Brexit: A Cross-Cutting
Political Issue
Master Thesis Political Science
Name: Brechtje Stallmann
Student number: 10987142
Date: 26-06-2020
MSc: Political Science
Track: International Relations
Supervisor: Dr. S. (Sebastian) Krapohl
Second reader: Dr. R.M. (Rosa) Sanchez Salgado
Abstract
A new cleavage has emerged that has affected all European regions and is cross-cutting traditional party lines. The cosmopolitan-parochial divide has been increasing and as a consequence of several European crises, Euroscepticism has been rising over the past decade. The outcome of the Brexit referendum has been a result of rising Euroscepticism and has put pressure on the British political system. Brexit has revealed the fragilities of the British electoral system and demonstrates that this system has been unable to absorb this new cleavage. This paper argues that in majoritarian electoral systems, cross-cutting cleavages put pressure on the political system and can break-up traditional party coherence by increasing divisions within the political parties. By presenting an analysis on the British electoral system, this paper demonstrates how mainstream political parties have tried to avoid the politicisation of European issues and were unable to respond to their voters. A response to this cleavage emerged from challenger parties, such as UKIP and the Brexit Party. Moreover, it shows the differences between electoral systems, proportional and majoritarian systems, and its influence on the representation of political parties in these systems.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ... 4
2 Literature review ... 6
2.1 Euroscepticism ... 6
2.2 British political system ... 8
3 Theoretical framework ... 11
3.1 Cleavage theory ... 11
3.2 Organisation of democracies ... 15
4 Data and Methodology ... 19
4.1 Case selection ... 19
4.2 Data ... 22
5 Empirical analysis ... 24
5.1 The Brexit referendum ... 24
5.1.1 A cross-cutting cleavage in the UK ... 25
5.1.2 General elections ... 27
5.1.3 European Elections ... 28
5.2 Electoral systems: majoritarian versus consensual ... 31
5.2.1 Proportional vs Majoritarian ... 32
5.2.2 Strategic decisions ... 35
5.3 Brexit and the two-party system ... 36
5.3.1 Party divisions ... 37
5.3.2 Voting behaviour MPs ... 41
6 Conclusion ... 43
1 Introduction
On January 15, 2019 the British government experienced the biggest defeat in the House of Commons in British history. The Brexit deal, that was proposed by former Prime Minister Theresa May, was rejected by a majority of 230 votes (BBC, 2019). The EU and May had reached an agreement on their future relationship in November 2018, which was a compromise between the on the one hand a “hard Brexit” and on the other hand a “soft Brexit” (Aidt, Grey and Savu, 2019: 8). The outcome of the Brexit referendum has been a surprising outcome for many, and it has increased divisions within political parties. Major government defeats are usually rare in the British Parliament and it is uncommon for governments to be defeated by more than 100 votes. In the last century the only record of this was in 1924 when the minority Labour Government of MacDonald faced defeats of 140, 161 and 166 (the Guardian, 2019).
Brexit has put enormous pressure on the British political system and has revealed a new cleavage that is entering British politics, which is cross-cutting traditional political beliefs. Euroscepticism has been rising over the past decades and scepticism towards the EU and EU integration can be found both on the left and right of the political spectrum. Electoral gains by Eurosceptic parties after the Eurocrisis and European migration crisis demonstrate an electoral shift, in which divisions between nationalists and cosmopolitans are increasing (de Vries, 2017: 1542). Mainstream British political parties have been unable to translate the voices of their voters into their party points, which has caused unclarity and uncertainty. Moreover, within the political parties, Members of Parliament (MPs) have been divided over the Brexit referendum and the future of the UK, which further increased splits within the political parties instead of uniting as one political party. In the House of Commons, MPs were unable to agree on a Withdrawal Agreement that had been reached between the EU and the UK, and May’s bill has been defeated three times. Evidence demonstrates that Conservative MPs that had voted “Leave” during the referendum were likely to rebel, because of several reasons, which has caused the enormous defeat of the UK’s conservative government in January 2019 (Aidt et al. 2019: 4).
This paper will focus on the influence of the outcome of the Brexit referendum on the political system of the UK and how it has exposed the fragilities of the British political system. The UK can be considered as an atypical case, as its majoritarian electoral system differs from the proportional electoral system of other EU member states. Eurosceptic political parties, such as the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Brexit Party, were only able to gain popularity for a short period in the UK and have experienced electoral losses after the referendum in 2016. On the contrary, Eurosceptic parties enjoyed successes during European Elections and have even become most dominant since the elections of 2014. By analysing the electoral system of the UK, I will emphasize its fragilities and inabilities to absorb new political issues. Furthermore, I will focus on the influence of Brexit on mainstream political parties in the UK and how they have been unable to respond to the demands of their voters. As a result of unclarity and disagreements within the political parties, the directions of the political parties remained rather vague. It highlights the political divides and demonstrates that Brexit cuts across the original party points of the political two-party system. More precisely, Brexit has contributed to the crumbling of the Labour party, as it has caused a crisis in the labour opposition (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 11-12). Therefore, this paper will focus on the following research question:
What are the consequences of the Brexit referendum for the British party system?
I will make use of a single-case study in which I will examine the influence of the referendum on
the British political system. By focusing on rising Euroscepticism and the cosmopolitan-parochial divide, I will demonstrate how this new cleavage has entered British politics, which is cross-cutting traditional political party lines. Moreover, I will focus on the political parties in the UK and how they have responded to the outcome of the referendum. By focusing on the political parties, I will find out why it has been so difficult to reach an agreement in the House of Commons, leading to the biggest parliamentary defeat in British history.
Individual voting behaviour of MPs will demonstrate that within the political parties, MPs have been very divided over the future of the UK, causing unclarity and the inability to unite as one political party. In contribution to this, political parties have been unable to respond to the outcome of the referendum and incorporate the voices of their voters into their party points. Finally, I will analyse the characteristics of majoritarian electoral systems to examine how cleavages are absorbed in dissimilar ways than in proportional electoral systems. I will argue that elections have been influenced by supply and demand factors, having different outcomes in majoritarian systems than in consensual systems. This paper will be organised into different sections. Section two will elaborate on previous literature to demonstrate how this paper will
contribute to existing research. Section three offers a theoretical framework, which will be organised into two different sections: cleavage theory and the organisation of democracies. In section four the data, methods and case selection of this paper will be explained. The empirical analysis will be presented in section five, explaining the data and the final results. Finally, section six will conclude this paper.
