More than a single identity? A case-study into multiple European Union
Foreign Policy Identities in relation to the Russian Federation
Desmin Dekker
Europe Boundaries and Orders 2014-2015
Supervisor: Dr. Julien Jeandezbos Second reader: Dr. Imke Harbers 10004947/6304591
Abstract:
This thesis sets out to advance academic discussion on the nature of the European foreign policy identity. It does so by refocusing away from the traditional literature that tries to capture the foreign policy identity with a single label, i.e. normative power. To illustrate the empirical findings a case study was performed on the complex relation between the European Union and the Russian Federation. A discourse analysis will be presented in which official EU documents from three key periods of EU-Russia relations were empirically tested to map different identity discourses. This thesis delivers convincing evidence for the presence of a normative power discourse, military power discourse and an economic power discourse in and across multiple documents. This gives an
explanation for the fact that the European Union has a complex and sometimes conflicting or ambiguous foreign policy identity as the analysis will show, there appears to be a gap between expectations and priorities. The European Union is expected to be a normative power but its priorities are its own security and economic well-being.
Key words: Normative, Power, Russia, European Union, Discourse analysis
Acknowledgements:
I would like to thank my supervisor, Julien Jeandezbos, for his support, patience and extensive comments throughout the entire research project. Furthermore, I would like to thank my mother and my father for giving me the opportunity to study the subjects I am most interested in.
Table of contents
1: Introduction and Set-up 4
1.1 Topic introduction and research question 4
1.2 Organization of the thesis 5
2: Theoretical framework 7
2.1 Different perspectives on European Union power 2.1.1 Normative Power Discourse
2.1.2 Military/geopolitical power discourse 2.1.3 Economic power discourse
2.2 Constructivism as a research perspective 2.3 Multiple identity discourses framework
7 7 10 12 13 19 3: Methodology 25
3.1 Methods of data analysis:
Process tracing through genealogical discourse analysis 25 3.2 Data collection
3.3 Collected data 4: Data Analysis
4.1 1997 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 4.2 2003 Common Spaces Agreement
4.3 2008 EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization 4.4 Overall analysis 5: Conclusion 6: Bibliography 27 29 30 31 35 40 45 49 50
1: Introduction and Set-up
1.1 Topic introduction and research question
In an article by The Economist, published on February 14th 2015, Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy towards the West, and in particular the European Union, is labeled as Putin’s war on the West (Economist, 2015, pp. 11-14). It appears that Russia aims to be accepted as a great power again by its neighbors and that it wants to regain as much influence as possible in comparison to its communist precursor (Neumann, 1999, p. 109). The current Russian leadership apparently does not shun any policy tools to reach those goals. In a 2014 report from Peter Pomerantsev it is claimed that Russia employs a form of disruptive politics across the European Union that is best named hybrid warfare (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 29). This includes the use of actual military force in the annexation of the Crimea and efforts to destabilize the Union through misinformation and
sponsorship of domestic fringe parties. Both the former and the latter prove to be security threats. The annexation of the Crimea in particular brings armed conflict and destabilized states close to the border of the European Union and the latter could destabilize the Union itself.
In response to these exogenous threats it would be expected that the European Union would have a coherent and stable foreign policy identity towards Russia. This would make it possible to analyze and predict actions of the European Union. Desk-research (Fernandez, 2008), the article from the Economist (p. 11-14 and the report by Pomerantsev (p. 12-35), however, suggest that the foreign policy identity of the EU towards Russia is far from coherent. The promotion of norms, such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law are interspersed with occasions where economic goals or security measures take precedence. This ambiguity could prove to be dangerous for the security and stability of the European Union now that Russia is no longer a weak state in its own eyes, and the eyes of others, a shift that has occurred approximately halfway into the first decade of the 21st century (Gerrits, 2008, p. 7). This shift has coincided with the increasing ambitions of the European Union to become an important foreign policy actor, with global capabilities and the waves of EU enlargement that further complicate the relationship (European Council, 2009, p. 4).
There is also no consensus on the nature of the European Union foreign policy in academia. An academic debate has in fact unfolded to determine whether EU foreign policy can be
characterized as either normative, military or economic. In short, normative power can be described as the power of ideas over military force, the desire to convey norms and the ability to shape the conception of normal in international relations (Manners, 2002, p. 238). Military power is much more based on the willingness and ability to use military means to reach foreign policy goals. For example H. Larsen argues that, with the development of the ESDP, the EU moves closer to becoming a regular military power (Larsen, 2002). Economic power, on the other hand, is seen when improved/better
regulated trade relations seem to be the most important foreign policy goals (Damro, 2012). A more detailed account of this debate will be provided in the theoretical part of this thesis.
How can the apparent lack of consistency in, and the disagreement about the nature of, the EU foreign policy be explained? It appears that it is not possible to reach an agreement on which one of the three mentioned ‘natures’ identified in the literature, normative, military or economic, is dominant. This thesis thus aims to answer the question whether international actors such as the EU can have more than a single foreign policy identity at the same time. This would give insight in why there are differences in discourse that are found in EU documents and on which the respective proponents of the normative, military and economic power traditions base their findings. This thesis therefore argues that The European Union foreign policy identity consists not of one single identity. It cannot be defined as entirely normative or as entirely something else. It is dependent on the (combination of) actor, context and time in which one is studying the European Union foreign policy identity. As such, foreign policy identity can be defined as flexible and changing over time, and multiple identities can coexist (even in the same document) without being mutually exclusive. Such a perspective would provide a novel explanation for the nature of the European Union’s foreign policy identity, which in turn could advance the debate on how to shape relations with other countries, in this case Russia. This is important in a fast-changing and increasingly globalized world in which threats can change and move fast. A better understanding would benefit the European Union society in particular as the current strenuous relations with Russia are not beneficiary to the security and the economy of the Union. In addition, more knowledge on the nature of the European Union foreign policy identity could give better insights on the ambitions of the EU as a more
important/visible foreign policy actor. Either normatively, economically, military or a combination of those.
1.2 Organization of the thesis
The research process in this thesis is two-fold. The first part consists of desk-research that consists of the following 3 important elements. First, there is the theoretical part in which a discussion on the nature of the foreign policy identity of the European Union and its limits is presented. Second, the constructivist perspective from which this research draws theoretical perspectives is laid out. Third, the framework is presented in which the main argument is
demonstrated, with examples from other authors. This will show that the concept of an identity that consists of multiple discourses is theoretically possible.
