Homeland Nostalgia : Iranians’ way of coping with politics of integration in the Netherlands

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Title : Homeland Nostalgia: Iranians’ way of coping with politics of integration in the Netherlands

Student Name : Nazly Dehganiazar

Student Number : 10468994- the title of the thesis

Supervisor : Tina Harris

Readers : Francio Guadeloupe & Barak Kalir

Programme : Master of Science Social and Cultural Anthropology

E-mail : nazly.azar@gmail.com

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Nazly Dehganiazar 10468994 Masters Cultural and Social Anthropology

nazly.azar@gmail.com Supervisor: Tina Harris

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Abstract

This study examines the concept of integration by moving away from an analysis of the failure or success of integration in the Netherlands, towards one which identifies the ways in which the concept of integration is constructed and re-constructed by members in Dutch society, with a main focus on Iranian immigrants. Additionally, this piece examines the ways in which the politics of integration affect sentiments of inclusion, identity and belonging of this particular immigrant group. Through analysis of the ways in which Iranian immigrants in the Netherlands cope with politics of integration, this piece argues for the adoption of new perspectives and approaches to the integration discourse in the Netherlands. Rather than using sentiments of exclusion and unbelonging of immigrant communities as an affirmation of their ‘failure to integrate’, policy-makers are urged to move away from this one-sided approach. By re-thinking this policy’s priorities and points of focus, we might find alternative means by which to stimulate a more inclusive approach towards members of Dutch society.

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Memoirs

An instant sense of familiarity washes over me when I enter Darya’s home. Walking through her small, yet open and light apartment, there is a strong feeling of comfort and welcoming warmth. Large Persian rugs cover the living room and dining room floor, and I am reminded of myself as a small child, tracing the patterns on the rug in my own home with my hands as if I was creating these incredibly intricate shapes on a blank canvas. The white walls of her Dutch home are decorated with pictures and colourful paintings, with plants and flowers bringing the whole room to life. A teapot, glasses and nabaat1_{stand on the coffee}

table, and I am told to make myself comfortable and have a seat on the sofa. She pours me a glass of chaii and we make some small-talk about how her family is, how my family is, until I work up the courage to ask her about her life in Iran.

She calmly proclaims that nobody even knew Khomeini before it all started, “and then all of a sudden, he was a hero”. As a fifteen year old girl, one day her father, who worked for the military, shoved a kalashnikov in her hands and gave her the responsibility of guarding their home and family. Sitting on the sofa with her hands gripped tight around the rifle in the deep night she would fixate her eyes on the front door, waiting for something to happen. It was not uncommon for groups of men to charge into people’s homes suspicious of opposition to the regime’s ruling. Especially after Mohammad Reza Shah had been overthrown and Islamic rules were implemented, Khomeini’s army would repeatedly incarcerate those who disagreed with the new regime, whether they had been supporters of the Revolution or not. The days before the Enghelab2 were complete chaos, I am told. She clenches her fist tight above her head, illustrating how she had joined a group of roughly twenty thousand Iranians in support of Bakhtiar in the streets of Tehran, shouting “Bakhtiar, Bakhtiar,

sangareto neghar dar3” in unison. Evidently there was also a large opposition to the Shah. For a brief period the country was split in two, and even though at the time they opposed each other both parties were to suffer the same violent fate.

Fear. Faith. Mistrust. Shock. Suspicion. Hope. Disbelief. Aspiration.

1_{Rock sugar}

2_{Word most often used in Farsi to refer to the Revolution. Enghelab Eslami literally translates to Islamic}

Revolution

3_{The last Prime Minister of Iran during the ruling of Mohammad Reza Shah. “Saghareto neghar dar” is a}

symbolic statement, urging Bakhtiar not to give up his position. Literally translates to: Hold your trench (like in war)

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Though all of these sentiments might not be exclusively shared amongst members of the Iranian community in the Netherlands, the first-generation political refugees that

participated in this research commonly share this amalgamation of contradictory sentiments in their recollections of the Enghelab. This was a Revolution with an outcome that was unexpected, perhaps more so for those who had eagerly participated in pursuit of promises of democracy and equality. After several years of fighting for democracy, Iran had become an Islamic republic instead. What followed was a sense of betrayal for both the supporting and opposition parties of Mohammad Reza Shah’s monarchy after the introduction of the new regime.

“Everything fell apart once he left”, Darya tells me, “and then the executions started...” Families anxiously had their ears glued to the radio, which would broadcast the names of the executed prisoners daily. Although the executions had started with those who had opposed the Revolution, soon enough even the supporters of the Enghelab would be apprehended, tortured and killed by the Pasdaran4 – an army intended to protect Iran’s Islamic system. A child, coming home to find his or her mother missing, only to hear her name on the radio several weeks after her disappearance. A father, called in to pick up his daughter from prison, only to be handed a bag of dismembered limbs. According to informants, scenes like these had become part of everyday life in Iran.

“And the next day they would publish pictures of the bodies in the newspaper”

The experiences of Leila, a middle-aged working class mother of two, who was then a young woman in a religious province south-west from the capital, paint a similar picture. Though she was very cautious about her anti-regime ideology, the Pasdaran would wreck Leila’s home and photography business constantly, demanding Leila and her husband to develop people’s photographs in the middle of the night. Coming home to find their furniture and personal belongings spread and destroyed in the garden was a fact of life for her;

mattresses sliced open with knives, cupboards completely shattered, photographs from personal albums strewn across the grass – but nothing taken. “They gave us the illusion that we were at liberty to move freely among political activities of our choice.” Her expression saddens as she admits that she lost many classmates and friends at the time. These were

4_{Sepah-e Pasadaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami – Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, also called}

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young girls aged twelve or thirteen, executed brutally for spreading flyers for the People’s Mojahedeen of Iran5 or the Fadaian-e-Khalgh6.

After the loss of lives and freedoms following the Revolution, the threats had not ended for the Iranian people. Whilst having to deal with the troubles people now faced in their country, suddenly the Iran-Iraq war broke out, which endangered the majority of the Iranian people for another eight years. “It was unclear why the war had even started”, Naser tells me. A man in his early fifties with a working-class background and father of two, who arrived in the Netherlands in the mid-1980’s, continues by saying; “and it became even easier for the regime to execute us, by calling people traitors, or spies of Saddam”. Iran had now become a country in which the majority of the population’s lives were in constant jeopardy. Those who had had hope, faith and aspiration during the 1979 Revolution, now shared a common state of fear, shock and mistrust that the opposing group had held from the start. Despite the varied political positions that any individual refugee in the Netherlands might have held during the Revolution, this remains a group of immigrants that are uprooted, nostalgic for their homeland, and many are convinced that they might one day return.