2 Literature review
This analysis of the influence of the Brexit referendum on the British political system will contribute to previous literature on emerging cleavages, electoral systems and the Brexit referendum. Moreover, it will elaborate on previous studies that have focused on changing voting behaviour, overall electoral change and the differences between authoritarian and cosmopolitan beliefs. This paper will contribute mainly to two parts of research: rising Euroscepticism and the British political system.
2.1 Euroscepticism
Previous research is mainly focused on the outcome of the Brexit referendum, rising Euroscepticism and what has influenced voting behaviour of the British citizens. Dennison and Geddes (2018) demonstrate what has caused the outcome of the referendum and how Brexit has been seen as the possibility to regain control over migration, which has become known as “Europeanised migration” since 2010. Their main argument is that anti-immigration sentiments and fears to lose the national identity have been the main contributors for rising Euroscepticism over the past decades (Dennison and Geddes, 2018: 1146). Incoming migrants were considered to be a threat towards the British economy, as they would have a negative influence on social spending and affect the overall national and local economy negatively (Dennison and Geddes, 2018: 1146).
Furthermore, research focuses on the rise of Eurosceptic parties and how they have been able to link immigration and integration to the British EU membership. Vasilopoulou (2016) argues that the UK independence party has successfully linked immigration to EU membership. Therefore, opinions on EU migration by British citizens can be a strong predictor for voting
different Eurosceptic parties and the emergence of a new cleavage that is cross-cutting all other political issues. However, they fail to explain how this cleavage was absorbed by the British political system and why UKIP and the Brexit Party lost their political power in the UK after the referendum in 2016. Research on Eurosceptic parties can be divided into two different sides. On the one hand, Elsas et al. (2016) argue that the political nature of Eurosceptic parties differs greatly and emphasizes the distinctions between radical left- and right-wing political parties. Left-winged parties have been criticizing European integration mostly because immigrants are perceived to be a threat to their social benefits. Scepticism by the radical right mostly comes from the argument that immigrants are seen as a threat to their national identity (van Elsas, Hakverdian, van der Brug, 2016: 1186).
The Eurocrisis and the migration crisis have caused rising dissatisfaction among EU citizens and research demonstrates a strong increase in Euroscepticism after these crises. After the governments had installed austerity measures, citizens were more likely to feel connected to Eurosceptic parties. Radical left- and right-winged political parties became more united after these European crises and their motivations have become more closely related. Nevertheless, “Eurosceptic voters” are still disagreeing on the future of the EU and criticism on the left still differs from criticism on the right (van Elsas et al., 2016: 1200).
On the other hand, studies by Norris and Inglehart (2019) and de Vries (2018) refer to a broader political change that is now moving beyond the traditional right-left division. Because of emerging cross-cutting issues, cosmopolitan and parochial parties can be found on both sides of the political spectrum (De Vries, 2018: 1545). Support for radical right-wing parties and authoritarian populism can be predicted by rising anti-immigration sentiments and the idea that foreigners can be a threat to national identities. This ‘authoritarian reflex’ is not just based on the idea that foreigners are a threat but on the opposition against cultural changes, contrasting political ideas, and the influx of ‘out groups’ (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 19). Studies demonstrate that these authoritarian personal values are the strongest among older, white European citizens that live in rural areas. This means that among older citizens and homogenous rural communities, citizens feel distanced from the cultural changes and the new norms and values. On the contrary, younger, well-educated citizens who live in urban areas are more open towards diverse cultures and have more cosmopolitanism and liberal values. This has caused the rise of a new cultural cleavage, which divides social liberals from social conservatives (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 17-19, 24). I
will contribute to this research by focusing on how this new cleavage has entered British politics and how political parties have responded to this in the UK. By studying the electoral system of the UK, I will find out why electoral gains of Eurosceptic parties have been different during general elections and European Parliament elections.
In contribution to this, Euroscepticism can be partly explained because of the special relationship between the EU and the UK. The UK has not always been satisfied as a member of the EU, which has increased criticism towards the European membership and presents the UK as “a stranger in Europe” (Wall, 2008). Previous studies focus on the relationship between the EU and the UK and demonstrate that the UK can be considered as an “awkward” and “reluctant” partner of the EU (Geddes, 2004, Cooper, 2012 and Gstöhl, 2002). Geddes (2004) argues that the UK has missed important steps in the European integration process, causing shortcomings and an awkward relationship with the EU. During the 1950s Britain decided not to take part in the first development of the EU as a supranational organisation and missed a crucial step in the integration process (Geddes, 2004: 21). However, Cooper (2012) claims that regardless of these crucial steps, the UK does not have the same vision as other EU member states have. The UK has always been concerned about the level of centrality of the EU, the preservation of national identities and has acted like “an outsider” (Cooper, 2012: 1203). Furthermore, Britain is characterised as a reluctant member state, which can be explained by the history of the country and its distance from Europe (Gstöhl, 2002: 15). The UK has continuously attached greater value to its own interests than to the interests of the EU. The EU and the UK certainly had a special relationship and the UK was offered two opt-outs, for the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and for the creation of the European Monetary Union (Gstöhl, 2002: 15).
2.2 British political system
Previous literature on the British political system is primarily focused on political mobilisation, electoral changes and divisions within the British political parties (Birch, 2016 and Aidt et al., 2019). Sarah Birch (2016) argues that the EU referendum and political mobilisation have caused the rise of new voters in the UK. The emerging electoral cleavage has caused a shift in British politics in which ‘liberal cosmopolitans’ and those believing in more traditional values are standing in great contrast to each other (Birch, 2016: 107). Following UK standards, voting turnouts for the
referendum were relatively high, which demonstrates that the vote has increased mobilisation. According to Birch, the referendum has encouraged many previously disengaged citizens to vote. Therefore, the Brexit referendum demonstrates the emergence of a new cleavage that shows the major divide between groups, their ideas on “what is to be British” and in which way the Brexit negotiations should evolve (Birch, 2016: 110). Furthermore, literature focuses on the two-party system and how Brexit has put pressure on political parties but does not explain why the British political system has been unable to absorb this emerging cleavage (Aidt et al., 2019 and Hobolt and Rodon, 2020). The emergence of this new cleavage has also put enormous pressure on the Conservatives and the Labour Party.
Other studies agree that the Brexit referendum has caused a clear separation in the British parliamentary system. Hobolt and Rodon (2020) focus on the positions of the two dominant political parties, the Conservatives and the Labour Party, and their position after the referendum. After the referendum the parties were internally divided and were unable to provide their voters with distinct and clear positions during the elections in 2017 (Hobolt and Rodon, 2020: 228). Political parties promised to honour the outcome of the referendum but partly due to internal divisions they did not focus on a clear and detailed plan for Brexit. Voters from both political parties were uncertain of the Brexit policies of their political party and whether their party was in favour of remaining or leaving the EU. This demonstrates that voters did not have a clear choice on the future of the UK and that political parties were unable to present the preferences of voters into their policies (Hobolt and Rodon, 2020: 232).
