African Statehood and the Western Push
for Neoliberal Developments
The Cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe
Author: Geert J. Jacobse Studentnr: 10687327
Supervisor: Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins Second Reader:
September 2015
Master thesis Political Science – International Relations University of Amsterdam
ABSTRACT
This thesis looks into the postcolonial relationships between states in the Western world and states in Africa, with a special focus on the continued impact of colonialism on African statehood by the spread of neoliberalism through international institutions for economic development. Two example cases of states in Africa are discussed in this thesis: Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, both bringing different histories and local contexts to the table. These cases show that African states have emerged in a very different context than the Westphalian states in Europe, but also that their own historical contexts are different for each state. The role of the West is ambiguous as their involvement is often indirect and different per African and European state involved in the matter. Yet, many international institutions seem to treat Africa as one ‘unit’ in their policies, especially for the creation of abstract spaces of neoliberalism and international trade.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Theory 7
Methodology 15
Neoliberalism and its Spatial Impact 17
The Concept of State in the African Context 22
Conflict and Intervention in Côte d’Ivoire 28
Isolation and Splinter Politics in Zimbabwe 33
Discussion and Conclusion 37
Acknowledgements 40
INTRODUCTION
In 1648, a series of treaties known as the Peace of Westphalia settled the decades long wars between the different European powers involved. Up until reaching agreement in 1648, those in power had competed with each other for prestige, wealth and space. While the Peace of Westphalia ended long lasting enmities in Europe, it also introduced the notion of non-intervention in another power’s internal affairs and respecting the sovereignty of other states. Therefore, it has been frequently conceived as a starting point for a world order in which the institution of state is at the core of international politics. However, while the state system spread across the world and claimed an important role in international relations, only a few European states has emerged as the result of the Peace of Westphalia. For the majority of the present day states goes that they are the result of a very different history and that the imposed state framework does not always fit the local cultures and societies (Nandy, 2010).
The dominant international state framework is problematic in several cases where a state cannot meet the ‘Westphalian standard’. For example, a state might not have the capacity to reproduce itself territorially, lack the resources for conducting effective economic policies, and/or is not socially inclusive to a certain group of citizens. As a result, these states are considered more ‘fragile’ than their ‘sustainable’ counterparts. In Africa, the vast majority of the present day states only recently became independent after a long era of European colonial exploitation. The young African states face many challenges with regard to the legitimacy, development, and governance of their states. Meanwhile, the ‘traditional’ state is also evolving: the increasing global economic and technological interconnectedness give leeway to the emergence of phenomena like globalization and neoliberalism.
In this thesis, I will discuss the African state space in the neoliberal world order. The focus lies on the postcolonial challenges to the African state, and the spatial impact that neoliberal governance and policy have on these states. The central research question addressed by this thesis is: ‘How and to what extent are postcolonial African states institutionally and spatially affected by the neoliberal turn in international governance?’ Furthermore, the following sub-questions will be addressed: (1) ‘What is neoliberalism and how does it manifest itself spatially?’ (2) ‘What are the challenges to the postcolonial state in Africa, posed by the colonial past and neoliberalism?’ (3) ‘How have the colonial past and neoliberalism influenced the capacities of the state and its ability to reproduce itself in the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe?’ With the help of these sub-questions, this thesis will work towards answering the central research question. While answering these questions, I will argue that Western states are
using the neoliberal agenda through international institutions and bilaterally in an attempt to control trade and political relations with former colonies, and therewith pose challenges to institutions and spaces under the sovereignty of states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The relevance of the topic of study can be approached from many different angles. First and foremost because the African continent is in the process of rapid change. While a significant share of the African populations lives in poverty and/or conflict at present, the continent’s population will double in size in the next thirty-five years and the share of the population under the age of eighteen will increase even more sharply. With this unprecedented demographic shift that goes against the global trend, the role Africa, which is already the second most populous continent, will dramatically change on the international level (UNICEF, 2014).
The swift changes in Africa’s demography will have many implications on the continent itself, but also for the rest of the world. The (formal) economies of Africa grow at a relatively quick pace, also because of the exports of many natural resources and commodities, the foreign investments in Africa, and a more productive agricultural sector (World Bank, 2015). But the economic growth can also be observed in the emerging service and trade sectors, which offers an increasing number of products and jobs (UNCTAD, 2015).
Changes in Africa’s macroeconomic situation do however also affect the inhabitants of the continent on a micro level. The economic growth offers opportunities to eradicate the severe poverty on the continent, and invest in services such as education and health care. Also the increased agricultural production can enhance the food security and reduce the human suffering of famines. Yet, political tensions and armed conflict, disease epidemics, and environmental change are looming risks that could endanger increased well-being, or even lead to major humanitarian crises (World Bank, 2015).
Democratic growth in Africa can also lead to all kinds of new geopolitical challenges. The states of Africa are relatively young and their institutions are based on Western examples, but lack the inclusiveness (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). When states are insufficiently supported by their inhabitants, they are often perceived as fragile. State fragility implies a lack of legitimate sovereign power and rule of law. Crime and conflict are les oppressed and might proliferate, and have spillover effects that can induce costs on neighboring states or the region. Internationally addressing state fragility has however proved to be difficult, as the external costs are high enough to address, but not necessarily by a single state (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).
The sharp shift in the demography of the continent and predicted economic growth are posing both opportunities and challenges to African states and African peoples. And also the
question of the role that should be played by the Western world in these opportunities and challenges, in relation to their past regimes of colonial rule, rises as a result of the changes in Africa. The dominance of the Western economies on the international level will be of influence on the way in which the economies of Africa will develop.
This thesis will address these issues, as well as answer the research questions above, as follows: I will first present an extensive theoretical framework will be presented that will put forward the relevant theories for this thesis and will give an overview of the relevant existing academic literature centering around postcolonialism, neoliberalism, and space and territory.. Subsequently, a methodological framework that will clarify the research design and research methods that will be used to answer the research questions I will then move on to address the questions of neoliberalism and its relation to space, and the question of African statehood. Then, I will present the two case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe and link these to the previously discussed topics of postcolonialism, neoliberalism and space. Lastly, I will discuss the two cases and conclude.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Postcolonialism in International Relations
Within the field of International Relations, there are several different theoretical approaches to the topics researched. One group of theories is formed by the critical theories, which consists of theoretical approaches that have a common ground in reflecting on the theorization process, questioning existing power and social relations, and rejecting positivist methods in social science research (Zehfuss, 2013). In the words of Robert Cox: critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. [It] does not take institutions and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (1981 p.129). The critical turn in International Relations occurred in the 1980s, in the context of a broader critical movement in the social sciences, and the end of the Cold War which had been a source for much rational choice IR research (Zehfuss, 2013). Not only were the 1980s characterized by the final chords of the Cold War, it was also the era when the process of decolonization came to an end and many former colonies had become states.