The first group of Iranian refugees arrived in the Netherlands in the early eighties, eager to rebuild their lives in a country known for its tolerance and freedoms. Having arrived during a time in which the Netherlands highly welcomed immigrants for use of labour – semi-skilled workers from Morocco in particular – I am told that there was not much difficulty in settling down and making contact with the non-immigrant community. Naser tells me that even though the impression was given that “they [Dutch people] did not have much knowledge of Iran, people made a conscious effort to get to know where you came from”. Niloufar, who was born in Iran but grew up in the Netherlands from the age of four in the mid-1980’s, tells me that “things are different now”, and that the Dutch government is implementing policies which restrict the inclusion and acceptance of immigrant communities in Dutch society. Here she adds that the integration policies in particular are now used in order to hold the immigrants completely responsible for their own position within society, and to penalise them when societal issues arise. Hereby she uses the ‘Marokkanen probleem’ as an example, in which the increase in crime among youth of Moroccan descent is claimed to be the result of the ‘failed integration’ of this community. I am told that at present time, there exists a feeling that one has to constantly prove to be actively part of society in the

5_{Also known as MKO, the Mojahedeen-e Khalq initially participated in Revolutionary activities that overthrew}

the Shah. At present day, it is an opposition movement in exile (currently in Iraq).

6_{The Organization of Iranian People's Fadaian, or Sazman-e Fadyan-e Khalgh-e Iran is the largest socialist party}

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Netherlands. Paradoxically, Keivan, a second-generation Iranian who was born and raised in the Netherlands, tells me that he feels “less and less eager to be part of Dutch society, or being proud of being born in the Netherlands”. Nonetheless, having to face problems with exclusion, a sense of unbelonging and discrimination, does not appear to get the Iranian community down, because as Darya often puts it, “we know how to deal with this with pride and positivity, and we teach our children the means by which to do so”.

From here on many questions arise with regards to the socio-economic and political developments in the Netherlands over the past thirty years, and in which ways the Iranian community in the country interacts with the changes that participants note throughout the course of this study. The following chapter will illustrate the significance of the Iranian community in examining the topic of integration, and the approaches used for the examination of conceptualisations and perceptions of this community.

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Chapter 1 The Research

This study examines the concept of integration by moving away from an analysis of the failure or success of integration in the Netherlands, towards one which identifies the ways in which the concept of integration is constructed and re-constructed by members in Dutch society, with a main focus on Iranian immigrants. Additionally, this piece examines the ways in which the politics of integration affect sentiments of inclusion, identity and belonging of this particular immigrant group.

Several theoretical writings on this topic point towards the normative and theoretical misconceptions present within the integration discourse. Bertossi argues that the integration models should not be considered “homogenous and stable cultural entities” (2011:1561), and acknowledges that a variety of social agents develop a multiplicity of conceptions of identity, equality and inclusion in national contexts. During the research it became apparent that identity here plays a large role in the ways in which Iranians in the Netherlands interact with politics of integration, and deal with sentiments of belonging – or rather, sentiments of unbelonging. These themes will be further explored in chapter 3.

Research done by Poppelaars & Scholten, who analyse the ways in which immigrant integration is framed differently by local and national governments, illustrate how the national level governments work from a more individualistic approach when it comes to the integration discourse in which policies accommodating needs of specific communities have become more unpopular, whilst local governments continue to approach this issue from a group-based perspective (2008). Banafshe’s experience with local municipalities provides further evidence for this, in which she often states that her local municipality in fact provides and organises many activities aimed at bringing immigrant communities into contact with non-immigrant communities in her city, adding:

“[...] that’s what integration is all about – having contact with others. Contact between and among different communities is extremely important.”

Throughout this study it has become apparent that the Iranian community is under the impression that the ways in which they deal with the integration concept varies greatly from

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the ways in which other immigrant communities approach this discourse. Most respondents claim that Iranians in the Netherlands are in fact not greatly concerned with integration, and according to Sara, a second-generation immigrant who was born in Iran but grew up in the Netherlands, Iranians take no initiative in actively integrating, “whatever that might mean”. I am told that rather, Iranian immigrants are more concerned with dealing with issues that have come forth out of the integration discourse itself, in which discrimination and exclusion are the problems most often stated.

Bertossi adds to this by discussing how models of integration “do not impose on actors ready-made ways for deciding what to do and how to do it” (2011:1572), and

emphasizes that a range of social actors construct national models not only in politics but also in the public sphere. Ultimately, we revert back to the idea that integration models are not appropriate for examining its success and failure, but it is perhaps even more important to study the ways in which people construct and re-construct these models, and ways in which the models of integration play a role in developing conceptions of identity, inclusion and belonging. Here, the study of Iranians seems particularly appropriate due to the

abovementioned motivations for their immigration and statistical evidence which illustrates high levels of success both academically and professionally compared to other immigrant communities in the Netherlands (Dagevos & Gijsberts 2009). If evidence is found that this concept is constructed and dealt with in a variety of ways, we may start questioning such a government policy which does not take into account the diverse experiences with and interpretations of the policy itself by different immigrant groups. Through analysis of the ways in which different immigrant groups might interact with politics of integration, we may come to the conclusion that by re-thinking this policy’s priorities and points of focus, we might find alternative means by which to stimulate a more inclusive approach towards members of Dutch society.

1.1 Research Question

Based on the theoretical framework of my study and the research population and setting, the main research question is as follows:

In which ways do first –and second-generation Iranians in the Netherlands conceptualize and interact with politics of integration?

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Several sub-questions are formed to serve as a guide to answering this research question, and also to clarify several key concepts that stand central to the research as a whole:

1. In what ways do Iranians in the Netherlands define ‘integration’ as a concept? 1.1. To what extent do they believe this concept to affect their everyday practices?

2. How significant and influential are national integration policies in the discourses of inclusion and belonging of Iranians in the Netherlands?

2.1. How do people define notions of autochthony and allochthony?

2.2. In what ways do these notions shape ideas of identity, inclusion and belonging in the

Netherlands?

3. In what ways do Iranian families feel that the rise of Islamophobia (and populism) has manipulated perceptions of immigrant communities, including their own?

1.2 Research Population

For this particular study I decided to focus on citizens of Iranian descent, as they do not appear to conform to more ‘stereotypical’ accounts of the non-integrated immigrant in the Netherlands whilst they are subject to and experience the same type of policy-making and immigrant perceptions as other immigrant groups. Iranians in the Netherlands distinguish themselves from other immigrant communities not only due to the fact that they are more often highly educated and successful in the labour market, but also due to the non-economic nature of their migratory motivation; the majority of first-generation Iranians are in fact political refugees.