After that, a methodological chapter will follow in which the research method and data
collection method of this thesis will be presented. This will be a genealogical discourse analysis based on the principles of M. Foucault (1970) and J. Milliken (1999). The data used to perform this
discourse analysis will stem from official EU documents that are directly linked to Russia or those that reflect strategy of the European Union that also affects Russia. This chapter will form a bridge
between the first part of the research process and the second.
The second part consists of the empirical analysis which will start with a narrative on
EU-Russian relations. It will then look at key documents from three different periods in EU-EU-Russian relations, to see whether the main question of this thesis can be answered and the driving argument can be demonstrated. These periods are 1997, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entered into force, 2003 when the Common Spaces Agreement was signed and the period after 2008, when negotiations on the Partnership for Modernization started and the nature of the relationship between the EU and Russia was complicated by a change in Russian foreign policy.
Finally, the thesis will end with an overall analysis and conclusions will follow to present the
empirical research findings that could contribute to the shape EU external action could take in the coming years.
2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework below consists of several parts. First it serves to provide the reader with an account on what different theories are found in the academic debate on the nature of the European Union foreign policy identity. Second, it explains why constructivism is a suitable strand of theory in international relations to research matters of identity. Third it creates a framework in which it is shown that it is in fact theoretically possible that multiple identity discourses can exist in practice. Fourth, it will provide a short historicization on the relationship between the European Union and Russia.
2.1 Different perspectives on European Union power
As discussed in the introduction, there is no consensus in the academic debate on the nature of power that the EU exerts through its foreign policy. For the purpose of this thesis, three different discourses have been researched. These are the normative power discourse, the military power discourse and the economic power discourse. This is not to say that this is a fully comprehensive account of all possible foreign policy identities, but as the empirical analysis will show, these are the most prevalent ones in relation to the nature of power of the European Union. This first part of the theoretical framework will now discuss their main characteristics. It serves to inform the reader on the current academic debate and highlight its shortcomings in explaining the complexity of the EU foreign policy towards Russia as neither discourse can explain all actions the European Union has made.
2.1.1 Normative power discourse
Starting with Duchêne in 1972, a significant number of authors have highlighted the
particularity of the European Union’s international role as linked to the normative nature of the policy itself (Sjursen, 2006, p. 169). To do so, they often build on Francois Duchêne’s conception of civilian power which translates as being ‘long on economic power and relatively short on military force’ (Duchene, 1973, p. 19). More detailed, civilian power, was defined by Hanns Maull as consisting of the following key features: The centrality of economic power to achieve international goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress (Maul, 1990, pp. 92-93).
The main argument in this strand of literature tends to be that the European Union
distinguishes itself from other actors because it is not just a civilian power (in the sense that a civilian power does not have military options available, whilst the EU does) but also a normative, ethical and civilizing power within an international system (Sjursen, 2006, p. 170). The author most linked to the conception of the normative power Europe discourse is Ian Manners. At the core of his theory, he
argues by refocusing from the debate whether the European Union is a civilian or (is becoming) a military power, it becomes possible to consider the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity as a normative power (Manners, 2002, p. 238). The EU can be considered as such through its process of its creation. The constitution of the EU as a political entity occurred to a large extent as an elite-driven, treaty-based, legal order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity (Manners, 2002, p. 241). The most important of its norms, the principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and the respect for human rights were explicitly enshrined in a treaty for the first time in 1973 in the Copenhagen declaration on European Identity. As such, Manners claims that human rights is one of the principle characteristics of the European Union (Manners, 2002, p. 241). In Manners view, the EU since then, has proceeded towards making its external relations conditional on, and informed by, a ‘catalogue of norms’ which comes closer to those of the European convention on Human rights and fundamental freedoms and the universal declaration of human rights than the vast majority of other actors in the international system (Manners, 2008, p. 241). It thus cannot be overlooked the extent to which the EU is normatively different to other polities due to its commitments to principles in accordance with the ECHR, United Nations and individual rights (Manners, 2002, p. 241). Central to Manners conception of normative power is that it is different from pre-existing political forms and that it has a strong pre-disposition to act in a normative way (Manners, 2002, p. 242).
Proponents or the normative power discourse argue that the discussion on what the EU ‘is’ can perhaps best be explained by examining what the EU ‘does’ in terms of responsibilities or duties beyond Europe’s borders in defense of universal values, such as human rights, physical security, economic prosperity, social well-being and democracy. This has resulted in a deeply-rooted image of the EU as an example and role model by drawing on the specific European experience in achieving peace, neighborhood stability and reconciliation (Aggestam, 2008, pp. 6-7). A such, the EU could be seen as an normative power because it does not pursue its goals at any costs to others. Being a
responsible power, the European Union is expected to follow certain rules of action based on concerns for the well-being of others. This would entail strategies of persuasion, dialogue and negotiation being favored over coercion. Working with carrots rather than sticks (Aggestam, 2008, p. 9). Normative power moreover includes a degree of self-reflexivity as norms are relational concepts with a social dimension. It includes that normative action in foreign policy is considered through the glasses of how others perceive the EU and that, in turn, the EU is able to reflect and improve upon this experience. Without this concept of self-reflexivity, the EU would be a power that is imposing its version of the ‘good-life’ on others in world politics (Aggestam, 2008, p. 9).
What more detailed characteristics can be distinguished as being part of the basis normative power? These characteristics or values will help inform the selection of indicators that will be used to
identify normative discourses within EU documents related to Russia. According to Manners, it is possible to identify 5 core norms within the vast body of Union law and policies. First of all, there is the centrality of sustainable peace, second there is the idea of social freedom and liberty, third the
importance of a stable and consensual democracy, fourth the importance of supranational rule of law and fifth, the protection of fundamental human rights. In addition to these core principles, the EU emphasizes a number of additional norms that are found within the constitution and practices of the EU. These are inclusive equality; social solidarity; anti-discrimination; sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2008, pp. 47-55). Based on these characteristics traces of normative power discourse will be sought after within the empirical analysis.
