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Think tank influence on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

deal or no deal?

By Chiara Beekhuizen

Abstract

The dynamics of policy advisory systems are an understudied topic in public administration. More specifically, we focus on the role of think tanks as actors outside of government which exert influence on the decision-making stage of policy. We will examine how and to what extent three Washington D.C-based think tanks exert influence on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This research fills the research gap of the role of knowledge in the decision-making stage of foreign policy. The comparative case analysis focuses on five elements: the think tank’s position in the political-administrative nexus, the communication of its knowledge, its strategy, the content of its reports and the key message. By shedding light on these elements, the institutional aspects of think tanks will be examined and how those affect the think tank’s influence.

Key words: policy advisory systems, externalisation, politicisation, foreign policy

‘I want to thank the Belfer Centre, especially Sharon Wilke, for contributing to this research by participating in the interview.’

 

     

Chiara Beekhuizen (s1685716)

Public Administration MSc – International and European Governance Supervisor: V.P. Karakasis MSc

Second reader: Dr. M. Beerkens 10-8-2020

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Table of contents

 

1.   Introduction  ...3  

1.1 The US-Iran relationship over time...3  

1.2 Political-administrative context  ...4  

1.3 The role of think tanks in the decision-making process  ...5  

1.4 Research design  ...6  

1.5 Structure of this research  ...7  

2.   Theoretical framework...8  

2.1 Policy Cycles and think tanks  ...8  

2.2 Think tanks as actors  ...8  

2.3 Type of think tanks  ...9  

2.3.1 Advocacy think tanks  ...  10  

2.3.2 Nonpartisan think tanks  ...  10  

2.4 Externalisation and politicisation  ...  10  

2.5 Think tanks and ideology  ...  12  

2.6 Policy advice content  ...  12  

2.7 Expectations  ...  14  

3.   Methodology  ...  15  

3.1 Introduction  ...  15  

3.2 Qualitative approach  ...  16  

3.3 Documents and interview  ...  16  

3.4 Data collection...  17  

3.5 Method  ...  18  

3.6 Reliability & validity  ...  20  

4.   Analysis  ...  21  

4.1 Introduction  ...  21  

4.2 Explanation of the JCPOA-deal  ...  21  

4.3 Analysis of each think tank’s documents  ...  23  

4.3.1 Brookings  ...  23  

4.4.1 The Heritage Foundation  ...  29  

5. Conclusion  ...  41  

6.   Bibliography  ...  44  

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1.   Introduction

1.1 The US-Iran relationship over time

The timeline of nuclear diplomacy between Iran and the United States dates back to the 70s. In 1970, the first nuclear treaty was ratified (NPT) by the Iran parliament. However, later events in 1979 damaged the relationship between Iran and the West, more specifically between the U.S and Iran due to the seizure of the U.S embassy in Tehran (Arms Control, 2020). During the following years, the framework of NPT evolved and Iran persisted that its programs were legal (IranWatch, 2016). Despite the framework, Iran pursued its nuclear expansion by building sites, which were discovered by the Paris-Based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NTI, 2020). This finding shocked the international community, in respond to this event new negotiations kicked off.

The five permanent members, together with Germany, proposed a new framework in 2006 that included an indefinite timeline of restricting Iran’s nuclear enrichment program with uranium. The policy review by the recent Obama administration in 2009 marked a change of nature, as it confirmed full US participation in nuclear negotiations. This implied a withdrawal from preceding administration’s policies towards Iran. This change derived from Iran’s diplomatic impasse with the international community, as it continued experimenting with this program (NTI, 2020). This experimentation did not take place within the guidelines of the IAEA. The Agency therefore stated Iran’s evasion of various terms of agreement (IAEA, 2017). The following years (2010-2013) were characterized by increased sanctions and postponed talks between Iran and the UN permanent members plus Germany.

The first direct contact since 1979 between the US and Iran leaders symbolized an incentive for further negotiations. Obama and Rouhani came to the agreement of pursuing cooperation (Arms Control, 2020). This contact was part of a broader bilateral approach to deal with the nuclear expansion of Iran. Thereafter, the US and four European countries negotiated about a short-term agreement to restrict Iran’s nuclear program. The Joint Plan of Action arranged these restrictions on Iran, in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. This plan represented the first formal agreement between the US and Iran in 34 years. This framework formed the basis

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for future negotiations and agreements, eventually leading to the final agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (IranWatch, 2016).

1.2 Political-administrative context

A diplomatic agreement with Iran has been a priority of the international community for a long time (Katzman, K., 2014). Likewise, it has been a foreign policy goal of the Obama administration. In the following section, the Obama administration’s policy goals and approaches are described, as they form the politico-administrative nexus of the path towards an agreement.

Over many decades, the main goal of US administrations was to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. Obama has continued the path of his predecessors by accepting the basis realist premises. This discipline considers the principle actors in international relations to be states (Gerges, 2013: 299). Apart from shifting his approach from Bush’s ideology of proselytizing about democracy as an ideal, the Obama administration has not pursued a transformational foreign policy. He rather maintains the status quo than to challenge the predominant beliefs in the Congress. The status quo is a centrist-realist approach which has not been very successful over the years, until the negotiations of the JCPOA were initiated (Gerges, 2013: 300). The new course in American foreign policy is traditional multilateralism in international affairs. This implies diplomacy and agreement to rebuild alliances with the Middle East. In contrast to other presidents, he wanted to rebalance power from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific Ocean. This approach is part of his foreign policy strategy of confronting Iran. His initial means to curb Iran’s nuclear program is to impose sanctions. Obama stated the following in a speech: ‘I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon’ (Gerges, 2013: 319).

Down the road, Obama is determined to achieve a diplomatic resolution. Obama opens the door to diplomacy in 2015, when he emphasized the achievement of many decades: ‘a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon’ (The White House, 2015). Moreover, ‘this deal is also in line with a tradition of American leadership’ (The White House, 2015). In his statement, America is characterized as an actor which is strong and principled. According to Obama, this deal enables the international

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community to verify Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear ammunition. Specifically, the objective is to cut off every pathway to a nuclear weapon.

Obama explicitly mentions the world without such a deal, meaning ‘there would be no agreed-upon limitations for the Iranian nuclear program’ (The White House, 2015). The sanctions enable the participating countries to achieve a diplomatic resolution. The agreement would allow for lasting constraints on the nuclear program. The absence of such an agreement could imply spill-over effects to other countries which ‘would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs’ (The White House, 2015). At last, he highlights the US national security interest of this deal. He pinpoints his opportunity to ‘veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal’.