The research population in the study consists of two generations within sets of families. Whilst the research includes approximately four respondents who did not have either their parent(s) or child(ren) interviewed, for the most part I was able to interview a parent and their child. The total number of participants in this study ultimately consists of six first-generation Iranians and six second-generation Iranians. The aim here is to gain insights into differences and similarities in perceptions and experiences of those that are closely related, and yet have experienced Iran and the Netherlands under completely different circumstances.

It is noteworthy that the majority of the participants of the research were female. With a total number of twelve participants, merely four males expressed interest in participating.

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Persis Karim provides an explanation for this in her introduction to the first anthology of Iranian American women’s writing, Let Me Tell You Where I’ve Been, stating that “the dramatic increase in the number of women writing and publishing outside of Iran is an

outgrowth of Iranian women’s specific experience; they have felt compelled to respond to the view of Iranian women purveyed by both the Islamic republic and the western media [...] they have found themselves having to reshape their identities to fit the new reality of their lives” (cited in Nasrabandi 2010:488). This corresponds to statements made by male first-generation respondents such as Omid, who often claims that “Iran hasn’t changed much for us men” and that “the rights are not as bad as people think they are”. It could be speculated then that this research was better received amongst women, because it would give them more of an opportunity to ‘set the story straight’. Apart from this, being female myself might have influenced gendered attitudes when it comes to openness of telling one’s personal story to a stranger.

1.2.1 Enghelabe Eslami

Sentiments regarding the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which were to change Iran as a country dramatically, are often very contradictory. There are groups that assert that the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah from 1941 onwards was both oppressive and incompetent, and claim him to have been a ‘puppet’ of Western powers (Slocum-Bradley 2008:171). In contrast, there is also a group – which consists primarily of political refugees – claiming that the Shah in fact improved Iran vastly on an economical, political and global scale. However, Iranian political refugees currently residing in the Netherlands include those that both joined and opposed the Revolution. What tends to go unnoticed is the fact that many of those who had supported the downfall of the Shah were promised a referendum and more political freedoms. Seeing their country being turned into an Islamic republic was something that none of my respondents had ever expected to happen. In conversations with Leila, a first-generation Iranian refugee, after hearing her comparisons between the country before and after the Revolution, she tells me that “the country hasn’t changed, it has been broken”.

After thirty-seven years of rule, demonstrations against the monarchy commenced in support of Ayatollah Khomeini, urging the leave of the Shah as a ruler. Khomeini before this time had been living in exile after publically denouncing the Shah’s strategies to reform and modernize Iran. He had gained popularity before and during the Revolution, by claiming that he wished to preserve ‘traditional’ aspects of Iranian culture and turn the country into a democracy – arguing that the Shah had been Westernizing the country and caused ‘Iranian

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culture’ to disintegrate and disappear during his rule. At the same time he had promised more ‘freedom’ and a decrease in costs for certain commodities, stressing that the Shah had

exploited Iranians in relation to electricity, petrol and oil charges in particular.

In 1979 the Revolution had come to an end and the Shah had left the country. Soon after this, Iran was declared an Islamic Republic, with Supreme religious Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in place to be Iran’s ‘ultimate political and religious leader’ (Amuzegar 1991). Surprising to many Iranians at the time, a range of strict Islamic laws were implemented, prohibiting many aspects of life people had known before, including restrictions on dress, consumption of alcohol, public displays of affection (holding hands) and women’s

participation within society. Many of those who had opposed the Revolution or had an affinity to the Shah were swiftly executed. The executions often also included those who had in fact supported the Revolution, but did not appear to conform to the new laws that were implemented. Darya tells me the story of her uncle, who had strongly opposed the new Islamic regime:

“[...] we got a phone call that he would be released. The day of his release on of the Ayatollah’s went to [...] where he worked and on the spot they – there were eight of them and they – they executed them all. All of a sudden we heard his name on the radio. We saw pictures in the papers too of bodies, which looked like colanders... bodies full of holes.”

This series of events gave rise to an increasing number of political refugees, including the participants in this research. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees currently residing in the Netherlands are of the Iranian ‘elite’ and so have an upper-middle class or upper-class background. This should not only be kept in mind when examining the ways in which the concept of integration is constructed by this particular community, but also when analyzing conceptualisations of identity, belonging and inclusion.

1.2.2 The participants

The reason I chose a focus-group of Iranian descent, is because they do not appear to conform to the ‘stereotypical’ account of the non-integrated immigrant in the Netherlands, yet, they are subject to and have experience with the same type of policy-making and immigrant perceptions as those of for example Turkish and Moroccan descent. What is significant about this community is that the majority are not economic migrants, but in fact

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have migrated to the Netherlands in search of asylum, as political refugees after the Revolution in 1979.

Out of all groups that have immigrated to the Netherlands, people of Iranian origin are among the most highly educated in the country; higher even than non-immigrant Dutch citizens. At the same time, there is also a large number of Iranian entrepreneurs, which implies high rates of academic and economic success in this immigrant group (Dagevos & Gijsberts 2009). Furthermore, due to the historical context and nature of their migratory motivations, the majority of this group does not practice Islam – many people in this community in fact fled Islamic rule.

These are all characteristics which distinguish Iranians from some of the other immigrant groups in the Netherlands. Despite this, due to the racialized nature of the integration discourse in the Netherlands, people are more often distinguished according to physical characteristics – and this is of vital interest in my research. As a result of a

generalisation of immigrants’ backgrounds, historical contexts and migratory motivations – and prejudices that come with them – all these communities face the same discriminatory behaviour. Keivan, a second-generation Iranian, comments on the fact that he is frequently mistaken for someone of Moroccan or Turkish descent:

“[...] so now especially, they see me as a Probleem Marokkaan. It’s worse when something violent happens like that referee who got beaten up by some Moroccan boys. The more these things come up in the media, the less people treat me like I am a person.”