As a single-issue party, UKIP could benefit from the internal divisions in the Conservative and Labour Party. Its main policy was a clear withdrawal from the EU, offering voters a clear and distinct policy as their main policy was Brexit (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 2). A vote for UKIP has mostly been based on dissatisfaction and rejection with mainstream political parties. Voters are mostly expressing dissatisfaction with the political system and by voting on populist parties, such as UKIP, they can express their discontent with mainstream parties (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 5). The divisions within the political parties are also visible when analysing the Meaningful Votes in the House of Commons and the support of MPs during these votes. Aidt, Grey and Savu (2019) have found that there exists a paradox, as rebellion from the Conservative backbench came primarily from MPs that voted Leave during the Brexit referendum in 2016 (Aidt et al., 2019: 1). In their paper, they have researched what has been the main reason for rebellion by Conservative
MPs and what has driven their individual decisions to rebel against the party line. Divisions within the conservative party have been starting since the referendum when David Cameron allowed MPs to campaign either for Leave or Remain instead of toeing them to their party line. Moreover, MPs became increasingly divided on the Brexit process, which resulted in “hard-Brexiteers” and “soft-Brexiteers”. This demonstrates that even though MPs belong to a political party and share policy preferences, there exists heterogeneity on certain political issues. This is the case because both extreme and moderate MPs can be labelled under the same political party, which makes the member choose between supporting the party line or the policy that they prefer individually (Aidt et al. 2019: 8). This demonstrates how MPs in the House of Common became divided on the Brexit referendum, regardless of their political party. This has made it increasingly difficult for the House of Commons to reach an agreement and MPs have rebelled against the Meaningful Votes (Aidt et al., 2019: 9-10).
Further studies focus on the single-party majority government in the UK and alternative options for Brexit negotiations (Curtice, 2010 and Aidt, Chadha and Sabourian, 2019). During the general election in 2010 no party had gained a majority, resulting in the formation of a coalition government. It had been the first time in British politics that a coalition had to be formed after general elections since 1930 (Curtice, 2010: 623). Curtice (2010) claims that the single-party majority of government of the UK has been eroded over the past decades and it is no longer possible to ignore third parties. The proportional system of the UK treats the two dominant parties in a fair way, but this is not the case for third parties. Because of single-member plurality, parties that come first receive a bonus and the system discriminates third parties (Curtice, 2010: 629). I will add to this literature by demonstrating why political leaders have to make strategic decisions in majoritarian political systems because they will be discriminated as third parties.
Research by Aidt et al. (2019) exposes the fragilities of the British electoral system and argue that the current voting procedure has not been the best and most democratic way to reach an agreement in the House of Commons. The referendum has caused a crisis that threatens to undermine the British constitutional order, as politicians have been unable to offer clarity on Brexit. MPs have contrasting preferences, meaning that within the House of Commons there will not be a majority in favour of any Withdrawal Agreement (Aidt et al. 2019: 5). Instead, they propose an alternative way to reach an agreement in the House of Commons to break the Brexit impasse with a democratic and legitimate outcome. They view the “open agenda principle” as a
better alternative to handle the emergence of this new cleavage. In the case of the open agenda principle, MPs would have the possibility to propose other options and possibilities for the UK, where every option that receives some support of voters should reach the political agenda. This would lead to the introduction of a broader range of multiple options. Examples of this are a “no deal”, a new referendum, replication of Norway or Switzerland, or staying inside the customs union. In this case, the House of Commons could have decided whether a proposal would be useful for further Brexit negotiations or not (Aidt et al., 2019: 10). This prevents the government from having a “quasi-monopoly” on agenda-setting and deciding what the possible alternatives are. Furthermore, it will become possible to put alternative agreements on the agenda and better translate the voices of British voters, which can be a more democratic way forward (Aidt et al., 2019: 6,10). This research focuses on the fragilities of the British parliamentary system, but it does not demonstrate the differences between majoritarian and electoral systems. By focusing on the different features of majoritarian and consensual democracies, I will add to previous research by arguing that it is more difficult to present new issues in majoritarian systems than in consensual systems.
3 Theoretical framework
In this section I will develop a theoretical framework that will demonstrate how a cross-cutting cleavage has been emerging throughout Europe and how this cleavage has affected different political systems. I will focus on comparative politics, cleavage theory and the different ways in which a democracy can be organized. This will demonstrate how majoritarian democracies differ from consensual democracies and how this influences electoral systems. Furthermore, I will focus on party competition and why political leaders are forced to make strategic decisions during election times.
3.1 Cleavage theory
According to cleavage theory, political parties make commitments on issues, on which voters are divided. Because of these programmatic commitments and issue coherence, a change in the party system is caused by external pressure on the party system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Changes in
because of a new leader for a political party whereas external factors can be changes in the electoral system and changing demands of their voters (Harmel and Janda, 1944: 261). This cleavage theory can also be adapted to European integration and rising Euroscepticism. According to Hooghe and Marks (2018), transnational cleavage has been emerging as a result of political reactions opposing European immigration and integration. Moreover, they focus on the migration crisis and rising concerns about immigration, and the responses of political parties to this. They argue that “voters changed, but mainstream parties did not”. Therefore, the transnational divide has forced mainstream political parties to compete on political issues that in reality are not included in their “programmatic core” (Hooghe and Marks, 2018: 111).
Following cleavage theory, the flexibility of political parties to respond to emerging cleavages is constrained by certain factors such as having durable constituencies of voters or having a distinct programmatic reputation (Hooghe and Marks, 2018: 112). Ford and Jennings (2019) argue that Western European party systems have been influenced by a new dimension of European politics. They have been transformed by emerging problems such as globalisation, migration and European integration. This has resulted into the emergence of new cleavages in European democracies, especially when focusing on mass migration and the inflow of different identities. It is now up to the political parties to respond to these new cleavages, which will cause a change in European politics (Ford and Jennings, 2019: 14-15).
Furthermore, political parties are formed by their historical roots and every party has its own ‘bounded rationality’ (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 434). The ideology of party leaders influences the way in which they respond to emerging issues and exogenous pressures. This means that when a new issue emerges, the bounded rationality of political parties affects the way in which the political party responds to “challenges and uncertainties”. Therefore, Marks and Wilson argue that in order to find out how a political party will respond to a new cleavage, it is important to focus on the historical predispositions of the political party (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 459).
