but meanwhile they have organized themselves and have access to governments, international organizations and the media. From their strengthened position in their country of settlement, the Riffian diaspora has mobilized themselves and others around this double vulnerability. Besides this, one could also state that their activism has further strengthened their position. According to my respondents, it has, for some of them, created a reappraisal of the Amazigh culture, of their country of settlement or of the community. “From each movement we can learn something: Nasser is still in prison, but we have learned ourselves as community abroad.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 16 April 2020) In-depth analyses of diaspora protest are necessary for multiple purposes. This case study does not only show us how a diaspora community uses their resources to mobilize around political struggles in their country of origin, but, in this case, how they use that mobilization to approach their own position. In this way it can give us additional insights on the position of diaspora communities in their country of settlement.
Transnational social space can be a useful concept to analyze other cases of diaspora activism as well. More specifically, towards diaspora communities where the diaspora politics of their country of origin is being seen as problematic, such as Turkey and Iran. Further research could be conducted on how virtual space plays a role. This article has only given limited attention to the role of internet, blogs and social media. More in-depth research could show what the role of the virtual space is within the transnational social space and how this interacts with the different actors and relations.
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