On the subject of racialization and discrimination, Halleh Ghorashi and Ulrike Vieten assert that “as the Dutch public space becomes increasingly insulting toward migrants with an Islamic background, new Dutch citizens feel increasingly out of place and humiliated”

(2012:109). During the fieldwork period, prejudices towards those with an Islamic

background was a recurring theme, in which many participants also stated that they felt they were discriminated against because they were viewed as Islamic or Arabic migrants who have come to the Netherlands for economic reasons. It is these types of migrants that are often viewed as ‘fortune seekers’ and abusers of the welfare system. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, Dutch integration policies are actively aimed at reducing the number of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands (2008). Arguably, these policies appear to be very ethnicity-specific and racialized, which causes an array of

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immigrant communities to become generalized and discriminated against. On this note, the concept of integration itself and the policies surrounding it could be strongly challenged, since it does not take into account the various types of communities and individuals – with their varied migratory motivations and historical contexts – which are subject to the integration discourse. The issue at hand then does not lie within the ethnic backgrounds of these communities, but rather within the concept of integration and its surrounding policies. The viability and usefulness of the integration concept is thus challenged, from the

perspective of a community which is deemed to be quite successful, but nonetheless has to deal with discriminatory and exclusionary practices that have come forth from the integration discourse.

1.3 Methodology

Throughout the whole fieldwork period, I utilized three sets of research activities in order to gather the information.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Semi-structured interviews mainly aimed to clarify interpretations of the key concepts of my research, such as the conceptualization of terms such as integration, allochthony and

autochthony, and the significance of ‘identity’ in the conceptualization of and interaction with politics of integration. It also served to establish rapport between the informant and myself, and laid a basis for the use of more in-depth and personal life-history accounts.

The semi-structured interviews, usually taking place during the first meeting,

generally followed the sub-questions stated above, although the nature of the interview itself allowed for further exploration of these themes. Some themes were investigated more in one conversation than in others, depending on the respondent and their personal interest and experiences. The questions were posed during the interviews with first –and

second-generation Iranians alike, in order to be able to analyze differences and similarities amongst those who were and those who were not born in the Netherlands.

LIFE-HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Following these semi-structured interviews, I set up several more meetings with the informants – approximately two to three for each person – in order to gather life histories to elicit more detailed, personal perceptions and experiences regarding the theme. For the first generation, I followed their journey from before the Iranian Revolution, to their lives at this

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point in time, in order to examine the underlying emotional, historical and contextual reasons for their changing perceptions of and reactions to politics of integration.

The structure of the life-history interviews of the second-generation Iranians remained relatively similar throughout the respondents in this group. The life histories of this

generation generally did not follow a particular journey from one physical space to the other, but rather examined what it is like to grow up among very diverse norms and values, and how this process has influenced their notions of identity and a sense of belonging not only in relation to Dutch society, but also to Iranian society.

As stated above, the life-history interviews with the second-generation Iranians examined growing up as an Iranian in the Netherlands. However, within this group I could distinguish three different categories of Iranians, which caused the life-history interviews to alter slightly within each category:

Born there, raised here

This category contains second-generation Iranian daughters that were born in Iran but moved to the Netherlands during their toddler years; Niloufar and Sara. These participants are among the eldest in this study. As the persons in this category travelled through other

countries such as Turkey or Germany before their settlement in the Netherlands, this would mean that they were born in the early eighties. None of the Iranians in this category have visited their country since their arrival in the Netherlands, but all claim they would feel more ‘at home’ in Iran.

Born here, stayed here

Within this category are two second-generation Iranian sons who were born and raised in the Netherlands, and have never seen their country of origin; Keivan and Dariush. What is interesting is that they base their idea of Iran almost completely on stories their parents have told them. Their perceptions of Iran and Iranians are here in a sense imagined communities. Furthermore, there appears to be an ‘inherited nostalgia’ to their country of origin. These themes will be explored in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Born here, goes there

The two second-generation Iranian daughters in this category were born in the

Netherlands but have visited Iran regularly from a young age; Baran and Aresu. Incidentally, they are the youngest participants in this research. They were not raised with ‘stories’ about

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Iran as they experienced the country themselves. What is also interesting is that the people in this category are the only ones who express that they would have difficulty living in Iran, whether now or after the fall of the regime. This opposes the view of the other two categories, who have never returned to Iran, but claim that they would feel much more in place there.

PHOTO-ELICITATION

This method was used in conjunction with semi-structured interviews and life histories in order to stimulate responses, memories and personal perceptions with regards to lived experiences of immigrant communities in the Netherlands. An organisation called Humans of Iran has allowed me to use their photographs in my research. The photographs used vary from nature and environment, to people engaging in conversation, family portraits and people in traditional clothing. The informants responded to the use of photographs in the interviews in different ways. Some focused on what kinds of emotions the photographs would evoke in them, whilst others would comment on the false perceptions people in the

Netherlands have of Iran due to media portrayals. Photographs of nature and environment generated a great feeling of nostalgia among first-generation Iranians, which could further be connected to the literal and figurative sense of ‘roots’ and love for the land. Among second-generation Iranians who had never visited Iran, it was often expressed that these photographs accurately illustrated the images that go through their minds when they think about Iran. Additionally, first-generations Iranians often seemed to recognize the exact location at which a (nature) photograph was taken – “this is a park in Tehran, this is Isfahan, this is Shiraz” – whereas second-generation Iranians would merely claim that “this is Iran as I know it”.

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It is noteworthy that photographs of nature and environment enticed greater and more detailed responses than images of people. With the first couple of respondents I had used many images of people in Iran and fewer photographs of environments (or monuments). Here I quickly noticed that the participants could identify more with nature rather than portraits of people. What could possibly serve as an explanation for this is the fact that images of people in contemporary Iran more often include women wearing headscarves and with fully covered bodies, and from my understanding this is not the Iran that neither the first nor the second-generation has in mind when they talk about their home country. This type of dress reminds them more of the current Islamic regime, even though first-generation respondents have repeatedly told me that before the Revolution came about, there were also women who indeed were religious and wore this type of dress. Perhaps the difference here is the fact that currently there is a lack of choice in this, and seeing this type of clothing reminds Iranians of the freedom of choice they have lost over the years. Additionally, and perhaps more

importantly so, photographs of environment and monuments are reminders of Iranian history and culture, which I am told generates the sense of a ‘shared’ or ‘collective’ Iranian identity. It is these types of imagery that parents pass on to their children through stories told about Iranian architecture, poetry, art and history.

These methods combined have allowed me to gain insights into a variety of themes surrounding the concept of integration. Interestingly, the findings do not only illustrate conceptualisations of the concept itself, but simultaneously introduce alternative approaches to policy making, much different from those that are perceive to be the norm on political levels at present day.

