Prevention of Radicalisation in Secondary Schools:
An Exploration in The Schilderswijk of The Hague
Name: Dionne Sloof
Student number: s1977741
Master: Crisis & Security Management, Leiden University Thesis supervisor: Prof. dr. A.P. Schmid
Second reader: S. Wittendorp MA Date: 9 January, 2018 Word count: 15.489
Preface
In front of you lies the thesis “Prevention of Radicalisation in Secondary Schools: An
Exploration in the Schilderswijk of The Hague”. This thesis is written in order to complete the master’s program Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University. Writing this thesis was a challenge and I could not have done it without the help of my supervisor. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor Professor Alex Schmid, for giving me the opportunity to carry out my research project, and for his feedback throughout the entire thesis process.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Professor Edwin Bakker for the opportunity to dig into radicalisation prevention policies as part of the elective ‘Dealing with Terrorism & Foreign Fighters’. These policies aroused my interest in the radicalisation prevention tasks assigned to local actors. In addition, I would also like to thank Professor Jelle van Buuren, who inspired me in one of his lectures to think about difficulties in the local implementation of government policy regarding security issues. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and friends for their unwavering support.
Dionne Sloof
Abstract
The European Union aims to prevent radicalisation as a tool of its counterterrorism policy, whereby tasks have been assigned to local actors. However, it has been questioned whether local actors can sufficiently perform such tasks. A limited number of studies have been conducted to research the difficulties local actors experience when implementing the tasks at hand. Research makes it possible to recalibrate radicalisation prevention policies in the future. This research is aimed at the implementation of radicalisation prevention tasks assigned to secondary schools in the Schilderswijk of The Hague. The research has been conducted with use of semi-structured interviews, established by means of a pre-existing analytical model, including Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrats theory. As a result, some of the described theoretical difficulties are present in both cases, while others are not applicable. Due to the case approach and limitations of the research project, the results cannot be generalised and a modest conclusion can be presented.
Table of contents 1. Introduction 5 1.1 Problem Outline 5 1.2 Research Questions 6 1.3 Societal Relevance 6 1.4 Academic Relevance 7 1.5 Reading Guide 9 2. Analytical Framework 11 2.1 Radicalisation 11 2.2 Prevention of Radicalisation 12
2.3 Radicalisation Prevention Policy 14
2.4 Frontline Practitioners and the Prevention of Radicalisation 16
2.5 Local Radicalisation Prevention in Practice 17
2.6 Problems in the Work Conditions of Street-level Bureaucrats 19
3. Methodology 21 3.1 Research Strategy 21 3.2 Research Design 21 3.3 Research Methods 22 3.4 Sampling 22 3.5 Ethics 23 3.6 Operationalisation 24
3.7 Data Preparation and Analysis 25
3.8 Limitations 26 4. Analysis 27 4.1 Subquestion 1 27 4.1.1 Resources 27 4.1.1.1 Personal Experience 27 4.1.1.2 Support 28 4.1.1.3 Ratio of Workers 29 4.1.1.4 Time 30 4.1.2 Partial Conclusion 31 4.2 Subquestion 2 31
4.2.2 Clients 32 4.2.3 Goal Expectations 33 4.2.3.1 Ambiguous Role 33 4.2.3.2 Conflicting Goals 34 4.2.3.3 Position of Teachers 36 4.2.4 Partial Conclusion 37 4.3 Subquestion 3 38
4.3.1 Performance of Goal Achievement 38
4.3.2 Partial Conclusion 39
5. Conclusion 41
5.1 Conclusion of Research Findings 41
5.2 Limitations 42
5.3 Recommendations 42
5.4 Future Research 43
Bibliography 44
1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Outline
The Schilderswijk can be seen as one of the poorest neighbourhoods of The Hague, together with Transvaal and Laakkwartier. It has the highest number of inhabitants living under the poverty threshold and it has a high number of unemployed inhabitants (Marijnissen & Zuidervaart, 2015). Based on the administration of the municipality of The Hague, this multicultural neighbourhood can be divided between the West, Schildersbuurt-East and Schildersbuurt-North. Over ninety percent of the inhabitants of the Schilderswijk are immigrants, primarily with a Turkish or Moroccan background (Municipality of The Hague, 2017). In 2007, the Schilderswijk was named as one of the ‘Vogelaarwijken’, a
neighbourhood in which the quality of the social environment is low and the number of social problems high (VROM, 2007).
The ethnic background of the inhabitants of the Schilderswijk is important because it can be related to the probability of radicalisation and the need for radicalisation prevention among youngsters. The prevention of radicalisation in neighbourhoods like the Schilderswijk is a challenge. The Muslim community has been targeted for radicalisation prevention
programs, but the Muslim community itself seems to lower the resilience of its inhabitants against radicalisation by presenting and legitimising extremist ideas (AIVD, 2014). In 2017, The Hague received the highest amount of governmental financial support, € 1.052.000, to invest in frontline practitioners and the prevention of radicalising youth and jihadism (NCTV, 2016 December). One of the reasons for this financial support is the fact that some youth in The Hague radicalised, joined the Islamic State, became foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq and returned. This is considered as a serious threat by the municipality of The Hague and was noticed by the National Coordinator Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV). In order to prevent the occurrence of violent extremism, the municipality came up with an action plan to prevent radicalisation in the first place. Thereby, the following objectives for local actors were formulated: the identification of radicalised youth, strengthening resilience against extremist ideologies and approaching individuals who might travel to Syria or who were retained from travelling (Municipality of The Hague, 2014). Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) have questioned whether such tasks can be performed sufficiently well by local actors. This question will be addressed in this thesis.
1.2 Research Questions
The main research question which will be explored and answered in this thesis is: ‘How is the prevention of radicalisation implemented in secondary schools in the
Schilderswijk of The Hague, given Lipsky’s theory on street-level bureaucrats?’ To answer this research question, three subquestions have been formulated:
‘What resources have secondary schools in the Schilderswijk received from ESS, SSV or school directors regarding the prevention of radicalisation?’
‘How is the task of preventing radicalisation experienced by secondary school teachers or security officers and viewed by ESS, SSV or school directors?
‘What quality control is there on the performance of secondary schools when it comes to the task of preventing radicalisation and what feedback do ESS, SSV and school directors receive on this issue?’
1.3 Societal Relevance
In 2015 the European External Action Service stated that the European security environment has changed because the security threats to European member states have changed. The security threats changed from preserving the territorial integrity by interstate wars towards the stability of the economy and challenges to European norms and values by non-state actors, like those associated with transnational terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2015a; Krahmann, 2005). With regard to the threat of transnational terrorism, Europe is currently facing a new source of instability created by young Muslims who left Europe to become jihadist foreign fighters and subsequently often return to Europe (AIVD, 2017; Council of the European Union, 2015a).