Based on the political-administrative nexus which is described above, we can identify a benevolent attitude of the Obama administration in the negotiations of the deal. The administration stresses the necessity of a deal to prevent Iran from expanding its nuclear program. The US strategy towards Iran was part of the Obama-doctrine, as one of the leading actors in Western-Iranian relationships (Gerges, 2013: 321).This so-called role of political leadership is important for foreign policy, as it shapes foreign policy-strategies. As noted before, the relationship between the US and Iran has been very complicated, in comparison to the other participating countries under the agreement. Many of the sanctions imposed on Iran, are originated from the US. For this reason, we focus on the US, due to its dominance and crucial role in the deal. It took many years, negotiations and diplomatic activity to achieve a mutual agreement.

1.3 The role of think tanks in the decision-making process

The JCPOA is an agreement between Germany plus the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the EU and Iran. The plan is part of the 2231 resolution, which is adopted by every member of the Security Council. John Kerry, former Secretary of State represented the US in negotiations and signing the agreement. Many actors have been involved in decision-making process of the JCPOA. Apart from official policy actors, other non-public actors have taken part in the decision-making process. Existing literature dismisses the contribution of epistemic communities in pushing Obama’s strategies forward. More generally, there is a lack of literature on the role of knowledge in decision-making process of such grandiose foreign

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policies. This research’s aim is to fill the void by focusing on three American think tanks as cases. Craft & Howlett’s (2013) theory will form the basis for the theoretical framework. By using their dynamics of policy advice, externalisation and politicisation, the contribution of think tanks to US foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran will be illuminated. The research agenda is to highlight institutional aspects of think tanks that determine the exertion of influence. This research will focus on five elements, in order to shed light on the understudied non-governmental components of policy advisory systems.

This research aims to answer the following question: how and to what extent did think tanks

and its institutional aspects influence the JCPOA deal? The goal of this research is to identify

the role of think tanks and its institutional aspects in the decision-making process of the JCPOA-agreement. To answer this question, three expectations are formulated using existing theories about think tanks. The first expectation relates to think tanks’ positions in knowledge- and policy advisory systems. The expectation is that they have a relevant position in these systems and exert influence on US foreign policy. This policy advisory system is related to the sources of knowledge used by governmental actors in the decision-making process according to Craft & Howlett (2013). The second expectation is that policy advice on the JCPOA-agreement is politicised. This is built on the theory of Craft & Howlett (2013) about the dynamics of policy advisory systems. We will examine to what extent actors outside government exercise influence on the agreement and whether partisan-political aspects of policy advice have displayed non-partisan public sector sources of policy advice (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 188). The third expectation relates to the use of ideological positioning by think tanks as a strategy to exert influence. This implies the strategic use of values to exert influence.

1.4 Research design

In order to answer the research question, relevant data is collected and analysed. This includes official reports from think tanks produced in the time frame of this research (January 2015 till October 2015). This research focuses on three think tanks: Brookings, Heritage Foundation and the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. These think tanks are selected based on their affiliation. The variety of affiliations (academic, university and political) facilitates the comparative approach of this research. This enables us to identify patterns, differences and similarities in the way think tanks exert influence. In addition, we focus on the think tank’s

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institutional aspects such as strategy, communication and affiliation. The general aim is to identify the dynamics between the institutional aspects and the influence that think tanks exert.

A qualitative method is suited to identify these dynamics, more specifically a document analysis including a complementary interview. The think tanks’ reports will serve as our documents to analyse their exertion of influence and to identify the institutional aspects that contribute to their influence. For this reason, this is an X-focus research, as the nature of the think tanks is central and its institutional aspects. The JCPOA-agreement is the outcome (Y), which is the result of the input of the think tanks (X).

1.5 Structure of this research

In the next chapter, we will discuss the research’s theoretical framework which illustrates the dismissal of the contribution of epistemic communities in foreign policy. Especially the dynamics of institutional aspects of think tanks are underexposed in existing literature. The theoretical framework is the base for the formulation of expectations in this research. The methodology chapter will elaborate on the research design and methods which are used to examine think tank influence on foreign policy. In addition, the limitations and validity of this research are discussed in this chapter. Thereafter, the documents and interview will be analysed in accordance with the theoretical framework. After analyzing each case step by step, we will determine how and to what extent the think tanks exerted influence on the final agreement. Furthermore, we will identify the dynamics between institutional aspects of think tanks and their influence. At last, we will bring the analysis to a conclusion with the research’s limitations and recommendations for future research. finally, we will present the research’s main findings in the conclusion.

 

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2.   Theoretical framework

 

2.1 Policy Cycles and think tanks

In this paragraph, we explain the logic behind Howlett, Ramesh and Perl’s (2009) policy cycle model. We use this model as a framework for analysis of public policy processes and the role of domestic policy actors in this cycle. They divide the policy process into five stages: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation. In this research, we particularly focus on the decision-making stage. This is ‘the process by which governments adopt a particular course of action or non-action’ (Howlett; Ramesh; Perl, 2009: 12). In the decision-making phase, the number of actors is reduced to mainly government decision-makers. However, there are various societal actors who influence the policy process. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009: 72) concentrate on think tanks as private organisations and the way they interpret policy options though particular ideological perspectives. They define think tanks as: ‘an independent organisation engaged in multidisciplinary research intended to influence public policy’. Their research is aimed at proposing practical solutions to public problems. Some think-tanks justify their ideological positions through their solutions. Think tanks generally produce partisan knowledge, however they must also maintain an image of intellectual autonomy, in order to be taken seriously by policy-makers. Think tanks differ in generating research solutions that are consistent in their beliefs (Mahmood, 2008: 538). Moreover, think tanks also differ in which phase of the policy cycle they are involved in, according to Abelson (2002). As this research identifies the role of think tanks in the decision-making phase of JCPOA, we examine this phase specifically.

2.2 Think tanks as actors

Craft & Howlett (2013) organize the policy advisory system by the policy content that actors produce. They make a distinction between procedural and substantive content, and short-term and long term focused content. Think tanks fall into the fourth category, which is evidence-based policy-making. They are part of the non-traditional actors which produce substantive, long-term and anticipatory policy content. Berteli & Wenger (2009) describe the dynamics between micro-level demand by congressional members and the supply of think tanks. They

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congressional members in order to enhance the credibility of their arguments (Bertelli, A., Wenger, J., 2009: 241). On a macro-level, Bertelli & Wenger (2009) explain the increasing demand for this policy-analytic kind of information, by partisan polarization in the US congress. Besides the congress, policy entrepreneurs act as strategic actors by investing in the supply of information, resulting in increasing numbers of think tanks.