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Chapter 2 The integration concept

The Netherlands has a long history of immigration, in which the influx of immigrants from former colonies and that of “guest workers’’ (gastarbeiders) from the 1960s onwards has significantly influenced developments in immigration and integration policies in the country. The first great influx of immigrants occurred shortly after the end of the Second World War, where a quarter million immigrants from the former Dutch-Indies moved to the Netherlands, having declared independence from Japanese occupation, and a few years later from Dutch occupation (Van Tubergen & Maas 2006:19). In the early sixties, in need of heavy industry workers, the Dutch government drew up an agreement with Turkey in order to recruit ‘guest workers’, and in 1969 created a similar programme with Morocco (Van

Tubergen & Maas 2006:20). As a result of this increasing ethnic diversity in the country, several relatively liberal policies were initiated which promoted ‘multiculturalism’ and the opportunity for minorities to maintain and develop their own cultural identities, which has given the Netherlands the widespread image of a society which is highly tolerant of immigration and the expression of diverse identities (Vink 2007).

One major multiculturalist policy which developed as a result of this increasing immigration was one in which “integration with preservation of own identity” was key (Vink 2007:344). These types of policies seemed much like the longstanding pluralistic traditions of pillarisation (verzuiling) in which all segments of society were assumed to coexist peacefully, based on the notion of “creating and supporting separate provisions and institutional

arrangements as a means of preserving group identity and promoting emancipation” (Entzinger, 2003:64). However, Maarten Vink argues that this perspective portrays a

somewhat idealised and naive picture of the Netherlands as being very ‘immigrant-friendly’ and accommodating, when in reality, this policy was a pragmatic strategy which served to prepare guest workers to return to their country of origin by integrating them as little as possible into their host society (2007). Through conversations with Niloufar, a second-generation Iranian, it appears that this ‘immigrant-friendly’ view of the Netherlands was also held among immigrant communities. Her take on this is not the idea that Dutch society was inherently tolerant of immigrants and a variety of cultures, but rather that immigrants served

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“I think back in the day they really wanted us here still. Especially because many high-skilled workers like doctors and lawyers were welcomed here very well. They needed these types of workers [...] most of us were highly educated so we were welcomed.”

Reverting to the comparison between the pillarisation systems and ‘integration with preservation of own identity’, Koopmans rightly argues that imposing such a pillarisation system would prove highly inadequate, remarking that “neither immigrants nor native Dutch people are helped by applying principles that were originally meant for a native population with a largely similar socioeconomic status, and common history and political culture, to the integration of newcomers with a different cultural background” (2007:5). Following

Koopmans’ claim then, one might anticipate that recent developments in government policies which portray a move towards an ‘integration policy’ based on the idea of mainstreaming – towards the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream services – would serve as an appropriate and improved alternative. It is noteworthy that this shift has the underlying assumption that the aforementioned ‘preservation of identity’ is not possible if a person is obliged to

integrate, as this feature has been completely excluded from the integration policies that have been implemented since then. Since policy-makers themselves have completely dismissed the notion of ‘preserving own identity’, it could be said that on a political level it has been

assumed that integration and preservation of own identity are mutually exclusive. Right-wing politician Geert Wilders has gone as far as saying that being a Dutch citizen means that one should give up any other nationality one might have (NOS 2010).

Most anthropological writings on the subject of integration in the Netherlands claim that integration policies have been high on the political agenda ever since the Dutch

government realised that the ‘guest workers’ were in fact here to stay (Van Reekum & Duyvendak (2012), Hurenkamp et al. (2012), Vasta (2007), Vink (2007). The majority of these workers had been living and working in the country for years at this point, and if they had not started a family here, their families had emigrated to be reunited with them. Hence, new policies were created in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, in order to include the

‘gastarbeiders’ – which would now be named ‘buitenlanders’ (foreigners) – in Dutch society. An example of this is the Ethnic Minorities Policy, which according to sociologist Jan

Willem Duyvendak and Peter Scholten was one in which “the policy problem was now reconceptualise in terms of participation and socio-cultural emancipation of ethnic or cultural minorities” (2009:7). Darya here adds the idea that integration policies in fact came about

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because “they [the government] realized that second and third generations of these

immigrants would have big issues if they were going to grow up in a society which didn’t stimulate different groups to move amongst each other”. Whether the move towards

integration policies has taken a different approach from Koopmans' take on multiculturalist pillarisation, however, could be questioned. The particular and somewhat unique history of Iranian political refugees currently residing in the Netherlands goes unacknowledged among a policy-making system which imposes a ‘one’ for ‘all’ approach, and thus fails to yet again take into account the variety of cultures and their historical contexts, now present in Dutch society. I thus argue for the acknowledgement of the different histories of other immigrant communities during policy making and implementation, and henceforth challenge the viability of the concept of integration itself.

From here, we may start questioning the concept of integration itself, and the significance of new approaches towards existing notions of integration in the Netherlands. Rather than adding to a discourse which sets normative conceptions of integration at its core – as a static government policy imposed on and followed by members of society – I argue for an approach in which the integration concept is considered as one which is subject to the creation, conceptualisation and implementation of a range of actors in Dutch society. This study therefore does not focus on the failure or success of integration in the Netherlands, but the ways in which the concept might be constructed and re-constructed differently by various members in Dutch society. In doing so, consequent influences on notions of inclusion, identity and belonging of immigrants in the Netherlands, are further explored, taking the case of Iranian political refugees in the Netherlands.

2.1 How is it defined?

“Integration is...een bakkie koffie doen! ” - Banafshe

The concept of integration is one which seems to have no clear or universal definition. Not only is the concept itself and its meaning very specific to the Netherlands as a country, when examining definitions of integration, it appears to be something which is done, rather than something which is. In other words, there appears to be a general impression that

integration is a process of actions taken by immigrant communities, and is not just something implemented, apparent and achieved in one day. According to the government, one integrates through the process of ‘inburgering’, which is stated to mean that “newcomers have to learn

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the Dutch language, and get to know the Dutch society” (Rijksoverheid). Not only is the second part of this rather vague, through further analysis of the integration policy itself it also becomes clear that it consists of a relatively individualistic approach in which the immigrant holds the responsibility for ‘integrating’ into Dutch society. Whilst the terms ‘integratie’ (integration) and ‘inburgering’ are used rather interchangeably, the most important aspects of this process appear to be learning the language, actively participating in the economy, and feeling/being involved within the Dutch community (BZK 2011). These ideals are closely tied to notions of holding the Dutch ‘identity’, where any failure to do so lies with the ‘problem immigrant’, who is widely perceived as unwilling to integrate.