The next important part of normative power Europe is the diffusion of norms. Only accepting the normative basis of the EU would not make it a normative power. Norms are not mere ‘ought’s’, rather, they are rooted in practice through processes of socialization and internalization (Sjursen, 2006, p. 173). It needs to be asked how these norms are diffused to other parts outside the European Union, in this case to Russia. This part of the chapter will also help finding traces of normative discourse in EU documents as it shows where such discourses could be found. Manners (2002, p. 244-245) lists 6 possible ways for norms to diffuse. First there is contagion, the process of unintentional diffusion of ideas to other political actors outside the EU. Second there is informational diffusion which is the result of strategic communications such as initiatives of the president of the Commission or the presidency of the EU. Third, there is procedural diffusion which involves the institutionalization of relations between a third party and the EU. These could be membership of the EU itself, taking part in an international organization or, particularly important for this thesis, a regional cooperation agreement. Fourth, there is the transference of norms which takes place when goods are exchanged or trade, aid or technical assistance is provided to third parties, mainly through financial or substantive means and based on conditionality. These include the exportation of community norms or the carrot and stick system of financial rewards and economic sanctions. Fifth, there is overt diffusion which is seen when there is a physical presence of the EU in third party states. An example could be found in the role of Commission delegates or member states’ embassy staff in monitoring missions. Sixth there is the cultural filter which is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the receivers of norm diffusion, an example of which can be found in the diffusion of environmental norms in Britain. Thus these are the mechanisms that are at work in the diffusion of the norms of the European Union. To conclude the discussion on normative power, a few examples will be presented in which European Union normative power was visible.
First, Eastern enlargement has been presented by Schmidt as necessary for the credibility of the EU’s own core values. The aim of exporting democracy and human rights to Eastern and Central Europe has been chiefly described as being about retaining the EU’s essential normative identity, driven
by a feeling of kinship and duty (Smith, 2001) Another view on Eastern enlargement says that this reflects a community perspective, which is encapsulated in a post-nationalist and liberal collective identity with similar values (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 184). Second, the EU’s commitment to rebuilding a democratic Kosovo, in particular through the use of civilian measures from the Stability Pact of South Eastern European countries, was also seen as being devoid of large material interests. Rather, it was driven by a conviction that ‘what was at state was no more, but also no less, than the identity of twenty-first century Europe (Youngs, 2004, p. 417). Commissioner Bonino suggested that the EU’s uniquely strong focus on humanitarian assistance is not a “policy... but an integral part of Europe’s external identity” (Youngs, 2004, p. 417). Thirdly, the inception of the European Security and Defense Policy is, although sometimes analyzed differently, interpreted as a further component of normative legitimation. From the Maastricht treaty onwards, the commitment to enhance cooperation in security and defense is seen as potentially providing an essential overarching political component that checks missions on normative principles. European citizens will see EU force, based on collective action, as inevitably imbued with greater legitimacy than previous nationally-driven interventions (Youngs, 2004, p. 418). Manners agrees with these views in his reconsideration of EU normative power. “Militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to diminution of the EU’s normative power” (Manners, 2006, p. 182). Finally, an example relating to Russia itself can be found within Manners 2006 (p. 194) article where it was said that EU normative power was obviously expressed in 2004 when the willingness of states and societies such as Turkey and Russia became clear to accept norms such as ‘equality’ and sustainable development’ in the cases of their constitutional law and the acceptance of the Kyoto protocol.
2.1.2 Military/geopolitical power discourse
Probably due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of European Union foreign policy, there is no consensus on what kind of power the EU is. The previous part gave an account of one important and perhaps dominant way of conceptualizing EU power. This part will look into a substantial alternative strand of theory in which authors contest the normative nature of the
European Union and rather assert that it is in fact (becoming) a military/geopolitical power, hereafter military for short.
Central to this discussion are two arguments. First, there is the argument that says that the limits of norm promotion are easily reached when placed in a geopolitical or security context. And second, it is claimed that the EU is moving away from its civilian/normative nature by incorporating more military means in its foreign policy.
First, in a number of situations, practice dictates that strategic decisions are made over normative ones (Laïdi, 2008, p. 3). According to Laïdi (2008, p. 4) Europe is facing a combination of
economic and security threats from outside its borders such as mass-immigration, terrorism and competition from emerging markets. In some situations the European Union is vulnerable, as is the case with energy (gas) dependence, which gives countries like Russia leverage. In situations like these, it would seem likely that security is chosen over the promotion of norms. This would seem even more likely if the promotion of norms does not seem to catch on as Laïdi argues in the next example. It claims that Europe has been facing the realities of a multifarious world for the past 15 years, putting its normative ambitions to the test. He states that the process of Eastern enlargement through the Copenhagen criteria has given prospective states incentive to take over and embed European norms into their system, has reached its limit. Spreading norms becomes problematic when Europe can no longer commit to offering rewards as substantial as accession (Laïdi, 2008, p. 14). In addition, after states eligible for accession are running out, other potential partners at the (new) European borders have to accept the terms of association, through for example the European Neighborhood Policy. Russia, for example, was initially part of the ENP-program but later rejected it as it felt that the terms of partnership were constituted in such a way that the two parties were not treated as equals (Laïdi, 2008, p. 14). This has resulted in a situation in which the diffusion
mechanisms of norms appear not to work. The EU is then forced to adopt a more geopolitical stance, focused on security, towards Russia.
The second argument is supported by the rather obvious move towards militarization that can be found in the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the current Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). These policies include the European Union Force, which consist of roughly 10.000 soldiers that can be deployed on short notice and various political committees to govern military operation and
ambitions at EU level (Diez, 2005, p. 623).
Henrik Larsen argues that the status of an international actor are linked to the presence of a strong economy, strong diplomatic and political apparatus and strong military capabilities. The higher an actor scores on these parameters, the higher the chance it will become an important international actor. The European Union has strengthened its position on military capabilities since the late 1990’s by adding military means to its portfolio of conflict resolution (Larsen, 2002, p. 297). This has opened up the possibility for a military discourse in the European Union’s foreign policy. Karen Smith sees this move as gradually moving away from the normative character of the European Union. She argues that reasons for building military capabilities are necessary for further EU integration, the success of the Common Security and Defense Policy as well as an essential requirement for an actor in an uncivil world (Smith, 2008, p. 18). Only by doing so, the European Union is able to share more of the burden of international military action next to the United States.
Like Smith, he notices the gradual replacement of civilian policy instruments such as aid, diplomacy and sanctions with military force. He claims that way in which the formation ESDP has taken shape, has repercussions for civil-military relations and the democratic control of security and defense policy (Wagner, 2006, p. 201). He argues that a democratic deficit could have implications for the credibility of the ESDP and the EU as a whole. Policy failure in these areas could result in casualties of citizens on the battlefield. From the normative viewpoint, the democratic deficit is alarming as the democratic control of security and defense policy has frequently been counted among the defining features of normative power (Wagner, 2006, p. 212). In Wagner’s argument, the ESDP may harm the normative character in several ways: Following the core claim of the democratic peace theory, a mounting democratic deficit could decrease institutional constraints on military intervention. Second, it could decrease the legitimacy of EU led military missions and third, most importantly, the EU’s ability to lead by virtuous example, an integral part of normative power set out by Manners (2002, p. 244), could be compromised (Wagner, 2006, p. 213). The above accounts show that there is an alternative view to the normative power discourse. Indicators for a military discourse can be found when emphasis is put on security, threats, coercive instruments, geopolitical interests, exclusionary strategies, the use of military power or force and competition rather than cooperation, these indicators will help find military discourses in EU documents.