Election outcomes over the past decade demonstrate that Euroscepticism has been rising since the financial crisis of 2008 and Euroscepticism can be found both on the right and the left of the political spectrum, referring to a broader political change in the European Union against globalisation. Parties have become divided over global cooperation and open borders, with on one side internationally focused and cosmopolitan parties and on the other side more traditional and parochial parties. This is also known as the “cosmopolitan-parochial divide”, in which the two
sides are standing in great contrast to each other. This divide has even become independent of the traditional left-right division, which has a major influence on people’s voting behaviour (De Vries, 2018: 1541). Voters are divided between two sides, with on the one hand higher educated and mostly younger cosmopolitans, and on the other hand older, lower educated and nationalist voters. Cosmopolitan and parochial parties can now be found both on the right and the left of the political spectrum and competition between these two parties will continue in future elections.
Party competition in the EU is traditionally divided into two different dimensions, the economic versus the non-economic dimension. Whereas the former mostly relates to state-intervention into the economy, the latter relates to tradition, religion and migration (De Vries, 2018: 1545). Previously, European integration was linked to the political left-right division. Nowadays extreme left and right winged parties both oppose European integration. On the one hand, extreme right-winged parties mainly criticise EU migration because of national sovereignty reasons and the inability to control their borders. On the other hand, extreme left-winged parties oppose integration because of its effects on the welfare state and the negative influence for its citizens. This again proves the emergence of a transnational cleavage in which political parties focus on the protection national ways of living against “external actors”. This emerging cleavage has caused that the two dimensions, the economic and the non-economic, are now cross-cutting and questions of migration and European integration have become more central (De Vries, 2018: 1546).
Altogether, theories demonstrate that there is a new cleavage emerging and European conflicts are no longer solely discussed in the “backrooms” by politicians and recent European crises have contributed to the level of politicisation. Hutter and Kriesi (2019) focus on globalisation as the main driver of a new emerging cleavage. Increasing globalisation has created “winners”, who benefit from globalisation, and “losers”, who have experienced the negative effects of globalisation. In contribution to this, European conflicts have now moved to the public sphere and especially European integration issues have been politicised. European crises, such as the Eurocrisis and the refugee crisis have contributed to the politicisation and can even strengthen the conflict and can be considered as ‘critical moments’ for the politicisation process (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019: 996).
Mainstream political parties have tried to avoid the politicisation of European problems and especially the politicisation of European integration. Mainstream parties have two main
reasons for avoiding politicisation of emerging issues. Firstly, a focus on these emerging issues can increase divisions within their political party. Secondly, they will be held responsible for these issues when they will become part of the government (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019: 999). Moreover, mainstream political parties have been unable to take a clear position on emerging issues, which has created uncertainty for voters and has divided political parties internally (Ford and Jennings, 2019: 14-15). For this reason, it is very likely that more contrasting responses to new European issues have to arise from new political parties.
When European issues emerge, existing political parties are hoping to avoid politicisation of these issues, whereas new parties can attract voters by being distinctive and offer an answer to these emerging issues (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019: 1000). Hutter and Kriesi (2019) have found evidence that supports this cleavage hypothesis. Central political parties are less likely to be Eurosceptic and try to avoid politicisation in comparison to radical left and right parties. The politicisation of European issues and the mobilisation of the radical left and right has a major impact on the political community and puts enormous pressure on political parties (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019: 1008, 1013-1014). Winning parties, those that move from opposing to leading party, are less likely to be an issue entrepreneur because they have a more beneficial position and aim to strengthen the existing patterns of political competition. However, losing parties or parties that have been unable to hold political office in the majoritarian system can be seen as issue entrepreneurs. They are more likely to an emerging issue that will harm the political equilibrium in order to reach electoral gains (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015: 1161).
Furthermore, Mair (2000) focuses on the representation of political parties in the EU and research shows that the representative function of political parties has declined over the past decade. When issues emerge, voters have to choose between different alternatives, which requires political debates. Nevertheless, when these alternatives are solely discussed within the institutions, voters are forced to decide between approving or disapproving the agreement that has been made (Mair, 2000: 32-34). Therefore, the voices of voters remain important for political parties, but they do not determine the political agenda. Moreover, there exists a divide between parties that deliver but do not represent and parties that represent but do not deliver in the EU. As a response to parties that do not deliver, populist parties will mobilise and will challenge mainstream political parties (Mair, 2000: 32-34). Today we are still feeling the consequences of the Great Recession of 2008 and it is likely that these new populist parties will rise by politicising European conflicts that have
not been politicised by mainstream political parties. These political parties will try to “bring the voters back in” and fight against the political elite (Kriesi, 2014: 13).
3.2 Organisation of democracies
For this section I will make use of the standard approach by Arend Lijphart on the organisation of democracies. Lijphart has classified the organisation of modern democracies into two different ways: majoritarian democracies and consensual democracies. The former is mostly defined as “a government by the people”, or the representatives of the people, which means that the government will do everything to favour the preferences of its voters. In the case of disagreements or divisions between the preferences of voters, the majoritarian model focuses on the preferences of the majority (Lijphart, 2012: 1). On the other hand, the consensual model of democracy perceives majority rule as the minimal rule and are responsive to “as many people as possible”, aiming to represent the preferences of all its voters. This means that the government should not represent just the majority, but also include preferences of all minorities. Therefore, the consensual model of democracy does not limit power to the mere majority and aims to find a compromise between the different preferences of all voters (Lijphart, 2012: 2).
In contrast to this, the majoritarian model mostly gives power to the majority and is likely to exclude the preferences of minorities. Consensual models of democracy are characterised by their proportional electoral system consisting of multiple political parties. Because of proportional representation, more political parties can gain seats proportionally to the number of votes that the party has gained. On the contrary, in the majoritarian model, power is concentrated mostly in the hands of two dominant political parties that compete with each other. Flinders (2005) demonstrates that the difference between these two ways of organising democracies is that in consensual democracies higher levels of participation are allowed, which causes a more “deliberative democracy”. This increases public trust in the electoral system and causes fewer radical policy shifts (Flinders, 2005: 67). Furthermore, this means that in majoritarian electoral systems it is harder for smaller political parties to be represented in parliament, as they have to gain a majority. Therefore, majoritarian systems are designed to support a single majority party and allow fewer parties. Political leaders are forced to increase their vote share to be able to implement the desired policies. Proportional systems allow more political parties, which means that parties need to gain
relatively fewer votes to be able to influence policies (Dow, 2001: 111).