After the beginning of the civil war in Syria, in 2011, the number of Europeans that left for Syria and Iraq to join a jihadist group grew to about 6,000 men and women (Köhler, 2017). These jihadist foreign fighters can be defined as Europeans who join foreign groups with a jihadist ideology and engage in armed conflict with the ultimate aim to support an Islamic state and expand its reach until it secures world domination (Bakker, Entenmann, & Paulussen, 2014; NCTV, 2014b). Most of the European jihadist foreign fighters joined the Islamic State, especially after the caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014 (Bakker et al., 2014; Weggemans, Peters, Bakker, & De Bont, 2016).
The number of jihadist foreign fighters that returns to the European Union grows and they are seen as a threat because they move their battlefield from Syria and Iraq towards European member states, where they are able to commit terrorist attacks (Bakker et al., 2014; Köhler, 2017).
The European Union seeks to defend itself against the threat of returning jihadist foreign fighters with a collective European response. However, it turns out to be difficult for the European Union to respond to this threat because the security of Europe was largely left to be the responsibility of NATO while the European Union focussed primarily on economic and political matters. As a result, the European member states are insufficiently prepared against non-state threats, including those emanating from returning jihadist foreign fighters (Council of the European Union, 2015a).
In 2014 the European Commission published a strategy paper about how to combat radicalisation with policy intervention (Köhler, 2017). The European Union aims to prevent radicalisation as a tool of its counterterrorism efforts (Council of the European Union, 2015b). In addition to the role that European member states play, local authorities and civil society actors also have to play an important role in this (Krahmann, 2005). The tasks of local actors, in general, are to reduce the spread of the extremist ideology, identify individuals who are vulnerable to these ideas, and identify those who are in the process of radicalisation. Even though a number of tasks have been assigned to local actors, the prevention of radicalisation by them has not been without problems (Bartlett et al., 2010).
1.4 Academic Relevance
With regard to teachers, the effectiveness of the detection of potentially radicalising individuals could be improved if more research is conducted on the training and the tools offered to some of these local actors (Van Wijk & Bolhuis, 2017). Teachers within educational institutions can contribute to the prevention of radicalisation, but in order to enable them to do so, changes should be made in the organisation and with regard to the resources provided to them (Lenos & Keltjens, 2016). Whether a program is effective or can be performed in practice should be evaluated and, depending on the outcome of the
evaluation, readjusted (Köhler, 2017).
From an academic perspective, a limited number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the difficulties local actors experience and the tools at their disposal to implement the prevention of radicalisation policies.
In other words, there is little knowledge on the effectiveness of their efforts (Van Wijk & Bolhuis, 2017; Köhler, 2017). Much of the literature notes that it is difficult to achieve measurable results. The lack of available evaluation studies about the performance of counter-radicalisation programs is in part a result of a lack of access to the target group and a lack of attempts to gather data from primary resources. The majority of studies to assess the
performance of counter-radicalisation programs are either descriptive studies of programs or studies based on secondary sources. Thorough evaluations will make it possible to assess and recalibrate policies in the future, based on solid evidence. Evaluations can be made by
gathering data with the help of theories from related academic fields of study (Van Wijk & Bolhuis, 2017; Köhler, 2017).
Two theses have already been written by Ruijs (2017) and Minneboo (2017) on the radicalisation prevention by teachers in secondary educational institutions in the Netherlands. In the thesis of Ruijs (2017), research was conducted to find out how teachers of secondary educational institutions perceive their role in countering radicalisation and how that influences the execution of their tasks. A document analysis of relevant academic literature and
newspapers was performed and interviews were held with teachers of a number of secondary schools. Based on the findings of this thesis, it can be stated that teachers experience
difficulties in defining and identifying radicalisation. For example, some refer to
radicalisation as beliefs whereas others focus on the aspect of violence. With regard to the willingness of teachers to play a role, it can be stated that the teachers think that radicalisation should be prevented by teachers, but most of them felt that radicalisation was not a burning issue in their own school. If teachers receive signals of radicalisation among students they are often not sure whether they are able to respond to this. According to the findings of Ruijs (2017), teachers do not have the qualification to intervene, due to a lack of training. Some teachers felt it was not up to them to respond. With regard to the support of teachers by the government, teachers stated that they need more support in their task. For example, there were no clear-cut guidelines and schools can assume their own degree of responsibility with
regarding radicalisation prevention (Ruijs, 2017).
In the thesis of Minneboo (2017), research focused on the question whether teachers of secondary schools can and want to fulfil a role in the prevention of radicalisation, which they were assigned to by the government. Interviews have been conducted with teachers from various schools, teaching different subjects on different educational levels.
With regard to the findings formulated in this thesis, it can be stated that the willingness of teachers to prevent radicalisation is doubtful. Some of the interviewed teachers mentioned that they are not willing to perform such tasks, they do not want to be seen as police officers. Radicalisation is seen by the teachers as a security issue, but not directly in their work
environment. Furthermore, teachers mentioned that the implementation of their role would be time-consuming. Next, most teachers question whether their instructions about citizenship would make their students resilient against radicalisation. In sum, teachers are stuck in the middle between the expected implementation of radicalisation prevention and their job as a teacher which is already time-consuming (Minneboo, 2017).
It can be stated that, in both theses, only a small number of responding teachers in the Netherlands, was found and these schools of the respondents were not geographically distinct. In both theses, the respondents were not found, based on teaching in an area that was marked as known for radicalising youth. Furthermore, from the results of the theses follows that the respondents mentioned that the problem of radicalisation and education are more problems of multicultural schools in urban areas. Both theses gained only a limited understanding of the problems that teachers in the Netherlands face because they lack the perspective of the teachers that are employed at the multicultural schools in urban areas.
With this thesis, I plan to explore the challenges employees in secondary schools in the Schilderswijk of The Hague face, when trying to fulfil one task assigned to them, namely the prevention of radicalisation. The Schilderswijk of The Hague can be seen as a
multicultural environment in an urban area. In addition to this, in the theses, the theory of Lipsky was shortly presented in the analytical framework. The findings of these theses can specifically be compared to the present investigation which will help to build up academic knowledge on the role of secondary school teachers in radicalisation prevention. However, this thesis will focus on one specific geographical area only.
1.5 Reading Guide
In order to answer the main research question as well as the subquestions in this thesis, the following elements will be discussed. In the upcoming chapter, the analytical framework will be discussed. For this purpose, relevant academic literature related to the prevention of radicalisation will be discussed. First, the conceptualisation of radicalisation will be outlined. Second, the conceptualisation of the prevention of radicalisation will be elaborated.