2.1.3 Economic power discourse
The third discourse discussed here is the economic power discourse. While much less represented in the academic literature than the other two discourses, it is important for the
empirical analysis of this thesis, as it was well represented in actual discourse. The EU, after all, is the world’s largest trading partner (Sjursen, 2006, p. 169).
C. Damro (2012) analyzes the European Union as a market or economic power, rather than a normative or military power. An economic power is a powerful actor that actively engages in
international affairs through the externalization of its economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures (Damro, 2012, p. 696). In saying so, he claims that the EU is not a unique or particular kind of actor in the international system. It has evolved from its origins as a market
integration experiment into the world’s most important economic bloc (Damro, 2012, p. 697). Damro claims this is a good starting point for conceptualizing EU power because the Union is often
recognized by its market-related policies and regulatory measures. Indicators for Economic Power Europe in the subsequent analysis are externalization of rules, regulatory measures and references to market-related policies, trade regulations and an emphasis on economic relations or gains. According to Damro, this may not comprehend how the EU has ability to use force through de CFSP but it does give a more realistic sense of EU power as it is the area in which it most actively and consequentially
influences policy in today’s international system (Damro, 2012, p. 697). Economic Power Europe argues that the “EU’s identity is not a particular set of collective norms but rather a comparatively large regulated market with institutional frames and interest group contestation. These three primary and explicit characteristics are central to the analysis of the EU as a power because they condition the choices of when, where and how to exercise Market Power Europe” (Damro, 2012, p. 697).
In addition, Damro’s theorizing is particularly interesting because it corresponds with S. Lucarelli’s 2013 study of how the EU is seen from the outside. The images most frequently associated with the EU, put forward by elites and the media, are those of economic superpower, multilateral action promoter, an area of economic integration and only rarely that of a norm promotor. According to her research, there definitely is a consensus, including among the larger public, on the fact that the EU is an economic giant. This image appears to be consistent among international institutions, countries and different types of constituencies outside the EU (Lucarelli, 2013, p. 7).
To conclude the part on the economic power discourse, its importance is shown by facts from the European Commission that say that Russia is Europe’s third largest trading partner. Also, Europe depends for more than 33 percent of its oil and more than 16 percent of its gas on Russia. In addition to that, the EU has been a strong proponent of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which has given a major boost to the further development of economic relations (European Commission, 2015). The above sections have shown that, within the academic debate, there are several strands of theory who appear to be mutually exclusive. This thesis, however, argues that they can coexist next to each other, sometimes even in the same document of discourse, but also in different combinations across time, actor and context. The next parts of the theoretical framework will show how this works by first laying out the constructivist theoretical presuppositions and then formulating the framework of multiple foreign policy identities.
2.2 Constructivism as a research perspective
This part of chapter 2 is concerned with the theoretical background of this thesis and why they are used. A good understanding of the assumptions about the discourses made above, and the framework that will be given below, can only be achieved by clearly stating the metaphysics that this research presupposes (Wendt, 1992, p. XVI). This thesis will develop its argument and basis for the subsequent methodology, by using the principles from constructivism from international relations. This research perspective was chosen because constructivism is well-equipped to research matters of identity, which is one of the core concepts of this thesis (Adler, 1997, p. 333). Constructivists hold that "Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a
specific, socially constructed world” (Wendt, 1992, pp. 397-398). To further justify the choice for constructivism it can be said that arguments about the EU as an actor, which is both conditioned by normative structures but also is contributing to shaping them, echo discussions about recent
developments in the international system in general. The study of the foreign policy identity can thus benefit greatly from the theoretical developments in IR and in foreign policy more specifically
(Sjursen, 2006, p. 175). According to J. Checkel, moreover, constructivism examines the roles of norms and identity in shaping the outcomes of international relations. These scholars are positivist in epistemological orientation (Checkel, 2006, pp. 4-5). Central to the constructivism approach on international relations thus are identities and the role of norms, which both play an important role in this thesis.
Ontologically, most constructivists are on the same page by recognizing the deeply social structure of international politics in the world around us, a claim that opposes materialism (Wendt, 1995, p. 71). That view is conducive to this thesis as identities and interests are shaped by these structures, rather than that they are shaped by just behavior. A fundamental principle of constructivists is that actors move towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the other objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). This means that knowing the nature of the foreign policy identity of the European Union is important as it may shape attitudes of other states towards their willingness to cooperate with the European Union, or even their openness to its norms. After all, states act differently towards enemies or potential enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). The international distribution of power, in constructivist eyes, effects states calculations of how to respond to one another, but how it does so, depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations they have towards each other. The distribution of knowledge thus constitutes the conceptions of the self and the other (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). For example, in the case of the European Union foreign policy identity, seeing the European Union as a norm promotor is only effective if others regard those norms as ‘good’ and the European Union as a legitimate actor to promote them. If the intersubjective understanding about the EU in, say the Eastern Neighborhood, would be that the EU is trying to impose its norms for its own benefits rather than creating a better Europe through enlargement, none of the Eastern states would consider implementing them. In addition, seeing the European Union as a military power hinges only partly on its actual capabilities to intervene or use military force. Much would depend on how others perceive the military power of the European Union. It is thus collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt, 1992, p. 397).
Identities are acquired by actors through relatively stable and role-specific understandings and expectations about the self, by participating in such collective meanings (Wendt, 1992, p. 398).
Intersubjective meanings thus have structural attributes that do not only constrain or empower actors, they define the social reality. It neither disavows nor assumes the collective mind, rather it has the notion that each of us has its individual thoughts, and concepts that we share with our fellow-men (Adler, 1997, p. 327). It thus seems that identities are entirely relational that stem from a specific socially constructed world (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). For the European Union’s foreign policy identity, this is important. From the constructivist perspective, defining oneself as a normative actor, thus is, insufficient to be one.