2.3 Type of think tanks

Mahmood (2008) points out five types of think tanks: universities without students, those contracted by the government, advocacy think tanks, legacy-based think tanks and policy clubs. McGann and Weaver (2000) on the other hand only distinguished four types: academic, contract researchers, advocacy and party affiliated think tanks. In terms of ideology, they can be categorized as conservative, centre-right, centrist, centre-left and progressive (Mahmood, A., 2008: 543).

Mahmood (2008: 535) provides an overview of the types of think tanks by elaborating on four categories: funding, agenda-setting, ideological and research. In the interest of this research, the focus will be on academic think tanks and advocacy think tanks. Academic think tanks are based on diversified funding which can derive from individuals, endowments and grants. Researchers play an important role in the agenda-setting. Their attempt is to not be ideologically oriented and to be a neutral source of information. In general, their research is long-term and future-oriented and their purpose is to supply expertise in social sciences. Their goal is to adhere to disinterested research and serve all of humanity by hiring PhD’s in adjutant positions (Mahmood, 2008: 535).

On the contrast, advocacy think tanks are funded by constituents. They agenda-setting is driven by ideology, which can either be liberal or conservative. Their focus is providing short-term oriented social science expertise. Their expertise is ideologically driven and distributed for stakeholders such as constituents. Their staff are non-permanent publishing PhDs and masters-level graduates (Mahmood, 2008: 535).

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2.3.1 Advocacy think tanks

As mentioned above, the focus of advocacy think tanks differs from academic think tanks. They have a specific marketing strategy aimed at particular audiences, whereas academic think tanks have a more objective approach (Mahmood, 2008: 538). Mahmood (2008) puts the Heritage Foundation forward as an example of an advocacy think tank. In contrast to other ideologically driven think tanks like the Brookings (centre-left), the Heritage is open about their political affiliation. They are more focused on winning the ‘war of ideas’ than producing pure research. They portray their research via the media, to influence policy and public opinion.

2.3.2 Nonpartisan think tanks

As mentioned before, politicisation is a trend within the policy advisory field. Moreover, contemporary politics become increasing partisan and advocacy organisation arise. Hird (2005) critically raises questions whether nonpartisan research still has meaning in contemporary policy advisory systems. He has studied the influence of nonpartisan policy research organisations in multiple states. The results show the significant impact of those policy research organisations on policy making. More specifically, even though nonpartisan policy organisations (NPROs) are part of a highly politicized environment, they still exert influence. They mainly offer information and analysis to decision-makers and consequently influence public policy outcomes (Hird, 2005: 83). They are perceived to be able to conduct longer-term research and being respected by the legislature. One of the most interesting findings of Hird (2005) was the perceived influence of NPROs by Republicans. They tend to believe that larger and stronger NPROs have less influence (Hird, 2005: 98).

2.4 Externalisation and politicisation

Craft & Howlett (2013) focus on the change in policy advisory systems, which is uncovered by past research on policy advice. Policy advisory systems derive from decision-making processes where advice is also given by a range of other actors, aside from professional analysts. These actors can be think tanks, scientific experts and other actors which are (not) government affiliated. Next to the studies on the actors involved in these systems, they provide an overview

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of the impact of those actors on government decisions and policy outcomes (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 187). Moreover, the dynamics within such systems is crucial to grasp as there is a variation of actors involved and their relationships evolve over time. The changes in policy advisory systems can be categorized by two dimensions. The first dimension is externalization, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. The second dimension politicisation will be specified further on.

Externalisation is to what extent outside actors influence the government. The advice of these outside actors is taken into account in case three separate locational components collide: the supply of policy advice, the demand of decision-makers and brokers who take advantages to match the first two components in a situation (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 188). The supply of policy advice originates from knowledge producers, which can be located in for example universities and research institutes. Proximate decision makers constitute the demand and consume policy advise. The third set serves as an intermediate between knowledge producers and consumers. They can adjust the information and data from the producers in order to make it usable for decision makers. Moreover, in the process of adjusting the data, they include others actors such as think tanks and interest groups (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 188).

In de past, internal knowledge producers were assumed to be primary influencers, as they officially take part the decision-making stage. However, decision-makers’ priority has shifted towards the use of external advice. This development can be categorized as the increasing externalization of policy advise (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 189). This shift has consequences for the nature of the relationship between the state and society, governmental authority and responsiveness as traditional hierarchical and vertical relationships have made room for a more pluralized advisory landscape. These external forms of policy advisory content is used to substantiate existing policy positions or as alternative source of advice. This source of new advice can secure expansion of political control and responsiveness of the administration. The use of exogenous sources of policy advice breaks with the perceived monopoly of advice that originates from the public sector (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 190).

Politicisation is to what extent non-partisan public sector sources of policy advice have made room for more partisan oriented political advice (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 188). This partisan oriented advice is provided by non-governmental sources, for example think tanks which are affiliated with political parties. This advice supports existing policy preferences or a certain

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political policy agenda. The dominant idea of objective and technical advice dominated the field of policy advice, this is a positivist approach which contrasts with more political and partisan-ideological approaches. There used to be a clear distinction between political and administrative affairs. The administrative side is related to technical, objective and rational analysis of policies. The political side is concerned with the electoral or media consequences of a certain policy (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 191). To what extent these sides converge and advice becomes more politicised, differs by country and sector.

2.5 Think tanks and ideology

As mentioned before, think tanks are generally more partisan and ideologically motivated (Howlett; Ramesh; Perl, 2009: 72). By proposing certain policy solutions, they justify their ideological or interest-driven positions. In addition, they target their research and recommendations to those politicians who support their ideas (Abelson, 2002). In the last section, we elaborated on the dynamics of politicisation. Throughout the production of partisan policy advice, think tanks try to shape the policy preferences of decision-makers. Some politically affiliated think tanks produce ideologically driven research for targeted audiences. They are concerned with the publications of their findings, preferably in the media. These findings are a quick response to policy crisis and produced on short term (Howlett; Ramesh; Perl, 2009: 73). Two out of three tanks, Brookings and the Belfer Centre, classify themselves as independent and academic. However, existing literature on the Brookings does identify some ideologically driven ideas in the Brookings reports. Heritage is very open about its conservative ideology and beliefs. For this reason, we expect to find ideologically driven ideas in the think tank’s reports to maximize its influence. Moreover, we expect the Heritage to produce research targeted at its conservative audience as a strategy.