Among the critical theories is postcolonialism, an approach to International Relations which is concerned with the inequality and power relationships between the Western hemisphere and the three non-Western continents: Africa, Latin America and Asia (Zehfuss, 2013). Postcolonial scholars stress that the non-Western continents are still presented with the continued effects of colonial subordination in the European colonial period, and that the power structures in international institutions are still a reflection of the world order as it was after the Second World War (Grovogui, 2013; Zehfuss, 2013). Furthermore, postcolonialism is concerned with the Western bias in the academic literature. Especially the Western perspective from which a significant share of International Relations literature is produced is challenged by postcolonial scholars, who consider this an epistemological bias (Grovogui, 2013; Zehfuss, 2013).
As postcolonialism is concerned with the unpacking of international power relations, there is a focus on the historical motivation and construction of colonialism and imperialism. This is exemplified by the work of Edward Said, who is known for coining the idea of ‘Orientalism’: “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (2003 p. 3). According to Said, the Orientalism discourse is mostly used in the West, in both academia and non-scholarly works, to produce a distinct space of norms, cultures, economies, etc. (2003). The West used this
discourse mostly in the post-Enlightenment period to underscore the ‘superiority’ of European culture over other cultures, and subsequently to justify its conquest of territories and domination of peoples outside of Europe. Moreover, the Orientalism discourse is rather part of the European culture and producing the arguments for the superiority of European ideas, than it says something about ‘the Orient’ itself. In this way, “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience,” than the other way around (Said, 2003 p.3)
While Orientalism discourse creates a distinction between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ from a European perspective, it is not limited to the southern and eastern parts of Asia. Instead, there is a broader Western assumption of the ownership of modernity, and the timelessness of their political systems and institutions (Zehfuss, 2013). Therewith, the West largely neglects any alternative political systems that exist, for instance in the Islamic world (see Pasha, 2003) or, more relevant for this thesis, in Africa (see Grovogui, 2006). These assumptions can also be found in several present-day political systems. One example of this is the division of political organization into a system of mutually exclusive states, that has materialized following the examples of the Westphalian states.
Statehood and Sovereignty
concept of ‘state’, has its roots in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 when several European powers reached an agreement on the terms to carry out their mutual relationships. Ever since then, the concept has evolved into several different forms of state, including the postmodern state which is a dominant mode of governance in the West (Nandy, 2010). For some centuries the concept of state has been a subject of theorization by political scientists and philosophers, and the state is still a topic of debate in the academic literature at present (Friedman, 2011). The group of early theorists of state includes many rationalists such as Rousseau, Hobbes, Hegel and Weber, who have put the state in a position of centrality in politics (Friedman, 2011; Agnew, 1994). The Weberian definition “of the state as an institution that possesses a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to extract tax revenues in a given territorial space has been widely used throughout the scholarship of IR, either explicitly or implicitly” (Biersteker, 2013 p.247).
However, the Weberian conception of state has been met with criticism from many scholars who in their publications critically assess the role of the state and its centrality in the field of International Relations. They make the “assertion that the State cannot be treated as an entity that exists over and above those living within it. The State is not a reified ‘thing’ in and
of itself, but rather a complex system of social relations” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940). In other words: the state is more than a single institution that manages its subjects. It is not only a material entity of governance, but also reproduced by behavior, ideas, discourses etc. of its members. The state is never static, but an ongoing dynamic social process (Friedman, 2011). Also, when approaching the state from the Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ perspective, the state is not limited to the execution of a specific set of tasks. It does not have a strict intentionality, unity, or functionality, and the set of functions performed by the state can be many depending on the state’s specific context in time and place (Foucault, 1991).
The concept of ‘sovereignty’ is closely related to the concept of state and how states are conceived and perceived as legitimate actors on the international level. In the ‘mainstream’ international relations theories, sovereignty is normally used to denote the Westphalian notion of nonintervention between different states, even though intervention occurs frequently. The sovereign then is the unchallenged political authority of the state (Biersteker, 2013). However, for the postcolonial scholar Siba Grovogui a “source of mis-diagnosis is the assumption that modern sovereignty is a derivation of the peace of Westphalia in 1648 and that it has led today to an international order of relatively autonomous states” (2002 p.315-316). This ‘Westphalian commonsense’ might be accurate for some of the European colonial powers, but leads to misinterpretations of the capacities of states in postcolonial Africa and other regions. Rather than universal, systems of sovereignty were region specific and existed parallel to one another, until the international institutionalization of sovereignty by the European powers. By the end of the colonial era, the world became divided into mutually exclusive states based on the Western, Westphalian standard. As a result, the privileged position of Western states in the international system is time and again reproduced (Grovogui, 2002).
The seeming lack of Westphalian sovereignty in African states leads to a perception of failure to adequately govern and protect its peoples. The African states lack the democratic institutions for supporting civil society, and the ruling elite is not sufficiently restraint in their legitimate powers by constitutional checks and balances (Grovogui, 2002). Furthermore, instead of being a sovereign nation-state, many African states rather possess a ‘quasi-statehood’: Former colonies were given statehood, while its societies are very ethnically diverse. The granted sovereignty provided the ruling class in African states with a protection from foreign intervention in their domestic affairs, while the former colonial powers stood aside for the maturing of institutions and governing capacities. Yet, this passive stance did not benefit democratic values and people’s interests, but rather proved a carte blanche for elites to
consolidate their rule. Subsequently, many states failed to conduct an inclusive policy (Grovogui, 2002).
Grovogui links the ideas of postcolonialism to the concept of Western sovereignty in a way that illustrates the perceived institutional fragility of some African states. This suggests that there is not only a tension between what is considered the sovereign and legitimate power in postcolonial Africa, and their actual abilities in governance and territorial control, but also that there is a socio-cultural gap between the African state institutions and the different societies.