During election times political leaders are forced to make strategic decisions in majoritarian systems in order to increase their political influence. Because of the difficulty to be represented in majoritarian systems, party leaders can choose to “informally cooperate” with other political parties (Norris, 2019: 2). When it becomes very unlikely that a political party will gain a majority during elections, it can be interesting for this party to cooperate with other political parties. In this case the political parties can present themselves as a “united front”, which can eventually increase their political influence and focus on their long-term goal (Norris, 2019: 3). During election times voters similarly need to make a strategic decision. Electoral systems that allow fewer parties to be represented in the parliament, voters need to decide between their economic left-right position and their cosmopolitan-parochial position (De Vries, 2017: 1562).
In contribution to this, voters are likely to change their voting behaviour in the case of European elections. European Parliament elections are regarded by voters to be a “second-order” election, meaning that voters would be less concerned about the outcome than during national elections. European elections do not lead to the formation of a government, which would be the case for national governments (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012: 7). Therefore, voters are more likely to support smaller parties than they would during national elections, which are first-order elections (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 363). Furthermore, voters can use second-order elections, such as European elections, to demonstrate their frustration over the performance of mainstream political parties or their national government (Ford et al., 2012: 7).
A central aspect of majoritarian democracies is the existence of a two-party system, with the majority party as the leading party, which is sometimes perceived to be an undemocratic system. The two dominant parties are normally of equal strength, which means that elections are only won with a small majority and coalitions and minority cabinets rarely happen in majoritarian democracies. The strength of leadership of the majoritarian party depends on the support in the House of Commons and the cohesiveness within their political party. Normally, leaders of the majoritarian party are confident that they will be backed by the majority in the House of Commons, meaning that they will remain their dominant position. Thus, parliamentary defeats are very unlikely and only an explicit vote of no confidence can cause resignation or new elections (Lijphart, 2012: 12). This majoritarian model of democracy puts power in the hands of the majority and creates a “government-versus-opposition pattern”. According to this principle, the majority
should govern the preferences of the people and the minorities should oppose (Lijphart, 2012: 15, 30). Nevertheless, this principle is also perceived to be undemocratic, because minorities are excluded and losing minorities are only able to criticize, but unable to participate in decision-making. In homogenous societies this means that majority parties stay close to the political centre and the preferences of their voters. However, in the case of less homogenous societies, or plural societies, flexibility is necessary to serve the preferences of the voters and majority rule can be both undemocratic and dangerous, because of exclusion and discrimination sentiments (Lijphart, 2012: 32). This also means that the majority party is not able to represent the voices of all the voters. Therefore, I expect the following:
A cross-cutting cleavage poses a problem for majoritarian political systems.
Figure 1 Consensual and majoritarian democracies
Consensual Model of Democracy Majoritarian Model of Democracy Majority rule as minimum requirement Majority rule
Multiparty systems Two-party systems
Proportional representation Majoritarian electoral systems Flexible constitutions Rigid constitutions
Based on: Lijphart (2012: 3)
Two-party systems offer voters some advantages: voters have a clear choice between policy statements, parties have a moderating influence because they have to compete for swing voters and they can form stable single-party cabinets (Lijphart, 2012: 61-62). On the contrary, two-party electoral systems only represent the two dominant parties and underrepresent all other parties. Moreover, levels of disproportionality are higher in plurality and majority systems than in proportional representation systems. This is the case because majority systems will always favour dominant parties and disadvantage smaller parties (Lijphart, 2012: 154). Decisions can be made more easily and faster in majoritarian government, but this does not mean that these are always the right decisions. Policies can be more successful when they are better supported by voters than when a “decisive” government implements policies that go against the preferences of voters (Lijphart, 2012: 257). Therefore, it is questionable whether countries should prioritize a
majoritarian system, which increases the government’s effectiveness, or a proportional system, which increases “fairness” and represents more diversity (Norris, 1997: 298).
Heinkelmann-Wild et al. (2020) describe a wedge issue as an issue that cuts across traditional party lines and is likely to increase divisions between political parties. The issue of EU integration can be considered as a wedge issue, because it is cross-cutting along party lines, increasing intra-party divisions between mainstream political parties (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020: 725). Therefore, mainstream political parties aim to keep these issues unnoticeable by making use of “politics of avoidance” and moving the attention to other political issues. Once a cross-cutting cleavage emerges, mainstream parties are forced to respond to this and adopt this in their party lines. Nevertheless, in majoritarian democracies, parties will reach a “politics of intransigence”, as both parties will be unwilling to make concessions and will respond with inflexibility to each other. Furthermore, cross-cutting cleavages are likely to increase divisions within the political parties, as members of parties are forced to choose between two opposing sides. This will further increase divisions between and within political parties (Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2020: 725). Based on these theories I expect that:
In majoritarian systems, cross-cutting cleavages have the potential to break-up traditional party coherence.
Previous research agrees that a new political cleavage is emerging, which does not fit the traditional divide between the left and right political parties. It can even be argued that a new cleavage is emerging with a primary focus on the mobility of Europeans, which is occurring in al European societies (Bauböck, 2018: 125). Traditionally, political cleavages have been between different classes, religions or citizens living in different parts of countries. These divisions could be placed between the different political parties representing these different interests among the nation. Nevertheless, nowadays the European cleavage is no longer about left or right, it is about open/closed borders and pro/anti-globalisation (Schön-Quinlivan, 2017: 296). Furthermore, cleavages can be absorbed in different ways because of the different electoral systems that are present.
4 Data and Methodology
In this section I will explain which data, methods and research design I will be using to analyse the effect of the Brexit referendum on the British political system. To answer the research question: “What are the consequences of the Brexit referendum for the British party system?”, I will be using the UK as a case study. For this I will make use of qualitative methods, to gain an in-depth inside into the case. I have chosen to focus on the UK as an atypical case, because of its majoritarian electoral system. When comparing the UK to other EU member states, the UK can be seen as a different case because of its majoritarian electoral system. Previous research has primarily focused on the causes of the referendum outcome but has given little attention to the consequences of the referendum. I will make use of process tracing to find out how the Brexit referendum (X) has affected the British political system (Y). I will make use of electoral outcomes in the UK and the EU to demonstrate how majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. This will reveal if Eurosceptic parties, also known as challenger parties, have enjoyed similar successes during European elections as they did during general elections. Moreover, I will examine how the referendum has affected the political parties and how they have reacted to the referendum outcome. By analysing electoral outcomes and the different electoral systems, I will argue that Brexit has exposed the fragilities of the majoritarian electoral system of the UK cleavage and how it further increased divisions within the political parties.