2.6 Policy advice content

Prasser (2006: 16) provides a framework for labeling the content of policy advice. Rather than making the distinction between political and non-political content, he makes use of ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ categories. He describes the role of bureaucrats and academic experts as providers of ‘cold’ advice. This is defined as factually based and long-term oriented. ‘Hot’ advice on the other hand, is provided for ministers and their minders, which is about the political

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consequences of certain policy proposals. There is a tendency towards this type of advice, rather than focusing on rational policy proposals. In the table below, the categories are clarified.

Table 1: Hot and cold advice (Prasser, 2006)

Rational (cold) advice Political (hot) advice

Information based Relies on fragmented information, gossip

Research used Opinion/ideologically based

Independent/neutral and problem solving Partisan/biased and about winning

Long term Short term

Proactive and anticipatory Reactive/crisis driven Strategic and wide range/systemic Single issues

Idealistic Pragmatic

Public interest focus Electoral gain oriented

Open processes Secret/deal making

Objective clarity Ambiguity/overlapping goals

Seek/propose best solution Consensus solution

Prasser (2006: 17) provides various explanations for the replacement of rational advice by other less-rational approaches. Firstly, ideology and beliefs play an important role in government behaviour, especially in the beginning of an administration. New governments are more likely to rely on ideology rather than analytical perspectives. Secondly, party politics prevent rational policies from being pursued, as they can contradict. The second explanation depends on the first one, as highly ideological parties feel more urge to pursue these party politics. Thirdly, departmental politics can cause rivalries and competitiveness among agencies on various policy issues. Agencies compete for a greater share of the budget and more control over policy areas, consequently their focus is on the policy that helps them pursue these goals (Prasser, 2006: 18). Fourthly, organisational factors (or group-think) prevent alternative viewpoints from being considered. These factors avert innovative thinking by holding on to hierarchy and groupthink. Fifthly, policy-making is a practice which is based on irrational and illogical thinking. Many governments make decisions based on ideas, instead of conducting a profound analysis. Lastly, economic factors determine a great deal of the policy options, as budget constraints dominate government behaviour. These limitations demand compromise and more economical policies. These explanations are ranked towards the extent of analysis, options and resources that are

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considered. The more the first explanation ideology is dominant, the less analysis is conducted. On the other hand, the more economic factors come into play, the more analysis is being conducted.

2.7 Expectations

Based on the theoretical framework, three expectations were formulated. Although think tanks can exert influence in various stages of the policy cycle, we focus specifically on the decision-making stage. Think tanks operate as policy producers in policy-advisory systems. This research aims to shed light on institutional factors of think tanks; its position in the political-administrative nexus, how they communicate their research, their strategy and the content of their research. Our expectations build on the dynamics of policy advisory systems (externalisation and politicisation) and ideological positioning. The expectations are as follows:

1.   Think tanks are expected to have a relevant position in knowledge- and policy advisory systems due to their institutional aspects.

2.   Think tanks are expected to produce content which is politicised or partisan-ideologically driven.

3.   Think tanks are supposed to exert influence due to their use of strategic ideological positioning.

We expect think tanks to exert influence on the final agreement by providing policy advice. The relevance of institutional factors in this influence will be identified by examining the reports and interview. The ultimate goal of this research to fill the research gap by identifying these institutional factors and the role of think tanks in American foreign policy.

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3.   Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this research, we explore an understudied-researched topic of non-governmental actors within the foreign policy field. Craft & Howlett (2013) have introduced two dimensions of change in policy advisory systems, which we elaborate on in this research. We address both politicisation (the content related dimension) and externalization (the non-content related dimension). The content related dimension is related to non-partisan public sector sources of policy advice, which have made room for partisan-political aspects within policy advisory systems. This part of the research focuses specifically on the content of policy advice, meaning whether it is partisan or non-partisan. The content-part entails the examination of institutional aspects of think tanks that influence content-related aspects of policy advice. This dimension is explored throughout the analysis of policy documents, by assessing these documents we identify the supposed changing nature of policy advice. These institutional aspect compasses the nature of think tanks, which can either be politically or university affiliated in this research. The non-content related dimension is related to policy advisory system dynamics. By focusing on this dimension, we aim at establishing a cause-and-effect relationship. This relationship entails the influence of actors outside government, in this case think thanks, on foreign policy. The dynamics of externalisation are identified in the light of the process of coming to the Iran deal. Apart from establishing a general cause-and-effect relationship concerning external advisory actors, we focus on the role of the nature of think tanks, consequently the influence they exert. Past research has focused on content-related dimensions exclusively, therefore we include a non-content related component in this research. By adding this component, this research does not solely examine the content of the advice, also their impact on policymaking due to their affiliation. The increasing partisan nature of think tanks (Abelson, 2002: 11) plays a significant role in policy making, threating the survival of nonpartisan research, in a changing policymaking environment (Hird, 2005: 85). For this reason, the case will be the Iran deal, more specifically the process of decision-making in the United States. This decision-making process takes place within the Obama administration and is highly politicised. Due to this political environment, it is particularly interesting to research whether and to what extent external political actors influence the decision-making process and what role they nature plays.

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3.2 Qualitative approach

This research has a qualitative approach and data have been gathered through documents. The research question we aim to answer is: how and to what extent do think tanks influence the

decision-making process of JCPOA? We will examine documents that derive from three think

tanks. Due to the research’s focus on American foreign policy, we drew a sample of three different types of think tanks. The sample consists of a variety of think tanks, who’s political and philosophical orientation differs. The units of analysis are the Belfer Centre (university affiliated), the Heritage Foundation (politically affiliated) and the Brookings Institution (academically affiliated). The selection of three tanks allows for a profound analysis of external political influence on decision-making processes. The think tanks vary in political orientation and the Belfer Centre is academically affiliated (not politically). In order to grasp the extent of influence of think tanks on the decision-making in general, the selection is based on the presumed influential status of the think tanks. The variation in political orientation allows for a comparative approach in the influence they exert based on their political orientation or academic affiliation. The selection is based on the comparative approach of the research.