The Territorial Trap in International Relations
Not only is the perception of states characterized by the extent to which they can act sovereignly, the image of a state is largely determined by its location in time and space. In the field of International Relations, ‘space’ can be perceived in two different ways. One perception is space as ‘territorial’ in which space is divided into mutually exclusive and bordered units of space. This perception neglects developments on other levels of analysis such as the regional or local level and makes general assumptions about the population of the territorial unit (Agnew, 1994). Another perception of space is ‘structural’, which does not divide space into units, but rather looks at processes within the space. These processes can be networks, flows and regions of people, goods, capital etc. For instance, it links a garment factory in Bangladesh to a customer in Ireland through a Swedish fashion company. Yet, both approaches fail to take historical backgrounds into account (Agnew, 1994).
The space of the state is often perceived and conceived as territorial. Especially from a Weberian perspective, a state requires control over a certain territory. With regard to the origins of the state space, philosopher Henri Lefebvre observes that “the national territory results from a historically specific, mutually transformative articulation between the state (…) and the land or soil that it inhabits, owns, controls and exploits” (Brenner & Elden, 2009 p.362) and thus that “the State and territory interact in such a way that they can be said to be mutually constitutive” (as cited by Brenner & Elden, 2009 p.362). In short, territory is an important factor for states in order to materialize and to define the scope of their power, but they can only do so in a specific historical context.
Moreover, with regard to the concept of state, John Agnew noted that “[m]uch of the literature on international relations assumes implicitly that a state is a fixed territorial entity (even if its actual boundaries can change) operating much the same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order; a state is territorial much like life
on earth is terrestrial” (1994 p.54). The metaphor used here indicates that spatial and territorial issues are often taken for granted or under theorized, but the quoted text also hints at the Weberian definition of state in which territory is an important pillar. He continues to argue that territory and geographical borders are not a requirement for a system of rule to operate, as for tribes and nomads membership is not spatially defined (Agnew, 1994).
Agnew identifies in his article three geographical assumptions that are made by rationalist International Relations theories: the state as a fixed unit of sovereign space, the tension between the domestic and foreign spheres of the state, and the separation of societies by state borders (1994). Especially the first assumption of the state as a fixed unit has been very powerful in the IR literature. He continues to claim that (rationalist) IR scholarship is stuck in these geographical assumptions, and he calls upon the field to transcend this so-called ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). The three factors of the territorial trap will be discussed in more detail below.
There is a close link in international relations between the concepts of state, sovereignty and security. With the state defending its interests of which its territory is at the core, national security became equal to the defending of politics and citizens of a spatial sovereignty. The state is currently often considered “as a primary mode of political organization” (p.65) and analyzed as a fixed unit of sovereign space. However, the concept of the sovereign territorial state surfaced only relatively recently and it is unlikely that this concept will prevail indefinitely. While the assumption that the state is the principal political actor at this point in time might be correct from certain perspectives, it seems impossible to predict for how long territorial states will keep this role and it neglects other security issues on the human, cultural, and ecological levels (Agnew, 1994).
The second focus point of IR leading to the territorial trap is the sharp divide between the domestic and foreign spheres in the academic literature. The domestic/foreign polarity is especially apparent in questions of political economy and partially based on the assumption of the state as principal actor. States competed with each other over wealth and prestige, based on mercantilist and imperialist incentives. The focus of IR on the international economical transactions disregards the domestic economic production (Agnew, 1994), even though domestic economies have an impact on a state’s international power. Moreover, the domestic/foreign polarity is fading as a result of rising interdependence and global markets.
Furthermore, the state is often conceived as a container of society. This implies that societies are limited to state borders and do not interact with each other across borders, but also that societies are uniform within a state. This stems in a parallel between society and politics
that was created during the earliest examples of democratic governance. Agnew argues that the state has developed out of historical events and that they were not the principals of society, but rather the result of society (1994). When looking for example at the postcolonial state in Africa, state borders do not coincide with the spaces inhabited by local communities, but rather these borders are the result of political decisions in Europe during the decolonization process. Society can thus not be considered a result of territorial boundaries, nor do the inhabitants of a state all belong to the same society.
Most of all, the territorial trap in International Relations theories shows that knowledge of social processes and the historical context are indispensable for understanding a state, its sovereign capacities, and its territorial space. A view that is shared by most critical approaches to International Relations, including postcolonialism, as the work of both Agnew and Grovogui highlights the shortcomings of the Westphalian assumptions regarding the concepts of state and sovereignty. However, as states continue to seek control over its claimed territorial space, it employs different strategies to achieve territorial control.
The State and Territorial Control
While the perspectives mentioned above are critical of way in which assumptions are made about the state’s territory, the state itself engages in ‘territoriality’. An exercise to increase control over the territory that it has claimed. Robert Sack defined territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This area will be called the territory” (1986 p.19). It thus addresses the socially invented, individual limits and restrictions on space to influence human behavior, and the implementation and policing of such spaces. A territory requires a permanent strategy and monitoring to be created and to be upheld. Such spatial strategies are employed by a certain authority with the aim to preserve and stretch their power. Space is not necessarily territorial, and its territoriality can change overtime or as the result of certain events or decisions. For example, an empty grass field in a city is ‘just another’ space, but it is turned into a territory when it is used for a game of soccer or when a project developer buys the lot for the development of real estate. On the other hand, territory can turn back into space if the monitoring authority withdraws its spatial strategy for the reproduction of the territory. Also, the defense of a territory from within its boundaries is not a prerequisite: territoriality includes exclusion and limiting access of people and objects, which can also be the result of fences or signs (Sack, 1968).
Having defined territoriality, Sack continues to explain why it is significant and what effects it has. First, territoriality needs a spatial classification: there should be a specification of the space to which one has the permission to enter, or is not allowed to leave. Second, territoriality needs to be communicated: without being informed one cannot act in accordance with territorial restrictions. Territoriality can be directly communicated through gestures or verbal agreement, but also indirectly through signs and fences. Lastly, territoriality needs enforcement or at least an attempt to do so: without enforcement it is unlikely that one’s behavior will be influenced. Violation of territoriality can result in both non-territorial and/or territorial actions (Sack, 1986).