4.1 Case selection
For this research I will make use of a single-case study, in which I will empirically analyse the British political system. The UK will be considered as an atypical case, compared to other member states. A transnational cleavage has emerged as a result of European crises, which is appearing in all European societies. Nevertheless, the implication of this emerging cleavage differs between the European countries and depends on the electoral systems of societies. The way in which emerging cleavages are absorbed by the political system is influenced by the way in which the democracy is organised. Lijphart (2012) demonstrates that democracies can be organised in two opposing ways: a majoritarian and a consensual model of democracy. As described by Lijphart (2012), the Westminster electoral system is the clearest example of a majoritarian model of democracy, in which power is concentrated in the hands of the majority and only majoritarian parties are
represented. Other EU member states are characterised by their consensual system and their proportional electoral systems, with Belgium as the purest case (Lijphart, 2012: 7). This is also the case for the electoral system of the European Parliament, where all MPs are proportionally elected. Therefore, the UK will be considered as an atypical because it is opposing the organisation of democracies in other EU member states.
The UK is a two-party system, in which minorities should oppose the majority. Nevertheless, the rise of a minority is very unlikely because of high levels of disproportionality and the exclusion of minorities in the majoritarian system (Lijphart, 2012: 154). This can be different in consensual democracies where power is in hands of more political powers instead of solely two dominant political parties. For example, in consensual democracy more political parties are present, who can present alternatives and a more diverse representation of voters. Lijphart (2010) presented the UK as “the leading alternative to a more general European practice”. Therefore, the rise of a cleavage might have a different influence on majoritarian democracies than it can have on consensual democracies. Moreover, the strength of the leaders of the two dominant parties depends on the unity within the parties and the extent to which they will be backed by the MPs in the House of Commons. In the case of Brexit, the two dominant parties, the Conservatives and the Labour party, have been unable to unify and MPs were very divided over the Brexit negotiations.
Mainstream political parties have been unable to translate the preferences of voters in their party points, which has brought a lot of unclarity and insecurity for British voters. Aidt et al. (2019) demonstrate that the defeats of the Meaningful Votes in the House of Commons between January and March 2019 are a result from rebellion of MPs. Furthermore, they argue that there exists a paradox because the main cause of the defeats was the rebellion of Conservative MPs. A huge amount of rebellion came from Conservative MPs that had voted “Leave” during the Brexit referendum in 2016 (Aidt et al., 2019: 1). Certainly, the outcome of Brexit is a unique case, because no member state has ever decided to leave the EU before. This means that there is no clear path to follow for the UK and it is certainly unclear for the political parties what to do.
This demonstrates that the majoritarian electoral system of the UK is an interesting case and this analysis will provide a closer inside into the fragilities of majoritarian electoral systems, as opposed to proportional electoral systems. Therefore, this case study focuses on how Brexit has put pressure on the British political system and how it has been a cross-cutting issue for the two
dominant political parties. With my analysis I will confirm the following hypothesis: In
majoritarian systems, cross-cutting cleavages have the potential to break-up traditional party coherence. I will analyse to what extent MPs have been divided over the Brexit negotiations and
how MPs have voted during the Meaningful Votes between January and March 2019. Moreover, I will focus on the UK’s majoritarian system and how political cleavages can be a problem for this majoritarian system. Because of the two-party system it is difficult to present new issues in the British political system. Due to the majoritarian system, power is only in the hands of the majority, meaning that voters can only vote on the two dominant parties. This becomes visible when looking at opposition parties, such as UKIP and the Brexit Party, who have been unable to translate their political gains from the European level to the national level (Cutts, Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017: 70). It is also important to include other consequences for contrasting outcomes during European and national elections. Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) demonstrate that voting behaviour can change during European Parliament elections because these elections are considered as “second-order” elections and voters feel that there is less at stake.
Operationalisation
The empirical analysis of the different electoral systems will be primarily based on the work of Lijphart (2010). He has described the main characteristics of majoritarian and consensual democratic systems and the different outcomes that this produces. My analysis is based on these descriptions in order to compare the electoral system of the UK and the EU. Moreover, my analysis will focus on cleavage theory and whether Brexit can be considered as a new cleavage. For this, I will base my analysis on Lipset and Rokkan, who defined four basic cleavages in 1967. Additionally, I will use more recent research on cleavage theory by Hooghe and Marks (2017). In their paper they have demonstrated that recent European crises are transforming into a transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2017). When it comes to European crises I will mainly focus on the effects of the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis on rising Euroscepticism. In this analysis I will primarily focus on Eurosceptic parties in the UK, which are parties that have included critique towards Europe as their main party line.
In this case I will consider the UK Independence Party and the Brexit Party as the two most dominant Eurosceptic parties. UKIP was established as a one-issue party, focusing on the UK’s withdrawal. Both parties claim to be different but have focused on the same political issues and a
“clear-cut Brexit”. Therefore, in this analysis I will combine their vote shares to give a better insight into the results they have achieved. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the Brexit referendum asked voters to decide on the withdrawal of the UK. Nevertheless, it did not address any further Brexit policy and only asked voters whether they were in favour of Remain or Leave. This has caused unclarity for voters and politicians because it has been unclear what Brexit actually meant. Therefore, political parties were unable to provide a clear Brexit policy and to absorb the voices of their voters into their party points.
4.2 Data
In order to gain a better insight into Brexit as an emerging cleavage and its influence on the British political system, my empirical analysis will consist of three different sections. Firstly, I will demonstrate how new European issues have emerged and why Brexit can be considered as a cross-cutting cleavage. Several European crises have reinforced Euroscepticism and I will mainly focus on the Eurocrisis and the European migration crisis. To demonstrate how Euroscepticism has increased over the past decades and Brexit has entered British politics, I will focus on changing voting behaviour in the EU since 2008. The European Parliament elections of 2014 have demonstrated a shift in voting behaviour and increasing vote shares for Eurosceptic parties. Data on shifts in voting behaviour will be gathered from the Eurobarometer Survey of 2015. This gives a closer insight into voting behaviour and why voters have decided to vote for more Eurosceptic parties. Moreover, it demonstrates whether critique towards the EU has been higher in the UK than it has been in other member states.