The ‘inburgering’ itself is structured as a compulsory course which immigrants have to follow, which consists of “understanding the Dutch traditions, learn how we live and work in the Netherlands, and how we interact with each other” (Rijksoverheid). You are considered to be ‘ingeburgerd’ once you have taken the exam to prove that you possess a good level of written and spoken Dutch, and have passed the inburgeringsexam. Questions to test a person’s ‘understanding of Dutch culture’ are asked, such as “What do you do when your neighbour is getting married”7_{(IB Groep).This inburgeringsexam only became compulsory} in 2006 however, after the ‘Wet Inburgering’ (Inburgering Law), and thus the first-generation Iranian political refugees that participated in this research were never at risk of being

penalised for language skills. Nevertheless I am told time and time again, that Dutch

volunteers provided free language classes at the time, and that the Dutch community was also eager to visit Iranian immigrants at home and give them personal language classes.

It becomes evident that language is a very important criterion in determining the integration of the immigrant in question. This can further be seen in recent developments which have attempted to prohibit immigrant communities from speaking their mother-tongue in public, and the belief that children of immigrants should speak no other language than Dutch in their homes (Volkskrant, 2000). Interestingly however, Joop Atsma, a member of the House of Representatives in the year this first became a topic of debate, asserts that he has raised his own children to speak Fries at home, and that they only learnt Dutch when they started going to school. Yet, he bluntly claims that “there is an important difference with the situation of allochthons. If you only read Turkish newspapers and watch Turkish television, we can no longer speak of integration” (ibid.). Through interviews with respondents it shows that they describe integration similarly, in which almost all respondents firstly mention

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“speaking Dutch”, when asked for the meaning of integration, before going on to talk about participating in the workplace and not being financially dependent on the state.

When asking Banafshe at the beginning of our conversation what it means to be integrated, she promptly answered “bakkie koffie doen!” (have a cup of coffee). We both laughed a lot, and she proceeded by saying that the trick was to learn how to observe the society itself, adapt your behaviour and take over certain customs. She added however that it is important to never lose your true self whilst doing so, and that for Iranians this is a very important characteristic which she tries to teach her own children as well; “don’t forget where your roots are”. Sara however, whilst acknowledging the necessity of adapting your own behaviour to others, makes a note on what is implied by doing so, and adds the following:

“Integration means... learn how they behave, and adapt you own behaviour so that people don’t notice that you were once different. But that’s impossible. Not only can you not change where you come from and who you are, they [Dutch people] will also never consider you the same as them. So no matter how much you want to ‘act’ Dutch, you will never be truly Dutch to them either.”

All add, however, that aspects such as language, taking on Dutch customs and proof of active participation are the meanings of integration that are held most important by the Dutch government, and that their personal idea of what integration should be is vastly different from the perceived norm. Banafshe further comments on this by addressing the vagueness of these criteria by questioning to what extent a person needs to know the Dutch language, and explains that for members of her generation language will always remain an issue, whether this is due to their accent, vocabulary or other problems with pronunciation. Henceforth, whilst an immigrant might pass the language examinations or is able to hold up conversations with members of Dutch society, their accents might still betray their otherness and cause them to be viewed as ‘unwilling to integrate’ and consequently unwilling to be part of Dutch society. The implementation of the new Integration Act of 2005 imposes sanctions on those who fail to integrate, in which Vasta claims that these sanctions and fines are not imposed to improve the situation, but are rather part of the discourse used to support claims that immigrants “have not met their ‘responsibility to integrate’”(2007:718). Although Iranian political refugees were not obligated to take an ‘inburgeringsexamen’, I am told that the majority did go to a language school because they personally wanted to be able to

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communicate properly in their new country of residence. This does not take away Banafshe’s point about accents and vocabulary however, and its consequent influences on the

perceptions of immigrants in the Netherlands. Admittedly, the idea that this is attributed to an unwillingness to be an active member of society seems more so prejudiced when hearing Leila’s heart-breaking account of her abusive ex-husband:

“He was jealous because I was learning much faster than he was. Eventually he forbade me to go to Dutch language classes [...] so I tried to teach myself at home. Now my pronunciation is not good, there was no one to correct me. I am trying to improve on that now but at this age it is very difficult.”

She continues by explaining that she has been working since she arrived in the Netherlands and has an extensive amount of work experience, yet at the present time she continuously gets rejected during job interviews because she is told she does not have the appropriate language skills. This has caused her to be unemployed for several years now, and even though she dedicates her free time to voluntary work, in this way she does not meet the integration requirement of being financially independent of the state, and is yet again

perceived as a non-compliant and uncooperative immigrant.

As the example of Leila shows, and following Vasta’s research, integration policies are more based on a ‘citizenship approach’ (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008) in which the responsibility to integrate lies with the individual in contrast to previous group-based

policies. Arguably, holding only the immigrant responsible renders society ignorant of other processes which influence the equality and inclusion of immigrants in the Netherlands, such as institutional racism. Through conversations with Darya it becomes clear that there is a sense of injustice and also that of exploitation of the integration concept by members of Dutch society in order to justify the exclusion of immigrants. These sentiments could explain how it increasingly occurs that Dutch people of immigrant origin claim to be victims of discrimination when it comes to the high rate of unemployment amongst this group.

Once, when I proceeded to ask Darya what her personal understanding of integration is, and what being integrated means to her, she briefly stared at the cigarette between her fingers and responded, “It’s nonsense. The whole concept is nonsense”. I repeated her answer in order to urge her to elaborate, and eventually she told me the following:

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‘[…] there have been Dutch people my own clients … speak Dutch, born in the Netherlands blond hair white skin … that live completely isolated from society. Are they integrated?’

[brief silence]

‘But if it’s an allochtoon it’s because of their language. But if it’s a Dutch person I have before me, who doesn’t work or doesn’t want to have anything to do with their environment well what do I call that person then?’

Darya’s critique on the concept of integration is closely related to Leila’s account above. The point she is trying to make here, is that even though a person with a

non-immigrant background might be in a similar position as one with an non-immigrant background, the explanations given for the position of each person in society will differ greatly. According to her personal experiences, whilst an ‘isolated’ or non-employed immigrant is more often perceived to be “lazy, unmotivated and unwilling”, a non-immigrant Dutch person in exactly the same situation is more often perceived to be “a victim, like perhaps he is isolated because he is coping with psychological problems”. In other words, the immigrant’s position is attributed to his lack of integration – for example poor language skills – which once again reinforces the rhetoric of ‘immigrant responsibility”.