3.3 Documents and interview

Throughout a comparative case study, we aim at identifying differences, similarities and patterns across three cases. These cases are three Washington D.C based think tanks, which have a common focus of exerting influence on foreign policy. This research design allows us to produce knowledge about causal relationships and is amenable to generalisation. Our approach is qualitative, using a document analysis with a complementary interview. The document analysis entailed official, ongoing records of the think tanks’ activities, during a specific time frame. The time frame dated back to the 27th of September 2013, which was the first high level of contact between the United States and Iran since 1979 (Armscontrol, 2020). The timeline ended at the adoption of the JCPOA in October 2015, after years of negotiations and coming to an agreement. The analysis focused on documents that where aimed at influencing the decision-making process or advising about policy options. A majority of the analysed documents were written in the lead up to the Congressional vote on the JCPOA deal. The documents have been written as reports that debated, analysed and made recommendations about the deal. The selection of documents was based on the time line and the nature of the

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documents. We specifically filtered on official reports on the Iran deal published on its website. This contained only official, publicly communicated reports of think tank experts. They were retrieved throughout the think tank’s websites throughout the search term ‘Iran deal’. Thereafter, a selection was made to find reports that were written in the process of coming to an agreement.

3.4 Data collection

Firstly, we collected documents on the Brookings’s website. We made use of the search engine by clicking on ‘search’ in the webpage’s right corner. We made use of the key words ‘Iran deal’ and selected the content type ‘report’. In addition, we selected the topic ‘U.S Foreign Policy’ and the research program ‘Centre for Middle East Policy’. This search retrieved two relevant documents within our time frame. We selected the first two documents ‘The West and the Middle East after the Iran nuclear deal’ and ‘Debating the Iran nuclear deal: A former American negotiator outlines the battleground issues’.

Secondly, we collected the Heritage’s documents on its website. We made use of the search engine by clicking on ‘explore issues’ in its webpage. We made use of the key words ‘Iran deal’ and the filter type ‘report’. In addition, we refined the results by the date range (January 2015 till October 2015). The first report related to the key issues of the Iran deal and is published before the official announcement. We selected the second report on the topic of Iran nuclear negotiations as this relates to the decision-making stage.

Thirdly, we collected the Belfer Centre’s documents on its website. We made use of the search engine in the right corner. We made use of the key words ‘Iran deal’ and the filter publication ‘report’. This retrieved the first hit ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal’ about the key issues of the deal. The second report is ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide’ to inform the Congress and public before the start of the review period.

In order to complement the data that derive from the documents, an interview with the Belfer Centre has been conducted. This serves the goal of contextualizing independent think tanks in an administrative-political environment. The interview is appended below this research. Due to the understudied independent nature of think tanks and their position in a competitive climate, a more in-depth approach is essential for understanding the role of external knowledge in

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foreign policy. The in-depth interview with the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs was arranged through a contact inquiry on its website. Consequently, an one-on-one online interview with a representative was conducted that consisted of five open questions. The questions are aimed at retrieving data about the communication of the report, the independent nature of the think tank and its involvement in the policy cycle. The document analysis on its own does not identify the political and institutional conditions under which think tanks in de United States are successful to influence policy preferences and choices of decision-makers. The complementary interview furthers the research by unboxing ‘the black box of decision-making’ (Abelson, 2006: 131), as it connects policy inputs from think tanks to policy outputs. Policy input is defined by the strategies think tanks use to influence the public arena and policy cycles.

3.5 Method

The approach to analyzing the qualitative data will be inductive, as it aims at developing a theory. We concentrate on the role of external actors in the foreign policy field, in the light of both content and non-content related dimensions. This procedure is used to identify patterns in the mediums, which are think tank’s reports, documentation and the interview. The criteria of inclusion is that the reports should be related to the decision-making process of the Iran deal, within the specific time frame, that derive from the three cases (think tanks).

In this comparative study, the content of the documents will be analysed throughout the categories that are established based on the theoretical framework. Consequently, the main purposes, messages and nature of the produced reports are classified. The first goal is to find patterns in how the reports are communicated towards the public and decision-makers, in what stage of the policy cycle they are involved in and their strategy. These factors are aimed at developing a causal relationship between the produced reports and the final agreement. The extent of externalization within the foreign policy field of the United States is explained by these factors.

The second goal is to identify their position in the political-administrative nexus, the essence of the reports and key message or sentiment. The extent of substantive politicisation is explained by the essence of the report, which entails ‘an action intended to, or having the effect

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2008: 343). Instead of using the terms political and non-political, we use the distinction ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ as it captures the temporal nature of advice (Craft & Howlett, 2013: 192). This approach elaborates on Craft & Howlett’s (2013: 193) content-focused research, which implies that influence is product of the nature of policy advice and the given issue. For this reason, we focus on how the nature of think tanks affects the nature of the given advice on foreign policy towards Iran.

Ultimately, we formulated five elements that measure the extent of externalization and politicisation of advice within the foreign policy field. We will examine the data based on the following five elements:

Figure 1: five elements of externalization and politicisation

The first element entails the position in the political-administrative nexus, which is determined by Mahmood’s (2008) findings on think tanks. This includes the think tanks’ ideological- and political position, affiliation and typology. The second element is the communication of the document, which can be public, directly granted to decision-makers or combined (Mahmood, 2008). We define public as an online, accessible source that is published on the think tank’s website. The think tanks’ strategies are determined based on Abelson’s framework (2006: 148). Their strategies can be aimed at exercising public influence, private influence and the media. This includes their short or long term focus, the lengthiness of the reports and their use of

Position in political-administrative nexus Communication of the document The think tank’s strategy The content of

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ideological positioning. The light blue elements represent the content-related analysis. The content of the document is found on Prasser’s (2006) and Craft & Howlett’s typology (2013: 194). A distinction is made between rational cold advice and political hot advice. The key message and sentiment is based on their efforts that are undertaken by the think tanks. Their message can be to do X, to not do X or to maintain the status quo.

3.6 Reliability & validity

As mentioned above, the data collection methods are a document analysis along with a complementary interview. This is the most suitable approach to answer our research question:

how and to what extent do think tanks and its institutional aspects influence the decision-making process of JCPOA? It allows us to evaluate the documents that derive from the think tanks in

such a way, that empirical knowledge is produced and understanding of their influence is developed (Bowen, 2009: 33). In the process of evaluation, a high level of objectivity and sensitivity is safeguarded, in order to assure the credibility and validity of the research. Document analysis is an unobtrusive data collection method, as documents are stable, non-reactive data sources that are not influenced by the presence of the researcher (Bowen, 2009: 31). Moreover, the systematic method increases the replicability by other researchers.