After this, radicalisation prevention policy will be funnelled from the level of the European Union towards the Netherlands. Next, the prevention of radicalisation and the role of frontline practitioners will be discussed. Also, the specific practical local radicalisation prevention difficulties encountered will be explored. Finally, the general problems in the work conditions of street-level bureaucrats will be addressed. The third chapter focusses on methodology, which will include the research strategy, research design, research methods,
operationalisation, data analysis and limitations of the present exploration. Extensive information about the researched cases, on the organisation and experiences with
radicalisation, can be found in the annex. In chapter four an analysis of the collected data will be performed, whereby the analysis will be based on the discussion of the separate
subquestions. After the analysis, in the conclusion, the most important findings to answer the research question will be presented. These findings will be placed back in the broader context of current academic research. Finally, the limitations of the current investigation and
2. Analytical Framework
2.1 Radicalisation
After the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the introduction of a new anti-terrorism legislation to prevent terrorist activity was hastened (Bartlett et al., 2010). Already before these terrorist attacks took place, academic research was done on the causes of terrorism (Köhler, 2017). However, it was after the Madrid and London bombings, in 2004 and 2005, that the concept of radicalisation as a cause of terrorism was entering the academic discussions (Schmid, 2013). The use of the concept of radicalisation by the media increased between 2005 and 2006, after the London attacks (Köhler, 2017).
Even though the concept of radicalisation is used, there is still a substantive discussion among academic researchers on the exact nature of radicalisation. Existing conceptualisations differ on which elements determine what encompasses radicalisation (Schmid, 2013; Köhler, 2017). For example, the importance of the place of violence as an element in the
conceptualisation of radicalisation is contested (Bartlett et al., 2010; Pisoiu, 2011). Furthermore, the concept of radicalisation and the concept of extremism are often used intertwined, depending on the context (Sedgwick, 2010; Schmid, 2013). In this section of the thesis, an attempt will be made to indicate how the concept of radicalisation should best be approached for the purpose of the current exploration. Specifically, the question how the shift from radicalism to extremism can take the form of terrorism.
Köhler (2017) stated that radicalisation can broadly be seen as a process in which an individual incorporates ideas that lead to violence and as a result becomes an extremist or a terrorist. The process of radicalisation should be addressed as a complex phenomenon. However, in a broad sense, radicalisation can be understood as a process with phases of individual development, from radicalism to extremism to terrorism (Governance of Security, 2010). Generally, radicalisation is used to describe the behaviour of individuals, whereby the outcome of the deviant behaviour is often stressed more than the internal process leading to behavioural changes (Köhler, 2017).
Before the concept of radicalisation was used, the concept radicalism already existed. Until the twentieth-century radicalism had a relatively positive connotation and was, in the context of European party politics, used to describe democratic opposition of individuals to authoritarian rule. For example, many radicals in the nineteenth century were in support of equal rights for men and women, universal adult suffrage, republicanism, and the separation of church and state without necessarily advocating the use of violence.
The conceptualisation of radicalism changed during the mid-twentieth century. Radicalism was increasingly associated with the use of violence in the struggle against oppression (Pisoiu, 2011). Especially nationalists and left-wing movements pushed the concept of radicalism more towards the use of violence (Pisoiu, 2011). However, Bartlett et al. (2010) defined radicalisation as an attitude that rejects the status quo but does not directly lead to extremist behaviour or terrorist activities.
In the second phase of the radicalisation process, the attitude towards the use of violence transforms. When individuals proceed from radicalism towards extremism, the idea of the use of violence as a tool to achieve political or social changes is accepted (Governance of Security, 2010). The NCTV (2014b) defined extremism as the willingness of a person to perform violent acts and illegal behaviour to achieve political influence. Extremism differs from radicalisation in that radicals accept diversity and discussion, whereas extremists are more violence-prone and intolerant and also more willing to eliminate opposing parties (Schmid, 2013). The radicalisation towards violence reflects also the justification of extremist violent behaviour based on an ideology (Bartlett et al., 2010; Köhler, 2017).
According to Daniel Köhler (2017), radicalisation can be described as an individual process of depluralisation. Depluralisation can be defined as the rejection of multiple systems. In the process of depluralisation, mainstream democratic political and individual values are replaced by the narrow values of an anti-pluralist ideology. These values become internalised and as a result, no other values are considered acceptable. When these new values become visible in the behaviour of an individual, the process of radicalisation can be recognised. Radicalisation can be a threat when an individual denies the rights and values of other
individuals who have political views of their own which differ from the one of the radicalised person. Depluralisation of values, taken together with an individual’s desire to change society, often results in extremist behaviour including the use of violence in the form of a terrorist attack (Köhler, 2017). When this occurs, an unproblematic peaceful but activist individual attitude of opposition to certain policies, escalates to the use of political violence which can destabilise a society and affect other people’s personal freedom (NCTV, 2014b). In this third phase, violence is used to achieve ideological goals (Governance of Security, 2010).
2.2 Prevention of Radicalisation
As was stated in the previous section, the use of the concept of radicalisation is debated and related concepts are used intertwined.
This is also true for the use of the concept of de-radicalisation and related concepts. According to Bjørgo and Horgan (as cited in Köhler, 2017; and also Schmid, 2013) the concept of de-radicalisation lacks conceptual clarity. The concept of de-radicalisation is on the one hand used to describe efforts in countering extremism, but can also refer to efforts to prevent radicalisation from occurring prior to the use of political violence. In some de-radicalisation programs, the proposed actions or methods are genuinely conceptualised as preventive efforts (Köhler, 2017; Schmid, 2013). Based on the unclear and intertwined use of de-radicalisation and prevention, a distinction should be made in the use of the concepts. According to Schmid (2013), this distinction exists between the concepts of de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation.
The concept of de-radicalisation can be used when an individual has already been radicalised. As a result, re-pluralisation efforts have to be made in effort of intervention. Re-pluralisation is a process of de-radicalisation in which an individual is moved away from radical ideological concepts and values (Köhler, 2017). The concept of de-radicalisation, in general, has been used to describe the process in which radicalised individuals are brought back into society and moved away from the use of violence to achieve political changes. De-radicalisation can be performed as individual De-radicalisation and collective
de-radicalisation. Individual de-radicalisation is the effort to change a person’s extremist ideological ideas. Collective de-radicalisation is focussed on the change of the behavioural outcomes of an entire previously violent militant group (Schmid, 2013). Within
de-radicalisation, the term disengagement should be discussed separately. In disengagement, efforts are made to change the behavioural outcome of individuals embracing extremist ideas, that is, induce them to desist from the use of violence. De-radicalisation refers to a change of the ideological framework of an individual as well, which goes further than a behavioural change. Many militants who disengage still adhere to their former ideology but their behaviour has become more peaceful (Horgan, 2008).