2.1.1 Integration or assimilation?

“They’re just looking for a clone ” - Omid

All first-generation respondents and most second-generation respondents claim that

integration should come from both sides. Current policies are perceived to hold a certain one-sidedness similar to Baumann’s notion of ‘integration into’ a society (2007). Baumann, as well as several other anthropological scholars (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008; Vink 2007; Vasta; 2007; Essed 2008) draw significant comparisons between integration policies and assimilation projects because this ‘integration into’ stands at the core of policies in the Netherlands. Park and Burgess defined assimilation as “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them

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in a common life”(1921: 735). This implies then that old traits and customs would be

replaced by a new type of identity – that of the host society. Van Bruinessen, who is a scholar of Islam in the Netherlands, furthermore asserts that “the notion that integration demands adaptations from both sides appears to be submerged” (2006:21). It is important to further examine this claim, because assimilationism presupposes a cultural superiority, and “sets out a hegemonic whole that other wholes are subordinated to (Baumann 2007). Thus, it could be said that the integration policies are indeed rather assimilisationist; evidently, access to cultural and human capital is central to participation within the host society, but to make it compulsory and sanctioned is assimilationist. For example, citizens in the Netherlands with an (non-Western) immigrant background might be declined welfare on the grounds of insufficient language skills (BZK 2011). Arguably, rather than stimulating, encouraging and allowing the participation that the government holds so dearly, such sanctions would isolate and restrict immigrant communities more. Leila for example explains how as a result of misconceptions and presumptions about her Dutch language skills, it has become increasingly difficult for her to find employment – even though several years ago her accent had not been an issue for employers.

The ‘Integration Policy New Style’ of the early 2000’s has arguably been one of the major contributors to the move towards assimilationism in the Netherlands. Duyvendak explains this by stating that this ‘New Style’ stressed the ‘common citizenship’ of migrants, meaning that “the unity of society must be found in what members have in common (..) that is that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch norms” (TK 20032004,29203, no. 1: 8. cited in Duyvendak 2009:10). He goes on to state that socio-cultural differences were from this point onwards considered to be “a hindrance to immigrant integration” (ibid.). From this it seems that integration policies in the Netherlands are very much assimilationist in nature, due to the fact that it values socio-cultural commonality rather than differences. In fact, not adhering to these policies might not only cause the immigrant to be penalized, but also stigmatized by wider society for their ‘disloyalty’ to the Netherlands as a whole. Such developments are said to be closely linked to concerns about the preservation of ‘the Dutch national identity’ and a certain ‘cultural anxiety’, which will be examined later in this chapter.

Interviews with Iranian respondents illustrate the feeling that present-day policies are rather assimilationist in their nature due to the fact that they appear to force immigrant communities to do away with part of their identity in order to take on a ‘Dutch identity’. This

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notion is often attributed to populist movements and an increase in popularity of right-wing politics:

“Right-wing political parties, Wilders, and until a few years ago also the VVD, when they talk about integration they actually mean assimilation. So they expect me to act 100% like [...]”

Here, Reza, a first-generation Iranian political refugee who has resided in the Netherlands more or less for thirty years, introduces the idea that the goal of integration policies are to take on the identity of the host society, moving away from your own culture. He continues to indicate that this goal is relatively problematic:

[...] well that’s the first problem there... who am I supposed to act like? What is a Nederlander?”

Several second-generation respondents here also assert that the thought behind integration policies is to “become someone else” and “be like Dutch people”, reinforcing the idea that these policies are in fact assimilationist. Many respondents state that they do adjust their behaviour in the public sphere, for example by ‘pretending to feel Dutch’ through verbal statements, and indicate that there is a necessity to do so in order to go about their daily lives happily. Sara for example tells me that in the workplace she will often do this during times in which the immigrant integration debate becomes very heated, and when she feels like co-workers are “testing my loyalty by asking for my opinion. In those cases I often tell them how I am a Dutch person, how I was raised here, and make them think that Dutch identity stands above my Iranian identity. But of course that’s all for show.” Although these kind of statements appear to have somewhat of a negative tone to them and imply a continuous negotiation of identities in the public and private sphere, first –and second-generation respondents add that they do not find this ‘adjusting’ very problematic, because in the end they say they manage to retain their Iranian identity, in all their loyalty and pride to their country of origin. These relationships between integration and Iranian identity will be debated further in a more detailed manner in the following chapter.

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2.1.2 What should integration be?

“The only possible road to success is mutual respect, and that becomes mutual integration.”

- Niloufar

All participants of this research, both first –and second-generation Iranians, assert that integration as a concept would only be justified if it were to move away from its one-sided nature, towards one which focuses on an ‘integration with’ – or mutual integration of – cultures with all members of society despite their place of birth or heritage. Respondents hold a perspective in which immigrant and non-immigrant communities should focus on what they could learn from each other, rather than on how differences between social and cultural backgrounds could be problematic. According to respondents’ accounts on the topic, conceptualisations of the integration of Iranians with Dutch society and the integration of Dutch society with Iranians appear to differ, and so we currently cannot speak of a mutual integration, as Reza here expresses:

“[...] the moment I am open to becoming a part of this society but Dutch members don’t accept me... well then... that makes me... pathetic... [laughter]. But that means that I can’t be comfortable, can’t feel at home. So then there’s no integration either. Integration, in my opinion, is not just what I do. They can’t expect that I integrate and the rest of society doesn’t. Dutch society also has to allow me to be who I am.”

From these types of statements it appears than Iranians do not consider integration to be a process which is identical on both sides. From the position of Iranians, integration means to adjust your behaviour in the public sphere to suit certain norms of Dutch society, and from the position of the non-immigrants it means to allow the Iranians to express their own

identities and be respected as people. In the view of respondents, this creates more of a give-and-take balance than the one which exists at present day. Banafshe for example tells me that “you need openness from both sides... if a society doesn’t welcome you... well then... why would you even want to try to be a part of it?”.

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Ultimately then, the Iranians that participated in this research do not expect nor desire non-immigrant Dutch people to adjust and adapt their behaviour or values to members of the Iranian community in the same way that this immigrant community does to Dutch society. Rather, they call for a treatment which is righteous and just, instead of the current treatment which insinuates a Dutch cultural superiority. Here, the majority of the first-generation respondents share’s Banafshe’s view that “they [Dutch people] do not look at who they are dealing with, whether they [immigrants] are low or high educated, where they come from, the nature of their immigration... they [Dutch people] always think they are above you. They always feel superior”. Interestingly, the relationship between integration policies and cultural superiority is one which has been acknowledged by a variety of researchers. Henceforth, this sentiment that respondents often shared with me proves to be valuable in further examining the nature of integration discourses. Nonetheless, in order to analyse these types of statements on cultures and the portrayal of the host culture as ‘superior’, these notions must be looked at in a more critical manner; we may not take for granted how these terms are used both on political and social levels, and why they are used in such particular ways.