Understanding identities is important in understanding what interests actors have. They do not have a set of interests that they pursue disconnected from the social context, instead interests are defined in relation to situations an actor finds itself in. Often, situations have routine qualities in which meanings and interests are assigned on the basis of institutionally defined roles. The absence of or ambiguousness in roles make defining situations and interests more difficult and identity confusion may ensue (Wendt, 1992, pp. 398-399). In the case of the European Union, understanding its foreign policy identity thus is essential to understanding how it shapes its interests. In the
normative power discourse the European Union may take on the role as teacher of norms and the recipient may take on the role as student of norms. The interests of the EU here would be to convey ‘good’ norms, such as human rights and democracy promotion, towards its neighborhood to create a better society for itself, the recipient country and its citizens with the potential goal of accession to the Union. A military power discourse, on the other hand, could see the European foreign policy identity in the role of the protector of the region that has to defend geopolitical interests. When, in addition, the European Union does not practice what it preaches it risks confusion about its identity altogether.
Shared understandings, roles, identities and meanings in terms of which action is organized, arise out of interaction between two or more actors. If two actors interact for the first time, they will not yet have formed intersubjective knowledge about each other and they will likely neither assume worst-case scenarios nor best-case scenarios (Wendt, 1992, p. 405). The mechanism of building intersubjective knowledge is reinforcement. Interaction rewards actors for holding ideas about each other and often discourages them from maintaining others. Once repeated over a long period of time these back-and-forth typifications will result in more-or-less stable concepts of the other and the self, regarding the issue in play. For the European Union and Russia there are, as the introduction has shown, deep historical patterns of interaction that has resulted in a firm sense of otherness and often in distrust. The (West) European countries and Russia have been ideological counterparts for much of the twentieth century and that has resulted in enduring social structures in which Europe and Russia define their identities, interests and even world views. Neumann stated that Europe has been trying to put more ‘Europeaness’ into Russia during different periods of time, while Russia has
(and is) not always been open to such rapprochements (Neumann, 1999). This also means, as mentioned before, that relations based on collective understandings are robust. Once distrust between, in this case the EU and Russia is institutionalized, it may be very hard to change.
Nevertheless, they are always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed. If states find themselves in a distrustful relation it is because their practices made it that way. Change the practices will (eventually) change the intersubjective knowledge that constitute the system (Wendt, 1992, p. 407).
Identities and interests that are competitive are thus not exogenously given, but endogenous to their relation between actors they are in. They are constructed from day to day by the process of what actors have made of themselves and of others (Wendt, 1992, p. 410). The reason that change or malleability is not guaranteed is twofold. First, once constituted any given system confronts its members as an objective social fact that reproduces behaviors and discourages others. Change depends on room for rapprochement or in other words, whether there is room for actions that deviate from the common practice. In the case of Russia and the EU this would mean significant gestures from both sides, for example Russia taking over norms about democracy and the EU loosening sanctions over the Crimea annexation. Second, some actors might be interested in stable role identities they do not want to give up. This can be rooted in keeping commitments to others or own constituencies or a belief in certain values. For the EU, maintaining a firm course towards Russia could be explained by a firm belief in norms from the normative power Europe perspective or a desire to restore regional stability from a military power Europe perspective (Wendt, 1992, p. 411). This shows that systemic and psychological reasons reinforce intersubjective understandings consisting of interests and identities. This has a self-perpetuating quality that results in
path-dependencies with possible undesirable outcomes. However, this does not mean that agents are not entirely incapable of choosing the preferences they have later (Wendt, 1992, p. 411).
If the preference should be better relations, one way of realizing that, according to constructivists, would be the stimulation of dynamic density or interdependence which is brought forward by globalization, improved communication technologies and the opening-up of the Eastern bloc. This does, however, not ensure that actors realize joint gains. Cooperation is a gesture
indicating one actor’s (A) willingness to cooperate. If the other actor (B) defects or tries to exploit the cooperation, A will show its desire not to be exploited. Over time and through reciprocity each will know about the other’s intentions of the cooperation or competition (Wendt, 1992, p. 416). For the EU this means that the externalization of norms needs to be accepted by the recipient state. If they are accepted but continuously only implemented on paper, this will create less willingness by the EU to keep the benefits of accepting the norms in the first place, flowing. Moreover, the relationship between the EU and Russia might never improve if Russia refuses to accept European norms and if
Europe refuses to see Russia as an equal partner rather than a student of its norms.
The constructivist account of cooperation between actors concentrates on how expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests. The process of creating collaborative
institutions is one of making sure new understandings of the self and the other are internalized. In doing so, new role identities can be acquired, it is not just a process of creating external constraints on the behavior of exogenously constituted actors. Thus, ‘Learning’ to cooperate for uncooperative states is also a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitment to social norms. Constructivist presupposition on cooperating or not is, hence, cognitive rather than
behavioral because it takes the intersubjective knowledge between states as endogenous in defining the structure of identities and interests that comes forward from the interaction itself (Wendt, 1992, p. 417). For the European Union and Russia this once again indicates that better relations are built by finding common ground, values and interests and trying to cooperate on those areas until the cooperation becomes internalized. Areas for deeper interdependence could be trade agreements or security cooperation.
Transforming identities and interests between two actors through means of cooperation is, however, easier said than done. First, it faces the constraints of being slow and incremental. Actors usually look for joint gains within already established structures of cooperation and are thus less likely to actively pursue policies that bring about changes to that stable system. For the European Union this would mean that it would most likely see active cooperation with its own member states and other Western countries (Wendt, 1992, p. 418). From a “normative power Europe” perspective however, improving the neighborhood is an important objective. So it would seem likely that the European Union would pursue policies that may change those parameters towards cooperation with i.e. Ukraine and Russia to promote its norms. From a “military power Europe” perspective, on the other hand, the Europeans might choose to pursue geopolitical stability rather than efforts to transcend existing institutions. Second, perhaps more important in the case this thesis is discussing, the more fundamental constraint that takes that the evolution of the cooperation presupposes that actors do not associate negatively with each other (Wendt, 1992, p. 418). Actors usually are
concerned primarily with absolute gains, but distrust and negative association can lead them to define security in relative terms. Then, it will be difficult for them to accept possible vulnerabilities that come with cooperation. According to A. Wendt, this is important because the ‘central balance’ in the state system is harmed by such competitive strategies. Realists might argue that cooperation with one side (i.e. the West) is parasitic on the dominance of competition between sides (i.e. the East-West conflict). Relations might however improve through positive reciprocity, but atmospheres of distrust leave little room for cooperation and its transformative capabilities in international relations (Wendt, 1992, p. 418). For the EU and Russia this means that the current situation of
distrust and clashing interests, already touched-upon in the introduction, is a difficult starting point for amending relations. In fact, negative identification, especially from the Russian side towards the EU (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014), works exactly against the logic of the evolution of cooperation (Wendt, 1992, p. 418).