The concept of counter-radicalisation can be used to describe the efforts to prevent individuals from becoming radicalised. The used tools to achieve this are the strengthening of the community where vulnerable individuals live in, in order to support those individuals. This differs from de-radicalisation in that the focus of counter-radicalisation is not on already radicalised individuals who have become terrorists (Schmid, 2013). Prevention should be seen as an effort to prevent radicalisation from occurring before it develops into extremist
behaviour or acts. To achieve this intervention involving re-pluralisation efforts are deemed to be necessary (Köhler, 2017).
When radicalisation policies have to be formulated, the objectives of the counter-radicalisation policy and the scope of collaboration have to be determined. First, with regard to the objectives, the target group has to be identified and clearly delineated (Schmid, 2013). Second, one has to keep in mind that preventive efforts can take place on the macro-social, the meso-social and the micro-social level (Köhler, 2017).
On the macro-social level, the field for preventive efforts of radicalisation stretches from the national to the regional level. The preventive tools used on this level are generally educational programs about citizenship and offering opportunities for active, but peaceful, political participation. For example, providing information about how to participate in the democratic process might be part of that, or education about the principles of human rights. On the meso-social level, the field for preventive efforts of radicalisation includes, for instance, efforts of better integration into the work process, support for families, greater participation in the community, and special attention for young people with a problematic background in school. On this level, a reduction of the attraction of extremist ideologies is one goal. Support for individuals vulnerable to radicalisation can be provided by tools like
community cohesion and resilience programs. On the micro-social level, preventive efforts of reducing chances of radicalisation are aimed at the vulnerable individual. Tools used when approaching such individuals include strengthening the feeling of connectedness and engagement with society or a smaller sub-group of societies like the local community (Köhler, 2017).
2.3 Radicalisation Prevention Policy
Some Western societies have experienced a shift in the way crime is handled, from
responding to already committed crimes towards the prevention of crimes (Niculescu-Dinca, 2016; Zedner, 2007). After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the European Union explored various ideas to combat terrorism. However, it first did not take measures or establish policies in relation to counter-radicalisation to prevent the occurrence of terrorism. This approach of countering terrorism came only after the London and Madrid bombings, within the European Union. The prevention of radicalisation was mentioned in the European Union’s declaration on combatting terrorism, which was established in response to the high-fatality bombings of 2005 and 2005 in Spain and the United Kingdom. In this declaration, the prevention of radicalisation was mentioned with related objectives in order to counter
Within the European Union, the importance and developments of de-radicalisation policies have increased over the last years, for example with the establishment of the
European counter-terrorism strategy and the European internal security strategy, both issued in 2005. In these strategies, the concepts of de-radicalisation and intervention have not been explicitly mentioned, whereas prevention was mentioned. The European Union stated that it would seek to detect and restrain radicalisation processes early before post hoc intervention was needed. This aim should be reached in cooperation with European member states in the prevention of support for terrorism, countering extremist ideologies and behaviour, supporting individuals who might be vulnerable to radicalisation, explore the existing extremist networks and improve responses to terrorist attacks (Bakker, 2015; Köhler, 2017).
Some policies for have been introduced by the European Commission to be implemented by European member states. This response of the European Commission towards member states expands upon the mentioned strategies and the declaration on combatting terrorism. Several goals have been set with regard to combating radicalisation within European Union member states, one of them was: Disrupt the activities that might lead individuals to commit terrorist attacks, a second: target extremist propaganda, a third: the promotion of security and a fourth: to put more efforts in responding to radicalisation. The Commission also referred to the importance of the role of local communities in countering extremism in European member states (Bakker, 2015).
Returning from the level of the European Union to the national level of the
Netherlands as a member state of the European Union, the policies and actions taken by the Dutch government in the prevention of radicalisation can be described briefly as follows: In the Netherlands, the base of counterterrorism policies can be characterised as a
comprehensive approach, in which the early detection of radicalisation and the use of
intervention measures to prevent terrorist attacks stand central. This approach is referred to as ‘broad’ because countering terrorism is not seen as an isolated activity. Rather, radicalisation processes are seen as opportunities for early intervention (NCTV, 2012). The Dutch
government proposed a national counterterrorism strategy in 2011 which ran until 2015. This counterterrorism strategy was then revised for the period between 2016 and 2020. This strategy is part of the national security strategy, the Netherlands’ international security strategy as well as the counterterrorism strategies of the European Union and the United Nations. The national counterterrorism strategy of the Netherlands is aimed at the prevention of both extremism and terrorism. Jihadism is in the Dutch strategy documents mentioned as the primary and increasingly dangerous threat to national security.
As a result, all Dutch government ministries and special agencies are tasked with playing a role in a comprehensive response to the threat of radicalisation (NCTV, 2016). Within the national counterterrorism strategy, five areas of intervention are mentioned:
First, acquire insights into the nature of the threats in the Netherlands. Second, prevent and distort extremism and terrorism.
Third, defend persons, objects and processes against extremism and terrorist threats. Fourth, be prepared for extremist and terrorist attacks.
Fifth, prosecute extremism and terrorism.
The threats of extremism and terrorist attacks vary; therefore the use of flexible local input to counter this is dependent on the existing threat level at any given moment. What is clear is that the implementation of the counterterrorism strategy is dependent on the involvement of local parties (NCTV, 2016).
2.4 Frontline Practitioners and the Prevention of Radicalisation
In the action program to combat extremism in the form of jihadism in the Netherlands, the tasks of local actors in the prevention of radicalisation are specified (NCTV, 2014b). First, at the local level, the prevention of radicalisation involves the identification of radicalisation for purposes of early intervention. With regard to the identification of radicalisation by local actors, the mayor, police, confidential contact points or intelligence services need to be informed. These local actors are generally frontline practitioners who received training in the recognition of signs of radicalisation. Although the recognition of radicalising individuals is somewhat difficult, some aspects can be distinguished. What often drives a young person towards radicalisation is the need for social recognition as a pull factor and the willingness to do something about perceives social injustice at home or abroad (NCTV, 2014a).
Second, at the local level, one element in the prevention of radicalisation is the result of strengthening resilience. Radicalising youth can be pushed back to mainstream ideas, instead of embracing extreme ideas, by peers and others who can present them with opposing opinions or at least nuance extreme interpretations of Islamist ideas. With presenting
vulnerable young people with alternative opinions, they can be made aware that they are in danger of being manipulated by extreme opinions. Especially local Muslims leaders who are a role model in their religious community or prominent and credible politicians, like, for
In making youth resilient peers can also play an important role (NCTV, 2014a).
Based on a survey how countries deal with the prevention of radicalisation, the United Nations, in one of its reports on de-radicalisation, stressed the importance of educational programmes (Schmid, 2013). In the Netherlands, education and teachers within educational institutions have two broad tasks to perform in relation to radicalisation prevention. First, teachers within educational institutions have been requested to identify radicalising students. Their information about radicalising students is gathered by the government. In sharing this sensitive information, teachers are supported by networks of other frontline practitioners to discuss individual cases in order to inform the government (NCTV, 2014b).