Even though territoriality requires specific attention, it occurs on different levels and in many places. On the local level, pedestrians, bikes, cars and trams all get an assigned exclusive space in city traffic, while on the international level territory distinguishes one state from another. Both examples are (to an extent) the result of the classification, communication and enforcement of territoriality (Sack, 1986). Overall, there are two concepts in the work of Sack that are particularly useful for answering my research question: Territoriality shows that territory is not simply bordered state space, but that it is a complex phenomenon that requires deliberate control of a bounded space with a certain power relationship. Spatial strategies are a tool for territoriality. They are the strategies used by the authorities to increase and reproduce their territorial control. For states, examples would be the creation of a network of police stations for a better enforcement of law, or the policing of national borders to prevent irregular migrants from entering the state’s territory.
Altogether, the state and its territorial space have been the topic of extensive and encompassing debates in the social sciences in general, and political science in particular. The sovereign capacities of a state entity, as well as its territorial appearance are often assessed from a European or Western perspective. The European states have surfaced in a specific historical context, have had a relatively long timespan for the maturing of its institutions, and were able to expand their rule beyond their own territories in the colonial era and at present through the setup of international institutions. This disadvantages the non-Western states in multiple ways, most notably as the Western states remain dominant in politics and economy on the international level, and the Western framework of mutually exclusive states as primary mode of rule seems inapt in the African context where territories do not coincide with communities. This results in a perception that some African states are incapable of conforming to the norms of statehood, and that African states are more fragile than their Western counterparts.
The fragility of the African state hood is also placed in connection with the tough humanitarian, economic, and political situation in which many of the African states find themselves: they lack the resources and institutions for (legitimate) sovereign acting and territorial control. The position of the African state and its capacities will be analyzed in more detail in the following chapters of this thesis, after the methodological framework.
METHODOLOGY
In this section I will briefly outline my methodological framework for ensuring reliability and validity of this thesis research, that was based on books that describe appropriate methodology for academic research (Flick, 2009; Bryman, 2012; Berg, 2006), and a methods workshop on content analysis offered by the University of Amsterdam’s Graduate School of Social Sciences. For this thesis, I am assessing how states in Africa are still influenced by former colonial powers through other structures than direct submission. In this case, I focus on the influence of the West through multilateral and international institutions. With a more specific focus on the use of neoliberal discourses and ideologies by these institutions and how these affect the lived space.
The body of this thesis can be divided into two major sections. A theoretical part that consists of a literature review of relevant theories regarding postcolonialism, the concept of state and the production of territory and spaces, and two chapters that are focusing on neoliberalism and the African state in relationship to the international sphere. A second section consists of two case studies which are subsequently contrasted and compared. The theories function in this research as a fundament for connecting the topics of the postcolonial state in Africa, neoliberalism and space to the existing academic literature
For the thesis I will use interpretive methods, mostly document analysis, and case studies for analysis of the topic. The case studies focus more on the empirical data but also links back to the theoretical framework. As the primary sources that I will study do mostly consist of reports and policy documents, I am using the method of qualitative content analysis and I follow the process model for content analysis that is provided by Flick (2009 p.324), to the extent that it is relevant for my research. All documents are being checked for their authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning as in the process model provided by Berg (2006). In contrast to other methods, content analysis requires only those documents that are relevant for answering the research question, rather than a large sample of data on which conclusions are based (Flick, 2009). After this first selection, the data will be analyzed for the purpose of the sender for the publication of the document, in many instances these will be formal and legal documents. Then, the documents are manually coded for their relevance to the research question. Finally, based on the codes in the documents, the data will be included in the written product.
The two cases, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, were chosen to demonstrate the variety of challenges that states in Africa are dealing with. I will argue more extensively in the chapter on
the African state, why African states cannot be generalized, and that Africa is also very much produced by the West. For this thesis, I will look at two states that were previously colonized by France and Britain, the main states involved in colonialism, but who used distinct modes of governing their colonies (Gordon, 2013). Also both states have seen recent outbursts of political violence, but again in very different ways. Côte d’Ivoire experienced two civil wars between ethnic groups, while violence in Zimbabwe was more politically motivated and targeted against individuals. And finally, both states were once considered an ‘example’ for other developing states in Africa, while now they are suffering from deep economic crises.
Of course, there are also limitations to the methods that I will use. First and foremost, it is not possible to say something about an entire continent by only looking at two example states. The cases are not intended to make any generalized claims about the African continent, rather they illustrate the complexity of statehood in Africa and how the state framework in itself has an impact. Another limitation of doing a document analysis of neoliberal policies carried out by international institutions is that these documents have a Western bias by default as they reflect the Western dominance in international relations and are headed by Westerners. Finally, this study is limited in the extent to which it can be objective, as there might be an influence of the writers backgrounds and perspectives.
NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS SPATIAL IMPACT
Before turning to the discussion of the African state and its challenges, I will explore in this chapter the idea of neoliberalism in the academic literature, and how neoliberalism manifests itself on a spatial level. Neoliberalism is not a uniform concept or school of thought, but rather there are a few different ‘neoliberalisms’ used by the different disciplines in the social sciences. Therefore, this chapter will first address the origins of neoliberalism and how the term will be used in this thesis, before moving on to the question of its influence on a spatial level and its relevance in the context of the African state.
The ideological origins and development of Neoliberalim
Neoliberalism has its origins in the wider tradition of political and economic liberalism. The foundation of this liberal tradition is classical liberalism, with its thinkers claiming that the individual is best able to understand personal needs and that “the highest virtue of society is the degree to which its individuals are allowed to pursue pleasure” (Hackworth, 2007 p. 3). They believe that the autonomy of the individual to make decisions should be at the core of every political consideration. Moreover, classical liberalism stresses the importance of the economic theories related to Adam Smith. This envisions a laissez faire state that limits itself to maintaining public order and security, guaranteeing individual rights, and creating a level playing field for markets to operate. The economy is market based and functions along the lines of the supply and demand mechanism. Again, the individual is central to this theory as they can make self-interested decisions on the demand side of the economy (Hackworth, 2007).
Even though the ideas of classical liberalism were never fully implemented in any society, some aspects of it were institutionalized but it also received much critique, especially after the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Among those critiques is Marxism, which fiercely countered the liberal assumption that that individual freedom is the highest attainable virtue, and claimed that liberalism and capitalism are closely associated to each other and create a larger social inequality in societies (Hackworth, 2007; Cameron & Neal, 2003). The critique on classical liberalism was however not only ‘external’ but also shared by thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes and John Steward Mill, who claimed that liberal ideals of individual agency could not be attained without a strong, wealth redistributing state. At the core of Keynesian economics is the anticyclical policy of the state, to limit the highs and lows with which capitalist economies are dealing. Something that rapidly gained popularity, and was put into practice by
Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ program to recover the American economy after the Great Depression (Cameron & Neal, 2003).