Despite the advantages of document analysis, it is crucial to underpin the shortcomings of document analysis. The main limitation of document analysis is the exclusion and selection of documents. This can result in a fragmentary type of source. Thus, we retrieved alternative sources, to limit possible differences between the sample and the entire population. Despite of these alternative sources, other non-official documents could have retrieved other data This threat to the internal validity is present, as we do not have access to such non-official document such as informal meetings between decision-makers and think tanks. Despite the interview with the Belfer Centre, we were not able to conduct more interviews. Moreover, content analysis have subjective characteristics. Consequently, the reliability and validity of the results and conclusions can be affected. In this research, we protect the reliability by triangulating different sources and examining the correspondence of these sources. The document analysis singularly does not acquire sufficient information about independent and university-affiliated think tanks. We fill this gap by relying on an additional source, by conducting an interview with the Belfer Centre. In conclusion, we aim at providing a clear research process that includes evaluative

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4.   Analysis

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the collected data will be summarized and analysed. Firstly, we provide an overview of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the agreement between Iran, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (plus Germany) and the European Union. Secondly, we will analyse the five elements per think tanks: position in political-administrative nexus, communication of the report, the think tank’s strategy, the content of the document and key message. In order to examine these elements, we use a document analysis and the data that derives from the interview with the Belfer Centre. Thirdly, the results will be presented in tables and examined after the analysis. Our analysis is designed to determine patterns or trends in the data. The formulated expectations will either be confirmed or rejected in the last part of the analysis. At last, we will make causal inferences and describe the expected similarities and differences between the cases, by the use of analytical reasoning. These causal inferences concern the concept of influence and think tanks’ institutional aspects with American foreign policy. We end this chapter with an conclusion.

4.2 Explanation of the JCPOA-deal

The JCPOA-agreement (next: Iran deal) is the result of 20 months of negotiations and is perceived as a historic foreign policy deal (Obama white house, 2015). The White House states in its report on JCPOA that the deal ‘will verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon’. This is the key message of the White House about the deal. For this research, we need a more in-depth analysis of the components of the deal.

The first component is related to the production of nuclear weapon with plutonium. The Iran deal enforces the removal of Iran’s heavy water reactor including filling it with concrete. The United States takes part in the international partnership which has the power to approve or disapprove the plan to redesign and rebuild the reactor. In this way, Iran will be restrained from the production of weapons-grade plutonium (White House, 2015: 5). Moreover, it needs to ship out all spent fuel for present and future power and research reactors and will not be able to build additional heavy water reactors for 15 years. It can solely rely on light water for future nuclear reactors.

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The second component is the prohibition of the production of a nuclear weapon through uranium enrichment. The first obligation is to remove two-thirds of its centrifuges which enrich uranium. The IAEA supervises the dismantlement and removal of the pipework. The production of highly enriched uranium at the Fordow facility has been made impossible, it can only operate the centrifuges at Natanz. The use of its first generation centrifuges is exclusively allowed for enrichment purposes. Moreover, Iran is obligated to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent for the next 15 years, which does not suffice to build any nuclear weapon. When Iran breaks its commitments under the agreement, the breakout timeline will delay its opportunity to acquire fissile material to build a nuclear weapon. This breakout timeline also accounts for an actual warhead that would be capable to deliver a nuclear payload (White House, 2015: 5).

The third component of the agreement is verification. The main principle of the agreement is an extensive and intrusive verification regime. As the White House’s report states, ‘there will be 24/7 monitoring of Iran’s key declared nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow and Arak’ (White House, 2015: 6). The verification regimes is founded on five pillars:

-   International inspectors are allowed to access Iran’s complete nuclear supply chain. This includes all critical elements for the next 25 years.

-   A procurement channel will be monitor and approve all supply, sale or transfer nuclear related activities as a transparency measure.

-   Iran is obligated to address its military dimensions, else it will not be relieved from sanctions.

-   Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which allows the IAEA to access any undeclared nuclear locations.

-   The participating countries can force Iran to grant the IAEA access to any location within 24 days, in case they form a majority.

The last component relates to the lifted sanctions under the agreement. The parties agreed that Iran will not be granted any relief, until it has verifiably reduces its program. There is an expected time span of six months to a year in which Iran can complete its nuclear steps. In case of a violation of the deal, sanctions can be imposed by the allies. The United States has chosen to preserve unilateral sanctions which are not related to nuclear activity (for example terrorism

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reinstate multilateral sanctions in case Iran violates the deal payload (White House, 2015: 8). This resolution also reinstates sanctions related to the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies.

4.3 Analysis of each think tank’s documents

In the analysis, we will discuss the think tanks’ documents separately. We will conduct the analysis based on the 5 elements that are founded upon the theoretical framework. Thereafter, we will provide an overview of the results and their implications.

4.3.1 Brookings

According to the Brookings’s website, it is a nonprofit public policy organisation based in Washington D.C (Brookings, 2020). Their mission is ‘to conduct in-depth research that leads to new ideas for solving problems facing society at the local, national and global level’. Their government and academic experts provide quality research, policy recommendations and analysis in various policy domains. For this research, we make use of its official reports within a specific timeframe. We selected the sources on this date range, official report content and directed at the decision-making process of the Iran deal. Our search yield two official reports, from the beginning of the nuclear deal in January 2015 till Adoption Day (18th of October 2015). Based on the theoretical framework combined with the documents, we will analyse the five elements: position in the political-administrative nexus and policy cycle, communication of the reports, the think tank’s strategy, the content and key message of the reports. The interview provides complementary data on the Belfer Centre in the third paragraph.

4.3.2 Position in the political-administrative nexus and policy cycle

First, we will determine the Brookings’s position in the political-administrative nexus founded on Mahmood’s framework. According to Mahmood (2008), think tanks can be examined by three categories: affiliation, organisational structure (and culture) and political-philosophical orientation. The Brookings Institution can be defined as academic think tank, which organisational type is diversified. Its position in the political-administrative nexus is politically affiliated. Although it does not publicly communicates its ideological position, their position is liberal and its produces ideologically driven research (Mahmood, 2008: 536). The Brookings

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prefers to maintain the appearance of nonpartisanship, instead of exposing their centre-left orientation (Mahmood, 2008: 540). Their purpose is to supply social science expertise to policy makers and the content is (Mahmood, 2008: 535). However, Brookings can be regarded as an hybrid as they are considered to be left-leaning and they systematically deny their ideological position. Their research topics are (not intentionally) based on ideological considerations. Their in-house researchers determine the research agenda together with the board of trustees which have the right to veto projects that do no serve the Brookings’s goals (Mahmood, 2008: 537). Their staff can be categorized as a ‘university without student’, as it consists of academics.