Second, teachers within educational institutions have the task to prevent radicalisation by making their students resilient through involving them in active and constructive
citizenship roles. According to Yehoshua (as cited in Köhler, 2017), the tools educational institutions have in order to foster rejection of extremist and terrorist ideas involve matters such as encouraging students to assume positive citizenship roles and embrace a broader range of perspectives, values and ideals. In the action program, this broader range of perspectives includes education about the importance of the rule of law and not providing a platform for extremist ideas. Information exchange on these subjects is facilitated and supported by a special knowledge centre of experts (Leeman & Wardekker, 2013; Lenos & Keltjens, 2017; NCTV, 2014b).
2.5 Local Radicalisation Prevention in Practice
As mentioned, some tools for the prevention of radicalisation are in the hands of local actors and specifically teachers (Bakker et al., 2014). However, Bartlett et al. (2010) question whether local actors are able to contribute sufficiently to prevention. In the following, an effort will be made to outline what has been proven to be difficult in the prevention of radicalisation so far.
It has been stated that the prevention of radicalisation is difficult since the radicalisation process of individuals is hard to trace. Local actors are expected to detect potential jihadists without possessing concrete enough indicators of radicalisation (Zannoni, Van der Varst, Bervoets, Wensveen, Van Bolhuis, & Van der Torre, 2008). Local actors experience difficulties in distinguishing who are mere radicals and who are potential extremists (Fitzgerald, 2016; Nordbruch, 2016).
In addition, there is the danger that frontline workers might identify individuals as extremists before they even had a proper discussion with the suspected person. It could be that a
particular person is in fact not radicalised but has other problems that result in peculiar behaviour, e.g., a gambling addiction or debts (Fitzgerald, 2016). When indicators are provided to local actors, the risk of creating false positives or false negatives is present. For example, local actors who work with asylum seekers are asked to be alert about potential jihadists. When the local actors are provided with a list of indicators, extremist asylum
seekers might demonstrate atypical behaviour to avoid being associated with indicators from a publicly known list of indicators of radicalisation (Van Wijk & Bolhuis, 2017).
The tasks of local actors in the prevention of radicalisation have also been criticised from another perspective. In the United Kingdom, the CONTEST program was developed to counter radicalisation and prevent terrorism. In this program, it was stated that an objective of prevention is to respond to radicalisation with the help of the education sector (Home office, 2011). According to Coppock (2014), teachers in the United Kingdom experience difficulties in the prevention of radicalisation among their students. Prevention efforts might lead to a negative stereotyping of young Muslims. Due to this preventive approach and the alertness of teachers, young Muslims who are considered to be a risk might be judged on the basis of their religious background, whereas non-Muslims would not. The entire Muslim population could be portrayed as a so-called suspect community as a result of such stereotyping (Kudnani, 2012). Some observers are not positive about this stereotyping because it could backfire and lead to strengthening the radicalisation process of young Muslims (Spee & Reitsma, 2010).
Another difficulty in the prevention of radicalisation that can be distinguished is a slowdown or cessation of reporting. Frontline practitioners sometimes do not respond to signals of radicalisation or do not report signals in order to avoid responsibility (Fitzgerald, 2016). Especially in those European countries where a frontline practitioner has to report the identity of a suspect by himself, instead of having the opportunity to discuss the situation first with a colleague at a contact point, have a tendency not to report. The existence of a network of frontline practitioners that function as contact point has proven to be successful in the Netherlands. In other European countries, without such networks, it is psychologically harder for frontline practitioners to report cases of radicalising individuals (Fitzgerald, 2016).
In the situations, mentioned above, some difficulties in the prevention of radicalisation for local actors have been mentioned. However, it is hard to prove when and where prevention efforts by local actors are effective. The actors who play a role in the prevention of
What has been achieved so far in the prevention of radicalisation is often not clear or has been insufficient. This could be due to problems first noted in a different context by Lipsky in the 1980s, which will be addressed in the next section of this thesis.
2.6 Problems in the Work Conditions of Street-level Bureaucrats
The street-level bureaucrats theory by Lipsky (2010) will be used in this thesis as an instrument to analyse the problems when implementing government guidelines on the prevention of radicalisation in secondary schools. In this section, some examples will be provided with regard to teachers and the prevention of radicalisation. However, such problems will be extensively operationalised in the methodology chapter.
Lipsky (2010) argues with his theory on street-level bureaucrats that bringing governmental policies into practice can be troublesome. This is due to the fact that local public actors often operate under high work pressure, and have therefore the tendency to make decisions on individual cases with their discretionary authority. This results in an uneven treatment of individuals cases or can lead to a simplification of the policy objectives. In particular, Lipsky (2010) states that street-level bureaucrats can experience five kinds of problems during their work.
First, the resources that are available for a street-level bureaucrat to perform his or her tasks sufficiently are inadequate (Lipsky, 2010). This lack of resources could be a relatively low ratio of workers available in relation to the number of clients, too little time available or too limited personal experience (Lipsky, 2010). Translated from the street to the classroom and to the responsibilities assigned to teachers for the prevention of radicalisation, this could, for instance, result in too little time and attention to identify radicalising students or, on the preventive side, make all students in a classroom more resilient.
Second, the demand for the services of a street-level bureaucrat exceeds the supply of the services. When the availability of services, provided by a street-level bureaucrat, increases then the use of those services will expand too. This tends to generate a chronical lack of resources (Lipsky, 2010). With regard to teachers and the prevention of radicalisation, this would mean that when teachers are available to perform the identification of radicalising students or make them resilient, the demands to perform such tasks might also increase.
Third, some of the objectives of a street-level bureaucrat might be conflicting with others or the objectives themselves might be ambiguous. The goals of the clients of a street-level bureaucrat can conflict with the goals of the street-street-level bureaucrat.
In addition, the goals of the clients can conflict with the organisational goals of the street-level bureaucrat. Also, the roles of street-street-level bureaucrats can be ambiguous when it is not clear what exactly should be the role of the street-level bureaucrat (Lipsky, 2010). To
illustrate one problem, with regard to teachers and the prevention of radicalisation, this would mean that the tasks of identification and resilience strengthening are hard to perform because students request a variety of services from the teacher.
Fourth, the performance of goal achievement of a street-level bureaucrat is hard to measure because there are often no concrete quality measures. In line with what has been said before, some goals are not measurable because the goals that need to be achieved are too vague. Also, there are too many variables that can influence the performance. Next, there can be a lack of supervision to measure performance (Lipsky, 2010). With regard to this last problem and teachers and the prevention of radicalisation, this would mean that there might be no proper supervision of the teachers, resulting in an absence of measurement of the actual performance of the assigned tasks.