In Keynesian-egalitarian liberalism, the individual person is still considered a central actor seeking to fulfill individual needs. The role that it envisions for the state is very different from classical liberalism. While classical stressed the importance of a reticent role for the state, Keynesian liberalism puts emphasis on the responsibility of the state to provide access for individuals to “basic goods that are needed for living according to any conception of a good life” (Kekes, 1997 p.13). Keynesian liberalism never intended to end the market-based capitalist economies, but it required states to more adopt a ‘managerial role’ to actively regulate markets. Materialized examples of Keynesian policies include an increase of public and social housing projects on a local level, and the basic redistribution of income and wealth on a higher level of government. Also, Keynesian liberalism allowed states to repair the bad externalities of market-driven production, for instance by taxing the Fordist automobile industry of that time (Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989).
The shift towards neoliberalism is in many ways a step away from the Keynesian approach to liberalism and returning to the ideas classical approach to liberalism discussed above. It is characterized by a withdrawal of the state since the early 1980s in providing (semi)-public goods, privatization of (semi)-public companies, and more room for markets and the private sector. In the words of James Hackworth: neoliberalism “is an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism and the Keynesian welfare state in particular, combined with a selective return to the ideas of classical liberalism” (2007 p.9). The state did not only withdraw, its role in society later also changed: from a ‘managerial’ state to an ‘entrepreneurial’ state, and from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. This implies that the behavior of state from a controlling facilitator to a market-oriented actor that engages in regimes and partnerships with the private sector and civil society (Harvey, 1989; Peck & Tickell, 2002).
As mentioned above, what is referred to as neoliberalism comes in many different shapes and forms, hence some stress that there are several neoliberalisms. Neoliberalism as such is a process that occurs in combination with or separate from other processes, rather than a thing in its own right (Jessop, 2002). Examples of such processes that occur in combination with, and are closely related to the neoliberal ideology are Thatcherism (see Jackson, 2012), Reaganomics (see Niskanen, 1988), and the Third Way (see Giddens, 2000). The policies of Thatcher and Raegan are examples of so-called ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism. These are policies characterized by the withdrawal of state and “the active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social collectivist institutions” (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The Third Way
approach that surfaced in the 1990s, on the other hand, is an example of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism. This is a more recent phase of the neoliberal project that, in contrast to the withdrawal policies of Thatcher and Reagan, builds new institutions for state intervention with a limited scope. Furthermore, roll-out neoliberalism forms governance coalitions and regimes such as public-private partnerships, especially visible on the urban level (Peck & Tickell, 2002). A material example of such a regime is the often referred to ‘plaza’ phenomenon in American cities: A private building leaves its ground floor ‘open’ for use by the general public, often in exchange for permission to build higher buildings. This creates a space that is accessible to all in theory, but in practice is monitored by the site’s owner and subject to their regulations (Peterson, 2006).
Neoliberalism and space on different levels of analysis
The turns in the different liberal approaches that have occurred, did so at a specific moment in history. The shift from classical to Keynesian liberalism and later to neoliberalism took place in the context of economic crises that are inherent to the capitalist mode of production. These were the Great Depression and the 1973 oil crisis and stock market crash respectively. In order to counter the economic downturn, states adopted a new approach to their economic policies (Hackworth, 2007). David Harvey identified the ‘spatial fix’: a mode of spatially fixing capital for generating new economic growth in a period of recession (1985). To ‘fix’ the 1930s depression, there was a stimulation of suburbanization, the automobile industries and consumer spending. The new transportation technologies for commuting allowed for a sprawled city as cars allowed for longer distance commutes (Harvey, 1985). Yet, the ‘fix’ to the 1970s recession, the centrifugal forces of the prior fix were reversed, with a renewed focus on city center investment and revitalization. The cities’ economic focus shifted from industrial production to the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) with a dramatic change in the urban fabric as a result (Warf, 1999; Hackworth, 2007; Fainstein, 2001).
Neoliberal governance did not only have an impact on the urban and local levels of analysis, but it also had an impact on the sub-regional and sub-national levels (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002), as well as it changed governance and policies on the international level. Neoliberal policies have especially adopted by those international organizations that are involved in international trade and development, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Where the policies of the WTO can be labeled as neoliberal because of their efforts to lift trade barriers and regulations, the strategies of the IMF are neoliberal in requirement of government reforms, privatization of public enterprises, and the deregulation of
markets (Bluestone & Harrison, 2000). Neoliberalism provides these international organizations with an “ideological software for competitive globalization, inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of state restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts” (Peck & Tickell, 2002 p.380), also in the non-western regions of the world.
The neoliberal ideology is to a great extent perceived to be connected to the capitalist mode of production, also with regard to its influence on a spatial level. Henri Lefebvre (1974; 1991) claimed that the modernizing capitalist state produces an ‘abstract space’ within its territory. This is a social space that is disconnected from historical conditions and differences, and has become a homogeneous space instrumental to capital accumulation and enhancement of modern state power. This in contrast to the precapitalist ‘absolute space’ in which societies cleaved along religious and political differences (Brenner & Elden, 2009). It is worth highlighting firstly, that abstract spaces are inherently political. Secondly, that producing abstract spaces requires transformations of political practices, institutional arrangements, but also in political imaginaries: namely how spaces of everyday life, capital and the state are conceived, envisioned and represented. And thirdly, that abstract spaces are inherently violent and geographically expansive, as “it provides a framework for interlinking economic, bureaucratic and military forms of strategic intervention, not only at the scale of every State, but also at the international and worldwide scale, the scale of the planetary state system” (Brenner & Elden, 2009 p. 359). Neoliberal policy at the international level promotes the capitalist mode of production and private sector investment. Indirectly IGOs do contribute to the strategy of creating abstract spaces of capital accumulation and state power.