In terms of their position in phase(s) of the policy cycle, we make use of Howlett, Ramesh and Perl’s (2009) framework. We distinguish five policy phases: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation and policy evaluation. Our time line begins at the end policy formulation stage, which dates back to January 2015. After this date, the decision-making phase is initiated. In this phase, various policy options are considered by makers. In this phase, think tanks are aimed at exerting influence on the decision-making process. This exertion of influence translates into the dissemination of their research, via various methods. This expert information includes basics about various policies: how they work, possible alternatives, costs versus benefits and consequences.

The reports by the Brookings are published on the 25th of July (the West and Iran after the nuclear deal) and the 12th of August. These publication dates fall in the decision-making phase and are aimed to exert influence on the final agreement. The content of the reports is focused on considering various aspects of the Iran deal. The first report is about the underlying goals of the agreement and how to ‘set up an inclusive security governance structure in the Gulf’ (Alcaro, 2015). The second report was written after the final agreement on 14th of July and is aimed at informing the Congress to vote on the agreement (Einhorn, 2015). In the reports, the Brookings’ experts outline the issues of coming to an agreement and the Congressional vote on the JCPOA. Even though think tanks are not formally involved in the policy-making process, their actions are directed at exerting influence. The Brookings’ involvement is in the decision-making phase of the policy cycle.

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4.3.3 Communication of the reports

Besides providing information and knowledge, think tanks are concerned with publishing their research. According to Mahmood (2008), think tanks use various methods to wide spread their research. The Brookings uses both publications and the media as means to exert influence on the decision-making on the Iran deal. The report was published before the Congressional vote and explained the key issues of the Iran deal. It is targeted at the Congress, to prepare them to vote on the agreement (Einhorn, 2015). The report on Western-Iranian relationships was written by a visiting fellow of the Brookings and was published by the Instituto Affari Internazionari. In such manner, the Brookings operates as a highly productive publishing house in collaboration with other institutes. In addition, the Brookings published the report on its website. It publishes a large range of information online, to reach an extensive public. The Brookings organizes for example an online debate on how the Congress should vote on the deal.

4.3.4 The Brookings’s strategy

Think tanks rely on various strategies to shape policy preferences and the decision-making process (Abelson, 2014: 127). The brooking has a cross-disciplinary approach to policies. Instead of managing areas of specialized expertise, they prefer an interdisciplinary approach to cross-cutting issues (Mahmood, 2008: 537). Their research programs are not territorially bounded and are characterized by topic: economic studies, foreign policy, global economy and development, governance studies and metropolitan policy program (Brookings, 2020b). Additionally, its strategy is long-term focused and proactive. It does not respond to day-to-day policy issues and executes research project within their permanent areas of expertise. The foundation of their permanent research topics and academic staff is in line with their institutional goal: independence. The Brookings is focused on maintaining the public’s view on its institutional independence, as it does not acknowledges its centre-left ideologically driven research.

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4.3.5 The content of the reports including the type of advice

In this paragraph, we will discuss the content of the Brookings’s reports. In the first, we will briefly point out its main arguments. In the second, we will examine the content centered on Prasser’s (2006) typology of policy advice.

The first report is written by Riccardo Alcaro, a visiting fellow at the Brookings, who debates the relationship between the West and the Middle East After the Nuclear deal (Istitutio Affari Internazionali, 2015). The report discusses the necessary and complementary action of the US in relation to Iran. Instead of focusing on containment, pressure should be exerted on Iran to engage in a dialogue along with the Sunni Arab states. In order for the US to achieve long-term stability, the following actions should be undertaken:

•   The US should contrast Iranian activities that foment sectarianism in the Sunni Arab states

•   The US should initiate a regional governance structure

•   By creating this security governance structure, incremental engagement on other issues can be facilitated

•   In order to engage Iran in such a governance structure, the US should engage in interaction with Iraq, Syria and the Gulf

The content of the report can be classified as rational (cold) advice based on Prasser’s (2008) framework. The report is has a clear long-term focus on stability in the Middle east. Moreover, the policy advice is strategic, as it provides neutral and problem solving recommendations on how to engage with the Sunni Arab states. Although the content is based on Alcaro’s opinion, the report is predominantly rational and ‘cold’ as it is research and information based. There is a dominant idealistic undertone in the report, as its ultimate goal is stability throughout an inclusive security governance structure.

The second report is written by Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow at the Brookings. The essence of the report is outlining the battleground issues in the Congress’s debate. Brookings discusses the following six issues:

•   Iran’s nuclear program after the deal’s first decade

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•   The significance of restrictions on conventional arms transfers and ballistic missile activities

•   The implications of sanction relief •   The consequences of rejecting the deal

The Brookings recommends the following actions by the United States to minimize the battleground issues (Brookings, 2015):

•   Regarding Iran’s nuclear status in the out years: ‘the United States should adopt a firm public policy aimed at deterring a future Iranian decision to cross the threshold and build nuclear weapons’.

•   Regarding the military dimensions: ‘United States should make detection of any future Iranian weaponization activities a high priority for U.S. intelligence; enforce strictly JCPOA restrictions on Iranian procurement of weaponization-related equipment; and encourage the IAEA to remain focused on the weaponization issue as it implements the Additional Protocol in Iran and develops its “broader conclusion” on the nature of Iran’s nuclear program that will provide the basis for a future congressional decision on terminating U.S. nuclear-related statutory sanctions.’

•   Regarding the IAEA’s access: ‘the United States should press for the most expeditious implementation of the JCPOA’s access procedures; share intelligence with the IAEA and its Joint Commission partners on suspect activities and on possible efforts by Iran to sanitize suspect sites; and be prepared to go directly to the U.N. Security Council, without waiting for IAEA access, when warranted by the seriousness and time-urgency of illicit Iranian activities.’

•   Regarding the restrictions: ‘The United States should take a number of steps to reinforce restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles’.

•   Regarding the sanctions: ‘United States should actively build support at the outset for rigorous enforcement of compliance’.

•   Regarding the Iran’s use of funds: ‘the United States, working with its regional partners, should closely monitor and be prepared to counter Iranian efforts to arm, train, and fund its proxies throughout the Middle East’.

The content of the report can be classified as rational (cold) advice. The report is information and research based, with an idealistic and public interest focus. It provides a balanced overview of advocates and opponents of the deal. Moreover, it has an proactive and anticipatory

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character, as the report was written in the summer recess in advance to the Congressional vote. It focus is on objective clarity and seeking the best solution which entails closing the deal and not pursuing ‘better deal’ in the future. The majority of the arguments have a long-term focus and are neutral and problem solving.