Fifth, the clients of a street-level bureaucrat are not voluntary and as a result, the street-level bureaucrat does not have anything to lose when taking care of the clients. Due to a lack of resources, street-level bureaucrats can limit the demands made by some clients, by ‘shipping off’ some of their clients, especially those who require a higher than average amount of time, which is always a scarce resource. Also, the interaction with clients can be kelp limited when clients do not want to interact; in that way, the street-level bureaucrat does not waste scarce resources (Lipsky, 2010). For instance, with regard to teachers and the prevention of radicalisation, this would mean that a teacher who has to perform the
identification of radicalisation or the strengthening of resilience ‘ships off’ those students who demand the investment of above average resources.
Taylor and Kelly (2006) explored whether Lipsky’s (2010) theory of street-level bureaucracy is still applicable, as his theory was first published in the eighties and since then reforms have taken place within the public sector. This was investigated in the United Kingdom after increased privatisation, growing market deregulation and more management supervision in the public sector. As a result of these transformations, the discretionary
freedom of street-level bureaucrats could be expected to be more limited. Despite the changes in the public sector, Taylor and Kelly (2006), found however, that teachers do possess
3. Methodology
3.1 Research Strategy
The research performed for this thesis is qualitative in nature. The advantage of a qualitative research strategy is that it provides an opportunity to understand and describe a social
phenomenon by exploring the view and daily experiences of the related actors (Boeije, 2014; Bryman, 2012). The qualitative research strategy fits the research conducted in this thesis because the experiences on the prevention of radicalisation by secondary school teachers and the perspectives on the role of those secondary school teachers in the Schilderswijk could be analysed and questioned in depth.
Next to a qualitative approach, a deductive approach was used. With a deductive approach, the data is collected and analysed by means of a pre-existing analytical framework. In the case of applying an inductive approach to a research, an entirely new theoretical model is built from the collected and analysed data, as in grounded theory (Bryman, 2012). The deductive approach could also be defined as a case-ordered display, in which the answers of the respondents can easily be compared on variables that follow from the analytical
framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this thesis, the collected data will be ordered in line with the analytical framework on the local implementation and the problems resulting from the work conditions of street-level bureaucrats.
In addition to the qualitative research strategy and the deductive approach, this thesis could also be characterized as an explorative research. In an explorative research, the aim is to better understand a certain problem situation. In order to do this the extent to which that problem situation can be related to certain formulated theoretical elements is explored (De Groot, 1972).
3.2 Research Design
This thesis will employ a multiple case study design. In a multiple case study design, more than one case is analysed. A case could, for instance, be a location or a population (Bryman, 2012). The advantage of a multiple case study design is that it provides an opportunity to analyse data over different situations. Thereby, the advantage of a case study design, over other research designs, is the opportunity to gain an intensive insight into the cases through analysing several perspectives within a limited period of time (Yin, 2009).
In this thesis, the context is formed by the implementation of the prevention of radicalisation by secondary schools in the Schilderswijk of The Hague. The cases, units of analysis, are the Johan de Witt school and the Edith Stein College. The unit of observation is formed by the individuals who are working at these schools and/or are responsible for tasks regarding
radicalisation prevention. A more extensive description of the cases, both schools, with regard to their organisation and their experiences with radicalisation can be found in annex I.
3.3 Research Methods
When conducting research, the research strategy and the research design can be brought together by the applied research method. According to Bryman (2012), a typical research method to combine a qualitative research strategy with a case study research design is interviewing. In this thesis, the data has been collected by conducting semi-structured
interviews. Although conducting and transcribing interviews is a time-consuming practice, it provided the option to ask follow-up questions on a politically sensitive subject, to better understand the subject as a result of the experiences that were shared by the respondents (Boeije, 2014; Bryman, 2012). While, at the same time, maintaining a clear structure as a base on which the interviews could be compared. The questions used in interviews were
established by following the primary tasks assigned by the NCTV to secondary schools, the problems experienced by other local actors that play a comparable role in the prevention of radicalisation and leading were the problems in the work conditions of street-level
bureaucrats.
3.4 Sampling
The selection of the respondents was made, based on the positions that the respondents have in relation to the implementation of the prevention of radicalisation in secondary schools. The choice for secondary schools was made as a result of the age level of the radicalised foreign fighters. The youngest radicalised Dutch student who left for Syria or Iraq was fifteen years old. This age is in line with the age that students of secondary schools generally have. Furthermore, the choice for secondary schools in The Hague was made because of the relatively highest number of radicalised individuals who left for Syria or Iraq, in comparison to all other Dutch municipalities (Bergema & Koudijs, 2015).
Finally, the Schilderswijk has been selected, due to the multicultural environment with primarily Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants, social problems and previously radicalised individuals (Marijnissen & Zuidervaart, 2015; Municipality of The Hague, 2017).
The respondents can be divided into three categories. The first category of respondents includes the individuals who are currently employed at the Johan de Witt, a secondary school in the Schilderswijk. The teachers of this school, however, have not been interviewed because the general director denied access to contact these teachers. However, the general director, security coordinator and school security officers were interviewed. These respondents have been purposively sampled, based on their responsibilities in radicalisation prevention. A purposive sample is a non-random sample in which the respondents are chosen on their ability to make a contribution in answering the research question (Bryman, 2012).
The second category of respondents was added to present the perspective of the secondary school teachers. This category of respondents can be referred to as the teachers who are employed at the Edith Stein College, a secondary school located in the centre of The Hague. The two teachers who had been interviewed were purposively sampled because they were employed at this secondary school in the Schilderswijk in 2014.
The third category of respondents is formed by two national security officials who assign the tasks of radicalisation prevention and train secondary schools teachers in performing these tasks. One of the respondents is employed at the foundation School and Security (SSV) and the other respondent is employed at the expertise unit Social Stability (ESS). Interviews with these officials have been conducted to compensate for the low response rate of secondary school teachers. These respondents have been purposively
sampled, based on their experience in the field, in order to make sure that the respondents are able to provide information on the subject.
3.5 Ethics
With regard to the ethics of this research, the following aspects have been taken into
consideration. All respondents were fully informed about the content of this research before the interviews were conducted. Based on this, they were open to accept or deny participation. The respondents from the SSV and ESS were informed by email, the teachers from the Edith Stein were informed face-to-face by the interviewer and the respondents from the Johan de Witt were informed by the interviewer and the security coordinator. An electronic copy of this thesis has been promised to all of the respondents in exchange for their participation.
Beside the informed consent, the respondents’ names have been removed to grant them
anonymity; in other words, direct quotes and the names of respondents are not used. However, some respondents allowed the usage of their names and position. For this reason, the names of the schools and position of the general director and security coordinator can be identified. With regard to anonymity, all respondents gave explicit permission to record the interviews.