The neoliberal discourse also distinguishes itself from its predecessors by its self-actualizing nature, comparable to the rhetorics of globalization. Both have been described as a natural, external force to which there is no alternative, and have “alleged tendencies towards homogenization, leveling out, and convergence” (Peck & Tickell, 2002 p.383). The self-actualizing quality provides neoliberalism with the capacity to adapt itself to the political-economic context of its heartland, and has its discourse has largely survived the periods of economic decline in the 1990s, but also the Credit Crunch of 2008-2011 and the European Debt Crisis, where other ‘liberalisms’ were abandoned in times of recession. Also, the different phases of neoliberalism, such as for instance the roll-back and roll-out phases, are an example of how the neoliberal discourse updates itself to address the issues of its time (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
Lastly, neoliberalism has been observed and summarized by Pierre Bourdieu, also with regard to the self-actualizing nature of neoliberalism, he noted that:
“[T]his initially delocalized and dehistoricized ‘theory’ has, now more than ever, the means of
making itself true (…) it is a ‘strong discourse’ which is so strong and so hard to fight because
it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to make as it is, in particular by orienting the economic choices of those dominate economic relations and so adding its own –specifically symbolic– force to those power relations” (Bourdieu, 1998 p.95).
This sums up that neoliberalism is not only a self-actualizing ideology, but also a dominant discourse in (international) power relations, used by those who produce and produced neoliberal policies and discourses, mainly Western states where it has its origins.
Neoliberalism can thus best be described as an ideology for competitive globalization, with state restructuring and open markets as its core interests, to be understood as a process rooted in the liberalist tradition, and created in the Western hemisphere. The spatial impact of neoliberalism can be perceived on two different levels of analysis. On the urban level, neoliberalism is most visible as its policies have a material impact on the build environment. It is characterized by the revitalization of the city center and the entrepreneurial mode of operation of local governments, but also the decrease in public housing and services. On the international level, the spatial impact of neoliberalism is more complex, and rather visible in institutional frameworks than in material artefacts. It facilitates flows of capital and commodities, and creates abstract spaces for accumulation and fixation of capital, separated from its history for the enhancement of state power.
The origins of neoliberalism are located in American cities, and it has been adopted by authorities across North-America and Western-Europe, from where it spread globally (Hackworth, 2007). Neoliberalism is thus in its origins and essence centered around the Western economies and politics. Even though states are considered sovereign, the dominance of the West in international politics is reproduced indirectly or multilaterally through international institutions such as the IMF and WTO, which are taking a neoliberal approach to the development of economies, and imposing policies of privatization and deregulation, also in Africa. Its creates spaces in all continents that are similar to those in the Western world, used for trade and capital accumulation. The impact of neoliberalism on the position of the African state will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
THE CONCEPT OF STATE IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
The Invention of Africa
The origins of the (post)modern state, as a concept, have been traced back to the outcomes of the Peace of Westphalia which created the first nation state is Europe (Nandy, 2010). However, the idea that all current states can and should function in line with the Westphalian standards is contested by many. Siba Grovogui claims that this ‘Westphalian commonsense’ is the basis for a state system in which the Western states can dominate states on the other continents, including African states, as they will have to engage in international relations through Western standards and institutions (2002).
There are approximately fifty states on the African continent, which covers about one-fifth of the Earth’s land surface, and is inhabited by more than 800 million people. As such, the African continent comprises a significant share of the world’s states, land, and people (Ferguson, 2007). Yet, one cannot make uniform claims about the African continent in its entirety. The category ‘Africa’ that is used in (Western) media, policy and some scholarly literature, is an ‘invention’ used simplify the complex political, socio-cultural and ethnic situations in the region, and to refer to the group of states on the African continent, while these in turn consist of many different natural environments, cultures, languages, peoples and societies (Mudimbe, 1988).
Moreover, ‘Africa’ is not a single place, but it is as ‘invention’ used to categorize the region along geographical or racial lines, hence it is often qualified as ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ or ‘black Africa’. These qualifications do also exclude the northern part of the African continent, which is rather categorized under the heading of the Middle East. Rather, Africa was invented by Western societies to create “a radical other for their own constructions of civilization, enlightenment, progress, development, and, indeed, history” (Ferguson, 2007 p.2). This does largely resemble the notion of ‘orientalism’ that was coined by Edward Said (2003): the Western world positions itself as morally superior, by othering societies on the non-Western continents. This reproduces an understanding of Africa as a place of crises, failure, conflict, underdevelopment, and political instability (Ferguson, 2007). In other words: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe, 2001 p.2). It is thus problematic to address the issues at stake on the African continent, by the endeavor of finding solutions that will have an encompassing benefit for the entire region. Africa is very diverse in cultures and peoples, and cannot be met with a generic approach.
Furthermore, when addressing issues relating to states in Africa, one has to be aware of the historical context of Western colonialism, and the continued impact of this era for power relations between the West and non-West in general, and between Europe and Africa in particular.
The African State in the International Context and State Fragility
Despite the significant differences between different parts of Africa, outlined above, that makes a single approach to Africa as a category false, the vast majority of the current African states share a common chapter in their histories. All but two of the present African states (Ethiopia and Liberia) were under European rule for much of the twentieth century (O’Toole, 2013). The European colonial powers used their African possessions for economic gain, primarily by the extraction of natural resources, and the exploitation of indigenous subjects through slave labor and selling manufactured products (O’Toole, 2013;Cameron & Neal, 2003).
The period of colonization by European powers in Africa, was also a time of rapid changes in political structures on the continent. The precolonial stateless societies of Africa were politically organized by social systems of kinship, of which the group size could vary from small politically independent villages with some ten inhabitants, to small kingdoms and chiefdoms that controlled larger groups of inhabitants (Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008). Colonial powers introduced state-like institutions to rule their overseas territories under the umbrella of the European states, yet these states were far from inclusive and only served as tool for the exploitation of lands and peoples. By the end of the twentieth century, all African colonies gained independence and had the colonial regimes removed from power, often after fighting armed struggles with the settlers (Shillington, 2005).
The decolonization process and the independence for African states meant a new challenge. Their first steps as independent states had to be made in a consolidated framework of interstate relations that reflects the international balance of power of the Post-World War era. The young African states did however not have the same histories and levels of maturity as their Western counterparts (O’Toole, 2013). The system for international relations had already been shaped by the West when African states gained independence. Multilaterally, IOs reflect the balance of power that is skewed in the advantage of the West, for example the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Grovogui, 2013). Bilaterally, the former colonizers could still interfere with the independent African states’ affairs, for instance by supporting the remaining colonial settlers (Gordon, 2013). And unilaterally, the young states were disadvantaged because their states are not ‘nation-states’ but ‘quasi-states’: their territories
coincided with the borders drawn by the colonial powers and are as such not embedded in the everyday life of local societies (Grovogui, 2002).