Interestingly, whilst most participants in this research highly condemned the cultural superiority of non-immigrant Dutch communities as Banafshe describes above, throughout the research it becomes apparent that a sense of ‘cultural superiority’ of Iranians is most definitely present among participants. Second-generation respondents such as Dariush for example, tell me that “when I experience discrimination, my parents always tell me to not pay attention to it. They tell me not to care, because we are Iranians, we have a rich culture and history, so I should be proud to be Iranian... proud to be different”. Thus, when they face a certain ‘othering’ by Dutch society, they strengthen this ‘othering’ themselves through which it becomes a coping mechanism, and allows them to deal with sentiments of exclusion and unbelonging. The ‘cultural superiority’ of Iranians takes form in a second type of

boundary-making: the making of boundaries between their community, and other immigrant communities in the Netherlands. As previously mentioned, within the integration discourse, those of Turkish and Moroccan descent stand quite central to the debate on political levels, and Muslim communities are a large point of focus in present day politics. Possibly, as a consequence, Iranians in the Netherlands might distance themselves from these as well as Arab-speaking communities now more than ever before.

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2.2 ‘Culturespeak’

“There’s this idea that you’re their enemy, a danger to their society or to their culture ...” - Dariush

The implementation of integration policies is often said to derive from a more recent ‘cultural anxiety’ (Grillo 2003) in which immigrants are believed to “erode national culture” (Vertovec 2011:242). The official integratienota8 also states that “time and time again it appears that many Dutch people do not consider ethnic and cultural diversity as an

enrichment, but as a threat” ( BZK 2011:1). This is a notion that does not only exist in the Netherlands, but has spread on a global level, appearing in many immigration discourses in countries such as the United States, England and France among others. Van Houtum and Pijpers describe the EU as a ‘gated community’ (2007) in which the management of immigration is to a large extent the product of fear – of losing a community’s self-defined identity. As a result of this anxiety in the Netherlands, immigrants are now expected to integrate into the Dutch language, culture and history. The greatest fear here is that the amalgamation of diverse cultures will cause the original or ‘indigenous’ culture to vanish completely, as Niloufar expresses here:

“Everyone has to fit in a specific hokje9_{because that’s the only way}

Dutch people can make sense of things. That’s how they determine who is their ally and who is their enemy.”

Here she expresses the idea that the immigrant ‘other’ is automatically seen as an enemy to the culture and society in question because of the label that it can never avoid. It is important however to note a certain misuse of ‘culture’ in the current discourse about

immigrants and integration. In political usage, culture is portrayed as static, bounded and uniformly shared between members of a group and arguably used in a racialized manner (Grillo 2003). Geert Wilders for example, leader of the Freedom Party, argues that Christians “should be proud that our culture is better than the Islamic culture” (cited in Kaya 2012:401). This statement does not only hold people with specific ethnic backgrounds as inferior, but

8_{Document which states the integration policies and related governmental research data}

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extends its racialization to religion-specific backgrounds. Several respondents assert that “Muslims are often viewed as underdeveloped or inferior by Dutch people”. These examples show that the notion of a cultural threat is heavily tied to the idea of cultural superiority, in this case ‘the Dutch culture’ being one which is superior over others, and more specifically, ‘the Islamic culture’. It is evident that this somewhat limited view of ‘the’ culture of any kind furthermore dismisses the large array of varieties with Islam as well as Dutch society.

Interestingly, whilst the majority of Iranians that participated in the study are non-religious and in fact fled Islamic rule, this community is subject to the same type of racialization and treatment as Muslim citizens in the Netherlands. Darya tells me about her feeling at the moment of arrival in the Netherlands, during her short stay at a ‘welcome center’10_:

“They treated us like we were a flock of animals that had never seen food in their lives.”

She did add however that at that time (thirty years ago) it was more because of “unknowing”, in the sense that the social workers were simply not educated about other cultures or Middle-Eastern countries. According to Darya, at present day, it is not because of “unknowing” but rather an “unwillingness of knowing”. In other words, she is of the opinion that immigrant communities are viewed as ‘less developed’ or ‘inferior’ because the non-immigrant Dutch community does not want to acknowledge that they might be able to learn from other cultures. As a result, immigrant communities are increasingly ‘put down’ and discriminated against – although she here adds once more that this feeling is much stronger now than it was thirty years ago. One could question however why these political and societal changes are more prominent now, seeing as the political rightist turn and the influx of

immigrants existed long before 2001 (Vink 2007). According to Baumann here, the problem is not the ‘new’ ethnic minorities, but rather the “fiction of ethnic purity”:

“Integration is not a problem of, for, about, or caused by minorities, but it’s a conceptual problem shared unknowingly. The most common problem of integration refers to the term ‘culture’ as the marker of

10_{Darya described this location as neither a refugee center nor a detention center. Rather, it was a building}

“like an old hotel or a guesthouse” where this group of Iranians stayed whilst they were awaiting permanent housing.

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difference and the borderline between inclusion and exclusion.” (2007:111)

Interestingly, he further points out that it appears that people in fact want bounded culture. Here he does not only refer to people in power such as politicians, but regular members of society in general. Baumann continues by claiming that “they often want it in precisely the bounded, reified, essentialized and timeless fashion that most of us now reject” (1999: S11). This feeling also arose in conversations with Iranians of both first –and second generations. Terms such as “Iranians are like...” and “As Iranians we are...” came up very regularly during the fieldwork period. Philomena Essed and David Goldberg give insight into this conceptualization of culture through explanation of the concept of “cultural cloning’’ – a universal phenomenon based on same-kind preference. Here they assert that “preference for sameness is historically part and parcel of the social fabric of our societies”(2002:1068). Keivan, a second-generation Iranian, illustrates his ideas about cultural superiority and cultural cloning in the Netherlands:

“If you are the same as me, you are safe because then I know who you are. If you are not the same, if I don’t know who you are, you are frightening and endangering. That’s what Dutch people think.”

Presently, it has become more common and reasonable in anthropology to view culture as something which is not static, but rather continuously in construction,

deconstruction and reconstruction under the impact of a variety of processes. From here on we might question the usefulness of integration policies; if these policies are indeed

implemented in order to ‘guard’ the host society’s culture against the ‘threat’ that is the immigrant community, how could this be justified when ‘the Dutch culture’ is naturally constantly changing?

From these statements and the abovementioned developments it might become clear how and why the Netherlands has shown a move away from multiculturalism, past

integration, and towards assimilationist approaches. For the purpose of this research it is valuable to further examine, through interviews and personal accounts, why majorities as well as minorities heavily emphasize an essentialist and racialized understanding of culture in the current political and social climate.