3.6 Operationalisation
In this thesis, the conducted research is primarily shaped by the theoretical elements which were described in Lipsky’s (2010) theory on street-level bureaucrats. The theoretical elements of this street-level bureaucracy theory involve five kinds of problems that civil servants can experience during their work. These problems have been operationalised in order to answer how the prevention of radicalisation by secondary schools can be implemented. The concrete indicators to measure these problems have been shaped by the tasks assigned to secondary schools and comparable problems in the prevention of radicalisation by other civil servants.
When considering each subquestion in this research, there will be an explanation given which problems and indicators have been formulated. The first subquestion is about the resources that secondary schools have been given in order to implement the prevention of radicalisation tasks. According to Lipsky (2010) those resources, such as time, ratio of workers and personal experience, are necessary to perform given tasks in a satisfactory way. ‘Personal experience’ has been translated into questions on the ability to recognize signs of radicalisation and the support needed for fulfilling the assigned role. ‘Time’ has been
operationalised by a question relating to the time available to perform each task. The ‘ratio of workers’ has been expressed in a question on the attention given to students in order to perform the assigned tasks.
The second subquestion is about the experiences at secondary schools regarding the tasks at hand and perspectives on performing these tasks. To answer how they experience the tasks the problem of an increasing demand for services and the problem posed by the fact that the clients were not voluntary were operationalised. The problem of ‘demand for service’ was put into questions about an increasing demand to perform the prevention of radicalisation tasks. The problem of ‘not voluntary clients’ was researched with the help of questions about the refusal to interact when it came to discussing radicalisation and the large investment of resources in order to come to a meaningful conversation about radicalisation.
To explore how the performance of these tasks by secondary schools is perceived, the problem of goal expectations was operationalised and researched. In order to measure ‘goal expectations’, problems such as the ambiguity of goals and conflicting goals were put into questions. The concept ‘ambiguity of goals’ was measured by asking about the instructions received on radicalisation prevention and the degree of clarity on how to approach the assigned tasks. The ‘conflicting goals’ issue has been approached by questions on discussion of radicalisation in class, discussing the issue by talking to individual students separately, the encouragement of an active role of students, informing other parties about radicalising students, the position of teachers to discuss sensitive subjects as radicalisation and the willingness of students to discuss radicalisation.
The third subquestion in the present research project is about the control of tasks and feedback received on the tasks performed by secondary schools. In order to answer this subquestion, the problem of the measurement of the ‘performance of goal achievement’ has been operationalised. This is measured by asking questions about the supervision on the performance of the tasks, ambiguity of the tasks and the variables to measure the performance of the tasks.
3.7 Data Preparation and Analysis
In order to answer the main research question of this thesis, the interviews have been analysed to create a broader vision on the implementation of the tasks regarding the prevention of radicalisation by secondary schools in the Schilderswijk. The interviews with the respondents from the Johan de Witt school, who were not teachers, and the Edith Stein College were conducted in face-to-face conversations and have been recorded with a tape recorder. However, the interviews with respondents from the SSV and ESS were conducted by telephone calls and have been recorded with use of a call recorder application. On average, the interviews took around thirty minutes each. In the analysis, the respondents are presented as respondent 1, respondent 2 and so on. In the transcripts of the interviews the abbreviations R1 CV JdW, R5 ESC, etcetera have been used to make a clear distinction between the
positions of the respondents. In order to be able to analyse the transcribed interviews, the data was coded. Coding is the process in which the complete interview transcripts are reduced to separate blocks of text and each part has a code (Bryman, 2012). The codes used were based on the analytical framework and have been connected to compare the data.
3.8 Limitations
Reliability and validity are two important criteria to assess quantitative social science research. Conversely, the criteria have been adapted and could also be applied to qualitative research. First reliability will be discussed and after this validity will be addressed. The reliability of an academic research can be determined by the degree of replicability: this is called the external reliability. When a research would be repeated in a likewise manner the outcomes of the research should be in line (Bryman, 2012). LeCompte and Goetz (1982) stated that the replicability of qualitative research is hard to achieve because social settings change over time. In order to establish the possibility of replication, the methodological framework has been clearly explained. The internal reliability is directed at the researcher, the involvement of more researchers could lack consistency in interpreting the data (Bryman, 2012). With regard to the internal reliability, no direct issues can be distinguished because the entire research was conducted by one researcher.
In qualitative research, the validity can be specified to internal validity and external validity. The term internal validity refers to the relation between the data collected in reality and the analysis presented as a reflection of that reality (Denzin, 1970). The internal validity is high because the researched reality is reflected in the analysis with use of interview
transcripts. The external validity is characterised by the ability to generalise the outcomes of a research over other settings (Bryman, 2012). LeCompte and Goetz (1982) mentioned that determining external validity is a problem in qualitative research and specifically when a case study has been performed. The results cannot be generalised beyond the researched cases.
4. Analysis
4.1 Subquestion 1
In this section, the first subquestion will be answered by looking at the ‘resources’ available to secondary schools. ‘What resources have secondary schools in the Schilderswijk received from ESS, SSV or school directors regarding the prevention of radicalisation?’
4.1.1 Resources
4.1.1.1 Personal Experience
Within the broader perspective of the general availability of resources to prevent
radicalisation among students, different elements have been examined. First, the personal experiences within secondary schools regarding signalling radicalising students have been questioned. In general, respondent 9, the official from the foundation School and Security, stated that secondary school teachers are able to recognize signs of radicalisation, but in a different way than other frontline practitioners. Similarly, the school director, security coordinator and school security officers associated with the Johan de Witt school all stated that the teachers employed at their school are able to recognise signs of radicalisation among their students. For example, respondent 1, the security coordinator, stated that not only the security coordinator and school security officers are able to recognize signs of potentially radicalising students, but that the teachers and mentors are as well able to recognize signs.
This statement, about the ability of teachers and mentors, was also shared by
respondent 8, a teacher at the Edith Stein College. In addition, respondent 2, a school security officer, stated that it is known by the school that teachers can also recognise signs of
radicalisation because the information about potential radicalising students, which is gathered by the teachers, is transferred to the school security officers and the security coordinator will compare such signals to their notes. Next, the ability of teachers to recognise signs of
radicalisation was also recognised by the other school security officers, the respondents 3, 4 and 7. They stated that teachers are able to recognise signs because of the hours of contact they have each week in class with students. Moreover, respondent 6, the school director, even mentioned that teachers get to know students through their entire school period and that is why they would be able to recognise changes.
The following specific signs of radicalisation that could be recognized among students in secondary schools were mentioned.
The public officials employed at foundation School and Security and the expertise unit Social Stability, respondents 9 and 10, stated that teachers do not have to be able to specifically recognise signs of radicalisation, but that they are able to sign all changes which concern them. They even mentioned that teachers signal behaviour that concerns them, without always knowing clearly when it is radicalisation. According to respondents 3, 4 and 6, teachers are able to recognise a general behavioural and attitudinal change of individual students.