Because of these different histories of Western states and African states, the impression has been created that many African states cannot meet the requirements for a functioning statehood set by the example of the Westphalian states in Europe. In (Western) media, policy, and some of the academic literature, those states are often qualified as ‘failed states’ (see Rotberg, 2004), ‘collapsed states’ (see Kurtulus, 2012), ‘weak states’ (see Fearon & Laitin, 2004), ‘brittle states’ (see Du Toit, 2001), or ‘fragile states’ (see Grimm et al., 2014; Fund for Peace, 2015). These terms are widely used to describe the same basic phenomenon, although there are differences in emphasis and nuance for each term. Moreover, despite the lacking of a clear and uniform definition of ‘state fragility’, “many of these conceptual nuances boil down to insufficient state capacity or the unwillingness of a state to meet its obligations, generally understood as delivering core functions to the majority of its people” (Grimm et al., 2014 p.199). Although the concept of state fragility is hard to define, there are some example studies in which the fragile state phenomenon is captured in some indicators. For example, the Fund for Peace (FFP) organization has quantified these indicators and annually publishes an index in which all states are classified according to their individual scores on several indicators of state fragility. While one can question the appropriateness of quantification and operationalization of a social construct, the indicators used for the composition of the index provide an interesting perspective on the different factors that give an idea of what potentially causes state fragility.
The Fund for Peace has divided the indicators into two groups: Social and economic indicators, and political and military indicators. Each of the two groups contains six more categories. The first group of social and economic indicators consists of demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), uneven economic development, group grievance, human flight and brain drain, and poverty and economic decline. The second group of political and military indicators consists of state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, fractionalized elites, and external intervention (Fund for Peace, 2014).
The social and economic indicators of state fragility seem to largely overlap with the often used indicators for distinguishing between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ states. For instance, the index uses, among others, the GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and the GINI coefficient to create an understanding of the economic situation of the different states. Moreover, several indicators are used that may suggest an ongoing violent conflict or high tensions within the state under investigation. For example: the number of refugees and IDPs,
natural disasters, disease, scarcity of food and water, and sectarian, religious and ethnic violence (Fund for Peace, 2014).
The political and military indicators also suggest that the particular state is burdened by war or violent conflict, looking for example at foreign military intervention and UN missions, proliferation of arms, military coups d’état, and activities of insurgent groups in the state under investigation. Furthermore, some indicators together assess whether the state legitimately exercises its power and whether it conducts good governance by looking for instance at government effectiveness and corruption, the level of democracy, provision of public services such as education and health care, and civil rights and liberties (Fund for Peace, 2014).
Altogether, these indicators of the ‘Fragile States Index’ sketch an image of what the classification of fragile state entails. The states that are classified in the highest ‘alert’ category are typically in the grip of a complex armed conflict, deal with extreme poverty, are hit by malnutrition, epidemics, pollution or natural disasters, and/or lack an effective central government for the intervention in these issues. Therewith, a fragile state is the opposite of ideal modern states, and African states are among the ‘most fragile’ while European and especially Scandinavian states are considered the most ‘sustainable.’ This ties in to Grovogui’s argument that after the decolonization, African states were granted sovereignty while Western powers stood aside for the maturing of the democratic institutions in Africa.(2002) The idea of sovereignty and the democratic institutions are however essentially Western. And so, perhaps state fragility occurs more often in Africa, as the institutions that should carry the state and rule of law are less mature, and because they are to a lesser extent adjustable for governing African societies.
On a spatial level, the territoriality of fragile states is often weak as central governments can have difficulties to control their territories. They generally lack the resources and capacities required to employ effective spatial and territorial strategies that can contribute to an increased control over the state territory. The absence of mechanisms for the reproduction of the state territory might lead to territorial control by third parties within the state, for instance by insurgents, tribal societies, or even foreign state agents. The articulation of territorial control can for instance be created by installing a network of officers for policing and law enforcement.
African States and the International Neoliberal Organization
African states are thus not only constructed according to the Westphalian commonsense and as such an Western invention, they are also assessed and categorized for their ability to comply with these Western standards, even though the historical and social contexts are very
different. African states are sometimes rather reproduced by Western foreign policy than by its own inhabitants. Neoliberalism, as discussed in the previous chapter, also functions as a mechanism of Western influence on states on other continents in the world, reproduced through international organizations or through foreign direct investments. For the African states goes too that the proliferation of neoliberalism has impacted their modes of governance in several different ways (Ferguson, 2009; González Aimé, 2008).
First of all, neoliberalism has spread through international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO which are involved in questions of international development, monetary policy, and trade. These and other organizations monitor the financial-economic policies of the African state with the aim to ‘strengthen and modernize’ their economies. Moreover, while the WTO focuses on mediating trade conflicts, promoting trade, and elimination protective measures for foreign investment between its members, the World Bank and IMF have a more powerful position in Africa. As these organizations have the capacity to freeze loans to African states when these do not wish or cannot comply with the conditions set by these IOs (Kahn, 2006; DeLancey, 2013).
Problematically, the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and the IMF push African states into their ideology of market regulations, even though in many African states the private sectors are relatively small and are not capable of carrying the weight of larger projects that were previously executed by governments. The result of this is that either a Western organization fills the created gap, or the specific service, for example infrastructure, housing, health care, etc., becomes unavailable to inhabitants (Broz & Brewster Hawes, 2006).
Second of all, some African states do to some extent rely on bilateral agreements with Western states for ‘development aid and assistance’. These ‘donors’ increasingly demand for a return on their investment. This can be in the form of business opportunities for their (multinational) companies in the receiving (African) state, or they require government reform and policies for good and inclusive governance, anti-corruption, environmental protection, etc. The Western states have herein thus adopted a neoliberal entrepreneurial approach to their international development policies, meanwhile they give the African states an incentive to introduce their own neoliberal policies (Ferguson, 2007;2009).