Constructivists however do see possibilities to escape these seemingly intractable situations of negative identification that fit the “profile of the European foreign policy identity quite well. A logic of transformation more driven by self-conscious efforts to change structure, identities and interests. This possibility lies in the difference in the social determination of the self and the personal determination of choice (Wendt, 1992, p. 419). The social determination of the self is determined in terms of others such as the behavioral expectations and the character of an actor’s role identity. For the European Union this could be Europe as an international promoter of norms. This role is socially constituted. Roles, however, are not played in a mechanical fashion according to a script, but according to Wendt, are taken and adapted in idiosyncratic ways by each actor. This means that, even in tedious situations, role performance still involves choice by the actor. The personal determination of choice is the part of subjectivity in which this appropriation and reaction to roles and its corresponding existential freedom lie (Wendt, 1992, p. 419). If roles are taken by actors themselves, a degree of character planning is possible. If actors, however were constantly changing themselves, social order would rather be chaos. In addition, the relative stability of identities and interests in the real world dictate our propensity for a preference of habitual behavior rather than creative action (Wendt, 1992, p. 419). To engage in role change, two important factors are in play. Actors must need a reason to think of themselves in new ways and the costs of transformation must be lower than its rewards. If these are present, actors might choose to implement specifically designed practices to transform their identities (Wendt, 1992, p. 420). As said, this fits the European Union’s normative power discourse well. After the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, states in the Eastern Neighborhood had opportunities to look at themselves in novel ways, because of the breakdown of identity commitments to the Soviet state. This made possible a close examination of the self and the other, in which structures, identities and interaction were sustained over multiple decades. The European Union, which had been the ‘other’ during that time, could now serve as an attractive model opposite communism, for a possible new self. The European Union, as a norm promoter, made the rewards of taking over that new identity outweigh the costs of implementing the new norms. This was done by the perspective of accession to the European Union. On the other hand, when carrots cannot be provided in an attractive enough fashion, and sticks must be used, the power of the European Union may take on a completely different character.
This part of the theoretical framework has shown that constructivism is well-suited to discuss international politics and matters of (foreign policy) identity. The previous two parts of this chapter,
however, have shown that it is difficult to put a single label on the nature of the European Union foreign policy identity. The next part will propose a novel way of looking at this research problem by suggesting the possibility of having multiple foreign policy identities at the same time.
2.3 Multiple identity discourses framework
The literature has shown that European Union foreign policy is both very complex and that there is no consensus on the nature of the European foreign policy identity. Whatever Europe is, it is certainly diverse. As a consequence, it becomes difficult to put the European foreign policy identity into a single ‘box’. Neither normative power, military power nor economic power would suffice to fully appreciate its diverseness. This does however make it rather hard to pitch the European foreign policy identity against other international actors (Diez, 2004, p. 319). This thesis argues that scholars who argue for or against “normative power Europe” are not necessarily right or wrong, but their analysis is missing the possibility that certain elements of a foreign policy can be normative while others might not be. The question is, why? It has not become clear at all why theoretical parsimony or simplicity on the European Union foreign policy identity would help us better understand the nature of it. Reductionism, the need for providing a single answer to all occurrences of a particular thing, in this case the European Foreign policy identity, does not serve the complexity of the phenomenon. A better solution would be to critically engage normative standards by establishing them, as was done in the first part of the theoretical framework, and empirically researching whether they are ubiquitous or not, this will be performed in the empirical chapter. This thesis hence argues that: The European Union foreign policy identity consists not of one single identity. It cannot be defined as entirely normative or as entirely something else. It is dependent on the (combination of) actor, context and time in which one is studying the European Union foreign policy identity. As such, the identity can be defined as flexible and changeable over time, multiple identities can therefor coexist (even in the same document), and they are not mutually exclusive. The argument given here can be broken-up into two parts. The first part says that there is no single identity due to the complexity and multifacetedness of the power the European Union exercises and the second part says it depends on (a combination of) actor representing the EU, the context in which power is exercised and the genealogical time it was used.
Preliminary evidence for the first claim comes from the principles of constructivism already discussed above. Constructivist scholars hold that states (and with them state-like actors such as the EU) are actors with identities consisting of intentions, rationality and interests (Wendt, 1999, p. 10). And as each person can have multiple roles connecting them to institutions, similarly, a state may have multiple identities as well. Examples of state identities are being sovereign, being an imperial power, being a normative power, positioning oneself as the leader of the free world, being a military
superpower, and being an economic power, etcetera. The commitment to and the salience of each of these identities can vary. One can be adhered to more than others. Each identity, however, is an inherently socially constructed definition of the actor in question. These views are grounded in the theories which actors collectively have about themselves and of each other. In total, they constitute the structure of the social world (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). This would mean that the European Union could be, for example, a normative power, an economic power and a military (super)power at the same time, without those identities being mutually exclusive. It seems at odds that the authors who were discussed above do not come to the same conclusion as most of them use the constructivist approach themselves. Manners (2002, p. 254), for example argues that military power does not necessarily impinge on normative power, if used in a ‘normative way’. This thesis argues that that is too narrow a conception to fully understand the ways in which the European Union may use coercive force. Much more interesting would be to research to what extent or degree an actor is a normative power and to what extent it is not (Tewes, 1997, p. 353). Here researchers would be expected to find many instantiations of normative power in many places and in many historical contexts. It would show exercising normative power is neither novel nor unique to the European Union (Diez, 2005, p. 620). They will, however, differ in the extent to which the actor tries to spread its norms to make them universally accepted, and what degree of prominence they play in their foreign policy identity as well as their means of projection of power (Diez, 2005, p. 620). Normative power should hence not be seen as the opposite of military power as Manners (2002) has rightfully claimed but the one should also not be seen as part of the other. The reason for this is simple, the more normative power builds on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of power because the reliance on the norm itself becomes blurred (Diez, 2005, p. 621.). If the European Union were to impose its norms through the use or threat of military force, rather than a system of rewards and less-so sanctions, their adaption cannot be equated with successfully changing others through socialization.