In contribution to this, I will analyse how a new cleavage has entered British politics. Data on this will be gathered from the European Parliament website and previous research on the influence of European crises on changing voting behaviour. For this I will make use of voting behaviour in the European Parliament to demonstrate how Eurosceptic parties have gained popularity throughout Europe. The European Parliament website clearly demonstrates how many votes each national party has gained during the elections, throughout different periods. For my analysis I will include the elections during the period from 2009-2019. I have chosen this period because I expect that votes for Eurosceptic parties will rise as a consequence of European crises and increasing dissatisfaction with the EU. Moreover, I will use data on the vote shares of the
British national parties in the European Parliament and during general elections in the UK. This will demonstrate whether emerging European issues gave rise to new, more Eurosceptic, parties in the EU or the UK and how the British political system has absorbed Brexit. According to Hutter and Kriesi (2019), mainstream political parties try to avoid politicisation, which means that new distinctive political parties will rise in the case of new emerging issues. Therefore, I will analyse how mainstream political parties have responded to Brexit in the UK and whether they have tried to avoid politicisation. Information about the Eurosceptic parties, UKIP and the Brexit Party, will be gathered from their websites to demonstrate what their main priorities have been considering the future of the UK.
Secondly, I will focus on the majoritarian electoral system of the UK and the proportional electoral system of the EU and how these systems differ. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the electoral systems of the UK and the EU I will gain data from the British Parliament website and the European Parliament website. This clearly describes the characteristics of both electoral systems. Moreover, it describes how many parties are represented and how these parties are elected. For my analysis it is important to include how many parties are represented in both systems and how many votes each party receives. This will show whether majoritarian electoral systems allow minorities, or smaller parties, to be represented in parliament or whether this has to come through other more popular parties.
Thirdly, I will analyse how the outcome of the Brexit referendum has affected the two-party system of the UK. I will focus on the two dominant political parties, the Conservatives and the Labour Party, and how Brexit has affected these two parties. I will gain data from various news websites, such as the BBC, the Guardian and CNN, and academic articles to analyse the influence of Brexit on the political system. After the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron chaos immediately emerged, which is revealed by various articles in newspapers. Furthermore, the divisions both between and within the political parties are demonstrated in newspapers and show how Brexit has been cross-cutting traditional party lines. Other academic articles demonstrate how Brexit has put pressure on the Conservative and the Labour Party. Additionally, this shows how Theresa May had been unable to unite the House of Commons and eventually reach an agreement, causing the biggest defeat in the House of Commons in history. I will combine these academic articles and news articles in order to demonstrate how Brexit has put pressure on the British political system.
Furthermore, I will focus on the individual voting behaviour of the MPs in the House of Commons and their voting behaviour during the Brexit referendum. This will demonstrate to what extent MPs have been divided over the Withdrawal Agreements. Moreover. This will give a closer insight into the levels of rebellion by MPs because it will show whether MPs have rebelled against their political party. Data on this will be gathered from Aidt et al. (2019), who have researched the levels of rebellion within the political parties. In contribution to this, data will be gathered from the Politics Home website, that demonstrates how all MPs have voted during the three Meaningful votes between January and March 2019. This will demonstrate to what extent MPs have been divided within the political parties during these meaningful votes.
5 Empirical analysis 5.1 The Brexit referendum
The emerging of a new political issue and the eventual outcome has put enormous pressure on the British political system. The British EU membership has caused a major transformation in British voting behaviour and for a short period Eurosceptic parties, such as UKIP, became very popular in the UK. In 2014 UKIP gained 24 seats during the European Parliament elections and it even became the first party to win the elections next to the Tories or Labour over the past century. Nevertheless, it lost its political power and the national vote share of UKIP dropped lower than 2% in the general elections of 2017 and left them without any seat (Quartz, 2017). In the European Parliament, UKIP has been gaining votes since 2009 and from 2014-2019 it gained 26% of all votes (European Parliament, 2019).
As a one-issue party, UKIP has lost its political power in the UK after the outcome of the Brexit referendum, but it cannot be ignored that UKIP and the Brexit Party have been very important for British politics and have transformed British politics. Whereas mainstream parties, such as the Conservatives and the Labour party, were unable to offer an answer to EU related issues, UKIP was able to change the political landscape and has caused an important political shift. Both UKIP and the Brexit Party have been gaining votes but did not enjoy the same gains on the national level as they did on the European level. This section will explain how a new cleavage has entered British politics and how this was translated into the British electoral system, by emphasizing the differences between general elections and European elections.
5.1.1 A cross-cutting cleavage in the UK
The European Parliament elections in 2014 demonstrate rising support for Eurosceptic parties. In 23 member states, out of 28 member states, Eurosceptic parties gained seats during the European elections (Treib, 2014: 1542). European voters had expressed their discontent with the EU and especially with rising immigration. This reveals the emergence of new cleavage, which has divided nationalists and cosmopolitans and is cross-cutting traditional politics. The risks of globalisation have become more visible and criticism towards EU membership has increased over the past decade. There has been a cultural transformation with increasing scepticism towards immigration and integration and fears of crumbling of national identities. The Eurobarometer Survey of 2015 demonstrates that in many member states citizens believe that immigration is the most important problem of the EU. In the UK, migration is also seen as the most important issue, where 36 per cent of the British population finds migration the most important issue (Eurobarometer Survey, 2015).
This cultural transformation has left certain voters behind and has divided voters between the parochial intolerant side versus the younger, better educated and more liberal side (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 279). This is also known as the cosmopolitan-parochial divide, which is cross-cutting the traditional political left-right division and is influencing voting behaviour (De Vries, 2018: 1541). Feelings of scepticism towards Brussels have been reinforced mainly by two European crises. Firstly, Eurosceptic parties have focused on the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 and the following Eurocrisis, which has created a new dynamic. The consequences of the financial crisis, the approach of the European Central Bank and the installed austerity measures have been criticized by many. The rise of Eurosceptic parties after the financial crisis can be explained by the “rejection” and the alternatives that they offer (Evans, 2019: 77). Challenger parties have increasingly emerged after the Eurozone crisis and voters have favoured these parties by leaving traditional parties. Challenger parties stood up against national governments and the installed austerity measures and increasing European integration and immigration. Furthermore, voting behaviour has changed because voters wanted to punish their government because of poor economic functioning (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016: 971). These challenger parties, or “new political parties”, are relatively new and have not yet taken part of any
government. However, they have influenced politics and tried to transform the traditional political landscape by emphasizing new issues, mainly European issues (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016: 974). This fits the expectation that mainstream parties have tried to avoid politicisation of these European issues and that contrasting responses have to emerge from new parties.
Secondly, the migration crisis in 2015 has contributed to rising Euroscepticism and has shaped this new cross-cutting cleavage. In 2004 the UK opened its borders for EU accession countries, which has caused major waves of critique. Mainstream political parties were unable to respond to the concerns of their voters about the threats of incoming migrants and cultural changes. The dominant parties were aware of the concerns of their voters but did not include this into their party points. This reveals that mainstream parties were unable to respond to these new issues and external changes (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Due to the inability of mainstream political parties to respond to these concerns, attitudes towards the EU and migration concerns were linked to each other by British voters (Evans, 2019: 77). Euroscepticism was rising from both sides of the political spectrum and it moved beyond the traditional left-right division in the UK.