Furthermore, African states have created a supranational platform for peace and security, and economic development by means of the African Union (AU). Like the European Union, the AU consists of different institutions facilitating among others the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the organization (Tieku, 2013; Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011) The AU acts as a mediator between different parties in conflict and has a Peace and Security
Council (AU-PSC), which observes some of the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council in order to avoid military interventions of non-African states, while leaving room for mutual sanctions and interventions among AU members (Tieku, 2013).
The AU members do not only cooperate in the field of peace and security, the AU is subdivided in regional economic communities (RECs) which promote economic development. Examples of such organizations are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Although the RECs also play a role in the AU’s security framework, their main focus is human and economic development. Some of the tools used by the RECs are deregulation, lifting their internal trade and visa barriers, and creating customs unions (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013), fitting the policies and tools of the neoliberal ideology.
The challenges to the African state, posed by its colonial past and the rise of neoliberal policies since the late twentieth century, consist mostly of the incongruences between the concept of state as an uniform sovereign unit, and the organization of African societies which reflects lineage rather than nationality. Despite the formal decolonization of the African continent, the impact of Western rule continues to have an impact on African states. Not only because the concept of state is in essence very Western and is dominant on the international level of analysis, but also because the postcolonial Western engagement in Africa fails to address the socio-cultural differences and diversity on the continent. The West has ‘invented’ Africa as a single place, and because it is unable or unwilling to meet the Western requirements for statehood, its states are perceived as ‘fragile’. Meanwhile, African peoples are living with the consequences of inhabiting a political space that reflect colonial times and without inclusive governments (Ferguson, 2007; 2009; Olsen, 2013; Routley, 2014).
Having discussed neoliberalism and the postcolonial state in Africa above, the following chapters will zoom in to two specific cases of African states that deal or have dealt with state fragility since their independence from the colonial power. Differences and similarities between the cases will be discussed consequently.
CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Historical Context of Côte d’Ivoire
The present day territory of Côte d’Ivoire was in precolonial times inhabited by several tribes that lived in communities and small kingdoms: roughly the Islamic kingdoms in the north, and the Akan kingdoms and kinship communities in the south. Contacts with Europe were limited to ivory and slave trade with Portugal, until France started to build settlements in the south from the 1830s onwards, and sent expeditions to the north that turned the kingdoms and communities into protectorates in exchange for tradable products (Akindès, 2004).
At the end of the nineteenth century, imperialism accelerated rapidly and soon brought large parts of Africa and Asia under foreign rule. Although the origins of imperialism are diverse and complex, many theories stress that the capitalist incentives of capital accumulation and market competition are among the factors that caused the rise of imperialism (Cameron & Neal, 2003; O’Toole, 2013). The Marxist and Leninist theory of imperialism as the ‘highest stage’ of capitalism was initially contradicted by then French prime minister Jules Ferry, who claimed that the goal of French imperialism was prestige and military advantage rather than economic advantages. Only later he admitted that the colonial empire was also an asset to the French economy (Cameron & Neal, 2003).
Côte d’Ivoire was put under French colonial rule in 1893. After the Ivoirian borders were established, it became a territory in the French West Africa administrative region. There were several Ivoirian insurgencies against French rule, especially when forced labor was introduced by a military regime and when Ivoirians were recruited to support the French armed forces in Europe during the First World War. Also in the Second World War Ivoirians fought in the French army before the different regime changes in French West Africa itself. The victory of general De Gaulle on marshal Pétain in French West Africa also meant increased possibilities for Ivoirian self-determination: equal treatment of African farmers and political representation in Paris were secured by the governor of the territory and the Syndicat Agricole Africain, the union of African farmers (Akindès, 2004; Hara & Yabi, 2013).
Félix Houphouët-Boigny became the first to represent Côte d’Ivoire in the French National Assembly. Besides his work in Paris he founded and led several political movements in French West Africa. When Côte d’Ivoire became an independent state in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny was elected the first president and his Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) remained in power until his death in 1993. Throughout his presidency, Houphouët-Boigny maintained good relationships with neighboring states and the former colonial power. This
included a strategic military pact with France, who would intervene in the case of substantial threats against the Ivoirian state. And even though the legitimacy of the lengthy Houphouët-Boigny presidency and the one-party system can be questioned, Côte d’Ivoire was a relatively stable and prosperous state during his rule, especially when compared to its war torn neighboring states. Yet, towards the end of his rule there was an increased civil unrest and demands for the end of the one-party system (Hara & Yabi, 2013; Simonen, 2012).
Following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, the political atmosphere of Côte d’Ivoire steadily destabilized. Not only did the PDCI clash with newly founded parties such as the Front Populaire Ivoirien (PFI) and the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), also old tensions between different ethnic and religious groups surfaced. The succeeding PDCI government of president Henri Bédié was overthrown by a military coup d’état in 1999 that was initiated by general Robert Gueï. The general sought to consolidate his rule by manipulating the 2000 presidential elections. However, the elections were won by PFI-candidate Laurent Gbagbo who eventually took office (Hara & Yabi, 2013).
The Ivoirian Civil Wars and Foreign Intervention
The downward spiral continued with another unsuccessful coup d’état that triggered the First Ivoirian Civil War in which armed groups from the north challenged the government troops in the south. In order to stop the civil war, France launched Opération Licorne (Operation Unicorn) and the member states of ECOWAS sent troops to end the violence and restore order in Côte d’Ivoire. Their efforts mainly focused at the creation of a buffer to keep the fighting groups in the north and south of Côte d’Ivoire apart. ECOWAS and the African Union diplomatically attempted to stop the violence, which resulted in a unilaterally proclaimed ceasefire. In early 2003 the parties finalized their peace talks in France. This Linas-Marcoussis Agreement provided for an reconciliation government and it paved the way for the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations MINUCI (in 2003) and later ONUCI (in 2004) in Côte d’Ivoire (Adjagbe, 2009; Hara & Yabi, 2013; Ministère de la Défence, 2015).
Despite the of the French, ECOWAS and ONUCI missions, the era of armed conflict did not end with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. In 2004 there were new armed clashes as Gbagbo never transferred power to the reconciliation government and delayed new presidential elections for five years, in order to marginalize his northern opponent Ouattara whose ‘ivorité’ meaning ‘the extent to which someone is Ivoirian’, was challenged. Eventually, both candidates ran for president in the 2010 elections that were won by Ouattara (Hara & Yabi, 2013). Yet, as both candidates claimed victory and were sworn in as presidents, the Second Ivoirian Civil War