It appears that (use of) norms (or not) and interests are difficult to separate. The promotion of norms such as democratic institutions, market economy and the respect for human rights are at the same time in the best interest of the European Union. Adapting those norms in the
neighborhood would further the conception that life as the Europeans lead it is the best way to build a community of ideals, purposes and interests (Diez, 2005, p. 622). The relationship could also be seen the other way around. If (geopolitical/security) interests outweigh the benefits of promoting norms, the preservation of the safety of the Union will probably prevail. The current situation between the European Union and Russia could be explained in that way.
With the call from the United States to Europe to be able to provide more for its own security, the entanglement and coexistence of normative and military power will be even more
evident. In fact, it cannot be precluded that the balance in kind of power may even be shifting from normative to military. That gives this thesis only a greater amount of relevance as a new and comprehensive way of understanding the complexity of European foreign policy as being
multifaceted, becomes more important. Walker argues that, if Europe is changing and developing as dramatically as most commentators suggest, it would be unwise to rely on deeply entrenched accounts on what it is and what such change and developments must look like. Any plausible account on what Europe is arguably demands multiple perspectives and proliferating labels. The complexity of the ‘European puzzle’ is illustrated through “its integrations that are embedded in flows of capital, technologies and peoples, in resurgent regionalisms, in decentrings of identity and authority, in layered institutions, in overlapping jurisdictions, in global hegemonies, in local sites of global productions, communications and exchanges, in networks of relations between cities and corporations and so on” (Walker, 2000, p. 20).
The second part of the argument, in which it is said that the foreign policy identity of the EU depends on the combination of actor, context and time, is best conveyed with the notion that identities are represented by discourse, the specifics of which will be explained in the next chapter. The following examples from the literature will show that the concept of having multiple identities in foreign policy is not as new as it might seem in everyday practice. It is in fact practice that has shown that the European Union displays ambiguities in its foreign policies. On more than one occasion this has led to different foreign policy identity discourses being detectable in its official documents. Moreover, it are these ambiguities that have prevented the academic debate from reaching a conclusion on what the European Union foreign policy identity is. The three arguments made show that there are possible differences in time, actor and context.
First, differences in discourse within the European Union documents are articulated by H. Malmvig in her article on the Barcelona Process and the European Union’s resultant double-discursive approach. She asserts that it is widely recognized that the EU has been inconsistent or reluctant to follow through on the Barcelona Process’s goals or democratization and human rights. More broadly, The EU has in practice often chosen immediate security concerns and strategic stability over the concerns for human rights and democracy, leading some to believe the EU’s commitment to its own values is merely rhetorical (Malmvig, 2006, p. 343). Malmvig, however, claims that the European Union is torn not between ideals and interests, but between two conflicting definitions of security (Malmvig, 2006, p. 344). The EU is said to be engaged in a paradoxical practice where it simultaneously uses and reproduces two different and conflicting security discourses what she calls the “liberal reform discourse” and the “cooperative security discourse”. She argues that future regional cooperation, in for example the European Neighborhood Policy and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, will have the same pitfalls, as they will be captured by different discourses
too (Malmvig, 2006, p. 345). She sees a clear distinction between practice and rhetoric and points out that although democratization in principle has a very important role in the framework of the ENP, in practice there seldom is consistency between the EU’s words and actions, between what the EU tells about the importance about democracy and when it comes to democracy promotion (Malmvig, 2006, p. 347) Already here, it can be seen that the European Union maintains two foreign policy identities at the same time. Or in other words, at least two foreign policy discourses can be distinguished. There is the “liberal reform discourse” that should promote democracy and human rights in the region through economic liberalization and the “cooperative security discourse” that rather cooperates with existing regimes to maintain the security of the European Union. There appears to be difference in context, as security is preferred in practice, and norm promotion is preferred in rhetoric. Besides that, there is a difference in actors opinions between Northern and Southern states about the benefits and risks of democracy promotion in the region. In EU relations with Russia this could also mean a clash between different discourses. The introduction has already shown that, when Russia was at its weakest, rapprochement was sought, but now in the Ukraine crisis the relation between the EU and Russia is discussed again in terms of security, indicating that different foreign policy identities over time are also possible. Moreover, there already is
disagreement between EU member states on what strategy to follow in relation to Russia (Meichtry & Winning, 2015).
The second example also concerns the Mediterranean region, and the security discourses that are present there. In the article by F. Bicchi & M. Martin on securitization surrounding Islam at three different levels is discussed. The UK (member state), the European Union and the framework of the EMP (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 190). Within the EU, religious dialogue is something that is often called for, but not at the center of its daily politics. The EMP discusses political Islam in a largely apolitical manner. Yet another aspect refers to Islam as an ideology justifying violence and terrorism, a link that has been made in the UK, a European Union member state (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 190). Already here, different points of view from different actors are visible. They all call for a different foreign policy as a way of cooperating (or not) with the Mediterranean countries. The way of looking at the issue is related to the different ways in which it is securitized at different levels. In other words, security issues don’t exist as such but they need to be securitized by public authorities as threat that requires a response (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 191) Like Malmvig, Bicchi & Martin see a lack of unity at EU-level discourse towards political Islam. Most notably there is, again, the EU’s call for more democracy and human rights in the Arab world that collides with its security purposes (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 196). There also is a split in discourse between foreign based security threats, such as North African or wider Arab imported terrorists and the perceived threats from radicalized populations domestic to the EU (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 204). Within the Union, there
thus appears to be a plurality of discourses, indicating the complexity of the European Union foreign policy identity. The article by Bicchi & Martin has shown that actor is important, as there are
differences detectable between actors that represent the EU. For the foreign policy identity in relation to Russia this provides further evidence that the EU might not always establish one coherent foreign policy identity towards Russia, let alone a single foreign policy identity in total. The
phenomenon exceeds a level of complexity that cannot be framed within one identity.
Third, the argument that foreign policy identities can change over time is well articulated by T. Diez in his 2004 article. He claims that the European foreign policy identity in relation to others could be discussed in terms of temporal and geopolitical othering (Diez, 2004, p. 320). Diez states that, while the EU opened up the possibility of the construction of a political identity through less exclusionary practices of temporal othering, since the late 1990 it reintroduced the more
exclusionary geographical and cultural otherings that hold more antagonistic views against out-groups. Geopolitical and temporal otherings overlap, providing evidence for the claim that identities are not mutually exclusive. The difference between the two kinds of othering, which is an important part of identity construction, is explained as follows. Temporal othering is self-reflexive: it does represent another group as a threat, but the self’s own past. For Europe this would mean that Europe’s other, the enemy image, today is not to a very large extent Islamic fundamentalism, the Russians or anything similar. Rather, Europe’s other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future (Diez, 2004, p. 325). This form of othering fits the normative power discourse well. The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for the European Union by
representing the Central and Eastern European States as Europe’s own past other, albeit with a new geopolitical dimension. They had become an incarnation of Europe’s own past, a past that the west already had overcome. Therefore, a push for enlargement was started (Diez, 2004, p. 326). Diez however, sees that geographical othering is on the rise in the discourse about European integration and expansion. This is slowly closing the window for less exclusionary forms of othering (Diez, 2004, p. 326).