4.3.6 The key message and sentiment of the reports

As our findings on the content of the reports show, the Brookings produces rational and cold advice about the Iran deal. The first report’s key message is the need for a dialogue between the US and the Sunni Arab states, to create an inclusive security governance structure. The sentiment of the report is to look further than the agreement on its own, as the deal ‘will not turn Iran into a partner of the West anytime soon’(Istitutio Affari Internazionali, 2015: 1). A governance structure is a pre-condition to restore long-term stability in the Middle east. The Iran deal on its own cannot achieve such a long-term orientated ambition. The report is overall cautious about the Iran deal and what the US aims to achieve with it. The Iran deal serves the goal of containment, however pressure is necessary to secure stability.

The second report focused on the battleground issues of the deal. Its key message is that the Iran deal is imperfect but a worthy deal (Einhorn, 2015). The deal will likely achieve the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The terms of the deal could have been more extensive, however those ideal outcomes are not realizable or necessary for the Iran deal to succeed. The sentiment of the report is realistic, as it acknowledges the deal’s flaws and strengths. It clearly states that a ‘better deal’ in the future is an illusion.

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4.4.1 The Heritage Foundation

According to the Heritage’s website, its mission is ‘building an America where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish’ (Heritage, 2020). They formulate and promote conservative public policies. They pursue this mission by: ‘performing timely, accurate research on key policy issues and effectively marketing these findings to our primary audiences: members of Congress, key congressional staff members, policymakers in the executive branch, the nation’s news media, and the academic and policy communities’ (Heritage, 2020). As mentioned before, we make use of the Heritage’s official reports within the date range. Our search retrieved two reports, the first report relates to the key issues of the Iran deal and the second one applies to the decision-making process in the Congress. First, we will analyse the Heritage’s position in the political-administrative nexus and policy cycle, communication of the reports and the think tank’s strategy. Secondly, we will discuss the content of the document and the key message (sentiment) of the reports.

4.4.2 Position in the political-administrative nexus and policy cycle

First, we will determine the Heritage’s position in the political-administrative nexus based on Mahmood’s (2008) framework. The Heritage Foundation’s organisational type can be characterized as a policy enterprise. As its website states: ‘as policy entrepreneurs, we believe the most effective solutions are consistent with those ideas and principles’. As an advocacy think tanks, their focus is to provide information on issues that arise on short-term (Mahmood, 2008: 538). They market information and distribute it promptly to targeted audiences such as the media and policy makers. The Heritage’s position in the political-administrative nexus is politically affiliated. In opposition to the Brookings, the Heritage openly communicates it political orientation. It produces ideologically driven research, it describes itself as the nation’s largest, most broadly-supported conservative research and educational institution (Heritage, 2020). Their principles are: free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values and a strong national defense. It is open about their political orientation, however it has organised its funding system in such a way that it does not rely on one contributor. Consequently, it has maintained its public perception of being independent. This independence differs from other think tanks’ definitions of independence, which implies not being politically affiliated (Mahmood, 2008: 539). At last, one of their battle is to win the war

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of ideas, instead of conducting objective and pure research. Their aim is to spread and promote their conservative ideas.

The Heritage Foundation is involved in the decision-making phase of the policy cycle. We selected two reports from the Heritage that relate to the key issues of the Iran deal and the decision-making process. The first report dates back to the 10th of February, in the beginning of the decision-making phase. In this phase, policy-makers were concerned with negotiating out the deal, Heritage publishes this report in order to shed light on the key issues of a possible deal. In its second report on the 16th of July, the Heritage emphases the concessions the US has made after closing the deal. In this period, Heritage anticipated on the Congressional review by publishing this report.

4.4.3 Communication of the reports

Apart from producing knowledge, think tanks are concerned with disseminating their research and influencing policy and public opinion (Mahmood, 2008: 539). The Heritage is one of the first to set their online presence in motion and can therefore classified as an ‘marketing machine’. Their extensive online platform is created to inform its targeted audience (conservatives) and to quickly respond to day-to-day policy issues. The first report was written by an in-house senior research fellow of Heritage, and refers to others types of sources. In this way, Heritage comments on other media sources to portray its opinion and to gain more media exposure. The second report was written by a senior scholar of the National Institute for Public Policy, exclusively for Heritage. The Heritage has communicated the reports throughout a publication on its website.

4.4.4 The Heritage’s strategy

The Heritage is concerned with day-to-day policy issues and influencing current policy debates. Its strategy is therefore short-term orientated, in contrast to the Brookings long-term and proactive approach. Their staff policy relies on this principle, as their researchers are full-time employed and have no other ideological beliefs than the Heritage. Moreover, its strategy is based on three principles: effective research (timely, accurate research on key policy issues), communication (effectively marketing of their findings to primary audiences) and solutions

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(founded on their conservative ideology). Its reports are generally brief (one to two pages), in order to promptly take part in current debates. As the second report is targeted at the Congress, its size is minimalized due to the need of generating timely and relevant policy research. According to Abelson (2014: 137), this is the idea behind the Heritage’s quick-response policy research. It prefers winning the ‘war of ideas’ over producing pure research (Mahmood, 2008: 539). In opposition to Brookings, Heritage creates solutions for policy issues according to their beliefs.

4.4.5 The content of the reports including the type of advice

In this section, we will discuss the content of the reports and the type of advice that is provided by Heritage on the Iran deal. The first report is about the key issues of the Iran deal. The article summarizes the Heritage’s publications about Iran-related issues (Heritage, 2015) Its main arguments are:

-   The Obama administration should sanction Iran, not Israel -   No deal is a good deal

-   The nuclear negotiations with Iran are difficult -   It prefers a delayed deal over a ‘bad’ deal

-   The US should not rush to make a deal, this shall lead to failure -   Iran cannot be trusted to defeat ISIS

-   A strategic relationship is a ‘bad bargain’ -   The US needs to maximize pressure on Iran

The Heritage recommends the following action in order to limit Iran’s nuclear activities: -   The Obama administration should sanction Iran the enemy, rather than alienating Israel

the ally

-   If the terms of the deal do not serve the US, a deal should not be closed -   Five major problems should be address before negotiations take place:

•Iran has been able to legitimize its once-covert nuclear program.

•Iran has won sanctions relief disproportionate to the minor concessions it has accepted.

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