Respondents 1 and 2 specified this behavioural change as a change in manners. For example, respondent 2, mentioned that potentially radicalising students can be recognised because they differentiate between individuals in the school based on their beliefs. Likewise, respondent 8 mentioned the change in manners and gave the example of students who deny having physical contact with women by shaking hands. Also, respondent 6 referred to the ability to sign radicalisation when they see an increase of interactions that a student has with other students known for deviant ideas.
Besides behavioural and attitudinal changes, the respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6
mentioned that the expression of opinions and statements could also be indicators to recognise radicalising students. To illustrate this, respondent 2 mentioned the expression of strong opinions about religious beliefs by students. Respondent 5 referred to students who force other students to accept their deviant religious beliefs. In addition, respondent 3 mentioned students who expressed strong deviant opinions about societal subjects, apart from religious subjects. However, respondents 1 and 2 stated that the ability to recognise signs of
radicalisation has changed. Respondent 2 stated that the willingness of students to openly mention their thoughts changed. Just like respondent 4 mentioned that changes in the way students dressed is no longer a clear sign in school, whereas respondent 6 mentioned that there was a change in clothing that could be recognised at first. A change from Western to more traditional clothes or the other way around, as a mark of possible radicalisation or de-radicalisation, was no longer a clear indication.
4.1.1.2 Support
Second, as part of the personal experiences of secondary school teachers, the demand and need to gain extra support in signalling and the resilient making of radicalising students have been questioned. According to respondent 10, teachers should have dialogues with each other, with the aim to gain knowledge on radicalisation and prevention.
This dialogue could be created by participation in a training, given by SSV or the ESS, about dealing with extreme ideas. It would be important to give teachers instructions on how to act in particular precarious situations, without creating a risk. Some reactions that teachers have in these situations might create a backfiring effect and could strengthen radicalisation instead of preventing it.
In line with this recommendation, respondents 1, 6 and 7 of the Johan de Witt school mentioned that their teachers had been informed about radicalisation. Respondent 1 stated that teachers should, to a certain level, be familiar with difficulties they might face during their work. The respondents 1 and 6 explained that the information that their teachers received was distributed by a briefing, provided by a commission of the municipality and the police. In line with this, respondent 1 mentioned that this briefing was repeated for new teachers and after new insights on radicalisation. Similarly, respondent 4 emphasised the importance of this for teachers with regard to new insights and changes in radicalisation expression. Respondent 1 and 7 referred to this briefing as providing information on how to sign radicalising students, where respondent 6 also added the information on the development of radicalisation and various religious Islamic groups.
Different from the information which was spread on the Johan de Witt school in form of a briefing, the teachers of the Edith Stein College received relatively little information. Respondent 8 stated that the teachers have not received a specific training or moment of attention to discuss the subject within the school. However, some information was spread from the direction of the school in the form of articles to do some self-research. As a result, a conversation on this subject developed within the school. Respondent 5 stressed the demand for more training or information on recognising signs. Conversely, respondent 8 also
mentioned that it should not be the case that one could expect all the teachers to become an expert on this subject. This statement is in line with the argument of respondent 6 about the possibility to support all teachers with information on signs of radicalisation, but the impossibility and wish to not make them all experts or give them information on resilience making.
4.1.1.3 Ratio of Workers
Third, in addition to the personal experiences, the ratio of workers available has been examined.
The ratio of workers available should be seen as the ability of a teacher to provide the attention needed to signal radicalising students or to strengthen resilience against
radicalisation. Respondent 10 mentioned that teachers are not continuously able to signal radicalising students or strengthen resilience against radicalisation. In class, the attention of teachers is demanded by a variety of students who also need extra attention, based on other problems or questions. Respondent 8 argued in line with this, that it could be that there are over twenty students in a class who have other demands. Respondent 4 specified these differences in demands as a result of the differences in interest because of differences in the cultural backgrounds of the students. Respondent 1 stated, based on the mentioned arguments, that teachers should be relieved from tasks in the prevention of radicalisation. With regard to the number of teachers available, respondent 9 mentioned that the decisions to be able to implement these tasks into the schedules are not up to the SSV.
4.1.1.4 Time
Fourth, the availability of time was questioned. The availability of time is the amount of time spend to individual students in order to signal radicalising students or to make students resilient against radicalisation. Respondent 3 and 4 mentioned that with regard to recognising signs of radicalisation, the teachers are able to perform this task in the time they have
available. They stated that teachers are able to do this because it is not time-consuming and the signs of potential radicalisation or concerns thereabout can be communicated to the school’s security officers. This statement is supported by respondent 8 who mentioned that teachers are only able to express their concerns, implying that teachers are not able to perform the task of making students more resilient to withstand radicalisation efforts in the time available.
In order to support this argument, respondent 1 referred to the limited number of hours teachers have available for other than core teaching assignments. In addition, respondent 4 and 7 mentioned that performing this task is not possible when teaching less than one hour at a time. Next, respondent 2 mentioned the extra tasks teachers have besides teaching in class. Respondent 7 explained this argument by giving examples like the time it takes teachers to prepare classes, conducting exams and the time small problems take that can always occur during class.
With regard to the availability of time, respondent 9 mentioned that decisions to implement these additional tasks into the schedules of teachers are not the responsibility of the SSV.
4.1.2 Partial Conclusion
The aim of this section was to answer the first subquestion of this research project about the resources that secondary schools in the Schilderswijk have received with regard to their tasks regarding the prevention of radicalisation. In sum, in line with the statement of the public officials of the SSV and ESS, the teachers who were employed or are employed in the Schilderswijk are said to be able to recognise signs of radicalisation. These signs can be general concerns about behavioural changes as well as specific signs of radicalisation. In order to recognise signs and make students resilient, teachers should be better supported, according to the ESS and SSV. The teachers employed at the Johan de Witt received
extensive information and briefings on signs of radicalisation, whereas teachers of the Edith Stein College received relatively little information. The respondents from both schools share the opinion that teachers should not be expected to become experts on the subject. The
respondents of the Johan de Witt, in particular, stressed this point with regard to strengthening resilience. Next, teachers are not able to perform the prevention of radicalisation tasks
continuously because of they should also give attention to students with different problems or backgrounds. In addition to this, the respondents from both schools mentioned that teachers are considered to be able to signal radicalisation or report their concerns in the time they have available. However, due to limited time, they are not able to make their students resilient to withstand radicalisation.
4.2 Subquestion 2
In this section, the second subquestion will be answered by looking into Lipsky’s categories ‘demands of services’, ‘non-voluntary clients’ and ‘goal expectations’. ‘How is the task of preventing radicalisation experienced by secondary school teachers or security officers and viewed by the ESS, SSV or school directors?’