As the book of I. Neumann (1999, p. 111) shows, there is a longstanding tradition of othering between Europe and Russia that does not reside along the spatial line but along the temporal line. Russia is perpetually seen as being in some stage of transformation or transition to Europeanization. This thesis has shown that this has become problematic as Russia wants to be accepted as a great power again. Moreover, in light of the recent Ukraine crisis, geopolitical differences between the EU and Russia, in terms of security, are forcing the EU to abandon the normative power discourse towards Russia. In accordance with Diez, however, the EU also had its hand in bringing back
geopolitics by increasing construction of Europe in terms of identities, politics and geography. This is not surprising because the end of the Cold War and the development of the EU and of the
international society in which it finds itself, have led to the politicization and explication of a previously much less ambiguous Europe. Europe used to end where the wall started (Diez, 2004, p. 331). Once again, this does not mean that the ‘past as other’ discourse is gone. They co-exist. It does however show that identities are not fixed and that they can change over time, and that they can evolve when the context changes. For example, the context changed at the end of the Cold War and now, perhaps, the context has changed again due to the Ukraine crisis. The analysis will show whether this has had impact on the European foreign policy identity, for example, during the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008.
The above statements and considerations have shown that the European Union very likely does display several non-exclusionary foreign policy identities, along the lines of different contexts, actors and in different periods of time. This is in contrast with the academic debate that preceded it, wherein a multitude of scholars try to put a single label on the European Union foreign policy identity. Evidence for this thesis’ claim has been demonstrated both by metaphysical arguments, by using the principles of constructivism, and by discussing secondary sources that have performed empirical research on the actual proceedings of European Union foreign policy and their real world reality. These sources showed compelling arguments that there often were competing discourses, complementary discourses or a differences in practice and rhetoric. These arguments will be used in the empirical analysis, but first the methodology used in this thesis is discussed.
3: Methodology
This part of the thesis concerns the methods that are used to perform the empirical analysis.
Methodology is an integral part of any research to provide readers with information on how data was collected and how it was analyzed. This is important because different methodologies can give different research results. A clear methodology allows research to be replicated, which is important for research’ validity. Clear and consistent methods also improve the reliability of research. This thesis method of data analysis is the genealogical discourse analysis in which different periods are examined to discover patters of discourses. Data collection takes place from official EU documents that were found on official websites.
3.1 Methodology: genealogical discourse analysis
It has already been established that identities are not simply given, but discursively constructed. Talking about a European identity that has political expression in the form of foreign policy is therefore not just an innocent statement but a political act that inscribes the notion of European foreign policy identity in the political debate (Diez, 2004, p. 321). However, before constructivists can analyze or construct anything such as an identity, the units and levels of analysis must be established. The discipline of international relations requires that these choices have some kind of an international dimension (Wendt, 1999, p. 7). For this thesis the unit of analysis is the European Union and with that the actors that represent it. The level of analysis in which this research tries to explain the behavior of this unit is the international system in which the behavior is assessed in relation to another actor, in this case a state (the Russian state). Thus, a case study will be
performed of the European Union foreign policy identity towards Russia. The case study will have a longitudinal component, four different periods of that relationship are researched.
As already shown, identities are never entirely fixed. There is acceptance among
constructivists that national identities are particularly stable but their discursively constructed nature means that there are many possible alternative identities to be found within discourse. This also offers the possibility for identities to gradually change over time (Diez, 2004, p. 321). This concept should be even more evident within the European Union, as its identity is still being constructed, debated and somewhat a collective of the plethora of national identities.
The type of discourse analysis performed is the genealogical discourse analysis according to the principles of Foucault (1970) and Milliken (1999). Discourse analysis carries a number of
theoretical commitments by which discourses are to be seen as systems of signification. First, there is the concept of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities. In other words, the material world does not convey meaning, rather people construct the meaning of things. As such,
language has political, cultural and social effects (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). Second, discourse is seen as being productive and reproductive of things defined by that discourse. What is meant here is that discourse moves beyond merely providing a language for speaking about phenomena but also makes intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). More specifically, discourses define who is authorized to speak and to act, such as institutions, foreign policy officials and experts (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). Third, discourses produce subjects, audiences for authorized actors, and their common sense of the existence and qualities of different phenomena and of how public officials should act in their name (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). Studying discourse involves empirically analyzing language practices such as speech, writing and other forms of communication to uncover structures of meanings-in-use (Milliken, 1999, p. 231).
The genealogical method is characterized by examining contemporary discursive practices and comparing them to historical studies of past discursive practices to discover patters, similarities but also breaks and differences (Foucault, 1970). As will be discussed in the data collection part of this chapter, three different periods of EU-Russia relations will be examined to uncover whether multiple foreign policy identity discourses are distinguishable, in context, actor and time, during and across those periods. A genealogical discourse analysis gives researchers the opportunity to look at discourse not only as a continuous progression from past to present, in which only one dominant discursive pattern is established. Rather, it also provides the opportunity to map and analyze different discourses that are found in the documents (Foucault, 1970).
Genealogy, according to Milliken and Foucault, emphasize that dominating discourses, contemporary ones included, involve relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially constructed and order is created from conditions of disorder (Foucault, 1970, pp. 233, Milliken, 1999, p. 243). In this thesis it will be examined whether an dominant discourse can be discovered and whether that discourse is held as artificially dominant over other periods as well.
Analyzing discourse through the genealogical method involves mapping representations that are often repeated in the discourse (Foucault, 1970, p. 222). When patterns of representation are identified frequently, across the lines of actor, context, place and time, they become a collection of statements from which foreign policy identities can be discerned, that have been institutionalized over time in what Foucault calls ‘fellowships of discourse’ (Foucault, 1970, p. 223). The foreign policy identity of the European Union should, following this logic, thus be enshrined in its documents and policy tools. Genealogical discourse analysis encourages to map and include differentiating
statements and variations, making it suited to identify different foreign policy identities. As such, both dominant discourses and its variations will be identified by creating indicators for the normative power discourse, military power discourse and economic power discourse, as these were the most