This demonstrates the emergence of a cleavage that is cross-cutting the British political system, to which UKIP has given a political answer. Not all British citizens believe in a European identity and attach greater value to their national identity, which is threatened by the inflow of migrants. As the leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage had been able to emphasize the economic divisions and focus on the ones that have been “left behind” as a result of globalisation. These “left behind” in the UK are mostly described as the: “older, working-class, white voters who lack the educational qualifications, incomes and skills” (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 278). As previously described, I would expect that mainstream political parties try to avoid politicisation because of several reasons. On the contrary, new political parties do focus on emerging political issues and are more likely to become issue entrepreneurs (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019) (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). In this case UKIP is represented as the “challenger party” that has given an answer to the issue of European migration and was able to translate the voice of voters into their party points, which mainstream parties were unable to do. Their approach to link immigration and the consequences of the financial crisis to Euroscepticism has been the “winning formula” to mobilise the left-behind and gain voters (Ford and Goodwin, 204: 282). Moreover, it demonstrates how this new cleavage has entered British politics, with Brexit as the ultimate goal.
5.1.2 General elections
The outcome of the Brexit referendum can be considered to be the ultimate victory for the UK independence party. Nevertheless, the party experienced a decreasing vote share after the referendum of 2016 and eventually lost its seat during the general election of 2017. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was established in 1991 and was formed as a single-issue party. The party focused on the British EU membership and the eventual withdrawal. Since 1997 the party has gained increasing attention and in 2010 it gained more than 3% of the British national votes (Quartz, 2017). Since then, the party had been gaining during general elections and gained one seat during the general elections of 2015. However, the one-issue party had only been successful for a short period in British politics and has lost its political power in the UK after eventually reaching their goal of leaving the EU. The party’s decreasing vote share was partly caused by the influence of other political parties. The outcome of the referendum forced mainstream parties to accept the result and take a stance on the British EU membership. These political parties, mostly Conservatives, included the EU membership into their party points by focusing on European integration and immigration. This has been a major threat for UKIP as this had been their central policy point. Party points of Conservatives and UKIP became somewhat similar, in which the Conservatives had gained the advantage of being in government (Usherwood, 2019: 1225).
In 2015, UKIP had received nearly four million votes, but less than two years later they lost their seat in parliament, their number of candidates reduced, and its share of the national vote decreased from nearly 13% per cent to 1.8% (Heat and Goodwin, 2017: 344). In April 2019 the Brexit Party was established in order to confirm a break with the EU and “to change British politics for good” (The Brexit Party, 2019). With Nigel Farage, former UKIP-leader, as the leader of the Brexit Party, the party proclaims not to be the successor of UKIP but has similarly pushed to reach a “clean-break” with the EU and take part in the general elections (BBC, 2019e). However, during the general elections of 2019, the Brexit Party gained merely 2% of the votes and was unable to win any seats. Farage argued that his party did have an influence on the election results by supporting the Conservatives to secure Brexit and that it had crushed the “hopes of another referendum” (BBC 2019b).
seems that both the Brexit Party and UKIP have experienced an “electoral flop” and were unable to maintain their political power in the UK (Norris, 2019: 2). The elections of 2017 saw decreasing support for smaller parties and the Conservative and Labour Party shared 82.4 per cent of the votes. This was the largest combined share of votes by two parties since 1970 (Heath and Goodwin, 2017: 346). This demonstrates that the British political system has gone back to the traditional two-party system in which the Conservatives and the Labour party have remained as the two dominant political parties.
5.1.3 European Elections
The European Parliament election that took place in May 2014 has demonstrated a transformation in votes and has made populist right-winged parties the largest parties in some EU member states, such as in France and the UK. The outcome of this election exposed a shift towards anti-EU and anti-immigration parties, which has put enormous pressure on the national governments of these member states (Luo, 2017: 407). Moreover, the election of 2014 has revealed criticism towards the EU and its mismanagement after the Eurocrisis and the inability to restrict migration. National governments faced difficulties to give an answer to European issues and the controversial results of the election can be considered as a rejection of the current political establishment (Luo, 2017: 414, 417). Overall, it shows how this cleavage has entered politics and how this is cross-cutting traditional politics.
In contrast to mainstream parties, UKIP was able to offer clarity and give an answer to this new cleavage, but the party was only able to represent itself at the European level and has lost its political power on the national and local level (Usherwood, 2019: 12). Since UKIP has been gaining popularity, it has performed better on the European level, than during British general elections. Gains that have been made by UKIP since 1999 on the European level, were not translated to the general elections. The same results are visible when analysing the results of the Brexit Party during European and general elections. After its establishment in 2019, the Brexit Party became the winning party during the European Elections in May 2019. They gained more votes than the Tory and Labour parties combined, and the achievement of 29 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) had made them the biggest British party in the European Parliament (The Brexit Party, 2019). This is an interesting outcome because the Brexit Part had only gained 2% of
all votes during the general elections, which stands in great contrast to the outcome of the European elections. The different outcomes between these two elections can be explained by the decisions that voters make during elections. Whereas general elections are perceived to be “first-order” elections, European Parliament elections are perceived as “second-order” elections and voters believe that there is less at stake (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 363). Therefore, voters are more likely to express their dissatisfaction with governments and vote for Eurosceptic parties during European Parliament elections, which explains the rising support for Eurosceptic parties.
Figure 2 demonstrates the combined vote share of UKIP and the Brexit Party during general elections and European Parliament elections from 2009-2019. UKIP and the Brexit Party have enjoyed growing vote shares during European elections, both parties failed to enjoy the same gains on the national level. After every success during the European elections, this success did not transfer to the general elections afterwards.
Figure 2 UKIP / Brexit Party during European and General elections
Source: House of Commons Library (2019) and European Parliament (2019)
Figure 2 shows the different results both parties have gained during European and national elections. In 2019 UKIP and the Brexit Party enjoyed 34 per cent of the votes during the European Parliament elections. However, during the general elections in 2019, they were only able to gain 2.1 per cent of the votes. Since 2015 the British Eurosceptic parties have seen their vote share decreasing by 10.5 per cent. European elections demonstrate a contrasting outcome, as UKIP and Brexit increased their vote share by 7.2 per cent up to a total of 34 per cent in 2019 (House of Commons Library, 2020) (European Parliament, 2020). Furthermore, it is interesting to compare
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